Al-Ghazalis Use of Original Human Disposition and Its Background in the Teachings of Al-Farabi and...

7/23/2019 Al-Ghazalis Use of Original Human Disposition and Its Background in the Teachings of Al-Farabi and Avicenna

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Al-Ghazal s Use of Original Human Disposition(fit

ra) and its Background in the Teachings of

al-Farab and Avicennamuwo_1376 1..32

Frank Griffel*

Yale University

In an often read and frequently cited passage on the early pages of his autobiographyThe Deliverer from Error (al-Munqidh min al-d

alal), al-Ghazal quotes awell-known propheticalh adththat says all children are born with a certain fitra

while it is their parents who turn them into Jews, Christians, or Zoroastrians. The passagegives a lively account of al-Ghazal s early intellectual development during his childhoodor teenage years and is aimed to explain to the reader what prompted him to abandonan attitude of uncritical emulation (taqld) that limits most peoples intellectualdevelopment. The notion offitra, a term that can be tentatively translated as originaldisposition, plays an important role in this personal development. The passage paintsa vivid picture of what set al-Ghazal on his lifelong intellectual quest for certainty andmerits to be quoted in full. Talking about the days of his youth before he was twenty,al-Ghazal says:

A thirst for understanding how things truly are was from the very beginning andfrom the prime of my life my habit and my practice. It is an inborn capacity(gharza) and a talent (fitra) from God that had been put into my nature (jibilla)notbywayofchoice(ikhtiyar) or as a means that accomplishes an end (h la). Thiswent so far that already at the young age of a boy the shackles of uncriticalemulation (taqld) fell off me, and the convictions that I had inherited fell apart.This came because I saw the boys of the Christians always growing up embracingChristianity, and the boys of the Jews always following Judaism, and the boys ofthe Muslims always growing up adhering to Islam. I heard the h adth that isreported from the Prophet, peace be upon him, where he says: Every newborn isborn according to the original disposition (ala l-fitra), and his parents turn him

into a Jew, a Christian, or a Zoroastrian (majus).1 Thereupon, my innermost

* While working on this article I benefited from conversations with Sophia Vasalou, University ofCambridge, who first realized the importance of some of the sources it discusses.1 The h adthis considered sound and appears, for instance, in quite similar wording within al-Bukhar scollection (qadar, 3). See the translation of the full h adthin Livnat Holtzman, Human Choice, Divine

2011 Hartford Seminary.Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148USA.DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-1913.2011.01376.x

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prompted me to seek the true meaning of the initial fitraand the true meaning ofthe convictions that come about by emulating parents and teachers.2

Al-Ghazal uses the Arabic wordfitratwice in this passage and each time it has a slightlydifferent meaning. The first time it describes al-Ghazal s distinct talent to ask criticalquestions and pursue them until he found an answer. Here, al-Ghazal shows nohumility and it is clear that his talent for rational inquiry is way above the average abilityin this field. Secondly, al-Ghazal refers to the initial original disposition (al-fitraal-asliyya) that all humans have in common. This latter understanding of a naturalhuman disposition is given great importance in this passage. Al-Ghazal almost reduceshis lifelong intellectual quest to a proper understanding of what this original dispositiontruly contains and where it leads to.

Fitraplays an important role in al-Ghazal s thinking and yet the subject has attractedonly scant attention.3 This is not only true for al-Ghazal but for Islamic intellectualhistory as a whole. Following al-Ghazal , the notion takes a quite central position inIslamic theology and it becomes even more important for authors such as Fakhr al-Dinal-Raz (d. 606/1210), Ibn Arab (d. 638/1240), and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), forinstance. This important development cannot be dealt within a single article. In fact, the

wealth of material aboutfitrain these and other authors merits monographic studies onthis subject. This article aims to break some ground about fitrain Islamic thought byshowing what al-Ghazal meant by this term and where the sources of his thinking lie.

As with much of al-Ghazal s thought, it has been heavily influenced by the teachings ofthe falasifa, most importantly Avicenna (Ibn Sna, d. 428/1037). This article willtherefore begin by discussing the meaning of the wordfitrain al-Ghazal and then focus

in its main part on how the term was used by al-Farab (d. 339/95051) as well asAvicenna.

The Arabic word fitracarries such a range of meanings that it cannot be easilytranslated into English. Al-Fayruzabad (d. 817/1415) in his dictionary of the Arabiclanguage defines it as: the natural constitution (al-khilqa) with which a child is created

Guidance and theFitraTradition: The Use of Hadith in Theological Treasises by Ibn Taymiyya and IbnQayyim al-Jawziyya, inIbn Taymiyya and His Times, ed. Y. Rapoport and S. Ahmed (Karatchi: OxfordUniversity Press, 2010), 163188, 166.2 al-Ghazal , al-Munqidh min al-d alal/ Erreur et dlivrance, ed. and French transl. F. Jabre, 3rd ed.(Beirut: Commission libanaise pour la traduction des chefs-duvre, 1969), 10.2111.6. For an English

translation see e.g. Al-Ghazali: Deliverance from Error. Five Key Texts Including His SpriritualAutobiography, al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, transl. R.J. McCarthy (Louisville (Ky.): Fons Vitae: 2000),5455. The centrality of this passage for the academic and even the popular understanding ofal-Ghazal may be illustrated by the fact that Ovidio Salazars 2006 movie Al-Ghazali: The Alchemist ofHappinessbegins with this quote and includes a discussion of the meaning offitrafor al-Ghazal .3 On fitra in al-Ghazal see Farid Jabre, Essai sur le lexique de Ghazali (Beirut: Librairie Orientale,1985), 222224, Hermann Landolt, Ghazal and Religionswissenschaft Some Notes on the Mishkatal-Anwar, Asiatische Studien. Zeitschrift der Schweizer Gesellschaft fr Asienkunde(Bern) 45 (1991):1972, esp. 1921, and the handful of contributions referenced in Hans Daiber, Bibliography of IslamicPhilosophy, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 2:148.

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in his mothers womb and the religion (al-dn).4 This description of the meaning offitrarelies heavily on its usage in the Qur an and in the h adthcorpus. Outside of thesereligious sources, the term doesnt seem to have been used in early Arabic literature.5

The verbfataraappears on seven occasions in the Quran in the meaning of to create.6

On five other occasions, the active participle of that verb describes God as the Creatorof the heavens and the earth (fatir al-samawat wa-l-ard ).

7 The key passage in theQuran is, however, in verse 30 in surat al-Rum(30). The verse, whose syntax isntentirely clear, assumes that there is a certain constitution according to which Godcreated humans, and that being a h anfis an expression of that constitution.

8Accordingto Theodor Nldecke und Friedrich Schwally fitrais a loanword from Ethiopian andmeans a certain way of creation or of being created.9 Ah anfis someone who livedbefore the advent of Islam according to rules and convictions that are similar to it.

Abraham is the model of ah anfin the Quran. Verses 6:7579 in the Quran tell that he

grew up among polytheists but understood that there is only one God and became amonotheist all by himself. At one point, the Quran calls Abraham ah anfan musliman(3.65), a h anf who submitted himself to God, or a Muslim h anf, somewhatsuggesting that as ah anf, Abraham was a Muslimavant la lettre.

This Quranic verse together with the above quoted and well-known h adthled towidespread notions within the Muslim community that, unless there is a cause fordeviation, theirfitrawill lead humans to become Muslims. The idea that all humans havea natural tendency to become Muslims is widespread in Islam. An example is atombstone from 277/891 that was found in Egypt and says the buried person died, inaccord with thefitraof Islam and the religion of Muh ammad.

10

It is therefore not surprising that the existing secondary literature on fitra whichis not very extensive tends to assume that Muslim authors equated the notion of aoriginal human disposition with Islam. This view certainly has a sound basis in Islamic

4 al-Fayruzabad, al-Qamus al-muh t (Beirut: Muassasat al-Risala, 1419/1998), 457. Cf. the Englishtranslation by Edward William Lane in his Arabic-English Lexicon, derived from the Best and mostCopious Sources, 8 vols. (London/Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 186385), 6:2416.5 For an analysis of the early use offitrain Arabic see Genevive Gobillot, La Fitra: la conceptionoriginelle, ses interpretations et functions chez les penseurs musulmans (Damascus: Institut franaisdarchologie orientale, 2000), 718.6 Quran, 6.79, 11.51, 17.51, 20.72, 36.22, 43.27, 21.567 Quran, 6.14, 2.101, 14.10, 35.1, 42.11.8 Quran, 30:30:fa-qim wajhaka li-l-dni h anfan fitrata Llahi allatfatara l-nasalayhi;Sosetthyfacetoward the religion just like a h anfdoes. Gods original disposition (fitrat Allah), according to whichHe created humans.9 [E]ine Art und Weise des Erschaffens oder des Erschaffenseins, see Theodor Nldecke, NeueBeitrge zur semitischen Sprachwissenschaft (Strassburg: Trber, 1910), 49, and Friedrich Schwally,Lexikalische Studien, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlndischen Gesellschaft53 (1899): 197201,199200.10

ala fitrat al-Islam wa-dn Muh ammad; M. Cohen, t. Combe, K. A. C. Creswell et alii,Rpertoirechronologique dpigraphie arabe(Cairo: Institut franais darchologie orientale, 1931 ), 2:245, no.752.

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texts. Several studies discuss the implications of that identification for the legal status ofchildren and unbelievers as well as their fate in the afterlife.11 The position that Islam isthe inborn religion of humanity bears, however, several theological problems. Oneproblem would be the need to reconcile the emergence of Islam as a religion that comesrelatively late in human history with the notion that the fitrais original. To whichreligion did thefitraturn humans before the advent of Islam? While that problem couldand has been solved through such notions as Adams original covenant with God(described in verse 7:172 of the Quran) or the existence of h anfsbefore Islam,

12 asecond difficulty weights heavier: Why would humanity be in need of divine revelationin the form of the Quran if all that Islam teaches is already contained in the originalhuman disposition? The position that thefitrais or includes Islam plays into the hand ofa Mutazilite concept of the relationship between human nature and revelation whererevelation simply confirms or repeats what is already known to humans through their

fitra. Assuming some kind of identity or implication of Islam with the fitraleads to theadmission that divine revelation is superfluous for those who have a sound originaldisposition. That was clearly unacceptable for Sunni authors such as al-Ghazal , Fakhral-Dn al-Raz, and Ibn Taymiyya. Their relationship between fitraand Islam is morecomplex than a simple identity or a relationship of implication.13

11 Camilla Adang gives a very good introduction to this literature in her Islam as the Inborn Religionof Mankind: The Concept ofFitrahin the Works of Ibn Hazm,al-Qantara21 (2000): 391410. She alsopresents the views of D. B. Macdonald, A. J. Wensinck, J. van Ess and others in the existing secondaryliterature. Recently Livnat Holtzman argued (in Human Choice, Divine Guidance and the Fitra

Tradition) that Ibn Taymiyya and his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) assume anequation offitrawith Islam (179) and hold the position that [a]ll humans are born as Muslims (174).In my earlier article The Harmony of Natural Law and Sharia in Islamist Theology, inSharia: IslamicLaw in the Contemporary Context, ed. F. Griffel and A. Amanat (Stanford: Stanford University Press,2007), 3861, 196203, esp. 4546, I suggested that for Ibn Taymiyya, Islam and its sharaare notidentical with the human fitranor are they a part of it. Rather, the humans fitraleads them to becomeMuslims because Islam and its shararespond most perfectly to what the fitrarequires all humans toadopt in terms of religion and legislation. With theirfitraintact and unobstructed, humans will choosemilk over wine and Islam over any other religion because they realize that milk and Islam respondbetter to their needs than the alternatives.12 Cf. theh adth qudswhere God is quoted as saying: I have created all my human creatures ( ibad)as h anfs, and the satans lead them away from their religion. (Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, al-Sah h , janna16.)13A third theological problem would be the conflict between human free will and divine predestinationthat the suggestion of Islam as the original religion of every human brings up. Proponents of human freewill would object that humans choose their religions individually. This paper, however, is mostlyinterested in theological debates among Sunni authors, who usually have few problems with acceptinga predestined original religion of all humans. On these kinds of theological debates see the discussionsby Gobillot,La Fitra: la conception originelle, 4670, and Holtzman, Human Choice, Divine Guidanceand the FitraTradition. As a background to Holtzmans article, it should be kept in mind that in histheology Ibn Taymiyya distinguished rigorously between two kinds of approaches to predestination,the tawh d al-rububiyya that asserts Gods omnipotence and predestination, and the tawh dal-uluhiyya that regards the human as a respondent to Gods commands who chooses between

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In the following I shall try and make a contribution to the role offitrain theologicaldebates about epistemology in Islam. Debates about the epistemological dimension of

fitra try to answer the question: What knowledge does the original dispositions of

humans include? This question does not as far as I can see seem to have been muchdiscussed in early Islam. A mayor thinker aboutfitrasuch as Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064) ofCordoba, for instance, was not interested in it.14 The position that all humans have acertain body of knowledge in common or at least have all access to a common body ofknowledge regardless of their upbringing, education, intellectual environment, oracquaintance with divine revelations is one that generates in philosophical literature andis carried into Muslim theological debates by al-Ghazal .

1. Fitra in al-Ghazal

There is not one passage in al-Ghazal where he clearly spells out what he means by

fitra. If we put some of the remarks together we can, however, establish a fewcharacteristics of how he understood the word. Most important is, of course, the abovequoted passage from his autobiography. When in that passage al-Ghazal evokes thenotion offitra, he clearly alludes to the popular understanding that the fitrawill lead allhumans to become Muslims rather than Christians, Jews, or Zoroastrians. TheDeliverer

from Errorwas at the end a book not written for other theologians or jurists but ratherfor a wider readership of people who are interested, for instance, in the dispute betweenthe different theological groups in Islam or the conflict between reason and revelation.

A close reading of the text, however, reveals that while invoking the notion of a closeconnection betweenfitraand Islam al-Ghazal also demolishes that idea. He quotes the

h adthin the context of his own destruction of things he had learned from parents andteachers. Al-Ghazals parents and teachers were Muslims, yet he says that to them alsoapplies what applies to Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, namely that their teachingsobstruct the natural human disposition. Disposition towards what, one must ask?

A simple answer is: disposition towards truth. In his autobiography andparticularly in the chapter where he quotes the fitratradition al-Ghazal tells the storyof how he searched for certain knowledge (ilm yaqnorh aqqat al-ilm).

15 Rejection oftaqld and reliance on fitra are important steps in that search. Uncritical emulation(taqld) only obstructs the truth, while fitraleads towards it. Later on in his autobiog-raphy al-Ghazal clarifies that the fitradoes not already contain the answer to the

question of truth. At the initial stages of this process, thefit

ra

is described as having noknowledge of the world. At the beginning of the chapter on prophecy in the Delivererfrom Error, al-Ghazal clarifies:

obedience and disobedience. The latter approach allows Ibn Taymiyya to argue in favor of humanfree will and thus adopt quite a number of Mu tazilite positions while still maintaining Godspredestination.14 See Adang, Islam as the Inborn Religion of Mankind: The Concept ofFitrahin the Works of IbnHazm.15 al-Ghazal ,al-Munqidh min al-d alal, 11.710.

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Know that the substance (jawhar) of a human in the initial original disposition (fasl al-fitra) is created blank and plain, without having any information about theworlds of God.16

Thefitrais for al-Ghazal a means that enables all humans to reach the truth.17While it

initially knows nothing about the world, once it begins working it is not empty. In fact,in the 21st book of his Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihya ulum al-dn) on thedispositions of the human soul al-Ghazal describes thefitraas a body of knowledge thatleads to other knowledge. Talking about how we acquire new pieces of knowledge(singl. ilm) that we did not have before, al-Ghazal clarifies:

If the knowledge that is searched for is not from the original disposition (fitriyya)it will only be hunted up with a net of [earlier] knowledge that one had alreadyreached at.18

The metaphor of hunting for knowledge with a net of earlier knowledge describes theprocess of logical reasoning understood in terms of Aristotelian syllogistics whereevery piece of new knowledge or every new judgment, is only acquired from twoearlier judgments that are combined and paired in a certain way. Two premisescombine in a syllogism to establish the truth of the conclusion. Yet with regard to theknowledge that comes from the fitrawe need no premises. No syllogistic argument isrequired to acquire this kind of knowledge.

There are two important passages in al-Ghazal s Revival of the Religious Sciencesthat shed further light on the meaning offitra. In both passages al-Ghazal explains themeaning of the word intellect (aql). The first is in the 29th book of hisRevival: I mean

by it (scil.the intellect) the inborn original disposition and the initial light through whichpeople perceive the essences of things.19 Cleverness and smartness are part of thefitra,al-Ghazal continues, as are stupidity and foolishness. A sound intellect and an acuteunderstanding must be from within thefitra, because if a human does not have them inthef trathen [he wont have them all] as acquiring them is impossible.

The second passage that explains intellect is at the end of the first book of theRevival, theBook of Knowledge(Kitab al-Ilm). The word intellect is homonymous andhas various meanings, al-Ghazal says, of which he will explain four. The first meaningrefers to that what distinguishes humans from animals, which is the inborn capacity

16 Ibid., 41.34.17 Through the original disposition (bi-l-fitra) every soul (qalb) is able to achieve knowledge of thetrue meanings [of things] (al-h aqaiq). Al-Ghazal , Ihya ulum al-dn, 5 vols. (Cairo: Muassasatal-Halab wa-Shurakahu, 1387/196768), 3:19.11. Cf. also the parallel print: Ihya ulum al-dn, 16 partsin 6 vols. (Cairo: Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqafa al-Islamiyya, 135657 [193739]), 8:1369.910. References tothe latter print will be added in brackets.18 Ibid., 3:18.2324 (8:1368.1920). See also the description of thefitraat the beginning of the 7th bayanthat follows this remark, 3:2122 (8:137273).19 an bihi al-fitra al-gharziyya wa-l-nur al-asl alladh bihi yudraku l-insan h aqaiq al-umur; ibid.,3:508.23 ult. (11:2066.1821).

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(gharza) through which one is prepared for the acquisition of theoretical knowledge(al-ulum al-naz ariyya).

20 Alltheoretical knowledge that is, and not only that which iscommon to all humans but also that, for instance, which we accept from parents andteachers. While this is not the fitra, the latter has a role in the acquisition of theoreticalknowledge: It is like as if [all theoretical] knowledge is included in this inborn capacity(gharza) through the fitra, yet it will appear and come into existence [only] if thereoccurs a cause (or: reason, sabab) that brings it out into existence.21 This cause or reasonis likely the earlier knowledge in the form of premises that al-Ghazal had mentionedabove, but also other things that cause knowledge such as sense perception, forinstance. According to this first meaning of intellect, the knowledge produced by theintellect comes about firstly through the original disposition (bi-l-fitra) and secondlythrough a cause. Apparently, both need to be present to produce theoretical knowledge.

The second understanding of intellect in al-Ghazal s list stands for thefitraitself.

Intellect also means, so al-Ghazal , a kind of knowledge that appears already in infantsand that distinguishes by assessing what is possible and what is impossible, such asknowing that two is greater than one and that one person cannot be at two places at thesame time.22 Here, in the first book of hisRevival, al-Ghazal does not call this kind ofknowledge fitra. We will see, however, that this is a more or less straightforwardadaptation of a passage in Avicennas Book of Definitions (Kitab al-Hudud) whichitself is adopted from chapter II.19 in AristotlesPosterior Analytics and that Avicennacalls this kind of intellect the initial original disposition (al-fitra al-ula). All through his

works, al-Ghazal keeps his remarks onfitrashort and scattered. Without support fromother sources and here I mean the teachings of Avicenna it would be quite difficult

to truly determine what he has in mind when he uses the word.If we look at al-Ghazal s two textbooks of logic, theStandard of Knowledge(Miyaral-ilm f fann al-mantiq) and theTouchstone of Reasoning(Mih akk al-naz ar), we findin the latter numerous appearances of the word fitra but again no single clearexplanation. Al-Ghazal remarks in hisTouchstone of Reasoning, for instance, that moraljudgments such as lying is bad are not part of thefitrabecause they are not unaffectedby doubt. Rather, these judgments are conventions acquired from other people. Thispassage is instructive since al-Ghazal clarifies that thefitraconsists of two parts:

Neither the original disposition of the estimative faculty (fitrat al-wahm) nor theoriginal disposition of the intellect (fitrat al-aql) judge that lying is bad.

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20 Ibid., 1:118.23 (1:145.9). Al-Ghazal adopts this definition from al-Harith al-Muh asib (d. 243/857).21 Ibid. 1:120.23 (1:147148).22 Ibid., 1:118.1620 (1:146.16). The definition that the intellect is that what distinguishes by[assessing] the possibility of what is possible and the impossibility of what is impossible, goes back toal-Juwayn ,al-Irshad, ed. M. Y. Musa and A. A. Abd al-Ham d (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanj , 1369/1950),16.910, yet it has a slightly different function there.23 al-Ghazal ,Mih akk al-naz ar f l-mantiq, ed. M. B. al-Nasan and M. al-Qabban (Cairo: al-Matbaaal-Adabiyya, w.d. [1925]), 57.1617. The passage is later repeated in al-Ghazal ,al-Mustasfa min ilm

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The original disposition of the estimative faculty (fitrat al-wahm) and the originaldisposition of the intellect (fitrat al-aql) appear throughout al-Ghazals explanation ofone particular kind of premises in arguments, the commonly accepted statements(mashhurat).24 Read closely, these teachings clarify why the fitrais initially empty of allknowledge of the world and they tell us why the body of knowledge contained in it isnot acquired through syllogisms. These passages also clarify why the original fitraisobstructed by the opinions of parents, teachers, and the intellectual environment.

Should then the fact that al-Ghazal answers all or most of our questions on fitrainhis Touchstone of Reasoningnot lead us to study these passages closely? Al-Ghazal stwo textbooks on logic are, as Jules Janssens had already proven for the Standard of Knowledge, extensive adaptations, reworkings, and copies of passages in various textsby Avicenna and al-Farab.25 In a similar context, Janssens concludes that, [n]o seriousevaluation of his (scil.al-Ghazals) personal contribution is possible while these sources

and copies remain undetermined.26Any close study of how al-Ghazal understands theepistemological role offitramust therefore start with the sources of this understanding.In this paper I will look briefly at earlier Ash arite literature and more closely at the

writings of al-Farab and Avicenna as well as some Avicennan falasifa. This is not tosuggest that other genres of literature such as Sufism, for instance, may not also haveplayed a role for al-Ghazal s understanding of fitra. We will see, however, thatconsulting the philosophical notion offitraleads to so many interesting results that thispaper shall be limited to philosophical literature, leaving the other avenues for futureresearch.

Fitra in Asharite Literature before al-Ghazal

Early Asharite theologians up to the generation of al-Juwayn (d. 478/1085) had aserious problem with the assumption that there is an original disposition of all humans.Their occasionalist ontology was based on the denial of any kind of unrealizedpotentialities in the created world. Al-Ashar (d. 324/93536) famously denied that the

word nature (tab) in the sense of an inherent attribute that a thing has or theAristotelian meaning of a potentiality that it strives to realize has any meaning.Assuming that things have natures (taba i) that determine their past or futuredevelopment would limit Gods omnipotence and would make it impossible for God, tocreate a plum tree, for instance, out of an apple seed. Early Asharites up to al-Juwayn,

however, maintained that God has the capacity to created whatever He wants.27

The idea

al-usul, ed. H. Hafiz , 4 vols. (Medina: al-Jamia al-Islamiyya Kulliyyat al-Shar a, 1413 [199293]),1:153.1213.24 al-Ghazal,Mih akk al-naz ar f l-mantiq, 5558;al-Mustasfa min ilm al-usul, 1:150154.25Jules Janssens, Al-Ghazzal s Miyar al-ilm f fann al-mantiq: sources Avicenniennes et Farabi-ennes,Archive dhistoire doctrinale et littraire du Moyen Age69 (2002): 3966.26Jules Janssens in a review of myApostasie und Toleranzin Journal of Islamic Studies14 (2003): 70.27 Frank Griffel, Al-Ghazals Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009),124127.

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of an inherent original disposition for humans would be such an unrealized potentialityand it does not fit into early Ash arite ontology. Subsequently, we read little or rathernothing about it in the major texts of al-Ash ar , al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013), andal-Juwayn.28

Fitra in al-Farab

Al-Farab uses the wordfitrain a variety of ways. In hisLong Book on Music(Kitabal-Musq al-kabr), for instance, the word fitra expresses the different originaldispositions in regard to how easy or difficult it is for humans to create new melodies. 29

This, we would today call talent and it differs widely among humans. Like in otherpractical arts such as eloquence (balagha) or writing (kitaba), talent is helpful but onlyrepeated practice (ada) will lead to mastership. This kind offitrais responsible for the

division of humans in different groups (tawaif) and leads some, for instance, tobecome philosophers while others are more inclined towards practical occupations.30

Yet there is a notion of fitrain al-Farab that all humans of sound mind have incommon. In hisPolitical Regime(al-Siyasa al-madaniyya) in a chapter on notions thathumans all agree upon, al-Farab clarifies that the human original disposition is theability or the talent to receive the first intelligibles. This is a talent that all, or at leastmost humans have. Those people whose original dispositions are sound (salma) foral-Farab this group excludes dull-witted and insane people have one commonoriginal disposition (fitra mushtarika) that makes them ready for the reception of theintelligibles, which are common to all humans who through them pursue the affairs and

28 This is a dangerously general and provocative statement that will probably (and hopefully) becorrected or qualified by subsequent research on this subject. I cannot, of course, read through all therelevant books of these authors. Rather, I checked the indices of those works I have at hand and wentthrough their table of contents, among them Ibn FuraksMujarrad maqalat al-Ashar, ed. D. Gimaret(Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 1986), al-Ashar s Kitab al-Lumaand his Risalat Istih san al-khawd , ed. R.McCarthy (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), the several partly editions of al-Juwayn sal-Shamil fusul al-dnas well as several editions of his al-Irshad. For al-Baqillan I looked at Samra Farah ats,Mujam al-Baqillan f kutubihi al-thalath al-Tamhd, al-Insaf, al-Bayan (Beirut: al-Muassasaal-Jamiiyya li-l-Dirasat wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawz, 1991). In addition I consulted Sam h DughaymsMawsuat mustalah at ilm al-kalam al-Islamiyya, 2 vols. (Beirut: Librairie du Liban Publishers, 1998) aswell as several others lexicons in theSeries of Arabic and Islamic Terminologies Encyclopedias(SilsilatMawsuat al-Mustalah at al-Arabiyya wa-Islamiyya) established by SamhDughaym, Rafq al-Ajm, andGerard Jiham . None of these works generated any significant passage that discusses the meaning of thewordfitraor makes use of that notion. In the existing secondary literature on early Asharism the subjectoffitrahas never been mentioned as far as I can see.29 al-Farab, Kitab al-Musq al-kabr, ed. G. A. Khashana and M. A. al-Hifn (Cairo: Dar al-Katibal-Arab , 1967), 55.57. See Yaron Klein, Imagination and Music:Takhyland the Production of Musicin al-Farabs Kitab al-Musq al-Kabr, in Takhyl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics, ed.Geert J. van Gelder and Marl Hammond (Cambridge: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 2008), 179195, 184.30 Philippe Vallat, Farabi et lcole dAlexandrie: Des Prmisses de la connaissance la philosophie

politique(Paris: Vrin :2004), 223, 302.

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perform the actions that they have in common.31 Philippe Vallat recently analyzed thisand other passages in al-Farab and he highlights the important rolefitraplays within hisphilosophy.32 For Vallat thefit

rain al-Farab is a natural human norm and identical to

the first intelligibles (al-maqulat al-awwal) that humans have in common and thatal-Farab in this chapter calls the first knowledge (al-maarif al-awwal).33 In a lesstechnical and more casual context, al-Farab uses the word fitra synonymously tointellect.34Yet, when looked closely at the passage,fitrais not the intelligibles as such,but the ability or the talent to receive them. That talent is common to all, or most humans,

while no other animal has it.In his Political Regime, al-Farab stresses that humans have the intelligibles, their

fitra, and their affairs in common. In his Book of Letters(Kitab al-Huruf) this leads to afourth commonality: language. In this book, al-Farab explains the origination of the firsthuman language (al-lugha al-umma), i.e. the language of the first human community.

The human fitra plays an important role in why humans were able to agree on acommon language. When the first language was formed, the members of the humanur-community reached a spontaneous and immediate agreement on the words and theirmeanings. This agreement was, according to al-Farab , due to the common fitraof thehumans. For al-Farab the notion of the human original disposition (fitra) is closelyconnected to the intelligibles (maan). The original disposition makes humans order

words in accord with the established order of the intelligibles. This coherence betweenwords and underlying intelligibles let to the spontaneous accord of those who createdlanguage. In hisBook of Letters, al-Farab writes about the process of language formationin the human ur-community:

Because the original dispositions within this community (fitar tilka al-umma)were sound (or: in an equilibrilum, ala l-itidal) and because this was acommunity that was drawn towards acumen (dhaka) and knowledge, theysearched through their original dispositions (bi-fitarihim) without [yet being able]to rely on the words which became representations of the intelligibles (maan)imitations of the intelligibles (muh akat al-maan) and made them (scil. thewords) closely resemble the intelligibles and the beings (al-mawjud). Their soulsrose up through their (scil.the souls) original dispositions (bi-fitariha), because

31 al-Farab, al-Siyasa al-madaniyya, ed. Fawz M. Najjar (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1964), 75.45.32Vallat,Farabi et lcole dAlexandrie, 280284.33 al-Farab, al-Siyasa al-madaniyya, 74.1516; Vallat, Farabi et lcole dAlexandrie, 281282: (. . .)Farabi apelle fitra insaniyya, norme naturelle humaine , cet ensemble dintelligibles communs tous les hommes de saine constitution. (. . .) Ces intelligibles communs tous les hommes sont doncen meme temps les intelligibles premiers, ceux justement qui assurent depuis lorigine la possibilitdun langage commun. (Emphasis in the original.) and 223: Farabi sinscrit dans le prolongementdirect de cette doctrine en parlant pour sa part de la norme naturelle de lhumanit ,fitra insaniyya,qui charactrise tous les hommes de saine constitution et qui constitue pour chacun deux une aptituderceptive lgard dun mme ensemble d intelligibles premiers et dactivits communes affrentes,ensemble qui est appel par mtonymie norme naturelle commune ,fitra mushtarika.34Vallat,Farabi et lcole dAlexandrie, 367.

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the souls aspired with these words to establish as much as they could do thatwith the words an order according to the [established] order of the intellligibles,so that they strove to express the souls affairs (ah waluha) that resemble the affairs

of the intelligibles.35

Philippe Vallat sees in al-Farab s understanding offitrainfluences of the stoic notionof natural tendencies (principiis naturae) as well as of the neo-Platonic idea that thelgoiflow from the universal soul onto nature and onto the human spirit.36 Fitra foral-Farab is the disposition natural to all humans of sane mind to receive the firstintelligibles from the active intellect. This disposition creates an innate (and certain)knowledge that is not acquired through syllogistic arguments.37Vallets analysis showsthat there is a certain ambiguity in al-Farab: Strictly speakingfitrais the disposition orthe capacity to receive the first intelligibles. In a broader sense, however, the ensembleof the first intelligibles is also called fit

ra.

Fitra in Avicenna and the Avicennans

Whilefitraplays an important role in al-Farabs epistemology, the sense we get ofthis notion is somewhat vague and not very technical. On the one hand, fitrais what allhumans have in common in terms of their epistemic capacities, yet at the same time it isa certain individual talent that divides us and creates the established divisions of labor insociety. Avicenna, who understood himself as a follower of al-Farab and someone who

would complete where al-Farab had left things off, has a much more precise notion offitrathat he fully integrates in his epistemological theories.

Avicenna writes aboutfitrain hisBook of Definitions(Kitab al-Hudud) as well as inhis various philosophical encyclopedias within the explanation of what kind of premisescan be used to produce demonstrative arguments (barahn).38 The treatment within theBook of Definitionsreiterates some notions we are already familiar with from al-Farab .There, fitraappears as an important concept in the definition of the word intellect(h add al-aql). Avicenna begins that definition by clarifying what ordinary people, i.e.the non-philosophers, call the intellect:

Intellect is a homonymous term for various concepts (maan). People call thesoundness of the firstfitrain humans (sih h at al-fitra al-ula f l-nas) an intellect

35 al-Farabi,Kitab al-Huruf, 138,penult. 139.4.36Vallat,Farabi et lcole dAlexandrie, 281: En definitive, la fitraet les fitar(plu. defitra) occupentstructurellement dans la pense de Farabi la place des logoi spermatiquesqui eminent de lme et sedveloppent dans la Nature en lorganisant du dedans selon un plan rationnel.37 On this type of knowledge in al-Farab see Vallat,Farabi et lcole dAlexandrie, 224, with referenceto al-Farab,Kitab Sharaital-yaqn, inAl-Mantiq inda l-Farab, ed. M. Fakhr (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq,1987), 97104, 101.1417.38Amlie-Marie Goichon,Lexique de la langue philosophique dIbn Sna (Avicenne)(Paris: Desclee deBrouwer, 1938), 274276.

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and [they say] that its definition is: A faculty through which the distinction betweenwhat is morally bad and morally good is achieved.39

But people also call the universal judgments that they acquire through experience andrepeated sense perception an intellect or the motives that make humans move or stayin rest. Among the philosophers (al-h ukama), on the other hand, there are eightdifferent meanings of intellect. Seven of them describe quite complex phenomena likethe theoretical intellect (al-aql al-naz ar), the practical intellect (al-aql al-amal), orthe material intellect (al-aql al-hayulan). Only the first intellect mentioned in this listinvolves the human fitra. Avicenna explains that this is the intellect which Aristotledescribes in his Posterior analytics, the fourth book in his Organon, dealing with thedemonstrative method. Avicenna says that there, Aristotle distinguished betweenintellect (aql) and knowledge (ilm):

He (scil.Aristotle) says about the meaning of this intellect that it is the concepts(tasawwurat) and the judgments (tasdqat) that come about in the soul throughthe original disposition (bi-l-fitra), and knowledge is that what comes aboutthrough acquisition.40

This kind of intellect and knowledge are distinct from one another because this intellectis defined as being concepts and judgments that appear within the soul through the

fitra, (bi-l-fitra) while knowledge generates through acquisition (bi-l-iktisab). WhatAvicenna seems to refer to in this passage is the difference between primary conceptsand demonstration from chapter II.19 in AristotlesPosterior Analytics. Regarded as oneof his most difficult chapters, Aristotle teaches here that the primary concepts cannot be

known scientifically, i.e. through demonstrative arguments, but are acquired inanother cognitive state called nos, a word that is variously translated as insight,intuition, or intelligence. In the Arabic translation that Avicenna had in front of him,the word was most likely translated as aql, intellect.41 There are various interpretationsof this Aristotelian passage, and Avicennas presentation that this kind of aql, i.e. thenosof Aristotle, represents intuitive knowledge that exists before we acquire (iktasaba)proper scientific knowledge (ilm) through demonstrative arguments is one of them. Likedemonstrative arguments, this kind of intuition (i.e. nos), says Aristotle, is always truein its apprehension of the primary concepts.42 Avicennas rephrasing, however, is very

39 Ibn Sna,Kitab al-Hudud, ed. A.-M. Goichon (Cairo: Institut franais darchologie orientale, 1963),11.912.1. Cf. the English translation in Kiki Kennedy-Day, Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy:The Limits of Words(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 102.40 Ibn Sna,Kitab al-Hudud, 12.89. Cf. Kennedy-Day,Books of Definition, 103.41 In the extant Arabic translation of the Posterior Analyticsin MS Paris, BN Ar. 2346, a translation thatwas most likely done by Abu Bishr Matta ibn Yunis (d. 328/940), the wordnosis translated as aql, seeAristotle,al-Nassal-kamil li-mantiq Aristu, ed. F. Jabr with G. Jiham and R. al-Ajm, 2 vols. (Beirut: Daral-Fikr al-Lubnan , 1999), 1:219.42 . . . no other kind of knowledge except intuition (nos) is more accurate than scientific knowledge,Aristotle,Posterior Analytics, 100b, 510.

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rudimentary and it does not clarify how concepts and judgments appear within the soulthrough the fitra. Are these concepts and judgments, for instance, acquired from theactive intellect?

Al-Farab had understood this passage of Aristotle in very similar terms as Avicennaand he had also used the termfitrain this context. In hisEpistle on the Intellect(Risala

fi l-aql), al-Farab describes the kind of intellect that Aristotle describes in the PosteriorAnalyticsas necessarily true universal premises (al-muqaddimat al-kulliyya al-sadiqaal-d aruriyya). These premises are the first knowledge (al-marifa al-ula) and theprinciples of the theoretical sciences (mabadi al-ulum al-naz ariyya). They arenon-syllogistic and non-reflective but available through the original disposition(bi-l-fitra) and through nature (tab), from childhood on and in a way that one doesntknow from where they come or how they come about. 43

Avicenna explains how they come about. In his own treatments of the subject matter

of the Posterior Analytics (Kitab al-Burhan), Avicenna talks most extensively aboutfitra. The treatment is particular instructive in his shorter compendium The Salvation(al-Najat) shorter than his philosophical encyclopedia The Healing (al-Shifa) but

written in the same period in the last decade of Avicennas life around 417/1026.44 In theSalvation, Avicenna comments about the relationship of the humans judgments with the

fitra in ways that is more instructive than his treatment of the same subjects in TheHealingand Pointers and Reminders(al-Isharat wa-l-tanbhat).

Avicenna mentions the human original disposition at the very beginning of TheSalvationin the introduction to the first part on logic. That chapter introducestasawwurand tasdq, two key notions in Avicennas epistemology that we translated above as

concept and composed judgment. Here, at the beginning ofThe Salvation, Avicennaaims to clarify the function and the benefit of logic. He starts by explaining that a concept(tasawwur) is acquired through a definition or something that fulfills the function of adefinition such as an explanation or an illustration. A composed judgment or simply aproposition is a combination of at least two concepts and can be either true or false.Composed judgments are acquired through syllogistic arguments or what fulfills thefunction of an argument. Definitions and syllogistic arguments are two means or tools(singl. ala) through which humans acquire knowledge of what has been hithertounknown. Definitions and arguments, Avicenna adds, can be correct (h aqq), incorrect(duna l-h aqq) but still in some way useful, or simply false (batil). The false can closelyresemble those that are correct and true.45

43 al-Farab,Risala f l-aql, ed. M. Bouyges, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dar El-Machreq, 1983), 89. Reading wa-instead ofaw- with most MSS.44 Dimitri Gutas,Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicennas Philo-sophical Works(Leiden: Brill, 1988), 112. We do not know when Ibn Snas Kitab al-Hududwascomposed.45 Ibn Sna, al-Najat min al-gharq f bah r al-d alalat, ed. M. T. Danishpazhuh (Tehran: Intisharat-iDanishgah-i Tihran, 1364/1985), 7.38. The text in Danishpazhuhs edition is often quite different fromthe one in the earlier edition by M. S abr al-Kurd:Kitab al-Najat, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Matbaat al-Saada,

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At this point, Avicenna brings in the notion offitraand says that the original humandisposition (al-fitra al-insaniyya) is in the majority of cases not able to distinguishbetween these kinds,46 i.e. the correct, the incorrect, and the false definitions andarguments. If it would be able to do so, then there would be no disagreements amonghumans about truth and falsehood and nobody would hold contradictory opinions.Thats why we need to study logic, Avicenna argues. Our natural inability to know truthfrom falsehood forces us to engage in a proper study of the tools to establish truth. At theend of this passage, Avicenna again has a brief reference to the human originaldisposition:

This is the benefit of the art of logic; its relationship to analytic thinking ( rawiyya)is the same as that of grammar to speech and metric rules to poetry. Ones soundoriginal disposition (al-fitra al-salma), however, and ones sound taste areprobably sufficient for knowing grammar and metric rules, yet there is in thenatural human dispositions (al-fitar al-insaniyya) nothing that is so plentifullyblessed with practicing analytic thinking that it could dispense to prepare itself forapplying this tool (scil.logic) except a human who is assisted by God Exalted.47

Here, Avicenna reiterates what he has said before: While the human fitramay contain anatural talent to know the rules of grammar and of poetic meter, it contains no such talentfor the rules of analytic thinking. We may know what is correct in grammar and in poetrythrough ourfitra, but thatfitradoes not contain a similar guide for correct arguments, forinstance. Only studying logic can do that.

There is a second, more important discussion offitrain AvicennasSalvation. Like

in hisBook of Definitions, Avicenna mentionsfitrain the context of the first intelligiblesthat we acquire. In the part that is equivalent to AristotlesPosterior Analytics, Avicennadiscusses which kind of propositions can be considered certain knowledge so that wecan employ them as premises in syllogistic arguments and thus produce demonstrations(singl.burhan) whose conclusions are certain and indubitable. This is an important partin Avicennas discussion of how to produce demonstrative arguments, which are thekeystone to his philosophical system. Demonstrative arguments rely on certain pre-mises, which makes the distinction of propositions into certain or doubtful so vital for

Avicennas philosophy.

1357/1938), 3.712. Not all variants of al-Kurd s edition are noted in Danishpazhuhs text and the twoeditions should be used in conjunction.46 Ibn Sna, al-Najat, ed. Tehran 7.910, ed. Cairo 3.1213. Cf. also Ibn S na, al-Shifa, al-Mantiq,al-Madkhal, ed. G. C. Qanawat , M. al-Khud ayr, and F. al-Ahwan (Cairo: al-Matbaa al-Amriyya,1952), 1617.47 Ibn Sna,al-Najat, ed. Tehran 9.48, ed. Cairo 5.15. Cf. al-Shifa,al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal, 19.815,20.1319. The latter text is translated and analyzed by Yahya Michot in his introduction to Ibn S na,Lettre au vizir Ab Sad, ed. and transl. Y. Michot (Beirut: Les ditions Al-Bouraq: 1421/2000), 6970,72. The human who is assisted (muayyad) by God in finding the truth through his original dispositionis, of course, the prophet.

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Avicenna discusses the kinds of premises one by one. In theSalvation, he mentionsnine different kinds of propositions. A proposition is defined as something that can betrue or false. For the purposes of this article, only three of these nine kinds are important:(1) those that come from the faculty of estimation (wahmiyyat), (2) the first intelligibles(al-awwaliyyat), and (3) judgments that are widely spread (dha iat) among the peopleabout what is right and wrong. The other six are: (1) judgments based on sense perception(al-mah susat) such as snow is white, (2) those that are based on experience(al-mujarrabat), i.e. repeated sense perception, such as scammony is a laxative, or theheavens have observable motions,48 (3) those that are acquired by reliable transmissionfrom other people (mutawatarat) such as our knowledge about countries that weourselves did not visit, (4) accepted judgments (maqbulat), i.e. religious convictions that

we havetaken fromprophets and religious leaders, (5) conjectured judgments (maz nunat)that one tends to hold true without methodological foundation, and (6) imaginations

(mutakhayyalat), i.e. things that are completely wrong, mostly due to a misidentification.49The fifth group of judgments is those based on estimation (wahm; aestimatioin the

medieval Latin translations). Avicenna discusses this category in greater detail than thefirst four and informs us that these are often not true. They are simply opinions (ara ) orconvictions (singl. itiqad) that humans have based on their faculty of estimation(quwwat al-wahm) which produces judgments on the basis of sense perceptions.Estimation (wahm) is in Avicenna one of the inner faculties of humans that provides animmediate knowledge connected with a certain sense perception. Adherent to sensibleperceptions there exist certain entities (maan) that are non-material and that thefaculty of sense perception (al-h iss) with its five external senses therefore cannot

perceive. These entities are accidents (singl. arad), i.e. entitative attributes that inherein the sensually perceived things.50While not accessible through the five external senses,

48 On this particular category of knowledge in Ibn S na see my remarks in Frank Griffel, Al-GhazalsPhilosophical Theology(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 208212, and the literature I discussthere. Ibn Sna uses the example of scammony as a judgment of experimentation because its laxativeeffect is considered a result on an unknown accidentalattribute in that plant. Were the effect the resultof something essentialwe would know it not through experience ( tajriba) but through induction(istiqra) by acquiring the concept of scammony from the active intellect.49 Ibn Sna, al-Najat, ed. Tehran 113123; ed. Cairo 6166. There is a similar passage in Ibn S na,al-Isharat wa-l-tanbhat, 5564 (6thnahjin the logic) that discusses the different kinds of premises in

a more systematic way though does not comment as extensively on their relationship to fitra(it doesso in the passage on the mashhurat). These ideas are also treated in Ibn Snas grand encyclopediaal-Shifa, al-Mantiq, al-Burhan, ed. A. Af f (Cairo: al-Matbaa al-Amriyya, 1375/1956), 6367. In hisdifferent works, Ibn Sna changes the technical termini used to name these kinds of judgments. Inal-Isharat, for instance, there are ten categories of judgments (not including those terms that are usedto structure them), in al-Shifathere are fourteen of them, which are conveniently listed in al-Shifa,al-Mantiq, al-Burhan, 67.1316.50 Ibn Sna, al-Shifa, al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal, 13.1118, English transl. in Michael E. Marmura,Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in theIsagogeof hisShifa,Journal of the History of ArabicScience(Aleppo) 4 (1980): 239250, esp. 245, reprinted in Marmura, Probing in Islamic Philosophy.

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the inner faculty of estimation (al-quwwa al-wahmiyya; vis/virtus aestimativain themedieval Latin translations) perceives those accidents. As examples, Avicenna refers toapperceptions and emotions, such as pleasantness, painfulness, friendship, and hostilitythat we associate with certain sense perceptions. A mother perceives loving pleasure

with seeing her child. Estimation exists as a faculty also in some animals, and a standardexample given by Avicenna is the sheeps immediate knowledge that the wolf isdangerous. The sheep knows this danger even when it sees the wolf for the first time.This knowledge cannot come from experience that would be fatal in this case andit cannot be apprehended from the active intellect since that way of knowing is notaccessible to a sheep. It must be from a third source of knowledge that knows the dangerjust as it knows the wolf has four legs. Seeing the wolf for the first time and knowing itsdanger is one and the same.51 The accident (arad) responsible for that perception mustbe one of relation and thus is relevant not to all subjects who perceive the sensible

object. In the example of the sheep and the wolf, an accident of the wolf would bedangerous to sheeps, a quality that a bear, for instance, would not consider relevanteven if the bear perceives it in his wahm. Similarly a mother perceives the accidentpleasant to her mother in her child, while a stranger, who may perceive the sameaccident, will pay no attention to it and remain indifferent to the child.

In humans the perception of these entities or accident leads the faculty of estimationto form universal judgments.52A proposition that we acquire through estimation is, forinstance: Either the universe ends in a vacuum or the plenum (al-mala), i.e. the spacethat is filled with matter, is infinite. This is a conviction that everybody among theordinary people holds true. A second example is the opinion that everything that exists

is spatially extended (mutah ayyiz). This, Avicenna says, is a judgment that all naturallydisposed estimations (al-awham al-fitriyya) find true. These two examples of judg-ments of estimation (wahmiyyat) are, however, both false. Yet there are true judgmentsof estimation that the intellect confirms such as: It is impossible to assume that two

Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sna, al-Ghazal and Other Major Muslim Thinkers(Binghampton(N.Y.): Global Academic Publishing, 2005), 115, esp. 78.51 On wahm in Ibn Sna see Deborah L. Black, Estimation (wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical andPsychological Dimensions, Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review32 (1993): 219258, Robert E.Hall, TheWahmin Ibn Sinas Psychology, in Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Mdivale

/ Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginao na Filosofia Medieval, ed.M. C. Pacheco and J. F. Meirinhos, 3 vols. (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers. 2005), 1: 533549, as well asthe insightful observations on wahmin connection to experience (tajriba) in Halls, A DecisiveExample of the Influence of Psychological Doctrine in Islamic Science and Culture: Some Relationshipsbetween Ibn S nas Psychology, Other Branches of His Thought, and Islamic Teachings,Journal forthe History of Arabic Science (Aleppo) 3 (1979): 4684, at 5473, and Jean R. Michot, La destinedhomme selon Avicenne. Le retour Dieu (maad) et limagination(Leuven: Peeters, 1986), 147153.52 Ibn Sna nowhere says that animals also perform this step. The sheep may perceive the danger of thewolf, but it may not be able to form the corresponding universal judgment that all wolves are dangerousto sheep.

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bodies are at in one place, or that one body is at the same time in two different places.Things like that do not exist and are not intelligible.53

These judgments of estimation, Avicenna continues, are very powerful in our minds.Only the intellect (aql) can determine which ones are false among them. Yet despitetheir falsehood, the faculty of estimation does not abandon them. In fact, we findourselves initially (f badial-amr) unable to distinguish between the judgments of theestimation and the first intelligibles (al-awwaliyyat al-aqliyya) since the two resembleeach other closely. Avicenna implies that both the judgments of the estimation and thefirst intelligibles come with the human original disposition (fitra). If we try to takerecourse to our original disposition in order to distinguish between these two, we findthat it fools us by suggesting that both of them are always true, i.e. they are necessary,and cannot be doubted.

Applied to a judgment the attribute necessary (d aruror lazim)meansforAvicenna

that the judgments truth must be acknowledged by everybody in every circumstance andthat nobody with a sound mind would say it is false.54 In the context of the humanfitraitmeans, as we will see, that judgments appear to be always true and that there are nocircumstances under which we would doubt their truth. In thePosterior Analyticsof hisHealing, Avicenna explains the kind of necessity that the judgments of thefitraproduce.The necessity of a judgment can be of two kinds, it can either be outwardly or fromoutside (z ahir) like in the case of the judgments of sense perception (h iss), experimen-tation (tajriba), or those that rely on trustworthy transmissions from other people(tawatur), or the necessity can be inwardly or from inside (batin). This latter kind ofnecessity is produced by the intellect or by other inner faculties. We may assume that

Avicenna refers here to estimation. The intellect and the other inner faculties also acquireparts of their knowledge from sources other than themselves. The most important sourcewould be the separate active intellect. But there is knowledge within the human intellectand other human inner faculties that is produced without seeking assistance (mus-tana) from a source. Avicenna calls this knowledge the pure intellect (mujarradal-aql)andidentifiesthefirstintelligiblesasbeingpartofthis.Itisthiskindofknowledgethat he connects to the inborn ability of a human (badha,gharza, andfitra).

55

Together with the first intelligibles and the judgments of the estimative faculty, thereis a third component of the human fitra. Avicenna mentions it only in the PosteriorAnalyticsof hisHealing, as far as I can see, in a difficult passage that has already beenmisunderstood by Western interpreters.56 Umar ibn Sahlan al-Saw (d. c. 540/1145), a

53 Ibn Sna,al-Najat, 116.38, ed. Cairo 62.610.54Al-Ghazal expresses this Avicennan understanding when he writes in hisIhya ulum al-dn, 3:24.12(8:1376.7): Know that knowledge that is not necessary (laysat d aruriyya), [meaning the knowledge]that the hearts [=the souls] acquire only in certain circumstances, circumstances that differ with regardto how knowledge is acquired, (. . .).55 Ibn Sna,al-Shifa,al-Mantiq, al-Burhan, 6364;al-Shifa,al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal, 1617.56 Michael E. Marmura, Ghazalis Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic, in Essays on IslamicPhilosophy and Science, ed. G. F. Hourani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 100111,

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faylasufwho lived contemporaneous to al-Ghazal three generations after Avicenna,includes a paraphrase of this passage in his compendium of logic.57 Once that is takeninto account, the original passage gets somewhat clearer. It is related to Avicennasdistinction between necessary knowledge where the necessity comes from the inside(batn) and where the necessity comes from the outside (z ahir). When humans formsyllogistic arguments, they need so-called middle terms (singl. al-h add al-awsat) toconnect the minor premise with the major. In the example: All Athenians are humans.

All humans are mortal. Thus: All Athenians are mortal, the word humans is the middleterm. It must appear in both premises, the minor and the major, to allow a syllogism to

work and it does not appear in the conclusion. Middle terms of syllogisms are most oftenuniversal concepts that we acquire from the active intellect. Humanness (insaniyya) issuch an acquired concept and as a cognition it is not part of the original disposition.Knowledge from the active intellect is for Avicenna an acquisition (kasb) of the human

intellect and would produce a necessity that comes from outside (z ahir). Sometimes,however, a principle (singl. mabda), i.e. a primary concept, functions as the middleterm in a syllogism. These primary concepts are readily available in the mind (h ad irli-l-dhihn), Avicenna says. They are from inside (batin) of the intellect and they aresuch concepts as being (al-mawjud), thing (al-shay), cause (al-illa), or universal(al-kull).58 We need no definition, sense perception, or experience in order to knowthese primary concepts. Paraphrasing Avicenna, al-Saw explains that there are judg-ments that we know through a syllogism whose middle term is such a primary concept.Such a syllogism, where a primary concept appears in the minor and the major premise,produces knowledge without the need for any kind of acquired knowledge.59 An

example is: Four is an even number (kull arbaa zawj). The middle term of thesyllogism that produces this conclusion is divisible in two equal parts (munqasima

bi-mutasawiyyayn) which is a primary concept. The judgment, Four is an evennumber, is for Avicenna and al-Saw , a premise whose syllogism is from the original

110, note 20, and Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 170, understood this passage to meanthat the mental process of grasping the middle term of a syllogism an ability that Ibn S na calls h ads is part of thefitra. Yet only a certain kind ofh adsis dealt with here.57 al-Saw,al-Basair al-Nasiriyya f ilm al-mantiq, with the notes of M. Abduh ed. R. al-Ajm (Beirut:Dar al-Fikr al-Lubnan , 1993), 222223. Al-Saw wrote this treatise on logic c. 525/1130.58 Ibn Sna,al-Shifa, al-Mantiq, al-Burhan, 65.56, gives an incomplete lists of the primary concepts:being (al-mawjud), thing (al-shay), cause (al-illa), beginning (al-mabda), universal (al-kull),particular (al-juz), and end (al-nihaya). In al-Isharat wa-l-tanbhat, 153.910, Ibn Sna adds themodalities: In the first intellect (al-aql al-awwal) it is clear that everything that did not exist and thenexist is preponderant of one of the two sides of its possibility ( scil. possible or impossible). For a briefclarification of the primary concepts in Ibn S na see Michael E. Marmura, Avicenna on PrimaryConcepts in the Metaphysics of his al-Shifa, inLogos Islamicos: Studia Islamica in honorem GeorgiiMichaelis Wickens(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984), 219239, reprinted inMarmura,Probing in Islamic Philosophy, 149169.59 min ghayr h aja ila kasbihi; Ibn Sna,al-Shifa,al-Mantiq, al-Burhan, 64.8.

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disposition (muqaddimat fitriyyat al-qiyas).60 Premise, here means judgment or

even conclusion and is used because in this chapter Avicenna and al-Saw deal withthe premises of demonstrative arguments. The conclusion Four is an even number, willbe the premise in the next demonstrative argument.61Judgments like these are part of the

fitrabecause their truth is established by arguments whose premises, including themiddle term, are also part of the fitra.

62

This latter remark further clarifies what Avicenna means byfitra. He does not thinkoffitraas a certain technique, like finding the middle term of an argument (h ads) or eventhe ability to construct correct syllogisms. Rather, he thinks of fitraas judgments orstatements that all humans are able to form regardless of their education or theirupbringing. For Avicenna,fitrais nota prioriknowledge thewahmiyyatare certainlynota prioribut require sense perception but rather knowledge that all humans havein common. Unlike early modern Western thinkers such as Ren Descartes or Immanuel

Kant, Avicenna is not interested in the question of what is a prioriknowledge.63 He israther interested to find out which kind of knowledge do all humans find true if theyhave only sense perception at their disposal, without being influenced by education, theopinions of other people, or any other factors that come with their individual lifecircumstances.64 That this is Avicennas question is clarified in a thought experiment inhisSalvation. Here, Avicenna explains what the word original disposition means:

The meaning of original disposition (al-fitra) is that a human imagines himself toappear at once in the world as a mature and intelligent being who has heard noopinions and believed in no religious convictions; he is not associated with anation (umma) nor does he know how to lead his life, but he acquires sense

perceptions and from them imaginations (khayalat). Then, based on these, hismind is presented with a thing and he doubts it. If he can doubt it then it [is a kindof judgment that] the original disposition cannot confirm. If he cannot doubt it, itis a kind [of judgment] that the original disposition renders necessary.65

60 The kind of syllogism al-Saw has in mind might look like this: Four is divisible in two equal parts.Every number that is divisible in two equal parts is even. Therefore, four is an even number.61 Ibn Sna,al-Shifa,al-Mantiq, al-Burhan, 64.412, al-Saw ,al-Basair al-Nasiriyya, 222.18223.1. Cf.also the version in al-Saws shorter Persian tractate on logic Kitab al-Tabsra, in: Tabsrah ve-dorisalah-yi dgar dar mantiq, ed M. T. Danishpazhuh (Tehran: Danishgah-i Tehran, 1337 [1958]), 3125,105106. The Arabic word fitraappears there as Persian tab.62Al-Ghazal adopts the passage from Ibn Snasal-Shifa that deals with these judgments in hisMiyaral-ilm f fann al-mantiq, ed. M. S abr al-Kurd (Cairo: al-Matbaa al-Arabiyya, 1346/1927), 124.13125.4, yet he does not mention them in his Mih akk al-naz ar.63 See Yahya Michots conclusion in his introduction to Ibn S na,Lettre au vizir Ab Sad, 73: (. . .) lapense du Shaykh al-Ras peut tre qualifie danti-naturaliste et anti-inniste (. . .).64At the end, Ibn S na was too much of a realist (in terms of the philosophical debate about the realexistence of universals, separate from human minds) to become interested in a prioriknowledge.Knowledge for Ibn Sna is triggered by the apprehension of entities that come from outside the humanmind, i.e. the outside world or the active intellect, for instance.65 This passage mirrors Ibn Snas similar though experiment in al-Isharat wa-l-tanbhat, 58.1359.6.On that see Black, Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna, 240241.

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Not all [judgments] that the original disposition of a human renders necessaryare true. Many of them are false. Only the original disposition of the faculty that iscalled intellect produces [always] true [judgments]. When it comes to the original

disposition of the estimative faculty (fitrat al-wahm) in general, it is probablyfalse.66

In this thought experiment, Avicenna takes everything away from the human and onlyleaves him or her with sense perceptions. These sense perceptions trigger via thefaculty of imagination judgments. If these judgments are not susceptible todoubt, they are considered part of the human fitra. The original disposition (fitra) ofhumans has two parts, the faculty of estimation (wahm) and the intellect (aql). The firstproduces judgments of estimation (wahmiyyat), the second produces the first intelli-gibles (al-awwaliyyat al-aqliyya) that we are familiar with from al-Farab s writings on

fitra and from the Book of Definitions. The latter are the basis of demonstrative

reasoning, since from them we are able to construct demonstrative arguments (singl.burhan) and produce scientific knowledge. The first intelligibles are always true. Theyare necessary in the way that one cannot possibly doubt their truths. In contrast,the judgments of estimation are not always true. In fact, looked at in general(bi-l-jumla), they are probably (rubbama) false. Still, the faculty of estimation presentsthem to us as being necessary. Like the intellect it insists that these judgments cannot bedoubted.

Deborah L. Black pointed out that it seems to be an oxymoron to talk aboutnecessary judgments that are not true. This seeming oxymoron is a result of Avicennascriterion for what is part of the fitra. The above passage clarifies that judgments of the

human fitra cannot be doubted while all other judgments can. Relying only on thefaculty of estimation, one cannot possibly doubt the judgment that all beings are spatiallyextended. For the faculty of estimation, that judgment is necessary. Once it is consideredby the intellect, however, it will turn out to be false. Still, even after such intellectualconsideration the faculty of estimation may have a strong hold on the humans soul andlead it to disregard the intellect and maintain the false necessity of its judgment. Like allhuman faculties, estimation and intellect are of different strength in different humans andsome may have a strong estimation and a weak intellect. This can make the human holdfalse opinions, like in the case of someone believing honey to be unclean because itresembles bile.67

Thefitraas a whole produces judgments that are held necessary, i.e. held to be true

under all circumstances and not allowing doubts. Yet only some of them arealwaystrue the first intelligibles , while others the judgments of estimation may betrue or false. Deborah L. Black explained Avicennas assumptions as follows:

66 Ibn Sna,al-Najat, ed. Tehran 117.19, ed. Cairo 62.1319. See also the English translation in Black,Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna, 233.67 Ibn Sna,al-Shifa, al-T abiyyat, al-Nafs=Avicennas De Anima (Arabic Text) Being the Psychologi-cal Part of Kitab al-Shifa, ed. F. Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 182183, and IbnS na,al-Shifa,al-Mantiq, al-Burhan, 63.7.

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The implication is that each faculty will, when operating in isolation, simply assentto what is in harmony with its own perceptual abilities: no doubt will arise so longas the beliefs formulated by each faculty are internally coherent and consistent. 68

Consistent means here, in the case of the wahmiyyat, consistent with the senseperceptions (mah susat) with which they are connected.

But how can the judgments of estimation be false? Their falsehood has nothing to dowith the underlying sense perception itself, Avicenna says, but rather with the principlesthe sense perceptions have (al-mabadi li-l-mah susat). These principles are moregeneral than the sense perception itself, such as assumptions about unity or multiplicity,about the limitations of things, or about cause and effect.69When we falsely assume, forinstance, that every existent is spatially extended, one might add at this point, we undulygeneralize knowledge that we perceive through sense perception to things or objects

where this knowledge does not apply.

The relationship between the faculty of estimation and the intellect is, however,more complicated than it would appear from what we read thus far. The faculty ofestimation supports all the premises that the intellect (al-aql) begins with and which itemploys in arguments. Estimation does not contradict these premises and does notdispute them. Should the intellect arrive at contradictory conclusions, this would bebecause it relied too much on the seemingly self-evident judgments it finds within thefaculty of estimation and it neglects to abide by those truths that are truly necessary.Coming to mutually contradictory conclusions reveals that the original disposition(fitra) has a corrupting influence on true knowledge. Avicenna examines the reason forthat:

The reason for this (scil.the corruption of the fitra) is that the fitrais an innatedisposition (jibilla) able to produce concepts (singl. tasawwur) based only onsense perception. An example is the influence that the faculty of estimation has onthe intellect when it [first] converses to it that for all premises it is true that there areno existences that have no spatial position and do not exist at a place and then[secondly] prevents it (scil. the intellect) from acknowledging the existence of thisthing (scil. any immaterial being).

The original disposition of the estimative faculty is true (sadiq) with regard tothe sense perceptions and the particular attributes that they have as long as theycan be perceived by the senses. The intellect follows it. The estimative faculty is atool (ala) that the intellect uses with regard to the sense perceptions. However, the

original disposition of the sense perceptions is a false (kadhib) disposition whenit comes to that what is not perceived through the senses because it converts themto sensually perceived existences.70

68 Black, Estimation (wahm) in Avicenna, 233.69 In al-Shifa, al-Mantiq, al-Burhan, 65.56, Ibn Sna adds that these principles (mabadi) are theprimary concepts that are outside of the things that are perceived by the senses.70 Ibn Sna,al-Najat, ed. Tehran 118.29, ed. Cairo 63.27.

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The faculty of estimation produces true statements about its own domain, namely thethings that we perceive through our senses. Those things, for instance, are all extendedin space. Its judgments are taken only from sense perception and from no other source.The corruption (fasad) comes into the human original disposition (fitra) through theinterplay of its two elements, faculty of estimation (wahm) and intellect (aql). Theintellect falsely accepts the judgments of estimation as being relevant for objects orsituations that cannot be perceived through the external senses. In the two examples

Avicenna gives, the intellect assumes that all existences are like those perceivedthrough the senses spatially extended and that what applies to our immediateenvironment also applies to the outer limits of the universe. Avicenna characterizes theinfluence (musaada) of the estimative faculty on the intellect as a whispering (intija)of judgments that are true for material beings yet not for immaterial ones.

Avicenna says that both the faculty of estimation and the intellect produce true

judgments within the domain that they have authority over. The judgments of the facultyof estimation are taken from the sense perception, they are extracted from them onemight say, and as such they are true. Confusion and corruption only comes in on thelevel of the human original disposition (fitra). Within the fitra, the epistemologicalboundaries of the estimative faculty are often overlooked and judgments that should bestrictly limited to sense perception are applied to other beings. This happens because theintellect, which is the second element of the original disposition, and which relies on thejudgments of estimation with regard to sensibly perceived things, applies thesejudgments too generally. But the fault not only lies with the intellect; the faculty ofestimation seems to make its judgments appealing to more than just things that we

perceive through the senses.If we follow just our original disposition, we might end up with true and falsejudgments. These judgments are true as long as they apply to objects of senseperceptions here the faculty of estimation guarantees truths but they may be false

with regard to everything beyond them. That, however, does not mean that what wethink we know initially about material objects is all wrong. There are, of course, truejudgments of the original disposition and these are the first intelligibles (al-awwaliyyat).In hisSalvation, Avicenna does not explicitly count them as part of the human fitra. Yetin other of his works he does and he thus agrees with al-Farab on this matter. In hisSalvationhe says that first intelligibles are . . .

. . . judgments or premises that appear in a human through his intellectual faculty(quwwa aqliyya) without any ground (or reason, sabab) other than themselvesthat would necessitate to acknowledge the truth of these judgments.71

Or, in simpler words, judgments that are true by themselves without a supportingargument or reason. They come about through the combination of two or more concepts

71 Ibid., ed Tehran 121.11122.1, ed. Cairo 64.2021.

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within the faculty of combining thinking (quwwa al-mufakkira al-jamia). The mindacknowledges the truth of these judgments immediately (ibtidaan), without anothercause (illa), and without knowing that this is one of the things that are acquired at once(f l-h al). Rather the human thinks that he had always known it. An example is: The

whole is greater than its parts, or things that are equal to the same thing are equal toone another. These judgments are not acquired through induction (istiqra, epagg)from concepts that are derived from the active intellect.

Acknowledging the truth of this judgment is a natural disposition (jibilla), andthose judgments that are true among thewahmiyyatare, as we have already said,within this group (scil. the first intelligibles).72

Judgments of the estimative faculty are if they turn out to be generally true firstintelligibles. They are generally true when they not only apply to objects of sense

perception but to all beings. Regarding the example of the judgment that the whole isgreater than its part, Avicenna says, it may well be possible that this is drawn from senseperception through the faculty of estimation that is. The acknowledgement of truth(tasdq) in a general sense cannot come from the faculty of estimation (wahm). Avicennasays it comes from a natural disposition (jibilla), meaning, of course, the intellect.

By now, Avicennas explanation of the human fitra as an epistemic capacity iscomplete. The faculty of estimation (wahm) extracts judgments from our senseperceptions. These judgments are notions that are associated with certain senseperceptions in an immediate manner and innately, without recourse to any kind ofthinking. Similar to the sheep which has an immediate knowledge of the wolfs danger,

humans have an immediate knowledge that sensually perceived objects are all spatiallyextended, for instance. The faculty of estimation suggests (istada)73 to the intellect thatthese judgments not only apply to objects of sense perception but more generally to allbeings. The human original disposition (al-fitra), which is made up of the faculty ofestimation (wahm) and of the intellect (aql) is often overwhelmed by that suggestionand adopts certain judgments as generally true that are true only for objects of senseperception. This is because thewahmiyyatare very similar to the first intelligbles. At the

very beginning Avicenna had said that the natural human disposition (al-fitra) is in themajority of cases not able to distinguish between what is true and false.74 Whereverthe intellect is sharp and does its proper work, however, it distinguishes between thosejudgments of the estimative faculty that can truly be generalized and those that cannot.The former are first intelligibles that function as the basis of scientific knowledge, whilethe latter are dismissed as mere wahmiyyat.75

72 Ibid., ed Tehran 122.10123.1, ed. Cairo 65.67.73 Ibid., ed. Tehran 122.7, ed. Cairo 65.474 Ibid., ed. Tehran 7.910, ed. Cairo 3.1213.75 One should note that in its non-technical meaning in Arabic the wordwahmis often used to denotea false or misleading cognition, i.e. a delusion or a fancy.

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Thus far, Avicenna has clarified what is part of the human original disposition withregard to descriptive judgments that tell us something about the world. But what aboutnormative judgments about what is right or wrong, good and bad, or beautiful and ugly?In the Salvation Avicenna considers these types of statements widely accepted(dha iat) among the people while in his Pointers and Reminders he calls themcommonly accepted judgments (al-mashhurat).76 They are held true by everybody,like the statement justice is good, or by the majority of people or just the learnedamong them, or sometimes just the best among the learned, while the mass of people donot disagree. These social conventions do not belong to those whose truth isacknowledged by the natural human disposition. They are not initial as first intelligiblesnor as judgments of estimation.77 They come from outside the original disposition(ghayr fitriyya). Rather, they are agreed upon by the people (mutaqarrarainda l-anfus)because through custom people have persistently repeated them since childhood. These

judgments are conventions, Avicenna says, whose roots may lie in a desire to livepeacefully together or simply in old habits (sunan qadma). They may also spring fromcertain human character traits (al-akhlaq al-insaniyya) such as shame or the desire forcompanionship.

Avicennas argument that these judgments are not part of the humanfitrarefers backto a point made earlier, namely that the judgments of the original human dispositioncannot be doubted. Moral judgments, Avicenna argues, can:

If you want to know the difference between a widely spread judgment ( al-dhai)and one that is from the original disposition (al-fitr), turn to your claim: Justiceis good, and lying is bad are in accord with the original disposition whose affairswe had become familiar with before this chapter. Regarding these two judgmentsyou are affected with doubt, a doubt that you find originating in them and notoriginating in the whole is greater than its part, which is an initial truth (h aqqawwal) or in the universe ends in something outside that is [either] a vacuum ora plenum (mala), which is a falsehood from estimation (batl wahm).78

The latter judgment about the end of the universe is, Avicenna had explained earlier,wrong, yet still it is a necessary judgment, as it cannot be doubted within the faculty ofestimation. Avicenna teaches that a wrong judgment is part of thefitraon account of ourinability to doubt it, while these seemingly self-evident moral judgments, which may

well be true, are not part of the fitrabecause they can be doubted. Later critics were

quick to point out the weaknesses of Avicennas concept of the human originaldisposition, where wrong judgments are necessary and considered beyond doubt while

76 Ibn Sna,al-Najat, ed. Tehran 117119, ed. Cairo 6364; Ibn Sna, al-Isharat, 5859.77 laysa bi-awwal aql wa-la wahm, Ibn Sna,al-Najat, ed. Tehran 119.3, ed. Cairo 63.1213.78 Ibid. ed. Tehran 119.1115, ed. Cairo 63.1822. The Cairo edition reads fitr wahmat the end of thispassage (instead ofbatil wahm), which would mean that the latter judgment is from thefitraand fromestimation.

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moral judgments that we hold universally true and beyond reproach are considereddoubtful.79

The first intelligibles and the judgments from estimation are also widely spread(dha i), says Avicenna, yet he does not identify them with the widely spreadjudgments he discusses here. That is a technical term reserved for social conventions.Some of them may appear praiseworthy in a self-evident way (f badial-rai) but ifthey were to be applied at face value, they would no longer be praiseworthy such as themaxim: It is necessary to help ones brother be he an oppressor or be he oppressed.80

Moral judgments are for Avicenna not part of the original disposition. The thoughtexperiment concludes that if one were confined solely to ones intellect and ones facultyof estimation, one would not come up with any of them.81 Michael E. Marmura, whoanalyzed the passage about moral judgments in Avicennas Pointers and Remindersclarified that Avicenna is not saying moral judgments cannot be true. Many of them are

true. Their truth, however, is not self-evident and not accessible to humans simply quabeing human, such as the first intelligibles and the true judgments of estimation.

Avicennas ethical theory is teleological, Marmura explains, where acts are valuable ifthey serve a certain end. That end is for Avicenna the humans happiness in this worldand the next. Such happiness is attained when humans actualize their individualpotentialities. Acts conducive to this end are good, while those detrimental to it are bad.82

In themselves, acts have no autonomous moral value for Avicenna, and thus noaccidents (arad) of moral value that any human faculty could perceive. In his moraltheory, Avicenna positions himself squarely against the Mutazilite position that everyhuman action has a self-evident moral value. That opposition certainly helped to

promote the integration of Avicennas moral theory and his views about the humanfitra into the Asharite theological discourse, a theological school that was founded onopposition to the Mutazilite moral theory.

Unlike al-Farab, Avicenna seems to use the word original disposition (fitra) in astrictly technical sense mostly for two kinds of premises, the first intelligibles(awwaliyyat) and the judgments of the faculty of estimation (wahmiyyat). Theyrepresent a kind of knowledge that all humans have access to, independent of

79 One strong objection will come from Ibn Taymiyya who will observe that Ibn Sna had alreadyadmitted normative judgments as part of the fitraby including them within the wahmiyyat. If theestimative faculty perceives non-material notions together with the sense perceptions then it will

perceive t

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