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HUMAN RESOURCESADVANCED LEADERS COURSE

42A

Perform Joint HR Operations

LESSON PLAN

Version 5.9

November 2019

U.S. ARMY SOLDIER SUPPORT INSTITUTENoncommissioned Officer Academy

Human Resources Advanced Leaders Course

Perform Joint HR Operations

LESSON PLAN

Lesson Author: AG Branch, ITDDate prepared: January 2013Last update: November 2019

1. SCOPE: Perform Joint HR Operations is a 6.5-hour lesson. The purpose of this lesson is to examine the structure, organization and responsibilities of joint operations.

This lesson builds on previous studies of:

Coordinating Personnel Support Deliver Essential Personnel Services Provide HR Services Implement Man the Force

Students will reach the following lesson outcomes through assigned readings, actively participating in class, and completing the practical exercise:

Identify joint service structure and organization Determine roles and responsibilities for providing personnel support to joint

operations Identify elements and requirements of a Joint Task Force Headquarters

2. LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

This lesson supports TLO5, Provide Input to HR Planning and Operations. In addition this lesson supports or reinforces the following ELOs:

Conduct Unit Postal Operations

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ELO 5.1:Action: Perform Joint HR Operations

Condition: Mid-grade HR Leaders in a classroom environment working individually and as a member of a small group, using doctrinal and administrative publications, practical exercises, case studies, personal experience, handouts, discussion and an awareness of the Operational Environment (OE) variables and actors.

Standard: Application includes:

1. Identifying the organization and functions of Joint Operations.

2. Identifying the roles and responsibilities for providing personnel support to Joint Operations.

3. Identifying key elements and requirements of a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

4. Applying principles of personnel support to Joint Operations.

Learning Domain: Cognitive

Level of Learning: Application

3. STUDENT PREREQUISITE WORK:

a. Study Requirements:

Study: JP 1, Chapter I JP1-0

Read:

1) AR 600-8-22 Chapter 1, 2, 3, 92) JP 3-0, Chapter IV3) FM 3-0, CHAPTER 5

Review: DoD Directive 5100.01, Enclosure 3 (6 pages)

Scan: None

b. Bring to class: NA

c. Be prepared to answer or discuss the following:

1) Organization and structure of joint operations2) Manpower and personnel (J-1) responsibilities3) Joint Task Force Headquarters elements and requirements

4. INSTRUCTOR ADDITIONAL READING(S)/MATERIAL: N/A

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5. TRAINING AIDS, REFERENCES, AND RESOURCES:

a. JP 1 (March 2013)b. DoDD 5100.01 (December 2010)c. JP 3-0 (August 2011)d. JP 1-0 (October 2011)e. AR 600-8-22 (June 2015)f. Appendix A: Assessment Plang. Appendix B: Slides

6. CONDUCT OF LESSONS:

a. Lesson Timeline:

20 minutes Concrete Experience20 minutes Publish and Process50 minutes Generalize New Information10 minutes Break50 minutes Generalize New Information10 minutes Break50 minutes Generalize New Information10 minutes Break50 minutes Generalize New Information10 minutes Break50 minutes Generalize New Information10 minutes Break10 minutes Develop30 minutes Apply

Instructor Note: Adjust the Lesson Timeline as necessary to facilitate class schedule, your teaching style, and student learning. You are not bound by any time constraints during any particular phase of the ELM model.

Throughout this lesson, solicit from students the challenges they experienced in the Operational Environment (OE) and what they did to resolve them. Encourage students to apply at least one of the critical variables: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment and Time (PMESII-PT).

Security Level: This course / lesson will present information that has a Security Classification of: U - Unclassified.FD1. This training product has been reviewed by the training developers in coordination with the Adjutant General School, Fort Jackson, SC foreign disclosure officer. This

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training product can be used to instruct international military students from all approved countries without restrictions.

The Army Learning Areas (ALA) are the baseline focal points Soldiers and Army Civilians must possess to prevail in the ambiguous environments that challenge the Army today. The four ALAs are: Army Profession and Leadership; Mission Command; Human Dimension; and Professional Competence. The Army Learning Area taxonomy provides a framework to assist in grouping the General Learning Outcomes. The four Army Learning Areas serve as the framework to catalogue the 14 General Learning Outcomes.

The General Learning Outcomes (GLOs) are essential outcomes resulting from training, education, and experience along a career continuum of learning. There are three primary purposes for the Army General Learning Outcomes. First, they provide trainers and educators a lens into how effective they are in conveying their support material. Second, it assists in improving instructional design and/or training support packages. Finally it places responsibility on training and education proponents to be nested with ALAs.

GLO 3: Soldiers and Army Civilians demonstrate proficiency in mission command philosophy.

GLO 5: Soldiers and Army Civilians demonstrate proficiency in mission command staff tasks.

GLO 8: Soldiers and Army Civilians demonstrate proficiency in communications skills.

GLO 9: Soldiers and Army Civilians demonstrate proficiency in cultural awareness, cross-cultural competencies in the strategic environment of 2025 and beyond.

GLO 12: Soldiers and Army Civilians demonstrate proficiency in Army and joint doctrine.

GLO 14: Soldiers and Army Civilians are technically and tactically competent.

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b. Concrete Experience (20 min): This phase is student-centered and observed by the instructor (not an active participant).

Slide: RankFocus:

Have students take out a sheet of paper and number it 1-9. Also have them fold down laptops.

Tell students they will 10 seconds to correctly identify the branch and rank that is displayed and record it on their paper.

You will have to click the slide to get the first rank to appear and then the others will appear on a 10 second delay.

Solution:

1. Air Force Master Sergeant (E-7)2. Marine Corps Sergeant (E-5)3. Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class (E-4)4. Coast Guard Chief Petty Officer (E-7)5. Marine Corps Corporal (E-4)6. Air Force Staff Sergeant (E-5)7. Navy Senior Chief Petty Officer (E-8)8. Coast Guard Petty Officer 3rd Class (E-4)9. Marine Corps Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps (E-9)

Instructor Note: Use similar questions, such as the ones below, emphasize the point that you never know when you will be assigned to a joint environment and it’s important to not only now the ranks of other services but also the procedures for performing HR functions in those environments.

Instructor Questions:

Q1: How many got all the ranks right?Q2: How many got half of the ranks right?Q3: Why do you think it’s important for us to know the ranks of other services?Q4: What are some other important parts of joint operations that you must know?

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c. Publish and Process (20 min): This phase is student-centered and instructor facilitated.

The “publish” portion is a short discussion on how group members felt during their experience of generating data. This phase focuses on the group dynamics during the exercise and is NOT intended to be a discussion of the content generated. This can be kept short; once the group moves to “process,” they will likely continue to add to “publishing” type information. Do not let the group jump straight to content. When well facilitated, publishing is a good method to relate a discussion of interpersonal communication and group dynamics to the broader topic of leader competencies described in FM 6-22, Army Leadership.

Instructor Questions:

Q1. What happened? How did you feel about that?Q2. Who had a similar or different experience, and why? Were there any surprises?Q3. What did you learn from the group experience?

Questions the instructor may ask to assist in publishing: (Intent is to push critical thinking. Push students to defend their answers – allow students to hash out ideas).

Why did you site “item X” as an example? What does it mean to you? (This gets at affective learning and how students find the material relevant from their experiences).

Did you find that once you got one idea down, it triggered related ideas? (If yes, have them show examples. This shows the interrelatedness of the materials in a larger process).

Would you say you saw any themes as you developed examples? (e.g. events vs. processes)

After having talked about this, can you think of additional examples?

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d. Generalize New Information (5 hours):

Slide: Learning Objective: ActionFocus: This lesson is focused on meeting AG technical education outcomes.

After completing this lesson, students should be confident in their ability to apply critical thinking in preparing performing joint operations to ensure proper utilization.

Discussions in this block relate directly to concepts students will need to apply in future assignments.

Slide: Learning Objective: ConditionFocus: This lesson is focused on meeting AG technical education outcomes.



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Slide: Learning Objective: StandardFocus: This lesson is focused on meeting AG technical education outcomes.



Instructor Note: The purpose of this lesson is not to impart knowledge and move on – it is intended to get students thinking about the importance of joint operations. There are very few slides in the lesson; however, there are multiple opportunities for discussion. While topic slides do introduce knowledge and provide a focus, they are primarily designed to start discussions and constantly engage students, even in the GNI portion. The information covered in this lesson is basic, and even students with limited HR background can prepare for the lesson by completing the reading assignments and sharing their personal experiences. All students have had some experience with joint operations during their careers and should contribute to discussions. Encourage students to draw on their experiences in past organizations and previous deployment(s), integrating Contemporary Operating Environment variables, as appropriate.

Slide: Historical PerspectiveFocus:

Give students a joint operations historical perspective.

A review of the defense and intelligence agencies prior to the entry of the United States into World War II in 1941 revealed a number of deficiencies in how the national security

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apparatus was organized. There were inadequacies in civil military policy coordination, inter-service coordination, and intelligence. The officers serving in the war were aware of these deficiencies and were experienced in Joint and Combined Operations. An attempt to fix these deficiencies produced the 1947 National Security Act which:

1. Created the National Military Establishment (later renamed as the Department of Defense (DoD).

2. Established the U.S. Air Force.

3. Established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a permanent agency which became the principal military advisers to the President and Secretary of Defense.

4. Established a legal basis for unified and specified commands.

5. Designated the Secretary of National Defense to exercise general authority, direction, and control of the US military.

6. Established the Central Intelligence agency (CIA) and National Security Council (NSC).

Several successive legislative and presidential acts have transformed the 1947 National Security Act:

1. 1948 Key West Agreement: Established JCS as executive agents for unified/specified commands and defined roles and missions of the Services.

2. 1949 Amendment: Renamed the NME the DoD.

3. 1952 Amendment: Provided equal status on the JCS to the US Marine Corps.

4. 1953 Plan: Established military departments as executive agents for unified commands.

5. 1958 Amendment: Stated that the Joint Staff assists Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in exercising C2 of unified commands.

6. 1978 Amendment: Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) becomes official member to the JCS.

7. DoD Reorganization Act of 1986: Strengthened position of Chairman; created Vice Chairman; strengthened Combatant Commander authority; created Joint Specialty Officers (JSO).

JOINT LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

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Slide: Joint :Large Scale OperationsFocus:

Refer students to FM 3-0 Chapter 5, para 5-2, 5-3, 5-13

5-2. As a nation, the United States wages war by employing all instruments of national power-diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The President employs the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve national strategic objectives. The nature and scope of some missions may require joint forces to conduct large-scale combat operations to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests. Such combat typically occurs within the framework of a major operation or a campaign.

5-3. When large-scale combat operations commence, the joint force commander (JFC) immediately exploits friendly capabilities across multiple domains and the information environment to gain the initiative. The JFC seeks decisive advantage by using all available elements of combat power to exploit the initiative, deny enemy objectives, defeat enemy capabilities to resist, and compel desired behavior. The JFC coordinates with other U.S. governmental departments and agencies to facilitate coherent use of all instruments of national power in achieving national strategic objectives. Seizing the initiative generally requires force a joint operations area (JOA) or theater of operations may be unopposed or opposed. (See paragraphs 5-110 to 5-113 for a discussion of forcible entry.)

5-13. Conditions preceding large-scale combat operations vary depending on the threat. Some adversaries possess significant capability to employ antiaccess (A2) and area denial (AD) strategies. Countering those strategies is the responsibility of the JFC. The land component commander's (LCC's) challenge deploying significant combat power in an environment where the enemy has an initial advantage.

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Slide: Chain of CommandFocus:

Refer students to JP1, Chap. II, para. 5 & Figure II-3

The President and SecDef exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, through the SecDef, to the CCDRs for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The other branch used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through the SecDef to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of that Military Department. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority through their respective Service Chiefs over Service forces not assigned to the CCDRs. The Service Chiefs, except as otherwise prescribed by law, perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretaries of the respective Military Departments to whom they are directly responsible.

1. The CCDRs exercise COCOM of assigned forces and are directly responsible to the President and SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. CCDRs prescribe the chain of command within their combatant commands and designate the appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate commands.

2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef. This branch of the chain of command is responsible for all military forces within their respective Service not assigned to CCDRs. This branch is separate and distinct from the branch of the chain of command that exists within a combatant command.

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Slide: The Joint Chiefs of StaffFocus:

Refer students to DoDD 5100.01, Enclosure 3

Have students click on the JCS link on the slide.

http://www.jcs.mil/

Instruct Note: Tell the students to note that the J-staff is composed of the same elements they are used to; such as a J-1 instead of a S-1 or G-1, and they perform the same roles. This is an example of how joint doctrine influences service doctrine as each service uses the same staff numbering system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The collective body of the JCS is headed by the Chairman (or the Vice Chairman in the Chairman's absence), who sets the agenda and presides over JCS meetings. Today, by law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, and SECDEF. However, all JCS members are, by law, military advisors and may respond with advice or opinions on a particular matter when the President, NSC, or SECDEF requests such advice. DoD Directive 5100.1 assigns the JCS, supported by the Joint Staff, as the immediate military staff of the SECDEF. This designation is not found in Title 10 USC but the directive is a clear statement that the SECDEF will turn to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for staff support on all military matters. Each military Service chief wears “two hats” as chief of their military Service and members of the JCS. As chief of their respective Services, they perform duties as directed by civilian Service secretary (e.g. Secretary of the Army). As Joint Chiefs of Staff members, they offer advice to the President, SECDEF, and NSC. Each Service Chief appoints an operations deputy who works with the Director, Joint Staff, to form the subsidiary body known as the Operations Deputies (OPSDEPS). This group of senior flag or general officers assist in resolving matters that do not require JCS attention. They meet in sessions chaired by the Director, Joint Staff, to consider

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http://www.jcs.mil/About.aspx

issues of lesser importance or to review major issues before they reach the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With the exception of the Director, this body is not part of the Joint Staff. There is also a subsidiary body known as the Deputy Operations Deputies (DEPOPSDEPs), composed of the Vice Director, Joint Staff, and a two-star flag or general officer appointed by each Service Chief. Issues come before the DEPOPSDEPs to be settled at their level or forwarded to the OPSDEPS. Except for the Vice Director, Joint Staff, the DEPOPSDEPs are not part of the Joint Staff. Slide: JCS J-1Focus:

Have students click on the J-1 Manpower and Personnel Link on the slide.

http://www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J1%7CManpowerandPersonnel.aspx

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

The mission of the JCS J-1 (Manpower and Personnel) is to provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently outstanding manpower and personnel advice support, thus ensuring maximum readiness and sustainability of the total force. Goals of the JCS J-1 (Manpower and Personnel):

1. Improve communication, understanding and cooperation between the J1 and our customers.

2. Enhance total force readiness by identifying, analyzing and acting on manpower and personnel issues through the Joint War fighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA)/Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) process.

3. Optimize the Joint Staff organization to support the JCS.

4. Obtain highly qualified people for the Joint Staff.

5. Provide highly qualified manpower and personnel support to the staff and other agencies.

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DIRECTORATES

The J-1 section of a joint force headquarters may be organized with the following directorates:

1. Personnel Readiness Division: With focus on both current operations and long-term issues, the Personnel Readiness Division develops and coordinates initiatives to ensure and enhance individual, theater and force-wide personnel readiness. Additionally, the division drafts, coordinates and implements plans to address policy concerns such as postal procedures, awards, entitlements and pay and morale, welfare and recreation programs in theater.

2. Personnel Services Division: The Personnel Services Division provides management of the internal Joint Staff military and civilian personnel programs, including selection, assignment and reassignment, and management of the organizational structure, functional assignments and manpower authorizations for the Joint Staff.

3. Joint Manpower Division: The Joint Manpower Division (JMD) develops manpower plans, policy guidance, and oversight for joint and NATO military activities, including the combatant commands and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-controlled activities. JMD controls and maintains a current record of all approved manpower requirements and authorizations for the combatant commands and Chairman’s Controlled Activities through review and validation of Joint Tables of Distribution (JTDs) and Joint Tables of Mobilization Distribution (JTMDs) listed in eJMAPS. It develops procedures and monitors all actions that affect manpower requirements and authorizations in the JTDs and JTMDs, coordinating the approval of such changes with OSD and the Services.

4. The Director's Actions Group reviews, analyzes, and provides the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, positions on a broad range of personnel programs including: military entitlements and compensation; assignments/tour lengths; military manning requirements; Stop Loss; leaves and passes; recruiting and retention; accession policy; and Defense Language Transformation issues. It also prepares Joint Staff positions in response to legislative actions relating to personnel and readiness issues.

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Slide: Organizing the Joint ForceFocus:

Refer students to JP 1-0 preface

How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint operations. The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on their intent and CONOPS. Unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Joint forces can be established on a geographic or functional basis.

Slide: Unified Combatant CommandsFocus:

Refer students to JP 3-0, Chap. IV, para. 3(b)

Combatant Commands

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A Combatant Command (CCMD) is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through SecDef, and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS.

Unified commands typically are established when a broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and necessitating single strategic direction and/or other criteria in JP1. Six unified combatant commanders have geographic area responsibilities. These combatant commanders are each assigned an area of responsibility (AOR) by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and are responsible for all operations within their designated areas: U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Africa Command. There are three combatant commanders assigned worldwide functional responsibilities not bounded by geography: U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. Instructor Note: Tell the students that the UCP will be discussed further in the next section of the lesson. Slide: Subordinate Unified CommandsFocus:

Refer students to JP 3-0, Chap. IV, para. 3b(2)

Refer student to JP 1, Chapter IV, Para. 4 and Fig. IV-5

Subordinate Unified Commands

When authorized by SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified (not specified) commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called sub-unified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established based on a geographical area or a specific function. Examples of sub-unified commands in PACOM include:

1. U.S. Forces, Japan (Yokota AB, near Tokyo)

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2. U.S. Forces, Korea (Yongsan Army Garrison, Seoul)

3. Eighth U.S. Army (Yongsan Army Garrison, Seoul)

4. Special Operations Command Pacific (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii)

5. Alaskan Command (Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage)

Slide: Joint Task Forces (JFTs)Focus:

Refer students to JP 3-0, Chap. IV, para. 3b(3)

Refer student to JP 1, Chapter IV, para. 5 and Fig. IV-5

Joint Task Forces (JFTs)

A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing commander, joint task force (JTF) to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require centralized control of logistics. JFTs may be established on a geographical area or functional basis.

Slide: Unified Command Plan

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Focus:

Have students click on the Unified Command Plan link at the bottom of the slide: https://www.defense.gov/Our-Story/Combatant-Commands/

Discuss the different regional/geographic responsibilities

The Department of Defense updated the Unified Command Plan, a key strategic document that establishes the missions, requirements, and geographic areas of responsibility for commanders of combatant commands. Every two years, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to review the missions, responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of each combatant command and recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any changes that may be necessary.

Instructor Note: Point out to students that most of North America (minus Alaska, which falls under both PACOM and NORTHCOM’s footprints) is now under the geographic responsibility of the newly formed NORTHCOM, while Russia falls under EUCOM. Notice that USCENTCOM has possibly the smallest geographic responsibility, yet is definitely the heart of most Joint Service activity.

The J-1 develops joint plans, policy, and guidance on manpower and personnel issues. Additionally, the J-1 coordinates manpower and personnel support to facilitate the success of operations. The J-1 must maintain close coordination with subordinate joint force command J-1s and Service component counterparts, the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3), and commanders of major deploying, deployed, and redeployment units to provide an avenue to cross-check strength figures and monitor changes to the task organization.

The J-1 has primary responsibilities for the following functions:

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

A Joint force command J-1 participates in strategy development, identifies planning factors, prescribes methods and procedures relating to the management of personnel, and synchronizes subordinate and supporting command personnel to meet the JFC’s intent.

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MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

Manpower management consists of providing plans, policy, and oversight on joint manpower program (JMP) issues. The JMP is the policy, processes, and systems used in the determination and prioritization within and among service manpower requirements. The MPO reflects an activity’s mission, functions, organization, current and projected manpower needs, and when applicable, it’s required mobilization augmentation. The JMP includes:

1. The joint table of distribution portrays peacetime manpower requirements for the current and succeeding five fiscal years in sufficient detail to support Service personnel systems.

2. The joint table of mobilization distribution states the additional manpower and organization required to shift to wartime, mobilization, or contingency operations.

PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION

The individual augmentation process flows from the combatant command (after its Service components fill all requirements from internal assets) to the Joint Staff J-1, to the joint force providers for sourcing determination, and then ordered by SecDef, IAW the Global Force Management (GFM) process. Slide: Joint Personnel Training and Tracking ActivitiesFocus:

Refer students to JP 1-0, Chapter II, 3b (4) (b) and (d)

Joint Personnel Training and Tracking Activities (JPTTAs) facilitate accountability, training, processing, and onward movement of both military and DoD civilian individual augmentees preparing for overseas movement for assignment to joint or combined staff positions. Joint Personnel Reception Center’s (JPRCs) are established in the operational area per direction of the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). Their purpose is to

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facilitate the reception, accountability, visibility, and processing of military, DOD civilians, CAAF, and individual augmentees upon their arrival in the operational area. JPRCs and JPTTAs should be established as early as possible in an operation, preferably in time to support initial movement of augmentees. All such facilities should be staffed with personnel from each Service comprising the joint force.

Slide: Personnel Accountability and Strength ReportingFocus:

Refer students to JP 1-0, Chapter II, para 3 (b) (5)

Service component commanders are responsible for maintaining accountability of their forces. The joint force J-1 accomplishes joint strength reporting for the JFC by combining daily Service component strength reports into the joint personnel status and casualty report (JPERSTAT). The JPERSTAT may be incorporated into the JFC daily situation report (SITREP) if the situation dictates.

Slide: Rotation Policies

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Focus:

Refer students to JP 1-0, Chapter II para. 3b (6a and b)

In coordination with the operations directorate J-3:

1. J-1 makes recommendations on rotation policy for individual augmentees assigned to JFC.

2. J-3 makes recommendations on unit rotation policies.

3. Component and CSA commanders make recommendations on both individual and unit rotation policies.

4. The GCC, in agreement with the Service providing establishes individual and unit rotation policies.

Rotation policies are based on a number of factors:

1. Joint force mission.

2. Projected length of the operation.

3. Operational environment.

4. Requirements for personnel with low density operational skills.

5. Authority limitations for recalled and/or mobilized personnel.

6. Unit Training and qualifications requirements.

Slide: Civilian Personnel

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Focus:

Refer students to JP 1-0 Appendix O para.1

The joint force J-1 is responsible for coordinating and integrating personnel plans and procedures for civilian support to joint operations. The GCC establishes AOR admission requirements for DOD civilians and CAAF. The J-1 will identify pre-deployment requirements to include proper identification cards, security clearances, training, clothing, equipping, and medical processing.

Planners must ensure DOD civilian government employees and US contractor personnel are considered in every aspect of deliberate planning and CAP, consistent with their noncombatant status.

Personnel Requirements

The GCC, through component commanders, is responsible for identifying civilian personnel requirements and managing DOD-related civilian resources in the JOA/AOR.

DOD civilians and CAAF deployed in support of a contingency will receive advance training, at a minimum, in the following:

1. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense and/or annual refresher training.

2. Provisions of the Geneva Conventions.3. Wear and appearance of uniforms.4. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and Code of Conduct.5. Weapons certifications and firearms safety (if authorized and eligible to carry a

weapon).6. Basic first aid7. PR training8. Self-aid9. Buddy aid.10.Country/customs familiarization (if outside the continental US)

JOA/AOR Admission Requirements

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The GCC will publish guidance outlining admission requirements for the AOR. This will include, but is not limited to the requirement for:

1. Passports and Visas2. Collection of DNA samples3. Completion of DD Form 934. Immunization requirements5. Policy on HIV testing6. Information on customs or laws that may impact deployment eligibility

The following are additional planning considerations for civilian personnel:

1. Pay and compensation2. Identification and Geneva Convention Cards3. Casualty and Mortuary Affairs4. Clothing, Equipping and Training5. Awards6. Support and Services

Slide: 60 Second Problem SolvingFocus:

Ask students to write down a problem or a question related to Joint HR Ops on a sheet of paper.

They then will pass the sheet of paper to another student and then that person writes down solutions to the problem or question for 60 seconds.

At the end of the 60 seconds that person hands it back to its originator.

Slide: Pay, Allowances, and Entitlements

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Focus:

Refer students to JP 1-0, Appendix H

Various pays and entitlements have been established to compensate military members for the rigors and sacrifices associated with military operations dependent on duty status and location.

Based on the unique aspects of each military operation, the GCC will make policy determinations concerning pay and entitlements. The J-1 will make recommendations on these policy decisions. Two considerations are:

1. Equity: Pay and entitlements (e.g. imminent danger pay [IDP] and type of TDY status) should be addressed by the J-1 during the planning process. Consistent policies should be developed to prevent inequities among personnel from the various Services.

2. Timeliness: Pay and entitlements request normally take time to enact, so an early policy determination will enhance personnel receiving proper and timely pay. For example, an IDP entitlement is not effective until a request for it is approved by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

Determination of entitlements should be made available to Service components, supporting CCDRs, and DFAS ESO via official military orders issued during CAP (e.g. warning, alert, or execute order).

Planning Considerations:

The following decisions should be addressed as soon as possible:

1. Designation of the operation as a contingency operation and determination on the Savings Deposit Program

2. Designation of IDP areas3. Declaration of combat zone4. TDY household goods weight allowance reference JFTR

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Instructor Note: Refer students to JP 1-06, Figure H-1 and discuss the various entitlements.

Slide: Postal OperationsFocus:

Refer students to JP 1-0 Appendix J

Postal operations and services have a significant effect on unit morale. Similarly, large volumes of personal correspondence, parcels and official mail can have a significant impact on logistic operations. Mail is common to all Services and must be processed, transported, and delivered as a joint operation.

Coordinate with the GCC postal staff to establish the start of mail service. Mail service should be initiated as soon as possible after necessary postal personnel and assets have arrived in the operating area. Although the commander may determine that other forces have priority of transportation, this is normally not later than C+30, or 30 days after forces begin JRSOI operations.

Planning Considerations

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Commanders must consider postal support for various types of operating environments ranging from austere locations where infrastructure is nonexistent to robust locations where permanent facilities are available.

Service component commanders with units responsible for postal operations will provide trained clerks for joint MPS activities, such as JMMTs or AMTs. Commanders must determine how to flow postal personnel into theater to ensure the mail delivery system is in place once the Joint, Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) and APO request process is complete.

The sourcing of trained personnel should be based on Service population, on a pro rata basis, determined by the following guidelines:

1. MPO: 1 trained clerk per 500 personnel during initial operations (30 days); 1 per 500 for sustainment operations up to 10,000 personnel; and 1 per additional 1,000 personnel thereafter.

2. AMT/JFMC: 1 trained clerk per 1,500 personnel supported.

3. Postal Finance Office: Minimum 2 personnel.

4. Postal Volumes: Unit can expect to process 2 pounds of mail per deployed Service member per day.

During the planning stages, commanders must ensure the availability of dedicated postal equipment and postal supplies necessary to start and maintain the flow of mail. Postal equipment includes:

1. Dedicated trucks2. Containers3. Container handling equipment 4. Forklifts5. Pallet jacks6. Specialized Postal equipment.

Slide: Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)

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Focus:

Refer students to JP 1-0, Appendix K

MWR programs are mission essential to combat readiness. They contribute to successful military operations by promoting individual physical and mental fitness, morale, unit cohesion, and esprit de corps, and by alleviating mission-related stress. If direct combat is not imminent upon deployment of a joint force, then the rapid implementation of MWR programs will be all the more important.

From a joint perspective, MWR programs may include but are not limited to fitness programs and recreation facilities, exchange and resale services, entertainment services (to include military band operations), food and beverage sales, book and video services, newspapers, access to telephones and other communication media, and R&R programs.

Family well-being impacts Service member’s focus on the mission and is thus very important to sustained readiness. The family well-being of deployed US Service members is a Service responsibility. In the event of civil support operations, Family Assistance Centers (FACs) and/or Emergency Family Assistance Centers (EFACs) may be established to support families affected by man-made or natural disasters.

INITIAL MWR SUPPORT

Initial support is a Service responsibility and will be provided in accordance with the Service doctrine for initial deployments. Fitness and recreation may be considered the heart of the MWR program for joint operations. US military units will arrange for, or deploy with, a basic load of MWR equipment included in their organic fitness and recreation kits and an organizational MWR specialist and/or generalist, if assigned. The JFC is responsible for operation of fitness and recreation programs/facilities during initial deployment. At a minimum, units should be prepared to conduct unit level sports programs, provide table games for self-directed or group activities, provide recreational reading materials, provide opportunities for individual fitness needs, and be prepared to operate activities that sell exchange retail merchandise. American (National) Red Cross (ARC) services are closely related morale activities requiring joint oversight and support. The ARC provides services to active duty military, National Guard, Members

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of the Reserve Components, DoD civilians, and their families worldwide in order to assist them in preventing, preparing for, and coping with emergency situations and providing emergency notifications to deployed Service members.

Slide: Casualty ReportingFocus:

Refer students to JP 1-0 Appendix L

Casualty reporting responsibilities reside under the purview of the Services. The J-1 should ensure that Service components adhere to Service reporting requirements, particularly when there is no Service personnel element assigned. The J-1 is also responsible for ensuring the chain of command and the Joint Staff receive casualty information via operations report (OPREP) 3 or other designated communication channels.

Planning and Execution

Prior planning is essential to efficient casualty operations and reporting. When casualties occur, information must reach the right people as quickly as possible. The J-1 should possess appropriate Service directives and maintain points of contacts (POCs) at Service casualty centers in the event they must assist their components. Procedural mistakes in casualty must not occur as they could potentially lead to Next of Kin (NOK) notification through the media, rather than through appropriate Service channels. Because NOK notification is a command responsibility, each Service component must ensure that rear detachment commanders have been trained appropriately on the casualty notification process. Military chaplains should advise commanders on religious support for the notification process and should be a part of the notification team (if available), but should not be detailed as Casualty Notification Officers.

Slide: U.S. Military Decorations and Awards

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Focus:

Refer students to JP 1-0, Appendix M, AR 600-8-22, Chapter 2 & 7

It is important to understand what awards can or can’t be awarded in theater. Knowing the processes, understanding other Service’s requirements for awards and decorations (concurrence), to include the presentation of US awards to foreign coalition members will help eliminate processing time when time matters most. For example, understand that in order to be eligible to receive a joint award individuals must be assigned or attached to a joint force. This includes personnel assigned to the Joint Force Headquarters, Joint units attached to the Joint Force, Individual Augmentees officially attached to the Joint Force, and Individual Mobilization Augmentees. Personnel assigned to Service Units attached to the JTF are not normally eligible for joint awards. This includes those forces identified as Functional Components (i.e. JFLCC, JFACC, etc).

Slide: Foreign Decorations and Service AwardsFocus:

Refer students to AR 600-8-22 para 1-38, Chapter 9, JP 1-0, Appendix M, para 1 (c)

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Foreign Decorations and Service Awards: Awards from foreign governments be accepted only in recognition of active combat service or for outstanding or unusually meritorious performance. Activities normally undertaken by the Armed Forces of the United States in support of an ally during peacetime are not considered sufficient to merit foreign individual or unit decorations. US Military personnel are prohibited from requesting or encouraging the offer of an award or decoration from a foreign government. Award of US Military Decorations and Awards to Foreign Military Personnel: These awards include recognition of individual acts of heroism and achievement by Service members of friendly foreign nations when those acts have been of significant benefit to the United States or have contributed significantly to the successful prosecution of a military campaign by the Armed Forces of the United States. Defense decorations shall not be awarded to foreign military or civilian personnel. Currently, there are no US campaign and service medals authorized to be awarded to members of foreign military establishments.

Slide: Joint Services Approval AuthoritiesFocus:

Refer students to AR 600-8-22, Para. 1-37a and 1-37e

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Award recommendations of the Meritorious Service Medal (MSM) and below to Army personnel permanently assigned to Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and/or Coast Guard commands may be approved by the award approval authority of that Service without seeking Army’s concurrence. Members of the U.S. Armed Forces permanently assigned to the Army units may accept Army awards, MSM and below, without seeking concurrence from their service. A copy of the approved award will be forwarded to the respective Services’ awards office for permanent records purposes. For service members assigned temporarily between the Services, the other Service may recommend an award by forwarding the recommendation directly to the service member’s permanent command for an action/concurrence.

Note to Instructor: Refer students to Table 1-1 and let them know that the table lists the addresses for other services when forwarding the award to the service member’s permanent command.

Recommendations for award of the Legion of Merit (LM) and above will be submitted to the Service member’s home service for consideration and processing. Purple Heart (PH) and retirement award recommendations on other service members must be submitted in accordance with that Service’s regulations/directives. Members of the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and/or Coast Guard permanently assigned to an Army Command cannot be recommended for any Army retirement awards.

A wartime award will not be awarded to a member of another Service without first seeking concurrence for the Service concerned. Requests for concurrence must be submitted directly to the Service concerned. Commands must ensure that the award has been processed through the approval authority for consideration before seeking concurrence. Permanent orders should not be issued and certificates should not be completed until concurrence from the other Service is received.

Note to Instructor: Refer students to Table 1-1Slide: Sample Joint Award RequestFocus:

Explain to students that this is an example of a joint award request.

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Slide: Sample Joint Award Request

Focus:

Explain to students that this is an example of a joint award request.

Slide: Joint Manning DocumentFocus:

Refer students to JP 1-0, Chapter III, para 3

There are required steps to effectively transition a single-Service organization from its routine Service-related mission to that of a JTF HQ. Key to this process is creating a JMD that will define the JTF HQ’s overall manpower requirements needed to complete

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its mission. The JMD can be filled through multiple sourcing methods to include units, coalition, other government agencies, and contractors. The JMD provides the venue for requesting the Joint Individual Augmentation (JIA) necessary to staff the JTF HQ.

Once a mission is delineated via SecDef orders, the unit identified to form the core of the JTF HQ must identify its personnel requirements. These requirements are translated into a JMD to ensure adequate manning levels with proper mix of military and civilian personnel with the correct skills to ensure mission success.

The JMD provides the baseline for JTF HQ staffing and is used for strength reporting, personnel accountability, awards eligibility determination, base support, and a host of other services and functions.

At a minimum, the JMD must contain the following critical elements:

1. Command2. Activity3. Department4. Line Number5. Billet Title6. Duty Description7. Grade8. Skill/Specialty9. Security Clearance10.Source Type11.Service12.Location13.Latest Arrival Date14.Tour Length

The establishing CCDR’s J-1 is responsible for maintenance of the JMD. Any subsequent additions, deletions, or changes to the JTF JMD must be coordinated via official correspondence.

Slide: JMD Example

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Focus:

Go over sample JMD with students and explain the need to review the JMD for proper slotting of personnel to ensure mission success.

Explain to students that this is just a portion of the document and that all the critical elements would be included in the entire document.

Slide: Learning Objective: ActionFocus: This lesson is focused on meeting AG technical education outcomes.



Slide: Learning Objective: Condition

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Focus: This lesson is focused on meeting AG technical education outcomes.



Slide: Learning Objective: StandardFocus: This lesson is focused on meeting AG technical education outcomes.



Instructor Note: Open and show ARSOF Slides

Slide: Describe Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Capabilities

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Focus:

Cover Slide

Slide: Telemark: Focus:

Components of Special Operations

Instructor Note: See handout.

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Slide: Video Focus:

Components of Special Operations

Slide: OutcomeFocus:

Outcome

At the conclusion of this lesson, the student will be able to identify typical ARSOF operational units and their core missions.

The student will understand key characteristics and capabilities for Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Army Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, and Special Operations Sustainment elements. The student will also be able to describe basic SOF/CF Interdependence considerations as they apply to training, planning, and operational situations.

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Slide: Learning ObjectiveFocus:

Action, Standards

Slide: ARSOF OrganizationsFocus:

Organizations

Note: During mid- 2014, CDR, USASOC directed the reorganization of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) into the 1st Special Forces Command (1st SFC [A]). In addition to USASFC’s seven Special Forces Groups, the 1st SFC (A) gained Sustainment, MISO, and CA units. The 1st SFC (A) force structure consolidates all “Special Warfare” focused units under one command. For further discussion on the ARSOF “Special Warfare” capability see paragraph 1-21, ADRP 3-05.

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Slide: Special Forces ODAFocus:

Principle Tasks, Structure

The primary operational element of a Special Forces company is the Special Forces Operational Detachment A(SFOD-A), also known as an "A Detachment" or "A-Team," which consists of 12 Special Forces Soldiers: 1 Officer (18A), 1Warrant Officer (180A) and 10 Noncommissioned Officers. A Captain leads the 12-man team. Team members include a warrant officer, a team sergeant (E8), two noncommissioned officers (E6-E7) trained in each of the SF functional specialties of weapons, engineering, medical, communications, and one NCO trained in operations and intelligence.All team members are Special Forces qualified and cross-trained in a number of team specialties and advanced skills. They are also multi-lingual. The A-Team is almost unlimited in its capabilities to operate in hostile or denied areas. A-Teams can infiltrate and exfiltrate their area of operations by air, land, or sea. An A-Team can operate for an indefinite period of time in remote locations with little or no outside support. They are truly independent, self-sustaining detachments. A-Teams routinely train, advise, and assist other U.S. and allied forces and other agencies while standing by to perform other Special Operations as directed by higher authorities. A critical SF skill is their ability to, advise, assist, and direct foreign counterparts in their function up through battalion level.In an SF company, one of the 6 A-teams is trained in combat diving and one is trained in military free-fall parachuting. Both are used as methods of infiltration. Some SF Companies have other specialty teams such as mountain, desert mobility, etc.The detachment can serve as a manpower pool from which SF commanders organize tailored SF teams to perform specific missions.SFOD-A Structure:

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Slide: Civil Affairs TeamFocus:

Core Tasks and Structure

The mission of Civil Affairs (CA) forces is to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations by engaging and influencing the civil populace and authorities through the planning and conducting of Civil Affairs Operations (CAO).

The 95th CA Brigade (Airborne) is commanded by an O-6 and headquartered in Fort Bragg, NC. The mission of the 95th CA Brigade is to rapidly deploy regionally focused, language capable, initial-entry CA Planning Teams, Civil Military Operations Centers, CA battalions, and CA companies to plan, enable, manage, and execute CAO in support of Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) objectives.

CA provides expertise on the civil component of the operational environment. A commander uses CA capabilities to analyze and influence the indigenous populations and institutions through specific processes, dedicated resources, and personnel. As part of the commander’s Civil Military Operations (CMO) element, CA units conduct operations nested within the overall mission and intent.

CA significantly helps ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the mission by advising on how to best meet moral and legal obligations to the people affected by military operations.

The key to understanding the role of CA is to recognize the importance of leveraging each relationship between the command, and individuals, groups, and organizations in the operational environment to achieve a desired effect. For example, across the range of military operations, a CA Company can support Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) operations and/or Brigade Combat Teams conducting contingency operations.

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Civil Affairs base operational element is the CA Team (CAT). The CAT is composed of a Team Leader (O-3), Team Sergeant (E-7), Civil Affairs NCO (E-6), and a Medical Sergeant (E-6).

In addition to those above, CATs support Special Forces Companies and SFODAs during the conduct of their Principal Tasks, conduct civil military engagement, and participate in theater security and cooperation exercises and engagements.

Slide: Tactical Psychological Operations Team (TPT)Focus:


The 4th and 8th Military Information Support Operations Groups are headquartered in Fort Bragg, NC.

These groups provide fully capable Psychological Operations forces to Combatant Commanders, U.S. ambassadors, and other agencies to synchronize plans and execute influence activities across the range of military operations. The 1st Special Forces Command (A) can rapidly deploy Psychological Operations units worldwide in support of SOF and conventional military forces.

Psychological Operations’ disseminates information to foreign audiences in support of U.S. policy and national objectives. Used during peacetime, contingencies, and declared war, MISO activities are not forms of force, but are force multipliers that use nonviolent means.

The ultimate objective of MISO is to convince enemy, neutral, and friendly nations and forces to take action favorable to the U.S. and its allies. MISO support national security objectives at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of operations.

MISO may be conducted as part of all special operations if appropriate to the mission and situation. Psychological Operations units conduct MISO in support of all Special Operations Core Activities.

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Slide: Ranger PlatoonFocus:


The 75th Ranger Regiment is commanded by a specially selected O-6 and headquartered at Fort Benning, GA. The Regiment is composed of three Ranger Battalions and a Special Troops Battalion.

The Special Troops Battalion has four companies noted as a reconnaissance, communications, intelligence, and operations company.

Ranger Platoons and Companies are similar to Army infantry units in size and organization. A Ranger Battalion is similar in size and organization to a standard Army Infantry Battalion except for a support company, which is organic to the Ranger Battalion.

The Ranger Regiment can deploy one Ranger Battalion and a Regimental C2 element within 18 hours of alert notification. The flexibility of the Ranger Force requires it to perform under various command structures.

The force can work unilaterally under an Army Corps, as a part of JSOTF, as an Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF), or as an Army component in a Joint Task Force (JTF).

The 75th Ranger Regiment plans and conducts Joint Special Operations in support of U.S. policy and objectives. These Joint Special Operations primarily consist of; direct-action missions to capture or destroy critical enemy nodes and facilities, or recover designated seizing lodgments under hostile or uncertain environments. The cornerstone of Ranger missions is the direct action raid.

Rangers are the premier raid and airfield seizure unit in the Army. In order to remain proficient in all light infantry skills, Ranger units focus their training on mission-essential

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tasks that include movement to contact, ambush, reconnaissance, airborne and air assaults, and hasty defense.

Slide: Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR)Focus:


The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) is the Army’s only Special Operations aviation unit. The Regiment, commanded by an O-6, is comprised of a regiment headquarters and Headquarters Company, and four Special Operations Aviation Battalions. The SOAR supports ARSOF Core Activities by providing short, medium, and long range infiltration or exfiltration of SOF, aerial resupply, armed escort, reconnaissance, fire support, CAS, and airborne command and control (C2). The 160th SOAR Battalions are regionally orientated to specific GCC. The battalions operate three types of aircraft, the MH/AH-6, MH-60, and the MH-47. Each battalion has a strategic composition of these light, medium, and heavy helicopters, modified to meet special operations mission requirements.

Slide: Special Operations Sustainment Element

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Focus:

Structure, Support Relationships

The 528th force structure differs from a standard sustainment brigade. The Brigade is composed of only 1,200 personnel. The 528th is maybe limited in the equipment area, but has a large number of highly skilled subject matter experts (SME) with non-standard skillsets. The unit also provides ARSOF Liaison Elements (ALE) to each Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). The ALE’s are led by a LTC except for Korea which has a MAJ as the chief. The 528th SB(SO)(A) ALE established within each CCDR’s AOR is a key strategic- and operational-level logistics planner for ARSOF missions. Within the adaptive planning and execution (APEX) joint logistics planning process, at the combatant command level, planning begins with the receipt of strategic guidance and continues as the CCDR conducts mission analysis. The ALE, in concert with the 528th SB(SO)(A)’s Plans Section, TSOC J-4, and ASCC G-4, assists with establishing and updating a standing logistics estimate of each theater of operations derived from the theater of operations logistics overview. The ALE remains integrated in the CCDR’s, TSOC’s, and ASCC’s logistics planning processes during plan development and assessment. The 528th SB(SO)(A) Operations Division, Plans Section, establishes logistics and FHP planning conferences during the planning and preparation phase to develop the operational-level ARSOF concept of support in concert with deploying ARSOF sustainment planners, to include the GSB, RSOD, and brigade S-4s. The 528th also has a Special Operations medical detachment with a structure similar to a forward surgical team with critical care capabilities. The unit has a Signal Battalion (112th SIG BN) that specializes in and supports SOF communications. The 122th SIG BN actually has the most robust equipment set in the brigade. Headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC, the 528th Sustainment Brigade sets the operational level logistics conditions to enable ARSOF operations worldwide using ARSOF Support Operations (ASPO) Teams, Special Operations Resuscitation Teams (medical/surgical), ARSOF Liaison Elements, and exceptional signal support capabilities from the 112th

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Special Operations Signal Battalion. The 528th Sustainment Brigade is responsible for providing logistical, medical, and signal support for ARSOF worldwide. The Brigade is capable of deploying up to three Army Support Operations Teams in support of three ARSOF-based Joint Special Operations Task Forces.

Slide: ARSOF/CF Interdependence ConsiderationsFocus:

Relationships Education Training LNOs Mission Command Planning Operations

Conventional Forces (CF) will need to develop and retain the ability to task organize at increasingly lower levels to execute “small footprint” operations. This includes conducting training between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CF units and improving the mission command and interoperability of small unit CF. Additionally, regionally aligned CF unit participation in SOF training venues will improve interoperability and support the Army vision.” “Training at all levels, but especially at the battalion and brigade echelons, must integrate and reinforce the interoperability of Conventional Forces and SOF, in addition to training with other Services, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Forces as we rebuild skills to support the full range of operations.” - Army Strategic Planning Guidance- Army Strategic Planning Guidance

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Slide: SOF Truths Focus:

truths

Instructor Notes:

Truth 1: Humans are more important than hardware.People – not equipment – make the critical difference. The right people, highly trained and working as a team, regardless of environmental/situational constraints will accomplish the mission with resources currently available (I believe the idea here is, regardless of resources). In contrast, the best equipment in the world cannot compensate for a lack of the right people (that is - the right configuration of attributes, competencies, knowledge, and skills).

Truth 2: Quality is better than quantity.The quality versus quantity issue is why Special Operations units assess and select their personnel based on a candidate's ability to demonstrate a number of SOF attributes and competencies. Similar to truth number one; a small number of exceptional individuals, carefully selected, well trained, and well led, are preferable to larger numbers of troops, some of whom may not be up to the task (this is concept is analogous to 300 Spartans fighting/holding 150,000 Persians at Thermopylae Pass).

Truth 3: Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced.It takes years to properly train SOF Operators and operational units to the level of proficiency needed to accomplish difficult and specialized SOF missions. Years of intense training/preparation – both in SOF schools and units – is required to obtain the required experience to integrate highly competent individuals into fully capable units. This process cannot be hastened nor can SOF qualification course or unit training standards be lowered without degrading the ultimate capability (SOF Soldier).

Truth 4: Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

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Creation of competent, fully mission capable units takes time. Employment of fully capable special operations capability on short notice requires highly trained and constantly available SOF units in peacetime.

Truth 5: Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.The operational effectiveness of our forces cannot be, and never has been, achieved without being enabled by the Conventional Force and our joint service partners. Support from the Air Force, Army, Marine and Navy engineers, technicians, intelligence analysts, and the numerous other professions that contribute to SOF, have substantially increased our capabilities and effectiveness throughout the world.

Slide: SOF Imperatives 12 Imperatives

Slide: Characteristics of ARSOF 13 Characteristics

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Slide: ARSOF Critical Capabilities Critical Capabilities

Slide: ARSOF Core Principle Principle

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Slide: ARSOF Core Activities 12 Core Activities

Slide: Ultimate Goals Vision

Instructor Notes: (Show this slide prior to the break) Current Army training and doctrine does not sufficiently address ARSOF/CF interdependence requirements, planning, or execution. Up to this point ARSOF/CF planning, partnerships, operations, and liaison activities were conducted out of operational necessity or through personal relationships.

Reporting mechanisms designed to share tactics, techniques, procedures, and lessons learned have failed to capture or institutionalize basic doctrinal principle and operational enhancements gained through ARSOF and CF interaction.

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The efforts to create greater special operations and conventional force interdependence is not just an Army view of the future force, but is a "Big Idea" that is also discussed in Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' publications as follows.

The key to seamless integration is the ability for CF and SOF to train and rehearse together both pre-deployment and in the operational area prior to employment. CF, in coordination with SOF, will have sufficient capability to train, advise, assist foreign conventional security forces, support foreign internal defense missions, and conduct CT and COIN operations (CJCS Notice 3500.01 2012-2015 Joint Training Guidance, Aug 11.)

Ask students to think of some ideas, instances, and situations in which leaders/units can adopt and/or improve ARSOF/CF interdependence throughout the U.S. Army and discuss (there are no right answers)?Army Strategic Planning Guidance (2013) (Near-Term objective) Continue to Increase the Integration of Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces. Conventional forces (CF) will need to develop and retain the ability to task organize at increasingly lower levels to execute “small footprint” operations. This includes conducting specific training between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CF units and improving the mission command and interoperability of small unit CF. Additionally, regionally aligned CF unit participation in SOF training venues will improve interoperability and support the Army vision. Conversely, Army SOF should assist in developing the means to enable and enhance SOF/CF interdependent operations that will be done in a networked mission command environment.

Slide: SOF/CF Interdependence Considerations

ARSOF/CF Interdependency Considerations Seven basic components of ARSOF/CF interdependency: 1. Relationships: Establish rapport and enduring relationships with partner

organizations.

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2. Education: Inculcate SOF education in CF PME to inform CF personnel (all cohorts and levels) on SOF force structure, roles, operations, capabilities, limitations, integrated planning, and enhance SOF/CF Interdependence. 3. Training: Institutionalize SOF/CF Interdependence through combined training opportunities. Integrate and train SOF/CF forces early and often, before conducting actual operations. Conduct SOF/CF integrated training at home station, during pre-deployment, exercises, FTXs, and during Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations. In addition, continue to conduct integrated training, while deployed to include combat deployments. 4. LNOs: Employ liaison personnel in each other’s centers, schools, and units (as many levels as possible). 5. Mission Command: Clearly define and articulate Mission Command relationships. 6. Planning: Integrate planning and intelligence efforts to enhance operations and alleviate misunderstandings. Special Operations must be considered during planning of all Unified Land Operations. 7. Operations: Understand the capabilities, strengths, and limitation of each force and apply this knowledge to the current situation and operational environment as an operational advantage.

Slide: Practical Exercise PE

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Instructor note: Open FY2020 Conducting Operations in a Degrade Space Environment Slides

Slide: Conducting Operations in a Degraded Space Environment

Slide: Learning Objective TLO

Slide: Risk Assessment

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Safety

This slide describes Safety, Risk, and Environmental Information.

Safety Requirements: Inform students about the location of fire extinguishers, first aid equipment, and other safety equipment locations. Ensure that they understand how the equipment works. You should also know phone numbers of first responders and ensure that they are posted in a visible place.

Risk Assessment Level: Low. Refer to the Composite Risk management procedures for additional information.

Environmental Considerations: Only office-like environmental considerations are needed during this lesson, the primary being the disposal of paper and trash. Follow local SOPs regarding such; in most cases, all paperwork including unclassified papers must be disposed of in accordance with operations security procedures.

Transition To: How does a satellite orbit the Earth?

Slide: How Does a satellite orbit the Earth Formulas

Here is sort of an outline of what we will NOT be covering in this lesson!

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Slide: Space Facts Facts

Instructional Lead in – The potential for cascading failures across the myriad systems reliant on space mean that the effects of any disruption could manifest themselves in unexpected places. When a single U.S. communications satellite broke down in 1998, it was not only television and messaging systems that failed. Credit card systems stopped processing payments, weather radars went blind and frustrated drivers found themselves unable to fuel their vehicles as automatic gas station pumps seized up. Think to yourself, when was the last time I used an ATM? Stopped at a traffic light? Completed an online transaction? All of these activities rely on space based systems to work. Imagine not being able to withdraw funds from your bank.

Slide: What if Video

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The following video reflects friendly use and dependence on space in support of a military operation. However, note toward the end of the video what the potential affects are on the operation when enemy disruption/jamming occurs against our satellites which are supporting this operation.The United States Army is dependent on space for successful operations more so now than at anytime in its history. Space systems are integral to supporting all Army Warfighting Functions (Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Sustainment, Fires, and Protection). The Global Positioning Systems (GPS) provides precise positioning, navigation, and timing; as well as supports accurate targeting. Satellite communications allows for world wide connectivity for deployed U.S. forces. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites provide a worldwide information collection capability including overflight over otherwise denied geographic areas. Both communications and GPS provide inputs for our Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) systems which allow commanders, staff, and operators to clearly see the battlefield. These space capabilities worked with limited enemy disruption during operations in the CENTCOM AOR over the last 18 years; however, todays adversaries have recognized our dependence on space and will likely attempt to deny, degrade, and disrupt the armies access and use of space.

Slide: Satellite Orbits Facts

LEO missions are primarily sensors that benefit from low altitude; imagery, radar, and weather. The Iridium NEXT SATCOM constellation is in LEO, and the International Space Station is at an altitude of about ~250 miles. The most common type of imagery occurs in LEO. LEO has very limited time periods. MEO is almost exclusively a GPS orbit. At an altitude of about 12,500 miles, 24-30 satellites can provide worldwide coverage. In most places you can view 8 – 11 at a given time. GPS constellation is 24 satellites operating in 6 equally space based MEO orbital planes (4 satellites per plane x 6 planes) at a 55 degree incline from the equator. Satellites in HEO can provide communication in the norther hemisphere and missile warning over the North Pole. Satellites in GEO provide communications and missile warning.

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Slide: BCT Space Enabled Equipment BCT Equipment

Instructor Notes: (numbers layout explained under relevant background)

This slide depicts a listing of space enabled equipment found on a typical Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). BUILD SLIDE The build slide shows 3200 pieces of equipment are Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled and approximately 300 pieces of equipment are reliant on Satellite Communications (SATCOM) for operation. As shown, even at the tactical level there is a great reliance on satellites to support operations. During Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), it is expected that the enemy will attempt to deny friendly force access to these capabilities. If the enemy is successful in attacking these satellite linkages, the BCT and subordinate elements will be negatively impacted across all warfighting functions (WfF).

Key Slide Takeaways:1. The core tactical combat element of the Army has a heavy dependence on space

illustrated by a typical Brigade Combat Team having over 3200 pieces of MTOE equipment reliant on GPS and over 300 of MTOE equipment reliant on SATCOM.

2. This slide is for illustration, so do not be focused on explaining individual pieces of equipment.

Key Terms:BCT: Brigade Combat Team BFT: Blue Force TrackerDAGR: Defense Advanced GPS Receiver AN/MRC: Mobile Radio Component (U.S. military Mobile radio systems)

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RQ-11 RAVEN B: Is a lightweight unmanned aircraft system (UAS). It is designed for rapid deployment and high-mobility AN/PSG- 14 LFED: Lightweight Forward Entry Device Computer SystemAN/UYQ-90 JBC-P-LOG: Joint Battle Command Platform AN/MSC-82 TCN: Tactical Component NetworkAN/PED-1 LLDR: Lightweight Laser Designator RangefinderAN/TAS-8 LRAS3: Long Range Advance Scout Surveillance SystemAN/PRC-150 HFMP: High Frequency Manpack RadioAN/PSC-117F MMMR: Multi Mission Manpack RadioLTLS: Laser Target Locator SystemLight-weight CLU-Command Launch Unit: it is a targeting sensor used with the Javelin system. M32 LHMBC: Lightweight Handheld Mortar Ballistics ComputerAN/PSG: 10 PFED- Pocket-sized Forward Entry DeviceAN/GYK-57 or 58 AFATDS: Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data SystemAN/TSC-167 STT: Satellite Transponder TerminalAN/PSC-5C: Multi-Band/ Multi-Mission Communication Terminal AN/TSR-8 GBS: Global Broadcast SystemM14A4 ITAS: Improved Target Acquisition SystemAN/TPQ-36 -37: Fire finder radar is used to locate the origin of enemy fire (artillery or mortar)AN/TPQ-50 LCMR: Lightweight Counter Mortar RadarAN/TSQ-226: commonly known as the TROJAN Special. Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal AN/TSC-154 SMART-T: Secure, Mobile, Anti-Jam, Reliable, Tactical-Terminal- MILSTAR satellite-compatible communications terminal that’s mounted on a highly mobile vehicle. AN/TTC-59 JNN: Joint Network Node, provides the means through which the communications resources at a node can be monitored, controlled, and managed. RQ-7 SHADOW: Shadow is an American unmanned aerial vehicle used by the United States Army, Marine Corps, Australian Army and Swedish Army for reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition and battle damage assessment.AN/TSC-183 CSS VSAT: Very Small Aperture Terminal AN/TMQ-52: Meteorological Measuring setAN/MLQ-40 (V)4: Mobile ground-based tactical SIGINT system. AN/PRC-148 JEM: JTRS Enhanced MBITR: The new radio is also undergoing certification for Type 1 encryption through the Top Secret level. As an SCA-compliant platform, JEM supports new JTRS waveforms, such as high-capacity data, networking, and new encryption algorithms. XM395: 120mm Precision guided mortar munition

Relevant Background:The numbers associated under each echelon refer to (assets linked to PNT/assets linked to SATCOM) under that level. Example: Under FBCB2-BFT and the BCT HQ level the graphic reads 23/23. This means that of the FBCB2-BFT assets at the BCT Headquarters level 23 are linked to GPS and 23 are linked to SATCOM for operation.

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Slide: Space Operations Requirements: COIN vs LSCO BCT Equipment

The U.S. has yet to face a near peer in terms of space for Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). During OIF/OEF the army operated in a uncontested space operating environment. This low threat environment is reflected on the left portion of the slide and depicts how space use was normalized and available in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the right side of the slide reflects what a future conflict might entail, which is a severe degradation in our access and use of space. Many services that are now taken for granted will either be degraded or denied. Additionally, other operational factors such as dispersed CPs that have to displace frequently, and less assigned HQ personnel, will all add to the operational challenge of the next battlefield.

Key Slide Takeaways:1. What we have been facing for the past 15 years is unchallenged freedom of

maneuver in space. 2. A contested operation environment degrading our space-enabled equipment is highly

likely in future conflicts.3. A worst case scenario would be a contested space environment in which we would

lose the benefits of space and go back to analog technology, which means “Cold War” era technology.

Key Terms:ADRP 3-0: The term “decisive action” replaces the term full spectrum operations as the concept of continuous, simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities.OFS: Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, U.S. Operation in Afghanistan after OEF and since December 2014. OFS is the U.S. portion of RSM OIR: Operation Inherent Resolve, U.S. Operation in Iraq after OND OND: Operation New Dawn, U.S. Operation in Iraq after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)RSM: [Operation] Resolute Support Mission, NATO operation in Afghanistan since Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)BLOS: Beyond Line of Sight communications systems separate from Satellite Communications (SATCOM)DMAIN: Division Main HQ

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DTAC: Division Tactical HQCP: Command Post

We will now discuss three of the key mission capabilities which Space provides.

Slide: Space Operations Requirements: COIN vs Near Peer Three Key Mission Capabilities

We will now discuss three of the key mission capabilities which Space provides.

Slide: Position, Navigation, Timing (GPS) GPS is critical to civilian and military

operations. The GPS satellite constellation is

positioned to provide worldwide support to the warfighter.

The GPS signal is very weak, and susceptible to enemy jamming and other electromagnetic interference.

4 satellites in view are required to receive a GPS ground fix (3 for trilateration and the 4th for timing)

Generally 8-11 satellites are in view at any given time

The GPS (Global Positioning System) provides military and civilian users with Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). GPS has become a critical capability for our civilian economy (air travel, ground transportation, banking, etc.), as well as for military operations. The Positioning and Navigation function is what is mostly frequently considered for GPS. However, the timing aspect is critically important for synchronizing

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communications, and other important functions. Disruption of GPS, mostly by deliberate enemy jamming, could have a significant negative impact on mission accomplishment. The GPS constellation requires a minimum of 24 satellites for global coverage and there are currently 31 operational satellites in orbit (As of March 25, 2019 http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/space/). They operate from an altitude of 12,500 miles above the Earth and broadcast their positioning and timing signals to any ground receiver in view. The GPS signal is very weak, equivalent to light bulb in space, and susceptible to enemy jamming and other electromagnetic interference. The primary ground receiver for the Army is the DAGR. Each ground receiver/DAGR requires a minimum of 4 satellites in the Field of View (FOV) in order to gain a reliable positioning solution. In most areas on Earth there are between 8 to 11 satellites in view at any given time, dependent on terrain.

Key Slide Takeaways:1. GPS is critical to civilian and military operations.2. The GPS satellite constellation is positioned to provide worldwide support to

the warfighter.3. The GPS signal is very weak, and susceptible to enemy jamming and other

electromagnetic interference.4. 4 satellites in view are required to receive a GPS ground fix (3 for trilateration

and the 4th for timing).5. Generally 8-11 satellites are in view at any given time.

Key Terms:

Field of View: The field of view is the extent of the observable area that is seen at any given moment. In case of radio frequency instruments or sensors it is a solid angle through which a detector is sensitive to signal reception.

The following five minute video will provide more information on GPS--- the key points to understand in this video have to do with threats to GPS, and the importance of encryption of the GPS receiver (in the case of video- the DAGR).

This GPS/PNT demo video will highlight many of the points discussed on the previous slide. The key point to focus on when watching this video is the importance of using an encrypted military receiver.Commercial GPS receivers only receive one portion of the GPS signal and are easily negated by adversary jamming. Encrypted military receivers (e.g. DAGR) acquire the complete (two frequencies and codes) GPS signal. If a military receiver has not been encrypted it functions just as a commercial receiver. The encrypted military receiver is much more jam resistant!

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Slide: GPS Warfighter Video The GPS signal is very weak and

vulnerable to enemy jamming. Civilian GPS receivers will cease to

work in a degraded environment. Encrypted military GPS receivers (e.g.

DAGR) are much more jam resistant than a commercial, or non-encrypted military receiver.

Key Terms:Encryption: The process of encoding messages or information in such a way that only authorized parties can access it. Encryption does not of itself prevent interference, but denies the message content to the interceptor.

Instructor Note: Ask Students “So what can you do about loss or disruption of your GPS?”

Slide: GPS Mitigation TTPs Be prepared to operate in a GPS

jammed environment Key your military receiver (DAGR)! Know basic techniques to block the

jamming signal Maintain traditional navigation skills

Encrypt your military GPS receiver in order to receive 2 GPS signals and become more jam resistant– this is very important. Once encrypted, the DAGR will notify the user if a jamming signal is detected with a pop-up (JAMMING DETECTED). An adversary jammer generally has to have line of sight to your receiver to be effective (however,

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some of the jamming signal may slightly curve around an obstacle). You can use terrain, buildings, and even your body in order to block most of the jamming effect. In a significant jamming environment --be prepared to operate without GPS. Train on the use of map and compass, terrain association, azimuth/distance/direction, and dead reckoning. These are skills every Soldier should be proficient in. In addition, develop a PACE Plan for having a Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency means for navigation and timing. Knowing what you can switch to if your primary source is lost is critical to maintaining time and tempo.Understand the threat and the GPS environment. As part of your operational planning, understand how weather and terrain factors, and enemy jamming may degrade your use of GPS.

Key Terms:DAGR: Defense Advanced GPS ReceiverPACE: Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency for a capability. Often referred to for communications sources but can also be used for any operational capability for continuity.

Slide: Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Typical BCT Linkages to SATCOM

Satellite Communications enable timely Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) communications of Voice, Data, and C2 across all echelons of the formation.

Satellite Communications enable timely Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) communications of Voice, Data, and C2 across all echelons of the formation.

Satellite communications (SATCOM) are critically important to the U.S. Army. SATCOM provides key connectivity for all Warfighting Functions---providing both voice and data communications. SATCOM allows Army and Joint Commands located at garrison locations in CONUS to be able to communicate with deployed forces anywhere in the world. In simple terms a

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Communications satellite is a relay station roughly 22,300 miles in space that has a field of view of 1/3 of the Earth’s surface. The signal is sent from the ground to the satellite, and then rebroadcast to the distant recipient. The top portion of the slide reflects military and commercial satellites which support the army. In today’s contested operational environment, the receiver antenna on the satellites may be vulnerable to enemy jamming (uplink), and the user equipment on the ground is also subject to enemy line of sight (downlink) jamming.

Relevant Background: The upper left of the slide depicts communications satellites on orbit. These satellites are roughly 22,300 miles in space, generally in line with the equator (to provide coverage of both the north and south hemisphere), and move at the same speed as the earth’s rotation- thus they appear to be stationary to the user on the ground. The satellites depicted are a combination of military satellites- referred to as MILSATCOM, and commercially leased satellites. It is DoD Space Policy that the Army will use both commercial and military systems to provide communications.

Key Terms:Satellite Communications: A satellite placed in orbit around the earth in order to relay television, radio, data, UAS C2, and telephone signals

a. Commercial SATCOM: civilian satellitesb. MILSATCOM: military satellites

Warfighting Functions: The 6 Warfighting Functions are Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, and Protection.

Command and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commanding officer over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS): Is a related term often used in the military to describe radio communications capabilities that link personnel or systems too distant or too fully obscured by terrain for LOS communications.

Slide: Typical BCT Linkages to SATCOM The Space enabled equipment referred

to on the previous slide utilizes the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) to transmit and receive data. This slide provides an overview of the EMS, discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the different components of the spectrum, and how the EMS components may be impacted by weather and enemy electronic warfare (EW).

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Space enabled equipment utilized by the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) relies on the EMS. The EMS facilitates the transmission of communication data from Army ground based terminals (i.e. Satellite Transportable Terminal (STT)) to the satellite on orbit. The satellite boosts the signal strength, and than retransmits it to the intended recipient back on the ground. The satellite is basically a “retrans” station in space, but because of its high altitude (22,300 miles) a single satellite can cover up to 1/3 of the earths surface. However– both the communications receiver located on the satellite, and the associated ground terminal, are vulnerable to enemy EW attack.Another example of satellite connectivity is the positioning and timing signal provided by the global positioning systems (GPS), which is broadcast continually by a group of GPS satellites operating at an altitude of 12,500 miles. These satellites provide position and timing data, and are easy to access by any terrestrial user that has either a military or commercial GPS receiver. However, in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), the GPS ground user equipment is very vulnerable to enemy EW attack, electromagnetic interference from adjacent/allied formations, and manipulation (spoofing). The GPS signal is about as strong as a 60 watt light bulb, and after traveling 12,500 miles thru space (distance from satellite to receiver) is very weak by the time it reaches the recipient on the ground. The communications portion of the EMS is divided into three primary components. The primary advantages and disadvantages of each portion of the spectrum are discussed below:Ultra High Frequency (UHF) – The UHF portion of the spectrum is effective for Army tactical operations– user equipment (like the PSC-5, and PRC-117 TACSAT) are easy to set up, great for communicating on the move, and pointing the antenna toward the satellite does not need to be as precise as for other forms of satellite communications. Additionally, UHF remains effective in bad weather (heavy rain). The GPS signal utilizes the UHF spectrum, and (as mentioned above) is broadcast on a continuous basis – thus always being available to the GPS user on the ground/or in an aircraft. The disadvantages of UHF include: very vulnerable to enemy EW, can be impacted by solar weather, and has limited bandwidth capacity (for instance--cannot support full motion video files).Super High Frequency (SHF) – The SHF portion of the spectrum is also very important for Army operations. SHF provides a good combination of tactical (operator friendly, some communications on the move), and operational support (greater bandwidth to transmit large files/video data). SHF is more resistant to enemy EW attacks than UHF, and provides a good combination of capability to help mitigate (though not eliminate) solar and terrestrial weather issues. However, there are some limitations of SHF that also need to be considered, which include: a sophisticated and skilled adversary can still conduct EW against SHF, some of SHF resides on commercially owned satellites – which makes it more vulnerable to EW and Cyber attacks, and certain portions of the SHF spectrum can be impacted by moderate to heavy rain. The bottom line with SHF is that from a communications standpoint it provides a “sweet spot” from an Army user perspective. It is not full proof to enemy attack/weather issues, but provides a great combination of capability that certainly makes SHF a very advantageous spectrum for Army use.

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Extremely High Frequency (EHF) – The EHF spectrum is the most EW resistant, and provides the greatest bandwidth capacity. The Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (Smart-T) is the primary EHF capable terminal that is assigned to the BCT, and would provide the best capability for assured satellite communications in a highly contest environment. The primary limitations of EHF are: technical – challenging for the operator, need to have a proficient signal soldier to operate, and– very susceptible to poor weather (moderate/heavy rain).

KEY TERMS

AN/PSC-117G MMMR: Multi Mission Manpack RadioAN/UYQ-90 JBC-P: Joint Battle Command Platform AN/TSC-167 STT: Satellite Transportable TerminalAN/TSC-183 CSS VSAT: Combat Service Support Very Small Aperture Terminal AN/TSC-154 SMART-T: Secure, Mobile, Anti-Jam, Reliable, Tactical-Terminal- MILSTAR satellite-compatible communications terminal that’s mounted on a highly mobile vehicle. BCT: Brigade Combat TeamBLOS: Beyond Line of SiteDAGR: Defense Advanced GPS Receiver EMS: Electromagnetic SpectrumEW: Electronic WarfareGPS: Global Positioning SystemLSCO: Large Scale Combat OperationsPACE Plan: Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency PlansSlide: CSS VSAT SATCOM Architecture

This slide describes the CSS VSAT SATCOM Architecture

Legacy CSS VSAT is Ku and improved CSS VSAT is Ku, Ka, X band. To ensure your success in using sustainment information systems, here are the top 10 things you need to know about CAISI and CSS VSAT.

1. The CAISI and CSS VSAT systems are found everywhere an Army sustainer works; they are used in support of combat training center rotations, field training exercises,

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garrison operations, and contingency operations. They are found in ammunition transfer holding points, motor pools, supply shops, support operations shops, brigade S-1 shops, and battalion or unit aid stations. A typical brigade-sized element has an average of eight CSS VSATs and 73 CAISIs.

2. The CAISI and CSS VSAT systems are easy to deploy and set up. In 20 to 30 minutes, CSS VSAT can go from being "fully stored for transport" to being able to successfully transmit automated sustainment data. A sustainer can shut down, store, transport, and set up the systems at a new location without assistance.

CAISI does not require the use of long cable runs. CAISIs communicate wirelessly with each other and provide connectivity even if the CSS VSAT is miles away. This is important because motor pools and supply support activities do not normally fit within a brigade, battalion, or company command post area.

3. CAISIs can extend communications support up to 35 miles. CAISIs can be deployed to establish connectivity using a combination of grid, dual-band, and omnidirectional antennas. Using a grid-to-grid line of sight configuration allows a sustainer the freedom to operate up to 35 miles away from the CSS VSAT. A grid-to-omnidirectional combination extends the range six more miles, and an omnidirectional-to-omnidirectional combination extends the range up to four miles.

Once the CAISI and CSS VSAT network has been established, clients are connected using an Ethernet cable up to 100 meters away from the CAISI switch. DSL [digital subscriber line] bridges in the CAISI systems support representatives kit can be used whenever mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and support available, time available, and civil considerations require their use.

4. The CAISI and CSS VSAT are user owned and operated. They can be set up by the owner, who may be military occupational specialty (MOS) 68G (patient administration specialist), 68J (medical logistics specialist), 88M (motor transport operator), 92Y (unit supply specialist), or 92A (automated logistical specialist). No additional MOS is required in the using activity to maintain and deploy the systems. With constant use and training, both in garrison and in field environments, users quickly become self-sufficient in deploying the CAISI and CSS VSAT.

5. CSS VSAT bandwidth is provided by the Product Manager Defense Wide Transmission Systems. Satellite access time is provided year round, assuring sustainers that their communications needs will be met. Satellite access requests are not required in order to conduct sustainment operations over the CAISI and CSS VSAT network.

6. CAISI and CSS VSAT can be palletized and transported in one vehicle. Each CAISI consists of a transport box and antenna carrier. The CAISI bridge module's shipping weight is 54 pounds, and the total weight for the CSS VSAT is 494 pounds. Read the fine print and follow directions. Do not put it away wet; properly pack and store it.

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Inspect the connectors before and after operation.

7. CAISI is the communications interface for sustainment information systems and GCSS-Army. CAISI has the technology to create secure wireless bridging and wireless local area network services. CAISI incorporates two radios and is dual-band frequency capable.

8. CAISI and CSS VSAT provide built-in level 2 security (as outlined in Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) and voice over Internet protocol. The centrally managed "call manager" provides sustainers with the ability to communicate worldwide with any other voice over Internet protocol phone that is connected to a CSS VSAT.

9. CAISI and CSS VSAT are supported by unit sustainment automation support management office (SASMO) personnel. With an average of 10 system specialists, including supply, medical, signal, maintenance, and aviation, SASMOs can support the brigade CAISI and CSS VSAT network. They ensure the brigade's automated sustainment information systems are fully operational.

No additional workload is placed on unit S-6 shops to support these systems. External CSS VSAT support is just one phone call away. While users may call the SASMO, satellite communications field engineers, or Inmarsat (a communications contractor) directly for assistance, the SASMO should always be the first choice.

10. Perhaps most importantly, a CSS VSAT and CAISI pocket guide application for mobile devices is available in the Apple app store for Apple devices and the Google Play app store for Android devices. Search for "CAISI-VSAT" on both store sites. This application includes valuable information to the operator in the field. It includes links to technical manuals, setup configuration videos, and contact information that can be used by sustainers needing assistance worldwide.

Slide: CSS VSAT Satellite Coverage Guide VSAT Coverage Guide

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Point out redundancy of SES satellites and then lack of redundancy of SES satellites in Africa and the Korea area of operations

Slide: SATCOM Mitigation Be prepared to operate in a

SATCOM degraded environment

Your technical expertise is with your S6 and EWO staff.

Trouble shoot equipment, understand the tactical situation, and know how the environment may impact your systems.Develop a PACE plan (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency) as the tactical situation dictates.

In order to operate in a SATCOM degraded environment or minimize the effects to operations you should know how to conduct basic Preventive Maintenance Check and Services (PMCS) of your SATCOM equipment, to ensure it is not an operator issue (i.e. make sure you have line of sight to the satellite). You should also know what is going on with the environment such as solar weather or terrestrial weather. Besides the natural environment, you should also know the tactical situation and check with your S2 to determine if the enemy may be jamming communications. SATCOM jamming may be directed either at the satellite, or may be local line of site issue. If you do suspect enemy jamming, report the interference as your unit standard operating procedures (SOP) dictate. This prompt reporting will help identify and resolve the problem. If the problem persists, be prepared to execute your mission with whatever communications means available. Commander’s intent implies the ability to continue the mission effectively- even when out of communications with your commander.

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Slide: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Space based ISR is very

important to the U.S. military. For the average Soldier,

commercial imagery is the easiest ISR capability to access, and the most relevant for operations.

Top portion (3 bullets): ISR satellites helps us gather information about the enemy and operational environment. This information allows us to monitor what the enemy is doing. Much of the information collected is done by U.S. Government owned and operated satellites. However, commercial companies contribute to Space ISR collection, primarily by providing a variety of imagery related products. The image scenes on the right side of this slide were collected by commercial imagery satellites. The key individual in your staff for accessing and exploiting ISR satellite data is your unit S2.

Bottom portion of slide (4 bullets): One of the great benefits of satellites is that they can access the entire globe, thus ISR can be collected in areas that would otherwise be denied to aircraft, UAS, or other types of information collection. Additionally, these ISR satellites can detect a variety of signatures on the battlefield which help us determine enemy technical capabilities. One of the great benefits (3rd bullet) that commercial satellites provide is the image is not classified. It can be easily shared within the organization, as well as with coalition partners. Finally, satellite ISR contributes to the S2’s efforts to have a complete and detailed picture of the enemy and environment.

Slide: Limits of Space Capabilities Physics Terrestrial Environment Solar Environment Enemy Actions

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There are various limitations to space capabilities, but the most prevalent four are displayed here. Objects in space do not simply “float” as seen in most Hollywood movies. Objects in space are subjected to the laws of physics and are constantly in motion around the Earth. How often a satellite revisits the same place on the Earth is a factor of many different things and dictated by physics, its altitude, and its operational mission.

The second limitation is terrestrial weather. Imagery satellites collect information in the same fashion a camera does. Light, clouds, sand storms, etc. can all prevent or degrade the ability of a satellite from doing its mission. Certain types of satellite communications can also be degraded by rain, sleet, or snow. If you subscribe to most types of satellite TV you might have experienced signal disruption in a heavy rain storm as an example.

The third limitation is from the harmful results of the solar environment. The sun and atmosphere can negatively affect lower frequency SATCOM signals. GPS signals reside in this band and are impacted by solar weather.

The fourth and most dangerous limitation is that of enemy actions designed to deny, degrade, or disrupt friendly force access to space.

LSA 1 Check on Learning:1. What is the most critical thing you can do to help mitigate the impacts of an enemy

jammer?

2. Why do adversaries invest in GPS jamming?Answer:1. Key or encrypt your receiver.2. Our reliance on GPS, it’s cheap and easy, and it’s weak signal

LSA 1 Summary:Identify Capabilities of Space Enables Equipment.Recall that the three mission capabilities Space Provides are: 1. PNT 2. SATCOM 3. Space Based ISR What are your questions regarding this topic?

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Slide: LSA 2 Identify Space Linkages

What does space provide? Emphasize again that Space is linked to all army Warfighting functions, and the following three slides will highlight a typical squad’s space dependencies.

Slide: Satellite and Space Statistics The army is supported by space

all the way down to the individual soldier.

**See slide 21 “Infantry Squad Reliance On Space” for a breakdown on the estimated 115 satellites used by an Infantry squad

In order to gain some perspective on the linkages of space-enabled equipment, let’s look at a few statics on satellites in space. Globally, there are approximately 1,975 satellites that operate in a variety of orbits from about 100 miles above the Earth to over 22,300 miles out in space. Many of these satellites have multiple packages/sensors onboard, which allow them to do a variety of different missions. Over 60% of operational satellites provide satellite communications all over the world (i.e. voice, internet, TV, etc.). Also in space is a large number of defunct satellites, rocket bodies, and other pieces of space debris which unfortunately remain in orbit. There are over 21,000 pieces of debris that we can track and continuously track in order to help notify and prevent additional debris being caused if they collide with each other or any of the 1,975 operational satellites.

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There are approximately 115 satellites an Infantry squad is enabled by. We’ll see a breakdown of those 115 satellites on the next slide, but also note that a Soldier has the potential of carrying 2 or more satellite receivers as part of individual gear. This gear can consist of a GPS receiver, Search And Rescue (SAR) transmitter, and/or a SATCOM capability.

BCT: Brigade Combat TeamINF: InfantryTotal satellites, per: http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.Vvqrb_7Vw74, last updated 06/30/16

Slide: Medical Squad Reliance On Space Space enabled equipment is

used in operations down to the smallest units in the formation

D3SOE effects can be felt down to the squad and even individual Soldier level.

This slide reflects the space linkages for a medical squad. There are a large number of communication and navigation satellites that can potentially support the Soldier on the ground. However, not all of these satellites are used by the squad at the same time. For instance, the slide reflects 66 Iridium satellites– but only one or two these 66 satellites may be necessary at any one time to support the actual voice transmission. Likewise, only four GPS satellites (out of 31) are necessary for a GPS position fix, and only one imagery satellite is necessary for a picture. However, the bottom line is that even our lowest tactical formation uses a lot of space systems for a variety of purposes.

Relevant background:-Iridium NEXT is a commercial communications satellite constellation. 66 satellites

provide global coverage for their customers. Even though the uplink call might be with 1 satellite, multiple satellites are used to link the call from one location to other location on the ground.

-GPS provides positioning, navigation, and timing to both civilian and military users. The 31 satellites provide worldwide coverage.

-There are numerous U.S. leased commercial imagery satellites contracted by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) but there are 5 main satellites used. The five main satellites used as apart of the EnhancedView contract. Military personnel have the capability to receive current, high quality imagery

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from these satellites via their S2 channels or directly via the commercial providers Web Hosting Service (https://www.evwhs.digitalglobe.com).

- Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs) are used by many units for Search and Rescue (SAR) needs, there is a separate capability not listed on the slides for Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). The CSAR mission uses other satellites in order to provide that capability.

- This slide does not list commercial GPS receivers, but it is well known that commercial GPS receivers, carried by U.S. Soldiers, far outnumber DAGRs on the battlefield.

Key Terms:SL: Squad LeaderTL: Team LeaderGREN: Grenadier (M203, 40MM grenade launcher)AR: Automatic Rifleman (M249, 5.56MM machine gun)AT SPC: Anti-Tank Specialist (Javelin missile)DM: Designated Marksman (M110, XM2010)

Slide: Infantry Squad Reliance On Space Space touches many facets of

our Warfighting Functions. Each of these areas may be affected by operations in a D3SOE scenario.

Instructor Notes: This chart is a simplified example of linkages to the tactical Army on SATCOM, PNT, and ISR and by no means encompasses all linkages.

The primary space capabilities that have a linkage to the tactical Army are SATCOM, PNT, and ISR– as listed on the left side of the slide. These three Space capabilities support all of our Army Warfighting Functions, which are listed along the top of the slide. The brief descriptions in each column show how the space capability supports each of these Warfighting Functions. Specifically: SATCOM provides beyond line of sight/long distance communications. This allows the units to communicate around the world, synchronize control, get timely intelligence and logistics, and protect units from unexpected threats. PNT (GPS) provides precise position, navigation, and timing. This allows units to accurately know the location of all formations, for the units to effectively maneuver, to employ precise fires on the enemy, get accurate enemy locations, and track logistics in a real time manner. ISR (Intel collection) allows the intelligence staff to collect on deep targets, receive higher level intelligence quickly, provides current and

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relevant targets, and logistics with key information (like commercial imagery) to effective plan Sustainment operations.

LSA 2 Check on Learning:1. True or False: Space operations impact all the warfighting functions

Answer:1. True

Slide: LSA 3 Identify Space Threat Capabilities

There are many types of threats.Recent example of Russian operations in the Ukraine. GYPSY KILO – GPS jamming results in Army FTXSummary discussion of implications on Army operations when operating against a near peer threat.

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Slide: Any Adversary Can Be Space Capable Use of space is not just

inclusive to space capable nations.

While Near Peer adversaries have robust space programs, many smaller countries have easy access to satellite information and can obtain products that are commercially available for purchase.

Any adversary can be space capable because commercially available space can be easily purchased. For instance, communications bandwidth is easily leased. The civilian GPS signal is broadcast to anyone in the possession of a GPS receiver. Space based imagery is available for purchase on the internet. Thus, any adversary can obtain satellite communications, navigation, and imagery.

Key Terms:Satellite Imaging: There are many commercial companies that acquire and disseminate satellite imagery in addition to nations that have their own satellites imagery capabilities for intelligence gathering.

Global Communications: Provides voice and video calling, internet, fax, television, and radio channels communication capabilities. This can span long distances, and can operate under circumstances or conditions which are impractical for other forms of communication.

Global Weather: Monitors the state of the atmosphere, and the estimated impact on the ground. Conducts current and future analysis of temperature, visibility, wind speed, humidity, etc. Prediction analysis is also important to aid planners in conducting operations

Foreign Collection: Information collected and exploited from satellite capabilities owned by foreign governments.

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Slide: Threats to Space Operations Threats

There are many threat “types” that can limit the U.S. Military's full and unrestricted access to space capabilities, services, and products. The main concern for Army tactical units are denoted with a star.Enemy Threats, Factors: (from upper left to right) include:

1. Anti-Satellite Missile (ASAT) – launch from the ground, or air, to space to destroy a satellite in orbit.

2. Ground station attack – physical attack against terrestrial satellite control facility, which could impact satellite Command and Control (C2).

3. SATCOM and GPS jamming are the greatest threat to Army ground formations, as these threats directly impact the tactical Army’s ability to communicate beyond line-of-sight (BLOS), navigate, receive critical timing data, and employ precision munitions.

4. CYBER and laser threats can impact space operations, but response and countermeasures to these threats are executed at higher levels.

Non-Enemy Factors to space systems are primarily related to natural or manmade interference. These include:

1. Unintentional electromagnetic interference (EMI) caused by friendly or neutral forces operating on the same frequency band, thus inadvertently disrupting operations.

2. Space debris can cause damage to satellites on orbit.3. Solar (space) weather can potentially temporarily disrupt certain types of SATCOM

and GPS.4. Terrestrial weather threats that could degrade U.S. satellite capabilities may include

heavy rains for certain types of SATCOM, or high winds which would cause SATCOM dishes to be retracted/stored or destroyed.

5. Terrain and Vegetation refer to natural or man-made terrain (such as buildings/complex terrain/urban canyons/etc.) as well as jungle canopy and it’s effects on GPS and/or SATCOM.

Transition to: D3SOE Issues in the UkraineRelevant background: D3SOE is a condition within the area of operations and area of interest characterized by intentional and unintentional interference on the ability of both friendly and adversary military forces to exploit space capabilities, services, and products. Consequences of this condition require U.S. military forces to employ both defensive and offensive measures to protect our unrestricted access to space while denying the same to the enemy.

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See JP 3-09 for Lethal/non-Lethal definitions. Also see JP 1-02.

Slide: D3SOE Issues in the Ukraine A peer or near peer

adversary can be expected to attack with the purpose to deny, degrade, and disrupt U.S. space advantages.

The most recent example of what to expect in a near peer conflict was illustrated in recent years during the Ukrainian Conflict.

PNT/GPS will be manipulated or interrupted by a peer or near peer.

Communication signals will be vulnerable to enemy electronic warfare, and/or signals collection.

Recent Russian military operations, such as their incursion into the Ukraine, have demonstrated what impact a technically sophisticated adversary can have on the battlefield. If the U.S. Army was to face such a threat, we would need to be prepared to execute operations in a Denied, Degraded, or Disrupted Space Operational Environment (D3SOE). The application of the basic SATCOM and PNT mitigation techniques discussed in earlier slides will be necessary if we are to have success against a high-tech threat. (Comments on each bullet):

1. Russians demonstrated a capability to attack the “electromagnetic spectrum” and especially jam the use of GPS.

2. They intercepted and disrupted friendly communications, located the friendly force, and subsequently targeted within minutes.

3. The Russians effectively employed UAS for both collection and targeting.4. All potential adversaries the U.S. Army faces in a future fight– will likely employ UAS

against us, some UAS will be technically simple and easy to employ.5. CYBER attacks, and disruption of networks, are a common practice employed by the

Russians.6. There is a rapid growth in the number of imagery satellites which makes even rear areas of the battlefield susceptible to collection and targeting.

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Key Terms:Jamming: Frequency jamming is the disruption of radio signals through use of an over-powered signal in the same frequency range. When most people think of frequency jamming, what comes to mind are radio, radar and cell phone jamming?

Slide: GYPSY KILO (GK) Operations in a Denied, Degraded, or Disrupted Space Operational Environment can severely impact Company and Platoon operations. Tactical units must encrypt their GPS receivers, recognize vulnerabilities to enemy electronic warfare, periodically train in an analog environment, and develop a PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) plan when threatened with a D3SOE scenario.

GYPSY KILO was a GPS jamming exercises executed by the Joint Navigation Warfare Center (JNWC). The JNWC (composed of reps from all services) periodically conducts these GPS jamming exercises to test the capabilities/vulnerabilities and training proficiency across the DOD. The results covered on this slides involved Army Company and Platoon engagements during a Ft Carson FTX and a WSMR FTX. After action reviews show that Soldiers and junior leaders are very dependent on space linkages, but are not aware of equipment vulnerabilities to jamming, or the need to encrypt GPS (DAGR) receivers. Additionally, units had trouble conducting legacy map reading skills, battlefield tracking was much less timely, and communications less reliable. Similar types of AAR results have been observed during 2018 National Training Center (NTC) rotations, the problems exhibited during the Ft Carson FTX, the WSMR FTX, and at the NTC reflect Army wide limitations when operating in a D3SOE.

Relevant Background: This assessment is similar to many of the other units the assessment team has observed. 1. The overall findings where that the unit failed to have the basic knowledge and skills to fight and win in a D3SOE.2. Soldiers and leaders appeared to take it for granted that their space enabled equipment would always work. -- Leadership admitted to their over-dependence on GPS enabled devices such as Friendly Force Trackers and digital targeting systems. -- All of the leadership we spoke with admitted to training deficiencies in basic land navigation skills.3. The overall majority of first line supervisors did not ensure that their equipment operators had taken the necessary steps to protect their devices from being disrupted or degraded. -- Approximately 80% of the Soldiers we observed failed to ensure that their DAGRs had the proper crypto prior to utilization.

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-- Many units did not have the proper cable necessary to fill the DAGRs with crypto.-- Several of the Soldiers utilized civilian GPS devices, unintentionally creating Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) vulnerabilities the adversaries can exploit.-- GPS COMSEC was not distributed specifically to the aviation unit, so all Shadow UAS would have had major issues (this is one of the OPFORs primary uses of GPS jammers). 4. The unit’s ability to communicate with FM communications was poor. -- Unit moved over to using Blue Force Tracker messages in order to communicate. -- The S6 had significant maintenance issues with the SATCOM equipment and by training day 3 had yet to establish connectivity between the BDE and BN.-- A SATCOM degradation threat scenario was scheduled; however, Commander Ops Group (COG) decided to not conduct it because the unit was already Mission Command challenged.

Slide: Space Planning Considerations Operations in a Denied, Degraded, or Disrupted Space Operational Environment can severely impact Company and Platoon operations. For planning purposes operations in a D3SOE environment must take into consideration the potential for an increase in civilian casualties, fratricide, collateral damage, ammunition expenditure, and decreases in operational tempo and situational awareness.

Instructor Notes: This slides covers some basic Space planning considerations when conducting the Military Decision Making Process MDMP). These steps should be accomplished primarily during Mission Analysis, but select enemy Threat/Electronic Warfare (EW) may also be applicable during Course of Action (COA) wargaming and/or comparison.

There are some basic Space planning considerations that you should incorporate during MDMP, specifically during Mission Analysis where the Commander and Staff determine a clear understanding of the mission and problem set. During Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), Space is a critical enabler to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), and Space linkages will be contested by the enemy.Space considerations should be integrated into your normal staff analysis, as would be applied to warfighting functions across the BCT. If necessary, the Space Support Element (SSE) in the Division G-3 staff can respond to request for information (RFIs), or help address more technical Space related questions.Space planning steps:Determine status of Space enabled equipment:

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1) Is all global positioning system (GPS) supported equipment (DAGR, JCR, UAS, etc.) loaded with current crypto? Critical to help defeat enemy EW and Spoofing.

2) What are key Space enabled pieces of equipment in the BCT? Is the equipment operational, are Soldiers trained, and how important is this equipment to mission accomplishment (offense, defense, stability operations)?

Conduct IPB (part of overall staff effort led by the S2): Solar activity may impact the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) spectrum – GPS and tactical satellite communications (SATCOM).

1) Rain may impact some of the more higher level communications (SIPR/NIPR, S2 intel, S4 logistics).

2) Terrain may be an issue– need to have line of sight to the supporting satellites.

3) Threat– at the BCT the primary concern is enemy EW and GPS spoofing. The S2 should track the EW threat capabilities, and include on the Intelligence Situation Template. The Division SSE can provide assistance with modeling Threat EW, answering RFIs on enemy capabilities, and addressing more technical issues like enemy spoofing, or friendly force counter options.

Operational Planning Considerations:1) Provide assessment of overall potential impact on BCT mission

accomplishment. 2) Ensure S2 includes enemy EW systems as part of IPB, specifically included

on Situation Template, and in Collection Plan. Fires cell should plan for kinetic targeting of known enemy EW locations. Soldiers should be trained to use the DAGR line of bearing capability to assist in locating GPS jammers.

3) Develop PACE plan to deal with D3SOE. For example: for navigation – DAGR (primary), map/compass (alternate), allied GPS like capability– Galileo navigation satellite (contingency), local maps/dead reckoning (emergency).

4) Bottom line: all elements of BCT need to be prepared to operate in an analog manner (vs digital) in a D3SOE during Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO).

The up and down facing arrows on the slide provide additional Space related planning considerations that should be considered during Mission Analysis. They are described below.Increase in (implied by Red arrow pointing up):

- The possibility of collateral damage (which could include civilian casualties), and fratricide (friendly force action), as precision munitions (EXCALIBUR, JDAM) become less reliable, and we have a less clear battle space Common Operating Picture (COP).

- Ammunition expenditure increases as “dumb rounds” must replace precision rounds (which means transportation and associated fuel requirements rise substantially).

- Paper maps must be obtained in sufficient quantities to meet tactical force requirements (maps down to platoon level at minimum).

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- Units must be prepared to revert to “analog” methods. This means manually (map, acetate, unit symbols, phase lines, check points, etc.) tracking the battle. Increased communication limitations with dispersed elements around the battlefield. Additionally, all units must be prepared to conduct traditional land navigation (thus the need for maps, and compass).

Decrease in (Red arrow down):- Operational tempo (OPTEMPO) will slow, and situational awareness

will decrease, as a result of having to operate in an “analog” fashion. Units will experience disrupted communications, get disoriented, cross unit boundaries, and have decreased clarity of the battlefield.

- As a result of degraded SATCOM and GPS, Logistics planners may need to estimate sustainment requirements and “push” supplies instead of a more efficient and effective “pull” system (which requires good communications and GPS).

- Fires lethality decreases as dumb rounds replace precision fires. Additionally, collateral damage, civilian losses, and friendly force fratricide may increase.

- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection is impacted, as the friendly force ability to collect on the enemy (ISR satellites), orient intel sensors (GPS), and execute intelligence dissemination (SATCOM) is impacted by enemy EW and/or counter space operations.

Transition To: MDMP Planning ConsiderationsKey Slide Takeaways:

1. Operations in a Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space Operational Environment (D3SOE) increases hazards to friendly forces and may significantly impact friendly force mission accomplishment.

2. It is important that the BCT (and subordinate BNs) consider D3SOE when conducting Mission Analysis. This will help the Commander better craft an appropriate COA, and prepare soldiers and leaders to deal with the degradation or loss of important Command and Control (C2), ISR, Communications, and Navigation capabilities when conducting LSCOs against a peer threat.

Key Terms:BCT: Brigade Combat TeamCOA: Course of ActionCOP: Common Operating PictureD3SOE: Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space Operational EnvironmentEW: Electronic WarfareGPS: Global Positioning SystemISR: Intelligence Surveillance, and ReconnaissanceLSCO: Large Scale Combat OperationsMDMP: Military Decision Making ProcessOPTEMPO: Operational TempoPACE Plan: Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency Plan

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RFI: Request for InformationSATCOM: Satellite CommunicationsSSE: Space Support ElementUHF: Ultra High Frequency

LSA 3 Check on Learning:1. Can any adversary be space capable?2. True or False. Russian EW operations in the Ukraine were poorly planned and executed? 3. What are some possible threats to space systems? Answer:

1. Yes. Any adversary can be space capable but their capabilities may vary.2. False. The Russians were very competent and effective.3. Enemy Jamming or Lasers, CYBER, ASATs, EMI caused by friendly or neutral forces, Space debris, Space (solar) weather, Terrestrial weather, terrain and vegetation can disrupt Space linkages.

You should now be able to Identify Space threat capabilities.Recall that there are many types of threats. 1. Ukrainian Conflict Lessons Learned 2. GYPSY KILO 3. Peer/Near Peer threatWhat are your questions regarding this topic?

Summary Check on Learning1. What is D3SOE? 2. What is the definition of D3SOE?3. What are some possible enemy threats to space systems? Answer:

1. Denied, Degrade, Disrupted Space Operational Environment.2. D3SOE is a condition within the area of operations and area of interest characterized

by intentional and unintentional interference on the ability of both friendly and adversary military forces to exploit space capabilities, services and products.

3. ASAT, Ground station attack, jamming, Cyber, and Laser

4. What is the most critical thing you can do to help mitigate the impacts of an enemy jammer?

5. What warfighting functions are enabled by and vulnerable to the impacts of space operations?

Answer:4. Key or encrypt your receiver5. Space operations impact all the warfighting functions.

Slide: LSA 3 Identify Space Capabilities Summary

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The purpose of the Conducting Operations in a Degraded Space Environment is not to make all of you subject matter experts or even rocket scientist but to give you the tools necessary to understand, request space resources, and fight in a contested environment during large scale combat operations.

SummaryYou should now be able to: Identify impacts of Denied, Degraded, Disrupted Space Operational Environment (D3SOE) on Army Operations.· Identify Capabilities/Limitations of Space Enabled Equipment· Identify Space Linkages to the Warfighting Function tasks· Identify Space threat capabilities

Slide: TLO

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e. Develop (10 min): This phase is student-centered and instructor facilitated.

NOTE: Instructors now initiate a student discussion of how material in the lesson plan will be used in their future assignments. Although instructors can guide students in the discussion, the answers ultimately belong to the students. The intent is that students recognize that value of understanding joint operations in both garrison and deployed environments and the various components of that support.

Here are some ideas that instructors can inject into the discussion:

Students in the concrete exercise should have identified many of the primary or related topics brought up in the lesson. Has this lesson helped them see linkages between all the topics?

Some tasks/processes are conducted sequentially while others are simply related and may occur before, after, or at the same time as others. Do students see how the relationships between different events can create opportunities or limitations in trying to accomplish missions in a time constrained environment?

f. Apply (30 mins): Administer Practical Exercise

The Perform Joint HR Operations practical exercise consist of five group scenarios that will evaluate the students ability to identify the Joint Operations organization, functions, and apply principles of personnel support to Joint Operations.

Appendix ATLO 5.0 – Provide Input to HR Planning and Operations Assessment Plan

ELO 5.1 Perform Joint HR Operations

ELO 5.2 Review the HR Organizational Structure

ELO 5.3 Apply the HR MDMP

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Appendix BList of SlidesSlide 1: Perform Joint HR OperationsSlide 2: RankSlide 3: ActionSlide 4: ConditionSlide 5: StandardSlide 6: Historical PerspectiveSlide 7: Joint Large Scale Combat OperationsSlide 8: Chain of CommandSlide 9: The Joint Chiefs of StaffSlide 10: JCS J-1Slide 11: Organizing the Joint ForceSlide 12: Unified Combatant CommandsSlide 13: Subordinate Unified CommandsSlide 14: Joint Task ForceSlide 15: Unified Command Plan 2011Slide 16: Joint Personnel Training and Tracking ActivitiesSlide 17: Personnel Accountability and Strength ReportingSlide 18: Rotation PoliciesSlide 19: Civilian PersonnelSlide 20: 60 Second Problem SolvingSlide 21: Pay, Allowances, and EntitlementsSlide 22: Postal OperationsSlide 23: Morale, Welfare, and RecreationSlide 24: Casualty ReportingSlide 25: U.S. Military Decorations and AwardsSlide 26: Foreign Decorations and Service AwardsSlide 27: Peacetime Approval AuthoritiesSlide 28: Sample Joint Award RequestSlide 29: Sample Joint Award RequestSlide 30: Joint Manning Document (JMD)Slide 31: JMD ExampleSlide 32: ActionSlide 33: ConditionSlide 34: StandardSlide 35: Army Special OperationsSlide 36: Telemark Slide 37: Special Operations Forces CapabilitiesSlide 38: OutcomeSlide 39: Terminal Learning ObjectiveSlide 40: ARSOF Organizations Slide 41: Special Forces ODASlide 42: Civil Affairs teamSlide 43: Tactical Psychological Operations Team (TPT)

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Ranger PlatoonSlide 45: Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR)Slide 46: Special Operations Sustainment ElementSlide 47: ARSOF/CF Interdependence Considerations Slide 48: SOF TruthsSlide 49: SOF ImperativesSlide 50: Characteristics of ARSOFSlide 51: ARSOF Critical CapabilitiesSlide 52: ARSOF Core PrincipleSlide 53: ARSOF Core ActivitiesSlide 54: Ultimate GoalsSlide 55: SOF/CF InterdependenceSlide 56: Practical ExerciseSlide 57: Conducting Operations in a Degraded Space EnvironmentSlide 58: Terminal Learning ObjectiveSlide 59: Safety, Risk and Environmental InformationSlide 60: How does a satellite orbit the EarthSlide 61: Space FactsSlide 62: What If?Slide 63: Satellite OrbitsSlide 64: BCT Space Enabled EquipmentSlide 65: Space Operations Requirements: COIN vs LSCOSlide 66: LSA 1- Identify Capabilities of Space Enabled EquipmentSlide 67: Position, Navigation, Timing (GPS)Slide 68: GPS Warfighter VideoSlide 69: GPS Mitigation TTPSSlide 70: Satellite Communications (SATCOM)Slide 71: The Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)Slide 72: CSS/VSAT SATCOM ArchitectureSlide 73: CSS/VSAT Satellite Coverage GuideSlide 74: SATCOM Mitigation Slide 75: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)Slide 76: Limitations of Space CapabilitiesSlide 77: LSA 2-Identify Space LinkagesSlide 78: Satellite and Space StatisticsSlide 79: Medical Squad Reliance on SpaceSlide 80: Space Linkages to Warfighting FunctionsSlide 81: LSA 3- Identify Space Threat Capabilities Slide 82: Any Adversary Can Be Space-Capable Slide 83: Threats to Space OperationsSlide 84: D3SOE Issues in the UkraineSlide 85: GYPSY KILOSlide 86: Space Planning Considerations for MDMPSlide 87: TLOSlide 88: Questions

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