Al Qaeda and the Taliban

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Unity in Terrorismthe relationship between Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Militants in Pakistan

Simon Franzen

INSTMED 2012 E: [email protected] W: instmed.org


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This paper examines the complex, often misunderstood, relationship between al-Qaeda, the Taliban

and the various militant groups found in FATA (the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in

Pakistan, including the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan).

Much of what is commonly assumed about the Taliban, the TTP and al-Qaeda is based on

misinformation, misunderstanding or a misrepresentation of historical events. The Taliban and al-

Qaeda can in many ways be seen as sharing common values, although their ultimate goals remain

very different. The Taliban were not part of the mujahedeenfighting against the Soviets in

Afghanistan, and emerged only in 1994. Al-Qaeda, for all the conspiracy, did not receive money

from the CIA during the 1980s, and was only officially formed as an organisation in 1988. The

creation of the TTP in 2007 is another matter, and was created as an umbrella organisation for

various Pakistani militant groups, and maintains close ties with al-Qaeda. However, the Pakistani

Taliban is not the same Taliban as the one formed in 1994, and although it swears its loyalty to

Mullah Omar, its goals differ from that of the Afghani Taliban.

We can speak of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in two broad strokes pre 9/11 and post 9/11. The attacks

on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon (as well as the failed attack on Washington DC with the

hijacked flight 93), was the culmination of al-Qaeda as a tightly knit, hierarchical organisation. The

subsequent War on Terror and the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 destroyed much of its

organisational capacity; it also left the Taliban severely weakened. However, they both regrouped in

the FATA region over a period of years, and al-Qaeda spread its ideology throughout northern

Pakistan, coalescing with militant groups and local warlords. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda and the Taliban

were very much two different organisations; today, it is not so simple, and in 2010, General David

Petreus claimed that there is a symbiotic relationship between all of these different organizations:

al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban ... They support each other, they coordinate

with each other, sometimes they compete with each other, [and] sometimes they even fight each

other. (cfr, 2010, http://www.cfr.org).

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Al Qaeda and the Taliban 2
http://www.cfr.org/http://www.cfr.org/


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This paper explores how this relationship came about, how it has evolved, and what it means for the

future of combating al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and the TTP.

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While Al-Qaeda became the Worlds most infamous terrorist organisation after September 2011, the

Taliban had come to prominence in the late 1990s, gaining their notorious reputation after the pre-

meditated murder of the former President of Afghanistan Najibullah following their capture of

Kabul on the 26thof September 1996. However, the underlying ideology of these organisations have

a long and colourful history that dates back almost eight hundred years to the Islamic jurist Sheikh

Ibn Taymiyya, born in 1263.

According to Charles Allen, author of Gods Terrorists, Taymiyyas reinterpretation of Jihad lies

at the heart of modern Islamist revivalism (Allen, 2007, pp. 45). Quoting two versus in the Quran,

specifically chapters 2, verse 193 Fight against them until idolatry is no more and Gods religion

reigns supreme. But if they desists, fight none except the evil-doers and chapter 8, verse 39

Tell the unbelievers that if they mend their ways their past shall be forgiven; but if they persists in

sin, let them reflect upon the fate of bygone nations, Taymiyya could declare jihad in strictly

literal terms: as unrelenting struggle against all who stood in the way of Islams destiny (Ibid,

2007, pp. 46). Although his teachings did not gain much traction during his own lifetime, his ideas

lived on, and would eventually greatly influence what is today commonly known as Wahhabism,

from the 18th century figure Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Today, his teachings form the basis

for the Islam enforced in Saudi Arabia. Al-Wahhab went further than Taymiyya: the Wahhabi code

stated that the moment a Muslim deviates from Al-Wahhabs interpretation of monotheism he

became an unbeliever and the moment he became an unbeliever his life became forfeit (Ibid,

2007, pp. 56).

A third vital influence for al-Qaeda and the Taliban ideology was the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, whose

book Milestones, was published in 1964. Qutb argued that the Muslim community has long

since vanished from existence, the community crushed under the weight of those false laws and

teachings which are not even remotely related to Islamic teachings (Wright, 2007, pp. 30, quoting

Qutb). His answer was to argue that We need to initiate the movement of Islamic revival in some

Muslim country (Ibid, 2007:30, quoting Qutb), this was in order to fashion an example that willeventually lead Islam to its destiny of world domination (Wright, 2007, pp. 30).




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For this, wrote Qutb, There should be a vanguard which sets out with this determination and then

keeps walking the path. I have written Milestones for this vanguard which I consider to be a waiting

reality about to be materialised (Wright, 2007, pp. 30, quoting Qutb).

Sayyid Qutb was hanged in an Egyptian jail in 1966 following dawn prayers, but his legacy, in

many ways, lives on.

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Although there were not many Arabs in Afghanistan at the time, Bin Laden offered every Arab and

his family who came to fight in Afghanistan a ticket, a residence and living expenses, roughly

amounting to three hundred dollars per household per month. Azzam, in turn, produced a fatwa;

eventually issued as the book In Defence of Muslim Lands in which Azzam argued that jihad

was obligatory for every able-bodied Muslim (Wright, 2007, pp. 102). This was to be the basis for

al-Qaeda, and four years later, on the eleventh of August a vote was taken in a meeting held by

Azzam to create a new body to fight the retreating Soviets, who in May had officially declared it

was withdrawing all troops from the country. A week later, on the 20th August, al-Qaeda al-

Askariya was officially established.

It must here be noted that the so-called Arab contingent were a very small minority within the

mujahedeen fighters. Of an estimated 175.000 Afghan mujahedeen, the number of Arab fighters at

any given time in Afghanistan never amounted to no more than several hundred (Bergen, 2011,

pp. 16). By 1992, al-Qaeda had settled in Sudan, but would return to Afghanistan in 1996, by which

time the Taliban had conquered most of the country.

The Taliban first burst into the scene in Afghanistan in 1994. Their rise to power in Afghanistan has

been extensively covered by numerous authors, although some points are worth reiterating. Firstly,

when the Taliban emerged, Afghanistan was in a state of virtual disintegration (Rashid, 2010, pp.

21). Many mujahedeenwho had left Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew saw the ruinous state of

the country and formulated a series of objectives. They aimed to restore peace, disarm the

population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan (Ibid,

2010, pp. 22).

The exact nature and relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban at this point is difficult to

ascertain, although the then Pakistani Interior minister Naseerullah Babar told journalists in

Pakistan that the Taliban were our boys, following their capture of Kandahar in November 1994

(Ibid, 2010, pp. 29). Just before 9/11, the Taliban controlled more than 90 per cent of the country,

with the Northern Alliance cornered in a small strip of land in north east Afghanistan.

There are a number of observations which can be made here. Firstly, al-Qaeda and Osama bin

Laden were not connected to the Taliban when they arrived in Afghanistan in 1996, instead living

under the protection of the Jalabad shura until the capture of the city by the Taliban in September of

that year.




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It was not until he met with the leader of the Taliban Mullah Omar in October in Kandahar,

pledging his unconditional support and financial backing on condition he was given official

Taliban protection (Allen, 2007, pp.292). The personal bond between the two men was sealed when

members of their respective families married (Griffiths, 2009, pp. 229).

A further important observation to make is that where the Taliban had no wish to export their

beliefs or their doctrine (Ibid, 2009, pp. 228), bin Laden issued his Declaration of War against the

Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places in August 1996, and praised martyrdom,

writing Men of the radiant future of our ummahof Muhammad, raise the banner of jihad up

against the Judeo-American alliance that has occupied the holy places of Islam (Burleigh, 2009,

pp. 424). Although this was bin Ladens first such declaration, during his stay in Sudan, his imam

Abu Hajer had in 1992 declared two fatwas the first one authorised attacks on American troops, the

second one authorised the murder of innocent civilians; the original idea of al-Qaeda as a form of

mobile army which would defend Muslim lands wherever they were threatened was replaced by a

policy of permanent subversion of the West (Wright, 2007, pp. 175).

After the Twin Towers fell on 9/11, it was, as Rashid writes, the end of an era. It changed the West,

al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the relationship between Pakistan and the West. Nothing has been the same

since.

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It has been argued that since 9/11 al-Qaeda has metamorphosed from an organisation to a

movement that can be called Al Qaedaism (Gul quoting Burke, 2010, pp. 12 13). This is vital if

one is to comprehend the struggle now taking place in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in many ways

explains the ongoing struggle in both countries. Following Operation Enduring Freedom, the US-

led invasion of Afghanistan, Rashid estimates that the Taliban lost eight to twelve thousand men, or

roughly twenty per cent of their force, with double the number injured and up to seven thousand

captured. The Taliban were seriously damaged, but not defeated (Rashid, 2010, pp. 220); to a

large extent their leadership remained intact, and were able to reorganise in Pakistan. Bin Laden,

although originally trapped in the Tora Bora Mountains, evaded capture and escaped to northern

Pakistan, where he would elude capture for over ten years before finally being killed in May 2011.




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Once al-Qaeda and the Taliban had fled to FATA, they quickly began to use the respite to re-

organise and re-equip. As many as ten thousand fighters were based in Kandahar in beginning of

2002 (Rashid, 2008, pp. 240).

By late 2002 al-Qaeda set up training camps in FATA, and taught and recruited Pakistani and

Kashmiri extremists. Pakistan had withdrawn troops from FATA to counter the threat of conflict

with India, and so both the Taliban and al-Qaeda were free to move around at will (Ibid, 2008, pp.

244). Two years later, in 2004, FATA had become terrorism central - al-Qaeda was so well

protected it was able to set up a media production arm, which in 2006 produced fifty-eight

propaganda videos, treble the number of the year before (Ibid, 2008, pp. 278).

In perhaps one of the most interesting books on the links between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Sayed

Saleem Shahzads Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban documentes the transformation that took place

within each of the organisations following their escape into Pakistan. Shahzad argues that al-Qaeda

and the Taliban have never been identical in personnel or objectives, but that they still share a

unique relationship, in which al-Qaeda aims to bring the Taliban and all Muslim liberation

movement into its fold and to use them to forward its global agenda (Shahzad, 2011, pp. XVII). In

doing so, al-Qaeda required a number of different factors, and Pakistans FATA provided the right

setting. Pakistan was fertile ground for al-Qaedas extreme brand of Islam, and coupled with the

popular firebrand anti-Americanism, Bin Ladens group was able to gain a strong foothold in the

country. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, the military dictator of Pakistan

Zia-al-Huq worked to Islamicise the country, and the number of madrassahs in the country

exploded. In 1979 there were 893 madrassahs, of which forty per cent were of the Deobandi school

of Sunni jurisprudence; by the end of the 1980s, this figure had risen to more than sixty-five per

cent (Allen, 2007, pp. 274 275). In 2002, the number of madrassahs in Pakistan were estimated by

the minister of Religious Affairs to be ten thousand, with over seven thousand of them Deobandi.

Out of 1.7 million enrolled students, 1.25 million were receiving a Deoband-based or Ahl-i-Hadith

religious education (Ibid, 2007, pp. 275). The hard-line schools were often linked with the JUI

(Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam), and were the schools from which the boys who later filed the ranks of

the Taliban received their education (Allen, 2007, pp. 275).

Disasterously, argues Gul, little attention was focused on the legacy of jihad (Gul, 2010, pp. 10).

As such, by the time al-Qaeda moved into Pakistan, there were at least 600.000 youths who had

trained and fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir since 1979, at least 100.000 Pakistanis were




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active in different jihadi cadres, and several hundred thousand people supported Pakistans

Islamic religious parties (Shahzad, 2011, pp. 8). As such, Shahzad argues that although al-Qaeda

initially struggled to acquire new allies in Pakistan, it was ultimately a relatively easy task because

much of the groundwork had already been laid out (Ibid, 2011, pp. 10). Yet Pakistan did not see

fighting between al-Qaeda and Pakistani forces until 2002 2003, which was followed in 2004 by

the first peace agreement (the first of many that were to be broken) between militants and the

Pakistani army. Significantly, the signatories representing the militants did not belong to the old

tribal structures that had been in place for centuries. Instead they were Taliban and al-Qaeda

sympathisers.

Subsequently, al-Qaeda along with the Taliban re-emerged as a viable fighting force, with new

tactics and gradually expanding support around the FATA. Not only did the conflict and violence

spread to Pakistan proper, but the merge between the militants, al-Qaeda and the Taliban saw the

increasing employment of suicide attacks, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first suicide attack

ever to take place on Afghan soil was the 9thof September 2001 attack on Ahmed Shah Massoud,

the leader of the Northern Alliance, al-Qaeda was behind the attack. But after that, not a single

suicide attack was reported against US or Afghan forces, until 2004, when six attacks were reported

early in the year. In 2005 twenty-one suicide attacks were reported, in 2006 the number was one

hundred and thirty six, and one hundred and thirty seven in 2007. There were a reported 1100

casualties in 2006, and in 2007 the figure was an astonishing 1730 (Gul, 2010, pp. 132). In 2008,

the head of al-Qaedas operations in Afghanistan, Mustafa abu al-Yazid, claimed suicide bombing

was in accordance with Islam, saying it was a legitimate weapon against the enemies of

Islam (Ibid, 2010, pp. 133). The first ever suicide attack in Pakistan occurred in 1995, and was

conducted by an Egyptian; the second attack was in 2002 in Karachi.

Between 2002 and 2006 there was a total of twenty two suicide attacks inside Pakistan, (Gul, 2010,pp. 135); in 2007 and 2008, there were more than one hundred and six attacks in the country (Ibid,

2010, pp. 145).

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mechanism designed to break the governments strategy, which was based on the tribes structural

propensity for internal conflicts (Franco, in Giustozzi, 2009, pp. 280). Approximately forty

militant commanders with some forty thousand men under their command formed the group in

South Waziristan; almost all the top militant leaders operating in the tribal regions and NWFP

(North Western Frontier Provinces) or their representatives who managed to set aside their

differences (Hussain, in Lodhi, 2011, pp. 138). The TTP was quickly seen by Pakistan as an entity

out of control, prey to al-Qaeda-leaning and Takfiri ideologies, yet he contends that based on

current understanding of the organisation, the TTP is nothing more than a limb of the mainstream

Afghan Taliban (Franco, in Giustozzi, 2009, pp. 281); still the TTP must be viewed as the most

formidable fighting force within the FATA (Ibid, 2009, pp. 283).

Hussain contends that the TTP charter clearly reflected al-Qaedas ideas, and that much of the top

leadership has long standing ties to the organisation. Its first leader, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in

August 2009 (the exact date is disputed) in a CIA drone attack in South Waziristan. Following the

creation of the TTP violence in Pakistan went up, and in the period 2007 2009 more than three

thousand people were killed in attacks. A further worrying development has been the failure of the

international community to prevent the region to continue being a breeding ground for international

terrorism. Almost all al-Qaeda related terrorist plots following 2004 can be traced back to FATA and

Waziristan, including the July 7 attacks on London, as well as plots in Denmark and Germany in

2007. After the region was overwhelmed by the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, it is now easier than

ever for foreigners to get in touch with al-Qaeda; prior to 9/11 it could take several months

before a new recruit joined a training camp, but now it is reportedly just a few weeks (Rashid,

2008, pp. 82).

Some of this can be directly laid at the feet of Pakistans ISI, and interviews in 2010 with former

and active Taliban commanders have indicated that during the 2004 2006 period the ISI wasactively encouraging a Taliban revival and assisting their war effort after two years of training

Taliban on a large scale in Quetta and other locations (Riedel, 2011, pp. 81).

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This paper has shown the evolving nature of the Taliban and al-Qaeda over a period of time,

primarily focusing on the post-9/11 world. We have seen adaptive shifts from both organisations, asthey have successfully expanded to their surroundings in FATA and Waziristan, as well as the




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North-West Frontier Province. The creation of the TTP must be regarded a major failure for

Pakistani long-term interests, and by default, for coalition forces in Afghanistan. In many ways, the

fight in Pakistan and Afghanistan is not against the Taliban or against al-Qaeda, but against a neo-

Taliban force of various militant Islamic Jihadists, brought together through al-Qaedaism.

In 2007, the same year the TTP was formed in December, Antinio Guistozzi argued that the old

Taliban were turning into the neo-Taliban, as the movement was evolving in a number of ways:

embracing new technologies, attempting to court educated constituencies, and embracing new

sources of support. (Guistozzi, 2007, pp. 236). However, Guistozzi argued that the ideological

aspect of the neo-Taliban was not well defined, and that the movement itself could take two

paths. Either, become fully radicalised and become incorporated into a global jihadist perspective,

or alternatively, following some form of settlement, become something akin to the Islamic parties

of Pakistan, which combine reactionary attitudes with, for example, electoral competition (Ibid,

2007, pp. 236).

Following the creation the TTP, the former would seem to be the case.

By 2009, rifts between Pakistan and the U.S regarding the handling of the Taliban had flared up,

and there were serious differences emerging between America and the various power centres in

Pakistan which could adversely affect the entire region (Rashid, 2009, www.bbc.co.uk). These

differences manifest as the US, Britain, France and NATO stake an enormous amount of political

prestige on rapidly improving the security situation in Afghanistan and receiving more co-operation

from Pakistan on combating the Taliban in both countries (Ibid, 2009, www.bbc.co.uk).

While Pakistani officials were enraged about the use of drone attacks inside their own country, and

insisted that the Americans share the technology with them, Western diplomats have claimed that

Pakistan is choosing to fight only those Taliban who threaten the government, but refusing to act

against those groups which are fighting in Afghanistan. (Rashid, 2009, www.bbc.co.uk).

Rashid's article was accurate: it was written in July of 2009, and a mere month later, in August, the

leader of the Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed in a drone led strike; in the same month, the

Pakistani military abandoned plans to mount a military offensive against the terrorist group

responsible for a two-year campaign of suicide bombings across the country as it concluded that a

ground attack on its strongholds in South Waziristan would be too difficult (Ghosh, 2009,

www.time.com). Yet 2010 saw a sudden surge in Pakistani military activity against the militants


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(Gul, 2010, pp. 213), although major targets such as Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are to

this day still at large. Similarly, the Haqqani network, the Talibans real strength (Shazad, 2011,

pp. 104), remains active, and should not, according to Guistozzi, be viewed as a separate body from

the larger insurgency (Guistozzi, in Guistozzi, 2009, pp. 299).

With the increasing number of drone attacks in the FATA region under the Obama administration,

the death of bin Laden in 2011, and continued killing of many senior al-Qaeda and TTP leaders

damaging their capabilities, it is tempting to be optimistic. However, it would be a mistake to

presume an end to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan is in sight or expect a decrease in jihadist

activity in FATA. It is impossible to imagine a situation in which the Taliban, TTP and Haqqani

network will cease to fight - these factions depend on the ongoing struggle, they depend on the

jihad for their survival and thus have to oppose any settlement. After all, if there's no war in

Afghanistan, they have no reason for being (Semple, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com).

Yet, as has been demonstrated on a number of occasions, al-Qaeda and the Taliban are capable of

restructuring, rebuilding and remodelling. To paraphrase Winston Churchill: the death of bin Laden

did mean the end of al-Qaeda, or the beginning of its end. It is perhaps, the end of its beginning.


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References

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Modern Jihad, Abacus, London

! Bergen, P, 2011, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America

and al-Qaeda, Free Press, New York

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http://www.cfr.orgCouncil on Foreign Relations available at: http://

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World, Penguin Books, London

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