ALBANIA AND GREECE: 2).)!3(1)04!2% UNDERSTANDING AND...

Albania and Greece: Understanding and explaining

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ALBANIA AND GREECE: UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLAINING

Alba CelaAlbert Rakipi Andi Balla Bashkim Zeneli Bledar Feta Dorian KoçiJordan JorgjiKonstantinos GiakoumisLedion KrisafiSelami Xhepa

Zyra e TiranësRruga “Abdi Toptani”, Torre Drin, kati 3P.O. Box 1418Tirana, Albania

Telefon: 00355 (0) 4 225098600355 (0) 4 2273306

Homepage: http://www.fes.org.al

RINIA SHQIPTARE 2011Mes besimit për të ardhmen dhe dyshimit për të tashmen!

Alba Çela

Tidita Fshazi

Arbjan Mazniku

Geron Kamberi

Jonida Smaja – koordinatore e FES


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Alba CelaAlbert Rakipi Andi Balla Bashkim Zeneli Bledar Feta Dorian KoçiJordan JorgjiKonstantinos GiakoumisLedion KrisafiSelami Xhepa

January 2018


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Published by: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung OfficeTirana Rr.AbdiToptani TorreDrin,Katii3-të KutiaPostare1418 Tirane,ALBANIA

Authors:AlbaCela AlbertRakipi AndiBalla BashkimZeneli BledarFeta DorianKoçi JordanJorgji KonstantinosGiakoumis LedionKrisafi SelamiXhepa

The opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations expressed in this publishing are of the respective authors and

do not necessarily represent those of the Foundations.

ThispublicationcannotbeusedforcommercialpurposeswithoutapriorwrittenapprovalbybothFoundations.


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Table of contents

Albania-Greece relations in the context of Albania’s EU integration process: gap between reality and perceptionAlba Cela .......................................................................................... 5

Understanding Albanian-Greek relations: Deconstructing paradoxes and myths

Albert Rakipi ................................................................................... 17

Migration: Bridge or pitfall in Albania – Greece relations?Andi Balla ....................................................................................... 35

Why are the Albanian-Greek relations moving backwards?

Bashkim Zeneli ................................................................................ 47

Bilateral Governmental Communication: A Tool for Stronger Albanian-Greek Relations

Bledar Feta ...................................................................................... 71

Unsolved political issues between Greece and Albania threaten the stability and liberal democracy in BalkansDr. Dorian Koçi ............................................................................. 107

Public opinion and Albanian-Greek relations

Jordan Jorgji ................................................................................. 115


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Greek-Albanian Relations in Greek and Albanian Historiography of the 2000s

Konstantinos Giakoumis ................................................................. 137

The Greek foreign policy towards Kosovo and the region and the implications for the Albanian-Greek relations Ledion Krisafi ................................................................................ 161

The economics of Albanian-Greece cooperation

Selami Xhepa ................................................................................. 175


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Albania-Greece relations in the context of Albania’s EU integration process: gap between reality and perception

Alba Cela1

Abstract:

Most of Albanian citizens asked in a national poll in 2013 about whether Greece would like to see Albania in the European Union answered no2, an answer that might sound expected in the context of the difficult relationships but that actually sounds perplexing when compared to the past track record of relevant developments. This belief that Greece is out there to become an obstacle to Albania’s integration path is unfortunately present in segments of the population. Yet it sharply contrast to the real performance of the Greek state and representatives when it comes to Albania’s integration. Whereas it remains true that Greek politicians from time to time mention integration when complaining about the handling of some issues in Albania, Greece has not done any significant step to halter integration so far. Greece has never vetoed any significant milestone in Albania’s European path compared to let’s say other countries such as the Netherlands did when it came to granting Albania candidate status. On the contrary Greece, just like Italy and Austria, is one of the engaged supporters of Albania’s European path. This paper tries to analyze

1. Alba Cela, Deputy Director of the Albanian Institute for International Studies2. “AlbanianGreek relations from the eyesof theAlbanianpublic–perceptions2013”,A.Cela;S.Lleshajhttp://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/10896.pdf


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this gap between perception and reality and offer a rationale for efforts to improve communication related to this particular issue.

Introduction

Europeanintegrationisacomplexandrichprocessthathasthepotentialnot only to transform countries internally but also to significantlyimprovetherelationsbetweenneighborssharingatoughhistoryfraughtwithmisunderstandingsandevenenmity.TheEuropeanUnion’sappealstandsfirstandforemostinitsbeingaprojectofandforpeace.WhenitcomestotheprocessofEuropeanintegrationoftheBalkancountries,theUnionhasbeenclearanddeterminedtooutlinetheconditionthatcountriesneedtohavenormalizedrelationsbeforemembership.Thesolutionofbilateralissuesforexampleisoneofthekeycomponentsthathasharnessedattentionandeffortduringtheseyears.3ThesolutionofbilateraldisputesisanunnegotiableconditionthatstemsnotonlyfromthevaluesofgoodneighborhoodwhichareatthecoreoftheEU,butalsofromtheEU’spreviousbitterexperiencewithcasessuchasCyprus.

Unfortunatelycountrieshavebecomeveto-powersandobstacleswhenitcomestotheprogressofEuropeanintegrationandhavecontinuedtheir conflictual rhetoric even after becomingmembers such as thecasesofCroatiaandSloveniashow.ThemostobviousexampleisthatofGreecevetoinganyfurtherstepsoftheEuropeanintegrationoftheFormerRepublicofMacedoniabasedonthenameissue.

ThefearthatsomethingsimilarcanhappentoAlbaniaisquitepresentinAlbaniansdiscourse,shadowingtherealrelationshipthathasexisted

3. “JointDeclarationAdoptedbyWesternBalkansForeignMinistersinVienna– Countries Will Not Obstruct Neighbours’ Progress in EU Integrations”,http://balkanfund.org/2015/08/joint-declaration-adopted-by-western-balkans-governments-representatives-in-vienna-countries-will-not-obstruct-neighbours-progress-in-eu-integrations/AccessedonAugust29,2017.


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theseyearsbetweenthetwocountrieswhenitcomestoEUintegration.

Theriskisalarming.TheEuropeanintegrationprocessisnotonlyanational aspirationwith no political alternative inAlbania. It is theprocess bywhich all important reforms are vestedwith legitimacy,assistanceandaremonitored.TheEUconditionalitypushesforwardthe transformation of the country.All delays and obstacles in thisprocessaresimultaneouslydelaysintheoverallprogressachievedinthetransformationofthecountry.

HowevertherecordhasshownthatGreecehashadadifferentattitudetowardsAlbania,atelatsuntilrecently.IthassupportedthereformsandshownconsiderablebackingforAlbania’sintegrationmilestonesinthepastsuchasstatusissueorevenvisaliberalization.

AsAlbaniaapproachesahopeful timefor thepossibilityofopeningnegotiations,withapositiveappraisalfromEuropeanactors4uponthesolutionofitsrecentpoliticalcrisisandtheregularheldelections,theissueofguaranteeingthesupportofitsneighborsbecomesaprimaryimportanceitem.InthefirstaddresstotheAlbanianAssembly,PrimeMinister Rama said that the only country with whichAlbania had‘issues’wasGreeceandthathewasdeterminedtoseekacollaborativerelationwhileupholdingAlbania’srights.

Thesedeclarationscomeatatimewhenthepressispushinghardonceagain the possibility ofAthens blocking the integration path uponunresolved issues, including a recent one concerning properties inHimara.Thiscontextbringsforwardonceagainthepersistingcontrastbetween the fiery rhetoric of both countrieswhen it comes to theirrelationshipandtheEuropeanintegrationframeworkandthepreviousexperience of sustaining constructive assistance in the process ofaccession.

4. http://top-channel.tv/lajme/artikull.php?id=363977#k1


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Brief history

Despitemanypoliticalproblems,confrontationsandunfortunateevents,GreecehasbeenacrucialpartnerinAlbania’stransition.Oneneedtoremember the impactofhundredsof thousandsofAlbaniancitizenswhofoundaneconomicviabilityandthenbuildalifeinthesouthernneighbor,providingpreciousremittancestotheirparents;theimportanteconomicinvestmentsandassistanceprovidedbythesouthernneighborandmostpertinentlyitscontinuouspoliticalandinternationalsupportwhenitcomestobothNATOandEuropeanintegrationprocesses.

More specifically during the decision making times in the UnionregardingAlbania, Greece has consistently fallen in the supportingcamp.

Of course the complexity of relations betweenAlbania andGreecehas been often reflected in the EU integration developments. ForinstancerightwingMPsintheEuropeanParliamentregularlydebateandchallengetheprogressreportsandrelevantpositiveresolutionsonAlbaniaongroundsthattheydon’treflecttheproblemsoftheGreekminority here or even worse raising issue about ‘GreaterAlbania’aspirations.5HowevertheseclaimsareusuallynotgettinginthewayofrealdevelopmentssincetheyareclarifiedanddismissedbyEUactors.

Furthermore recently there have been some promising attempts toaddress the outstanding issues in a more formal and constructivemanner,themostrecentonebeingtheBushati-Kotsiaspackagewhichhas been highly praised by Commissioner Hahn. However even inthiscasethedebatehasbroughtupsensitiveclaimsontheGreeksidethat theCommissionerwrongfullyaddressed theChamissue,whichremainsunrecognizedbyGreece.6

5. http://top-channel.tv/lajme/english/artikull.php?id=13663&ref=ml#.WcN149VL-M8 6. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/eu-commissioner-caught-in-between-


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Political context and electoral rounds greatly influence the serenityoftherelationsandthereforetheintegrationnarrativeaswell.Inthelast elections round inAlbania, theperceptionwas that thepoliticalestablishmentwassidingwiththerhetoricofthePDIU,thepoliticalparty inAlbaniamost at oddswithGreece since they represent theChamcommunityinthecountry.Thiswascoupledwithadecreasingfrequencyofhighlevelmeetingsandgenerallytepidbilateralrelations.

Morerecently integration iscominguprepeatedly in thecomplaintsfromtheGreekside,asapotentialnegotiatingchipfurtherexacerbatingexistingperceptionandfearsthatGreececouldindeedblocAlbania’sfutureintheEU.

Perceptions

ThereisawidelyheldperceptionamongAlbaniansthanwhenpushcomes to shove,Greecewill blockAlbania’s entry to theEuropeanUnion.Thisperceptioniscomfortablynestedwithinsomeothermythsoftenperpetuatedby themediaor irresponsiblepoliticians. Quiteasignificant number ofAlbanians alsomentionGreece to be a threatto the securityofAlbania,7 despite the fact thatboth countrieshavesignedaTreatyofFriendshipandmostimportantlythattheyareNATOmembers.

IngeneraltheperceptionsofAlbanianregardingGreeceandrelationswithGreecerevealaverymixedpicture.Theresultsofapublicpollin2013showthat“45percentofthecitizensbelievethattheserelationsarenormal.22percentbelievetheyareinabadshapeandasmallgroupof5percentsaythattheyareinaverybadshape.Similarly27percentbelievetherelationsareinagoodorevenverygooddividedrespectivelyalbania-greece-hot-topic-09-29-2016 7. “AlbanianGreekrelationsfromtheeyesoftheAlbanianpublic–perceptions2013”,A. Cela; S. Lleshaj http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/10896.pdf,pg31.


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between21and6percent.AlbaniansseemtobelievethatgovernmentsofAlbaniaandGreeceenjoyabetterrelationshipwitheachotherthandotherespectivepeopleofeachstate.While52percentofAlbaniansbelieverelationsbetweenGreekandAlbaniangovernmentarenormalonly42percentsaythesameabouttherelationsbetweenGreeksandAlbaniansthemselves.”8

WhenitcomesspecificallytotheperspectiveofAlbania’sintegrationwithintheEuropeanUnion,theAlbanianpublicopinionisfragmentedandgenerallyskepticalaboutGreeksupport.Hencewhenaskediftheirfellowcitizens inGreecewouldsupport theEuropean integrationofAlbania,AlbanianthemselvesseemdividedinalmostthereequalpartsbetweenthosewhobelieveintheGreeksupport,thosewhoareafraidofanegativerelationand thosewhodon’tknow.Withaverysmalladvantage of 37 percentAlbanians are hopeful that Greek citizenswould supportAlbanianE integrationwhile 34 percent believe that Greek citizens do not support this aspiration of Albania.30percentis thegroup thatdoesnothaveaclearopinionon thismatter.EvengrimmerseemstobetheperceptionofwhethertheGreekgovernmenthasbeentohelptoAlbaniainitseffortofEuropeanintegration.Inthiscaseamajorityofcitizens,46 percent, believe that this has not been in the case while35percentbelieve that theGreekgovernmenthashelped.18percentdonotknowtheanswer.9

The difference in the perceptions about the role of citizens andgovernmentisparticularlyodd.WhereasskepticismandevendislikeamongtheGreekpopulationregardingAlbaniamightbeexistingandmightincreaseafterspecificincidents,theGreekgovernmenthashadtosurpassthatinsustainingAlbania’sefforttojointheEU.

Foracomparativeperspective,anopinionpollundertakeninGreece

8. “AlbanianGreekrelationsfromtheeyesoftheAlbanianpublic–perceptions2013”,pg19,http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/10896.pdf. 9. “AlbanianGreekrelationsfromtheeyesoftheAlbanianpublic–perceptions2013”,pg36-37.


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has revealed that “About half of the Greek public opinion viewscurrentrelationswithAlbaniaasneithergoodnorbad,whileonethirdconsiderthemasgood.”Whenitcomesspecificallytoquestionsaboutintegration,“sixoutoften(58%)[believe]thattheGreekgovernmenthasassistedAlbaniainitsEUaccessionprocess.32%ofrespondentsbelievethatGreeksdonotwantAlbaniatobecomeamemberoftheEU,while56%disagreewiththatstatement.”10ItisinterestingtonoteinthelastresultthatthemajorityofGreeksseemtobeofapositiveattitudetowardsAlbania’sEuropeanperspective.

Media role

OfcoursetheseperceptionsareflamedbyoccasionalmediacoverageofdeclarationsofGreekpoliticiansaswell.ForexampleinthecaseofthedebacleaboutsomepropertiesofGreekminoritycitizensinthecityHimarafrequentlygeneratestrongstatements.Thisisnottheonlytime.EuropeanstandardsthathavetoberespectedarebroughtupwhenitcomestocomplaintsaboutGreekminority,propertiesoftheOrthodoxChurch,Greeksoldiers’cemeteriesonAlbanianterritory,etc.

There is no doubt that the long list of unresolved issues and longheld misunderstandings puts this relationship in a far from perfectposition. However the media articles also do not provide the rightcontextualizationanduse titles thatsoundmoresensational than thecoveragewouldwarrant.

A previous study of theAlbanian Institute for International Studies(AIIS),has shown that thepercentageof articlesandcoveragewithnegative and quasi negative connotation inAlbanian press when it

10. All results of the poll undertaken in Grece in 2013 are available at “heGreekPublicOpinion towardsAlbania and theAlbaniansSocial attitudes andperceptions”,IoannisArmaklosas,ELIAMEPhttp://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/The-Greek-public-opinon-towards-Albania-Final-report-Dec-2013.pdf.Citednumbersareinpage8.


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comestoGreeceandGreek-Albanianrelationsisdoublethatofpositivearticles.Thestudyalsopointstofewpositivestorieswhileexposingsome stories such as the infamous ‘Kareli case’ which poisonedrelationsinthepublicopinionforalongtime.11

Oneexampleisthecaseofthedeclarationsattheendoflastyear,offormerMinister of ForeignAffairs ofGreece, NikosKotzias aboutGreecenotbeinggenerouswiththevoteproopeningofnegotiationsforAlbania.12Themostusedtitleinthiscasewas‘GreecewillblocktheEuropeanintegrationofAlbania’,suggestingabsolutecertaintyandnotpossibility.InfactthefullstatementregardsthenecessityofAlbaniafulfilling the 5 conditions posed, monitored and evaluated by theinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnionandthereforeit’sfactuallycorrect.Naturally theconnotationgiven in thestatementbyhighlighting therespect forminorities isnot encouragingbut the statementdoesnotconveyatallacertaintythatadecisiontoblockhasbeentaken.

Ontheotherside,manyGreekpoliticianshavenothesitatedtocomeforwardwithstrongsupportdeclarationsinthetimewhenthedecisiontograntAlbaniatheofficialEUcandidatestatuswasbeingdeliberated.Just before themeeting of the EUCouncil ofMinisters,where thedecisionaboutgrantingAlbaniatheEUcandidatestatuswaseventuallypostponed, the Geek ambassador to Tirana, Leonidas Rokanas,emphasizedGreece’sfirmsupportforAlbanian’sEUintegration.ThisstatementwasfollowedrecentlybyanotheronethatwasmadethistimebytheGreekDeputyPrimeMinisterandMinisterforForeignAffairs,11. “Greece and theAlbanian-Greek relations in theAlbanian printedmedia2014”,pages10-11,http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/11319.pdf 12. MediacoverageexampleswithtitlessayingGreece will block the European integration of Albania:

• http://www.gazetatema.net/2016/12/06/greqia-bllokon-integrimin-e-shqiperise-ne-be-kotzias-sdo-bejme-gabimet-e-se-shkuares/

• http://www.javanews.al/der-standard-greqia-do-te-bllokoje-integrimin-e-shqiperise-ne-be/

• http://www.tiranaobserver.al/krisja-e-marredhenieve-greqia-gati-te-bllokoje-integrimin-e-shqiperise/


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EvangelosVenizelos,whoreaffirmedGreecesupportandstated that“AlbaniashouldgetthecandidatestatusinJune”.13

Not taking things for granted

ThroughthetimelineofAlbania’sintegrationprocess,Greecehasnotbeenanobstacleoradelayingfactor,onthecontrary,ithasbeenadefactosupporter.Thegap thatexistsbetween thespecificperceptionsaboutitsstanceonAlbania’sintegrationandtheperformancesofarisadirectresultofheatedpoliticaldeclarations,faultymediacoverageandlackofcommunicationbetweenotherimportantsocialactors.

Thatsaidthereareofcoursenoguaranteesthatthingswillnotgosouth.Therhetoricinthelastmonths,mirroredbyamediafrenzyhasbeenmostlynegative.Integrationiscomingupagainandagainasakeywordforaddressinghowrelationscanbecomeworse,insteadofimproving.ThelastdeclarationsofPresidentPavlopoulos,thatAlbaniadoesnotseemtohaveaEuropeanperspectivesinceitisinfringinguponminorityrightsareanalarmbellsinceheisnotconsideredanextremevoice.14

TheriskthatGreececanuseitsvoiceanddecisionmakingpowertoimpedeAlbania’sgoalsorevenvetoitsmilestonesisarealpossibility.IndeedthemostrecentpoliticalclassinGreecehasbeenlesspatientandmoreaggressivewithitsrhetoric.Whereasinthepast,Albanianpoliticianscouldcountonmaturedandfamiliarpoliticalactorssuchas those fromPASOKorNewdemocracy, the relative newplayersare definitely more challenging. In this context the need for bettercommunicationbecomesevenmorepertinent.

13. Tirana Times, (2013).Albanian-Greek relations: Beyond the status quo.TiranaTimes.(2014).GreecetosupportAlbania’sEUintegrationprocess.www.tiranatimes.com 14. “Greek president uses harsh voice, conditions integration”, Ora News 8September2017 http://www.oranews.tv/vendi/presidenti-grek-ashperson-tonet-ndaj-shqiperise-kushtezon-integrimin/


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Communicationchallengesshouldbeseenandtargetedbyastrategicapproachthatgoesbeyondtheoccasionalfriendlymeetings,lunchesandsoon.Thelatteroftendomoretoconfusethepublicthantoreassureitthatdialogueisonthewaytoresolveoutstandingissues.Thecontrastbetweenthewaythesesymbolicmilestonesarepresented(withoutmostenthusiasm)andthesubsequentorevenparallelmessagesthatcomefromtheneighbors.

Improvingcommunicationbothatthepoliticalandpubliclevelrequiresa long terminvestmentalsoonkeyactorssuchasmediawhichhasbeenmissingentirely.Whilethereareseveralattemptsoforganizingregionalexchangeswithreportersandeditors,orevenbilateralfromAlbaniaandSerbia,theexperiencehasnotbeenreplicatedinthecaseofAlbaniaandGreece.

Conclusions

ItisnotjustsymbolicthatthemostpubliccommitmenttakenbytheUniontothisregionregardingitsEuropeanfuturehasbeenduringthefamousThessalonikiSummit,albeitmanyyearsago.TheStabilizationandAssociationAgreementwassignedwithAlbaniainJune2006andenteredintoforceinApril2009.Albaniabecameanofficialcandidatecountryin2014andthenextstepistheopeningofnegotiations.Theroadhasbeen longandwillcontinue tobearduous.Albania largelybenefitsfromhavingthesupportofGreeceinthisprocessandshouldbecommittedtopreservinganddeepeningthissupport.

Ontheotherside,theEuropeanfutureofAlbaniaisalsoadesirablegoalforGreece.Anorthernneighborwhich issafeandstable, integratedintheUnionandfurtherdevelopedrepresentsapositiveoutcomeforGreece,itspoliticians,investorsandcitizens.

ThemutualsupportbecomesevenmorenecessaryinacontextwheretheinternaldevelopmentsintheEUitselfhaveseentheenthusiasmand


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commitmenttotheenlargementpolicyweakensubstantiallyandthereisnowaclearsplitbetweenskepticalcountriesandcountriesthathavebeenpushersofintegration.AlbaniarecentlysecuredthepublicsupportfromItaly toopennegotiations15andshould itget thesamesupportfromGreeceitwouldsendanunmistakablypositivesignaltoEuropeaninstitutionstogoforwardwiththisstep.

BothsidescanandshoulddomoretoimprovetheofficialandpublicdiscoursewhenitcomestotheircollaborationinthecontextofEuropeanintegration,thisalsoincludesanefforttorefrainfromemotionalshortterm responses to occurring events in order to safeguard long termachievementsonbothsides.Theprimaryresponsibilityrestswiththepoliticalclasswhichneedsonlytokeepinmindthelongtermmutualbenefits of the process and use that framework when dealing withspecificissues.

Media inAlbania andGreece should be providedwith informationandopportunitiestofurtherexplorethepositiveaspectsofpartnershipin this regard rather than focus on sensational events that createmisperceptions.OneillustrativeexampleistheCrossBorderProgrambetweenAlbaniaandGreecefinancedbyIPAfunds,whichbestportraysthepotentialofEuropeanintegrationtoassisttheborderregionsandstrengthenbilateralbonds.Successfulprojectexamplesandtheirsocio-economicorenvironmental impactneed tohavemorehighlightandpresencealongsidetheinescapablepoliticalcoverage.16SimilarlythereisarecentprojectthatassisttheParliamentofAlbaniatofinetuneitsroleintheprocessofEuropeanintegration,assistedspecificallybythe

15. Tirana Times: “Gentilioni promises support for opening of the EU talks“http://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=134135 (PrimeMinisterRamaofficialvisit toItaly)13October201716. Recommendations also form the research study onAlbanian media alsopinpoint the fact thatmore articles of economic and social nature are neededtochangeperceptionsonbothsides.“GreeceandtheAlbanian-GreekrelationsintheAlbanianprintedmedia2014”,pages10-11,http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/11319.pdf


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counterpartsinItalyandGreece.17

Finallycivilsocietyonbothsideshastakenimportantstepstoimprovethe communication and have genuine discussions even on difficultmatters.CSOsshouldkeepuptheworkdoneintheaspectofbilateralrelations and therefore needs financial and technical assistance tocontinue increasing dialogue, awareness and collaboration betweendifferentsocialgroups.

Europeanintegrationshouldbethekeypositiverealmofimproving,developingandsophisticatingbilateralrelationsbetweenAlbaniaandGreece.Unless the level ofmaturity in political andother formsofcommunication increasessignificantlyweall risk to loseouton thisenormouspotential.

17. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/albania/ipa/2015/20160126-eu-integration-facility.pdf


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Understanding Albanian-Greek relations: Deconstructing paradoxes and myths 1

Albert Rakipi2

TwomainissueshavedominatedAlbanian-Greekrelationsduringthelastover-onehundredyears,alsocoincidingwiththemodernhistoryof theAlbanian state: the issueof territorial/borderdisputes and theissueofethnicminorities -both typical for twoneighboringnationsandstates.

Territorial, border and minority issues have historically been, andcontinuetobe,themainsourceoftensioninbilateralrelations. Theyhave fed a cyclical relation of criseswith frequent ups and downs,interruptedbyperiodsofcooperationonlytoreturntoastateoftensionbutneverleadingtoconflict,intheclassicalsenseoftheword.

At first glance, territorial/border and ethnic disputes seem to be amediocrestorybetweentwoneighboringnations,thestatesofwhichwereestablishedincontextofthevacuumcreatedfromthewithdrawalorfallofempires,aswasthecaseoftheOttomanEmpire’swithdrawalfromtheBalkans.

Inthefollowingpaper,Iwilldiscusshowandwhyterritorial/borderdisputesandminorityissuesgoingbackasfarasthebeginningofthe

1. This paper is part of the study “UnderstandingAlbanian Greek relations:Deconstructingparadoxesandmyths”2. Albert Rakipi, PhD in International Relations


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twentiethcenturystillserveasthemainsourceoftensionandinstability.AnotherelementtobediscussedwhichmakesthecaseofAlbaniaandGreece unique, as much as paradoxical, is simultaneously being atwarandinpeaceforterritory/bordersandminoritiesforwhichneitherGreecenorAlbaniaiscurrentlycontesting.

Revisiting history

ThreemainhistoricalperiodshavedefinedthenatureandproblematicofAlbanian-Greekrelationsduring the lastcentury.First, it was the period of national movements in the Balkans,andthewithdrawaloftheOttomanEmpire in the turnof thenineteenth century, anduntilthestartofthetwentiethcentury.ThesenationalmovementsledtotheestablishmentofBalkanstates,theterritoriesandbordersofwhichdidnotnecessarilycomplywithethniclines.Albania’scase,inparticular,wasthemostcriticalandsignificant.ThecreationandrecognitionbyEuropeanpowersofanAlbanianstateledtothefractionofAlbanianterritoriesamong itsneighbors, includingGreece.Thus, thepoliticalmap of theBalkanswas finally complete, but the territorieswhich,accordingtothismap,wererecognizedasstatesandthebordersthatseparated them would become the main source of future conflictsand tensions.The twoBalkanWarsandWorldWar Iquestioned, intheworstcase, thefutureofanAlbanianstateand, in thebestcase,Albanianterritoriesnotonlyinthecountry’snorth,butalsoinitssouth,duetoGreekclaims.

Secondly, it was World War II, at the start of whichAlbania andGreece, accidentally in fact, were in opposing fronts due to thirdcountries’commitments.ItalyattackedGreeceinOctober1940usingAlbanian territory, which it had invaded sinceApril, 1939. Two ofthemostimportantissuesofAlbanian-Greekrelationsaretiedtothisperiod,issuesthatareintertwinedandstillpresentonthenegotiations’tableevenafterseventyyears:the law on the state of war,whichis


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paradoxically still in power, and the Cham issue. Through a royaldecreeonNovember10,1940,Albaniawasdeclaredanenemystate,alongItaly.Asparadoxicalasthislawmayseem,itremainsinpowertothisday.Inaddition,althoughthetrajectoryoftheChamissuebeganin19133,withthe endoftheBalkanWarsandtheplacementoftheChampopulationunderGreekjurisdiction,duetothedramaticdevelopmentsofWorldWarIItheChamissueisrelevanttothisdayandpartofthenegotiations’historicalproblems.

Similarly,Albanian intervention in theGreekCivilWar during andimmediatelyaftertheendofWorldWarIInotonlycreatedtensioninbilateralrelations,butalsothreatenedAlbania’sterritorialintegrityandinfluencedrelationsforalongperiodtocome.

Thirdly, the Cold War,withitsEast-Westdivide,placedtheoldBalkanneighbors in opposing blocks again.Albanian-Greek relations werehighly influenced by the ColdWar climate during the long periodit lasted and, at least until 1970, the only relation between the twocountrieswasastateofconflictandalmostfrozenrelations.

AlthoughGreecewasoneof the fewWesternstateswithwhich theAlbaniancommunistregimemanagedtoestablish,otherthandiplomaticrelations, a very modest economic cooperation, the two countriesremainedoverallisolatedfromeachotherfordecades.Communicationbetween the two populations,which are the oldest neighbors in theBalkans, was interrupted immediately after World War II. Staterelationsremainedtenseespeciallyuntilthebeginningoftheseventies.Inadditiontotheideologicaldividethatbelongedtoopposingblocks,thepermanentpoliticaltensionsbetweenthecountriesweremainlyfedbyahistoricallyconflictingheritageandhistoricallyfoundeddisputes,stemmingfromtheprocessofstatecreationandindependenceand,morespecifically,directlyrelatedwiththeestablishmentofanindependent

3. For a detailed understanding of the Cham issue, see EleftheriaK.Manta,Muslim Albanians in Greece, the Cham Epirus(1923-2000),InstituteforBalkanStudies,Thessaloniki2008.


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Albanianstateatthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury.

With the endof theColdWar and fall of the communist regime inAlbania,anotherfactorinfluenced,andcontinuestodoso,Albanian-Greek relations:Albanianemigrantsor, the emigrationofAlbanianstoGreece.4ThemassivemigrationofAlbanianstoGreeceservedtoestablishalivelyandintensecommunicationbetweenthetwosocieties.ThismassivepresenceofAlbaniansinGreecerevolutionizedpolitical,economicandsocialrelationsbetweentwopeoplewhowereseparatedforalongtimeduetotheColdWarandAlbania’sextremeself-isolationduringthecommunistregime.

Themigrationofmore thanonesixthof theAlbanianpopulation toGreecesimultaneouslycreatedotherproblemsrelatedtotheintegrationofAlbanianemigrants,theireconomicandsocialstatusandtheirhumanrights.

The nature of the international system and the nature of regimeswhichgovernedbothstatesduringthiscenturyhavebeentwoimportantfactorstoinfluencetheuniquedynamicofAlbanian-Greekrelations,butinanycase,ithasnotyetbeenpossibleforbothstatestoconclusivelyreachfinalagreementsonthecontestedissues.

Lastbutnotleast,the populist approachesusedbybothadministrationshaveminedtheopportunitytosolvethedisputesmainlycreatedduringthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury.

4. AtleastFivehundredthousandAlbaniansmigratedandrelocatedinGreeceafter1991.ThebigmigrationwaverightafterbordersreopenedhadGreeceasitsdestination.Althoughthereisalackofexactstatistics,likeinItaly’scase,wherethenumberofregisteredAlbanianmigrantswas540,000,itisestimatedthatatleast700,000AlbanianshavemovedtoGreeceduringthelast25years.


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The big paradox: two states at war living in peace

ParadoxesandmythsinAlbanian-Greekrelations,likeinthehistoryofothernations,aretiedgenerallytothepast,andexclusivelytotimesofwar,butinthecaseofAlbaniaandGreecethedegreeofinfluenceparadoxesandmythshaveincontemporarybilateralrelationsisunique.

In 1996,Albania and Greece signed the Treaty of Friendship andCooperation - the most wholesome diplomatic tool possible toformalizing a state of peace and full cooperation between the twocountries.Butinthemostparadoxicalwaypossible,theStateofWarLawbetweenthetwostatespersists,approvedbytheGreekparliamentin1940.

Albania and Greece have been united by their common NATOmembership since 2009. However, despite their membership to analliancewheremember states have agreed to engage in a commondefenseincaseofanattackbyathirdparty5,Greecewithholdsits1940royaldecree.

Hereliestheparadoxofallparadoxes:in1949,Greecesupersedestherespective law thatmakes Italyanenemystate,but leaves thesameWarLawwithAlbaniainpower,thusofficiallycontinuingtoregardAlbaniaanenemystatealthoughitwasItalythatattackedGreeceusingAlbanianterritory,alsoinvadedbyItalians.

Afteralmosttwocenturies,the“NorthernEpirus”narrative,whichingeographicaltermsconsistsofhalfofmoderndayAlbania,hasactuallyendedupbeingamyth,justliketheBigIdea(MegaliIdea)itself.Ontheotherhand,theChamissue,whichconstitutesthebiggestprobleminAlbanian-Greekrelationsfor70percentofAlbanians6,continuesto

5. Article5oftheNATOTreaty6. See Greece and Albania,AlbanianInstituteforInternationalStudies,Tirana,2013


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feedthepoliticalnarrativeofpoliticalparties’institutions,themediaandspecificgroupsinAlbaniawithoutanyonedaring,asitusuallyhappensinthecaseofmyths,tocrackthemythandseewhatliesinsideit.

Butparadoxesandmythsarenotjusttiedtohistory:GreeceisAlbania’smaineconomicpartnerandduringthelast25years,sincethefallofcommunism,at least700thousandAlbanianshavemigratedandarecurrently livingandworking inAlbania.Also fromastrategicpointofview,themajorityofAlbaniansbelievethatGreeceisanimportantcountryforAlbaniaandthatthegovernmentshouldpaygreatattentiontobilateralrelationsbetweenthecountries.7

Paradoxically enough, the majority of Albanians who believe thecountryisunderaforeignthreatalsothinkthisthreatcomesfromGreece, and that Greece represents the biggest threat to Albania’snationalsecurity.8

AlbaniaandGreece,althoughareNATOmembers,differinadditionin their various foreign policy orientations in the Balkans. Greektraditional alliances have been historically regardedwith doubt anddistrust inAlbania.Thisparticularlyhappenedwith thealterationoftheBalkanpoliticalmap,afterthecreationandrecognitionofanewstate,thestateofKosovo.GreeceisoneofthetwoBalkanstates,andoneofthefiveEuropeanstates,whichhasnotrecognizedKosovoasan independent state.The degree towhich not recognizingKosovohasaffectedbilateralAlbanian-Greekrelationsisdebatablebut,attheendoftheday,itisafactorwhich,ifnotaffectingtherealsphereofrelations,definitelyaffectsthevirtualsphereofrelations,whichremainsaprisonerofmythandparadoxes.

7. Twenty years later: People on state and democracy,AIIS2011.8. See European Perspective for Albania,Albanian Institute for InternationalStudies, Tirana, 2016. Also see Twenty Years After: People on State and Democracy,AIIS,Tirana,2014.


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Territorial/border disputes and the issue of continuity

WhenstudentEleftheriosVenizelosgatheredhisfriendaroundamapandimaginedGreekborders,hesoughthalfoftoday’smoderndayAlbaniaandabigpartofmoderndayTurkey9,whileAlbaniadidnotyetexistasanindependentstate.Butonlyafewdecadeslater,in1919,excellentformerlawstudentVenizelos,nowholdingthePrimeMinister’smandateinGreece,presentedonbehalfoftheGreekdelegationattheParisPeaceConferencealltheargumentswhyGreeceshouldhaveSouthernAlbania,or“NorthernEpirus,”ashelikedtocallit.10

AlthoughtheParisPeaceConferencedidnotrecognizeGreekclaimsin“NorthernEpirus,”theCouncilofForeignMinistersofthefourbigpowers-theUSA,GreatBritain,theUSSRandFrance-wasanywayintroducedtotheGreekrequestandargumentsconcerningitsclaimsinSouthAlbaniain1946.

DuringtheColdWar,territorialclaimswereafactoroftensionbetweenthe two countries and an unspoken public barrier in establishingdiplomaticrelationsforatleastafewdecadessincetheendofWorldWar II.The reasonswhy the twocountriesdidnotescalate towardsconflictcanbeexplainedwiththeColdWarandtherivalrybetweenbigpowers,aswellasBalkanrivalries,whichhavebeenhistoricallypresentwhenitcametoacceptinganindependentAlbanianstateanditsterritories.

Withtheestablishmentofdiplomaticrelationsin1971,apositivestepwasmadeineliminatingoneofthebiggestsourcesoftensionbetweenthe two countries, the “Greek territorial claims, per the NorthernEpirusplatform.AgradualwithdrawalfromtheGreeksideisnoticed

9. MargaretMacmillanParis,1919,Six Months that Changed the World,RandomHouse,p.34810. Ibid,351


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sincethen,butalsoaneffortfromofficialTirananottoidentifyGreekofficialpolicywiththeso-calledNorthernEpirusthesis,supported“byreactionaryGreekcircles,includingtheGreekChurch,whichthroughchauvinistpointsofviewseektohampertheapproximationofGreecewithAlbania.”11

It canbe saidwithouthesitation that,with theendof theColdWarandfallof thecommunist regime, the territorialclaimsaccordingtotheNorthernEpirusideologicalplatformwerefinallyarchived.Furtherdevelopmentssuchasthemutualsigningofthe TreatyofFriendshipandCooperationandAlbania’sNATO12membershipfinallyultimatelyconcludedeveryterritorialclaimcreatedandcarriedthroughouthistory.

Despite this new reality, peripheral segments within Greece, andespecially those belonging to the GreekDiaspora, continue to feedthe born anddeadNorthernEpirus thesis andkeep the populist-feddiscourseofthevirtualspherealive.

Paralleltoterritorialdisputes,issuesofdefiningbordersbetweenthetwo states - the same international borders recognized by the BigPowers-havebeenasourceoftension.

In 2010, Albania’s Constitutional Court devalued the continentalshelfagreement.Afterseveralyearsofnegotiationsandtheeventualacceptance of a maritime border agreement - the only border leftundetermined-itseemedlikeAlbaniaandGreecewereonthetrackof closing the open chapter of border disputes.However,Albania’sConstitutional Court devalued this agreement because it “steppedon constitutional principles and did not respect international rightprinciplesindeterminingmaritimeborders.”13

The failure to approve a maritime border agreement, for which11. EnverHoxha,Dy Popuj Miq,Tirana,1985,PublishingHouse8Nentori,pg415.12. AlbaniangotinvitedtobecomeaNATOmemberattheBucharestSummitof2008and,ayearlater,in2009itbecameafullmemberoftheAlliance13. SeeConstitutionalCourtruling,15April2010


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negotiationshadbegunimmediatelyafterWorldWarIIended,proveanother constant characteristic of Albanian-Greek relations: borderissuesanddisputessurroundingitcontinuetobeanessentialsourceof political tension, no matter the democratic changes, common membership in theNorth-AtlanticAllianceand theconsistentGreeksupport towards Albania’s EU integration. The issues of definingthe borders between Albania and Greece appeared immediatelyafterEuropeanpowers recognized theAlbanianstate. Initially,morethan an issue of defining the countries’ borders, itwas relatedwiththe territorial claims towards SouthernAlbania or Northern Epirus.AlthoughtheConferenceofAmbassadorsoftheEuropeanpowersdidnotrecognizeGreekclaimsthatwantedtoincludeAlbanianterritories,these claims persisted to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.14 In1921,theAmbassadorsConference,whichimmediatelyfollowedthePeaceConference,recognizedthebordersof1913.Fromthisperiodon,borderdisputescanberegardedseparatelyfromterritorialdisputes.ForseveraldecadesduringtheColdWar,theissueofdefiningborderswasoneoftheobstaclestoestablishingdiplomaticrelations.15Actuallyevenaftertheestablishmentofdiplomaticrelations,occasionaltensionsarisingweretiedtoundefinedbordersandtotheGreekhesitationtodefineitslandborder.

However, it is important to state thatmore than theminority issuesperse,thewaythegovernmentsofbothcountriesaccommodatedandbehavedtowardstheGreekminoritywasasourceoftension.Primarily,thepresenceoftheGreekminorityanddisputeconcerningitsnumbershas served to feed territorial claims and, later, border claims, but -gradually - the policies followed byTirana andAthens towards theGreekminoritywereasourceoftensionontheirown.DuringtheColdWar, including the period diplomatic relationswere established, theissueoftheGreekminorityinAlbaniawasaconstantsourceoftensionwhichpersistedevenafterthefallofcommunism.

14. See The Albanian Problem in the Paris Peace Conference,AIIS,Tirana,201815. SeeEnverHoxha,Dy Popuj, Dy Miq


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The populist account: don’t open the box

Oneof themostdisputed issues inAlbanian-Greekrelations, in factalsorelatedtootherhistoricaldisputes,istheChamissue.

AftertheBalkanWars,theChampopulationwasplacedunderGreekjurisdictionwhilewiththeFirenzeProtocolof1913theterritoriesinNorth-WestGreece,inhabitedbyChampopulation,remainedoutsideAlbanianborders.Nonetheless,thebeginningof1923markstheoriginof theChamissue,whenGreeceandTurkeystartednegotiationsonpopulationexchange.GreeceannounceditdidnotintendtoincludetheChampopulationinthepopulationexchangeconventionwithTurkey.Although the exchange programswere to only include the region’sMuslims, without touching the Cham population, at least 500,000Chamswereinvolvedintheseprograms.16TheAlbaniangovernmentdidnotregardtheexpulsionoftheChampopulationintheexchangeprogramsasaprivilege.

Eitherway,thebiggestpartoftheChampopulationremainedexpelledfromtheGreek-Turkish1923TreatyofLausanne’spopulationexchangeandwasthussupposedtoenjoythesamestatusasGreekcitizens.

However, regardless of official policies announced by the Greekgovernment, the Cham population did not enjoy equal rights withGreek citizens during the period between twowars.The social andeconomic heritage gained during theOttomanEmpire’s rule startederoding under local and central policies backed by the governmentand,inanincreasinglyhostilepoliticalandsocialenvironment,thefirstclashesbetweentheChamandGreekpopulationsbegan.Thesituation

16. TheUNCommission,unabletodeterminetheMuslimoriginsoftheChams,decidedtocompromisebyapplyingtheChamsfreewilltogotoTurkey.AccordingtoGreekauthorities,outofthe10,000thatwantedtoleave,only5,000wereacceptedbyTurkey.SeeEleftheriaK.Manta,Albanian Muslims in Greece, the Chams of Epirus (1923-2000),TheInstituteofBalkanStudies,Thessaloniki,2008


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fortheChampopulationgotevenharderundertheIoannisMetaxasdictatorshipof1936.Inadditiontothearbitraryuseofviolence,theMetaxasgovernmentprohibitedboththeuseoftheAlbanianlanguageinboththepublicandprivatespheresoflifeandthepublicationofAlbanianlanguagebooksandnewspapers.

Yet,itwasthedevelopmentsofWarWorldIIthatwerereallydecisivefor theChampopulation’sfuture.Italy,atfirst,andGermany,afterItaly capitulated, announced the national union of Albanians,including, amongothers, theChampopulation living inGreece. ItseemstheChamssoughtthereturnoftheeconomicandsocialstatus,andtheirfutureingeneral,incooperatingwiththeItaliansfirstandtheGermanslater.DuringFascistoccupation,thecommunitieswereinvolved in a cycle of violence that took bigger dimensions onceGermanywithdrewfromGreecein1944.TheGreekresistanceforces,inparticular,underthecommandofGeneralZervas,undertookhostileoperationstowardstheChampopulation,causingmanyvictims.17

Collective violence and massacres persisted with the massivemovement of the Cham population to Albania.18 In 1940, in theChameriaregion,preciselyattheSouthoftheAlbanian-Greekborder,25,000 Chams were gathered.19A decade later, during the Greekpopulation census of 1951, only 127Albanian-speaking Muslims

17. ThemostviolentmassacreofMuslimAlbanianswasmadebyGreeksoldierswho did not belong inmilitary formations, on June 27,1944, in the Paramithisarea,wheretheforcesoftheRepublicanGreekLeague(EDES)ofGeneralZervasenteredthecityandkilledabout600MuslimAlbanians,men,women,andchildren-manyofwhomwererapedandtorturedbeforedeath.Accordingtoeyewitnesses,thefollowingday,anotherEDESbattalionenteredParga,where52otherAlbanianswere killed. On September 23, 1944, Spatar was robbed and 157 people werekilled.Youngwomenandgirlswererapedandthosemenwhoremainedaliveweregat27/06/18heredandsenttotheAegeanislands.18. For anobjective account of theCham issue, seeMirandaVickers, JamesPettifer,The Cham Issue: the Next Stage,Naimipublishinghouse,201419. WithinthecontroversialChamissue,thenumbersarealsodisputed.


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wereregisteredintheentirecountry.20

TheChamissue,whichbothcountriesinterpretdifferently,wasthefirstclashanddisputebetweenAlbaniaandGreece.

ThemostessentialquestionishowthehistoricaltrajectoryoftheChams,which,inthewordsofStathisN.Kalyvas“couldn’tbemoreemblematicofthedarkcontinent-theEuropean20thcentury,”hasinfluencedandcontinuestoinfluenceAlbanian-Greekrelations.

TheChamissuehasbeensourceoftensionbetweenthetwocountriessincetheGreek-Turkishpopulationexchangeof1926.

OtherthanthedemarchesundertakendirectlytowardsofficialAthens,theAlbaniangovernmentexpresseditsworriesconcerningthepopulation’ssituationattheLeagueofNations.Duringthistime,AthenswasalsocloselyfollowingthedeepeningofAlbanian-Italianrelations,alsointhecontextoftheChampopulationwithinitsterritory,worryingAlbaniansmighthavethesupportofapowerlikeItalyintheirclaimsandpotentialsharesoftheirbrothersinGreece.21

Until the startofWorldWar II,Albaniawasengagedwith theChamissueinonewayoranother.Developmentsduringthewarweredramaticfor theChampopulation inGreece.Atfirst Italy, and thenGermany,announced the creation ofGreaterAlbania,which includedNorthernterritoriesontheborderwithKosovoaswellasthoseintheSouth,alsowiththeChameriregion,inadditiontoAlbaniaaccordingtothe1913borders.

WithAlbania’sliberationandtheestablishmentofthecommunistregimeinAlbania,theHoxhacommunistgovernmentwasattentivetotheChamissueatfirst.

20. StathisN.KalyvasatEleftheriaK.MantaMuslim Albanians in Greece, The Cham Epirus ( 1923- 2000), InstituteforBallkanStudies,Thessaloniki200821. MirandaVickers


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Hoxha presented the Cham issue at the Paris Peace Conference of1946.TheCommunistgovernmentaskedfortherepatriationofChamsin Greece and the restitution of their assets.22 This was the periodwhen relations between the two countries worsened due to officialGreekrequestsonterritorialclaimsatNorthernEpirus.23Meanwhile,the ideologicalpositioninganddivisionamong thebigpowers - theUSSRontheonehandandtheUSAandGreatBritainontheother-alsoinfluencedrelations.AlongtheinterstatedisputesoftheBalkans,clashesbetweenglobalsuperpowershadtheirimpactonaconsiderablescale.

Similarly,theAlbaniancommunistregime,althoughnotdirectlyandopenly,supportedtheeffortsoftheChampopulationplacedinAlbaniatointernationalizetheircase.TwoChamcongresseswereorganizedinAlbaniain1945and1947andaseriesofeffortswereundertakenbyEuropeanpowersandtheUnitedNations.

During theGreekCivilWar, theCham issue starts to resurface: theGreek communists sawChamsplaced inAlbania as agoodway tostrengthen the Democratic Party. Greek communist leaders askedTirana,theAlbaniancommunistleadership,helpinrecruitingtheminthearmy.24

ThiswasthelasttimetheAlbaniangovernmentengagedwiththeChamissue,andthatwasentirelyinanideologicalcontext,asitaimedtohelptheGreekcommunistsinthecivilwar.

Finally, thecommunistregimeputa lidontheChamissuein1953,when it gave the Cham populationAlbanian citizenship through aspecialdecree.

22. SeeBeqirMeta,Greek-AlbanianTension,1939-1949,TheChamTragedy,111-167,AcademyofScienceofAlbania,Tirana,2006.23. Ibid,Meta.24. Outofapproximately2000ChamsthatGreekleadersaimedtorecruitamongChamcommunistsbasedinGreece,theyonlymanagedtorecruit150.


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DuringtheentireColdWaranduntilthefallofthecommunistregimethe Cham issue was not part of the frequently tense and troubledrelations.TheColdWaranddivisionintwoopposingblocksarenotenough toexplainwhy theCham issuewasno longera concernofthegovernment.RegardlessofAlbania’sisolation,aclosedborderwithGreece,thelackofdiplomaticrelationsforthreedecadesanddespitethefactbothcountriesbelongedtoopposingmilitaryandideologicalblocs,AlbaniaandGreecehadtenserelations,butitwasneverduetotheChamissue.TheHoxhagovernmenthadalsogivenuptherequestspresentedattheParisPeaceConferenceof1946and,untiltheendoftheColdWarandthefallofthecommunistregime,keptquiteregardingtheChamissue.TheChaimissuewasnotevenpartofthenegotiationsduringthere-establishmentofdiplomaticrelationsatthebeginningofthe1970s.25

The complete silence regarding the Cham issue becomes even lessunderstandableifwecompareittothecommunistgovernment’sattentiontowardstheGreekminorityinAlbania.Theregimeconsecutivelytriedto point out theGreekminority inAlbania, “a smart, hard-workingandpatrioticpeople,”26 “enjoyed the same rights aseverycitizenoftherepublic.”Thegovernmenttookcareandpropagandizedhowtheminorityhaditsownnewspaper;alivelymilitanttribunetotheGreekminority’s working masses. The Populist Republic’s Constitutionensuresthemthesamerightsasallothercitizensoftherepublic.27

TheonlycomparisonbetweentheChamissueandthatoftheGreekminorityinAlbaniaisthatof1945,whenEnverHoxhahimselftriedtostressabigdifferencebetweenGreekreactionaries,

Greek chauvinists and his regime. “We don’t act on theminority,”

25. Onepossibleexplanation is the fact that theColdWarand theEast-Westideologicalclashserved,amongotherthings,asabackbonetomaintainnationalissuesandnationalistideasallovertheworld,includingtheBalkans,frozen.26. SeeEnverHoxha, Dy Popuj, Dy Miq 8 Nentori,Tirana,198527. Ibid


31

Hoxhawrites,“likethebandsofZervasandPlastirasdowiththeChampopulation,which they’vemassacredandviolentlykilled.OurstandtowardstheGreekminorityisoneofthemostprogressive.TheGreekminorityinAlbaniaenjoysallrights,ithasitsschools,itsteachers,itspressanditsrepresentativesinpowerandthemilitary.”28

ThefinalizationoftheColdWarandthefallofthecommunistregimeinAlbaniamarkedthereturnoftheChamissue.Since1991,theChamcommunity created its own political organization and, later on, itsownpoliticalparty,whichachievedparliamentaryrepresentation.Theorganizationinitiallymadeitsclaimspublic-claimsthatwerenotsodifferentfromthosepresentedtotheUN,foreignmissionstoTiranaandtheGreekgovernmentonlyhalfacenturyago.Likeinthepost-WorldWarIImemorandums,theorganizationsoughttherepatriationoftheChamstotheirlands,therestitutionoftheirpropertiesandwealth,compensationofincomeandrespecttowardstheirhumanrights.TheCameriaOrganization,thesecondpoliticalorganizationfoundedafter1991,whenthefirstoppositionpartywasalsoestablishedinAlbania,hopedtohavethenon-communistgovernment’ssupportinsolvingtheChamissueandbelievedtheChamissueshouldre-entertheAlbanian-Greek relations agenda. The Cham population inAlbania and theirpoliticalorganizationputitshopesintheDemocraticParty-Albania’sfirstnon-communistgovernment.During thecommunist regime, theChampopulationwasregardedwithdisbeliefandnorightsforassemblyweregrantedtothem,whiletheideathattheregimehadbetrayedtheChamissuewasquitepopular.ThisnotonlyexplainedtheChams’bighopesafterthefallofcommunism,butalsoasortofmistrusttowardstheSocialistParty(anditsallies),which,atleastduringthefirstdecade,wasseenastheCommunistParty’sheir,responsibleforthelongsilencetowardstheChamissue.Startingfrom1991andonwards,theChamissuewouldbeapermanentpartofAlbanian-Greek relations.From1992, the requestsof theAlbaniansidewere related to thefinancialcompensationofconfiscatedpropertiesandtherepatriationofexpelled

28. Ibid


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Chamsintheirland.ItseemedthattheGreekgovernmentacceptedthereturnoftheChamissueinthecountries’bilateralrelationsagenda.29 Despitethisacceptance,furtherstandsoftheGreekgovernmenthaverangedfromcompletelyrefusingtorecognizeaChamissuetorefusingto discuss compensation for the confiscated properties, arguing theCham population cooperated with the occupants and court ordershaddeclareditspeoplewarcriminals,30althoughtheyhadprincipallyagreedtotherequestsince1992.ThestandofAlbaniangovernments,similarly, since the returnof theCham issue in1991,hasmarkedadynamicofupsanddowns.The1994-1995crisisofAlbanian-Greekrelations radicalized the Albanian government’s stand towards theChamissue.Ontheotherhand,the1997crisis,whichhadthecountryclosetoanarchy,lefttheChamissueaside.

The reason behind this radical stand is related to theweak, almostfailed,stateofthegovernmentduetothecrisis,butalsotothefactthesocialistscameintopower,forwhichthepopularconceptionremainsthatthey“supportthenationalAlbanianissuealittleornotatall,”andhave reflectedweakpolicies in relationswithGreeceanda levelofdependence towardsAthens.31Meanwhile, theCham issue becomesincreasingly part of the internal conflict betweenAlbanian political

29. DuringavisittoAlbaniain1991,ForeignMinisterKarolosPapouliassaidthedemandsforpropertyrestitutionandfinancialcompensation,“shouldberesolvedbyabilateralcommission.”SeeMirandaVicker.Likewise,at thefirstmeetingofthetwoprimeministersSimitis-Berishain1992,concerningthetworequestspresentedbytheAlbanianside:financialcompensationforconfiscatedpropertyandreturnoftheirlandtotheChams,Greekauthoritiesexpressedawillingnessconcerning financial compensation. “For the properties that were seized fromChamswhowerenotdenouncedasconspiratorsoftheAxis’invadingforcesbutwho had fled from fear, abandoning their property.” See EleftheriaK.Manda,MuslimAlbaniansinGreece,TheChamEpirus(1923-2000),InstituteforBalkanStudies,Thessaloniki,2008.30. Ibid,pg.23231. InNovember 1997, PrimeMinister FatosNanometMilosevic inCretes,givingPrishtinaamediatingroleinsolvingtheKosovoproblem,whileignoringtheChamissuewhichwasnolongerpartofthebilateralagenda.


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parties.32Thedrifttowardsatotalitariannarrativebecomesapparentattheendofthe1990sandamythbeginssurroundingtheChamissue.ItisnolongerspokenofthespecificrequeststhatmakeuptheChamissue - requests thatwere clearly articulated after the end ofWorldWarII,theColdWarandthefallofcommunism.Althoughitisbeingincreasinglydiscussed,thepoliticalpartiesandother(notnecessarilypolitical)groups’narrativespeaksmoreofamythrather thanof theelementsthatmaketheChamissueandthewaystosolveit.TheChamissuenarrative,atleastsincethe1997crisis,issimilartothenarrativeofmyths.ThecreationofthePartyforJusticeandUnity,itsdissolutionandcreationofthePartyforJustice,IntegrationandUnity(PDIU)wasnotasmallinfluencetowardsthetotalitarianrhetoricoftheChamissueandcreationofitsmyth,asitalmostprivatizedtheChamissueanditsmyth.

ThePDIUdeclaresitself“Partyof thenationalcauses,of theChamissue, the inclusion of patriotism in the country’s governance,”33 claimingexclusivenessofthenationalissue.TheChamissueisnothingmorebut“partoftheunresolvednationalissue.”34

Liberation from paradoxes and myths

Albanian-Greek relations, after the end of theColdWar, the fall ofcommunism andAlbania’s re-exposure to theWest, develop in twodifferentspheres:oneisthesphereofpeace,inwhichactualrelationsdevelop in the fields of economy, trade, investments, parallel toexchangesinthesocialaspect-thecommunicationsofthetwosocieties

32. OrdinarydebateswhenanAlbanianministervisitsGreeceorwhenaGreekministervisitsTiranaaresummedupinthequestions“DidhementiontheChamissue?”“WhywastheChamissueleftoutofthetalks?”“Whoisbetrayingitandwhy?”33. SeePDIU’smission,Officialwebsite34. See Sh. Idrizi Speech, 27-year-anniversary of theChameriaOrganizationfounding,January2018


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in thefieldsofartandculture;while theothersphere is the“sphereofwar,”which is in fact virtual: it operates the political discourse,the political elites, the media and different interest groups.Withinthisspherethediscourseisalmosttotalitarianandcentersonmainlycontestedissuesstemmingfromhistory,suchastheChamissue,theso-called“NorthEpirusissue”andtheminorities’issue.Thefirstistherealsphere,thesecondisfictive.

Although it seems these two spheres develop and function parallelandsimultaneously,thereisadegreeofinfluenceandinterdependencebetweenthem.ThealmostcyclicalcrisesintheGreek-AlbanianrelationsaftertheendoftheColdWarhavebeendefinedbytheinterdependenceofthesetwospheres.Thefirstisarealworldthatisrelatedtoeconomicinterests, communication and societal cooperation,while the secondwasbuiltandfunctionsonmythsandparadoxes,creatinginfactonebigparadoxwhich,inthebestcasescenario,maintainsthestatusquointheserelationswithoutallowingtheirdevelopmentandstrengtheningand, in theworstcasescenario,producescyclicalcriseswhichhavedamaged,orhavethepotentialtodamagethefutureoftheserelations.

ItisnotpossibletoexplainAlbanian-Greekrelationsinthepost-ColdWarcontextwithoutunderstandingandexplainingtheparadoxesandmyths created by history. Undoubtedly, the strengthening of theserelations is not possible without liberation from these myths andparadoxes.


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Migration: Bridge or pitfall in Albania – Greece relations?

Andi Balla1

Inmany ways, Greece has left more of a mark on post-communistAlbania than anyother country.The twocountries’ peopleshave forcenturiesbeensimilarinculture,temperamentandoutlookfortheworld,butthepastthreedecadeshaveincreasedcontactsandledtoincreasedsimilaritiesandsynergiesbetweentheAlbanianandGreekpeople.

Thelargestelementintheseinteractionsinthepastthreedecadesis,ofcourse,themassivemigrationofAlbanianstoGreece,whichstartedintheearly1990sasAlbaniarosefromdecadesofcommunistisolation.Itcontinuestothisdaywiththetrendofcircularmigration–AlbaniansreturningfromGreeceorreturneeswhogobackto.Thusthetwocountriesarelinked–throughgeography–yes–butprimarilythroughthehumantiesthatpermeateallinteractions–betheypoliticaloreconomic.

Yet,increasedfamiliaritycanalsoresultincontempt.ThereislittledoubtthatmanyAlbanianshavealove-haterelationshipwithGreece.Annualsurveysby theAlbanian Institute for InternationalStudies repeatedlyshowthatAlbaniansviewGreeceasthegreatestthreattoAlbania–inmostyears,evenmorethanSerbia,withwhichtheAlbanians,asapeople,hadanarmedconflictwithaslateas1999.Thefindingsarepuzzlingatfirst,butexplainableandrelatetotwofearsAlbanianshave,preciselyduetoextensivecontactwithGreece.

1. Andi Balla, Media expert


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The first fear relates to what theAlbanian people view as Greece’sterritorial ambitions toward Albania, with the latest case being thedisputeoverthemaritimeborder.GreeceisseeninAlbaniaasamorepowerfulneighbourthatholdstherighttoolsinitsarsenal:along-timeEUmembershipandrelativewealth.TheeconomiccrisismighthaveweakenedGreece–andthatthreatperceptionhasgonedonewithit–butwithGreececomingoutofiteconomiccrisisanditsforeignpolicygrowing more ambitious with time, the perception of threat amongAlbanianswilllikelyrespondaccordingly.

Nowhere is that perception stronger than the second fearAlbanianshaveofGreece–thefearofhowGreecetreatsAlbanianmigrantsandvisitors.ThetreatmentsofAlbanianswhowork,studyandvisitGreecehas changeda lotover thepast threedecades, steadily improvingasAlbaniansinGreeceandAlbaniansingeneralimprovedtheirfinancialwell-beingandintegrationinGreeceandtheinternationalcommunityofnations.However,concernsflareupnowandthen,poisoningrelationsandfeedingpopuliststancesonbothsidesoftheborder.ItisnotunusualforAlbanianmigrantsandvisitors tobe thefirst to feel thenegativeeventsinbilateralpoliticalrelations,turningthebridgethatpeople-to-peoplerelationsformintoapotentialpitfall.

Theverynatureofmigratorymovementsinrecentyears,beingcyclicaland secondary at times – meaning a return toAlbania and back toGreeceormigrationofAlbanianmigrantstothirdcountrylikeGermanyorCanada–makeithardtopredictthenumberofAlbanianmigrantsthatcurrently live inGreece.TheAlbaniangovernmentbelieves thatapproximately500,000peopleborninAlbaniaarelivinginGreece,withtheirchildren,thenumberwouldgohigher.The2001CensusinGreeceindicatedthepresenceof433,249Albanianimmigrants.Thecrisis inGreececouldhaveledtoasmany180,000Albaniansleavingthecountry,albeitperhapsnotpermanently.Regardlessoftheactualhardnumbers,averylargepopulationofAlbanianscurrentlyliveinGreece,makingitastrongelementofbilateralrelations.


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Lookingatthelongerterm,mostofthatpopulationwilleventuallybecompletelyintegratedintoGreeksociety;holdingontoaweakerandweakerconnectiontoAlbania,however,thatconnectionwillbestrongerthantherestoftheDiasporaduetogeographicproximity.Inaddition,inabouttenyears,AlbaniawilllikelyjointheEuropeanUnion,barringanyfurthermajorcrisisinthebloc.Thisprocessisalreadytakingtoolong for the aspirations of many Albanians, but once membershipbecomesrealitythenarrativeofrelationandpeople-to-peoplerelationswillchangetoo.Onemajorchangewillrelatetotheremovalofthehardborderandintegrationofinfrastructure.Themovementofpeopleandmigrationonbothsideswillbecomeeasier,andwearelikelygoingtoseemoreGreeksmigrate toAlbania,whether toprofitfrombusinessopportunitiesorfromthelowercostoflivingandsimilarclimateandculture–asislikelytobecaseforretirees.

As the two governments look at bilateral relations, these people-to-people ties shouldbe seen as a priority.Migrants are and shouldbeviewedasabridgebetweenthetwocountries,notasapitfall.

Economic impact of migration

OneofthemostimportantaspectsofAlbanianmigrationtoGreeceistheeconomicimpactithasonbothcountries.Greeceisjustemergingfromtheworsteconomiccrisisinrecenthistory.Itseconomyandwell-beingshrunkconsiderablyduringthattimeandAlbanianmigrantswereamongthemostaffectedgroups.

AninterestingtrendthathappenedduringthedepthsoftheGreekcrisiswasthatGreekmediaexpressedconcernthatAlbanianworkerswereleavingthecountry indrovesforbetterpastures–eitherreturningtoAlbaniaorgoingintosecondarymigrationtoNorthernEuropeorNorthAmerica.

Sinceearly1990s,theGreeknarrativehadbeensimple.Itdetailedhow


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theGreekpeopleweretheretohelpthepoorAlbanianmigrantspouringovertheborder--givingthemfood,shelterandwork.Theywere--astheysawit,humanitarian.AndAlbaniansshouldjustbegratefultohavebeenallowedtostayandwork.

TheAlbanian narrative is different, however. It looked at the harshsacrifices and hard workmigrants had to go through – often underintensediscriminationfromtheGreeks–tomakeendsmeet.

Butbeyondthenarrativesandhumanstoriesthatgowiththem,therearehardnumbers.TheeconomicimpactofAlbanianmigrationtoGreecehasbeenhighbothfortheoriginatingandhostcountries.Greeksourcesput theremittancessenthomebyAlbanianmigrants in thebillions–withsome2.2billioneurosduringtheeightyearsprecedingtheGreekcrisisalone,from2003–2011,accordingtodatapresentedtoparliamentin2012bytheBankofGreece.

With the severe financial crisis in neighbouring Greece, tens ofthousandsofimmigrantsworkingtherelosttheirjobs,severelyaffectingremittanceswhichremainavitalsourceof incomefor their families.AlbanianmigrantsstartedaflowofreturnstoAlbania,somepermanentlyandotherstemporarilyuntiltheGreeksituationimproved,accordingtoreportingbyTirana Times.

MostoftheimpactonAlbaniahastraditionallycomethroughremittances,moneymigrantssendhometohelptheirfamilies.Around46percentofmigrants sending remittances toAlbania are reported to living inneighbouringGreece,comparedto41percentinItaly,accordingtoacentralbanksurvey.

Albania was up until 2010 one of the top per capita recipients ofremittances in Europe, according to the World Bank. As a result,remittanceshave carried a largeweight as apercentageof theGDP.Thingshaverapidlydeclinedsince,andthatisverymuchrelatedtotheeconomiccrisisinGreece–atalesserextentinItalyandelsewhere.


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A large wave of migrants returning home, lower trade exchanges,investmentandremittancesweresomeofthemostobviousimpactstheeconomiccrisis inneighbouringGreece, the top investorandsecondmostimportanttradingpartner,initiallyhadinAlbania,accordingtoalate2012studyconductedbytheAlbanianCentreforCompetitivenessandInternationalTrade(ACIT).

Thestudy,whichdubbedtheGreekcrisis“asocialbombforAlbania”foundthataround180,000Albanianmigrants,or18to22percentofthe totalAlbanianmigrants inGreece, returned home from 2008 to2012.Thesharpcutinremittancesisoneofthemostobviousimpactsfor thousandsofpoorhouseholds.FuelledbyarecoveryinItalyandGreece,Albania’smaintradingpartnerswhereanestimated1millionAlbanianmigrantsliveandwork,remittancesslightlyrecoveredforthethirdyearinarowin2016whentheyclimbedto616millioneuros,butremainedaboutathirdbelowtheirpeaklevelof952millioneurosin2007justbeforetheonsetoftheglobalfinancialcrisis,accordingtothecountry’scentralbank.

But the positive contribution has been important for Greece too,accordingtodatabytheNationalBankofGreece(NBG).Accordingareportbythebank,“ImmigrationhasplayedaveryimportantroleinsupportingbothdomesticdemandandtheproductivepotentialoftheGreekeconomy.”NBGreportedthattheonemillionimmigrantsfromSouth-easternEuropehaveboostedtheflexibilityofGreece’srelativelyrigid labour markets, raising potential output growth and supportedconsumption following their integration and assimilation into theeconomy.”

That impact isalsofelt in themoneymadeandsaved.In thelast15years, the number ofAlbanians in Greece has constantly increased.Evenmoreimportant,toaverylargeextenttheseAlbanianmigrantsarebecomingupwardlymobileastheyworkinbetterpayingjobsincludingconstruction, industry and services, and increasingly steer clear ofagricultureandseasonaljobs.Atthesametime,manyoftheseAlbanians


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havebeenreunitedwiththeirfamiliesandplantostayforlongerperiodsinGreece.Allthesefactorsareinfluencingtheirsavinghabits.

NoonedoubtsthatAlbanianshaveahighpropensitytosave.In1999,itwasestimatedthateachAlbanianmigrantinGreecesavedatleast2,340dollarsannually.In2004,theaverageannualsavingsroseto5,390eurosperhouseholdand that resulted inmigrantsdepositing largesums inGreekbanks.Bywayofindication,in1992,oronlytwoyearsaftertheinitiationofthefirstmassivewaveofemigration,AlbanianmigrantsinGreecehadalreadydepositedanestimated80milliondollarsinGreekbanks.Bytheendof2007,itwascalculatedthatAlbanianmigrantsinGreecehaddepositedabout2billioneurosinGreekbanks,accordingtoreportingbyTirana Times.

AlbanianmigrantsprefertodeposittheirsavingsinGreece,orotherhostcountries,becauseofeconomicinstability,underdevelopmentofthehomebankingsector,lackofinvestmentopportunitiesinAlbania,badmemoriesfromthecollapseofpyramidschemesin1997andotherreasons.These2billioneurossavedinGreekbanksareequal to30percent of theAlbanian GDP. Nevertheless, theAlbanian state andAlbanianbanksdoverylittletoconvinceAlbanianimmigrantstosaveinAlbaniansbanksortoinvestevenmoreintheAlbanianeconomy,insteadofsimplyfinancingtheeverydayconsumptionoftheirfamiliesandrelatives.

Things getting better for migrants

AsneighbouringGreeceescapesitsworst-everrecessionthathasseenitseconomycontractbyaquartersincelate2008,theAlbanianmigrantcommunity there has been severely affected,with about asmany as180,000migrantsleavingGreeceandpermanentlysettlinginAlbaniaandotherEUmembercountries.

ProspectsforAlbanianmigrantsinGreecehavebecomemoreoptimistic


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inthepastthreeyearsastheneighbouringcountrygraduallyescapedrecessionandissettoregisterpositivegrowthratesof2.1to2.5percentin2017and2018onimprovingconsumerandinvestorsentimentandaboostinitskeytourismindustry.

But it’s important to look directly and the human stories behind thenumbers, as done by a documentary produced by German publicbroadcasterDWrecently.

Init,ArdianRakipioftheFederationofAlbanianAssociationsinGreecesaysbetween180,000to200,000AlbanianshaveleftGreeceinthepasteightyearsbecauseofthecrisisthere.“ThetwofactorsmostlyaffectingAlbaniansisbeingunabletosupporttheirchildren’seducationandtheirownfinancialsituation.Currently,thereistoughpressureinthelabourmarketastherearenojobsavailable,”hesays.

AviolMarra,a25-year-oldwaiter fromAlbaniawhohasbeen livinginGreeceforthepast12years,saysthingsaregettingslightlybetter.“It’ssixyearsnowthattheeconomiccrisishasbeenaffectingAlbanians.ManypeoplehavereturnedtoAlbania,manyfamilieshaveremainedjobless,”saysAviol.“Albaniansarepeoplewholikeworkinganddotheirbest.TheGreeksappreciatethisandweareamongthefirsttheywillhire,”headds.

Things are not as smooth for some otherAlbanianmigrants.ArdianDako,a30-year-oldAlbanianmigrant,usedtoworkasplumber,butonlyworksasawaiterduringsummernow.“Peoplearesleepingoutside,theycan’taffordeating,payingtherentorelectricity,”hesays.

Finding a job is gettingmore difficult forAlbanian youngmen andwomenandmanyofthemtargetgoingtoEUcountries.“Itisdifficultforyoungandelderlypeople,”saysEvaCani,a19-year-oldAlbanianwhowantstostudymedicine.“MyfatherwenttoEnglandforashorttimeandhehasturnedbacksothatweallleavetogether.YoungpeoplenowseetheirfuturemostlyabroadtoEngland,theU.S.,orEurope,”sheadds.


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ThesecondgenerationofAlbanianmigrantsborninGreecemanagetofinda jobbasedontheireducationalattainment.Some60percentofAlbanianyoungpeople are educated.However,withGreece’s youthunemploymentatabout44percent,theEU’shighest,chancesareminimalandevenGreekyoungmenandwomenhavetakentomigration.“Onethingweshouldbearinmindisthatwhenthereiseconomicpressureandweinsiston‘economiccrisis’foreignersarethefirsttobeaffectedandthatmeansAlbanianswhoaccountforthree-quartersofmigrantshere,astheGreekresidentsthemselvesarelookingforajobandthereisextraordinarycompetition,”saysArdianRakipioftheFederationofAlbanianAssociationsinGreece.

Migrants, visitors and the hard border

TheAlbanianmediaandpublichavealwaysbeenhighlysensitivetohowAlbaniansaretreatedinGreece.Leavingbehindsomeofthemoreextremeandviolentexperiencesof the1990sandearly2000s, todayphysicalmistreatment ismostly episodic onmigrants, while visitorsfacefewproblemsasthousandsofAlbaniancrossthebordereachdayproblem-free.

Thatborderremainshashardaseverthough–takingtimeandeffortformigrantsandvisitorsnavigatingthroughit.

Problemsremain,especiallyonissuestiedpoliticsandbilateralrelations,thingslikeoldpeopleborninGreeceandexpelledaschildrenaspartoftheChamdeportationcampaignaftertheendofWWIIaswellchildrenofAlbanianmigrantsborninGreeceandwhosepassportsrefertoGreekbirthplacesinAlbanianratherthaninGreek–anexcuseofsortusedbyGreekauthoritiestodenyentrytoentiregroupsofAlbaniancitizenswhohavearighttovisitallSchengenAreacountries,includingGreece,visa-freefor90days.Albanianauthoritieshaveworkedtosolvethisproblem,especiallyinthecaseofthechildren,whiletheChamissueremainsahot


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potatoinbilateralrelations–onetheGreeksdon’twanttotalkabout,whileAlbaniansareincreasinglybringingup.

However,beyond systemic issues, treatmentofmigrants andvisitorsgoes up and downdepending on political relations between the twocountries.

Let’slookatanexamplefromAugust2013,asreportedbytheAlbaniansectionoftheVoiceofAmerica:AnelderlyAlbaniancouplewholivedintheUnitedStatesdecidedtogoseetheirgrandchildreninGreeceaspartoftheirbriefvisittotheregion,theywerepreparedtositforalongatimeinthescorchingheatoftheKakavijaBorderpointbetweenAlbaniaandGreece,experiencingwhatAlbanianswhotraveltoGreeceforanyreasonhaveknownwellsincetheearly1990s.

Longwaitsandgrumpyborderguardsarethenormontheborder,butthistimeitwassomethingelse.Astheyreachedpassportcheck,theyweretoldtogobacktoAlbania,astheydidnothavetheneededfundsto visit Greece. Several accounts of that day say the Greek guardsdemandedAlbaniansshowtheyhad1,500eurosincashonthem,whichmanypeoplesimplydon’tcarryforsecurityreasoninanageofdebitandcredit cards.But the true reason for theborderclosurewasalsogiveninhintsandcurses:GreekangeroverapropertydisputebetweenanAlbanianlocalgovernmentandtheOrthodoxChurchinthetownofPermet.

“WhenItriedtoexplain,theGreekguardmotionedasifhewasgoingtotearupmypassport,”thewoman,NexhijeLipaj,toldareporteroftheVoiceofAmericawhowasonthesceneanddescribedwhathappenedinareport.

TheLipajswerenot alone in their experience thatday.HundredsofAlbanians, anyone traveling toGreeceonAlbanianpassportwithoutGreekresidencypermits–touristsandbusinessvisitors–weretoldtheywouldnotbeallowed intoGreece.Thenewscausedanger inpublic


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opinioninAlbania,whichhadworkedhardtoearnanagreementwiththeEuropeanUnion,ofwhichGreeceisamember, togainvisa-freemovementforitscitizens.Since2010,Albanianshavegonevisa-freetowatchfootballmatchesinNorwayandtothebeachinSpain,butmoreimportantly,theyhavebeenfreetotraveltoseelovedonesinGreeceandItaly–twoneighbouringcountrieshostingthelargestpercentageofAlbanianmigrantsabroad.

TheincidenthadmarkedthefirsttimeaEuropeanstatearbitrarilycloseditsborderstoAlbaniantourists.ItpromptedtheAlbanianborderofficialstoresorttoreciprocityforthefirsttime.Greekcitizensweresimplysentbackunder thesamepretext:Notenoughcash toenterAlbania.Thesituationwasquicklysolvedthroughdiplomaticchannelsonbothsides,buttheincidentclearlymarkedaturningpointforAlbanianpolicyandpublicopinion. It indicated thecountrywouldno longerputupwithbeingtreatedasanythingbutanequalpartner.

Italsohighlightedhowmigrantsrightswereheldhostagetorelationsbetween the two countries have soured over many issues, from theunsolved maritime border to Athens fighting for the rights of theOrthodoxChurchandethnicGreekspropertyrights--alltotheirritationoftheAlbaniangovernmentwhodoesnotwanttheneighbourtomeddleinitsinternalaffairs.

Government needs to do more

Albania’sgovernmentneedstodomoretohelpAlbanianswhoresideinGreece.Beyondwordsofpraisefortheirhelpthroughremittances,successiveAlbaniangovernmentshavedonelittletosupportAlbanianimmigrantsabroad–largelyfailingtoofferessentialcitizenshiprightslikevotingandchildren’sbirthregistrationforthoselivingabroad.

Albaniancitizensabroadareessentiallydisenfranchised.TheycanonlyvoteiftheyreturntoAlbaniaonballotday,whichisimpossibleformany,


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withsomenotingthissuitsAlbanianpoliticianswhodon’twanttodealwithamajorvotingblocperhapsusedtomoreaccountablepoliticiansinthecountriesinwhichtheylive.

Beyondvoting,AlbanianbureaucracyhadleftmanyAlbanianchildrenbornabroadvirtuallystatelessforyears,becausetheirparentscouldn’tcomebacktoAlbaniatoregisterthem.ThousandsofAlbanianchildrenborninGreecetoAlbanianparentswentunregistereduntil2009,whenan NGO, TLAS, signed a memorandum of understanding with thegovernmenttohelpgetthesechildrenoncivilregisters.

“Therehavebeentechnicalissuesthatmadeitimpossibleordifficulttoregisterthesechildren,”saidthenDeputyInteriorMinisterIvaZajmiatthesigningceremony,addingAlbaniandiplomaticandconsularmissionsabroadwillnowhelpsecureidentificationdocumentsandregistrationforthesechildren,whichhaveaconstitutionalrighttoAlbaniancitizenship.

TheAlbaniangovernmentmustalsodomoretohelpAlbanianfamilieswhoreturnedfromGreeceduringthecrisis.Morethan133,000peoplereturnedtoAlbaniaduringthattime,markingthehighestpaceofreturnsincethecountrystartedlosingathirdofitspopulationtomigrationinthe1990sandearly2000s.

The data comes from a study of the International Organization forMigration and the Albanian Institute of Statistics, INSTAT, whichurgedauthoritiesinAlbaniatocreatebettercapacitiestoreintegratethereturnedmigrantsintoAlbaniansociety.Men,whoweremorelikelytoemigrateinthefirstplace,outnumberedwomenatnearlythreetooneamongthosewhohadreturnedtoAlbania.Researchersfoundthat95percentofthosewhoreturneddidsovoluntarily,andthelion’ssharecamebackfromtheneighbouringcountries–71percentfromGreeceand24percentfromItaly.BothGreeceandItalywereparticularlyhard-hitintherecenteconomiccrisis,andthemainreasonthemigrantscitedforreturningtoAlbaniawaseconomicdifficultieslikeunemploymentandlowerwagesintheirhostcountries.


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Thosereturningarenottypicallyhigh-skilledworkersAlbanialosttothemassivebraindrainofpreviousdecades,however.Thestudyfoundthatmostofthereturneeswerenotuniversitygraduatesandwerelong-termmigrants,withanaverageofsevenyearslivedinGreeceandfourinItaly.MostofthesemigrantswereverypoorbeforeleavingAlbania,andcamebacksignificantlybetter-offthantheywerebefore,bothintermsofsavingsandinskills,theauthorsofthestudynoted.Inadditiontotheirownsavings,throughtheyearstheyhadalsohelpedtheirfamiliesbackhome,remittingonaverage200-250eurospermonth,althoughthatnumberrapidlydeclinedinrecentyearsduetotheeconomiccrisis.

In post-migration Albania they mostly found self-employment inagriculture or started small businesses. But, in a worrying sign, thestudyshowedthat theaveragereturneeshaveyet tomakesignificantinvestments inAlbania, either because they lack the sufficient fundstodoso,orbecausetheydon’tbelievetheirinvestmentwouldbesafe.TheresearchersalsofoundthatabouthalfofthesurveyedreturneessaidtheyplantosettleinAlbaniapermanently,whileathirdseethemoveastemporaryandmightmigrateagainshouldtheconditionschange.

Migrationcanbecircular,however.DatareleasedbyINSTATinearly2015, showed about 15 percent of people like him had re-migrated,indicatingmobilityofAlbanianworkersisnowanentrenchedfeature--andemigrationislikelytocontinuetobepartoftheAlbanianstoryfordecadestocome.

Sources:● https://www.zeriamerikes.com/a/albania-greece-

border/1734130.html● http://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=112464● http://www.dw.com/sq/si-e-kan%C3%AB-p%C3%ABrballuar-

kriz%C3%ABn-greke-emigrant%C3%ABt-shqiptar%C3%AB/av-40379553

● http://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=104226● http://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=133722


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Why are the Albanian-Greek relations moving backwards?

Bashkim Zeneli1

March 23, 2018

BilateralrelationsbetweenAlbaniaandGreecehavealwayshad,andstillcontinuetohave,agreatimportance.Notonlyforthesakeof goodneighborly relations between the two countries, and thefriendshipbetweenourpeople,butalsoforthefutureofourEuro-Atlanticaspirations.

Albania has always viewed Greece, a member of the EuropeanUnionandNATO,asagatewaytoNATO,andnowtotheEU.Truly,theGreeksupportinourEuro-Atlanticprocesseshasalwaysbeenconvincing.AndthesupportcomingfromGreeceafterthe90shasbeenreassuring.Withoutdoubts,inGreecewehavealwaysfoundanally,afriend,aneighborwhohasalwaysbeentheretosupportusinourdifficulttransitionpath,notonlyintheEuropeanintegrationprocess, but also in our economic and social development. Inall these years, Greece has stood on our side, encouraging andsupportingourdemocratictransitionprocesses,butalsobeingoneoftheimportantpartnersinourtradeandeconomicrelations.

In particular, after theThessaloniki Summit, held in June 2013,Albaniahasbeenaforeignpolicypriorityfor thegovernmentof

1. Bashkim Zeneli, Former Ambassador of Albania to Greece


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Greece, not only under the political aspect, but also through itssupportwithcomprehensivedevelopmentprograms.Ourrelationshave been meaningfully of a strategic, comprehensive andsustainablepartnership.TheserelationshavebeencharacterizedbyaEuropeanandforwardlookingspirit.

Weshouldnotforgetorregardas irrelevant,as ithascommonlyhappened in recent times, the extraordinary sense of humanismthat Greek people showed in the beginning of the 1990s whentheyopenedthedoorstoAlbanianemigrantsseekingabetterlifein Greece. Today, well-integrated in the Greek society as equaland well-respected citizens, they are building a better life forthemselves and their families.Without any doubts, theAlbaniancommunityinGreeceisapreciouscapitalintherelationsbetweenourtwocountries.Thisisafactthatweneedtoattributeamuchgreaterimportance,andnottreatitjustasevidenceandreminderonlyduringelectoralcampaigns,throughtheincursionsofpoliticalforcestowardsourcompatriotsinGreece.

On the other side, the presence of a Greek ethnic minority inAlbania has been, and still is, a very important political,moral,andhumanelementintherelationshipsbetweenourcountries.InAlbania,aspecialattentionhasalwaysbeenpaidtofulfillingtheminority rights and standards of this nobleminority community,infullaccordancewiththeEuropeanandinternationalstandards.AlbaniansloveandrespecttheGreekminority,andtheycohabitateperfectlywitheachother. Iamconfident thatcertainpropertyorregulatoryplans,wouldnevercompromisethisrelationship,neitherharmtheGreekminorityinAlbania.

Nevertheless,it´simportanttolookmorecarefullyattheproblemsthat theGreekminority is facing,andunderstand theirdemands,andtheirlegalrights.Noone,ever,shouldthinkinaway…”wegave this or that…to the Greek minority”.Absolutely not! TheGreekminority,likeanyotherminority,shouldenjoytheirrights


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notasa“gift”or“reward”,butas legallydeservedrights.AndIcansaythatsomegoodworkisbeingdoneinthisdirection.Themostrecentlycreatedproblems,shouldnotbeover-exaggerated,orevenworse,seenaspoliticalattitudestowardstheGreekminority.Thiswould harmour bilateral relations.BetweenAlbanians andthe Greek minority there are no divisions, in every aspect, intheir rights and obligations. The sustainable commitment of theAlbaniangovernmenttofulfilltheEuropeanstandardsoftheGreekminorityinthecountry,shouldbeatthecenteroftheattentionofthepoliticiansandstateinstitutions.Itwouldneverbe“toomuch”whatwearedoingfortheGreekminorityinAlbania,butwealsoshould increase our efforts to demand better fulfillment of thestandardsforourcompatriotslivingandworkinginGreece.

People of our respective countries live in friendship and goodunderstanding,inharmony,andtheyloveandrespecteachother.They closely collaborate in all sectors, turning into importantfactorsnotonlyineconomicandsocialexchanges,butalsocrucialforthestabilityandpeacefuldevelopmentofourregion.Oursis,unfortunately, a troubled region still affected by ethnic hate anddangerousnationalism.

Lookingbackatourhistoricalrelations,itisnoticeablethatthepathfortheirreconciliationhasnotbeeneasy.Instead,ourrelationshavefacedchallenginganddelicatemoments,well-knowntoallofus.Butonlythroughdialogue,oftenadifficultone,andacollaborativeand forward looking spirit, leaving thedividingpast behind, thenecessarydialoguehasbeenachieved.

Thesporadichatefeelings,orsomeincidents,someofthemevendangerous, often intentionally and grotesquely amplified by themedia,fortunatelyhavenotbeenabletodictateorruinourbilateralrelations.Thegoodunderstandingandthefriendshipbetweenthepeopleofourcountriesgoesbackintime,inhistory,traditions,andculture.Fortunately,we´venotfallenintothetrapofprovocations,


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oremotionaldailyevents.Ourrelationshavemovedintotherightdirection,whencourageousanswershavebeengiventonegativespeculations,veryoftencreatedfromcertaingroupsthathavetriedtomisuseormisinterpretoldenmitiesfortheirpoliticalgains,bothinAlbaniaandGreece.

When the spirit of positive political dialogue has been keptalive, to defend the good relations between our two countries,also a courageous response has been given to groups negativelypredisposed to harm the bilateral cooperation, and stimulate thesenseofhatebetweenournations.AnybehaviorinoppositiontothegeneralconsensusandtheEuropeanvaluesofgoodneighborlyrelations and cooperation, has been harshly criticized. Whenpoliticianshavedonewelltheirjob,thishashelpedinstrengtheningtherelationsbetweenournations.Ontheopposite,goodrelationshavebeenharmed,whenpoliticianshavebeenledbynationalisticandxenophobictones,basedon“ethnichate”andfalseprotagonism.Whenbothsideshavegenuinelylookedforwardinstrengtheninggoodneighborly relations,cooperation inallareashasbenefited.Suchacooperativespirithasgiventoourrelationsastronghumandimension,whichI´mafraid,todayismissing!

Withastrongpoliticalwillandthroughhealthydialogue,bothinTiranaandAthens,wehavebeenabletojointlygivesolutionstoold traditional enmities or newBalkan problems.Real dialogue,throughrespect,tolerance,andcompromisehasbeenintheinterestnot only of our two counties, but also for peace and stability inthe region… This is not an empty slogan, considering currentdevelopments.Nothing has been easily achieved, but everythinghasbeenpossibleonlywithacomprehensiveunderstanding,andtrustineachother.Problemsneedtobecalledforwhattheyare,without using “folkloristic” backgrounds, acting in the name ofourcommonEuropeanfuture.Ofcourse,ittakescouragetosolveissues, and courage does not lay in rhapsodies; courage lays in


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futurethinking.

BuildingandconsolidatingsustainablebilateralrelationsbasedonastablesystemofEuropeanvalues,wouldservetofosterdeeperandsustainable regional relations in theWesternBalkans, supportingalsoitsEuro-Atlanticintegration.OurobjectivehasalwaysbeentostrengthenourtieswiththeWest,andtheEuro-Atlanticalliances.TheWest,forus,beginswithourimmediateneighbors,GreeceandItaly,membersoftheEUandNATO,bothourfriendsandpartners.

Weshouldbeclearandnot“distracted”inourstrategicrelations,both politically and diplomatically. The “cheque” diplomacy,or the “cultural” and “religious” ones should not replace ourstrategic, long-termrelations.Strategic relationsshouldbebasedonsolidprinciples,andshouldnotchangebecauseof“theoreticalfabrications”ofclientisticpoliticiansfortheirpowergames.

Ibelieve,modestyaside,IcanspeakconfidentlyabouttherelationsbetweenAlbaniaandGreece.And,Ireallylookattheserelations,with great objectivity. In this context, I can say, not withoutdisappointment,thatourbilateralrelationshavebeenworseninginthelast7-8years.Ialsotendtodisagreewiththeallegedperceptionthat theworsening of these relations should be attributed to thecurrent socialist government, despite the fact that the latter hasbeenalso“confused”inthisdirection.

Today, it is obvious that our bilateral relations are frozen.Unfortunately,relationshavesledbackwards,withthemainactorsfalling pray of this “frozen situation”, despite voices claimingotherwise. I’m afraid, we are facing this situationwith frivolityand lack of responsibility. The political class should take fullresponsibilityforthecurrentsituation,forthebilateralfailuresinthe efforts to solve the current problems. Numerous diplomaticmeetingshavenotmanagedtobringanysolutions.Inaddition,wehavesuccumbedtounacceptablepoliticalanddiplomaticlanguage.


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ThesituationhasescalatedatthepointthatministersinGreecepointoutthat….theyaremuchstrongerthanus(asifwe,bothNATOmembers,arepreparingtofaceeachother).Oursideresponds…askingtheneighbors“toputdowntheirtales….”

Whyaretalkinglikethistoeachother?Whatistotakeprideinsuchdeclarations?Whyarewegettingstuckinthissituation,sufferingasignificantlackoftrustbetweeneachother,focusedon“revealingeachother´stricks”?Anaturalquestionarises“whyisthepolitics,intentionally or unintentionally, freezing relations between twofriendlynations”?Thereisconstantlyonlytalk,insteadoffindingthesolutionsto“untiethestringknot”.Whatistheperspectiveofourrelationsinourcapitals,TiranaandAthens?Areourrelationscapturedbynationalisticandxenophobicrhetoric?

I think, unfortunately, instead of liberating ourselves from thetraditionalreservations,anddoubtsanddistrustsofthepast,we´remainlyholdingontothem,andusingthempolitically.Weforgetthattheadaptionofsuchextremepositions,despitepromisingandeuphoricdeclarationsonbothsides,issendingthewrongmessagestothepublic,irritatingpeopleandtheirrelations.(In the last 4-5 months there have been some moves in the positive direction, and we wish to improve the “frozen relations” of the last 7-8 years. And without any real responsibility, there have been numerous declarations on “our good relations”).

The policy of European values has been long replaced, perhapsunintentionally, by the petty accusations, and an awkwardwillingnesstoreactagainsteachother.Thecurrentissuesthatweare facing,which Iwouldnot consider so problematic to hinderour relations, are restricting us to see beyond them.These longterm“cramps”areharmingourrelations.Particularly,ourrelationshaveworsened (I use this termwithout any hesitation) after thedecisionoftheAlbanianConstitutionalCourtontheannulmentoftheMaritimeBorderAgreement.


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According to the Albanian Constitutional Court, the agreementdoesnotexist.AccordingtotheGreekside,theagreementisvalid.Withoutgettingintothedetailsofthiswell-knowndebate,therealquestion is:whathasbeendoneuntil todaytoresolve this issue,fromthemomentthatthePDgovernmentsignedtheagreement,totheSPgovernmentthataimedtosolvethisproblem?

Duringthelast8years,wehaveheardpettypoliticaldeclarationsof ministers in TV shows, we have witnessed a professionallyunacceptable “spinning” of the issue for the public opinion, ashamefulincompetency.Therehavebeenconflictingdeclarationsovertime.Wehaveheardtalkofnewprojects,courts,andarbitrationpossibilities, newworkinggroups and experts, negotiating team,foreignexperts…

IthasbeensaidthatwearetakingthebestexperiencesfromTurkey,ItalyandCyprus.TheSlovenianmodelhasbeenmentionedasapotentialsolution…InwhattermshavewesatdownwiththeGreekside to discuss this issues?What is the space for improvement,correction,calculations,andrecalculations?Shouldn´ttheAlbanianpublic know what is happening with this agreement, which isturningten-years-old‘withoutanagreement’?Obviously,yes!Itisapolitical,legal,moralandnationaldutyforthepoliticalclasstoexplainthesequestionstothepublic.Forthesakeoftransparency,theAlbanianpublicshouldknowthepositionoftheGreeksideonthis issue.What is the opinion of theGreekGovernment?Whatis acceptable and unacceptable for them? Is there any room forcompromise?Whoshouldansweronthesequestions?Whataretheperspectivesofsolvingthisissue?

Thisisamatterofnationalsecurity,andeveryoneshouldbeinformed.Communicationwiththepublicshouldbedoneinstitutionallyandwith great responsibility. It is a duty of the government to keepitsowncitizensinformed.TheAlbanianparliamenthaskeptsilenton such issues of important national security. In the developed


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Western countries, parliaments also play crucial roles on theseissuesofnationalsecurity,keepingeveryoneaccountablefortheiractionsorinactions.

(It seems that we are moving towards a solution on this issue, but there is no transparency. What is more dangerous is that we´re still seeing in this “agreement” treason and traitors. Treason 8 years ago, still treason today. Is this a bad political game? Yes! A political game is being played to show to the people that we have “big gains” with the new agreement. We need a fair, honest, a legal agreement. There is a need to explain to the public opinion what has changed in this new agreement that is being negotiated from the previous one).

Especially in the last fewyears, the issuesof the“stateofwar”,theChamquestion,andthecemeteriesoftheGreeksoldiersfalleninAlbania during thewar against the Italian fascists, have beenfrequentlyatthecenterofdiscussions.Iwillnotaddressseparatelyeach of these issues, since other authorswill elaborate on thoseissues in more details. However, these issues were not bornyesterday, they have existed for quite some time. Each of thosehasbeenpreviouslydiscussed,thereishistoryandanalysisbehindthem.Buttoday,Ithink,theseissuesarebeingreferredformainlyinternal political consumption.Addressing these issues on thesepoliticalnervoustones,hasincreasedaggressivelyindeclarationsfrombothsides.

Today,morethanever,therearecontinuousdiscussiononthe“stateofwar”betweenthetwocountries,wherecertainpoliticalsegmentsarefallingpreyofdisinformationonthisissue.Intheworstcase,theyareintentionallyusingthisissuetoharmrelationsbetweenthetwo countries. Infamousorganizations, individuals, anddifferentgroups,who are skeptical or opposed to good relations betweenAlbaniaandGreece,keepdigginginthefarpast,stuckbehindinhistory.Certainly, creating problems between our two countries.


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Weshouldnotforgetthatsince1996thereisinexistenceaTreatyofFriendship,Cooperation,goodneighborlyrelations,andsecuritybetweenAlbanianandGreece…!

Peopleinbothcountriesliveinharmony,andhavemostlyputthedifficultpastbehind them. I think,whilenotviewing theabsurdissueofthe“stateofwar”asanobstacletofallpreyinourbilateralrelation,weneed to insist that theGreekparliamentabolish thislaw.DespitethefactthatwiththeGreekGovernmentDecisionof1987,“theissueoftheStateofWarwithAlbaniaisaclosedcase,politicallyandlegally”.Onthisissuethepartiesshouldreallyhaveadialogue,not just talk. If this law is justa relicof thepast, itsplaceisinthemuseum.(The Greek government is saying that will soon abolish this law, and this would be really a very important step for our relations).

Similarly,inrecenttimes,strongerthanever,therearediscussionabout the Cham issue and a potential solution. Our governmentofficialshaveconstantlyrequestedthesolutionofthisissuetotheirGreek counterparts.Their answer has always been that “there isnoChamissue”.Whatareourrequestsinregardtothisissue?Forsure,we areNOT asking for any border changes.TheAlbanianrequests in regard to this issueshouldbe treated in linewith thestandards of human rights, with a new spirit of cooperation, ina good-understanding of what is acceptable for each side. Thisrequiresrealtrustoneachother.Aboveall,itrequiresthatwelookforward,withoutfallingpreyofprejudiceandpressure.Butatthesametime,notacceptingthatthisissue“cannotbediscussed”.

The issueof thecemeteryofGreeksoldiers fallen inAlbania, isanotherissuethatIthinkmeritsasolution.PassingtheballfromtheMinistryofForeignAffairstotheMinistryofDefensewillnothelpsolvethesituation.Therehasbeenaverylongunjustifiablebureaucratic process on this issue, long overdue. Too manycommissionshavebeenestablishedandabolished.Naturally,this


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isaverysensitiveissuefortheGreekpeople.Withoutanydoubts,soldiersfalleninthewarmustbehonoredandrespected.TheyarerespectednotonlybytheGreekpeople,whosesonsdiedinthewar,butalsobytheAlbanianpeople,well-knownfortheiranti-fascistvaluesandcontributionsduringthewars.

NumbersandlocationsoftheGreeksoldiers´cemeteries,isamatterthatshouldbebilaterallydiscussedwiththespiritofcooperationand full responsibility. Everything can be solved when there isgoodwillandnoprejudice.Morethan12yearsagoitwasagreedinprinciplebetweenthetwocountriestoreleaseajointgovernmentstatementconcerningthisissue.But,itwasagreedtopostponeitaftertheparliamentaryelectionsof2005inAlbania.Itwouldbeinourhonorasacountry,underthepoliticalaspect,butalsoforthemoralandhumanaspectstohavethisissuefinallyresolved.(I had written these line on October 3, 2017. The Albanian government decision on this issue of few weeks ago needs to be positively recognized).

Theabovementionedissuesandothers,haveanegativeimpactintherelationsbetweenourcountries.AsImentionedabove,issuesarenotnew(withtheexceptionoftheMaritimeBorderAgreement),butthewaythesearebeinghandledwithdangerouspoliticaltonesandwithlackofaconstructivedialogue,willnothelpsolvetheseissues.TheseproblemscanonlyberesolvedwithaEuropeanspiritanditsprogressivephilosophy.(Let´s wish for the best interest of our countries and our people, that finally, in the last few months we seeing signs of some good reciprocal understanding).

Weshouldbeworriedthattherebeennonewagreementsignedinthelastcoupleofyears,withtheexceptionofanyrareprotocols,consideringthatseveralyearswewouldsignupto10agreementsayear.Agreementsareasignofgoodcooperation.Agreementsinthefields of education, culture, healthcare, or other cross-bordercooperation have been forgotten. There are no new economic


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agreements in a long time, despite the fact that the economicexchangesbetweenourtwocountrieshaveincreased(thisisaveryimportantelement),

The number of official exchange visits is also decreasing. Evenwhen they take place, their follow-up declarations leave a bittertaste. In the last5years, therehavebeennoofficialvisitsat theleveloftheprimeministers.Thistellsalot,andaboveall,ithasneverhappenedbefore.

Inthepastfewyears,relationshavegoneinthewrongfoot,usingtheconceptthat“weraisedallourissues,theballisontheotherfield”.Inpoliticsanddiplomacy,thereshouldbehardworkeveryday,evenwithsmalllittlesteps,butconsolidated.

Weareneighborsandfriends,andweneedtohavegoodrelationsineveryfield.WeneedtoacknowledgewithmorerealismthefactthattheneighboringGreeceisamemberofNATOandEU,nottorepeatitasasimplefact,buttoconsideritasaconstantsupportinourEUintegration.Ofcourse,trustineachotheriskeyinthisprocess.

In addition, we should seriously take into consideration, theimportanceofalmost800thousandAlbaniansthatliveandworkinGreece,notonlywithelectoralcampaignslogansandpoliticians´visits.On theother hand,we should treat theGreekminority inAlbania in adherence of all European standards and rights. Ourpeople,onbothsides,wanttoliveinpeace,friendship,andgoodcooperation. This needs to be ensured and guaranteed by ourgovernments. It can only be achieved by avoiding unnecessaryclashes, hatred, hostility, which are unfortunately amplifiedintentionally.

Any respective“goodwords”orevaluations foreachotherhavebeenmissingforalongtime.Greekpoliticiansexclaimthatweare


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seekinga“greaterAlbania”.Thisisreallyabsurd!Onourside,“theTrojanhorse”appearsnowandthenoneveryissuetobesolved.Thisisanotherabsurdity!Therearethose“givingcredit”toofficialsforfinally“teachingtheGreeksagoodlesson”.Thesepeoplearenothing but megalomaniacs, xenophobic and provocateurs, whoareconvinced to“winningcredits” forencouraginghostilityanddivisionsbetweenAlbaniaandGreece.

People do not accept such a language, such negativemessages.Morethananyoneelse,theAlbaniancommunitylivinginGreecedoes not accept such a behavior. For decades they haveworkedhonestlyforafullcoexistence,friendship,andcooperationwiththeGreeks.Rightlyso,manyofthemconsiderGreeceastheirsecondhomeland.Theirchildrenarebeingraisedandeducatedthere,proudtobeamongstthemostdistinguishedateverylevelofschooling.Iknowpersonally,manyAlbanianfamilieswhosekidshavebeenawardedfortheirexcellentresultswithscholarshipsfromtheGreekgovernmenttostudyinothercountries,suchGermany,Austria,theUKandFrance.

Inter-marriages among Greeks and Albanians are becomingcommonplace.Thisisabeautifulthing.Thisisafactoflife!ManyofthemhavebecomeGreekcitizens,too.What´swrongwiththis…tocallthem“traitors”?Whyisitconsidereda“goodthing”onlywhenyoubecomeaGerman,British,American,orFrenchamongothers?

Whenrelationsbetweenourtwocountriesarefrozen, thehumandimensioniswhatsuffersmost.Itiseasytofallpreyofnationalisticbehavior, but that cannot lead the way forward in our future.“Frozenrelations”isnotjustreflectedinpeople´slives,butitalsohurtsthem.Nothingshouldbeoverlookedinthebilateralrelations,butaboveall,wrongexpectationsandlongdelayscouldbereallyharmful.Insuchasituation,positivedevelopmentshavenopresentandnofuture.


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Several years ago, the bilateral relations were considered asexcellent,on thebasisofa strongstrategicpartnership.Our twocountrieshavegreatlycooperatedineveryfield.Severalagreementsandcooperationprotocolshavebeensignedandratified.HundredsofAlbanians with severe illnesses have been treated for free inGreekhospitals.HundredsofAlbanianstudentshavebeenawardedscholarshipsinGreekuniversities.Sincetheendof2002,theGreekgovernment has allowedAlbanian citizenwho live inGreece tocross the borders evenwithout proper documentations, enablingtheirfreemovement,andbeingabletovisittheirhomelandoutsideanySchengenarearegulations…

TheGreekprimeministers,Mr.SimitsandMr.Karamanlis,intheirofficialmeetingswiththeirAlbaniancounterpartshaveevaluatedrelationsbetweenourtwocountriesasamodelforcooperationintheregionandbeyond.

Ibelievethatthereshouldbe“morewalk”and“lesstalk”.Thisisthemessagetobepassedeveryday.Goodbilateralrelationsneedmuchwork,buttheycanbebuiltupandstrengthened.But,ittakesjustamomenttoharmgoodrelations,andfreezethem.ThiscanhappenwhentheattitudesarecharacterizedbyaweakEuropeanspirit. (As an example, Germany wouldn’t have been able toachieve anything, hadn´t it been led by a strongEuropean spiritafterthefalloftheBerlinWall,andinthe329daysthatfolloweduntiltheGermanre-unification.AgreatexampleofleadershipthatfocusedontheEuropeanfuture).

Obviously, the politicalwill to overcome this “frozen situation”betweenourtwocountries,needstobereciprocal.Wefacecommonchallenges,andneedtoresolvethemtogether.

RelationsbetweenAlbanianandGreecetakeahigherimportancenowadays,notsimplyforthebilateralcooperation.Theserelationsshould be put in the regional andEuropean context.You cannot


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stand for European values on one hand, and fail to have goodneighborlyrelations,ontheotherhand.

Certainly, the European Union is going through difficult times,wrapped into its own problems and challenges. In many EUcountries,thetrusttowardtheEUhasdecreased,beingplacedbyEuro-skepticism. The Great Britain exited the EU. NationalisticpartiesareontheriseinEurope.Intheirlastelections,countrieslike France, the Netherlands, and evenAustria, were threatenedbynationalisticparties’antiEU-rhetoric. InotherEUcountries,mainlyintheformercommunistEastEurope,populismandilliberaldemocracyareontherise.

TerrorismisthreateningEuropemorethanever.TherefugeecrisishasgivenbirthtonewproblemsbothfortheEUmemberstatesandtheEU institutions inBrussels. In this context, anew racist andxenophobic behavior is being evidenced everywhere in Europe.EasternEuropeancountriesintheEU,inclinedtogoagainsttheEUpolicies,optingtobuildwallsinthedoorsofEurope,areevenaskingforEUfinancial funds tofinalize thoseprojects.Other countriesclaimthattheyonlyacceptcatholicrefuges,ornotacceptinganyMuslins(arealshamefortheEuropeanhumanandculturalvaluesforwhichthesecountriesfoughtforinthebeginningofthe1990s).

Turkey,aNATOmemberandEUaspirant,duetoitsowninternaldevelopments, has been worsening its relations with the EU,and some of its most prominent member states, some of whichwith great contributions for the Turkish emigrants in Europe.The Turkish foreign minister declared, recently, that “Europeis inclined towards fascism,goingback to its situationofbeforeWWII”.Suchadeclarationisreallyconcerning.PresidentErdoganopenlydeclared“Wedon’tneedEurope”!!!or that“thestudentswho study in theWest, return asvoluntaryWestern spies.” (TheEconomist,September30–October6,2017,pg.27).Drivenbya nationalistic agenda, threatening towards Europe, the Turkish


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foreignpolicyseemsunacceptable.TurkishrelationswithRussiahavebeenstrengthening,whilethosewiththeUnitedStateshaveseenworsening.

TocomplicatefurtherthecurrentsecuritysituationinEurope,youaddUS-Russia,Europe-Russia,andEurope-USrelations,withnewproblemsandconfrontationalattitudes.Othersecuritychallenges,such as ISIS’ aggression, the endless bloodshed in Syria, theannexation of Crimea byRussia, or the nuclear threat byNorthKorea.

Well, unfortunately, we are not living in a peaceful world offreedom!

On the other side, recent developments in our region are notpeacefulanddemocraticintheircore,despitesustainableeffortsoftheWesterncountriestopromotepeaceandstabilityintheBalkans.InspiteofthegoalsofEuro-Atlanticintegration,andsomepositiveprogress made in that direction, the Western Balkans is stillsufferingfromanarrow-mindedconceptofEuropeanvaluesandstandards.Nationalismisontherise,withdangerousinclinationstowardsnationalisticgovernments.Ethnicdisputesandhatredaredangerouslyshapingregionalrelations.

TheWesternBalkans,initsEUintegrationpath,todaymorethanever, is in great need of reconciliation.TheGermanChancellor,Angela Merkel, has been strongly repeating this message sincethe first meeting of the Berlin Process. Countries in the region,in specificmoments, unfortunately too frequent, tend to hold onethnic, xenophobic, and religious problems. (The well-knownGerman magazine ‘Der Spiegel’, few weeks before the TriesteSummitinJuly2017,haddedicatedalongpieceoffive-fullpagesto the developments in theWestern Balkans. The analysis wastitled“Step-childrenofthecontinent”,focusingontheriseofthenationalisticrhetoricofthepast).


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CountriesintheWesternBalkans,includingAlbaniaandKosovo,inmorethanfewoccasions,havethreatenedEuropewithalternativeoptions, which are completely absurd. “Der Spiegel” made itevident, that inTiranaandPrishtina,EUdisappointedAlbanianscouldundertakeachangeofthenationalbordersinEurope.(N.26,26.02.2017,pg.93)

Witheverythingmentionedabove,Europeisnotlivinginitsbestdays. Problems are challenging. However, the EU should not,underanycircumstances,forgettheWesternBalkans.Ontheotherside,theEUintegrationistheonlygameintownforourregion.There is no other alternative! Without the EU, there can be nopeace,freedom,stability,anddevelopmentintheWesternBalkans.By doing our own homework in strengthening the rule of law,in our integration path,we also give our own contribution in instrengtheningtheEU.(The most recent published EU Commission strategy on a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans, is a very positive signal, and a significant turn in the EU´s vision for the region. However, the recent visits of the EU leaders in the region, expected with high optimism, turned to be a routine tour).

Anydoubtsforasustainablepeaceintheregion,oranyrhetoricforalternativeoptionsoutsideoftheEU,wouldbedangerousforthefutureof theWesternBalkans. TheEuropeanpolitical languagein the region shouldn’t be replaced by unclear jargons, euro-skepticism,disappointments,orspeechesofnationalsuperiority.

It is dangerous that every time that the “European appeal”decreases,the“nationalisticrhetoric”increases.Suchanationalistic“readiness”isdangerousforthefuture.Ontheotherside,itspeaksabouttheseriousnessandhonestcommitmenttotheEuro-Atlanticintegration.IwilluseFYROMasanexample.TheysignedtheEUAssociationAgreementmorethan16yearsago,anEUcandidatefor the last 11 years. On the other side, 9 years ago, FYROM


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receivedaconditionalinvitationtobecomeaNATOmember,butithasremainedstuckofthenationalisticpoliciesandethnicclashestoresolvethenameissuewithGreece.(Fortunately, in the recent months, the new government led by Zaev is moving seriously in the positive direction in the European path).

InBosniaandHercegovina,thenationalisticnarrativeandtheethnicdivisions,butalsodemandsforapoliticalseparationofthecountryhavebeenincreasing.OthercountriesintheWesternBalkanshavetheirsimilarproblemswithriseofnationalismandethnicdisputes.Inacertainway,therehasbeenalsosomebackslidingalsointhedemocraticdevelopmentsintheregion.

I mentioned the examples above, to reiterate that Albania too,shouldlookattheEuropeanintegration,alsointheframeworkofgoodneighborlyrelations,andregionalreconciliation.Idon’tfindexcessivetoremindourselvesofthelegendaryquoteoftheGermanChancellor,VilyBrandt,aNobelPrizewinner,whenhereferredtogoodneighborly relations “notnext to eachother, butwith eachother”.Thiscanbereallydemanding,butalsoatthesametimeabigtestforus.Itrequiresclearandcourageousactions!Weneedtotalktoeachother,notagainsteachother.

Clearly, we will not be able to progress with good faith andconfidencetowardstheEuropeanUnion,ifwe´renotabletomoveaheadinimprovingrelationswithourEuropeanneighbor,Greece.Fortunately,theWesternBalkancountriesaspiringtobecomeEUmembersareborderinginthenorthwithCroatia,andinthesouthwithGreece,bothEUandNATOmembers.Weneedtotakegoodadvantageofthisveryfact.

Getting back into the bilateral relations with Greece, it is veryimportanttowork,onbothsides,basedontheconvictionthatwecanonlymoveforwardifweworktogether.Farmorethingsuniteus, thanthosethatdivideus.Politiciansowethistotheirpeople.


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Theywanttoliveinpeaceandfriendship.Wecannotcloseoureyes,but instead understand better, thatwe arewitnessing very tragiceventsnot farawayfromourregion.Peopleandnations,not farawayfromus,arelivinginhostilityandwar,ahostilitythatseemstoneverstop.Thesenationshavetakennosteps,withorwithoutforeignmediation,toreconcile,tocomeclosertoeachother,andleavethepastbehind.Andthesearepeoplewithimportantcultures,traditions,andhistory.

InourbilateralrelationswithGreece,weshouldnotallow(inrealityweshouldbeworried)thecreationofanycurtains.Theabilitytomoveoverthissituation,tobelieveinpartnerships,shouldnotbeabsent at any situation.We need to know each other better, andmovebeyondallobstacles,toberealstrategicpartners,trustingineachotherand inourcommonfuture.The full responsibility forthe future requires all of us to giveup thenationalistic rhetoric.OnOctober3,2017,attheoccasionofthe27thanniversaryoftheGerman reunification, the German President Steinmeir declaredthat“thebigloveforourcountryshouldnotleadtonationalism.Homelandmeansresponsibilityforthefuture”.

IhavepersonallypubliclysupportedPrimeMinisterRama´seffortsfor the normalization of the bilateral relations with Serbia.Wecouldnotaffordanymoretocontinuetobe“frozen”inourrelationswithSerbia,inthecontextofourcommonEuropeanfuture.But,I cannotagree that,voluntarilyornot,our relationswithGreecehavemovedbackwards.Weshouldnotleaveouroldfriendsaside,tomakenewones.

Forathousandsofreasons,fromanypointofview,ourbilateralrelationswithGreece aremore important. But unfortunately, onbothsides,wehaveremainedhostageoftheshadowsofthepast,allowingthosetodictateourfuturerelationswitheachother.

IshareagreatrespectfortheGreekPresident,Pavlopoulos,withwhom I have had an excellent cooperation on issues related to


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Albanian immigrants, during the years ofmy service inGreece,when he was Minister of Interior. He has always been verysupportive,andIhavealwaysexpressedmygratitudetohimforhiscommitment.But,IwasreallycaughtoutofasurprisewhenhetoldtheFrenchPresidentMacron, that “inAlbania,human rights areviolated,especiallypropertyrights”.(Afterthisdeclaration,therehavebeensomeotherhastydeclarationsfromotherpoliticians).

Inthelast28yearsoftransition,therehavebeenmanyunresolved,or “badly resolved” property issues in Albania. But, I am 100percent convinced that there no bad government intention, oranythingspecificagainst to theGreekminority´spropertyrights.Ontheotherside,Iagree,thatifthepropertyofanAlbanianhastobetorndown,weneedto“thinktwice”whenwedealwiththepropertyofamemberofaminority.IncertainpoliticalcirclesandsomeGreekmedia, itwas presented as theAlbania governmentundertooka“blitzkrieg”againsttheGreekminority.Thiswasalsosupported by political andmedia segments inAlbania.Minorityissuesarealwaysmoresensitivethanothers.IbelievethatthenewminoritylawthatwillbepassedintheAlbanianparliamentwillbeagoodstepintherightdirectionforthefullrespectoftheirrights.

Imentionedtheexampleabove,toshowthatwhenwecarryalongproblemsfromthepast,wehavea“readiness”toadd“newquarrels”tothose.Isthereapoliticalwilltoovercomethissituation?WhenItalkabout“will”,Idon´tmeanjusta“desire”.“Will”means,aboveand foremost, clarity, responsibility, and European standards.Dragging necessary solutions over time, creates room for newquarrels, problems, and disputes. Conflict breeds conflict. Thespectacleofdiplomaticmeetingsisonlyproducingmoreeuphoria,at least judging from the jointpress conferences,ordeclarationsfromGreek restaurants thatweareveryclose togoodsolutions.Howlongwillthislast?Shouldn´tweinstead,withoutmuchnoiseorpublicity,takethefirstnecessarystepsofdialoguetowardstherealsolutions?


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Ourcitizenshavetherighttoknowwhatishappening,whatarethenewdevelopments,whatisthereciprocalcompromise,whataretheobstacles?Solutionscannotcomefrom“brave”declarationsfromadistance.Lackoftransparencytalksaboutlackofprofessionalism,butalsolackofpoliticalclarity.Wherethereisonlyrhetoric,thereisnoprogress.

Inmynumerousarticlesortelevisiontalksinthepastrecentyears,focusing in the relations between our countries, I have alwayshighlighted that, unfortunately, there is lack ofmutual trust. Forsome time now, we look at each other with doubts and seriousreservations.Thisisindeedunacceptable.Itpointsouttoamoveinthebackwarddirection.

In this situation, it is unforgivable that the diplomatic relationsbetweenourcountriesarenot“wakingup”toseethatwearestuckina“frozensituation”.Nosideisundertakingthenecessarystepsto improve thesituation. Once, it tookonlyadeclarationof theBritishPrimeMinister,Thatcher,beforetheGermanre-unificationthat“twoGermany-sarebetterthanone”,fortheGermandeputyChancellorandministerofforeignaffairs,Genscher,toimmediatelyfly toLondon tomeetwithher.He talkedwithThatcher.Again,when the French foreign minister, Frances Duma, said that “aunified Germany would be a danger”, minister Genscher flewagainimmediatelytoParistomeetwithPresidentMitterrand.Hetooksimilar trips toMoscow,Warsaw,andWashington, togetherwith Chancellor Kohl. The reason was simple, to clarify everydeclaration, any prejudice, any reservations. And with greattransparency and accountability, everything would be reportedbacktotheBundestag.

Thenumerousdeclarationsfromadistance,notonlyfailtosolveany issues, but they actually are reminders of our problems.Perhaps,wearesteppingbackbeingshyinfrontoftheobscurantist,populist,andnationalistvoices,onbothsides.Willourpoliticians


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allowthesenationalistvoicestodefineourmutualbehavior?Thejointpolitical responsibilities shouldgobeyond thegoodwill tonormalizerelationsbetweenourtwocountries,buttheyalsoshouldaddressourEuropeanfuture,beingcrucialforpeace,stability,andsecurityintheregion.

Ourpoliticalleadersshouldlearnto“swallowwords”declaredinTiranaandAthens,whichhave“heated”thesituation.Thisrequirescourageandresponsibility.Ourcountrieshavecommoninterests,forthisweneedtoworktogethertofindthenecessaryunderstanding,withoutanyconfusion,prejudice,orreservations.Tolookforwardinourbilateralrelationsdoesnotmeanthatproblemsshouldnotbe discussed.

Ibelieveweneedanew“guide”forourcommonEuropeanfuture.WeneedaguideofEuropeanstandards,notBalkanones.Weneedaclearguide,anadvancedone!Andthebasisofthisguideshouldbetrust.Trust,andeffortstore-establishtrust.Withoutre-establishingtrust,wecannotmove forward.Wecouldcertainlyputa façade,andafterformalmeetings,wecoulddeclarethatthingsarebeingresolved, that a good climate is being established. However, itwouldbeonlytemporary,andnotsustainable.

Toreestablishedtrust,courageandclarityarecrucial.Tobeledbycourage,meanstofeelandtakeresponsibilities.Itisaresponsibilitytowardsthegoodfriendshipandunderstandingofourpeople,whohavelivedtogetherforcenturies.Responsibilityshouldbebareofmomentarydeclarations,undernationalistorpopulisttones.

Totakeonresponsibilityandtositdowntoresolveproblems,meanstoactuallywork in favorofhundredsof thousandsofAlbanianslivinginGreece,whomhavehighexpectationsforbetterrelationsbetweenourcountries.

To take on responsibility means to show more attention to theeveryday problems of the Greek minority inAlbania, not only


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related to property issues, but also to more broader cultural,educational,andsocialissues.

Claiming responsibility means showing added, daily, attentionto theminority for each of its issues, not just property, but alsocultural, educational, social. Trust is won through actions, notjustwords.There is no trustwhenwords are rounded up,whenpromisesareoverlooked,whenmomentaryanddomesticintereststakeover.Onlyopen,European, andhonest behavior, shouldbearealstandardofre-establishingtrust.Trustismeasuredthroughattitudes.

WecannotmoveaheadinourEuropeanintegrationwhilelookingback. History has taught us that Europe was made of bravemen to serve theirpeople inpeaceand liberty, in friendshipandunderstanding,takingresponsibilityforthefuture,andleavingthepastbehind.Andtheywerecapableofleavinganuglypastbehindthem.

Our problems (for what they are, without adding unnecessaryadditionalvaluetothose)cannotbesolvedinonedaywithamagicstick.But, I don´t thinkwe have seriously sat down together toresolvethoseissues.Forthisreason,weshouldnotwasteanymoretime.

Skilled and capable experts, on both sides, should sit down,without nationalistic loads and populist guidance.These expertsshouldbeskilled,experienced,andvisionarydiplomats,withhighintegrity, andnot spoiledand servile,whichunfortunatelyare inlargenumbers.(Let’s talk seriously, despite the fact that bilateral meetings have been held in Crete and Korca, the “heated” declarations in Athens and Tirana have continued).

Ithasbeenmore than13years since the startof thediscussionsaboutinspectioncommissionstoreviewthehistorytextbooks.Theobjectiveistostripthemoffuntruthfulandfaultyinterpretationsof


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thepast.Isthisinitiativesodifficulttobeundertaken?Animportantstepthatwouldservetothehistoricaltruthofourpast.

TheEuropean future should be “seen in the eyes” every day, inevery step, in every relationship.Weneed to be clear about ouralliances,andour strategicallies.Ofcourse,Greeceshouldbeastrategicallyforus,intheregionandbeyond.Astrategically,isamongother things, someone that lovesEurope, and contributespositivelytowardsitsfuture.Europeanvaluesshouldleadourwaytothefuture.Today,anyfriendshiporcooperation,ineveryfield,shouldnotbeseenoutside theseEuropeanvalues. (Willweeverbeabletosayoutloud,eventually,that“weloveGreece”,andourrelationsarestrategic?Willbeclearonourpositions, today,fiveyears after repeated declarations that “we areworking to sign astrategicpartnershipagreement?”

Foreign policy, especially diplomacy, are based on seriousness,honesty and credibility. That is what makes a real interlocutor,a credible partner. “Punch lines” are not political, neither canguaranteeabetterfuture.

What has been built up in our bilateral relations, should notbe allowed to get spoiled by certain segments, associations,speculative, populist, and delusional individuals, on both sides.Ourgovernmentsshouldtaketheirfullresponsibilities,andshouldnotbe influenced fromnationalisticvoiceswhooperate for theirpettydomesticinterests.

Governmentsshouldtaketheirfullresponsibilitieswhengenuineinterestsofpeople,andtheirfriendshiparenegativelyaffectedandthreatened.Theabilitytoovercomeincidents,prejudices,tensions,istheabilitytohaveaclearpictureofthefutureandtoknowhowtoachievefutureobjectives.

I personally think that PrimeMinister Rama should look at thebilateralrelationsbetweenAlbaniaandGreecewithatimelyhigh


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responsibility.Anypopulistdeclarationswillnotsuffice.Heshouldnotlistentothosebiasedadvisors“whisperinginhisears”“itwasgreatwhat you did to theGreeks”.We should learn our lessonsfromwhatishappeninginEurope,andnot“clap”thoseleadersthatarechallengingtheEU.Our“friends”and“brothers”shouldbeinlinewiththeEuropeanintegration.Veryclearly!Intheirwordsandactions!Outloud!

Forus,goodrelationswithGreece,asaNATOandEUmember,asaneighborandbeyondhaveasignificantimportanceanddeservetobeclearlyprioritized.WeshouldnotlosesightofthefactthatrelationsbetweenAlbaniaandGreeceshouldbestrategicones.

Weneed to commonlyundertake initiatives to return to thebestdaysofourrelations.

Albanians and Greeks are good neighbors, good friends andshouldcoexistassuch.Politiciansandgovernmentsshouldservethisend.Thisiswhatthepeoplewantandtheywillalwaysholdtheirgovernmentsresponsibleandaccountable,bothinTiranaandAthens.


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Bilateral Governmental Communication: A Tool for Stronger Albanian-Greek Relations

Bledar Feta1

Addressingbilateralcommunicationisanessentialaspectintheprocessofstrengtheningstaterelationsbetweencountrieswheremistrustishigh.InthecaseofAlbaniaandGreecewhilegrapplingwiththeunfinishedbusinessanduncharteredwaters,maintainingcommunicationchannelsopen is vital.The twocountries, albeit inextricably linked likeveryfew others in Europe, as they’re intertwined bymultiple historical,economic, cultural, and societal ties reserve a mutual suspicion ondeep-seatedandopenissues,collidingtheirbilateralrelations.WhileconsolidatingtherecentchangesischallengingforAthensandTirana,conflictingviewshaveperplexedbilateralrelationsandtheatmospherehasbeenattimesdistinctlyfrostywithnohigh-levelcontacts.Clearly,theintensificationofbilateralcontactsduringthelastfouryearsandtheestablishmentofjointmechanismstodiscusstheopenissuesseemtobeastepintotherightdirection.Atthesametime,theflipsideofthispositivedevelopmentisthecomplexityofthesecontroversiesandthetoughpoliticalrhetoric,whichcastdoubtonwhetherthetwopartswillsuccessfullyconfronttheirproblemsinthenearfuture.Tomoveforward–allinonepackage,TiranaandAthensneedtoacknowledgethecostsoffurtherescalation,showstrategicclarityandpoliticalwill,and above all need tomaintain communication channels open as anecessary tool for thedismantlementofbarriers responsible for theparalysisintheirrelations.

1. Bledar Feta, International Relations Analyst


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Introduction

SincethefoundationoftheAlbanianstatein1913,therelationshipwithGreecehasbeencomplexandunstable.DuringmostoftheColdWar,relationsbetweenthetwocountriesweretense.Aftertheendofthecommunistregimeanditsreplacementbyademocratically-electedgovernment,thesituationdidnotchangedrasticallywhileseveral zigzagshavebeenobserved in their relations.During thepresidency of Sali Berisha (1992-1997), bilateral relations werealmostfrozenwithbreaksindiplomaticcontactsandviolentborderincidents.2RelationsimprovedduringtheSocialist-ledgovernment(1997-2005),butbegantodeteriorateagainfollowingthere-electionofBerisha’sDemocraticPartyin2005.Althoughduringthisperiodrelationsdidnot reach the lowlevelofBerisha’sfirstpresidency,the contacts at political level were limited. Communication washeldmainlyinthefringesofinternationalsummitsandsince2010,AthenshaddowngradedbilateralcommunicationandconsultationswithTiranatotheleveloftheForeignMinistrySecretaryGeneral.3 ThisviewwasmainlyattributedtoAlbania’sreluctancetoratifytheAgreementfortheDelimitationoftheGreek-AlbanianContinentalShelf andMaritime Zones signed in 2009 and nullified in 2010by theConstitutionalCourt ofAlbania.After the agreementwasrevoked,AlbaniaandGreeceexperiencedanother“frozen”phaseintheirdiplomaticrelations.4

2. MirandaVickers:“The Greek Minority in Albania – Current Tensions”,DefenseAcademyoftheUnitedKingdom,page2,January2010.Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111787/2010_01_$Balkan%20Series%200110%20WEB.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).3.AlexandrosMallias:“Greece and Albania: the framework and terms for a New Deal”,speechdeliveredduringaninternationalconferenceorganizedinTirana,2012.Available at: http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Greece-and-Albania1.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).4. DorinaNdoj:“The Albanian-Greek relations following the Sea Border Issue”,EuropeanJournalofSocialSciences,EducationandResearch,Vol.4,No.1,May-


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However,despiteall thedifficulties icehasstarted tomelt.Since2013, high-level contacts between Tirana andAthens have beenstrengthened and intensified, signaling a new era of improvedbilateralcommunication.Thisfrequencyofbilateralexchangesandtheengagementindiscussionsconcerningcertainissuesdemonstratethe importance that both sides attach to their relations, as wellas their common determination to move forward. The strongerbilateral communication has already delivered some results. Thedifficultlong-standingissueregardingtoponymshasbeenresolvedinamutuallyacceptablewayandbothpartshavere-engagedinadialogueonotherkeyissues,byreinstatingseveraljointcommitteesof experts. However, the negotiations aimed at resolving someof these problems are slow andwith yet uncertain outcomes. Inaddition,thisperiodsawtheresurfaceoftensionsbetweenAthensand Tirana due to many incidents which have provoked strongnationalistovertonesgivingtheimpressionthatcountries’relationsarestuckintopatrioticandpopulistgear.Someexamplesofrecenttensionscanbementionedhere:thedisagreementovertheterritorialreform inAlbania and the demolition of ethnic Greek families’homes inHimara considered byGreece as a threat tominority’srights;thedemarchedeliveredbyAlbaniatoGreekauthoritiesoverenergyexplorationintheIonianSea;thenationalistdiscourseonthebothsidesoftheborderandtheracistextremismofGoldenDawnin Greece directed against all foreigners, including theAlbanianimmigrants.

ThedisputesandproblematicaspectsinrelationsbetweenGreeceandAlbania remain in place and capable of creating tensions ifbrought back to the forefront at any givenmoment. Four issues,whether raised byAthens or byTirana, have turned bilateral tiessourbetweenthetwoneighbors:theunresolvedmaritimedispute,thecemeteriesofGreeksoldiers inAlbania, thetechnicalstateof

August 2015. Available at: http://journals.euser.org/files/articles/ejser_may_aug_15/Dorina.pdf (lastaccessedon30September2017).


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warstillinplaceandCham’sclaimsontheirconfiscatedproperty.Inaddition,theGreeksidefocusesespeciallyonthefateoftheethnicGreekminorityinsouthernAlbaniaexpressingconcernsaboutthediscrimination of their rights, while theAlbanian part complainsabout the bureaucratic hurdles that Albanian immigrants oftenfaceinGreece.5Notonlydothetwogovernmentshaveopposingviewson all these topicsbut alsoboth societieshave completelydifferentreadingswithagreatdealofmistrustbetweeneachother.“ThegeneralperceptioninAlbania is thatGreecehasneverfullyaccepted the creation of themodernAlbanian state; whereas thegeneralperceptioninGreeceisthatAlbanianshaveahiddenagendaaimedatdiminishingGreece’scloutintheregion”.6Thereservoirofpublicdiscontenthasnotdriedout;thereforethestatusofGreekminorityinAlbaniaandthestatusofAlbanianimmigrantsinGreeceare likely to keep theTirana-Athens channel busy in the comingyears.

Albania’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy

SoonaftertheSocialistPartycametopowerin2013,Albania’sPrimeMinisterEdiRamaunderlinedtheneedforagoverningteamthatwillbringanewmodelofbehaviorandamorecollaborativespiritin theforeignpolicyarea. In thatcontext,hearticulated theZeroProblemswiththeNeighborsasoneofthemainleadingprinciples

5. See “The Greek Public Opinion towards Albania and the Albanians – Social Attitudes and Perceptions”, South East Europe Program ELIAMEP,page 11, December 2013. Available at: http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/The-Greek-public-opinon-towards-Albania-Final-report-Dec-2013.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).6. Speech ofAlbanian Minister of ForeignAffairs Mr. Ditmir Bushati at aRoundtableDiscussionorganizedbytheHellenicFoundationforEuropeanandForeignPolicy(ELIAMEP)inAthens.Availableat:http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Report.docx.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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oftheSocialistgovernment’sforeignpolicy.7ThenamegiventothispolicysuggestedthatitwoulderadicatealltheproblemsthatTiranahas with its neighbors by following a more “cooperative track”portrayingAlbaniaasafriendlycountrythatprioritizescooperationwithitsneighbors.Inlinewiththisprinciple,thegovernmenthasannounced the creation of a strategic quadrangular with Greece,Italy,TurkeyandAustria, inaneffort tocultivatebetter relationswith them.8 Inorder tomaintainequilibrium, theAlbanianPrimeMinistertestedhisnewapproachduringhisvisitinAthens,RomeandAnkaraimmediatelyafterhisvictoryintheJune2013elections,affirming the importance of relationswith allAlbania’s strategicallies.

So farAlbanian-Greek relationshavealwaysbeendescribedasastrategicpartnership.9Tiranaisverymuchinterestedincultivatingandmaintaininggoodrelationswithitssouthernneighbor;however,therelationsbetweenthetwocountrieswerewidelyshapedbythedifferentapproachestowardtheforeignpolicy,whichthedifferentpolitical parties have pursued in both countries.The principle ofzeroproblemstowardsGreece,althoughinitiallyconsideredoutoftimeandplace,ithasbeeninsomewaysuccessfullyimplementedinthepastfouryears.Tirana’srelationswithAthensnowfollowamorecooperativetrackwithmanyhigh-levelcontactswhichhaveledtotheestablishmentofjointexpertmeetingswheresomeopen

7. “Rama: Greqia partner strategjik. Politika jone e jashtme “zero probleme me fqinjët”,GazetaShekulli,September2013.Availableat:http://gazeta-shqip.com/lajme/2013/09/24/rama-greqia-partner-strategjik-parimi-politikes-sone-te-jashtme-zero-probleme-fqinjet/(lastaccessedon30September2017).8. “Trekendeshi i diplomacise rajonale behet katerkendesh”, Reporter.al,September2017.Availableat:https://www.reporter.al/trekendeshi-i-diplomacise-rajonale-behet-katerkendesh/(lastaccessedon30September2017).9. See “Bushati: Albania is interested in strategic relations with Greece”,European Western Balkans, 22 September 2017. Available at: https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/09/22/bushati-albania-interested-strategic-relations-greece/(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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issuesarediscussedindetails.AccordingtotheAlbanianMinisterof ForeignAffairs Ditmir Bushati, through this “policy of smallsteps”TiranaandAthens“havesetthetraininmotionagainandareworking together to achieve concrete results”. “Wewill continuewith our motto, zero problems with the neighbors and we willintensifyoureffortstoaddressallproblemswehavewithGreece”.ThiswasthedeclarationmadebytheAlbanianPrimeMinisterEdiRamaduring thepresentationofhisnewgovernmentprogram intheAlbanianAssembly in September 2017.10Albania’s Head ofGovernmentaddedthat“wewantmutualfriendship,mutualrespectandstrategiccooperationwithGreece”,butunderlinedthat“despitethe internal problems,Albaniawill never close its eyes andwillneverbequietwhenitcomestodefendingthetruthandourrights”.

Athens’s initial expectations for a change in Tirana’s stancewith Edi Rama as a Prime Minister were very high.11 Greece’ssatisfactionwithRama’s victory can be explained by the lenientposition adopted by his Socialist Party in the past, compared tothe intransigent stance of Sali Berisha’s Democratic Party. It isnot uncommon among ordinaryAlbanians to view the Socialistsas “soft” on national and foreign policy issues, often pointing tothe closebondswithGreece that thePartyhadat times enjoyed.ThesoftapproachtowardsAthensonissueswithnationalinteresthas angered ordinary Albanians with local media demandingfromAlbanian politicians to react to what they see as Greece’sinterferenceinAlbania’sinternalaffairs.Therefore,Rama’srecentnationalist/patrioticrhetoriccanbeviewedinlightofhisdesireto

10. “Kuvend – Mesazhi i Rames per Greqine: Nuk mbyllim syte, as gojen per te drejtat tona”,OraNewsTV, 11 September 2017.Available at: http://www.oranews.tv/vendi/rama-ka-nje-mesazh-per-greqine/ (last accessed on 30September2017).11. “Ελλάδα και Αλβανία: ο δύσβατος δρόμος των ψευδαισθήσεων και οαξιότιμοςκ.Ράμα”,mignatiou.com,February2017.Availableat:http://mignatiou.com/2017/02/ellada-ke-alvania-o-disvatos-dromos-ton-psevdesthiseon-ke-o-axiotimos-k-rama/(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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enhancetheSocialists’imageasaforcethatis“nolesspatriotic”than theDemocratic Party aswell as his attempt to improve hisimageasavisionarypioneerbothdomesticallyandwithregardstoforeignpolicy.Therefore,theAlbaniangovernmenthastopreserveadifficultequilibriumbyaddressingsensitivenational issuesandpreservingatthesametimegoodrelationswithAthens.ThecurrentstatementsofAlbanianPrimeministerandhispersistenceinraisingtheChamissueinanofficialwayhavesatisfiedaconsiderablepartoftheAlbanianpublicbutatthesametimehaveangeredGreece,eliminatingAthens’s hope for radical modification on Albania’sofficial position in relation to some of the open issues. SomeanalystsbelievethatbyputtingbilateralrelationsintoanationalistandpatrioticgearRamamaintainsexistingproblemsandaddsnewones, far from following a zero problempolicywithGreece.Onthe contrary, for some others his persistence in raising any issueofficiallyisintherightdirectionfortheresolutionofallopenissues,approachingthefinalreconciliationinGreek-Albanianrelations.

Tensions persist despite the diplomatic intensity of high-level contacts

The diplomatic intensity of high level-contacts between Tiranaand Athens has not put an end to new tensions and low-rangebilateral disputeswhich still are coming to the surface.Not verylong, after the election of EdiRama, tensions rose again in July2014whenAlbanianparliamentadoptedthelawoncountry’snewadministrativeandterritorialdivision.Government’splanstoslashthenumberofmunicipalitieswerefiercelycontestedbytheUnityfor Human Rights Party (PBDNJ), which represents Albania’sGreek minority. Party’s leader Vangjel Dule considered the newadministrative division as illegal, declaring that “it is threateningminorityrights”.12Hemainlyobjectedtothenon-denominationof12. See “Miratohet me 88 vota reforma territoriale”,VoiceofAmericaNews,


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southernmunicipalityofHimaraasanethnicminorityarea.

Worriedaboutthesituation,theleaderofPBDNJtraveledtoAthenswhere he had a meeting with the then Greek Foreign Minister,EvangelosVenizelos.13InatelephoneconversationwithhisAlbaniancounterpart, Ditmir Bushati, Venizelos pointed out the sensitivenature of the territorial reform and the need to push forward thependingissuesbetweenthetwocountries,withoutaddingothers.14 TheAlbanian ForeignMinister replied that the territorial reformis Albania’s domestic issue and has long been discussed in theparliamentandbyaspecialparliamentarycommittee.15RegardingtheHimaraissue,whichwaspresentedasaconcernbyAthens,Bushatisaidthat“Himaraisoneofthefunctionalunitsofthecountryanditwillbetreatedasallotherunits”.Meanwhile,Venizelosreactedbysayingthat“thesolutionmustbedonethroughEuropeanpractices.AlbaniaisnowanEUcandidateandithasmoreobligations”.TheconversationbetweenthetwocounterpartscameseveraldaysaftertheletterofVenizelostoBushati,wherehestressedtheimportanceofthereformandthefactthattheGreekminorityinAlbaniamustnotbeaffectedbyit.

The strong reaction of the PBDNJ became a headache for thegoverning coalition since the bill required a qualified majorityto pass through the parliament.Thus, the government decided to

31July2014.Availableat:https://www.zeriamerikes.com/a/reforma-territoriale-parlament/1969029.html(lastaccessedon30September2017).13. “Dule meets Greek Foreign Minister”,Top-Channel,24July2014.Availableat: http://top-channel.tv/english/artikull.php?id=12372 (last accessed on 30September2017).14. “Municipal cull anger Albanian opposition”,BalkanInsight,25July2014.Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-to-pass-first-administrative-reform-in-decades(lastaccessedon30September2017).15. “Will the territorial reform make the Greek minority leave the governing coalition?”,IndependentBalkanNewsAgency,25July2014.Availableat:http://www.balkaneu.com/territorial-reform-greek-minority-leave-governing-coalition/ (lastaccessedon30September2017).


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include the recommendationsof theParty for Justice, IntegrationandUnity,PDIU,whichrepresentstheChamCommunityinAlbaniaandhasastrongrivalrywithPBDNJ.Finally,theParliamentpassedthe territorial reformbutGreekswere deeply concerned. PBDNJcontinued to be part of the ruling coalition until March 2015when the Albanian government included PDIU in his coalitionand angeredGreece.16 Party’s leader, Shpëtim Idrizi,was electedas deputy speaker of parliament. Protesting over themove,Duleresigned as deputy speaker and PBDNJ left the ruling coalition.TheexistenceandpoliticalperformanceofPDIUandthesupportitwasgettingfromEdiRama,whowasusinghispowertopromotetheChamissue,wasseenwithincreasingconcernsfromAthens.17 Automatically, theGreekMinistryofForeignAffairs condemnedthe appointment of a Cham representative as a Deputy SpeakeroftheAlbanianAssembly.Greeceisdissatisfiedwithwhatitseesasagrowinganti-GreeksentimentinAlbaniansocietyandpublicdiscourse,expressedbytherisinginfluenceofnationalistandanti-GreekpartiessuchasPDIU.18PDIUisnotpartofRama’ssecondcabinet, leavinghimmoreroomtodealwiththeChamissueinawaythatwillnotirritateAthens.

Tensionscontinuedin2015whenTiranaandAthensengagedinadisputeoverexplorationrightsandborders.OnMay4,2015,AlbanianauthoritiesdeliveredanofficialdemarchetotheGreekambassador,

16.See“PDIU brakstis PD-në, hyn në qeveri, koalicion me PS-në”,OraNewsTV, 30 March 2015. Available at: http://www.oranews.tv/vendi/zgjedhjet-rama-konsultime-me-deputetet-takon-edhe-kreun-e-pdiu/ (last accessed on 30September2017).17. SokolKondi:“Tirana, the centre of world diplomacy”,AlbanianPlatformforPolicyAdvocacy,July2015.Availableat:http://appa.al/en/report-july-2015-ministry-of-foreign-affairs/(lastaccessedon30September2017).18. IoannisArmakolas and Giorgos Trianatafyllou: “EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans–Greece”,EuropeanPolicyCenter,IssuePaperNo.79,page136,July2015.Availableat:http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_5832_eu_balkans_-_issue_paper.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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askingAthenstoreviseitsplansforenergyexplorationintheIonianSeaonthegroundsthatitwouldintrudeAlbanianterritorialwaters.19 Inaddition,TiranaaskedGreecetopresentmapsofplannedlandexploration inEpirus, a region in northwesternGreece along theborders.20TheAlbanian complaint caused the intense reaction ofAthenswithForeignMinisterNikosKotziascancellingascheduledmeetingwith theAlbanianAmbassador inAthens aswell as hisparticipationintheInter-BalkanForeignMinisters’MeetingheldinTiranaonMay22,2015.DiplomaticresourcesinAthensinterpretedTirana’smoveasaclearbidtoquestionexistingbordersinthecontextofthedecades-oldnationalistideaofcreatinga“GreaterAlbania”,as Greek “Vima” daily noted.21 TheAlbanian part considers thedecisionofGreekauthoritiestoconducthydrocarbonexploitationintheIonianSea“asaunilateralmove”withtheAlbanianMinistryofForeignAffairssendinganewverbalnoteontheissueonOctober26,2015,supportingthat“atleastoneoftheexplorationblocksislocated into theExclusiveEconomicZones ofAlbania”.22Tiranaunderlines thatsince there isnoagreementon thedelimitationofthecontinentalshelfbetweenGreece,AlbaniaandItaly,noactofresearchorexploitationshouldbeundertakenwithouttheconsentof all parties.23 It seems that the debate over the sea border andmaritimezonesunfoldedanotherimportantissuebetweenthetwo

19. Nikolas Katsimpras: “Is Edi Rama joining Erdogan and Putin in the 180-degree-turn-club?”, HellenicAmerican Leadership Council, 2 June 2015.Available at: http://hellenicleaders.com/blog/edi-rama-joining-erdogan-putin-180-degree-turn-club/#.Wdn28I-0PDd(lastaccessedon30September2017).20.Ibid21. AggelosAthanasopoulos: “Τα Τίρανα αμφισβητούν περιοχές για έρευναστοΙόνιο”.ToVima,17May2015.Availableat:http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=704871(lastaccessedon30September2017).22.AggelosAthanasopoulos:“ΗΑλβανίατραβάειτοσκοινίστοΙόνιοκατάτοπαράδειγματηςΤουρκίας”,ToVima,15October2015.Availableat:http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=753978(lastaccessedon30September2017).23.Ibid


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countries-i.e.potentialoilexploitationsinthewatersoftheIonianSea-,anissuewhichwillkeepTirana-Athenschannelsbusyforalongtimeputtingbarriersontheroadtoacompletereconciliation.

Tensionsresurfacedagainin2016and2017.Thistime,attheheartofthetensionswasthedecisionoflocalauthoritiesintheAlbaniantownofHimaratodemolishthehomesof19ethnicGreekfamilies.24 Reactingtothedemolitions,theGreekMinistryofForeignAffairsmaintained thatAlbania’sEUaspirationsmaybecompromised ifTiranafailstoprotecttheminorityrights.25ThesafeguardingoftheGreekminority rights inAlbania constitutes a significant foreignpolicyobjectiveofGreecewithGreekofficialshavingrepeatedlyconditioned the improvement of bilateral relations andAlbania’saccession into the EU on the respect of these minority rights.“ReforminthejusticesectorandprotectionofhumanandminorityrightsweretwoofthefivekeyprioritiesthatAlbaniamustimplementfullyandinasustainableway,asaconditionforexaminingthestartofEU-Albaniaaccessionnegotiations”GreekMinisterofForeignAffairsNikosKotziassaid,underliningthat“theillegaldemolitionofGreekminoritypropertyisablatantviolationofhuman,minorityandpropertyrights”.26TheAlbaniansidehasdeniedanyviolationof

24. “Athens in diplomatic spat with Tirana over demolition of ethnic Greeks’ homes”,ekathimerini.com,November2016Available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/213304/article/ekathimerini/news/athens-in-diplomatic-spat-with-tirana-over-demolition-of-ethnic-greeks-homes (lastaccessedon30September2017).25. “Athens reacts to demolition of ethnic Greeks’ homes in Himara”,ekathimerini.com,August 2017.Available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/221273/article/ekathimerini/news/athens-reacts-to-demolition-of-ethnic-greeks-homes-in-himara(lastaccessedon30September2017).26. ForeignMinisterNikosKotzias reply to questions tabled byMPs on thedemolition of Greek minority-owned residences and businesses in Himara,southernAlbania(July2017).Available at: http://www.mfa.gr/epikairotita/diloseis-omilies/anakoinose-upourgeiou-exoterikon-skhetika-me-katedaphiseis-stis-drumades-kheimarras-akineton-pou-anekoun-se-mele-tes-ellenikes-ethnikes-meionotetas.html (last


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minorityrightsdeclaringthattheplansoftheAlbaniangovernmentincludethousandsdemolitionsalongthecountry, inanattempttoreconstructthechaoticurbanizationthattookplaceafterthe1990s.27

Into what might already be coined as a complex situation, thestatement ofPrimeMinisterEdiRama that “Athens owes a lot toAlbanian speaking population who had lived there throughouttimes: such as the rescue of theAcropolis by the intervention ofthe Archbishop Gjergj Dushmani”, was considered by Athens asa nationalist rhetoric, and added fuel to the fire frustrating Greekofficials’ initial hopes for potential improvement in the bilateralrelations.This statementofRama,whichcameafter thedemarcheoftheGreekministryofForeignAffairsregardingthedemolitionofhouses inHimara, raised the reaction ofGreekmedia consideringthemprovocativeandoutoftime.ForGreece,AlbanianPrimeMinsterhasincreasinglygivensignsofprovocationoverthepastcoupleofyears,especiallyvis-à-visthepresenceofAlbanianminoritiesintheGreaterBalkans.ErionVeliaj’spolicy,apoliticalfetusofEdiRama,torenovateTirana’smainSkënderbejëSquarebyputtingstonesallover regions of the Balkans, including even stones fromGreece’snorthwest Thesprotia region is seen as an “action that cultivatesandconcealsirredentism”.“Thesestones,onwhichtheirregionsoforiginareinscribed,constituteaworkthatsymbolizesthe“unityofAlbanianterritories”andisclearlya“stateactionthatcultivatesandconcealsirredentism”theGreekMinistryofForeignAffairssaid.Theministrywenton to label the initiativeas“yetanotherprovocationfromtheAlbaniangovernment,whichisopenlyundermininggood

accessedon30September2017).27. SqarimiMinistrisësëKulturëslidhurmeDeklaratëneMinstrisësëPunëvetëJashtmetëGreqisëpërprishjeneobjektitnëfshatinDhërmi(27July2017).Available at: http://www.kultura.gov.al/al/newsroom/deklarata-per-shtyp/sqarim-i-ministrise-se-kultures-lidhur-me-deklaraten-e-ministrise -se-puneve-te-jashtme-te-greqise-per-prishjen-e-objektit-ne-fshatin-dhermi&page=1 (lastaccessedon30September2017).


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neighborly relations”.28 The current government inTirana, like allmainstreampoliticalparties, isopposed toanypoliticalunificationofAlbanian-inhabitedterritoriesthroughborderchanges;theywouldpreferitcausedbytheirintegrationintotheEU.29OncetheplannedextensionofEuropeanUnionmembershipintotheWesternBalkansbecomeareality,borderswilllosetheirmeaningintheclassicsense,andthehopeisthatthefreemovementofpersons,ideasandgoodsinaEuropeancontextwillensureapeacefulandaprosperousfuturefortheentireregion.

In a climate ofmutualmistrust, doubt and strong statements bothcountries have managed with some success to maintain balancedbilateral relations without jeopardizing the already establishedprocessofhigh-levelconsultations.However,buildinguprelationsofmutualtrustremainsanurgenttasksincetensionsandethnicallyrelatedincidentswilloccur,particularlyinHimara,erodingthebasisfor friendly rapports and closer cooperation.Yet, the fact that it isinneitherside’sinteresttoallowbilateralrelationsbetweenAthensandTiranatodeteriorateagainandthereforethisshouldinprincipleexerciseapowerfulmoderatingeffect.Neithersidehastheluxurytoletrelationssour.

28. ΑνακοίνωσηΥπουργείουΕξωτερικώναναφορικάμεαλυτρωτικούχαρακτήραέργοανάπλασηςκεντρικήςπλατείαςΤιράνων(26June2017).Availableat:http://www.mfa.gr/epikairotita/diloseis-omilies/anakoinose-upourgeiou-exoterikon-anaphorika-me-alutrotikou-kharaktera-ergo-anaplases-kentrikes-plateias-tiranon.html(lastaccessedon30September2017).29. “Ράμα:Η“Μεγάλη”ΑλβανίαείναιηΕυρωπαϊκήΑλβανία”,SKAITV,23November2016.Available at: http://www.skai.gr/news/politics/article/331640/rama-ston-skai-i-megali-alvania-einai-i-europaiki-alvania-/(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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High profile visits between Athens and Tirana – New Democracy-PASOK Government

In2009,thethenPrimeMinisterofGreeceCostasKaramanlisvisitedAlbania,thefirstandtheonlysuchvisitbyaGreekPMsince1992.Thesigningoftheagreementonthedelineationofmaritimebordersby the two foreignministersof that time,LulzimBashaandDoraBakoyanni,wasthemainoutcomeofhisvisitshowingsentimentsofimprovementinGreek-Albanianrelations.However,thebalanceofthebilateralrelationschangedsignificantlyafterthedecisionoftheAlbanianConstitutionalCourttonullifytheagreement.From2010to2013AlbaniaandGreeceexperiencedanother“frozen”phaseintheirdiplomaticrelations.Thethree-yearperiodofSiberianwinterintherelationsamongTiranaandAthenscametoanendafterthe2013parliamentaryelectionswhenthesocialistscametopowerinAlbaniaand when in Greece the previous Samaras–Venizelos governmentwaspreparingtotakeoverthePresidencyoftheEuropeanCouncil.Withinthisfour-yearperiod,therehasbeenanumberofimportanthighlevelvisitsofGreekofficialstoAlbaniaandAlbanianofficialstoGreece,whichhasreconfirmedthepoliticalcommitmentofbothsidesto achieve progress and simultaneously have boosted the bilateraldialogueonimportantopenissues.

The official visit of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister ofForeignAffairsofGreeceEvangelosVenizelosonOctober14,2013inAlbaniaendedthepreviousstagnationofhigh-levelofficialvisits,puttingthefirststoneforfurtherbilateralcommunication.VenizelosvisittoTiranatookplaceintheframeworkoftheEuropeanCouncilPresidencythatAthenstookoverinJanuary2014,andfewdaysbeforethe visit of the thenGreekPresidentKarolosPapoulias.VenizeloswasreceivedbythethenPresidentoftheAlbanianRepublic,BujarNishani,andhadmeetingswithPrimeMinisterEdiRama,ForeignMinisterDitmirBushati,andtheSpeakerofParliamentIlirMetaat


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that time.The core issues that dominated thesemeetingswere thecalloftheAlbanianparttoGreecetoabolishtheWorldWarII-eralawthattechnicallyhasleftthetwocountriesatwarandtherequestoftheGreekpartforfullrespectoftheseaborderagreementbytheAlbanianauthorities.30Previously,onSeptember24,2013, the twocountries’foreignministershadameetingonthemarginsofthe68th UnitedNationGeneralAssemblyinNewYorkwheretheydiscussedmostly aboutAlbania’sEuropeanperspective and thepolitical andeconomic dimension of their relations.31 According to the GreekMinistryofForeignAffairs32thetalksbetweenthetwoMinisterstookplacewithin thepolitical frameworkwhichwas shapedduring theunofficialvisitofPrimeMinisterEdiRamatoAthensonAugust5,2013,andthemeetingshehadwiththethenPrimeMinisterAntonisSamarasandForeignMinisterVenizelos.33

Therequestfortheendofthe“StateofWar”wasalsorepeatedbytheAlbanian President Bujar Nishani during the meeting he hadwith theGreekPresident,KarolosPapouliaswhoarrived inTirana

30. JointstatementofDeputyPrimeMinisterVenizelosandAlbanianForeignMinisterBushatifollowingtheirmeetinginTirana(15October2013).Availableat: http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/joint-statements-of-deputy-prime-minister-venizelos-and-albanian-foreign-minister-bushati-following-their-meeting-in-tirana.html(lastaccessedon30September2017).31. FaniKotzamani“The Albanian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Priorities”,SoutheasternEurope IntelligentUnit, Security andDefenseAnalysis Institute,Issue 1, Page 24, September 2013. Available at: http://www.i-sda.eu/main/documents/SEEMR_SEPTEMBER%202013.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).32. DeputyPrimeMinisterandForeignMinisterVenizelosmeetswithAlbanianForeignMinisterDitmirBushati(24September2013).Availableat:http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/news-announcements/deputy-prime-minister-and-foreign-minister-venizelos-meets-with-albanian-foreign-minister-ditmir-bushati.html(lastaccessedon30September2017).33. “Samaras welcome Albanian PM”,ToVima,5August2013.Availableat:http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=525097 (last accessedon30September2017).


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onNovember4,2013,fewweeksafterVenizelos.CallingPapoulias“agreatfriendofAlbanians”forhispersonalcontributions,Nishanirequested that the Greek President help out so that the “Greekparliament cancels the law of a state ofwar that is still in effectbetween the two countries and is keeping Albanian nationals’property in Greece under provisional seizure, as well as to helprecallallrelevantlawswhichalsogoagainsttheArticle15ofthebilateralfriendshipagreement”.34LikeForeignMinisterVenizelos,PresidentPapouliasfocusedontheimplementationoftheseaborderagreementshowingAthens’sdeterminationtoclosethischapterwithAlbaniabyputtingthisissueatthetopofGreece’sbilateralagenda.BothvisitscameaftertheelectionsinAlbaniaandaimedatboostingbilateral cooperation since the electionofEdiRamaasAlbania’spremierhadraisedhopesforanimprovementinformerlystagnantbilateralties.Thesemeetingsdidnotbringconcreteresultsregardingtheresolutionofopenissuesbecauseofdifferentreadingsbutbothpartsagreedontheintensificationofbilateralcommunicationwhichsawaboomthefollowingyears.

In2014,AthensandTiranadidnotabandonthispolicyofbilateralengagement. On January 14-15, 2014, immediately afterAthensassumed the Presidency of the European Union, the AlbanianDefenseMinisterMimiKodheliembarkedinatwodayofficialvisittoAthens,invitedbythethenGreekMinisterofDefenseDimitrisAvramopoulos.Kodheli and her counterpart shared the view thattheirmeetinggaveanewdimensiontothebilateralcooperationinthefieldofsecurityanddefensebyopeninganewchapter.35Inthestatementtothemedia,MinisterAvramopoulosaffirmedGreece’s

34.PressreleaseofthePresidentoftheRepublicofAlbania,BujarNishani(04November2013).Availableat:http://president.al/?p=12719(lastaccessedon30September2017).35. DefenseMinister Kodheli official visit toAthens (14-15 January 2014).Available at: http://www.mod.gov.al/eng/index.php/events-and-analysis/131-defence-minister-kodheli-official-visit-to-greece-14-15-january-2014 (lastaccessedon30September2017).


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support in restructuring Albania’s armed forces, while MinisterKodheli stressed the importanceof reinforcing thecooperation inthe field by underlining the fact that 35Albanian students haveattendedsuprememilitaryacademyinGreeceandthattwoGreekofficershavealreadycompletedthesupremedefenseandsecurityacademyinAlbania.36

The following month was characterized by a high volume ofcontactsbetweenAthensandTirana.OnFebruary6,2014AlbanianForeignMinisterDitmirBushatitravelledtoGreecewherehehadbilateralmeetingswithPresidentKarolosPapoulias, theMinisterof Foreign Affairs Evangelos Venizelos and the Prime MinisterAntonis Samaras. In the meeting with Prime Minister Samaras,Minister Bushati commented on the “strategic importance” ofrelationsbetweenGreeceandAlbaniaexpressingTirana’sreadinessto talk about concrete solutions to issues not addressedyet.37 On hispart,PrimeMinisterSamaras,referringtotheprioritiesoftheGreek2014EUPresidency,reassuredMinisterBushationGreece’scommitmenttoacceleratetheEuropeanintegrationoftheWesternBalkancountries.HealsoexpressedthewillingnessoftheGreekparttomovetowardsamoreproblem–solvingorientedrelationshipwithAlbania,inanefforttodetachfromtheproblemsofthepast.FourdaysafterthevisitofMinisterBushati,thethenAlbanianMinisterofHealthIlirBeqajcontinuedthestringofAlbanianofficials’visitstoGreece.BeqajarrivedinAthensonFebruary10,2014,wherehe

36.StatementbyDefenseMinisterDimitrisAvramopoulosandAlbania’sDefenseMinisterMimiKodheliaftertheirmeetingattheMinistryofNationalDefense(14 January 2014). Available at: https://www.avramopoulos.gr/en/content/statements-defence-minister-dimitris-avramopoulos-and-albanias-defence-minister-mimi-kodheli-after-their-meeting(lastaccessedon30September2017).37. Minister BushatimeetswithGreek PrimeMinisterAntonis Samaras (06February2014).Available at: http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en/press-office/news/minister-bushati-meets-with-greek-prime-minister-mr-antonis-samaras?page=52 (lastaccessedon30September2017).


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hadameetingwith theformerMinisterofHealthof theHellenicRepublicSpyridonAdonisGeorgiadis.Bothpartsexpressed theirabsolute readiness for strengthening bilateral cooperation in thefield of health. In addition, Greek Minister Georgiadis repeatedGreek government’swillingness to assistAlbania in speeding upthestepsforobtainingEUcandidatestatusintheframeworkoftheGreekEUPresidency.38

Greece’s strong interest in supporting Albania’s EU accessionprocess was also expressed by the Minister of Foreign AffairsEvangelosVenizelos during his second visit toAlbania.MinisterVenizelosreturnedtoAlbaniaonFebruary24,2014,forasecondtimeinaperiodofsixmonths,aspartofhisWesternBalkanstourintheframeworkofthe2014GreekEUPresidency.InhiscapacityasaChairmanoftheEUCouncilofMinister,Venizelosunderlinedthat it isa“mainpriority”oftheGreekpresidencythatcandidatecountrystatusbegrantedtoAlbaniabytheendofthesixmonthsoftheGreekpresidency.39ThedimensionofbilateralrelationswasoneotheraspectdiscussedduringthemeetingsofVenizeloswithPrimeMinister Edi Rama and Foreign Minister Ditmir Bushati whereallpartsconfirmed theirdesire for rapprochementof thebilateralagenda.Both sideswereof theopinion that “thebusy agendaofhigh-level politicalmeetings in the past fivemonths served as asoundpoliticalandpracticalbasistoputintomotionanewstructuredprocessthroughtheactivationofjointexpertcommitteeswhichwillhelpintheresolutionofallpendingissues”.40

38. New agreement betweenAlbania and Greece in the field of health (10February 2014). Available at: http://www.shendetesia.gov.al/al/newsroom/lajme/marreveshje-e-re-shqiperi-greqi-ne-fushen-e-shendetesise&page=1 (lastaccessedon30September2017).39. Joint statement ofDeputyPrimeMinisterVenizelos andAlbaniaForeignMinisterDitmirBushatifollowingtheirmeetinginTirana(21February2014).Available at: http://gr2014.eu/sites/default/files/22-02-14%20Venizelos-Bushati%20joint%20statements.pdf(lastaccesseson30September2017).40. MinisterBushatimeetswithDeputyPrimeMinisterofForeignAffairsof


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WithinthesamemonthoneotherAlbanianministervisitedGreece.OnFebruary21,2014,thethenMinisterofJusticeNasipNaçoheldavisittoAthens,invitedbyhiscounterpartHaralamposAthanasiou.Thefocusofthisvisitwasthestrengtheningofcooperationinthefieldofjustice.Fewdayslater,onMarch7,2014,itwastheAlbanianMinisterofEducationLinditaNikollawhovisitedGreecetomeetwithher counterpartKostantinosArvanitopoulos.Thepurposeofhervisitwastheincreaseandtheconsolidationofcooperationinthefieldofeducationandresearch.MinisterNikollawasverysatisfiedwith the levelofcooperationandunderlined theestablishmentofa joint expert committeewith themission to review the texts ofschool books.41 The reactivation of the “mixed textbook reviewcommittee”was part of the bilateral agenda also during the visitoftheGreekMinisterofEducationAndreasLoverdoswhovisitedTiranaeightmonthslateronOctober19,2014.Duringhismeetingwith Nikolla, the Greek Minister discussed the possibility of abilateralcooperationinwritingbooksfortheeducationoftheGreekminoritychildren.42

Withinthisframeworkofregularpoliticalconsultationswhichtookplaceduringallyear,theSecretaryGeneraloftheGreekMinistryofForeignAffairs,AnastasisMitsialistravelledtoTiranatomeetwithhisAlbaniancounterpart,AmbassadorQirjakoQirkoonDecember

Greece (21 February 2014). Available at: http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en/press-office/news/minister-bushati-meets-with-deputy-prime-minister-and-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-greece&page=7 (last accessed on 30 September2017).41.Educationandscience:anewchapterofcooperationwithGreece(07March2014). Available at: http://www.arsimi.gov.al/al/newsroom/lajme/arsimi-dhe-shkenca-nje-kapitull-i-ri-bashkepunimi-me-greqine&page=1 (last accessed on30September2017).42.AlbaniaMinisterofEducationmeetswiththeGreekMinisterofEducationandSocialAffairsAndreasLoverdos(19November2014).Available at: http://www.arsimi.gov.al/al/newsroom/lajme/ministrja-nikolla-takim-me-ministrin-e-edukimit-dhe-ceshtjeve-sociale-te-greqise-loverdos&page=21(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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18, 2014. The high profile representatives of both countries’diplomacy assessed positively the “existing level of bilateralrelations,thetendencytoseekandfindsolutionsofmutualinterestandthespiritofunderstandinginacooperationthathasproducedvisible results”. In addition,Qirkos andMitsialis expressed theirsupportfortheadvancementoftheworkdonebyjointcommitteeson the levelof experts, an initiative launchedduring2014whichaccordingtothem“needstobedeepeningtowardstangibleresultsinspecificareasofcooperation”.43

During2013and2014AthensandTiranamanagedtoestablishoneofthemostimportantcommunicationinstrumentsthatexpressthedynamic of their relationship.The instrument of frequent officialvisits of Albanian officials in Greece’s capital and vice versademonstrates their continuous commitment to thefinal resolutionofdeep-seatedissuesalthoughtheresurfaceofanumberoftensionsduring thesameperiod.Theformationof thenewgovernment inGreeceinJanuary2015didnothaltthispositivetrendintheareaofbilateralcommunicationwithmanyimportanttop-levelcontactstakingplace.

High profile visits between Athens and Tirana – SYRIZA-led government

In 2015, Greece entered in one of the country’s most difficultmomentswhenthefailureofGreekMPstoelectheadofstateledthecountryinsnapelections.AttheJanuary25,2015parliamentaryelections the radical-left and anti-austerity SYRIZA of Alexis43. Foreign Ministry Secretary General, Ambassador Mitsialis in politicalconsultations with his Albanian counterpart, Q. Qirko (19 December 2014).Available at: http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/al/zyra-e-shtypit/lajme/sekretari-i-pergjithshem-i-ministrise-se-puneve-te-jashtme-z-qirjako-qirko-pret-homologun-e-tij-grek-amb-anastassis-mitsialis&page=34 (last accessed on 30September2017).


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Tsipras won, attracting the 36.34% of the Greek vote. Duringthe next period, the SYRIZA-led government did not takemajorinitiativesintheforeignpolicyareaduetothedemandsofinternalpolitics and pressingmacroeconomic and social problems. FromJanuary2015toJuly2015nobilateralofficialexchangetookplacebetweenTiranaandAthens.However,thissmallstagnationtotheofficialvisitsisnotattributedtoAthenschangeofpolicytowardsAlbaniabut to the timingandthedifficultpoliticalandeconomicsituationinGreece.Athensnewgovernmentcontinuedthispolicyof communication with Albanian institutions adopted by theirpredecessors and the next visit of Greek official to Tirana camesevenmonthsafterSYRIZAtookpowerinJanuary2015.

ThistimetheAlbanianofficialsreceivedthenewMinisterofForeignAffairsNikosKotziaswhovisitedTiranafortwodays(14-16July2015) as part of hisWestern Balkan tour. The visit of MinisterKotziaswasconsideredasastepforwardintherelationsbetweenthetwocountriessincethetwopartstalkedaboutfindingmechanismsthatwouldleadtothelegaldismantlingofthewarlaw,acontinuousdemandof theAlbanian side.44Regarding thedelimitationof thecontinental shelf and theexclusiveeconomiczones the sideshaddifferentreadingsonhowtoresolveitbutagreedtocreateaspecialcommission“toconductatechnicalassessmentanddeterminethemodalitieswhichwillleadtothedeliveryofasustainablesolution”.Accordingtothejointstatementdeliveredbythebothparts“incasetherewillbenoagreement,itwillberequiredtoaddresstheissuewithin the norms of international law and theEuropean spirit”.45 Duringthisvisit,MinisterKotziassignedthreeagreementswiththe

44.MinisterBushatimeetswithGreekForeignMinisterBushati(15July2015).Available at: http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en/press-office/news/minister-bushati-meets-with-greek-foreign-minister-nikolaos-kotzias?page=28 (lastaccessedon30September2017).45.“NoquickfixtoAlbanian-Greekmaritimedispute”,BalkanInsight,16July2015.Availableat:http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/no-deal-on-albania-greece-maritime-shelf-border-dispute(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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Albanianpartonspecificareasofbilateralcooperation.

ThevisitofMinisterKotziaswasfollowedbyanintensiveperiodofdiplomaticactivitywithhighvolumeofbilateralvisitsbetweenthe two countries’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs. On March 21,2016wastheAlbanianMinisterofForeignAffairsDitmirBushatiwho conducted a visit to Athens, where he met with PresidentProkopisPavlopoulos,SpeakerofParliamentNikosVoutsisandhiscounterpart,MinisterofForeignAffairsNikosKotzias.Themeetingbetween the twoforeignministers focusedon thecontinuationofthealreadystartedprocessofaddressingtheopenissues.46Inthatcontext,thetwosidesexpressedtheircommitmentforthecreationof amechanism thatwill resolve all open issues “one at a time”and“willconcludeonapackageagreement”.47DuringhisstayinAthens,MinisterBushatiparticipated ina roundtablediscussionorganizedbytheSoutheastEuropeProgramofELIAMEP,wherehe delivered a speech on the importance of Albanian-Greekrelations in the current challenging European context. MinisterBushatidedicatedasignificantpartofhisspeechtotheopenissuesthat are at the heart ofGreek-Albanian relations, dividing themintothreecategories.Accordingtohim,thefirstcategoryincludesissue inherited from the past such as “the state of war”, “thesequestratedpropertiesofAlbaniansduringandafter thesecondworldwar”,and“thehumanrightsissueoftheChampopulationandtheirdescendants”.Inthesecondcategory,heincludedissues

46.MinisterBushativisitsGreece(21March2016).Available at: http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en/press-office/news/minister-bushati-visits-greece?page=19(lastaccessedon30September2017).47. JointStatementsofForeignMinisterKotziasand theForeignMinisterofAlbania, Ditmir Bushati, following their meeting (21 March 2016), GreekMinistryofForeignAffairs.Available at: http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/joint-statements-of-foreign-minister-kotzias-and-the-foreign-minister-of-albania-ditmir-bushati-following-their-meeting-foreign-ministry-21-march-2016.html(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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ofdailyimportancesuchas“theworkofjointbilateralcommittees”and“consularaffairs”.Inthethirdandthelastcategory,MinisterBushatiincludedissueswhichhaveadefiningimportanceforthefuture,suchas“thedelimitationoftheExclusiveEconomicZonesandcontinentalshelf”,“traderelations”and“energysecurity”.48

TheForeignMinisterofGreece,NikosKotzias,returnedtoTiranaon June6,2016 for a second timewithinayear. In aperiodoftensionsthetwocountriesmanagedtoagreeonthecreationofaroadmapinordertoresolvealloutstandingissuesdividingthem.49 DuringthejointstatementtheAlbanianMinisterofForeignAffairshighlighted that “the established mechanism for addressing allbilateralissues,willbeaccompaniedbyaroadmapandacalendar,toachievetangibleresults”50 OnMarch2,2017,inthecourseofthiscloseandperiodicdialogue,theAlbanianForeignMinistercarriedoutanotherworkingvisittoAthens,whichwasprimarilyfocusedontheestablishmentofjointworkinggroupsofexpertstodiscusseachopenissueseparately.51Theexchangeofofficialvisitsisnot

48. Roundtable discussionwith theAlbanianMinister ofForeignAffairsMr.DitmirBushation“TheRoleAlbanian-GreekRelationsinaChallengingEuropeanContext”,ELIAMEP,22March2016.Availableat:http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Report.docx.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).49.Despitetensions,GreeceandAlbaniaagreetoroadmap(6June2016).Available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/209361/article/ekathimerini/news/despite-tensions-greece-albania-agree-to-road-map (last accessed on 30September2017).50.JointstatementofForeignMinisterKotziasandtheForeignMinisteroftheRepublicofAlbania,DitmirBushati,followingtheirmeetinginTirana(6June2016).Available at: http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/joint-statements-of-foreign-minister-kotzias-and-the-foreign-minister-of-the-republic-of-albania-ditmir-bushati-following-their-meeting-in-tirana-june-2016.html (last accessedon30September2017).51.“Kotzias,Bushatidiscussbilateralissuesandcooperationonenergy”,AthensMacedonianNewsAgency,3March2017.Availableat:http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/2017/17-03-03.apeen.html(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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the only instrument ofAthens andTirana to communicatewitheachother.Bothcountries’high-rankingofficialshavealsobeenmet in differentmultilateral occasions such as the 2016NATOMinisterial Meeting and the Quadrilateral Meeting of Greece,Albania,BulgariaandFYROMoncrossbordercooperationheldin Thessaloniki onApril 22, 2016. One othermeeting betweenKotzias and Bushati was held on September 21, 2017, in NewYork.Theworkinglunchbetweenthetwoministerswasconductedinaverygoodclimateandanextensivediscussionwasheldonallbilateralissues,regionalandinternationaldevelopments.52 On November11,2017, the twoMinisters and theirworking teamsengagedinamarathonmeetingintheislandofCreteinGreece.Althoughnothingconcretewasannounced,thismeetingshowedthatbilateralcommunicationbetweenthetwocountriesisintherightpathandabletoopennewperspectivesfortheimprovementofbilateralrelations.

No visits at Prime Ministers Level

Althoughthelastfouryearshavebeenfullofvisitsbetweenthetwocountriesatdifferentlevels,includingpresidents,assemblyspeakersand ministers, no visits of prime ministers have been in place.Therefore,thevisitoftheGreekPrimeMinisterCostasKaramanlisin2009remainsthefirstandtheonlyvisitofaGreekPrimeMinstertoAlbania.ThelackofbilateralexchangesattheprimeministerlevelhasraisedquestionsbymanyanalystsinAlbaniawhoarewonderingifthelastyear’sintensificationofbilateralcommunicationhasfullyexploiteditspotentials,makingspeculationontheeffectivenessofthewholeprocess.TherefusaloftheGreekPrimeMinisterAlexis

52.SpirosSideris:“NikosKotziasmetwithhomologuesBushatiandDimitrovinNewYork”,TheGreekObserver,21September2017.Available at: http://thegreekobserver.com/politics/article/20366/kotzias-met-homologues-bushati-dimitrov-new-york/(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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TsiprastoaccepttheinvitationoftheAlbanianpartforanofficialvisittoTiranaandhisdecisiontoreconsiderhisvisittotheAlbaniancapital for participating in theSEECPSummit onMay 22, 2015isattributedtoAlbania’sPrimeMinisterEdiRamastanceandhisrhetoricwhichisconsideredbyAthensasanewnationalisticwaveinthecountry.InaphoneconversationwithhisAlbaniancounterpartAlexisTsipras underlined that “recent actions and the increasingnationalist rhetoricon theAlbaniansideunderminedaclimateofconfidencethatisnecessaryfortheprogressofbilateralrelations”.53

Inaddition,EdiRama’scooperationwiththeChampartywasseenwith increasingconcerns fromAthens,which fearsa riseofanti-Greeksentiment inAlbania. In thatcontext, thevisitofAlbanianSpeaker of Parliament IlirMeta toAthens on October 13, 2016wherehehadameetingwithPrimeMinisterTsipraswasinterpretedby Albanian analysts as an effort of Greece to promote Metaas a counterbalance against Edi Rama to make sure that TiranamaintainsaproGreekline.54AfteraperiodofconflictingrhetoricandstatementsthetwoPrimeMinistershadtheirfirstmeetingonMay25,2017.ThismeetingtookplaceonthesidelinesoftheNATOSummitinBrussels.ThetwoprimeministersunderlinedthenatureandstrategicimportanceoftheAlbanian-GreekrelationswithPrimeMinisterEdiRamaemphasizingon theneed toprogress towardsfindingsolutionstoexistingdisagreements,whilerespectingthebestEuropeanandinternationallawpractices.55PrimeMinisterTsipras

53. Phone conversation of Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras with theAlbanianPrimeMinisterEdiRama(22November2017).Availableat:https://primeminister.gr/2016/11/22/15441(lastaccessedon30September2017).54.“Controversy in Tirana as Meta’s visit to Athens disturbs majority allies”,South East Europe from Tirana, 13 October 2016. Available at: http://www.tiranaecho.com/latest-news/controversy-in-tirana-as-metas-visit-to-athens-disturbs-majority-allies/(lastaccessedon30September2017).55.PrimeMinisterEdiRamameetswithGreekPrimeMinisterAlexisTsipras(25May2017).Available at: http://www.kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/news/prime-minister-


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voicedGreece’sstrongsupportonthestate-consolidationreformsinAlbaniaandthe importanceheattaches torespectof therightsoftheGreeknationalminority.56Bothpartiesagreedthat“onlybyfindingstable solutionswithadirect impacton thewell-beingofbothnationswillstrengthentrustbetweenthetwocountriesandwillremovethemfromtheconflictingrhetoricandthedeadlockofthepast”.

The success story

ThisfrequencyofhighlevelcontactsbetweenAthensandTiranaisindicativeofbothpartsintentiontokeepcommunicationchannelsopen.Even though this intensive communicationwhich achieveditspeakduringthelastfouryearstherehavebeennocommitmentsyet regarding a potential change in the position in a number ofissuesonwhichpartieshavenotyetbeenabletoagree.Thisisnottosaythattheallabovementionedtop-levelmeetingsandcontactsbetweenthetwocountriesofficialsconstituteafailedmission;onthecontrary, the institutionalcommunicationbetweenAthensandTiranaisbearingsignificantfruits.

The biggest success of this interaction is the agreement reachedonMay12,2014,whichresolvedtheproblemof toponyms.Thisbreakthroughdemonstratedjustwhatcanbeachievedwithpoliticalwill,reflectingthecontinuedstrengthandeffectivenessofbilateralcommunication, if used in a consistent manner. The technicalcharacter of this problem did not downgraded its importance, aswell as the necessity for its quick resolution having inmind theedi-rama-meets-with-greek-prime-minister-alexis-tsipras (last accessed on 30September2017).56. “A meeting of Alexis Tsipra and Edi Rama in Brussels”,Naftemporiki,25May2017.Available at: http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1239491/sunantisi-al-tsipra-enti-rama-stis-brukselles(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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negativeeffectsithadintheeverydaylifeofmanyAlbanianslivinginGreece.TheGreekborderauthoritieswererefusingtheentryofAlbanians toGreece–especially tochildrenwith legal residencepermits born in Greece – because of the Albanian spelling ofGreekcitiesintheirpassports57.Aftermonthsofnegotiations,theForeignMinisterofGreeceEvangelosVenizelos and theForeignMinisterofAlbaniaDitmirBushatiannouncedinBrussels,duringtheEU-AlbaniaAssociationConference,thatTiranaandAthenshadreachedanagreementontheuseofgeographicalnamesofGreeceintheAlbaniandocuments.58Thetwocountiesagreedtorefertothestandardssetoutby the InternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO) with Albania taking the responsibility of issuing newpassportforAlbaniansborninGreeceincludinganEnglishspellingoftheirbirthplace.Duringthetransitionperiod,untilthepreparationofnewdocuments,freemovementofcitizenswasallowedonbothsidesoftheborder.59

The settlement of the issue of toponyms marked the beginningof both countries efforts to overcome current challenges.60These

57. Sashenka Lleshaj and Dritan Sulcebe: “Greece and the Albanian-Greek relations in the Albanian printed media 2014”,AlbanianInstituteforInternationalStudies, page 40, 2014. Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/11319.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).58. Joint statementofDeputyPrimeMinisterandForeignMinisterVenizelosandtheForeignMinisterofAlbania,DitmirBushati,ontheMarginsoftheEUForeignAffairsCouncil(12May2014).Available at: http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/joint-statements-of-deputy-prime-minister-and-foreign-minister-venizelos-and-the-foreign-minister-of-albania-ditmir-bushati-on-the-margins-of-the-eu-foreign-affairs-council-12-may-2014.html(lastaccessedon30September2017).59.Resolutionoftheissueoftoponyms(15May2014).Available at: http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/en/press-office/news/resolution-of-the-issue-of-toponyms?page=44(lastaccessedon30September2017).60.DitmirBushati:“Does Albania have a foreign policy?”,IndependentBalkanNewsAgency,1November2017.Available at: http://www.balkaneu.com/op-ed-albania-foreign-policy/#sthash.


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issues have dominated the bilateral agenda in all meetings andmanyfruitshavebeenseeninthedirectionoftheirresolutionwiththeestablishmentofajointmechanismthathasallowedbothpartstomaptheiropenissuesandaddress them“facetoface”without“taboosandcomplex”.OneofthemaintopicsoftheofficialtalksbetweenAthens andTirana is the one concerning the cemeteriesofGreeksoldiers fallen inAlbania.The twocountriesdecided tore-activatethejointcommissionofexpertstodeterminethisissue.Bilateral commission met inAthens in October 2016 to discusstechnicaldetailsabouttheproperexhumationandburialofGreeksoldersfallenduringtheGreek-ItalianWar.61

AlbaniaandGreecehavereengagedindialoguealsoonotherkeyissues,byreinstatingthelong-dormantjointcommitteesofexpertsregarding the revision of school textbooks, the transboundaryfreshwater management and protection, and road transport.62 On January 29, 2016, the joint committee for road transport met inTiranaforfurtherenhancingtheAlbanian-Greekcooperationinthetransportfield.Thetwosidessignedaprotocolwhichaddressesaseriesofconcernsraisedbypassengersandtransportoperatorsinbothcountries.63ThethirdmeetingofthejointcommitteeonschooltextbookstookplaceonFebruary22,2017at thepremisesof theGreekMinistryofEducation.Intheagendaofthismeetingwastheexaminationof thewaythathistory, literature,geography,cultureFefUpfha.dpuf(lastaccessedon30September2017).61. “Varrezat e ushtareve Grek ne Shqiperi, takohet komisioni i perbashket Shqiptaro-Grek”, Star Plus TV, 25 October 2016. Available at: http://www.starplus-tv.com/politike-star-plus-tv-shkoder/item/17995-varrezat-e-ushtareve-greke-ne-shqiperi-takohet-komisioni-i-perbashket-shqiptaro-grek (last accessedon30September2017).62.InterviewofGreekAmbassadortoTiranaatAlbanianDailyNews,30March2015. Available at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/intervista-e-ambasadorit-grek-z-l-rokanas-per-daily-news-tirana(lastaccessedon30September2017).63.SeetheProtocoloftheJointCommitteeforRoadTransportbetweenGreeceand Albania here: https://www.lawspot.gr/sites/default/files/annex_files/other/parartima-0544.m.6861.as189.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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andeconomyarepresentedatschooltextbooksinbothcountries,inaneffort tokeep them in linewith the spiritofUNESCOandthe Council of Europe.64 This meeting was characterized ashighly constructive,with both sides agreeing on all issues of thepredeterminedagenda.

TiranaandAthensarealso trying tonegotiate solutions forotherthorny issues through the finalization of a mechanism that willresultinapackageagreement.Thetwosideshaveagreedtofocusontheirdiscussiononapackagethatcategorizestheopenissuesondifferentbasketsandwiththeprinciplethatnothinghasbeenagreedaslongasthereisnoagreementtoallissues.65AlbaniaandGreeceplansadditionallytorenewandamendthefriendshiptreatybetweenthemwhichhasadeadlinethatexpiresbytheendofthisyear.ThenewfriendshippactthatTiranaandAthenshavedeclaredthattheywanttosignwillreflectthecurrentdevelopments66,andwillincludesafeguardswhichwillconstitutethebasisofanewlegalframeworkthat will lead to the resolution of all problems between the twocountries.67Owingtothedeepdistrustbetweentheparties,thelocalanalystsdonotshareoptimisticprojectionsabout theoutcomeofthesenegotiations.

64. Τρίτησυνάντηση επιτροπής εμπειρογνωμόνωνΕλλάδας-Αλβανίας,GreekMinistryofEducation,ResearchandReligiousAffairs,22February2017.Available at: http://www.minedu.gov.gr/news/27046-22-02-17-triti-synantisi-2 (lastaccessedon30September2017).65. Interview of theAlbanian ForeignMinisterDitmirBushati atTop Story,AlbanianMinistryofForeignAffairs,28September2017.Availableat:http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/al/zyra-e-shtypit/intervista-shkrime/interviste-e-ministrit-ditmir-bushati-me-gazetarin-sokol-balla-ne-emisionin-top-story (lastaccessedon30September2017).66.Ibid67. “Κοτζιάς-Μπουσάτι: ΑΟΖ, υφαλοκρηπίδα και νέο Σύμφωνο Ελλάδος-Αλβανίας”,CNNGreece,21March2016.Availableat:http://www.cnn.gr/news/politiki/story/26041/kotzias-mpoysati-aoz-yfalokripida-kai-neo-symfono-filias-elladas-alvanias(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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Key open issues at the heart of the Albanian-Greek relations

ThereareseveralpendingissuesbetweenGreeceandAlbania.Therecent bilateral communication revealed that there are four hotpointsinTirana-Athenstalks.TwoofthemarethedemandsofGreekauthorities and the other two the demand ofAlbania.TheGreeksidefocusesespeciallyontheregulationoftheExclusiveEconomiczonesofthetwocountries,andontheconstructionofGreeksoldiers’cemeteries inAlbania. From its part,Tirana complains about thefailureofGreekparliamenttoformallyannulthe“lawofwar”withAlbania,andtheissueofthepropertiesofAlbanianChamswhofledGreeceinthe1940s.

• Maritime border with Greece: The 2009Agreement for theDelimitationoftheGreek-AlbanianContinentalShelfandMaritimeZoneshasbecomeahighlysensitiveissueinthebilateralagenda.The agreement became the apple of discord between the thengovernmentofSaliBerishaandtheSocialistopposition,creatingastirofcontroversyinthelocalmedia,whichaccusedtheDemocraticgovernment of selling national interests to its southern neighbor.The initiative of theSocialist Party to send the agreement to theConstitutionalCourtledtoitsannulment(April2010)–adecisionthatdispleasedAthens.Greecewasdemandingtheenforcementoftheagreement,whileAlbaniawasaimingatitsrenegotiation.68 Since thenanduntilSeptember2013thecontactsatthepoliticallevelwerelimited,encouragingspeculationthattherewasacoldwarbetweenthetwocountries.After2013,bothpartscamebacktothenegotiation

68.DorinaNdoj:“The political discourse on the Albanian-Greek Sea Agreement Dispute”, International Journal ofAcademic Research and Reflection, Vol. 3,No. 7, page 3, 2015. Available at: http://www.idpublications.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/THE-POLITICAL-DISCOURSE-ON-THE-ALBANIAN-GREEK-%E2%80%98SEA-AGREEMENT%E2%80%99-DISPUTE.pdf (lastaccessedon30September2017).


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tabletohammeroutanewsolutiononthemaritimeborderdispute.Althoughtheyhavenotchangedtheirofficialpositionontheissue,TiranaandAthenshaveagreedthat“theirrespectiveteamsshouldconduct a technical assessment and determine modalities whichcouldleadtothedeliveryofasustainableandacceptablesolution”.69 Noagreementon the issueafter the technicalconsultationscouldresultinaddressingthedisputetoaninternationaltribunal,whichforthemomentisnotprofitablefornoneofthestates.

• Cemeteries of Greek Soldiers in Albania:Anothercontentiousissue betweenAthens and Tirana is the Greek demand to buildcemeteriesinsouthernandeasternAlbaniatocommemorateGreeksoldierswhodiedfightingItalianforces. OnFebruary9,2009,GreeceandAlbania signedanagreement to locate, exhume, identifyandburytheGreeksolders,whichforeseesthecreationoftwomilitarycemeteries, one inKleisoura and one inVoulariates inAlbania.70 However, since then no serious action for the implementation ofthe agreement has taken place, while the joint Albanian-Greekcommitteeset-upunderitsprovisionshasstuckforalongperiodoftime.TheexactnumberofGreeksoldersfallenintheAlbaniansoil,thenumberofcemeteriesandtheirlocations,plustheidentificationwayofGreekmartyrshavebeensomeofthecontroversiesontheissue.ThecurrentpoliticalconsultationbetweenAthensandGreecehasrevealedthatTiranarecognizesitsobligationsresultingfromtheagreementbutaccordingtotheAlbanianMinisterofForeignAffairsDitmirBushati, theAlbanianpartneedssomeguaranteesonhowthisagreementwouldbeimplementedinpractice.71Inthatcontext,

69. Minister Bushati meets with Greek Foreign Minister Nikolaos Kotzias.AlbanianEmbassyinGreece,Availableat:http://www.ambasadat.gov.al/greece/en/minister-bushati-meets-greek-foreign-minister-nikolaos-kotzias(lastaccessedon30September2017).70. “PM Karamanlis meets Archbishop Anastasios of Albania”, Council ofHellenesAbroad, 28April 2009.Available at: http://en.sae.gr/?id=16456 (lastaccessedon30September2017).71.InterviewofAlbanianForeignMinisterDitmirBushatiatTopStory,Albanian


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according toMinisterBushati bothparts areworkingondraftingan implementationprotocolfor theenforcementof theagreementinpractice.Inaddition,theyhaveagreedonthereactivationofthecommitteeonmilitarycemeterieswhichisworkingontheissue.

• The Cham Issue: Disagreements over the Cham issue havecontributed to thepoor stateofbilateral relationsbetweenTiranaandAthens.ForAlbania,theChamissueisacomponentpartofitsdiplomaticagendawithGreece. TheAlbaniandiplomacyhaslongpushedfortheissuetobeincludedinapackageofmeasuresthattwocountries need to resolve.However, theGreek authorities appearextremelyreluctanttoengageinanydialogueontheChamissue.Various Greek administrations, both socialist and conservative,havepubliclydeclaredtheChamquestionanon-issue.72Therefore,itisstillunclearwhetherthetopicwillbeincludedfordiscussioninthesuggesteddiplomaticpackagewhichreferstoabilateralsetofopenissuesbetweenthetwoneighboringcountries.TheinclusionoftheChamissuetothebilateralagendacametothesurfacein2016whenittriggeredcontroversiesnotonlybetweenAthensandTiranabutalsobetweenAthensandtheEUCommissionerJohannesHahnbecauseofhisstatementthatthetwocountriesarecommunicatingon thematter as a bilateral issue, causingAthens to immediatelyrebuke his comments as impartial andwith a clear bias towardsAlbania.73“Greece isnotdiscussing the issueofChamAlbaniansMinistry of Foreign Affairs, 28 September 2017. Available at: http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/al/zyra-e-shtypit/intervista-shkrime/interviste-e-ministrit-ditmir-bushati-me-gazetarin-sokol-balla-ne-emisionin-top-story (last accessedon30September2017).72.“Greece/Albania: Neither side can let relations sour”,OxfordAnalytica,11October2010.Available at: https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/DB163342/GREECE-ALBANIA-Neither-side-can-let-relations-sour (last accessed on 30 September2017).73.FatjonaMejdini:“Greece accuses Hahn of backing Albania over Chams”,BalkanInsight, 29 September 2016. Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/eu-commissioner-caught-in-between-albania-greece-hot-


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in its bilateral talkswithTirana”, theGreekMinistry of ForeignAffairssaidinapressrelease,respondingtoclaimstheissueisupfordiscussion.74“GreecehasproposedtoAlbaniaadiscussiononaseriesofissueswhichremainopenforbothsides,buttheChamissue is not one of them”, theMinistry’s supported. The foreignministrystatementcontinuedbymentioningthat“theAlbaniansidewanteditandaskedforit[tobeincluded],buttheGreeksidedidnotacceptit”.

• State of War with Albania: OneoftheconstantdemandsoftheAlbaniansideduringthehighlevelmeetingsistheabolitionoftheWorldWarTwo-eralawthathasleftGreecetechnicallyinastateofwarwithAlbania.AlbaniananalystssupportsthatGreekrefusaltonullifythelawinquestionintheparliamentislinkedtotheChampopulationandtheirpropertydemands.AlbanianofficialsmaintainthatthelawpreventsAlbaniansfromclaimingpropertytheyownedinGreecepriortoWW2,whileitsscrappingwillallowthevindicationof property rights in accordance with international law. “Greeceshouldscrapalawdatingbackto1940sothattheAlbanianChamminoritywhowere expelled byAthens duringWorldWar II canclaimbackconfiscatedproperty”,BushatisaidatajointstatementwithVenizelosin2013.75AccordingtoBushati“theabrogationoftheRoyalDegree ofNovember 1940which established the stateofwarwithAlbaniawillunleashpositivepoliticalenergyandhelptransformthestrategicimportanceofbilateralrelationsintoatrue,relevant strategic partnership”.76 Greek officials, however, have

topic-09-29-2016(lastaccessedon30September2017).74. “Greek Foreign Ministry denies discussing Chams with Albania”,Kathimerini,5October2016.Availableat:http://www.ekathimerini.com/212588/article/ekathimerini/news/greek-foreign-ministry-denies-discussing-chams-with-albania(lastaccessedon30September2017).75.“Albania asks Greece to end state of war”,BalkanInsight,14October2013.Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-calls-on-greece-to-end-state-of-war(lastaccessedon30September2017).76. SpeechofAlbanianMinisterofForeignAffairsataroundtablediscussion


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constantlyturneddownTirana’sclaimsthatthewarlawisstillinpower,supportingthatthatthestateofwarcannotbesaidtoexistbecausewasabolishedthroughadecisionbytheGreekgovernmentin 1987.77Although their different positions, the two parts haveagreetoworktogetherandaccordingtoMinisterBushati“thetwopartsarecloserthaneverbeforetofindsolutiononthisissue”.

The Greek minority in Albania: a barometer of bilateral relations

ThesafeguardoftheGreekminorityrightsconstitutesasignificantforeign policy objective of Greece. Greek foreign policy’s toppriorityisthetreatmentofallthemembersoftheGreekminoritythroughout the country, and not just in the areas recognized bythe Albanian state as “minority zones”. The Greek Minister ofForeignAffairsNikosKotzias has declared that “Albania shouldnotcontinuewiththereformofEnverHoxha,whorecognizedasminorityonlypeoplelivingintwoareas,whoiftheymovetoTiranaoranyothertown,wouldlosethatstatus”.Accordingtohim,“thishasnow received attention from theEUand theUSA”.78GreecealsowantsthewholeminorityissuetobetackledfromaEuropeanUnion rather thanaGreekperspective.For this reason theGreekgovernmentisraisingtheminorityissuenotonlyonabilaterallevelbutalsowithintheframeworkoftheEUandtheCouncilofEurope

organizedbyELIAMEP,March2016.Availableat:http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Report.docx.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).77. “Κοτζιάς: Διαφορετική η προσέγγιση Ελλάδας-Αλβανίας στο θέμα τωνΤσάμιδων”, CNNGreece, 6 June 2016.Available at: http://www.cnn.gr/news/politiki/story/34864/kotzias-diaforetiki-i-proseggisi-elladas-alvanias-sto-thema-ton-tsamidon(lastaccessedon30September2017).78. “Greek Foreign Minister: “We shouldn’t have supported Albania’s EU accession without conditions”,TopChannelTV,29September2017.Availableat: http://img.top-channel.tv/lajme/english/artikull.php?id=21043&ref=fp#.Wd9pH4-0PDd(lastaccessedon30September2017).


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supportingthatseveralproblemsinrelationtoGreeceandAlbania,includingtheprotectionoftherightsoftheGreekminority,shouldnotbeseenasbilateral,butratherasfollowingwithinthescopeoftheEuropeanacquisandCopenhagenconditions.79

Therespectforminorityrights throughoutAlbaniaisconsistentlyamong thecriteriasetby theEuropeanCommission in itsannualprogressreportsonAlbania’sEUaccessioncourse.GreececlaimsthatAlbania is repressingGreekrights,whileAlbaniaclaims thattheserightsarerespectedinaccordancewith internationalnorms.Althoughbothcountrieshavewiderstrategicinterestsinpromotingcooperation and European integration, frictions over minorityright cannot be precluded as uncontrolled local problems evolveespecially in the predominantly ethnic Greek town of Himara,which plays a hugely disproportionate role for its size inGreek-Albanianrelations,anddistrustremainsinplace.ItfallstoTiranatodealwiththeminorityissueinaverymeasuredway,recognizingthe importanceofnot angeringAlbaniansby seeming too lenientinnationalissues,whilenotupsettingAthensgivenGreece’svetopower toblockAlbania’s entry to theEU.On itspart, theGreekdiplomacy should maintain also a delicate balance of keepingAlbania’s European perspective opened, while trying to resolvebilateral issues, without being perceived as standing in Tirana’sway towards theEU.80However, it is notwithout significance tomention that local cross-ethnic relations remain strong despitetheoccasional tensions.Albanian citizensofAlbanian andGreekethnicbackgroundoftenclaimthatpressurefromTiranaandAthenscreatesartificialdivisionsintheirlocalities.

79. IoannisArmakolas andGiorogosTriantafyllou: “EU members states and enlargement towards the Balkans–Greece”, European Policy Center, IssuePaper No. 79, July 2015.Available at: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_5832_eu_balkans_-_issue_paper.pdf(lastaccessedon30September2017).80.Ibid


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Conclusion

On the whole, Greece and Albania have enhanced significantlytheir bilateral communication,which is an important step for theimprovementoftheirrelations.Yet,frequentmeetingsonthelevelofministers,secretaries-general,andexistingcommitteesalonearenosalvefortheresolutionofopenissues.Despitethefactoftop-levelcontacts,thepictureofrelationsemergedfromthelastfouryearsisstillquiteworrying,castingdoubtonwhetherthetwocountriesareinapositiontomakethenextstepforthefullreconciliationontotheirrelations.OneofthefactorsthatburdensAlbaniaandGreeceintheirquesttoupgradetheirrelationsistheexistenceofcontroversialissues,namelytheGreekminority,whichseemstokeepalivethesenseofdoubtandmistrustbetweenthem.Theseissueshavebeenswept up in the ethno-nationalist rhetoric that runs tension highleavinglittlespaceforrationalargumentation.Onlyadeterminedandconsistentapproach,withagreatmanifestationofpoliticalwillwould renew momentum in Greek-Albanian relations, while thestrategic clarity will create conditions for developing trust-basedrelations,whichwillnotbeaffectedbythemediacacophonyandnationalistrhetoric.ItisinAlbania’sandGreece’shandstousetheinstrument of bilateral communication to establish a constructivedialoguethatwillleadtotheresolutionofallissues,strengtheninginthiswaytheirrelations.Onthecontrary,thereisstillagrowingconcernthatthelongertheopenissuesremainsatlimbo,themorethedanger increasesof these issuesbeinghijackedbyextremistsandpotentiallybackfiringwithseriousconsequencesformoderatepoliticalforcesandbilateralrelations.


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Unsolved political issues between Greece and Albania threaten the stability and liberal democracy in Balkans

Dr. Dorian Koçi1

Historical background

Throughout the ancient history of theBalkans,Albanian andGreekpopulations in the region have shared territories, historical destinyand mutual traditions for a long-time. This reality has increasinglystrengthenedtheirrelations,alreadyexpressedinthecreationofsimilarculturalandpoliticalparadigmsuntilthelateMiddleAgesandontheeveoftheFrenchRevolution.However,thisproximitywhichseemedto create grounds for a very close and non-conflicting cooperationbetween the twopopulations at thefirst glance, highlighted also thefirstcontradictionsforterritoriesandhegemonyintheregionaftertheemergenceofnationalstatesandtheembraceofnationalismasacentriststate-buildingideologyintheirpoliticalandpubliclife.

TakingintoconsiderationthattheGreeknationalstatewasestablishednearly80yearspreviouslythantheAlbaniannationalstate,thepressureand the nationalist tension often ascending in the relations betweenthetwocountrieswasgreaterandwell-organizedfromtheGreekside.ThisperiodtranspiredtobelikewisepivotalfortheconsolidationofthenegativeperceptionsandstereotypesintheGreekculturalandpubliclife aboutAlbanians, whichmade possible the organization of anti-AlbaniandiscoursesandtheseparadigmsengagedforalongtimebyGreeknationalism.

1. Dr. Dorian Koçi, Director of National Museum of Albania


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Nevertheless,theAlbanianpopulationwhowasstillinpursuitofcreatingitsnationalidentitywasnotinactivetothemessagesthatnationalismas a streamwas conveying in themid-XIX century.At this period,mainlyintheGreek-Ottomanconflictof1897,wefindideologistsandnationalactivistsconveyingananti-Greeknationalistmessage,butduetopoliticalalliancesintheregionthattheAlbanianelitewasinquestof,andduetotheexistenceofagreatAlbanianlinguisticminoritywellintegrated in theGreekpolitical life in thenewly establishedGreekstate,thelatestempoweringbridgesofcooperationbetweenthepartiesrelated, theAlbanian sidewasmore inclined toacloserand freeofprejudicesco-operationbetweenAlbaniansandGreeks.

However, this climate of confidence that was designed to be builtbetween the two sides for the final purpose of building a commonGreek-Albanianstate,wasseverelydamagedbythenationalistclaimsofbothsidesofunequaloriginandintent.

TheGreekpoliticalelitesupporteditspoliticalactiononthenationalistplatformofMegali Idea (1844),whichmeant the restoration of theByzantineEmpire.Inthisform,itwasuniversallyacceptedthatMegaliIdea was imperialistic and that absolutely or exactly involved thesubjugationofotherpopulationstoHellenism.TheGreeknationalismwasofMessianictype,attributingtoitselftheroleofsalvationofalltheBalkanOrthodoxwhichequaledthemtoGreeksfromtheOttomanrule. It is true thatwithin theOttomanprovincesofYanninawereaconsiderablenumberofHellenicpopulationbuttheclaimsofofficialGreekpolicytocountasGreeksevenAlbanianOrthodoxpopulationcreatedabiggapintherelationsbetweentwoelites.

Meanwhile, the Albanian political elite has a different politicalplatformtoMegaliIdea;AlbaniannationalismwasnotofMessianictype,butmainlyrequiringbyitsrepresentativessuchasPashkoVasa,SamiFrashëri...toprotectAlbanianottobetornapartbyforeigners,to keep their language and their nationality, to compete against theintriguesoftheirenemiesandtopreventthespreadoftheGreekand


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Slaviclanguagesandthoughts,whichareshakingthefoundationsanduprootingAlbaniaandAlbanians.

However,thisapparentdefensivesenseofAlbaniannationalismwasamplifiedbya senseofpreserving theOttomanEmpire integrityorrather,preservingpropertyrightsintheeventofitsdisintegration,asAlbanians andmainly their aristocratic classwere great landownersin some other European vilayets of the Ottoman Empire such asThessaloniki andThessaly,where therewasno significantAlbanianpopulationtobeincorporatedinthefutureAlbaniannationalstate,whichwasunderstandablypowerfullyopposedbytheGreeknationalismandthenationalstatewhichhadaccurateintentionstowardstheseterritories.

Thisclearinconsistencybetweenplatformsandideas,aimsandgoalsmadeitpossibleformanyoftheGreek-Albanianapproachesinitiatedbybothmajorculturalandpoliticalfiguresfrombothcountriestofailinaccomplishmentof theexpectationsfrombothsides. Incontrast,there have been bitter confrontations in direct armed conflicts andindirectdiplomaticconfrontationswhichledtoclearlyprevailingintheAlbanianpoliticalthoughtoftheideasexpressedbySamiFrasheriinhisbook“Albania-whatitwas,whatitisandwhatitwillbe”declaringthattheGreeksaretheworstenemiesofAlbania...Inordertoachievetheirgoals,theGreeksutilizedagainstAlbanianstheschool,thechurch,theOrthodoxfaith, the religiousandprovincialdivisions, thearmedwar,murdersetc..

TheBalkanWars (1912-1913),delineationofAlbania’sborders, theCorfuProtocol(1914),thePeaceConferenceinParis(1920),theItaly-GreekWar,thedeportationoftheChampopulation(1944-1945),thePeaceConferenceinParis(1946)andtheearthlyclaimsabouttheso-calledNorthernEpirus, the involvementof theAlbaniancommuniststate in the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and the August 1949provocationsorganizedbytheGreekgovernmentovertheterritoryoftheAlbanianstate,areepisodesofalongseriesofmisunderstandingsandhatebetween the twostatesandpopulations;by thismeansnot


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onlyattestingthecontradictorynatureoftheGreek-Albanianrelationsobservedincontrasttothepositiveaspectofhowtheystarted,butatthesimilarlywerehigh-tension sources inSouth-EasternEurope,whichalsomarkedagreatirritationtothecountries’interestedintheregion.

ThiswasanotherreasonwhyevenintheframeworkoftheDetentionand the reduction of tensions across Europe, the Albanian-Greekdiplomatic relations reinstatement news onMay 6th, 1971 after thebreak-upandproclamationofthe1941warlawwaswellreceivedinthediplomat’scirclesinEuropeandbeyondtheAtlanticintheUSA.

Challenge of the present

The Albanian side was forced to make concessions regarding thereinstatement of this diplomatic relationswithGreece regarding theChamissue,theAlbaniancitizens’propertyandtheAlbania’sbordersrecognition.TheGreeksidewasobviouslycontentednotwithdrawingfromitspreviouspositionsandat thesametime,findingout that its30-year-pressurehadbroughtresults.

WearementioningthesethreeimmutableobjectivesfromtheGreekside, because they continued to be problematic topics between thetwo countries, though during the ‘70s and ‘80s some positive stepsweretakenbytheGreekgovernmenttoreducethetensionthattheseunresolvedissuescarriedoverGreek-AlbanianrelationssuchasGreekStateCouncil SE 2327/76 decision,Greece’s highest administrativecourt,accordingtowhich“AlbaniaceasestobeconsideredanenemystatesinceitsestablishmentofaregulardiplomaticrelationshiporadecisionoftheGreekgovernmentofAndreaPapandreouof1987toformallyabolishthestateofwar.

However, this abolitionwas never voted in any form in theGreekParliament,orwasdecreedbyanypresidentoftheHellenicRepublic.Thus,GreeceandAlbania,astwocountriesthathavebeenintheprocess


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ofestablishingregulardiplomaticrelationsforalmost27years,enteredthenewpost-ColdWarErawitha formidable stateofwarbetweenthemandwithabunchofproblemsthatrequiredsolutionswithinthenewwindofchangesininternationalrelations.AllthisgreatburdenofproblemshaveplayedandcontinuetoplayanimportantroleinshapingpeaceandthefateofliberaldemocracyinsouthofBalkans.GreeceandAlbania’spoliticallifeandpublicdiscoursehavebeeninvolvedinhighlevelofexpressingnationalismandseveraltimesimportantdecisionsintherelationshipbetweentwocountrieshavebeentakenundertheinfluenceofconflictandthisnationalisticclimate.Thus,Greecehasthreaten informallyAlbania with the use of veto before importantdecisions taken for it fromEuropeanUnion andAlbania has beenobligedtoenterindiscussionsoverthedisputabletopicsbyavoidingthepublicopinion.Theagreementsignedbybothsidesin2009aboutthedelimitationsofwaterswasaproofofnoethicalagreement.Thisagreementas it is alreadyknown initiatedanationalistic reaction inAlbaniaandcreationof “AllianceRedandBlack”,whichcreatedawaveofnationalisminthepublicdiscourse.Thiswaveofnationalismattempted tobespreadamongAlbanians inregionand in100yearsofAlbanianIndependenceevenmoderatedAlbanianleadersadaptedanationalisticrhetoric.Thus,thedestroyingofbalanceinIonianSeaandCorfuChannelinfavorofGreeceandindisfavorofAlbaniacausedanumberofproblemsretakenfromthepastforbothcountries.

However,inthisnationalistdiscoursethathadbeguntobearticulatedinthepubliclifeofthetwocountries,theytriedtobecarefulnottopassonthetonesofextremenationalismorirredentismandabovealltobeabletodistinguishwellAlbania’sobligationstominoritiesasacountrythatclaimstobecomeamemberwithfullrightsintheEUandnottocreatethewrongimpressionwithregardtoforeignpolicywithAlbania’sneighboringanddomesticminorities.WishingthatAlbaniabenefited froma rapid integration into theEuropean family, officialpoliticstriedtodraftitspolicyatleastinaccordancewithCopenhagencriteriawhere if itcouldn’tmeet theeconomiccriteriaat least tobe


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abletomeet thepoliticalcriteria.Inthepoliticalcriteria it isknownthatrespectforhumanandminorityrightsaretwoofthefivenecessarycriterions.

Therefore,Albaniafeelscompelled,butlegallyithasadutytofulfillallminorityrightsineducation,investmentandpreservationofitsculturalheritage.Ontheotherhand,Greeceshouldbemoreopeninitsforeignpolicy towardsAlbania and show a “common sense” regarding theproblemsthatthetwoneighboringstateshave.Theseproblemsrelateto theweak and backward support provided byGreece toNATO’sactioninKosovo(1999),theregistrationofpopulationonethnicandreligiouscriteria(2001)and(2011),thecontinuedimprovementofthestatusofAlbanianemigrantpopulationinGreece,minorityexpansionin Albania (Himara case), Cham problem and controversial waterdisputebetweenGreeceandAlbania.AlthoughthereisareformoftheGreekpoliticalclass,especiallyaftertheThessalonikiSummit(2003),whereGreecesoughtfullBalkanintegrationintheEUorrecentcallsofofficialGreekforeignpolicyfortheWesternBalkans’EUaccessionin2025,thetensionraisedontheaboveissueshindersthecreationofagoodandfriendlyclimatebetweenthetwocountries.

Onesuchthing,fore.g.,isthelackofrecognitionoftheindependenceoftheRepublicofKosovo,arealitythatnomatterhowGreecetriestoavoidit,itwillturnintoaboomeranginthecontinuityoffriendlycontacts between the two countries. But not only between the twocountries, as it is already known that the Albanians except beingorganizedinthestateoftheRepublicofKosovo,theyareastate-formingmajorityalso inMacedoniaandavery importantethnicminority inMontenegro.Having such important numberofAlbanians in regionandinsomeneighborcountries,itisalreadyanaxiomaticthoughtfortheInternationalDiplomacy,includingtheGreekonethatthestabilityofBalkansdependsonthewelfareofthesecommunities.Greeceneedsto have an agreement for the official name ofMacedonia, not onlywithMacedonianelitesbut alsowithAlbanianelitesofMacedonia.


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AgreeinginrecognizingKosovoasanindependentstate,Greececansoothetheethnictensionsinitsnorthernborders.

TheChamproblemasoneofthehumandramasthathasnotyetbeenresolvedisaproblemthatshouldnotbeoverlookedasa“nationalistpassion”ofAlbanians,butthetechnicalsideofthisproblemshouldbetreatedasaEuropeanissueofownershipdenialandasaconsequenceas a fundamental human rights2 and the moral side requires thepunishmentofthecrimethathasoccurredagainsttheChampopulationinsuchawaythatitwillnotberepeatedagain.AnotherimportantissueisthelegalityofChampopulationpropertiesinGreece.AccordingtoEuropeanstatistics,thenorthernregionofGreececalledEpir,isoneofthepoorestregionsinEurope.Theinhabitantsthatlivetherecannotdeveloptheirpropertiesandforeigncompaniescannotinvestbecauseofthelegalstatusofthelandproperties.Discoveringofgreatreservesofgasintheregionwillcomplicatemoretheproblem,ifbothsideswillnotachieveanagreementaboutthelegalstatusoflandproperties.

ThisentiresituationintheofficialrelationsbetweenthetwostateshascomebecausetheAlbanianstatehasnotbeenabletobuildanaccuratestrategy regarding problematic issues with Greece. The differentpoliticaltensionsinAlbania,theongoingchangesofadministrationandtheamateurbehavior expressed indealingwith these relationshavemadeitpossibleforthepoliticalrapprochementbetweenalltheGreekandAlbaniangovernmentstobeadmirable,butthefriendshipbetweenthetwonationstobefrozen.

Certainly, the performance in Greek-Albanian relations will have abetter future thanwhat is leftbehind. In thiscontext, it isno longerpossibletotalkaboutthereturntothetenseeraof1994-1995,butitfeels,anditisnecessarythattwoneighboringNATOalliesnowandsoonalliesalsointheEUshouldreformtheirpoliciestomakepossibleforthepopulationstoembraceaEuro-Atlanticdiscourseinaddressingtheirproblemsandrelationships.2. Koçi.D,“Hesapet dhe kasapët”.Shqip,19.05.2009,pg:9


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AgoodlegalbasisforachievingthisgoalisthesigningofanewTreatyofFriendshipandbothpartiesshouldcallforjointcommissionstoresolvealltheirproblemsbasedonthisnewTreaty.Jointcommissionsshouldimmediatelyafterthattpbeginwork,firstlytoabolishthemeaninglesswarlawandthereturnofpropertiestoAlbaniancitizens,thatareunderseizurebutalsoAlbaniashouldperformthepreservationofpropertytitlestotheGreekminorityinAlbania;therewritingofthetextsofthehistoryofGreeceandAlbania;highlightingthecontributionofAlbanianstotheGreekRevolutionandtheirparticipationasmercenariesinOttomantroops;thedestructionandburningofSouthAlbaniabyGreekforcesintheBalkanWars;theabolitionofthediscourseagainsttheAlbanianpopulationwheretheOrthodoxChurchcontinuestobeconsideredasGreek;theexplanationtotheyounggenerationsthatAlbaniain1940wasaconqueredcountryandthereforecouldnotattackGreece;opendiscussion andwithout prejudice to theCham issue; protection andsponsorshipofthelanguageandculturalheritageoftheArvanitesinGreeceandtheopeningofethnicschoolsforAlbanianemigrantsbasedonallEuropeanconventionsandtheprotectionandsupportoftherightsoftheGreekminorityinAlbania,itsculturalheritage,there-evaluationoflinguisticminoritiessuchasinNartaandHimara.

LookingattheissuesthatarereflectedintheGreek-Albanianrelationsisalongwaytogoforasincereandlessproblematicapproachinthefuture.Fortunately,theroadtoEuropeanintegrationandtomorrow’scoexistence in Europe creates many premises that according toCopenhagencriteriaandotherEUtreaties,alltheproblemsbetweenthetwocountrieswillbereducedbycreatingabetterco-operationnotonlyinthegovernmentlevelwhichforthesakeoftruthhasnotbeenmissingbutanapproachbetweenthetwopeoplesundertheexampleofFranco-Germanfriendship.Infact,morethananeconomicandpoliticalintegrationofthewholeBalkansinEUthecreationofaFranco-Germanco-operationmodelamongitspeoplesremainsthebiggestchallenge.


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Public opinion and Albanian-Greek relations

Jordan Jorgji1

Abstract

Inananarchical internationalsystem, therelationsbetweenstatesarebasedonmaterialpower,whichismainlycomposedofmilitaryandeconomiccapacitiesofnations. Inaddition, thesystemicandsub-systemic balance of power determines to a great extent theinternational behaviour of states. This logic applies particularlyin neighbouring countries,which are essentially characterized bysecurityproblems.SuchanexampleistherelationbetweenAlbaniaandGreece,astwocountriesoftheBalkanRegion.

Besidetheabove-mentionedfeatures,therelationsbetweennationsarealsobasedonnon-materialfactors,suchashumancapacity–thatareAlbanianimmigrantsinGreeceandGreekminorityinsouthernpart of Albania – cultural and educational cooperation, publicopinion,andsoforth.Theroleofpublicopiniononforeignpolicy–andasaresultoninterstaterelations–hasbeenincreasedrecently,alongsidewiththedemocratizationprocessoftheBalkanstatessincetheendoftheColdWarperiod.WiththeaimofexploringAlbanianpublicopinionregardingGreece,apilotsurveywasconductedwithyoungpeopleofKorçaRegion.Thecollectedinformationprovidesa descriptiveoverviewonopinions towardGreece, aswell as itsrelationswithAlbania.

1. Jordan Jorgji, Lecturer, “Fan S. Noli” University, Korçë


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Suggestionsdrawnfromthisprimarysurveymayserveasaguidefor other more comprehensive researches. In addition, Albanianelitesmayundertakefurthereffortsregardingpublicopinion,withtheaimofimprovingthebilateralrelationswithGreece.

Key words:complexnetworkofmutualmisunderstanding,foreignpolicy,neoclassicalrealism,publicopinion.

Introduction: complexity of Albanian-Greek relations

The politicalAlbanian Greek relations are generally based on acomplexityofdynamicfactors.Thelatterlooktobelikeapieceoflandthatwasonceconsidered‘virgin’,butafterwardswereaddeddifferentgroundlayers,darkandopencolour,asaresultofclimatechange andother influencing elements. In an analogousway, therelationsbetweenthetwostateswerebuiltonacomplexnetworkofmutualmisunderstanding,whichwascreatedandfurthermultipliedinthenameofextremenationalism.Thenatureofthelatter–asaphenomenoninBalkan–wasoftenirredentistandalsodisrespectfulto‘others’,thatmeansotherneighbouringcountries2.

ThenegativecollectivememoryofGreekelitestowardAlbaniansononeside,andthecultivationoffearandsiegepsychologyagainstGreeks byAlbanian politics on the other side, enhance the oldbilateralproblemsthathavebeenexistedforalongtime–aswellasthenewones.Theseproblemscoverawiderangeoftopics,startingfromtheterritorialissuestilltheendoftheSecondWorldWar;themassiveexpulsionofChampopulation;theAlbanianprovocationsduringtheGreekcivilwar;theperpetual‘stateofwar’bytheGreekpart; the provocations ofAlbanian communist regime during theColdWarperiod,especially through thepresenceofSovietnaval

2. StefanaqPollo,ArbenPuto,The history of Albania: from its origins to the present day (London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1981),113-114.


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baseinsouthAlbania;theAlbaniannationalismafterthe1990-s;theproblemsbetweenAlbanian immigrants inGreece and theGreekstate,aswellasthosebetweenGreekminorityinAlbaniaandtheAlbanianstate3.Inmanyinstances,theexistenceoftheseproblemshas continuously prevented the governments of both countries todevelopasatisfactorybilateralcommunication,andfurthermoretomotivateasustainableAlbanianGreekpartnership.Butwhatmakesitevenmoredifficult,istosolveapartoftheseissuesrelatedtothecultivationandspreadofnegativeimagesinthedirectionofeach-other,bothinGreekandAlbanianpeople4.

Often,publicopinionexertsconsiderableinfluenceonformulationandimplementationofforeignpolicy,withinthecontextofrelations

3. Βασίλειος Κόντης (επιμ.), Ελληνισμός της Βορείου Ηπείρου και οιΕλληνοαλβανικές σχέσεις: έγγραφα από το ιστορικό αρχείο του ΥπουργείουΕξωτερικών,τόμος3,1922-1929,Αθήνα:ΒιβλιοπωλείονΕστίακαιΚοινωφελέςΊδρυμα ‘Αλέξανδρος Ωνάσης’, 1997, 13-35, 91-92, 349-356, 365. ΒισκόντιΠράσκα,ΕγώεισέβαλαστηνΕλλάδα(Αθήνα:Γκοβόστη,1999),77.GazmendKapllani,NicolaMai,“‘GreeceBelongstoGreeks!’TheCaseoftheGreekFlagintheHandsofanAlbanianStudent,”The New Albanian Migration, eds. Russel King,NicolaMai,StephanieSchwandner-Sievers (Brighton:SussexAcademicPress, 2005), 153-172. James Pettifer, “Rising Tensions in Albania’s EthnicRelations,”The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe. State-building, Democracy, and Ethnic Mobilization,ed.JonathanP.Stein(Armonk,NewYork:M.E.Sharpe,2000),178-188.ΚωνσταντίνοςΣβολόπουλος,ΗΕλληνικήπολιτικήσταΒαλκάνια,Αθήνα:ΕλληνικήΕυρωεκδοτική,1987,66-71.MirandaVickers,JamesPettifer,Albania. From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (London:Hurst&Company, 1999), 197.PaskalMilo,Të vërtetat e fshehura: Incidenti i kanalit të Korfuzit(Tiranë:Toena,2010),63-65,87-95.RichardClogg,ΣύγχρονηΙστορίατηςΝεότερηςΕλλάδας(Αθήνα:Καρδαμίτσα,1993),236.ZihniHaskaj,Mendimi politik e shoqëror i Rilindjes Kombëtare Shqiptare, vëllimi I(Tiranë:UniversitetiiTiranës,InstitutiiHistorisëdheiGjuhësisë,1971),323.4. According toQuincyWright, thesympathyor thehatredsharedwithin thepublic opinion plays an important role on the directions of foreign policy.AsWrightquotedcharacteristically“If only love of peace and hatred of war could be universalized…war would disappear”.QuincyWright,A Study of War, Vol.2(Chicago,Illinois:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1942),1079.


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thatstatesdevelopwithotherneighbouringandnon-neighbouringcountries5. In addition, public opinion’s influence becomeseven greater, when legitimacy of political power by the masseshas democratic nature6. However, this doesn’t mean that otherinfluencingfactorsareeclipsed7.Certainly,thefundamentalroleofsystemicsignals;ofregionalbalances;aswellasofcalculationandcomparisonofstatestotalpower,canneverbecalledintoquestion.Onlyanirrationalandenthusiasticleadercouldattempttodoso8. Whatistobenotedisthattheroleofthesefundamentalfactorsinforeignpolicyand inter-state relationshasrecentlybeenenrichedbytherealpowerthatpublicopinionhasgained,especiallytodayintheeraofrapidflowofglobalinformation9.

Theinternationalrelationstheoryhasalsobeenadaptedtotheabove-mentioned contemporary changes. Neoclassical realism attachesparticular importance to the role that various factors – includingpublic opinion – do havewithin the process of systemic signalselaborationandthatofforeignpolicyformulation10.Therefore,thistheoreticalmodelfitsmorewithforeignpolicyanalysis,ratherthanglobaltheories,suchasNeorealism,LiberalismandMarxism.

5. RandallL.Schweller,“UnansweredThreats:ANeoclassicalRealistTheoryofUnderbalancing,”International Security Vol.29,No.2(Fall,2004):170-173.DouglasC.Foyle,Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1999),9.6. OleR.Holsti,Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, RevisedEdition(AnnArbor,Michigan:UniversityofMichiganPress,2004),291-292.7. Ibid,291.8. Foyle,13.9. Holsti,300-302,316.10. Schweller,164.JeffreyW.Taliaferro,StevenE.Lobell,NorrinM.Ripsman,Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy”,Neoclasical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,eds.StevenE.Lobell,etal.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 2009), 3-4.GideonRose, “NeoclassicalRealismandTheoriesofForeignPolicy,”World Politics vol.51,no.1(October,1998):144-172.


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I. Survey characteristics: data collection and interpretation

Thepresent analysis is stronglybasedon taking intoaccount theabove-mentionedaspects.Examinationofhistoricaldynamicsthatrelate with inter-state relations is not intended to be developed,neither thedescriptionofnature thatexistingunresolvedbilateralissuesdohave.Themainpurposeofthisarticleistodescribetheknowledge andpreferencesofAlbanianpublic opinion related totheGreekstateandpeople,aswellastoAlbanian-Greekrelations.Thisisarchivedthroughapilotsurveythatwasrecentlyconductedwith young people ofKorça region, in the south-east part of theRepublicofAlbania.

Thesurveytookplaceduringthefirsthalfof2017,andwasbasedon aprobable sampling.The latter consists of 100 students,whostudy in various bachelor and master programs of “Fan.S.Noli”University.Respondentsageisfrom18to35yearsold.

Furthermore, it is important to stress that the tendencyof surveyresultsmayalsoindicatethegeneralpreferencesofAlbanianpublicopinion,duetothechiefcharacteristicsofthesurveyitself.Becauseof their young age, respondents turn into participatory subjects,regarding theflowofopinionswithin their familyenvironment–whereaninteractionofideasoccursbetweenthemandparentsorother relatives – as well as in university facilities, where youngpeoplecomeincontactwiththeirpeersfromdifferentgeographicalregions.Inthiscontext,theconclusionsdrawnfromthispilotsamplemaybeusedinordertoundertakeothermorecomprehensivestudiesinthefuture,aswellastoenrichthescientificcontributions.

Within the survey, a questionnaire filled by respondents wascomposedof33questions,whichrelate todifferentfields. In thisway,thequestionsaregroupedintofourmaincategories:


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FirstcategoryreferstothegeneralknowledgethatAlbanianpeoplemayhaveinregardtoGreece,GreekcultureandchiefelementsoftheGreekwayoflife.ThisisachievedbystudyingpersonalcontactofAlbanianswithGreece,throughtouristicandemploymentvisits,culinary,culture,literature,geography,dailypoliticsandspeakingtheGreeklanguage.

Second category is made up of specific questions, where theknowledgeismorelimitandprofessional.Themainfieldshereareart,history,diplomaticrelations,politics,mythologyandreligion.

Thirdcategoryconsistsofopinionson‘hotpoliticaltopics’ofthepast,whichstillhindertheprogressofAlbanian-Greekrelations.

Fourthandfinalcategoryisassociatedwithopinionsthatrespondentsexpressonthecurrentcourseofbilateralrelations,aswellasonthefutureperspectiveoftheserelations.

1. First category: general knowledge

Thedatashowthat70%ofrespondentshadbeeninGreeceatleastone time in their life, while 41% of them have regularly visitedtheaforesaidcountry.Only30%ofpeopleneverpaidavisittotheneighbouringGreece.The latter does not consist an unimportantfigure,duetogeographicalproximityofKorçaregionwithGreece.Nevertheless, economic and social problems ofAlbanian societydonotmotivateenoughyoungpeopleofvisitingtheneighbouringcountries.

Concerning food – a very important element of ordinary life –many respondents, 43%of them, are able to distinguish ‘feta’ asthe traditional greek cheese.However, almost half of people hadnotthechancetofaceintheirdailylife–andtopreserveintheirmemories–thisimportantaspectofculinary,despitetheincrease


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ofculturalinteractionbetweenAlbaniansandGreeksinthelasttwodecades. ‘Feta’ cheese ispopular in albanian foodmarket, and isalsorecommendedtobecookedeachtimewhenAlbaniansreturnfromGreeceduringtheholidays.

78% of respondents are informed thatGreece is a parliamentaryrepublic,butonly32%answeredcorrectlyaboutNikosKazantzakis,asauthorof“CaptainMichalis”novel.Furthermore,33%ofpeopleare able to distinguish “Apology of Socrates” as Plato’s work,althoughthetwo-mentionedworksarealreadyincludedinAlbanianpre-universityprograms.

Themajorityofpeople (54%)believe thatAlexisTsiprashas thestateofPresidentofHellenicRepublic,while in truthhispost isthatofPrimeminister.Only17%respondedcorrectly,identifyingasPresidentMr.ProkopisPavlopoulos.However,thefocusofthegreaterpartofmediatoMr.Tsiprasoverthelastfewyearsreflectsthe familiarization ofAlbanianswithGreek politics. In addition,84%ofpeopleknowthatnearesturbancitiesofGreecewithKorçaregionarethoseofKozaniandThessaloniki.Thebroadidentificationof‘Korça-Kozani-Thessaliniki’trianglecoincideswiththespecificdetailthatmanyrespondentshavefrequentlyvisitedGreece.

64%ofpeoplearefamiliarwithgreekwords,while15%ofthemare able to write these words correctly, using greek alphabeticalcharacters.Itshouldbenotedthatthelatterdiffercompletelyfromthe Latin characters that albanian alphabet applies.Additionally,72% can identify mathematical symbols that relate with greekletters, whereas 81% know more than three islands of Greece.Concerning entertainment, about a quarter of people – 23% – isabletodistinguish‘Rebetiko’astraditionalgreekmusicanddance,whereasthemajorityhasneverheardofit.

Geographicproximitybetweenthetwocountries,aswellasmassmigrationofAlbanianstoGreeceaftertheendoftheColdWar,have


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bothcontributedtostrengtheningthecontactsamongAlbaniansandGreeks.These contacts hadbeen frozen for about half a century.Particularly,Albanianemigrantsplayanimportantrole,concerningthediffusionofmanygreekculturalaspectsintoalbaniansociety.

Despitetheobstaclesthatoftenexistinbilateralinter-staterelations–mainly, because of the complexity ofmutualmisunderstanding– a large part ofAlbanians possesses the basic knowledge aboutGreece and its culture. The most important bridge of contactsbetweenAlbanianpeopleandGreecerelatestothefrequentvisitsthatthefirsthavepaidtothementionedcountry.Notwithstanding,thedifficultfinancialsituationofmanyAlbaniansdoesnotmotivatethetouristictripstowardtheBalkancountries,feedinginthiswaythephysicalandintellectualisolationofoursocietyregardingtheneighbours.Beyondtheneedtoimprovewelfare,theencouragementofmobilityprogramsbetweenAlbanianstudentsandworkersandtheirfellowsfromotherBalkancountrieswouldhelptoreinforcethe mutual contacts among Albanians and neighbours. Thiswill further contribute to improve the collective image toward‘others’,aphenomenonthatcharacterizeAlbaniaandotherBalkansocieties,includingalsobilateralrelationswithGreece.Moreover,the educational programs of theRepublic ofAlbaniamay give agreater emphasis to prominentGreeks and their importantworksinphilosophy, literature,art,geography,andso forth.ThiswouldexpendthecosmopolitanwayofthinkingofAlbanians–especiallyofyoungpeople–helpingindemythicizingstepbystepthemutualhatredof inter-ethnicrelationswithGreeks,aswellaswithotherpeopleoftheBalkanRegion.

2. Second category: specific knowledge

Despite the particular difficulty of this category of questionswhere knowledge is more limited, it was noticed thatAlbanians


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have become partially familiar with Greece. Specifically, 28%of respondents are able to distinguish Giorgos Seferis as a poetand diplomat; 15% recognizeMariaCallas as aworld-renownedsoprano,andalso15%knowthatIoannisKapodistriaswasthefirsthead of the greek state, after its independence. In addition, 33%haveinformationconcerningtheancientcityofKnossosinCrete,butonly5%ofrespondentsknowthatdiplomaticrelationsbetweenAlbaniaandGreeceweresettledin197111.Nevertheless,themajorpartofpeople–48%–haveknowledgeofPericles,asapoliticianand orator in classicalAthens, alongwith 37%,who have heardaboutPenelope.The latter isknown inHomer’sOdyssey forherfidelitytohertravellerhusband,Odysseus,whilehewasabsent.Asforantiquity,24%answeredcorrectlyaboutthe‘BattleofSalamis’,asanavalbattlefoughtbetweenGreeksandPersians.

Regarding geopolitics, 77% of respondents know that Greece isa member state of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),although33%isexactlyinformedaboutGreecepopulation,whichisaround11millioninhabitants.Accordingto11%ofpeople,greekmilitary junta of 1967-1974was a dictatorial regime,while 12%believe that another non-democratic regime – alongwith junta –wasthegovernmentofIoannisMetaxas,thelatterservingasPrimeminister of Greece from 1936 until 1941. Furthermore, manyrespondents–47%ofthem–identifygreekstateandsocietywithorthodox religion only,whereas 28% responded precisely on theexistenceofatleastthreereligiouscommunitiesinGreece,whicharetheOrthodox,theMuslimandalsotheCatholics.

ConcerningthequestionofwhowastheGeneralConsulofGreecetoKorça in1936-1938,only2%managed toanswerexactly that

11. EvanthisHatzivassiliou,Greece and the Cold War. Frontline state, 1952-1967 (London&NewYork:Routledge,2006),105.MichaelSchmidt-Neke,“ABurdenofLegacies–ThetransformationofAlbania’spoliticalsystem,”Legacy and Change. Albanian transformation from multidisciplinary perspectives, ed. RobertPichler(Münster,Germany:LitVerlag,2014),25.


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thisstatuswasheldbyGiorgosSeferis,whobecamelateraNoblelaureateinliterature.Interestingly,3%ofrespondents-thatis1%more than theprevious–believe that thegradeofConsul in thatperiodwasheldbyTheodorosOikonomou. In fact, it is true thatthelatterservedasConsulofGreeceinKorça,althoughnotduringthementionedperiodwhenhewasn’tevenbornatthattime,butin2009-2011.Then,Mr.OikonomouleftthepositionupontherequestofgreekMinistryofForeignAffairs,afterthenationaliststatementshehadmadeaboutAlbania12.Itwaspreciselytheturmoilcausedbyhispublicstatements,themainfactorthatleadAlbanianpeopletocommittorememberthisperson.Hence,channellingofnationalismto public opinion played a greater role than the very factwe alloughttobeproud,regardingthediplomaticserviceofarenownedpersonalitylikeSeferistothegreekauthorityinKorça.

Improvement of inter-ethnic relations does not relate exclusivelywith personal experiences – visits, migration, relationships –but is also the result of the image constructed by socializationand politization process in society. In this case, media owns aconsiderableinfluencingpower.Inspiteofdifficultyofquestions,morethanaquarterofrespondentsmanifestedtheirknowledgeonhistory,cultureandpolitics.EnlighteningalbanianpublicopinioninregardstoGreece–aswellastootherneighbouringcountries–consistsanimportantelementthatencouragegraduallimitationofdistancebetweenAlbaniansand‘others’.Thisprocesswillbecomefasterandmoreefficientifenlighteningismutualandnotbiased.But,whenitcomestoenlightening,itisimportanttomentionthenecessityofinformationobjectivityandofemotionalcontrol,duringtheprocessofinformingpublicopinion.Manytimes,emotionsareartificially irritated by elements which are able to gain a certainprofit,exploitingthecomplexnetworkofmisunderstanding.Whenmedia–asamaintoolthatinfluencethestrengtheningofthemention

12. “Provokimet e konsullit grek,”Top Channel, February 8, 2011,AccessedSeptember20,2017,http://top-channel.tv/lajme/artikull.php?id=203539.


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network – operates in full dependence onmarket or on differentactorpreferences,thennewsbecomesdeliberatelymoresubjectiveandalsospreadsfasterinthedirectionofpublicopinion.

Many times,Albanianmedia has led to the further strengtheningof myths, including the nationalist myth that it’s always Serbsand Greeks fault dealing withAlbania. Consequently, the imageof hostility toward neighbours within the collective memory ofAlbanians became stronger, hindering the possibility of coherentrelationswithneighbouringcountries.Ofcourse,similarproblemsprevailalsoontheothersideofborders, in termsof thenegativeimage that prevails in Greek public opinion toward Albanians.Nonetheless,thereisstillthechancethatthisrealitymaychange.IfmediainAlbaniawillbroadcastmoregreekfilms,songsandevents,thiswould‘soften’ tosomeextent thedistancethatexistbetweenAlbaniansandtheGreekpeople.ThesameappliesadditionallytomediainGreece,concerningthenecessitytocultivateamorepro-Albanianimage.

Untilnow,mediahaschosentotransmittotherespectivemasses–AlbaniansandGreeks–almostonlythenegativesideofnewstoward‘others’.Concretely,albanianmediaproclaimloudlythenationaliststatementsofaninappreciablenumberofGreekpoliticians,whereasmediainGreecedoesnotmakeenougheffortstodemythicizetherepresentationsofAlbaniansascriminals,an image thathasbeenunfairly created after 1990. Several years ago, a big televisionchannelinAlbaniahostedsomeweeklymusiceveningsofdifferentBalkanandEuropeancountries.Oneofthemwasdedicatedtogreekmusic,where surprisingly familiar greek songswere broadcastedfromthetelevisionscreen,masterlyperformedbyAlbaniansingers.Similarly, on the other side of borders, an impressingfilm serieswaspresentedtothegreekpublicopinionintheearly2000s.Itwasthe firstmove that described the difficult contacts that existed atthattimebetweengreeksocietyandAlbanianimmigrants.Named


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“Η αγάπη ήρθε από μακριά” (Love came from afar), the movieportrayedthe‘forbiddenlove’thataroseamonganAlbanianyoungman and aGreekmarriedwoman.Afterwards, no other attemptswere made by media, aiming at limiting the distance betweenGreeksandAlbanians.

If media becomes more cautious in using its influence overpublic opinion, and display fairly negative and positive aspectsofeachphenomenon,theninformingprocessofthemasses–andconsequently the public awareness –will bemore objective andcontemporary.

3. Third category: opinions on ‘hot topics’

Inthiscategory, thereareintentionallypresentedquestionswhichtriggerrespondentsensitivityconcerningthemythof‘fatherland’,andalsotheirabilitytocontrolemotionsincaseofmoderateandrationaljudgment.Atthispoint,provocativetermswereintroduced–familiartoalbaniannationalismandhistoriography–as‘NorthernEpirus’,‘Cham’and‘Arvanites’.

Regardingthequestionofwhatdoes‘NorthernEpirus’mean,33%ofrespondentsmentionedthatthetermrelatestoageographicalregioninsouthAlbaniainhabitedbyAlbaniandescents.Almostsamerate–28%–believethattheregionsiscomposedbyGreeks.Accordingto18%ofpeople,‘NorthernEpirus’hadbeenusedlong-agowithinthehistoricalcontextofthepast,butwhichtodaydoesn’trelatetoanyspecificgeographicalregion.Inaddition,11%considerthattheuseofthementionedtermconstitutesirredentismandisextremelydangerous.Lookingat theothersideof thecoin, the respondentswereaskedtodeterminewhatdoes‘Chameria’mean.Theanswershadadifferentdirectioncomparetothepreviousquestion.Hence,themainmajority of respondents – 76% – believe that the term


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‘Chameria’isconnectedwithacertainregioninnorth-westGreece,inhabitedbyAlbaniandescents.Only5%considerthatpopulationinthisregionareGreekcitizensanddescents.Themoderateanswerthatthissortoftermhadbeenusedwithinthehistoricalcontextofthepastbutwhichtodaydoesnotrelatetoanyconcretegeographicalregionwasprovidedbyonly1%ofrespondents,asopposedto18%inthepreviousquestion.Nevertheless,9%believethat‘Chameria’consistsanirredentisttermandisextremelydangeroustobeapplied,similarlywiththeanalogousansweroftheabovequestion.

InconnectionwithArvanites,mostoftherespondents–49%–believethatthistermisassociatedwithAlbaniandescentswhohadalwayslivedinGreecebutaresuppressedbygreekstatethroughthedenialof theirnativelanguage.Inaddition,23%ofpeopleconsiderthatArvanitesareGreeks,whosefamiliarorcommunitycommunicationisrelatedtothemedievalversionofalbanianlanguage,while28%donothaveanyknowledgeconcerningthisterm.

To these three political questions, it is concluded that youngpeople–asacoreofalbanianpublicopinion–are indoctrinatedbynationalismtoaconsiderableextent,andarestillfarawayfromthecommunitarianemancipation,thelatterrootedintheEuropeanUnion culture.Although the respondents are attending universityfacilitiesandhavethechancetoaccessbroadliterature–inordertoexpendtheirabilitytothinkrationally–theyarestillremainingsubjects of a very ethnocentric spread of information. This isevidencedbytheselectiverationalitythatisappliedbyrespondents,asfarastheyhavetojudgeother–notAlbanian–nationalism,butnotinthecaseofalbaniannationalismorirredentism.Ethnocentrismof education and the large commercialization ofAlbanianmediahavecaused,amongotherthings,theexcessivedegreeofAlbanianspoliticization. Similarly, to communistAlbania of the ColdWarperiod, people continue to be politicized in a troublesome way.Troublesome because the politization is extreme but not real. It


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can be comparable to a deceptive outward appearance – brieflyfacade–whichmakesthecitizensuperficiallyinformed,andasaconsequenceunderestimatetheessentialmattersofsociety,thatiseconomicproblems.Therefore,themajorpartofAlbanianstodayisclosertoakindof‘tyrannyofthemajority’inAlexisdeTocquevilleterms,thantheruleoflaw,wherethelattercharacterizethemodernnations.

Difficultyandretardationofpoliticalemancipationisstill‘imprisoning’Albanianswithin thenetworkofmutualmisunderstanding,whichbegantobebuiltintheperiodofnationalmovements.Thusly,greeknationalismisseenbyAlbaniansasthemainproblemthatthreatensnational security, whereas domestic – albanian – nationalism isperceived as natural, legitimate, fair and harmless. Specifically,commercialization of nationalism is illustrated in daily life byprintingthemapof‘GreaterAlbania’indifferentordinaryobjectsast-shirtsandpaintings13.Ontheotherhand,displayinganyirredentistgreekflag–forexample‘NorthernEpirus’map–wouldconstituteamassivewarningtoAlbania’selites.Asimilarsituationprevailsinthegreeksociety,whichhasbeenusuallytranslatedbyAlbaniansas ‘albanofobia’14.Thus, domestic nationalism is often perceivedandevaluatedwithintherationalframes,whilethenationalismofneighbours through the lens of the 19th century.On these terms,demythicizingofhatred,andfurtherbuildingacommonEuropeanperspectiveamongAlbaniansandGreeks, ismainlybasedon theneed ofmodernization – or ‘Europeanization’ – of the collectivepoint of view toward ‘others’,mostlywith regard to inter-ethnic

13. AndrejNikolaidis, “Balkan nationalism has been reawoken by the attackofthedrone,”The Guardian, October15,2004,AccessedSeptember21,2017,https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/15/balkan-nationalism-drone-football-serbia-albania.14. “Vrasja e Karelit, Berisha: Mbizotëron albanofobia në shtetin fqinj,”Shqiptarja.com, March31,2014,AccessedSeptember21,2017,http://shqiptarja.com/politike/2732/vrasja-e-karelit-berisha-mbizoteron-albanofobia-ne-shtetin-fqinj-207652.html.


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relations. This process, which previously happened betweenGermansandFrenchservingasthecoreofEuropeanUnionstart,isanecessitytobealsoappliedintheBalkanregion,widelyknownasthe‘powderkeg’.Consequently,inter-staterelationsineconomyand infrastructure should accompanied with efforts to changementalities,inaccordancewithGlobalizationpriorities.

4. Fourth category: present and future of bilateral relations

As to the last category of questions, the respondents focused onestimating the progress and the future perspective of Albanian-Greek relations, according to their beliefs. Regarding the extentof support that Greece provides to the European perspective ofAlbania, the respondents answered as follows: 31% believe thatGreece ishelpingAlbania ‘neither toomuch,nor too little’,17%‘enough’,17%‘verylittle’,15%‘notatall’,12%‘little’,andonly1%answered‘toomuch’.Judgingfromthegivenanswers,itcomestolightthat75%ofpeopledescribenegativelythegreeksupporttoEuropeanintegrationofAlbania,oppositeto18%whoevaluateitinapositiveway.

WhenpeoplewereaskedtodeterminetherelationsbetweenGreeksandAlbanian immigrants inGreece,58%stated that therelationsratewasmedian,while the restof respondentsdescribed themasfollows: 26% ‘good’, 10% ‘bad’, 4% ‘very good’, and 2% ‘verybad’.Similarly,therespondentswereaskedtoevaluatetherelationsbetweenAlbaniansand theGreekminority inAlbania.From thisangle, people chose the following options: 41% ‘good’, 28%‘median’,13%‘verygood’,11%‘correct’,2%‘verybad’,and1%‘bad’.Hence, 65% of respondents believe that relations betweenAlbanian descents and Greek minority are strong, while peoplewhodonotthinkinthiswayconstitutesonly31%ofthesample.Onthecontrary,aslittleas12%considerthatrelationsofAlbanian


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immigrantswithgreekstateandsocietyarevigorous,whereas88%describe these relations as problematic.What is peculiar at thesetwoquestionshastodowiththeethnocentricangleofrespondents.So,peoplebelievethatthebehaviourofAlbanianstateandsocietytowardminoritiesisinaccordancewiththeprinciplesofdemocracy,buttheoppositeoccurswhenrespondentsareaskedtoestimatethetreatmentofimmigrantsbythegreekstateandsociety.

Further,peoplewereaskedtoratetheirsympathytowardGreece,choosingfromtheminimumgradeof1tothemaximumgradeof10.Theaveragescorewas6.49,whilemostpreferredgradeswere5,8and7.However, itwas found that54%of respondentshavepositiveperceptionstowardGreece,ratingthiscountrywithgrades7to10,while46%optedtochoosenegativegradesfrom1to6.Thispositiveassessmentisalsoaccompaniedbypeople’soptimismonthenecessityforfurtherimprovementofrelationswithGreece.Thus,87%ofrespondentssaythatbilateralrelationsshouldbedevelopedevenmore,comparedto7%whorejectsthispreposition.Inasimilarway,81%believethatestablishingafriendshipassociationbetweenAlbaniaandGreeceoneducationandcultureareas,wouldstronglymotivate the further improvement of bilateral relations. Againstsuchanassociationwereonly6%ofpeople,whobelievethatthisideadoesnotbringanybenefit.

TherecurrentcrisisinAlbanian-Greekrelations,aswellasmutualmisunderstandingininter-ethniccontacts,hadasignificantdamageon thechances forcooperationbetweenAlbaniaandGreeceoverthelasttwodecades.Instead,thecollapseof‘IronCurtain’,whichdividedBalkansduringtheColdWar,broughtcloserthetwocountriesaspartnerswithintheEuro-Atlanticfamily.Realisticallythinking,there is not – and should not exist – any fundamental divisionbetween Greece, as a member-country of NATO and EuropeanUnion,andAlbania,asNATO’smemberandEUcandidate-country.ThepresenceofalargenumberofAlbaniansinGreecewhohave


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beenalreadyintegratedintothegreeksocietymakesthemamajorhumaninvestmentinimprovingbilateralrelations.Simultaneously,theGreekminorityinAlbaniacanserveasabridgeofunderstandingconcerningAlbanian-Greek relations, in case that the prejudicesexistingbetweenminorityandalbanianstatewillbereduced.Thishumancapital–AlbanianimmigrantsinGreeceandGreekminorityinAlbania–hadnotbeingproperlyvaluedandinaddition,ithasbeen‘takenhostage’bytheinheritedmentalityofthepastinbothcountries.Consequently,theprovocativestatementsoftenmadebyAlbanianpoliticiansontheoneside,andimposingverbalconditionsontheeuropeanpathofAlbaniabythegreekpoliticalelitesontheotherside,haveledtoincreasingalbanianpublicopinionpessimismin regard with the greek support. In this way, many AlbaniansestimateasproblematictherelationsoftheircountrywithGreece.

However, ‘hope dies last’. The improvement of Albanian-GreekrelationsisgreatlydesiredbythemajorityofAlbanians.Culturalandeducationalaffiliationshouldbecomeasignificantinvestmentpowerwhichmustbepursued,aimingattherealandlong-termimprovementofbilateralrelations.Therespectiveembassiesandconsulatesmaycreatenearbyspaceswheremutualinformation,aswellastheculturaland educational cooperation, should be promoted to the benefit ofboth countries. Such spaces may be libraries and cheap languagecourses,whereinformationonalbanianandgreeklanguage,cultureandotherparticularaspectsmaybeprovidedtothepeople.Inaddition,encouragementoftouristictripsandmobilityprogramswouldmakeGreeceandAlbaniamoretangiblebybothcitizens.

Conclusions and suggestions

Accordingtothesurveyresults,AlbaniansbelievethattherelationswithGreecearenotintheproperlevel,andthatfurthereffortsmustbemadetoimprovethem.Thecultivationofethnocentrismbypolitical


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and non-political elites has led to the prevalence of nationalismon albanianpublic opinion, insteadof rationalism.Consequently,Albanians perceptions toward Greece – and also other balkancountries–have remained staticand stronglyconnectedwith theunresolvedpoliticalissuesofthepast.Nevertheless,consideringthatAlbania’sforeignpolicypriorityremainsitsaccessioninEuropeanUnion,aswellas theadequaterole that thiscountryplayswithinNATO,itisanecessitythatthegreekpolicyofAlbaniatomatchupwith thecontemporaryelementsofGlobalization.Ofcourse, thismusttakeplaceincontextofdefendingnationalinterest,wherethelatteritselfshouldnotremain‘hostage’oftheconflictualpast.

Bearing inmind that usually there is an important interactionbetweenpublicopinionandforeignpolicyincountrieswhicharecharacterizedby–or intendtoimplement–liberaldemocracy,then it is necessary to explore the image, perceptions andpreferences of public opinion toward other countries. Hence,political and other elites should influence public opinion insuch a way that the latter may not be incoherent with actualchallenges,mainlyintermsofnational,regionalandinternationalpeaceandstability.So,iftheconflictualpastanddivisionsthatwere imposedby theColdWarpropelled thehostilitybetweenAlbaniaandGreece, today thereare totallydifferent situationsandprioritieswithin theareaofGlobalization.Thehumanandfinancial capital that describes actually the relations betweenAlbaniansandGreeks,leadstotheconclusionthatthepoliticalrelationsandtheirinteractionwiththecollectiveimageofbothpeople toward each-other, must be modernized, or using thecorrectword ‘Europeanized’.Herewith,politics,artandmediamayplayaremarkableroleinimprovingtheimageofAlbaniansconcerningGreeceandbilateralrelations.Thiscanbeachievedthroughseveralprocesses,asfollows:

a) showing more movies, songs and documentaries, which are


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associated with Greece and with relations that exist todaybetweenGreeksandAlbanians;

b) dedicatingagreateremphasistoGreekwritersandphilosopherson behalf of albanianMinistry of Education, including themwithintheeducationalprogramsofpre-universitylevelstudies;

c) agreatercooperationbetweenGreekandAlbanianauthorities,insupportingreciprocalvisitsofstudentsandyoungpeople;

d) a greater support by Albanian and Greek authorities – incooperationwithEuropeanUnion– inexpandingstudentandlabourmobilityprogramsbetweenAlbaniaandGreece;

e) the reduction of those technical aspects, which artificiallyhinder the bilateral relations, such as altering the timetableof international routes – albanian busses towardGreece – orimprovingefficiencyofcustomscontrols;

f) greater democratic measures of albanian government towardGreekminority inAlbania, aswell as improving cooperationwiththegreekauthoritiesinordertoprotectbettertheAlbanianimmigrantsinGreece;

g) more frequent sportive, cultural and artistic exchange visitsbetweenthetwocountries.

References

Clogg,Richard.Σύγχρονη Ιστορία της Νεότερης Ελλάδας.Αθήνα:Καρδαμίτσα,1993.

Foyle,DouglasC.Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy. NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1999.


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Haskaj, Zihni.Mendimi politik e shoqëror i Rilindjes Kombëtare Shqiptare. Vëllimi I. Tiranë: Universiteti i Tiranës, Instituti iHistorisëdheiGjuhësisë,1971.

Hatzivassiliou,Evanthis.Greece and the Cold War. Frontline state, 1952-1967.London&NewYork:Routledge,2006.

Holsti,OleR.Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy.RevisedEdition.AnnArbor,Michigan:UniversityofMichiganPress,2004.

Kapllani,Gazmend.,Mai,Nicola.“‘GreeceBelongstoGreeks!’TheCaseoftheGreekFlagintheHandsofanAlbanianStudent.”The New Albanian Migration, eds.RusselKing,NicolaMai,StephanieSchwandner-Sievers, 153-172.Brighton: SussexAcademicPress,2005.

Κόντης, Βασίλειος., επιμ. Ελληνισμός της Βορείου Ηπείρου καιοι Ελληνοαλβανικές σχέσεις: έγγραφα από το ιστορικό αρχείοτου Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών. Tόμος 3, 1922-1929. Αθήνα:Βιβλιοπωλείον Εστία και Κοινωφελές Ίδρυμα ‘ΑλέξανδροςΩνάσης’,1997.

Milo,Paskal.Të vërtetat e fshehura: Incidenti i kanalit të Korfuzit. Tiranë:Toena,2010.

Pettifer, James. “RisingTensions inAlbania’s Ethnic Relations.”The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe. State-building, Democracy, and Ethnic Mobilization, ed.JonathanP.Stein,178-188.Armonk,NewYork:M.E.Sharpe,2000.

Pollo, Stefanaq., Puto, Arben. The history of Albania: from its origins to the present day. London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1981.

Πράσκα,Βισκόντι.ΕγώεισέβαλαστηνΕλλάδα.Αθήνα:Γκοβόστη,1999.


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Rose, Gideon. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of ForeignPolicy.”World Politics vol.51,no.1(October,1998):144-172.

Schmidt-Neke,Michael.“ABurdenofLegacies–Thetransformationof Albania’s political system.” Legacy and Change. Albanian transformation from multidisciplinary perspectives, ed. RobertPichler,13-29.Münster,Germany:LitVerlag,2014.

Schweller,RandallL.“UnansweredThreats:ANeoclassicalRealistTheoryofUnderbalancing.” International Security vol.29,No.2(Fall,2004):159-201.

Σβολόπουλος,Κωνσταντίνος.Η Ελληνική πολιτική στα Βαλκάνια. Αθήνα:ΕλληνικήΕυρωεκδοτική,1987.

Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Lobell, Steven E., Ripsman, Norrin M.,Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy,Neoclasical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,eds.StevenE.Lobell,NorrinM.Ripsman,JeffreyW.Taliaferro,1-41.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009.

Vickers, Miranda., Pettifer, James. Albania. From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity. London:Hurst&Company,1999.

Wright, Quincy. A Study of War. Vol. 2. Chicago, Illinois: TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1942.

Newspapers

Nikolaidis, Andrej. “Balkan nationalism has been reawokenby the attack of the drone.” The Guardian. October 15, 2004.Accessed September 21, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/15/balkan-nationalism-drone-football-serbia-albania.


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“Provokimet e konsullit grek.”Top Channel. February 8, 2011.AccessedSeptember20,2017.http://top-channel.tv/lajme/artikull.php?id=203539.

“Vrasja e Karelit, Berisha: Mbizotëron albanofobia në shtetinfqinj.”Shqiptarja.com. March31, 2014.AccessedSeptember21,2017. http://shqiptarja.com/politike/2732/vrasja-e-karelit-berisha-mbizoteron-albanofobia-ne-shtetin-fqinj-207652.html.


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Greek-Albanian Relations in Greek and Albanian Historiography of the 2000s

Konstantinos Giakoumis1

… I am glad to report that our project proposal was finally accepted by the General Assembly of … I presented the project on the first day and was badly attacked by the … [a national] delegate… The Academy of [capital city of a Balkan state] does not accept the term “pre-modern” or any term different to the term “post-Byzantine,” although it is not willing to participate in the project. We had a discussion and I convinced the other delegates that the latter term is just an expression of a Balkan anachronistic nationalism, not a scholarly argument. The vote for the new projects was on the last day and … [the very national delegate] used that period to oppose me and to find people on his/her side. I kept answering indirect questions and made a lot of clarifications. Finally, at the time of vote, the ad hoc Committee presented the project in a positive way, and even [the very national delegate] voted us, but surprisingly the … delegate [of a western European state] voted against. So, the project was triumphally accepted and I was congratulated a lot by many colleagues from all over the world. The … delegate [of a Balkan state] refused to support me in the last day, because the … Academy [of the very Balkan state] is …

1. Assoc. Prof. Konstantinos Giakoumis, Ph.D., European University of Tirana


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This anonymised report, whose extract is quoted above carefullyeditedwithsquarebrackets,couldwellhavebeenanextractfromthelobbyingmeetingsatthesideofnegotiationsaheadoftheTreatyofLausanne,haditnotbeenfortheterms“project,”“pre-modern”and“post-Byzantine”pointingtocontemporarytimes.Inreality,thetextabovewasreportedonthebasisofarecentmeetingofaninternationalscientificevent for thepurposeofevaluatinganumberof researchprojectproposals.As is implied, theoutlinenegotiations involveanumberofBalkanstates,includingGreeceandAlbania.Thiseventisnottheleastisolated;toquoteonlyonetypeofsuchevents,manytimesinternationalscientificeventshavefallenpreytoGreekboycotton account of how the neighbouring state of FYRMacedonia isreported.Withoutenteringintotheessenceofthenameissue,theself-exclusionfromeventsaimedatbringingtogetherscientistswhoarepotentiallytodrivethechangeofhostilepublicperceptiontowardstheOtherismuchtelling.ItisthereforeunderstoodthatinsomewaysthepastcontinuestohaunttheBalkanpresentanditsscientificcircles,especiallythoseemployedatstateinstitutions.Inthiscontext,theaimof thispaper is tooutline theevolutionof theGreekandAlbanianhistoriography in matters pertaining to Greek-Albanian relationsin thecourseof the2000sandhowtheseareconditionedmorebyideologicalproclivitiesthanbytheintensityandqualityofcontactofAlbanianandGreekhistorianswitheachotherorbythegenerationofhistorians.

Questions pertaining to the ideological orientation of Greek andAlbanian historiography even after the 2000s remain highlycontroversial for a number of reasons. The scientific politics andideologemesbroughtforwardbybothsidesaremoreoftenthannotbased,originateorareattributed toearly twentiethcentury inertialremnants(Tsitselikis&Christopoulos2007,9).Inthecourseofthepast century several generations ofAlbanians (includingAlbanianhistorians) were nationally nurtured with the image of the Greekasanenemy(GiakoumisandKalemaj2015&2017;Kalemajand


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Giakoumis2015)whilethesamegenerationsofGreekswereraisedwiththemoraleoftheirredentistpoliticalnotionof“NorthernEpirus,”popularized innationalist songs, like“ Ihavea littlesister, trulyadoll;hername isNorthernEpirosand I loveher…”(Tsitselikis&Christopoulos2007,17).Hence,dealingwiththemultifacetedaspectsof Greek-Albanian relations has inevitably borne the ideologicalcharge and arsenal that such perceptions of the ethnic Other hasinherited.

In the past,matters related to the ideological orientation ofGreekandAlbanianhistoriographyweredeceptivelyupheldasself-evidenttruthsintheserviceofpoliticalagendaswhichweresetoutinadvanceof researchonhistoricalmaterial.BlatsiotishasdemonstratedhowtheprincipalideologemeofGreekpolicythatAlbaniansconstitutenonation,butratheravolatileethnicgrouphastransformedinvariousperiodsoftime(2003,46-50),alsoimpartingscholarlyworksofquitesomemerit(e.g.Malkidis2007,1-80).Conversely,GreekirredentistclaimsoverNorthernEpiros,entangled,astheywere,intheperiodthey were raised, acquired a quasi-inherent trait of the Greeks asthe ethnic Other andwas consequently projected by theAlbanianpopularandscientifichistoriographyintotheancientpasttoupholdthenationalmythofpermanentvictimization(e.g.Ministria1959,6).

Inpre-warBalkanscholarship,butalsothereafter,historicalproblemsandphenomenawereseparatedfromtheirwider,internationalcontextandwere studied from thenarrowsightofnational ideology inanattempttoconstructtheiralleged‘national’character.Forexample,thelong19thcentury’spassagefromtheempireasapoliticalentitytothenation-statewasviewedinalinearfashion,therebyfailingtodistinguishprocessesofhybridizationintheprocessofconstructingnationalidentities,wherebyempiresimaginedtheycouldtransformtonation-states(Ottomanism)andnation-statesenvisagedtheirfutureas empires (theGreek ‘Great Idea’ and the Serbian ‘Nacertaniye;’Stamatopoulos2018, Introduction). Ihaveelsewheredemonstrated


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how the instrumentalization of the Albanian language questionin the process of constructing a national identity led to historicalexaggerations and distortions with regards to the stance of theOrthodox Patriarchate towards Albanian language and its use inliturgical services (Giakoumis 2011). It is therefore evident thatsuchethno-centricconstructsareprofoundlybothmethodologicallyproblematicandresearch-distorting.

SuchbiasesinGreekandAlbanianhistoriographycould,intheory,providepartialanswertothequestionwhyeducationdoesnotalwaysleadtoprejudicesreductioninAlbania,contrarytotheconclusionsofintergroupcommunicationtheoryscholars.Anincreasingbodyofliteraturepresentsevidencethatmoreeducationleadstolessintergroupprejudices.However,asPeshkopiaetal.haspresented(2017), thisconclusion,drawnonthebasisofevidencefromwesterncountriesapplying multicultural education, does not apply to most Balkancountrieswhich,alikeAlbania,setprimarygoaloftheireducationalsystemstoinstilasenseofnationalidentityandbelonging,inviewthatenduringnotionsofnationalidentityarebelievedtoforminthecourse of primary socialization years as also indicated by theUSparadigm(cf.Giakoumis&Kalemaj2017).Inhissurvey,Peshkopiahasfoundthat,contrarytotheexpectationthatmoreeducationleadstolessintergroupbiases,inthecaseofAlbania,moreeducationleadsontheonehandtoprejudicereductiontowardshomosexuals,butontheotherhandtoprejudiceincreasetowardsGreeks,i.e.agrouptargetedasthehostileOtherbyethno-nationalistnarratives(Peshkopiaetal.2017).WhilePeshkopia’sresearchhasnotbeenconductedinGreecetodrawusefulconclusions,Papakosta’swork(2009;2013)certainlyindicatessimilarpromptsfromthesideofGreekhistoriography.

Not surprisingly, the subjects of historical research from bothacademic and non-academic milieus were dominated by subjectsrelated to dominant national(ist) narratives, occasionally alternatedwith topics of political and diplomatic history.One also notes the


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parallel development of a non-academic literature on the samematters (e.g.Dalianis 2000& 2008; Isufi 2002;Karkasinas 2014;Litsios2008;Mandi&Jovani2013),notboundbyrigorousscientificmethodsandinterpretativeapparatus.Suchliteraturemoreoftenthannot promotes nationalist agendas. Especially after the turn of the21stcentury,publichistoryinitiativesplayanincreasinglyimportantrole,onoccasionleavingnoteworthytraces(e.g.Tzimas2010).Theavailabilityofarchiveshassignificantlyfacilitatedresearch,althoughthe declassification time of archives after 25 years, in the case ofAlbania,and30yearsinregardtoGreeceisonlynominalasinrealityfewerdocumentshavebeendeclassifiedandpreparedforhistoricalresearchtotheofficialdeclassificationtime(cf.Skoulidas2015).Itshouldbenoted,however,thatthenumberofdocumentaryevidencepublishedorutilizedfromAlbanianarchives(Boçi2008,2009,2010&2012;Dervishi2009;Dushku2012;Gurakuqi2011;Meta2009,2010,2012a,2012b&2013;Naska1999;Puto2011;Tritos2003)is greater than the number of publishedGreek sources of the like(Baltsiotis 2009; Karakitsios 2010; Kollaros 2015; Koltsida 2008;Kondis2004;Kouzas2013;Manta2004&2005;Margaritis2005).

For the historical period frombeforeAlbania’s independenceuntilWorldWarIIdominanttopicsintheAlbanianandGreekpost-2000historiography relate to matters of territory, minority rights, theestablishmentof theAutocephalousChurchofAlbaniaand theso-called “Cham” issue. The delimitation of the new state’s borderswas studied from a variety of perspectives.Most scholars includematters related to territory in wider studies pertaining to Greek-Albanianrelations(e.g.Gurakuqi2011;Dushku2012;Meta2013)and the subsequent claims of an unsolved “North-Epirotan” issue(Barkas2016;Skoulidas2015&2012;Baltsiotis&Skoulidas2013;Triadafilopoulos 2010; Malkidis 2007; Baltsiotis 2003). Anotherpreferred subject for theGreekhistoriography relates to theethnicGreekminorityinAlbaniaanditsrights,atopicthathasbeentouchedinpolitical(e.g.Baltsiotis2009;Barkas2016;Anastasopoulou2013;


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Dalianis2000&2008;Karakitsios2010;Tsitselikis&Christopoulos2003),geographical(Kallivretakis1995),linguistic(e.g.Barkas2016),cultural (e.g.Karkasinas 2014;Litsios 2008;Mandi&Jovani 2013;Pappa 2009) and educational (Barkas 2016; Giakoumis&Kalemaj2017; Ismyrliadou2013;Karakitsios2010;Koltsida2008;Kouzas2013)perspectives.Thematterof theOrthodoxChurchofAlbaniaanditsAutocephalywasdealtwithinalessernumberofmonographs[Glavinas 1996; Katopodis 2001; Giannakou 2009; Simaku 2011;Bido2016].Lastbutnot least,asignificantnumberofworkshavebeendevotedtoChameriaanditsinhabitants.Thisisaprimarilylegalmatter related to the properties of the exiled ChamMuslimswhowereforcedtofleeoutofGreecetowardsAlbaniaafterWorldWarII, after the collaboration of certain individuals of this communitywiththeNazioccupationforcesinGreece,butitalsobearspoliticalramifications. Such works were written from anAlbanian (Naska1999;Isufi2002;Dervishi2009;Meta2009,2010,2012a;Puto2011;Elsie & Bejtullah 2013), and a Greek (Tritos 2003;Manta 2004;Margaritis 2005; Ktistakis 2006; Papatheodorou 2007; Baltsiotis2009)perspectiveonthematter.

Althoughonewouldhaveexpectedthat,aftermanyyearsofGreek-Albanianexchangesatalllevels,Albania’sintegrationtoNATOandtheEU,whereGreeceisalreadyamemberandAlbania’ssupporter,acertainpostnationalistic (Bennett2001)or internationalistic trendwouldemerge,infact,nationalistdiscoursesandrelatedstereotypesdemonstrateanoutstandingendurance.Thisispartlyowedtothefactthatveryfewscholarsspeakthelanguageoftheethnicother.MichaelTritos’ brief treatise on the Chams (2003), for instance, cites noAlbanianbibliography,while theAlbanianperspectives consideredby Malkidis (2007) are solely in English, thereby imparting theauthor’s ability to passmore informed judgements on themattersheraises.ThisisnotanexclusivityofGreekhistoriography.WritingaboutminoritiesandtheconstructionofnationalidentityinAlbaniaayearafterhiselectionasamemberof theAlbanianAcademyof


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Science(2012),BeqirMeta(2013)didnotconsideranynewerGreekbibliographytoLazarou’s1986bookontheVlachsoftheBalkansandtheirlanguage.HisbooksonChams(Meta2010)andtheGreek-AlbaniantensionfromtheoutbreakoftheWorldWarII(1939)totheendoftheGreekCivilWar(1949)(Meta2012a)includesnoGreekscholarship after 1997,while even theAlbanianworks consideredwerepublishednolaterthan2000and2001respectively.Onecouldattribute this topersonalhastiness, ashisbookonGreek-Albanianrelationsin1949-1990(Meta2012b)hasnobibliographicalupdatesafter1997,haditnotbeenforscholarsofayoungergenerationwhoconducted part of their studies in Greece using a rather outdatedbibliography,as is thecaseofSonilaBoçi’sworkonminorities inAlbaniafrom1939-1949(Boçi2012),whoselastconsultedworkinGreekbibliographywasManta’smonograph(2004).ItissurprisingthatKtistakis’authoritarian,purely legalworkon thepropertiesofChamsandAlbaniansinGreeceandtheliftofthewarstatusfromadomesticandinternationallegalstandpoint(Febr.2006)hasbeenentirelyneglectedinAlbanianbibliography,asfarasIknow.

The absence of an international perspective from the majority ofhistoriographicworksproducedinGreeceandAlbaniaaftertheyear2000isalsoanapproachentangledinpast,ethnocentricperceptionsandnarratives.Hence,whileArditBido’smonograph(2016)isverywell-informed in terms of Greek and Albanian bibliography, theauthor’smonoscopicperspectiveoftherelationsoftheEcumenicalPatriarchate with the Orthodox Church of Albania falls short ofunderstanding how developments analysed and discussed in hisworkwereconditionedbywiderpoliticalpowerreconfigurationsthatshapedtheframeinwhichtheEcumenicalPatriarchatecouldmove,suchasdevelopmentswiththeRomanianandBulgarianChurches,etc. (cf. Giakoumis 2011). Sonila Boçi’s (2012) well-researchedandoverallbalancedmonographonminorities inAlbaniabetween1939 and1949 reproducesuncritically anolder thesis ofAlbanianhistoriography, stereotypically repeated by the older generation of


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Albanianhistorians(e.g.Meta2013,51-8),thattheGreek-speakingpopulationinSouthernAlbaniaweremeticssettledduringthesecondhalf of the 18th century towork the lands of the rich land owners(formerly called feudal lords) ofGjirokastra andSaranda, a thesisthathaslongbeenreviewed(cf.Giakoumis2003).Thedominanceofethnocentric,monoscopicandratherlocalisticinterpretativeapparatusisapparentlynotatraitofsomeAlbanianhistoriographicalworks(cf.Xhufi2009;Karagjozi-Kore2014),butalsoofGreekhistoriography(e.g.Koltsida2008;Koltsidas2008;Pappa2009;Karakitsios2010;Xynadas2012;Ismyrliadou2013;Karkasinas2014).Itisinterestingtonotethatsuchproclivitiesareveryevidenttoselecthistoriographyproduced by members of the Greek minority inAlbania (Barkas2016).

The studies of scholars substantially trained internationally offerinsightsofwiderinterest.ThehistoriographicalvalueoftheworkofIlirKalemaj(2014)isgoodevidenceofhowsubstantialexposuretointernationalscholarlyenvironmentscanprovideoriginalinsightsofinterestbeyondthenarrowfocusofastudy.WhileKalemaj’sstudydidnotfocusexclusivelyonGreek-Albanianrelations,hisstudyofrealversusimaginaryterritorialityofAlbaniaalsotouchesonGreek-Albanianrelations.Kalemajdevelopedatwo-by-twomatrix,oneofwhoseaxisrelatedtodomesticpoliticalpressuresregardingAlbania’sactualandshould-beborders,whiletheothertointernationalpressuresvis-à-vis Albania’s borders. His findings that high internationalpressure lowered claims of imagined territories and that lowinternationalpressureresultedinaugmenteddomesticpoliticalclaimsoverimaginedborderscanbeappliedinwidercontexts.TheworksofRidvanPeshkopia andhis colleagues (Peshkopia&Voss 2016)canbeclassified in thesamecategoryofstudiesby internationallytrainedscholarsdealingwithmattersrelatedtothehistoryofGreek-Albanianrelationsandhowtheseaffectcurrentattitudestowardstheother.Peshkopia&Voss’workontheroleofethnicdivisionsintheattitudeofethnicmajoritiesorminorities toward thedeathpenalty


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(2016)drawsconclusionsofuniversalinterestinsuchmatters.Thoughaboutanentirelydifferentperiodandsetting,IthinkthatMargaritis’stunningcomparativestudyofbothJewsandChamsas“undesiredfellow-patriots” (2005) can also be classified to the interpretativeapparatusofviewingmultipleperspectivesofasinglematterforsaferconclusions.

From Greek historiography, important and rather well-balancedcontributionscanbequotedfromscholarswhosestudiesandpublicinterventions aim at smoothing the divisive forces of nationalismin the Balkans. Such type of historiography highlights mattersrelated to minorities, holds theses often deemed as cosmopolitan,in juxtaposition to other ‘nationally-minded’ scholars. LeonidasKallivretakis, for instance, has conducted the earliest historicalgeography and demography account of Albania’s post-socialistperiod(1995), inwhichhe looksatmatterswith thecoldbloodofa disengaged scientist. The political, pragmatic and, on occasion,self-interested,adaptationsofethnic identifications inpost-socialistAlbania have been studied by Lambros Baltsiotis (2003) throughtheprismofsocietiesintransition.Baltsiotis(2003)tracesanumberofpolitical argumentsand ideologemes raisedbybothGreeceandAlbaniainahistoricalfashion.Insodoing,heoutlinestheprocessesbywhich calls for a joint ‘Greek-Albanian nation’ transformed totheconstructionofthepoliticalnotionofNorthernEpirus(Baltsiotis2003,45-53);theinstrumentalizationoflanguagetoupholdpoliticalclaimsoverasinglegeographicalregion(Epirus)bythetwostates(op. cit.54-61);issuesofthehistoricaldelineationoftheGreekminority(op. cit. 61-84); matters related to the complex identifications ofAlbanianandVlachOrthodoxChristians(op. cit. 84-110).Tsitselikisand Christopoulos’ (2003) work on the historical “uncertainties”of the Greek minority in Albania viewed as “national truths” isalso tobe included in the sameanalytical categories. Iwouldalsosingleout theworksofEliasSkoulidas(2001,2012,2015),whosebalancedapproachtowardscontestedissuescausingmuchpolitical


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controversiesowesmuchtohiscompetentknowledgeofAlbanian,aratherrarequalityofGreekscholarswritingonmattersofbothGreekandAlbanianinterest.Itshouldbenoted,however, that thelistsofneither theworks nor the authors discussed above are exhaustive,thoughtheyarerepresentative.

In the course of 2000s a number of very interesting researchescast light onhow the ethnic ‘Other’ is represented in primary andsecondary school History education and textbooks in the Balkansandhowthismighthaveaffectedmodernattitudestowardstheethnic‘Other.’ The representation of the ‘Other’ was approached from aBalkanperspectiveinthecourseofthelate1990sinabackgroundofrisingtensionsthateventuallyledtothebloodyKosovoconflict.Thepublicationofacollective1998volumetitledThe Image of the Other (Collective1998)inSofiawasonlyastart,inwhichtheimageofAlbanians inBalkan textbookswas discussed, yet, noAlbanianor other scholar presented the image of the ‘Other’ in Albanianhistorytextbooks.In1998aninternationalconferenceonthesamemattergatheredscholars fromtheBalkans (includingAlbania)andwestEuropeon thisvery topic (Xochelis&Toloudi2001),whoseproceedingscomprisedafirstdecisivestepinthe2000stowardsthestudyoftheroleofHistorytextbooksinnationalidentityconstructions.Theconclusionthatnegativeconstructionsofthe‘Other’needtobereplacedintheframeofaunitedEuropeledtoanumberofinitiativesaimingatproducingalternativeHistoryeducationmaterialsinseveralBalkanlanguages(e.g.Murgescu&Berktay2009;Kolev&Koulouri2009).

In this context, it is hardly surprising that similar studies wereconducted in the frame of Greek-Albanian relations. Althoughinterest in thismatter dates back in 1990s (e.g.Kofos 1993), newresearch was conducted and presented in the 1998 conference inThessaloniki,whichwaslaterpublishedin2001.Thevolumedealtbothwith the image of theAlbanians inGreek textbooks and the


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imageofGreeksinAlbaniantextbooks(Xochelisetal.2001).TheimageoftheAlbaniansinGreektextbookswaslaterresearchedwithadifferentsampleof textbooksbyKonstantinaPapakosta(2009&2013),whosefindingscorroboratetheconclusionsofXochelisetal.(2001).Inbothsamplesoftextbooks,theimageoftheethnic‘Other’inGreek-Albanianrelationsisportrayednegatively.

In 2014 the author of this paper initiated a longitudinal projectresearching the image of the ‘Other’ in Albanian History schooltextbooks from before the establishment of theAlbanian state tothe country’s post-communist period (1886 to date). Research ofthe imageof the‘Greek’ inAlbanianHistoryschool textbookshascurrentlyadvancedtotheendofthecommunistregime(1990)anditsoutcomeshavebeenpublished(Giakoumis&Kalemaj2015and2018;Kalemaj&Giakoumis2015).Ashasbeendemonstrated,thetransformationoftheimageoftheGreekinAlbanianhistoryschooltextbooksreflectstheprincipalphasesofbilateralrelations,echoinghistories of conflict, neighbourhood and partnership, whereas theimageoftheGreekismorenegativeuponthenation-building(1912-1921) and the complete self-isolation ofAlbania from the rest ofthe world after the Sino-Albanian split (1972-1978) than in othertimes;for,Albania’snation-buildingproject,similarlytotheonesofotherBalkancountries,washighlydependenton thedemonizationoftheethnic‘Other’(Giakoumis&Kalemaj2015),whileAlbania’sseclusionfromtherestoftheworldcouldbesustainedonlyuponthesystematicterrorizationofthepopulationonthepretencesofforeignexistentialistthreat(Giakoumis&Kalemaj2018).TheportrayalofanegativeimageoftheGreekisprimarilyowedtonationalcurricularchoicespersistentlyfocusingonterritorialityandmilitaryoperationswith reference to the Greeks (Kalemaj & Giakoumis 2015).Such findings have been used to explain the failure of intergroupcommunication theory to explainwhymore education in the caseofAlbaniadoesnot leadtobiasesreductionin thecaseofGreeks,contrarytowhatitdoesinthecaseofhomosexuals(Peshkopiaetal.


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2017;Peshkopiaetal.July16,2017).

In a paper dealing with the evolution of historiography vis-à-visGreek-Albanianrelations in the21stcenturyitwouldhavebeenanomissionnottomentionsomeexcellentworkscenteringonGreek-Albanian relations before the establishment of either nation-state.Among these studies,one should singleout theoutstandingmulti-yearwork ofVasilis Panagiotopoulos and his team (2007), whichculminatedwith the publication in 2007 of the (almost) completepreservedarchivesofAliPashaofTepelena,thePashaofIoannina(c.1750-1822),acontroversialbutdominantpersonalityofthelateOttomanEmpire.HisfigureisofinterestsomuchforlateOttomanhistoryas it is for theemerginghistoryof theAlbanianpeople,asAlbanianhistoriographyhasinterpretedhimandotherlateOttomanpashasinEpirusandAlbaniaasanearlyagentofnationalawakening.TheclosevicinityofAliPasha’spashalik to theIonian islands,bythen underEuropean control (Venetian, French,Russian,English),and his ambition to rise to some sort of a local hegemon pavedtheway toBalkan and international scholarshipswriting a varietyof information about his life and deeds, viewing him positively,negativelyorvariably.Althoughsuchaccountswerebasedonsomesporadic letters of his, a complete publication of original sourceswhichcouldtestwhathasbeenwrittenabouthimwasthusnecessary.The publication of the almost 1500 documents of his (preserved)archive,systematicallyannotatedandorganizedtoprovideallpossibleassistancetoreaders(indexes,glossary,extensiveintroduction)wasmissing. Their publication (2007) helps understand the operationsof a primitive hegemonic system of power with its difficult-to-understandbureaucracy.Panagiotopoulos’introduction,inparticular,isamonumentofbalancedhistoriographicaldiscourse,whichsetsthetoneofsuchworks.

Having outlined the major developments in Greek and AlbanianhistoriographyonGreek-Albanianrelations,inspiteoffewnewand


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innovativeapproach,oneisstunnedatthepersistenceofethnocentrismandpaststereotypes.Inspiteofthealmostfreemovement,veryfewGreek orAlbanian historians learn the language of the other evenwhen theydare towriteaboutbilateral relations,at theexpenseoftheeffectiveutilizationofother’sbibliography.Inaddition,withtheexceptionoffewinternationalinitiatives,suchastheonesundertakenintheframeoftheGeorgEckertInstituteforInternationalTextbooksresearch’sprojecttitled“HistoryTextbooksandTeachinginAlbanianLanguageAreas,”GreekandAlbanianhistoriansarerarelyinvolvedinjointbilateralormultilateralhistoricalprojects,therebyobstructingampletimeforcontactandexchanges.Lastbutnotleast,eventhoughithasneverbeeneasiertotravelandacquireinternationalperspectivesonmattersofinteresttoGreek-Albanianrelations,therestillisbareinternationaldimensionthatwouldprovidefreshinsightstomattersraisedinolderGreekandAlbanianhistoriography.InsomewaysGreekandAlbanianhistoriographiesseemtoremainentangledintheirownpast.Thefewinnovativeandbalancedworksmentionedaboveseemtobewritteneitherbymostlypoliticallyleft-wingorientedscholars,suchasLambrosBaltsiotis,inGreekhistoriography;andbyscholarswithsubstantialinternationaleducationandtrainingwithregardstotheAlbanianhistoriography.Itisinterestingtonoticethatmyfindingsregarding the Greek historiography corroborate the findings of aGreekreportthatthebiggestfactor[s]determining“attitudestowardsAlbanians is (primarily) ideologicalself-identification”(Armakolas2013,Chapter5].

Writingtotheauthorofthispapertocomplainfornotbeinginvitedtoaconference,acolleagueexclaims:“Goodlucktotheconferenceon…;Ijustreadtheprogrammeat…Itseemsthatbigstringswerepulledandwe[i.e.thecolleague]werenotinvited.Iassumethatthe…participants[fromathirdBalkancountry],fierceexponentsof…nationalism[ofthisthirdBalkancountry],aremoreseriousscientists.Whereareallthesedistinguishedscientistsfrom…whohavedealtwith… and…?” Considering that the point is not related to the


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nameofthecolleague,thetitleoftheconferenceortheoriginofthethirdBalkanstateanditshistoriansparticipatingintheconference,Iomittedthemforobviousreasons.Infact,althoughtheconferencewaslaunchedwithanopencallforproposalswhichwasmissedbythegoodcolleague,thereasonofnon-invitationwasowedsolelyonbudgetarygrounds.Yet,levellingaconspiracytheoryappearstobealmostinherenttotheBalkanpeninsula,wherethevalueofhumanlifehasrarelyoutweighedtheviolentthrustofnationalism.

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Skoulidas, Elias. 2012. “Οι σχέσεις Ελλάδος και Αλβανίας.” InNikolaosMertzios,ManosKaragiannis,SpyridonSfetas,StratosDrordanas,IoannisZoukasandEliasSkouldias.Βαλκάνια 1913-2011. Εκατό Χρόνια Θύελλες και Χίμαιρες, edited by 203-23.Thessaloniki:InstituteofBalkanStudies–KyriakidisBros.

Skoulidas, Elias. 2015. “Συνέχειες και ασυνέχειες στιςελληνοαλβανικέςσχέσεις:ηελληνικήπολιτικήσεπεριφερειακές


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Sfetas, Spyridon. 2012. “Η αποκατάσταση των ελληνοαλβανικώνδιπλωματικώνσχέσεων(1970-1971).”InΑνοιχτοσύνη. Μελέτες προς τιμήν της Βασιλικής Παπούλια,editedbyTheodorosKorres,PanagiotisDoukellis,SpyridonSfetas,FotiniI.Touloudi,555-73.Θεσσαλονίκη:Vanias.

Stamatopoulos,Dimitrios,2018.“Introduction.”InBalkan Empires: Imperial Imagined Communities in Southeastern Europe, 18th-20th c.,editedbyDimitriosStamatopoulos.Budapest:CEUPress(forthcoming).

Triadafilopoulos,Triadafilos. 2010. “Power politics and nationalistdiscourse in the struggle for ‘Northern Epirus’: 1919-1921.”Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online2(2):149-62.

Tritos,Michael.2003.Τσάμηδες.ΕπίμαχοΠρόβλημαΕλλάδοςκαιΟρθοδόξουΕκκλησίαςΑλβανίας.Thessaloniki:Kyromanos.

Tsitselikis,Konstantinos,Christopoulos,Dimitrios,2003.“ΗΕλληνικήΜειονότητατηςΑλβανίας:ΣτιγμιότυπαΑβεβαιότηταςωςΕθνικέςΑλήθειες.”InΗΕλληνικήΜειονότητατηςΑλβανίας,editedbyKonstantinos Tsitselikis and Dimitrios Christopoulos, 17-44.Athens:Kritiki.

Tzimas,Stavros.2010.Στον Αστερισμό του Εθνικισμού. Αλβανία και Ελλάδα στη Μετά-Χότζα Εποχή.Athens-Thesaloniki:Epikentro.


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Xhufi,Pëllumb.2009.Ikje nga Bizanti. Histori / Publicistikë.Tiranë:Dituria.

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Xochelis, Panos D., Toloudi, Fotini, eds. 2001. The Image of the “Other”/Neighbour in the School Textbooks of the Balkan Countries. Proceedings of the International Conference Thessaloniki, 16-18 October 1998. Athens: Typothito-GeorgeDardanos.

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The Greek foreign policy towards Kosovo and the region and the implications for the Albanian-Greek relations

Ledion Krisafi1

Introduction

Kosovo’sFebruary2008declarationofindependencewasconfrontedwithdifferentreactionsbydifferentcountriesoftheBalkansandtheSoutheasternEuropeingeneral.Thesereactionsdependedondifferentfactors.Geopoliticalcalculations,historicalandreligioustiesbetweenSerbia and the other countries or Kosovo and the other countries,determinedtheacceptanceornotofKosovo’sindependence.

TheGreekreactiontowardsKosovo’sindependencehasbeenamixof geopolitical calculations and historical and religious ties withSerbia.But,theGreekinitialreaction,inthedayafterthedeclarationofindependence,wasneutral.Itemphasizedtheneedfortheinvolvedparties“torefrainfromactionsthatmightsparkdangeroustensions”,and“thestabilityandsecurityoftheregion”.2WhileGreeceatfirstrecognizedthat“yesterday’sdecisionsinPristinaundoubtedlyshapeda new reality in the particularly sensitive region of the WesternBalkans”, it left the issueof recognition for a future time,when ithasexaminedallofthedevelopmentsindepth;allofthedimensions

1. Ledion Krisafi, PhD, Researcher, Albanian Institute for International Studies2. Statements of FMMs. Bakoyannis following the EUGeneralAffairs andExternalRelationsCouncilhttps://web.archive.org/web/20120503235708/http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/190208_alp_1300.htm


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andconsequencesthesedevelopmentshaveforregionalsecurityandGreece’sinterests.”3

Ten years after Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia inFebruaryof2008,Greeceisoneof thefiveEUmembercountries,which haven’t yet recognized Kosovo’s independence. Contraryto theother four countries,Spain,Romania,Slovakia andCyprus,whichhaveinternalproblemswithlargeminorities,concentratedinacertainpartoftheterritoryofthatstate,Greecehasnosuchproblem.ThereisnolargeminorityconcentratedinapartofGreecethatmayseek autonomy or independence. Having this in mind, Greece’snot recognition ofKosovo’s independence and its politics towardsKosovo and what this means about theAlbanian-Greek relations,needsanexplication.

InJanuary2017,duringavisitinSerbia,theGreekPrimeMinisterAlexisTsiprasaffirmedtheGreeksupportforSerbiaintheKosovoissue.TsiprassaidthatGreecedesiredtohelpSerbiainsolvingthisissue, but the maintenance of stability was the crucial issue.4 He didn’tsayexplicitlythatGreecewillneverrecognizeKosovo;Greecehasneversaidthis,butwiththeemphasizesonthe“solutionoftheKosovoissue”maybeunderstoodthatGreecewillrecognizeKosovoonlyafteramutualagreementbetweenSerbiaandKosovo.ThiswasemphasizedbytheformerGreekPresidentKarolosPapouliasduringathree-dayvisitinBelgradein2009.PapouliassaidthatonlyamutualagreedsolutiontotheKosovoissueisacceptableforGreeceandthissolutionshouldbeinsidetheinternationallaw.5

AslateasOctober2017thenewGreekPresidentProkopisPavlopoulos

3.Ibid.4. Tanjug,Cipras Nikoliću: Grčka podržava Srbiju kada je u pitanju Kosovo i Metohija, http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/cipras-nikolicu-grcka-podrzava-srbiju-kada-je-u-pitanju-kosovo-i-metohija/5thmh1f5. Srbiji je mesto u Evropskoj uniji, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Srbija/71181/Srbiji+je+mesto+u+Evropskoj+uniji.html


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saidthattheGreekstancetowardsKosovohaschanged.6

Nevertheless, of all the five EU countries that haven’t recognizedKosovo,GreecehasbeenthemostcooperativewithKosovo.7TherehavebeenseveralmeetingsbetweenhighofficialsfromGreeceandKosovo,especiallywiththeforeignministerofGreece,butKosovoin those meeting hasn’t been represented as a state. Greece hasrecognized Kosovo’s passports and has given a reluctant supportforKosovo’sbid tobecomepartof the internationalorganizations.DuringthevotingforKosovo’sUNESCOmembership,Greecewasoneofthecountriesthatabstained.But,sincethebeginning,Greece’spositioninregardtoKosovo’sindependenceanditsrecognitionhasbeenunequivocal.

In 2014KosovoFoundation forOpenSociety conducted a surveywithmorethanathousandGreekcitizens.Almost70%ofthemsaidthat Greece and Kosovo should have good relations, but withoutrecognition.8

The two-fold foreign policy of Greece

Since the fall of communism in Albania, former Yugoslavia andBulgaria,Greecehaspositioned itself as themainpromoterof theEuropean perspective of the former communist countries of theregion. The Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 and the “ThessalonikiAgenda”,adoptedduringHellenicPresidencyofEUin2003,havebeenthemainguidelinesfortheEuropeanperspectiveoftheWesternBalkancountries.FourteenyearsaftertheThessalonikiSummitthe

6. PavlopuloszaRTS:GrčkanemenjastavoKosovu,http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/2890965/pavlopulos-za-rts-grcka-ne-menja-stav-o-kosovu.html7.EraldinFazliu,Recognition denied: Greecehttp://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/recognition-denied-greece/8.Të jesh Grek, të jesh Kosovar,“FondacioniiKosovëspërShoqëritëHapur,2014


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integrationprocessesoftheregionhavegoneaccordingtotheplanlaidoutinThessaloniki.AlltheseyearsGreecehasfullysupportedtheEUperspectiveoftheregion.

ButatthesametimeGreecehaspursuedaforeignpolicyinrelationtotheotherBalkancountriesbasedalsoonitsnationalinterests.Thecaseof‘’Macedonia’s’’namehasbeengoingonformorethantwodecadesandGreecehasn’ttakenastepbackfromitsposition.Onthecontrary,itexpectsthattheFormerYugoslavRepublicofMacedoniatomakeastepbackandtoobeytoGreekpropositionthatthenameMacedoniashouldbedroppedoff.ForGreece the issueofFYROM’snameisnotjustabouthistoryandsymbols,itisaboveallabout“theconductofaUNmemberstate,theFormerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia,whichcontravenesthefundamentalprinciplesofinternationallawandorder;specifically,respectforgoodneighborlyrelations,sovereigntyandterritorialintegrity.”9ThisisnottosaythattheGreekpositioniswrong,butthisservesasacasetounderstandGreece’sforeignpolicy.TheEuropeanintegrationofFYROMwouldhaveastabilizingeffectintheWesternBalkanregion,butforGreeceitsnationalinterestinthiscasecomesfirst,nottheEuropeanintegrationofMacedonia.

Also in relation toAlbania,Greece has pursued two different andparallellinesinitsforeignpolicy.GreecehasbeenagreatpromoterofAlbania’s EU integration processes and the candidate status toAlbaniawasgivenduringtheHellenicPresidencyin2014.GreecealsohasacceptedhundredsofthousandsofAlbaniansemigrantssincethebeginningofthe90sandconsidersthemas“abridge”betweenthetwocountries,butalso ithasfocusedon issuesofnational interestforGreeceastherightsoftheGreekminorityinAlbania,cemeteriesofGreekfallensoldiersduringthewarbetweenGreeceandItalyin1940-1941andtheissueofthemaritimeborderbetweenAlbaniaandGreece.ManytimesGreecehasthreatenedtoconditionAlbania’sEUintegrationprocessesbasedonthedevelopmentsoftheissuesthatare

9.http://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/


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ofnationalintereststoGreece.

The Greek stance towards Kosovo’s issue should also be seen inthistwo-foldforeignpolicywiththeotherBalkancountries.Greecehas recognized Kosovo’s passports; mainly in order to benefit itstourismindustry,andalsoGreeceispartoftheforeignarmedforcesstillstationedinKosovo.GreecealsohasopenedaliaisonofficeinPrishtinaandGreekbusinessesareactiveinKosovo.ButGreecehasn’trecognizedKosovoandthelastvisitoftheGreekPrimeMinisterinSerbiaconfirmedtheGreekstanceofnotrecognizingKosovoasanindependentstate.GreecehasdonealloftheaboveaboutthepassportsandUNMIKbecauseofitsroleasapromoterofpeaceandEuropeanintegrationinthepeninsula,butthenon-recognitionofKosovoasastateservesitsnationalinterestsandthelargergeopoliticalinterestsofGreeceintheregion.

This situation is explainedwitha twofoldviewof thegeopoliticalcalculations and interests of Greece. On the one hand, this non-recognitionofKosovoandtheGreekstancetowardsKosovohasitsrootsinthewarsinformerYugoslaviainthebeginningofthe90sanditgoesbeyondmerepoliticalandgeopoliticalconsiderationsonthepartofGreece.History,cultureandreligionplayasimilarimportantrole as the national interests of Greece in regard to Kosovo andSerbia.Sincethebeginningofthe90sandduringthedissolutionofYugoslavia,Greecehasconstantlybeenaclosepartnerandsupporterof Serbia’s actions in the region. Greece evaded“United Nationssanctions and, according to the International Criminal Tribunal,contributedconsiderablytowardsMilosevic’swarmachine”.10

For Greece and the Greek public with their Christian OrthodoxsympathiesaboutSerbiaandSerbsingeneral,itisdifficultaccepttheindependenceofanotherMuslim-majoritycountryintheBalkans.In

10.HelenaSmith,Greece faces shame of role in the Serb massacre, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/05/balkans.warcrimes


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1999,97%ofGreekswereagainsttheNATOinterventioninSerbia.11

On theotherhand, theGreekpolicy towardsKosovo isnot linkedonlywithcultural,religiousconsiderations,butalsowiththecaseofCyprus.Since1974, the islandofCyprus, inhabitedby amajorityofGreek-speaking population has been divided into aGreek zoneandTurkishzone. IfGreece recognizedKosovo’s independence, itwouldgivelegitimacytotheTurkishzoneinNorthernCyprus.ItishardlybelievablethatGreecewillrecognizeKosovo’sindependencewithoutafinalsolutionoftheCypruscase.

ThesecasesillustratethecomplexforeignpolicyofGreecetowardsthe Balkans. Historical, cultural and religions considerations andfeelingsplayanimportantpart,andtheperspectiveofEUintegrationoftheentireregionwouldbebeneficialtoGreece,butalsotherearetheGreeknational interestsand there is thecaseofCyprus.AlloftheseareequallyimportantintheGreekforeignpolicyandtheyareneverimportantontheirown,withouttheothers.InthislightshouldbeseentheinfluencethatKosovo’sissueandKosovo’sindependencehasintheAlbania-Greecerelations.Ifoneanalyzedonlyoneofthevariablesmentionedabove–history\culture\religion,EUintegration,national interests, Cyprus; the view would have been partial andmisunderstood.

AllthevariablesaboveshouldbetakenintoconsiderationwhenoneconsiderstheGreekforeignpolicyincludingthattowardsAlbaniaandKosovo.IninternationalrelationsevensmallcountrieslikeAlbaniacouldusedifferentvariableswhenconducting their foreignpolicy,butindifferencewithotherlargercountries,thesmallcountriescan’tuseallofthematthesametimetogainsomeprofit,exactlybecauseoflargercountriesintheirregionthathavemorevariablesandbecauseof themmoremaneuverability.Greecehas the luxury tousealloftheminourregion.

11.Të jesh Grek, të jesh Kosovar,“FondacioniiKosovëspërShoqëritëHapur,2014


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Kosovo and Albania-Greece relations

InarecentsurveybytheAlbanianInstituteforInternationalStudies(AIIS),AlbaniansthinkthatGreeceisthemain“enemy”intheregion.ThisstanceisperfectlyunderstandablebecauseofthemanyissuesstilltoberesolvedinAlbanian-GreekrelationsandalsobecauseGreeceistheonlycountrywithwhichAlbaniaconfinesthatismuchbiggergeographically,economicallyandmilitarily.TheothercountrieslikeFormerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia,MontenegroandKosovo,withwhomAlbaniaconfines,don’tposeasimilar“threat”toAlbaniaasGreeceandtherearen’tsomanyunresolvedissuesaswithGreece.

Inthebeginningofthe90sGreecewastheonlystablecountryintheregion.Yugoslaviawasengulfedinsuccessiveinterethnicwars,thefallofcommunisminAlbaniasenthundredsofthousandsofrefugeesin ItalyandGreeceand later the1997collapseof thegovernmentexasperated further this situation, and Bulgaria and Romania hadtheir problems in establishing the rule of law. Greece’s EU andNATO membership made it the natural starting-point for all theEuropeanprocessesoftheregion.Greeceastheonlylightinadarkneighborhood, tookall the responsibilityofbeing theguidance foralltheothersandGreecetookthisresponsibilitybecausenotonlyitsupportstheEUintegrationoftheregion,butalsobecausebeingintheEUandhavingunresolvedissuesofdifferentnatureswithalmostall the countries it confines with, this responsibility gave GreecealsothepotentialtoconditiontheEUintegrationofthesecountrieswiththeresolvingoftheproblemswiththem.Greecehasdoneandthreatenedtodothisuntilnow.

TheissueofKosovohasn’tdirectlyinfluencedtherelationsbetweenAlbania and Greece. Almost in every meeting with their Greekcounterparts, the Albanian foreign ministers since 2008 havedemanded from Greece to recognize the reality in the Balkans,


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whichisKosovo’sindependence.12TheGreeks,fromtheirpart,haverepeated the same things without taking a definite position aboutKosovo’sindependence.Intheirpublicdeclarations,thehighofficialsofAlbania andGreece haven’t gone beyond these positions aboutKosovoanditisunlikelythatthissituationwillchangeinthenearfuture.TheissueofKosovohasneverbeendirectlyanissueintherelationsbetweenAlbaniaandGreece.

This has happened because Kosovo’s issue hasn’t been a directissue between Albania and other countries of the region, neitherwithGreecenorwithMacedoniaorMontenegroorevencountriesalittlefurtherlikeBulgariaorCroatia.Albania’sroleinthisissuehasbeentorecommendtoallthesecountriesKosovo’srecognitionasanindependentcountryandtoexplainwhythiswouldbenefittheentireregion,butnothingmorethanthis.Kosovohasitsinstitutions,hasitsPrimeMinister, itsForeignMinister,whichhave the responsibilityandallthecapacitiestodealdirectlywiththecountriesoftheregion,withouttheinfluenceofAlbania.

InordertofindandunderstandtheinfluenceofKosovo’sindependenceandKosovo’s issue ingeneral in theAlbania-Greecerelations,oneshouldlookatthegeopoliticalcalculationsthatAlbaniaandespeciallyGreecedoinrelationtotheirBalkanpolicy.

On the one hand, the stability that the Kosovo independence hasbrought to the general security of the Balkans is something thatGreece cherishes, because an unstable Kosovo directly influencesin theGreek immediate neighborsAlbania andMacedonia and anunstableAlbaniaandMacedoniahasdirectconsequencesforGreece.

Butontheotherhand,Kosovo’sindependencehasweakenedSerbia’spositionintheBalkans,whichisacloseandhistoricalallyofGreece.AlsoKosovo’sindependencewasunilateral,wasachangingofthe

12. Konferenca e përbashkëtpërshtypBushati-Kotzias,http://shqiptarja.com/skedat/2724/konferenca-e-perbashket-per-shtyp-bushati-kotzias---304867.html


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borderswithouttheconsentofthetwostates,inthiscaseofSerbiaandKosovo.Inthe18February2008statementoftheMinisterofForeignAffairsofGreeceitwassaidthat“Greecehasalwaysbelievedandcontinuestobelievethatthebestsolutionstodifferencesandproblemsarise from mutually acceptable arrangements. From dialogue andnegotiations. Not from unilateral actions and accomplished facts.This position, foundedon respect for theprinciple of thepeacefulresolutionofdifferences,alsodeterminedourpolicyontheKosovoissue.”13ThisisapointthatGreecehasrepeatedlyemphasizedandhaspushedfordirecttalksbetweenSerbiaandKosovotoreachafinalagreementbetweenthem.

The Greek recognition of Kosovo’s independence and its right tosecedeunilaterallyfromSerbiashouldbeseenalsointhelightoftheNorthernEpirusissue.ThisissueisnotanofficialissueoftheGreekforeignpolicybutitisasensitiveissuefortheGreekpublicingeneral.IfGreecerecognizesKosovo,whyshoulditrefrainfromdemandingmoreontheNorthernEpirusIssue?PoliticalorganizationsandevenpoliticalpartiesliketheGoldenDawn,thethirdmajorpoliticalforcein theHellenicParliament,havebeenvocal in the lastyearsaboutthisissue.TheGreekrecognitionofKosovo’sindependencewouldgivelegitimacytotheirdemandsandthiscouldhaveanimpactontherelationsbetweenAlbaniaandGreece.

EveninthesetimesofgreatEuropeanintegration,states,bytheirverynature,tendtoviewitheachotheraboutinfluenceandGreeceisnotan exception to this.Since the fall of communism in theBalkans,Greek economic influence in the countries of the region has beenenormous.Byconditioning theEU integrationof severalcountriesof the regionwith issues that aremainly in the national interest ofGreece, ithas triedtorender itspolitical influenceintheregionasimportant as the economic one.Also, in the last decade with the13. StatementsofFMMs.Bakoyannis following theEUGeneralAffairsandExternalRelationsCouncilhttps://web.archive.org/web/20120503235708/http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/190208_alp_1300.htm


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growingeconomicpowerofTurkeyanditsattempttotranslatethisneweconomicpowerintopoliticalinfluenceintheregionsoncepartof theOttomanEmpire, there is also an indirect and silent rivalrybetweenthetwocountriesforeconomicandpoliticalinfluenceintheregion.Albania and theKosovo issue alsohave their place in thisindirectrivalry.

TheproblemofKosovo ingeneral is part of the “Albanian issue”whichbecameanissueafter theGreatPowers in1913dividedtheAlbaniannation intoseveralstates.Only inAlbania, theAlbanianswerethelargestnation.Intheothercountries,likeSerbia,Macedonia,Greece andMontenegro, theAlbanians become a minority insidethosecountries.Kosovo’sindependenceisthesolutionofoneofthepartsofthe“Albanianissue”intheBalkans.ButthefearoftheothercountrieshasalwaysbeenthatKosovo’sindependencewillincreasethe demands for more rights forAlbanians inside their respectivecountries and even more than that. This has happened already inMacedoniaandMontenegro.

A supposed consequence of the Greek recognition of Kosovo’sindependencewouldbethegreaterpressurebyAlbaniaabouttheChamissue.ThisisunlikelytohappenbecausetheBalkanforeignpolicyofAlbaniainthelasttwodecadeshasn’tworkedthisway,andAlbaniahasbeenapositiveinfluenceintheregion,butGreecemayperceiveit this way. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia hasn’texpressedanyirredentistviewsconcerningtheGreekMacedonia,butregardlessofthis,GreeceaccusesFYROMofirredentistaspirations.Ininternationalrelations,inmanycaseswhatisperceivedtobetheintentionofastatebyanotherstateismoreimportantandhasmoreimpactthanwhatreallythatstateaimstodo.

TherivalrybetweenGreeceandTurkeyintheregionisnotonlydirect,butalsothroughtheiralliesandtheirpotentialinfluenceintheregion.Since 2003 and especially since the influence of Turkey’s formerPrimeMinisterandMinisterofForeignAffairs,AhmetDavutoğlu’s


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neo-ottomanpoliticalideology,Turkey’sforeignpolicyintheBalkanshasbeenconcentratedmoreontheMuslim-majoritycountriesortheMuslim-majorityareasoftheregion:Albania,Kosovo,Macedonia,SandžakinSerbia,BosniaandHerzegovina.

Inthiscase,theGreekrecognitionofKosovo’sindependencewouldstrengthenanallyofTurkeyandwouldweakenanallyofGreece.Therefore, Greece’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence andestablishingfullinterstaterelationsbetweenthemwouldstrengthenthe “Albanian factor” in the region,namelyAlbania and Kosovo,which in turn ismoreoriented towardsTurkeyandwouldweakenthe“Serbian factor”which isoriented towardsGreeceandRussia.AlbaniaandTurkeyaretheonlycountriesofsoutheastEuropethatKosovo has excellent relations.Kosovo has signed 21 agreementswithTurkey,morethanwithanyoneelseandTurkeyandAlbaniahadadiplomaticpresenceinKosovoevenbeforetheindependence.14TheGreek recognition of Kosovo’s independence would give morelegitimacytotheTurkishinfluenceinKosovoandintheAlbaniansingeneralintheBalkans.

But, thissilent rivalry for influenceandpower in the region isnotconfinedonly to the geopolitical calculationsof theGreek foreignpolicy.ItstretchesalsotothefeelingofsympathyandantipathythatGreekshave for certainmajorglobalpowers and these feelings ina certainmeasure determine the influence that thesemajor globalpowershaveintheBalkans.Theyprojecttheirinfluenceintheregioninthosecountrieswheretheyfeelthattheyareappreciatedandmakethosecountriesastarting-pointfortheirpolicyandinfluenceintheregion.

Thisstrengtheningofthe“Albanianfactor’’intheBalkans,mentionedabove,forGreecewouldbeafurtherstrengtheningoftheUnitedStatesin the region, given the enormouspolitical, economic andmilitary

14.Kosova në kontekst rajonal. Marrëdhëniet politike bilaterale.InstitutiKosovarpërKërkimedheZhvillimetëPolitikave,Maj2014


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investment of theUnited States inKosovo, andwouldweakentheinfluenceofRussiaintheregion,whichisdirectedmostlytowardsSerbiaandlesstoGreece.Thereisawell-knownandwell-documentedanti-AmericanizationintheGreekpublicingeneral.‘’Theextentandintensityofanti-AmericanisminGreece,asregisteredbyPew,Gallupandotherpublicopinionsurveys,isindisputable’’.15As,ontheotherhand,thereisawell-knownsympathyforRussia,mainlyconnectedwiththecommonChristianOrthodoxfaith,whichisveryimportantfortheidentityofthetwonations.16Aswasmentionedabove,religionisaveryimportantfactorfortheGreekforeignpolicy.

Greece, of course, is not a starting-point for Russia’s influence inthe region (the Slavic countries, especially Serbia retain place ofpride),buttheenormousrolethattheUSplayedinendingthewarinKosovoandtherolethattheUShasplayedsinceinallthedifficultsteps forKosovo’s international recognitionand in thebuildingupofitsinstitutions,havemadeKosovointheGreekpublic,tobeaUSprojectintheBalkans.ThisisnotsoeasilyacceptablefortheGreekpublicingeneral.‘’It’sabouttheUSpursuingitsownexpansioniststrategicinterest’’,citedNewYorkTimesin1999ayoungGreekgirlparticipatinginarallyagainstNATO’sbombardmentofSerbia.17And many shared her views.At that time 95% ofGreeks opposed thebombing,63.5%of thosepolledby the largestdailynewspaperTaNea, had a favorable view of Slobodan Milosevic and 94.4% ofthemhad a negative viewofBillClinton.18 In this view, the anti-AmericanizationoftheGreekpublicingeneralandtheinfluenceoftheGreekpublicopinioninthecountry’sforeignpolicyinthiscase,

15. Ted Couloumbis,Athanasious Moulakis, Are the Greeks Anti-American?, GlobalEuropeProgram16. Henry Stanek, Is Russia’s Alliance with Greece a Threat to NATO?, TheNationalInterest17.AlessandraStanley,CRISIS IN THE BALKANS: ATHENS; NATO bombing, Tears at Greek Loyalties, Reawakening Anti-Americanism, NewYork Times,April25,199918.Ibid.


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shouldn’tbeexcluded.

IntheenditcanbesaidthatKosovoisnotadirectissueintheAlbania-Greecerelations,ithasneverbeen.AGreekrecognitionofKosovo’sindependencewouldbewelcomed inAlbaniaand itwouldchangealmostnothinginthedirectbilateralrelationsbetweenAlbaniaandGreece.ButKosovoispartofthe‘’Albanianissue’’intheBalkansandKosovo’sindependenceandtheGreekrecognitionofitplaysapartinthegeneralforeignpolicyofGreeceintheregionandinthiswayitaffects therelationsbetweenAlbaniaandGreece.Theissueof Kosovo is inseparable from the Greek religious and historicaltieswithSerbia, but alsowithgeopolitical rivalrywithTurkey forinfluenceintheregion.IftheissueofKosovowouldhaveconnectedonlywiththestabilityandsecurityoftheBalkans,Greecewouldhadalready recognized Kosovo, because Kosovo’s independence hasconsiderablyminimizedthepotentialforsecurityproblemsandwarintheBalkans.

Also, Kosovo’s recognition by Greece would reopen the issue ofNorthernEpirusintheGreekpublicingeneral,eventhoughitmaynot have any influence in the bilateral relations between the twocountries.

References

• Alessandra Stanley,CRISIS IN THE BALKANS: ATHENS; NATO bombing, Tears at Greek Loyalties, Reawakening Anti-Americanism, NewYorkTimes,April25,1999

• Eraldin Fazliu, Recognition denied: Greece http://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/recognition-denied-greece/

• HelenaSmith,Greece faces shame of role in the Serb massacre https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/05/balkans.warcrimes


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• HenryStanek, Is Russia’s Alliance with Greece a Threat to NATO?,TheNationalInterest

• Konferenca e përbashkët për shtyp Bushati-Kotzias http://shqiptarja.com/skedat/2724/konferenca-e-perbashket-per-shtyp-bushati-kotzias---304867.html

• Kosova në kontekst rajonal. Marrëdhëniet politike bilateral. InstitutiKosovar përKërkime dheZhvillime të Politikave,Maj2014

• Pavlopulos zaRTS:Grčkanemenja stavoKosovu,http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/2890965/pavlopulos-za-rts-grcka-ne-menja-stav-o-kosovu.html

• TedCouloumbis,AthanasiousMoulakis,Are the Greeks Anti-American?,GlobalEuropeProgram

• Të jesh Grek, tëjesh Kosovar,,Fondacioni i Kosovës përShoqëritëHapur,2014

• http://www.mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/• Tanjug,Cipras Nikoliću: Grčka podržava Srbiju kada je u

pitanju Kosovo i Metohija, http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/cipras-nikolicu-grcka-podrzava-srbiju-kada-je-u-pitanju-kosovo-i-metohija/5thmh1f


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The economics of Albanian-Greece cooperation

Selami Xhepa1

Withthefallofcommunistsystem,AlbaniaandGreecestartedtobringdownwallsandbuildbridgesintermsofeconomic,politicalandsocialrelationships.Thequestionsweaskalmostthreedecadeslater are: Is this reallyhappening?Aren’twe still largelydividedandbordersstillveryimportantintermsofcrossbordertradeandinvestment?Howissocio-culturalsettingworkingtobringpeopleonthebothsidesoftheborderclosertogether,oritisnotworkingatall?

Dynamicsofcooperationbetweenour twocountriesover the lastthreedecadeshadtheupsanddowns,momentsofenthusiasmandeuphoria,andmomentsofdecline,pessimismandfrustration.Inthebeginningof‘90s,giventhatGreecewasadevelopedeconomyandfullyintegratedinregionalandglobaleconomy,aleadingrolebyGreecewiththeBalkanregionwasevident.ThecrucialroleplayedbyGreece in shelteringvery largeflowsofmigrants shall not beforgotten.Almost40%ofmigrant,or600,000peopleweresettledin Greece. They still continue to work and live in this country,contributingmostlytodevelopmentofGreekeconomy,butalsotoAlbanianeconomythroughremittancesflowingbackinthecountryhelping families improve the standard of living and relieve themfrom poverty. Trade and investment was intensively flowing andfirstimportantinvestmentsweremade.Greekbankswereamongthefirsttocrosstheborder;privatizationbyGreekcompaniesofsome1. Dr. Selami Xhepa, President, European Institute Pashko (IEP)


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importantindustries,particularlyofthemobiletelecommunication,small and medium Greek firms started green field investmentprojectsinmanufacturing,mainlyintheneighborcities.

ThisprivilegedpositionofGreeceinrelationtoAlbaniaandotherBalkancountriescouldhavegivenGreecesomeadvantagesintheinternationaldivisionof laborandstrengthenhercompetitivenesson international markets. But research 2 shows that they missedthatopportunity.Greeceusedeconomiccooperationasameanstoadvanceforeignpolicyinterestsratherthentakingadvantageofthatpositiontocreateanewperspectiveintheinternationaldivisionoflabor.AhubandspoketradeandinvestmentareawithGreeceinthecenterasahub,basedonrevealedcomparativeadvantages,couldhaveproducedadifferenteconomicrealityforGreeceandfortheregion.Although Greek government lunched some initiatives tosupportpenetrationofGreekcompaniesintheregion,forexamplethrough the Hellenic Plan for the Reconstruction of the Balkan(1999),thisprojectseemsafailuresincenosustainableresultswereachieved.Perhapssomecompaniestookadvantageofsuchfinancialsupport, but this did not generated sustainable results since theirpresence in ourmarkets remains verymodest compared to othercountriesandwiththepotentialsitdoesrepresent.

Economicintegrationisassumedtobringmorespecializationandproduct differentiation among countries – thereforemaking themmoredissimilar.On theotherhand, thisprocessof specializationmay take place on regional clusters, not following of nationalborders.Whathashappenedinourcaseafterclosetothreedecadesofcooperation?Dowehavesomesuccessstoriesinbuildingsomesortofregionalclustersinsomeindustries?Unfortunatelythereisnotsomuchtotellonthatregard.Crossbordercooperationremainsvery fragmented and limited to EU funded projects and it never

2. Vassilis Monastiriotis and Achilleas Tsamis, 2007, Greece’s new BalkanEconomicRelations:policyshiftsbutnostructuralchange,Hellenic Observatory


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materialized on a comprehensive strategy by Greek orAlbanianauthorities.Bordersdonot look thesameas thirtyyearsago;butstillwedonotseeintensiveeconomicactivitytakingplace.Thisissupportedbyempiricalevidencesaswell.

Research shows that trade and investment potentials are largelyunexplored.Gravitymodelstotradeandinvestmentflowsindicatesthatactualflowsarefarbelowthepotentialflowsandwhatmodelspredict.The samefindings are drawn throughquestionnaires andinterviewswith the business community. For example a researchprojectofDrLefterisTopaloglou3fromtheUniversityofThessalyfinds that level of cross border cooperation is at low levelswithAlbania,MacedoniaandBulgariaandthatmarketsize,purchasingpower,geographicalconditions,distance,qualityandproductivityoflocalfirms,productdifferentiationoflocaleconomiesareamongthevariableswhichstronglyimpacttheflowofcrossbordertradeandinvestment.

Lookingattradeandinvestmentdata,thetrendshavebeenonacleardecliningpath.Lookingat trade relations, forexample, 4 in2004Greecerepresentedamarketfor11.3%oftotalAlbanianexportsand18.6%ofAlbanian imports.On2017, this sharehas significantlybeen reduced to 4.3% ofAlbanian exports and 8% ofAlbanianimports.DecliningtrendshavebeenconsistentparticularlysincethestartofthecrisisstronglyaffectingGreece.Thelogicofacountryin crisis is that crisismakes the affected countrymore attractiveintermsofcompetitiveproducts thereforeAlbanianimportsfromGreece should have been increasing. Instead they were reduceddramatically. From the investment perspective, although Greeceremains a large investor forAlbania, the dynamics have been instrongdecline,particularlyaftertheGreekcrisis.Majorinvestment

3. “Enterprises’StrategyacrosstheNorthernGreekCrossBorderZone:Trade,InvestmentandObstacles”,Discussion Paper Series,14(3):49-624. Tradedataaretakenfromwww.instat.gov.alandinvestmentdatafromwww.bankofalbania.org


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projects tookplace inearly startof the transition inAlbania– in‘90s-andthentheystagnated.ThebehaviorofFDIfromGreeceintherecentyearsalsoshowsforaverylowlevelofinvestmentflowsfromGreece toAlbania. For the period 2014-2017, for example,investmentflowsfromGreecerepresentedonly5.6%oftotalFDIinAlbania.Furthermore,from2016andon,thetrendhasbeeninreverse – a reverse flow of investments fromAlbania toGreece.ThismaybeattributedtoreversingofflowsfromGreekbanksbackinmotherbanksorotherGreekfirmsrelocatingbackinGreece.

RivalryhascharacterizedGreekAlbanianrelationshipinimportantEuropean projects, particularly on infrastructure. The mostdistinguishedexampleisthe8thTransportCorridor,orthelinkingofAlbaniawith thegas routes toEuropeanmarkets,whichnevergainedtheGreeksupportandthereforeremainedundeveloped.Withthe exception of some improvement on the border connectivity,thereisnojointprojectonalargescaleofeitherininfrastructureorinmanufacturingindustries.

Greek crisis reversed many things. About 180,000 Albanianmigrantshavereturnedhomeover thepastfiveyearsasGreece’scrisisintensified.ThreeGreekbanksinAlbaniaowncloseto16percentofallassetsintheAlbanianbankingsector.RecentlythereisaprocessofbankconsolidationoftheGreekbanks,mostlypurchasedbyotherprivatebanksofothernationality.

From an institutional and legal framework point of view, basicbilateral agreements in trade and investment cooperation havebeen in place since before ‘90s. Double taxation, protection andpromotionofbilateralinvestmentsandfreeflowoftradeingoodshavebeeninstitutedbothbilaterallyandintheEUcontext.

However, the cooperation remains below potential levels. If abetterpolicyapproachtowardstradeandinvestmentregimecanbedesigned,economicrelationscanbefurtherimproved.Byabetter


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policyapproach,Imean,firstofallapolicyofgoodneighborhood,easingtensionsandrethorics.Thereshouldbemoreindepthresearchexploring barriers to trade and investment, intensive contactsbetween business associations, institutional structures to supportthisagenda.Freetradeandasecuredinvestmentareabetweenourneighborcountriesareessentialfortheprosperityofpeopleonbothsidesoftheborder.

CIP Katalogimi në botim BK Tiranë

AlbaniaandGreece:understandingandexplaining/ed.AlbertRakipi.–Tiranë:AIIS,2018...f.;...cm.Bibliogr.ISBN978-9928-195-22-7

1.Marrëdhëniendërkombëtare2.Historia

3.Shqiptarë4.Shqipëri5.Greqi

327(496.5:495)(091)(082)

94(=18:495)(082)


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Zyra e TiranësRruga “Abdi Toptani”, Torre Drin, kati 3P.O. Box 1418Tirana, Albania

Telefon: 00355 (0) 4 2250986 00355 (0) 4 2273306

Homepage: http://www.fes-tirana.org

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