Airpower Malayan Emergency

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    PROJECT NO. AU-4lJo62.AS1JNlI1lIlGI!NCY AND COllNTDIN5VBGENCY S'11lDI1!l!

    THE ACCa OF AlBPOWERIN THE MAlAYAN EMERGENCY

    (1948-1960)..

    C IS II,' ,

    ",1l lOI

    .&litW i Ii lAir ~ " U " ' _

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    THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF AIRPOWERIN THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

    (1948-1960)

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    PREFACE

    This study has been prepared a t the Aerospace

    Studies Inst i tute (ASI) as part of a continuing program to examine the role of airpower in guerr i l la warfare. I t is one of several s tudies undertaken simultaneously on the conduct of guerr i l la warfare in theperiod 1945-1960, and follows the ASJ publication, TheRole of Airpower in Guerri l la Warfare (World Har I I ) ,which was published in December 1962.

    This study emphasizes the application of airpowerand only brief ly t reats the preponderant role of theground forces and the contr ibuting role of the seaforces. Although i t is recognized that the entirestory of the defeat of the communist te r ror i s t s isintensely interest ing in i t se l f , we have been moreconcerned with the employment of airpower. As a resul t ,this study describes the Malayan Emergency in general

    terms and examines in detai l the use of airpower tocounter guerr i l las .

    The study was written and prepared by Major Arthur D.Barondes of the Concepts Division of ASI as part of the

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    ASI Counterinsurgency Study Program, currently super-vised by Lt Colonel L. V. Schuetta. The ent i re programwas directed by Colonel David H. Likes, Chief, ConceptsDivision.

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    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    PREFACELIST OF I L L U S T ~ ~ T I O N S INTRODUCTION . . . . .GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONCOUNTERGUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONFIGHTING THE WAR .THE WAR IN THE AIR

    Air SupplyAerial ReconnaissanceAir StrikesSpecial Air MissionsHelicoptersAir Activity SummaryCONCLUS IONS .APPENDIX . . SELECT BIBLIOGF.APHY

    Pageiii

    vi i 16

    111628

    697881

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    LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

    Pagel. Map of Malaya 2.2. Mep Organization 93. Commonwealth Organization 154. Transport Missions . 315. Helicopter Missions 386. Helicopter Landing Zone 397. Reconnaissance Missions 448. Strike Missions . 47

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    INTRODUCTION

    The Malayan Emergency came to an end on July 31,1960, with the communist terror is ts reduced to a gaggleof 700 stragglers, scouring the Thai-Malay borderlandfor edible roots, Reduced to only a small fract ion ofthei r peak strength, the communist terroris ts and theMalayan Communist Party (MCP) had been soundly thrashedin one of the few contemporary examples of regular forcesdefeating guerr i l las . But the Brit ish Commonwealthforces that waged this war and the Brit ish exchequerthat financed i t paid dearly for this hard fought victory;they paid in l ives and equipment and pounds ster l ing overa period of 12 years,

    The roots of the Emergency reached back much furtherthan i t s declaration on 18 June 1948. I t a l l began inthe 1920"s when communism emerged in Malaya as a poorlyorganized movement directed toward the conspiracy ofworld communism. In founding an organization, thecommunists had difficulty in enlist ing the support ofMalays, the predominant ethnic group; and the movementfloundered. In 1930, the MCP formed under the auspices

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    MALAYA

    lI.elanlan

    Perak lJV'..r'''(M LAY A

    Pahallf

    KUALA LUMP N'i"",Sembiliiln

    o CITY* AIRFIELD

    ILLUSTRATION 1

    .nu

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    of Chinese Communists in a meeting held in Shanghai anddirected i t s attention tQward Chinese immigrants inMalaya, I t grew in sta ture with the Japanese attack onthe Chinese motherland and became a dominant force amongMalayan Chinese with the Japanese invasion of Malaya,The Brit ish, noting the MCP capability to form guerr i l launits , supplied and trained the communists in sabotageand jungle warfare, 1 The Malayan Peoples ' Anti-JapaneseArmy (MPAJA), the guerr i l la element of the MCP, hosted aBrit ish mission that arrived by submarine from the AlliedSouth-East Asia Command in May 1943 and began negotiat ionsthat led to a 1945 agreement between Lord Mountbatten 1ndChin Peng, th e appar en t head of MPAJA, to provide 6,000to 7,000 men to ass is t in an intended in vasion o f Malaya

    ?in exchange for arms, explosives, money, and supplie,.>.,-The RAF flew /unerican-made Liberators between Ceylon and

    3Malaya to deliver these goods in 1945; but the Japanese

    IF. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle Is Neutral (LondoD'Chatto and Windus, 1952); and Gene F, Hanrahan, TheCommunist Struggle in Malaya (New York: I n s t i t u t e ~ o Pacific Relations, 1954), ppo 33-35,2Victor Purcell, Malaya; Communist or Free (London:Victor Gol1ancz, 1954), ppo 41-42 and 47.3Lawrence V. Schuetta and Arthur D. Barondes, AirGuerrilla Warfare - G L ~ R R I L L A I R , unpublished manuscript(Maxwell AFB: Aerospace Studies Ins t i tute , 1963),3

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    surrender in August of that year made the invasionunnecessary; and the MPAJA eventually, and unwillingly,returned some 6,800 guns to the Brit ish, S u b s e q u ~ n [ Me?act iv i t ies concentrated on subversion of labor ~ n d u n d ~ r cground ac ti vi ti es un ti l the outbreak of viclence in 1948and the resultant Emergency.

    Official accounts credi t the outbreak of communistviolence and te rr or ism to external leadership and inpart icular ly the Second Congress of the Communist Partyof India in February 1948. 4 This Congress called forth e cap ture of power by th e pea sants and workers by an ymeans and established a schedule for widespread laborunrest in April, pol i t ica l demonstrations in May, andarmed rebell ion in June. The communists expected toemploy terrorism to intimidate local populations to theextent that communist l iberated areas could be advertisedto the res t of ~ 1 a l a y a . The optimistic communists fullyexpected to announce a fa i t accompli by 31 August 1948,

    4purce11, op. c i t . , p. 60; Lucian W. Pye, GuerrillaCommunism in Malaya (Princeton: Princeton universityPress, 1956), p. 84; and Philip E.. Mosely, "SovietPolicy and the Revolution in Asia," Annals of the AmericanAcademy of Poli t ica l and Social Science, CCLXX"vl (July1951), 91-98.

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    an d claim onto themselves The Communist Republic o fMalaya. Time an d events would prove them wrong, but no twithout th e expenditure o f o ne -h alf to two bil l ion d o l l a r s ,v a s t ground and a ir re so u rc e s, and the l o s s o f a t l e a s t11,000 noncommunist l i v e s . 5

    5"Ha1ay Emergency, If Time, LXXV, Hay 2, 1960, po 2L

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    GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION

    The Central Committee of the MCP decided that theparty must be revital ized to carry out the program adopteda t the Second Congress of the Communist Party of IndiaThe committee sensed the unrest and dissat isfact ion tha texisted within the ranks and moved against the Secretary'General, Lai Teck, as a matter of expediency and, possibly,necessity. Suspicion was cast on Lai Teck's loyalty andcapabi l i ty, and a special meeting called for March 6,1948, a t which the Secretary-Genera l should defend himselfLai Teck declined to attend the meeting choos ing ratherto make his getaway. As new Secretary-General, theCentral Committee chose Chin Peng, a man who had beenLai Teck's aide during the war and the same Chin Pengthat had met the Brit ish submarine in May 1943, and re-ceived the Order of the Brit ish Empire (0. B. E.) in

    6England af ter World War I I .The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), now dedicated to

    6 .Pye, op. c ~ t . , pp .3rd Edition (Hong Kong:1960), p. 480.83-86; and The Asia Who's ~ f u o ,Pan-Asia Newspaper Alliance,

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    an armed struggle and under the fresh leadership of26-year-old Chin Peng, organized to establish so-calledliberated areas. 7 They took their f i r s t step by secretlycreating a military force, the Malayan People's Anti-British Army, but experienced considerable diff icul tyin finding recrui ts while, a t the same time, maintainingthe secrecy of the army. In typical communist fashion,the MCP formed the "Blood and Steel Corps" to extort ,intimidate, and rob the populace while identifying''volunteers. ' ' Inasmuch as these activi t ies had noreadily identif iable pol i t ica l connotation, the communistterroris ts became known to the populace as bandits,

    The communist t e rro r is t a c ti v it ie s could not remainsecret for long and on 6 June 1948, Commissioner GeneralMalcolm MacDonald announced his awareness of the "knifeand gun" approach of the terroris ts . After severalfatally brutal terroris ts attacks on noncommunists, thepolice moved against known communists, their headquarters,and front organizations. However, most of the important

    7William O. Douglas, Nor th From Malaya (Garden City:Doubleday, 1953), pp. 38-39.

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    MCP leaders managed to escape into the jungle where theyundertook to reorganize their operations.

    In the jungle, the MCP conceived a new organizationalstructure (I l lust rat ion 2). The army, now cal led TheMalayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA), had i t s ownsupreme headquarters. Parallel to the MRLA, the MCPorganized i t s top-down pol i t ica l channels with the CentralCommittee and Politburo at the apex and state , dis t r ic t ,and branch committees corresponding to the regiments,companies and platoons of the MRLA. The MCP maintaineda separate propaganda channel whose influence was fe l tthrough the pol i t ica l commissars in the MRLA and throughthe party press in the civi l ian ranks. The dis t r ic tcommittees sponsored civi l ian action groups known asMin Yuen to provide various types of underground funct ions. Such an organization, as shown in the chart ,rel ied heavily on effective communication channels. Butin the jungle, the MCP could not maintain anything closeto the needed communications. As a resul t , the ent i reorganization re l ied wholly on the party organizationand leadership. Also, in practice, the MRLA had greatdifficulty in mustering units of regimental size. Early

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    MALAYA COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP)I CENTRAL COMMITTEE 1l POLITBURO I

    t tCENTRAL STATE 1-1- [ROPAGANDA COMMITTEES HQ MRLA

    I

    I !

    ILOCAL DISTRICT-I -

    PROPAGANDA COMMITTEES REGIMENTS,.---\.,I I

    "'I I I--------------------1-------_ .. _- +BRANCH I -COMMITTEES COMPANIES

    II I, 1

    MIN YUEN CELLS f- PLATOONS ....l-II I

    ILLUSTRATION 2

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    in the Emergency as many as 200 or 300 men and women mightconsti tute an MRLA camp although the average num ber wasonly 40 or 50. Assembling camp members into a regi-ment required command and control capabi l i t ies rarelyavailable to MRL\. By 1950, with increasingly effect iveBritish interference, regimental s iz e u nits became com-pletely impossible. And by 1951, even platoon size unitsbecame impracticable. Shortcomings in command and controlsoon ref lected in shrinking to ta ls o f communist lcrees,In 1950, the Me? could count over 5,000 men and 500women of the ~ R L 4 in the jungle, but bv 1955, thenumbers h8d dropped to 3,000 men and 300 women. Inaddit ion, the Xin Yuen maintained numbers rough ly equalto the i'iRLil s t rength and experienced s imilar declines.The NC1' i t s e l f numbered about 3,000 bona f ide party

    8members.

    8 pye , op. c i t . , pp . 86-94.

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    COUNTERGUERRILLA ORGANIZATION

    With the declarat ion of the Emergency, the Brit ishaccepted responsibi l i ty for the u ltimate d es tru ct io n o fthe communist te r ror is ts in Malaya. At the time theEmergency was declared, the Brit ish had avai lable inMalaya close to 13 bat ta l ions of foot soldiers andar t i l l e ry . But they recognized th at v as tly superiorforces , in the conventional mili tary sense, would beneeded to thwart the MCP movement. To sa t is fy th isrequirement, they rel ied heavily on the 14,OOO-man

    9Royal Federation of Malaya Police Force and reinforcedthe i r mil i tary forces in Malaya with addi t ional troops

    10so as to provide the following ground order of b a t t l e ~In place a t outset--Gurkha RiflesKing's Own Yorkshire L ight InfantrySeaforth Highlanders

    Malay Regiment26th Field Regiment (a r t i l le ry)

    6 bat ta l ions1 bat ta l ion1 bat ta l ion2. bat ta l ions3 bat ta l ions

    9J . W. G. Moran, .pearhead in Malaya (London; PeterDav ies , 1959), p. 9.lOpye, op. c i t . , pp, 96-97.11

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    Reinforcements--Royal Inn isk il ling Fus il ie r s2d Guards BrigadeKing's Afr ican RiflesFijian Regiment

    1 battalion6 battal ionscontingentscontingents

    The a ir order of bat t le consi st ed o f four RAF squadrons:Noo 45 (Bomber) Squadron; No. 60 (Fighter) Squadron;No. 81 (Photo/Reconnaissance) Squadron; and No. 52(Transport) Squadron, a to ta l of less than 100 aircraf t .The bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance squadronsoperated out of Singapore while the transport squadronflew out of Kuala Lumpur in Malaya. Additional squadronssupplemented the full-time squadrons and included suchunits as Nos. 155 and 194 (Helicopter) Squadrons, la terreplaced by No. 110 (Helicopter) Squadron, No. 848(Helicopter) Squadron of the Royal Navy, No. 41 (Trans-port) Squadron from the Royal New Zealand Air Force,and bomber units such as No. 205 (Maritime Reconnais-sance) Squadron and elements of Bomber Command on a

    11rotational basis. In addition, No. 656 (Light Liaison)

    l lAir Ministry News Letter, No. 706, 29 July 1960;and "Naval Helicopters for Malaya," Flight, LVII, December19, 1952, pp. 746-47.12

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    Squadron, administered by the RAF but controlled by theArmy, provided a variety of services attainable only by

    12l ight a i rc ra f t .

    As the Emergency forces grew, the armed forcesdevoted more and more of thei r time and effor t to fight-ing the communist terrorists in a mili tary sense whileheavily augmented police forces maintained local order 0The Federation of Malaya Police expanded rapidly and re-ceived the a ss is tance o f newly created Home Guard unitsand a Special Constabulary, The to ta l number of reg ularand auxil iary police eventually grew to some 100,000 menmost of whom were Malays who performed as vi l lage andhome guards. An infusion of men with Sco tl and yardexperience and Palest ine terrorists experience alsoenhanced the capabili t ies of the regular police in

    13e f fec tive ly curt ai ling communist ter ror is t act ivi t iesThe organization of the mili tary forces, as well

    as t he ir c iv ili an police counterpart s, followed regional

    12M. C, A. Henniker, Red Shadow Over MalaY8 (Edin-burgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1955), pp . 18485.l3Pye, Ope c i t . , p. 97.

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    l ines under a Directo r of Operations Committee. Thiscommittee, the top-level planning and directing element,encompassed civi l , mili tary, and police members and waschaired by a Dir ec to r o f Operations . Subord inate levelsincluded State War Executive Committees, Distr ic t WarExecutive Committees, and finally a functional organiza-t ion of civi l administration, troops, police, home guard,information services, etc. This organization (I l lust ra-t ion 3) was tailored to the re la t ively uncoordinatedcommunist terror is ts as well as local customs and t radi-

    14t ions which gave the impression of federated sta tes .Tailored though i t was, the organization could nothandle mili tary operations that extended beyond oracross dis t r i c t and s ta te boundaries. In such cases themilitary alone exercised "shooting r ights" not u nlikethe principle of ' 'hot pursui t ," but in a l l other wayscoordinated their act iv i t ies with the civi l authori t ies ,police, home guard, etc. The objective of the entireorganization was to win a pol i t ical victory, i . e . , se

    15cure the support of the populace.

    l4Henniker, op. c i t . , pp. 61-70.l5Ibid. , p. 104.14

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    COMMONWEALTH ORGANIZATIONDIRECTOR. OF OPERATIONSDIRE CTOR OF OPERATIONS

    COMMITTEECIVIL POLICE MILITARY

    Ir STATE WAR EXECUTIVE I-

    COMMITTEECIVIL POLICE MILITARY'

    IDISTR ICT WAR EXECUTIVE f-

    COMMITTEECIVIL POLICE MILITARY

    r

    II I I I I ICIVIL TROOPS POLICE HOME INFO- MISCELLANYADMIN. GUARD SERVICES

    ILLUSTRATION 3 '

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    FIGHTING rrlE WAR

    The Brit ish conduct of mili tary operations againstthe communist te r ror i s t s was predicated on gett ing thebest resul ts in the shortest time with avai lable resources. Within th is strategy, the ethnic distr ibut ionof Malayans and the geographic features of the ~ ~ l a y a influenced the mili tary operations to a marked degree.In 1947, almost 6,000,000 Malayans l ived in c i t ies ,towns, and vil lages concentrated, for the most par t ,along the west coast. Within th is population, roughlyhalf were Malayans; one-tenth, Indians; and the remaining four-tenths, Chinese. These almost 2,000,000 Chineserepresented potential sympathizers and supporters forthe communist terrorists and required close observationand eventual resettlement for many.

    The geography of Malaya l e f t much to be desired forthe conduct of mili tary operations. The land ischaracterized by mountains and hi l l s that r ise abruptlyfrom f la t plains; and the warm, moist, t ropical climatefosters a mantle of forests that cover most of the landmass. Within the forests , t rees have grown in two

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    layers with the t a l le r t rees reaching up some 200 feetand the second layer about 100 feet. Underneath thisdouble layer of dense t rees , the jungle is dark, wet,and sticky. The Brit ish would eventually have to pene-t ra te this jungle and seek out the communist te r ror i s t s .

    The conduct of mili tary operations commenced withthe declaration of the Emergency. In the early days theobjective seemed to be directed a t k il lin g o ff as manycommunist te r ror i s t s as possible, but the resul tantjungle-based te r ror i s t s and thei r supply l ine of Chinesesquatters led to a revised strategy. In April 1950,Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, who had commandedthe 5th Indian Division in Burma from 1942 to 1944, be-came the Director of Operations with sole responsibil i tyfor elimina t ing the Emergency. In exe.rcising this re-sponsibil i ty, the General ins t i tuted the 'Briggs Plan, 'largely on the basis of the Squatters Committee Report.This report indicated that the Chinese squatters ,wil l ingly or otherwise, provided food, shelter , and mento the te r ror i s t s and that the solution to the squatterproblem lay in thei r resettlement away from the jungle

    16fringe. The Briggs Plan also called for the police

    16Purcell , op. c i t . , p. 75.17

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    force to dominate the popuJated areas and for the RAF tosupport both the army and the police with transport ,reconnaissance, and firepower. The main points of theplan are l is ted below:

    1. Rapid resettlement of squatters under thesurveil lance of police forces.

    2. Regrouping of workers in mines and on estates .3. Recruiting and training of add it ional pol ice.4. Army to provide concentration of forces to

    clear priori ty areas.5. Police and army to combine operations wherever

    possible.The Brit ish recognized that the Briggs Plan representeda long-term operation and that immediate or spectacularresul ts could not be expected. Execution of the Planbegan on I June 1950, with a Federal War Council a t thetop level and War Executive Committees on S ta te le ve ls . 17

    The Briggs Plan, as measured by apparent resul ts ,worked quite well. Under pressure from police andmili tary arms, and cut off from thei r supplies and

    l7 Ibid . , p. 65.

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    communications, the MRLA dispersed and weakened. Largescale guerr i l la operations became a thing of the pastand the Emergency appeared to be reduced to isolatedte r ror is t act ivi t ies involving combined MRLA and MinYuen communists in mobile gangs.

    In fact , by 1 October 1951, the MCP had recognizedthe error of i t s ways and had moved to take correctiveactiono On that date, the Politburo o f the MCP publisheda new directive, 18 one which called for much s t r i c t e radherence to Maoist theory, and one which, deliberate ornot, would give the appearance of reduced t e r ro r i s tactivi ty. The new direct ive freely confessed thatte r ror is ts had engaged in burning vi l lages , attackingpublic services, and ki l l ing innocent bystanders. Itwent on to direct that such practices would cease andthat a l l communists should keep paramount the goal ofexpanding and consolidating the organization of themasseso Furthermore, in class ical Marxist-Leninistfashion, the MCP called for coali t ions with bDurgeoisieand capi ta l i s t s in the formation of front organizations;

    18Text in The ([ondon7 l i ~ ~ s , 1 December 1952.

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    coali t ions that would provide a vast ly b roader base ofpublic support. Operating on this broad base, the MCPplanned to exploit a l l d ispu tes for i t s own purposes,demand concessions from the government, and ultimatelyfoster sufficient dissension to overthrow the government. 19 Fortunately, this familiar form of communisttake-over was not to succeed.

    Five days la ter , on 6 October 1951, communistt e r ror i s t s ambushed and ki l led the High Commissioner,Sir He nr y Gu rn ey . Whether th is ac t was the resul t ofaccident or MCP design is not known, especially in viewof the communist communications problems; i t certainlywas not in consonance with the sp i r i t of the 1 OctoberDirective although i t did conform to the l e t te r of theDirective which allowed the ki l l ing of government off ic ia l s . At f i r s t the public viewed the death of SirGurney as evidence of communist strength, but soon thepeople realized that Malaya must r id i t s e l f of thisblood-thirsty menace -- the very at t i tude the MCP hadtr ied to avoid. The RAF contributed to solidifying

    19Purcell, op. c i t . , p. 69.

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    public opinion with quick. reaction a ir s t r ikes shortlyaf te r dawn on the day af te r Sir Henry Gurney"s death.In addition, Brit ish and Gurkha troops fanned out in thenortheast Selangor s ta te , s i te of the assassination, ina deliberate show of force. The masses, clearly movedby the cold-blooded murder and the obvious Brit ish determination, were ready for a more dynamic countert e r ro r i s t campaign. Taking advantage of this strongpopular support, Mr, Oliver Lyttelton - Brit ish ColonialSecretary - vis i ted Southeast Asia and on 11 December1951 broadcast his 6-point plan to exterminate terrorismin Malaya. His six points called for: 1) centralizedcontrol of a l l mili tary and civi l ian forces, 2) reorganization of the police establishment, 3) a new and compulsory education program, 4) increased protection forreset t led squatters , 5) integration of large numbersof Chinese into the Home Guard, and 6) a review of theMalaya Civi l Service system. Also as a resu l t of S irHenry Gurney's death, the Brit ish appointed General SirGerald Templer to the post of High Commissioner for theFederation. General Templer had both mili tary government and intel l igence experience a t the highest level.

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    He took his oath of office a t Kuala Lumpur on 7 February1952. 20

    General Templer took office as the executive agentfor an enlightened Brit ish co lon ia l pol icy. The direct ivegiven to Templer expressed the Brit ish government'spolicy that Malaya should become a fully self-governingnation, hopefully within the Brit ish Commonwealth. Evenmore important, the directive identif ied the High Com-missioner 's primary task to be the removal of communistterrorism and the restoration of law and order. Furthermore, i t vested in General Templer complete operationalcommand over a l l armed forces ass igned to Malaya.

    General Templer immediately took charge of the ent i re Malayan operation. He merged the Federal ExecutiveCouncil and the War Council and delegated a l l mattersnot direct ly concerned with the terrorists to his DeputyHigh Commissioner, Mr. D. C. MacGillivray. He thenpersonally implemented Emergency Regulation l7DA, aregulation that detailed a policy of collect ive punishment in repr isal for t e rro r is t a c ti v it ie s . In addit ion

    20Ibid . , pp. 84-86.

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    to reprisals , Templer pushed the complete resettlementof Chinese squatters and undertook to control a l l foods tuffs - - both actions designed to i sola te and starvethe ter ror is ts . Although he revoked Regulation l7DA on25 November 1953, the General continued to punish vi l lagesby levying fines and establishing curfews. His effect ivefood-denial plan required a l l food, both in towns and onplantations, to be centrally prepared and dist r ibutedin closely controlled rations. The police, and l a te rthe Home Guard, administered the program without anymili tary part icipat ion.

    The General fel t strongly that t ight control offood offered the greatest promise of destroying theter ror is ts . In furtherance of this conviction, heestablished r igid controls on the transport of a l l foodstuffs and directed his Security Forces to increasethe i r a ir surveil lance of the Malayan inter ior . Junglegardens, found by aer ia l reconnaissance, became thetargets of patrols and formed the basis for an experiment in plant control by the airborne application ofchemicals. The emphasis on food control became so greatthat the RP.F employed infrared sensors in an ef for t to

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    discover cult ivated crops growing under trees. Theseand other major contributions of airpower are describedin the next section.

    As General Templer aggressively pursued his counterte r ror is t program, the Malays moved toward self-government.They were well on their way to free election when theGeneral l e f t Malaya in June 1954 to become Chief of theImperial General Staff . However, the te r ror is ts viewedthe departure of General Templer as a signal for renewedact ivi ty and greeted the new Director of Operations,General Bourne, accordingly.

    The f i r s t national election came in July 1955, withTengku Abdul Rahman taking office as Chief Minister ofthe Federation. Rahman, eager to demonstrate Malaya'sabi l i ty for se l f - rule , moved to end the Emergency andwas instrumental in leading the government to announcei t s declaration of amnesty on September 9, 1955. Thisdeclaration stated that ". a l l those who have takenup arms against the government and those who have consorted with them and who come in and surrender wil l notbe prosecuted for any offense connected with the Emer-gency. . . . "

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    In November, Chin Peng, s t i l l leader of the MCP andfaced with a December 25 expiration of the amnesty, agreedto negotiate with Minister Rahman. The negotiations produced a cease-fire covering 400 square miles in northernPerak and eastern Kedah and paved the way for a Decembermeeting between R a l l i ~ a n and Chin Pengo The MCP did not,or could not, maintain the cease-f ire and continuedte r ror is t raids on vil lages led to the jo int Brit ishMalay declaration of a l l -ou t war against the te r ror is tson November 21, 1955. Under these strained conditionsand with continued MCP demands for legal recognit ion, themeeting between Chin Peng and the British and Malayanoff ic ia l s on December 28, 1955, led to nought. ChiefMinister Rahman firmly held that the MCP would not berecognized, and Chin Peng declared that the MCP "willnever accept surrender a t any time and will continuethe struggle to the las t man. I I viith these declarations,the Emergency entered i t s closing phase of relentlessa t t r i t ion of the communist t e r ror i s t s .

    At the i r peak, the Commonwealth military forcesincluded 40,000 regulars that included 10,500 Gurkhas.In addition to mili tary forces, the Commonwealth had

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    24,000 police, 37,000 constables, and a Home Guard orabout 250,000 men. These 300,000 men exercised theresponsibil i ty for d ete rrin g te rro rism and capturing orkil l ing the ter ror is ts but the large bulk of thesepeople, vir tual ly a l l of the Home Guard, did much moredeterring than cap tu ring o r ki l l ing. The m ajority o fthe dead ter ror is ts fe ll a t the hands of British regulars

    ", land in part icular the G u r k h a s . ~An example of Gurkha e ffec tiveness aga in st guerri l las

    is provided by Brigadier M. C. A. Henniker in Red ShadowOver Halaya.

    By f i r s t l ight next morningwere in position round the camp.corporal was within two yards ofsentry. He shot him dead. Thissignal to begin."Charge :" shouted John.

    the GurkhasThe lancethe banditwas the

    rhe Gurkhas crashed forward through thejungle, jumping the pig fence round the campin their s t r ide . A bandit appeared . . .and sprayed them with a Bren gun. Johnheard the bul le ts thudding into the treetrunks. Grenades were hurled, and a l l hel lwas le t loose.The resul ts of the raid showed eight te r ror is ts kil led,

    21 .Ibld. , pp. 84-97.

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    a collect ion of anns, and masses of propaganda and docu-ments of a l l kinds. A hel icopter came in to remove thecorpses for identif icat ion.

    Raids similar to the one described above occurredover and over again. But there i s no f inal resu l t tothis kind of war. Even though the Emergency terminatedon 31 July 1960, and the sp i r i t and resistance of thet e r ror i s t s appears to be crushed, the price of securi tyis continued vigilance.

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    THE HAR IN THE ;, l i t

    In the words of Air Vice Marsha l Sir Francisl1ellersh, Air Officer Conunanding in Ma laya from 1949to 1951, "Although this was not an aLe war, aviat ion

    "?was essent ia l to the operations in ;'lalaya. , , ~ - vihatthe RAF contributed can be sununarized in four roles ,presented here in decreasing order of pr ior i ty . First ,and certainly in the area of greatest effor t , came thejob of air-supplying and a i r l i f t ing the ground forces.Then came aer ia l reconnaissance, tac t ica l a ir st r ikes,and special missions. In addition, a section on theuse of helicopters is included because of thei r uniquecharacter is t ics and capabil i t ies . The nature of theseroles suggests that the &\F performed a support functionwith overall responsibil i ty in the hands of the groundforce conunander. In actual fact , the High Conunissionerexercised control over a l l forces; and the central lycontrolled PAF squadrons flew in support of the Army.

    As an aid in describing the a ir operat ions, a

    22 In a lecture t i t l ed liThe Campaign Against theTerrorists in Malaya," delivered 7 Harch 1951, a t TheRoyal United Service Inst i tut ion, London.28

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    functional organization is presented. Within the funct ional roles of airpower, two time periods are usuallyconsidered. The f i r s t covers the beginning of theEmergency through 1953 and is l imited to reciprocatingengine ai rcraf t of largely World War II vintage. Thesecond period covers the a i r act iv i t ies flown during andaf ter the 1953-54 reequipping and modernization program.This l a t t e r phase is character ized by high-performanceje t ai rcraf t with the dual mission of f lying in supportof the Emergency while, a t the same time, consti tut inga signif icant part of the Brit ish Far Eastern i\irForces, responsive to Brit ish commitments in Southeastl',sia. All of the ai rcraf t referred to in the text aredescribed in the Appendix.

    Air SupplyThe shortage of a i r f ields in laya, except for

    the coastal regions, aggravated the a ir supply problem.Although there were large numbers of small landingst r ips suitable for l ight ai rcraf t , the conventionala i r transports , the Dakotas (C-47's), and Valettas hadto rely on parachute drops or freedrops to deliver goods

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    from the transport base to forward posit ions. The RAFlocated the ir primary transport base at Kuala Lumpur( I l lust rat ion 4) on the fringe of mountainous te rra inand in a te r ror is t hot spot. The mountains did not offera part icular ly severe obstacle because of the general lygood flying weather. Air operations were not seriouslydelayed by bad weather although localized thunderstorms,early morning clouds, and afternoon cumulus buildupsoccurred frequently. As a resul t , the RAF t r ied toschedule most of i t s f l ights between midmorning andnoon. 23

    The tremendous advantage of a i r supply rested ini t s capability to provide the necessi t ies of l i fe toArmy and police patrols penetrating deep into the jungle.Without this capabil i ty , the penetration distance wouldbe l imited by what the men could c arry on th eir backs.As i t was, the ground forces had great confidence in theabi l i ty of RAF ai rcraf t to provide suff ic ient suppliesfor patrols to penetrate as deep as they needed and

    23See John Fricker , "Flying Aga inst the MalayBandits - I I , " The Aeroplane, LXXX (January 5, 1951), 43;and "Air Operat ions in the Malay Campaign," The Aeroplane,LXXX (April 20, 1951), 470.30

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    TRANSPORT MISSIONS

    4 ~ ~ ~,

    KUALA-.... LUMPUR

    IllUSTRATlO. 4 ...f:)"CU

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    remain as long as they must. Receiving airdropped supplies placed very l i t t l e burden on the ground forces because of the demonstrated sk i l l of t ransport aircrewsin placing supplies in the smallest clearings or indropping them through the jungle canopy. The use ofsmall clearings, averaging on the order of 200 yardssquare, was complicated by the surrounding t ree growthwhich often stood 200 feet above the jungle f loor.Under these conditions, the RAF considered drops withless than 300 feet of ter ra in clearance (100 feet oft ree clearance) to be unreasonable and thereby ruledout freedrops for anything but r ice sacks. Of course,the 30D-foot drop al t i tude placed heavy rel iance ontechniques for dropping supplies by parachute.

    The deta i ls of supply-dropping techniques employedby the ~ ~ F offer some new approaches. Firs t , Armypersonnel packed the airdrop containers with bundlesof commodities and also had the responsibil i ty for loading the aircraf t" In addit ion, Army troops flew asloadmasters in the t ransports and carr ied out the"muscle work" in get t ing the cargo containers out of theai rcraf t . The coordination achieved between pi lo ts ,

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    loadmasters, and ground parties achieved such a highlevel that , by November 1950, only 468 containers hadfailed to reach the ground part ies while 28,000 had beensafely delivered - - a loss ra te of less than 2 percent.

    The ai rcraf t equipment f lown for the bulk of theearly supply miss ions has been the Dakota. In this re-gard, a quotat ion from an eyewitness is appropriate:

    There is probably no ai rcraf t more suitedto this task than the Dakota, whose re l iabi l i tyis renowned and whose true t ra c ta b il i ty i sonce again being thoroughly appreciated. TheDakota has surely earned the retirement forwhich i t is shortly due in Malaya, but unt i ltha t time, i t will remain the l i fe l ine of thejungle forces. 24In addition to supplying penetrating patrols , the RAF

    also supplies remote s i tes and po li ce ga rr isons origi-nally dropped into place by Valettas and helicopters.These outposts bui l t landing s t r ips 450 to 600 feet longto accommodate short takeoff and landing (STOL) ai rcraf t .For th is type of work, the RAF employed the PrestwickP ioneer w ith i t s outstanding STOL character is t ics . Inaddition to using the STOL character is t ics , the RAF

    24Fr icker, op. c i t . , p. 44.

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    developed new flying techniques that permitted the useof short, rough terrain landing st r ips in the jungle.These techniques dealt with landing patterns, approachspeeds, and other parameters necessary for successfuloperation. 25 As a resul t of th is effect ive a i r l i f tcapabil i ty , the Brit ish were in a position to influencethe jungle aborigines to renounce the communist te r ror is ts .Specially trained contingents took advantage of th issi tuat ion to gain the confidence and friendship of theaborigines and turn the i r effor ts toward progressiveself-improvement and against the te r ror is ts .

    In the f ie ld of rotary-wing ai rcraf t , in March1953, the British put into service ten American-madeSikorsky 5-55 h e l i c o p t e r ~ furnished under the MutualDefense Assistance Program and belonging to the RoyalNa,ry. They la ter added RAF helicopters of No. 110Squadron. These helicopters contr ibuted to a l l of theairpower roles in Malaya including supply f l ights . Theycarr ied supplies and troops in and out of almost inac-cessible landing spots, o ften with only a few feet of

    25D. Fo McIntyre, "RAF's New Techniques in Malaya,"The Aeroplane, LXXXVIII (February 4, 1955), 145.34

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    clearance between the rotor and 200-foot high t rees.Where the ground was too rough to land, they hoveredwhile completing the i r mission. The helicopters sparedpatrols a 3-day march into or out of the jungle. TheNew York Times published an account of an early hel i -copter assaul t on July 4, 1953:

    Singapore, July 3-- Two thousand British,African and Gurkha troops have launched oneof the biggest a ir and land offensives of theMalayan campaign against Communist te r ror is tsdeep in the jungles of Pahang. The offensive,covering an area of 25 sq mi, is aimed a ttrapping a gang of 80 Communists.

    The troops were flown into the area bygiant British Navy helicopters. They wereaccompanied by police dogs. The planes couldnot land in the thick jungle but British paratroopers climbed dOvm ropes from the helicoptersand landed safely. Within 30 minutes they hadcut down t rees with axes and saws and m ~ w e d d o " ~ neck-high grass with parangs (Malayknives) to make six landing patches for thehelicopters. Helicopters flew in four abreastimmediately the st r ips were ready.

    Within a few minutes of the f i r s t landing a radio post had been se t up and was working. Three hours af ter the beginning of theoperation the security forces had spotted andkil led the f i r s t Communist guerr i l la .In addition, on return f l ights out of the jungle, he l i -copters contr ibuted immeasurably to the morale of theground troops by bringing out sick and wounded and

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    depositing them a t hospitals in minutes rather than days,26weeks, or not a t a l l .

    Subsequent to the 1953-54 modernization, the trans-port squadrons rel ied heavily on Valettas and Pioneersin the RAF squadrons and the awkward looking but effect iveBristol Freighters in No. 41 Squadron of the Royal NewZealand Air Force. These transport squadrons succeededin flying almost 15,000 sor t ies across the length andbreadth of Malaya and delivered an ave rage annual loadof 2,000 tons of supplies. In 1955, the versat i leVale tta s, c ru is ing at 160 knots and carrying up to fourtons of load, flew 2,100 supply-dropping sort ies to de-l iver 4,000 tons of food, ammunit ion , and other vi ta l lyneeded equipment. In the same year, the economicalPioneers, cruising a t 90 knots and burning 18 gallons offuel per hour, flew 4,700 supply sort ies carrying loadsas high as 4 men or 800 pounds of cargo.

    Also, as a resul t of the equipment modernizationprogram, the Brit ish exhibited an increased helicoptercapabili ty. Their helicopter force expanded to three

    26Air Ministry News Letter, No. 706, 29 July 1960.

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    squadrons with a total of 40 rotary-wing aircraf t in1955. No. 195 Squadron flew Sycamores, and No. 155Squadron operated Whirlwinds. The third squadron, No.848 Fleet Air Arm Squadron, flew American-made Sikorsky5-55"s. The medium-sized Whirlwinds and S-55's, ofwhich there were 26, operated out of Kuala Lumpur(I l lus trat ion 5) as troop carriers. The 14 l ightSycamores also operated out of Kuala Lumpur, performingl iaison and evacuation of wounded missions.

    The maximum capabil i t ies of the helicopters causedAir Headquarters to impose s t r ic t requirements on landing zones and operational considerations. All hel i copter landing zones had to measure a t least 150 feetin diameter with the center 90 feet being cleared toground level with no obstructions. Growth on the 30foot fringe could not exceed two feet in height. Inaddition, an approach path 120 feet wide had to be provided to permit approach and exi t angles of 30 degrees

    or less at sea level to 3,000 feet (I l lus trat ion 6).Landing zones between 3,000 and 4,000 feet had toaccommodate approach angles of 20 degrees; and thoseabove 4,000 feet could not exceed 10 degrees. Furthermore,

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    HELICOPTER MISSIONS

    IllUSTIATIOM 5

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    \ " I(l

    HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE,

    IL USTRATID 6

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    a 10-degree approach ang le could not be exceeded i f thehelicopter was to carry i t s maximum load.

    The medium-sized Whirlwind hel ic op te r, r ate d ascapable of carrying ten fully armed troops,27 did notdeliver anything close to i t s advertised performance.kben operating between si tes a t sea level to 2,000 feet ,the Whirlwind could carry 720 pounds for SO miles, 800pounds for 30 miles, or 850 pounds for 16 miles. Operatinga t s ites of higher elevation called for a reduc tio n inload of 100 pounds for each thousand feet of s i te eleva-tion above 2,000 feet . Any adverse conditions, such asturbulent winds, called for further decreases ina llowab le loads . The ~ b i r l w i n d consumed 290 pounds offuel per hour when cruising a t a l i t t le over 60 knotsand could be uti l ized about nine hours a day.

    The small-sized Sycamore hel icop te r a lso had re-st r ict ions. When operating between s i tes a t sea levelto 1,500 feet , i t could carry 540 pounds for 75 miles,600 pounds f

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    s i tes above 1,500 feet , the load had to be reduced 170pounds for every thousand feet above 1,500 feet . TheSycamore consumed about 175 pounds of fuel per hour whilecruising a t about the same speed as the Whirlwind.

    The magnitude of the helicopter ef for t is ref lectedin the number of sort ies flown - - in a single year , 1955,these 40 helicopters flew more than 20,000 sor t ies in

    28Malaya.

    Aerial ReconnaissanceThe f i r s t and most str iking need for aer ia l recon-

    naissance was to provide a subst i tute for outdated andinaccurate maps. Second to this need, aer ia l recon-naissance provided vert ical photography to ass is tt ac t ica l str ikes. Lastly, the aer ia l photography pro-vided photographic interpreters with a source of in te l l i -gence from which they could detect guerri l la act iv i t ies .

    The need for accurate maps in planning and conduct-ing mili tary operations is extremely important. At the

    28 GP . Capt. K. D. C. Slater , "Air Operations inMalaya," Royal United Services Inst i tut ion Journal, Clr(August 1957), 382-83.

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    outset of the Emergency in Malaya, the map s i tuat ion wasdeplorable.

    The pre-War maps were almost useless tothe patrols , being mostly inaccurate and withmany areas marked as unexp lo rable. Now !I95l7Army maps had been prepared from a ir photographs covering 4,000 square miles of t e r r i -tory. Photographic mosaics essent ia l for a iroperations and briefing had been made, andalso ver t ica l ~ h o t o g r a p h s to be carr ied bystr ike crews. 2

    The Army Photographic Interpretation Section a t KualaLumpur prepared the maps from the aer ia l photographs andfurnished them to both ground and a ir elements. Aircrewsfound the ver t ical photographs to be a signif icant aidin target ident i f icat ion.

    The standard tact ics used by the RAF in fly ingphotographic reconnaissance miss ions did not requireany major modifications for application in Malaya. Con-sequently, deta i ls of f li gh t a lt it ude s, leg lengths,overlap c r i t e r ia , e tc . , are omitted. However, the RAFMosquito reconnaissance squadron a t Butterworth remained

    29"Air Operations in the Malay Campaign," TheAeroplane, LXXX (April 20, 1951), 470.

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    30fully committed as did subsequent reconnaissance ai r -c ra ft ( Il lu s tr at ion 7).

    Aircraft modernization and increasing intel l igenceneeds led to expanded aer ia l reconnaissance act ivi tyduring and af ter 1953. In order to maintain a constantflow of information on the location and movement ofcommunist te rr or is ts - - as well as supply t ac t ica l tar-get mat er ia ls and aer ial surveys - - the RAF equipped No.81 Squadron with Pembrokes and Meteors and enl is ted theservices o f a detachment of photographic reconnaissanceCanberras from RAF Bomber Command. Additional tac t ica lreconnaissance came as a resul t of Auster f l ights by No.656 AOP Squadron and the l ight Sycamore helicopters . 3l

    The Austers of No. 656 Squadron became part icular lyadept a t discovering te r ror is t act ivi ty in the jungle.The Army assigned a specif ic area of jungle to eachAuster pi lo t and charged him with the responsibi l i ty ofbecoming familiar with the area in deta i l . After abr ie f period, the pilots could detect probable areas of

    30John Fricker , "Flying Against the Malay Bandits -I ," The Aeroplane, LXXX (January 5, 1951), 7.3lSlater , op. c i t . , pp. 382-83.

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    RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

    ILLUSTRATION 1 ... ' \ C ( )

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    te r ror is t act ivi ty by such indicators as small changesin the color of vegetation. Light helicopters could thenmake more detailed investigations of th e su spec ted areas.The British inst i tuted a more f lexible system of recon-nais sance a s the pi lo t s ' capabi l i t ies became bet ter de-fined. Their modified sys tem called for the pi lots totake turns in a number of patrol areas so that , in threeto six months, each pi lot cou ld handle any part of arelat ively large ter r i tory. The 34 l ight Austers,assigned to five regional f l ights , logged over 22,000flying hours in 1955 alone.

    Also, in 1953, the RAF undertook to compile a com-prehensive photographic survey of ~ w l a y a . The resultsof No. 81 Squadron's photographic missions found theirway into badly needed corrections on exist ing maps, intoentirely new m ap s, and most important to the s tr ike a i r -craf t , into annotated target materials . In support ofthis program, No. 81 flew over 460 photographic recon-

    . . . . 195532 d 3 000 d .a ~ s s a n c e m ~ s s ~ o n s ~ n an as many as, u r ~ n gthe course of the Emergency.

    32 Ibid . , p. 380.

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    Air StrikesThe RAF flew offensive a ir st r ikes (I l lus trat ion 8)

    to harass the ter ror is ts , keep them on the move, destroytheir camps and food si tes , and ki l l as many as possible.The RAF operations never assumed strategic proportionssimply because there were no strategic targets. Theterror is ts had no identif iable l ines of communication;no industr ial organization; and, even from a tact icalsense, no really worth-while a ir targets. Yet, theRAF with cannon, rockets, and bombs -- d id p rovidethe ground forces with f irepower and did their best toovercome the obstacles presented by small, f leet ing tar-gets which were rarely visible from the air .

    Two RAF Spitf i res flew the f i r s t a ir strikes33against communist terror is ts in July 1948. The Spit-

    f i res , called in by Army ground forces, carried eight60-pound rockets and two 20-mm cannons. Just what theyh i t is not known, but their contribution to the moraleof the ground forces did not go unrecognized. The

    33AVM Sir Francis Mellersh, "The Campaign Againstthe Terrorists in Malaya," The Journal of the RoyalUnited Service Inst i tut ion, XCVI (August 1951), 410.

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    STRIKE MISSIONS

    HAILAND

    IllUSTRITiOH I

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    str ike appeared in the newspapers, date l ined Singapore,July 7, and read:

    An RAF spokesman a t Kuala Lumpur saidthat dive-bombing Spitf ires fired rocketsla te July 6th into a suspected Communistguerri l la camp in North Perak State. Groundtroops la ter found the jungle camp abandoned.The occupants l e f t signs of a hasty f l ight . 34

    The press described subsequent coordinated air-groundoperations in terms of rocket-firing Spitf ires attackingfrom the a i r while ground troops slashed through thejungle to smash communist ter ror is ts . In actual fact ,the results were not too satisfying with te r ror is tcasualt ies running one or two per mission. The RAFstarted dropping bombs on te r ror is t camps in August1948. The f i r s t bombing mission h it and destroyed ate r ror is t concentration of huts that made up a head-quarters in the low-lying Kroh forest reserve of SouthPerak.

    As the Emergency went on into 1953 and the scopeof ground operat ions increased , Army and police unitscould ca l Ion Spi t f i re , Tempest, and Hornet fighters and

    34New York Times, July 8, 1948, p. 4.

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    Brigand attack bombers fo r d ay li gh t str ikes and on Lincolnbombers for day or night missions The Tempests andHornets carried the same rocket load as the Spitf i res(eight) and had four 20-mm cannons but carried nobombs The Brigand had both a bigger punch and longerstaying power. I t carried three 60-pound rockets, one1,000-pound, three SOO-pound bombs, and four 20-mmcannons. Normally, a crew of two flew the 40,000-pound twin-engine Brigand. The Lincolns carriedfourteen 1,000-pound bombs unt i l modified to carry a l-most double that number of SOO-pound bombs. In addi-t ion to these ai rcraf t , the Brit ish also flew the largeSunderland flying boats which carried more than 3S020-pound fragmentation bombs and remained on s ta t ionfor ten to 12 hours. The higher priori ty Korean War ledto the replacement of Sunderlands with ground-basedShackletons. The l as t of the early vintage ai rcraf tto see service in Malaya was the Harvard (AmericanT-b), which c ar rie d e ig ht 20-pound fragmentation bombsand a small 7.9-mm machine gun. 3S

    3SFricker, "Flying Against Malayan &ndits - I ,"op . c i t . , p. 7.49

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    The tac t ics used by these and subsequent ai rcraf trel ied on simplici ty of equipment and technique. Thevast majority of missions entailed preplanned areastr ikes with very few immediate or "on-cal l" missions.Recognizing that the guerr i l la re l ies heavily on mobilityand has no in teres t in holding te r ra in or engaging incombat -- especial ly against superior forces -- theabsence of class ica l close a ir support missions is not

    surprising. Conversely, the RAF could execute preplannedstr ikes against points or areas specified by the groundforces and that might contain inhabited guerr i l la camps i tes and food or weapons storage s i tes . In order toappreciate the target ing problem, one need only understand that the basic source of intel l igence consisted ofagents and captured or surrendered te r ror is ts and thatthe l a t t e r could neither read a map nor recognize anaer ial photograph. The intel l igence s i tuat ion wasfurther compounded by the ground forces ' frequentinabil i ty to specify the i r own posi t ion with anyaccuracy.

    As a resu l t of th is knotty target ing problem, theRl\.F set t led on a system of flying "time and heading"

    so

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    from recognizable ground features, recognizable from theground and a ir alike. This system also worked a t nightwith the subst i tut ion of searchlights pointing s tra ightup to identify the point from which to s t a r t the "timeand heading" f l ight . According to one eyewitness, thissystem provided greater accuracy than the Rebecca-Eurekaradar -- presumably on a reasonably clear night. TheBrit ish also developed a balloon-marking system thatcould be effect ively employed in the jungle. A colorcoded balloon could penetrate a small opening in thet ree cover and provide pilots with check points . Theballoon would also convey the meaning associated withi t s color. Some of the codes gave fr iendly troop deployment information and also established bomblines.

    As a consequence of modernization, the f ightersquadrons converted f i r s t to j e t Vampires and l a te r toje t Venoms while the bomber forces went from Lincolnsto je t Canberras. The Air Officer Commanding (AOC) , AirVice Marshal F. R. W. Scherger, Royal Australian AirForce, announced the arr ival of Canberras from England,in February 1955, to see how well they would stand upunder operational use in the tropics and to see how well

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    they cou ld handle counter terror is t missions. The useof je t ai rcraf t raised some questions in the minds ofground force commanders on the abi l i ty of high-performanceai rcraf t to fu l f i l l the counterguerri l la support role.However,

    . . . t r i a l s using je t ai rcraf t in thestr ike role proved ent irely successful, andfrom 1954 onwards je ts have been employed onhundreds of st r ike operations in Malaya withthe resul t that the feasibi l i ty of employingthe presen t genera tion of high-performancef ighter and bomber ai rcraf t in th is rolehas been demonstrated beyond doubt. 36

    Proof of the correctness of the RAP decision is exempli-fied in a 1956 coordinated air-ground operation. Inthis case, as a resul t of unusually good intel l igence,the Brit ish became aware of an important guerr i l la camp.They assembled a task force of No. 1 Squadron withLincoln bombers, No. 12 Squadron with Canberras, andthe 1st Batallion South Wales Borderers. The aer ia lbombardment display la id down by the ai rcraf t destroyedthe guerr i l la camp so e ff ec tiv el y th at only one survivorremained for the ground troops -- and he died within

    3748 hours.

    36 I ' . d01. .,37Ibid. , p. 379.p. 381.52

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    The British worked hard to improve their weapon-delivery techniques in the jungle. They employed theArmy's l ight Austers to mark the targets with variousprocedures and also used ground radars to direct thebombers. These techniques gave excellent resul ts butonly when the ground forces knew the target 's posit ionto w ithin 500 or 600 yards. Unfor tuna te ly , the Armycould rarely sat isfy this condition.

    Throughout the course of the Emergency, the RAFput 25,000 s tr ik e sor tie s into the a ir to deliver a

    38tota l of over 33,000 tons of bombs. In a single year,1955, the RAF flew 850 bomber sort ies and 950 groundattack sort ies against the communist terrorists . 39 Inthe 2-week period ending April 7, 1958, British, Aus-t ra l ian, and New Zealand aircraf t completed the heaviestaerial bombardment of the Emergency in delivering 186tons of bombs; 200 rockets; and 23,000 rounds of cannonf i re .

    38Air Ministry News Letter.39Sla ter , op. c i t . , p. 381.

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    Special Air MissionsThis category inc ludes three types of a ir missions

    which consumed considerable RAF effor t but which do notfa l l in the previous t hr ee ca tegor ie s. I t includes a i rmissions in support of Special Air Service parat roopoperations, crop-spraying for food control, and psychologi-cal warfare through the use of loud-speaker a i rc ra f t andpamphlet-dropping.

    Special Air Service SupportThe f i r s t airborne operation saw paratroops o f the

    Malayan Scouts dropping into a remote area of Pahan.The results were not too exciting. The dif f icu l t ies tobe encountered in jungle drops became quite apparent.Firs t , the 200-foot h igh trees could be expected tocatch and hang-up half of the paratroops. The chancesof success were not very high with half the force dis-played l ike Christmas tree ornaments. Second, a sub-s tan t ia l paratroop force, crashing through the trees,was l ikely to a le r t the guerr i l las and send them dashing

    40through the jungle.

    40 .Brlg. 1. L. Wight, "Operations in Malaya," Brassey'sAnnual 1952 (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 208-223.54

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    The Brit ish solved the tree problem with a techniqueused by American and Canadian f irefighters and calledAbseil gear. This equipment c on sis ts of a 2S0-footlong ro l l of 1,000-pound tes t nylon webbing housed in acontainer that can brake the unrol l ing of the webbing.With th is gear, the hung-up paratrooper fix es the looseend of the webbing to the t ree and lowers himself to theground. Originally adopted as a safety device, theAbseil gear became part of the tact ics of jungle41drops. Equipped with the Abseil gear, a troop of 15men jump in "st icks" of five from slow-flying Valettastha t are 600 to 700 feet above the terrain. Each para-troop carr ies 65 pounds of arms, grenades, food packets,medical ki ts , and radio parts in addition to the Abseilgear. In a routine drop, the parachutist 's f i r s t con-tac t i s with the thick top foliage of the 200-foot hight rees. I f he successfully penetrates the top fol iage,his next contact is with a second layer of trees tha tr ise about 100 feet and are the only remaining obstaclein gett ing to the ground. A parachutist stuck a t e i ther

    41S1ater, op. c i t . , p. 383.

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    level uses the Abseil gear to lower himself quickly tothe ground.

    Solution to the second problem involved a change intact ics. Special Air Service troops, instead of tryingto land on the guerr i l la camps, dropped so as to ringthe camps and contain the guerril las or dropped and re-grouped and then moved against the guerr i l las . The combi-nation of Abseil g ear and tact ics sui ted to the s i tuat ionallowed the Brit ish to deploy any part of two paratroop42trained regiments to any part of the jungle.

    Crop SprayingTightening of the Brit ish food control program

    forced the te r ror i s t s to cultivate gardens in thejungle. This, in turn, led the Brit ish to seek out anddestroy the jungle gardens from the air . Air Headquartersassigned the task, as an addit ional duty, to No. 155Squadron with i t s 14 Whirlwind helicopters and alsoemployed fixed-wing Beavers and Pioneers in this rolefrom time to time. The RAF technique rel ied on spraying

    42Wight, op. c i t . , p. 220; and Slater , op. c i t . ,pp. 382-83.

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    the gardens with weed ki l le r suff icient ly strong to ki l lthe plant growth; but the RAF also reasoned that , i f theycould spray the gardens, the guerr i l las could spray thehelicopters -- with bul le ts . They therefore insis ted onapplying neutral izing machine-gun f i re with escort ingfixed-wing aircraf t . The wily te r ror is ts quickly learnedthe Bri t ish procedure; and, "As soon as the helicopterhad gone away, they t ro t ted into the garden and pickedoff every leaf on which the drops of spray had fal len.

    43 The RAF improved theirhe roots were s t i l l good."techniques, employed different sprays and eventuallycontributed to the e ff ec tivene ss o f the food controlprogram to the extent that they were170 crop-spraying operations in 1955

    Psychological Warfare

    cal led upon to f ly44alone.

    The RAF employed two techniques designed toinfluence t e r ror i s t s to surrender or a t leas t throwdown the ir arms. The f i r s t of these consisted of flyingloud-speaker equipped ai rcraf t over areas known to

    43Henniker, op. c i t . , p. 180.44S1ater, op. c i t . , p. 381.

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    contain t e r ror i s t s and broadcasting messages composedto lower morale and encourage desertion. One Austerand two Valettas, complete with loud-speakers, formed'Voice' Flight of No. 267 Squadron in 1953. The programproved so successful that the RAF added an additionalAuster in 1954 and replaced the two Valettas with threeof the quieter and more maneuverable Dakotas. BrigadierHenniker describes the ir operation:

    I t was possible with these ~ i r c r a f t / tospeak to bandits in th e deepest jungle andmake them hear, whether the ir leaders wantedi t or not. The ai rcraf t could "saturate" afa ir ly wide area to compensate for rathervague information on where the enemy was.Every State submitted i t s daily requirementsto Kuala Lumpur and a special jo int committeeconsidered pr ior i t ies for the voice-aircraf t . 45The 'Voice' had the advantages of reaching the

    i l l i t e ra te and not requiring any observable act by thete r ror is t in getting the message. These advantages arecontrasted with the l eaf le t program which, to be effec-t ive , required the te r ror is t to pick up the leaf le t andread i t both punishable by communist leaders. Theresul ts of the 'Voice' operations were quite impressive

    45Henniker, op . c i t . , p. 188.

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    with 70 percent of those who surrendered admitting tothe in fluence of the 'Voice. I In 1955, 'Voice' ai rcraf tspent 870 hours, on station, broadcasting their mes-sages. 46

    The second psychological weapon, a ir delivery ofleafle ts , began in August 1948, with the dropping of1,000,000 leaf lets asking for cooperation. The leaf le tprogram rece ived the attention of helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft alike. The RAF distributed the leafletson a routine basis, in support of ground force operations,47 and for such special occasions as the KoreanArmistice and the September 1955 amnesty declaration. 48The Korean-Armistice leaf lets were printed in Chineseand read on one side, "PEACE" in large characters andon the other, the message

    After th ree years of fighting, the warin Korea has stopped by agreement between theUN and Chinese armies. After five years offighting war in Malaya without hope ofvictory certain Malayan Communist partyleaders s t i l l wish to continue to sacrif ice

    46Slater, op. c i t . , p. 386.47Henniker, op. c i t . , p. 277.48Pye, op. c i t . , p. 107.

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    l ives. Who is for the new path of cooperation in Malaya?followed by an appeal to the terror is ts to lay downtheir arms and s tar t a new l i fe of peace. The leafle t-dropping program averaged between 10,000,000 and20,000,000 leafle ts per month and reached a million aday for two months in pub licizing the amnesty offer. Asa sidel ight , during 1954-55, the RAF put 50,000 leaf letsinto the jungle for each terror is t . 49

    HelicoptersFrom some points of view, the helicopter won the

    war for the British; but others viewed i t with a morecr i t ica l eye. On one point, there is no questionthe helicopter sat isfactori ly performed a variety ofmissions. I t air l i f ted. troops and supplies, providedthe most detailed reconnaissance, assisted in theassault role, evacuated wounded from otherwise in-accessible places and dropped psychological warfare

    50leaflets . I t even carried tracking dogs into the

    49Slater, op. c i t . , p. 386; and Air Ministry NewsLetter No. 706, 29 July 1960.50Lt. Cdr. Trevor Blore, "The Queen's 'Copters,"Marine Corps Gazette, XXXVIII (July 1954), 52.60

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    51jungle to hunt out hiding te r ror is ts . Such versa t i l i tytranscended the capabi l i t ies of a l l other vehicles.

    However, the versa t i l i ty of the hel icop te r inv it edproblems of ut i l izat ion and economy. As Group CaptainSlater put i t ,

    Because of thei r unique f lexibi l i ty ,there is always a strong temp ta tion to misusethis type of ai rcraf t in a costly and extrava-gant manner, and the greatest care must betaken to avoid f r i t te r ing away availableeffor t in a series of uneconomical, penny-packet detachments. 52

    In order to gain maximum helicopter ut i l iza t ion, AirHeadquarters a t Kuala Lumpur exercised control over a l lthree helicopter squadrons. Furthermore, the Air Head-quarters would not approve the use of helicopters unt i lthey had sat isf ied themselves that the helicopter wasboth the best suited and most economical means to achievethe desired resul ts . Even with this s t r i c t control , in

    . . 53one year (1955) h e l ~ c o p t e r s flew 20,000 s o r t ~ e s .The Brit ish appreciated the protracted nature of

    SILt. CoL Rowland S. N. Mans, "Victory in MalayaConcluded, I t Marine Corps Gazette, XLVIII (March 1963), 48.52S1ater, op. c i t . , p. 385.53Ibid. , p. 382.

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    the Malayan Emergency and recognized the importance oflong-term costs. In this regard, the helicopter hadseveral disadvantages when compared with i t s fixed-wingcounterparts. First , the helicopter required considerablemaintenance because of i ts relat ive complexity; i t alsorequired the supply and storage of more spare parts.Second, helicopter-operating costs ran appreciablyhigher than comparable l ight ai rcraf t . The cost perhour of f l ight , shown below, takes on increased meaningwhen considering that both the Pioneer and Auster carry

    Whirlwind $218 per hourSycamore $162 per hourPioneer $ 98 per hourAuster $ 36 per hour

    four people and that the Pioneer carried 800 pounds ofcargo. Third, the hel icopter crew t raining requirementshad to be more str ingent ttlan for l ight ai rcraf t pi lots .RAF operational experience in Malaya indicated that f lying hel icopters a t the extremes of the i r performanceenvelopes led to many unexpected problems that could bedisastrous for the unwary or inexperienced pi lot . Theload-carrying capabi l i t ies of both the Whirlwind and the

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    Sycamore were small indeed in the Malayan environment;and, consequently, a maximum load was scheduled for almostevery mission . Carrying a maximum load subjected thehelicopter pi lot to exacting flying requirements with nomargin for error. As a result , Air Headquarters di-rected that p i lo ts selected to fly helicopters musthave a t leas t 1,000 hours of fixed-wing time beforeentering the helicopter training program. The t rainingprogram i t se l f required 100 hours before cer t i f icat ionas operationally ready. Group Captain Slater summarizedthe employment of he li cop te rs in this way:

    Clearly then, one of the main governingfactors in hel icopter operations is economy .essent ial to ensure ful l integration of thehelicopter force w ith other types of a ireffor t and . . . other types of transport. 54The he li cop te r a lso posed operational problems,

    often coupled with efforts to maximize uti l iza t ion.As an example, the Austers often flew reconnaissancemissions to find sui table landing areas for helicopters,a job the helicopter could do for i t se l f but a t muchgreater expense. Another example, helicopters flying

    54Ibid . , p. 384.

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    in close proximity to te r ror is ts required fixed-wingescort t o neu tr al iz e the area les t the helicopter bedamaged or destroyed. True, the helicopter could havecarried armament to defend i t se l f ; but, as alreadypointed out, the load-carrying capabili ty of the heli-copter was severely strained in moving troops and supplies;and any increase in weight for armament must be accompaniedby a corresponding decrease in load-carrying capabili ty.

    Object ively , t he helicopter certainly made a majorcon tr ibut ion to the Brit ish success in defeating thecommunist terroristso With unl imi ted resources , thehelicopter could have made an even bigger contribution.However, when the confl ict is protracted, as guerri l laoperations usually are, the meaning and imp li ca tions o fcost-effectiveness cannot be ignored. In such cases,helicopter operations should not be allowed to absorbresources out o f p ropo rtion to their operational contr i-bution.

    55Air Activity SummaryThe Malayan Emergency off ic ia l ly came to an end on

    55N b d ' h ' .urn ers presente ~ n t ~ s summary are c o m p o s ~ t e sof data in Fricker, op. c i t . ; Slater , opo c i t . ; andAir Ministry News Letter , No. 706.64

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    31 July 1960, twelve years af ter i t s declaration. Duringthe course of the Emergency, the RAF employed a t least21 different types of ai rcraf t to fu l f i l l their responsi-bil i ty of flying the predominant a ir role. In additionto the RAF a ir act ivi ty, the British ground forcesflew th eir lig ht Austers; and the Royal Navy supplied

    *n 8-55 helicopter squadron.The transport squadrons of the RAF Far Eastern

    Air Forces flew close to 14,000 sort ies to deliver24,000 tons of supplies, an average of 2,000 tons peryear. In 1955, one of the years of heavy a ir act ivi ty,RAF Valettas airdropped 4,000 tons of supplies in 2,100sort ies and a i r l i f ted 29,600 people, with 250 tons ofequipment, in and out of the jungle. RAF Pioneers,also carrying men and supplies, flew 4,700 sort iesduring the same year.

    Aerial reconnaissance cont inuously supportedground forces throughout the entire Emergency. Mis-sion object ives var ied a l l the way from a close lookat a suspicious area to the aerial survey and mapping

    *All of the ai rcraf t used in the Malayan Emergencyare described in the Appendix 065

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    of M ~ l a y a . The ai rcraf t used also varied from the smalll ight helicopters and Austers to twin-jet Canberrasconfigured for photographic reconnaissance. The bulk ofthe photographic reconnaissance act iv i ty is credited toNo. 81 Squadron flying Pembrokes and Meteors andassisted by a detachment of Canberras from RAF BomberCommand. A measure of the importance ascribed toaer ia l r e c o n n ~ i s s a n c e by the Brit ish is given by AirHeadquarters' assignment of over 460 photographicreconnaissance tasks to No. 81 Squadron in 1955 and asmany as 3,000 during the Emergency.

    The abi l i ty of the RAF to get bombs on target madea mate rial cont ribu tion to the success of the overallcounterterrorist operation. 'The in i t i a l sort ies ofHarvards, Spitf i res , Tempests, and Hornets expandedwith the app li ca tion o f Brigands, Lincolns, and Sunderlands. The RAF withdrew many of these World War II air-craft and replaced them with higher-performance je tssuch as the Meteor, Venom, Vampire, and Canberra.Worthy of note is the Brit ish reasoning for introducinghigher-performance aircraf t . The decision was not basedon an! need for increased performance in fighting the

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    te r ror is ts ; rather, the British deci sion represen ted asingle force compromise between an aging reciprocatingforce adequate in performance to counter terror is t needsand the high-performance capabil i ty necessary to fu l f i l lBritish Southeast Asia commitments. As a resul t , RAFCanberras, designed to fly high and fas t , flew low andslow against the terroris ts while maintaining the capabi l i ty to f ly high and fast against anyone else. Thedecision proved to be sound with no ident i f iabledegradation in a ir support attr ibutable to the highperformance ai rcraf t . In 12 years of fighting thete r ror is ts , RAF ai rcraf t -- je t and reciprocating together - - flew upwards of 25,000 sort ies to deliver over33,000 tons of bombs and close to 100,000 rockets withact ivi ty approaching 2,000 bombing and ground at tacksor t ies in a single year.

    The a ir weapons used against the te r ror is ts remainedsubstantially unchanged throughout the Emergency. Inthe bomb category, large numbers of small bombs provided the desired effect with 500-pound bombs beingused extensively early in the Emergency. Much s m ~ a l l e r20-pound, pressure fused, fragmentation bombs and

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    27-pound cluster bombs provided excel lent area coverage.Fighter aircraf t effectively employed the 60-poundaer ia l rocket. The Griffin bomb -- an RAF version ofnapalm -- had l i t t le effect in the t ropical jungle.

    The British employed a team approach to theircounterterrorist operations in Malaya. The team rel ied heavily on Brit ish Army and Malayan Poli ce fo rcessupported by a ir elements of the RAF and other Common-wealth a ir forces. There is l i t t le doubt that the teamaccomplished i t s objective and no doubt about the partplayed by airpower.

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    CONCLUSIONS

    The MCP and the i r communist te r ror is ts fai led toachieve a take-over in Malaya even a t the expense of7,000 te rroris t l ives. This spectacular communistfai lure stands alone as an example of the resul t s thatcan be attained through strong, determined, and aggressiveaction against so-called "wars of national l iberat ion."The Brit ish in Malaya succeeded in meeting the threatof the te r ror is ts head-on, stemming the t ide , andultimately bringing the communists to the i r knees. In sodoing, the Brit ish Commonwealth forces and the Malayanpopulace los t 11,000 l ives , predominantly civi l ian.

    The Brit ish success rested firmly on the programlaid down in the Briggs Plan. In par t icular , the BriggsPlan recognized the t r i -ethnic nature of the Malayanpopulation and took advantage of strong Malay support,as well as Chinese support by those Malayan Chinesein tent on proving their loyalty to Malaya. In so doing,the Briggs Plan clear ly labeled the communist te r ror is tsas a minority group bent on self-aggrandizement throught e r ror i s t tact ics. In this way, the Brit ish won thepopular support of the Malayans.

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    The Briggs Plan also provided the machinery formaintaining popular support by demonstrating the capa-bi l i ty to protect the population. Through the establish-ment of a high density police force composed of loyalMalayans, the Brit ish were able to deter many t e r ror i s traids and reduce the effectiveness of many more. Byestablishing close control of populated areas, smallnumbers of police could provide effective protectionfor relat ively large numbers of civi l ians.

    Through these steps, the Briggs Plan effectivelyisolated the population from the ter ror is ts and se t thestage for communist at t r i t ion through starvation. Withthe population contained and the means to produce anddistr ibute food controlled, the ter ror is ts had noalternative but to l ive off the jungle and cul t ivateland wherever possible. The te r ror is t s , preoccupiedwith finding food or t ied to small plots trying to growfood, could hardly be expected to function as clever,wily guerr i l las . Yet, without a sanctuary, without a"Ho Chi Minh Trai l ," the ter ror is ts had no choice butto trade some measure of mobility for food cult ivation.And, in so doing, they enhanced the i r vulnerabil i ty toa ir attack.

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    But even though the Briggs Plan contained the meansto success, i t could not assure success without a dynamicleader charged with the responsibi l i ty of success andempowered with the authori ty to exercise overall cont ro l . This man was Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, 54years old, a graduate of the Royal Military College a tSandhurst, and a man experienced in military governmentand intell igence. As both High Commissioner andDirector of Operations, he commanded the jo in t and com-bined operations of Commonwealth forces, police andmili tary a l ike , in a unified and coordinated counterguerri l la action. He not only implemented the BriggsPlan; he accelerated i t .

    By vir tue of unity of command -- provided by FieldMarshal Templer in his execution of the Briggs PlanArmy, Navy, Air Force, and civi l ian police formed ateam equal to the task of defeating the ter ror is ts .The police maintained law and order and protected l i feand property; the Army had the primary role of seekingout and destroying the terror is ts in the jungle; theNavy patrolled the coastal perimeter and, on occasion,bombarded te r ror is t areas within range of the i r ships '

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    firepower. The a ir forces operated in direct cooperationwith the ground forces to provide a i r l i f t of suppliesand troops, reconnaissance, tact i9al str ikes, and avarie ty of special a ir missions.

    The a i r l i f t provided by Commonwealth a ir forcesmay well have been decisive in permitting the groundforces to move rapidly to areas where they could capture,k i l l , or corner the communist terror is ts . The mobilityprovided by a i r l i f t , in effect , multiplied the effect ivestrength of the counterguerril la forces by cutt ing int rans i t time from days to minutes. The importance ofsuch speed of deployment cannot be overemphasized,especial ly in view of the guerr i l la mobility and theshort duration of counterguerril la engagements. Furthermore, ground forces, deployed by a ir or otherwise, hadstaying power when necessary by means of a ir supply.And, l as t ly , the abi l i ty to supply by a ir often providedthe abil i ty to evacuate by a ir -- a point of no smallconcern to ground-force morale. This l a t te r point ispart icular ly t rue of Pioneer and Auster fixed-wingSTOL a i rc ra f t and the rotary-wing helicopters.

    The air-reconnaissance capabil i ty provided the

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    jo in t forces with both intell igence information and themeans for targeting. The photographic reconnaissancecarried out by Mosquitoes, Pembrokes, Meteors, andCanberras provided the raw material for ski l led photographic interpretat ion and for the mapping of a largeportion of Malaya. The photographic interpretat ionidentif ied targets which could then be annotated ontarget materials produced as a resul t of the mappingmissions, In this way, air- target materials could beused by both the ground and a i r forces to fac i l i ta tecoordinated attacks by str ike a i rc ra f t ,

    The actual employment of s t r ike a i rc ra f t , althoughused extensively, is dif f icu l t to evaluate. Those str ikemissions conducted against area targets , and withoutalmost immediate follow-up by ground forces, arealmost iropossible to evaluate in terms of casual t iesinfl icted on the enemy. Conversely, coordinated a i r ground operations in which the target could be accuratelydefined for aircrews provided str iking resul ts . Theent ire question of target identif icat ion remains worthyof addit ional study. The Brit ish flew "time and heading" from recognizable check points, such as terra in

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    features, colored balloons, and smoke pots. They em-ployed this same technique a t night using searchlightsor Eureka radar beacons and claim to have achievedsat isfactory resul ts . Even so, the resul t was s t i l larea bombing that , although sat isfactory, could hardlybe considered eff ic ient or economical.

    The importance of the economic considerations cannot be neglected. The protracted nature of counterguerri l la warfare - - paced as i t is by long, slowat t r i t ion -- makes the consideration of economic factorsmandatory le s t bankruptcy precede victory. An excellentexample of the use of airpower to provide economy offorce has already been ci ted in the rapid t rans i t oftroops. Conversely, no such clear-cut case can bemade for tac t ical str ikes against i l l -defined targets .

    Similarly, the use of the helicopter can bestrongly influenced by economic considerations. Therecan be no question but that the helicopter demonstratedtremendous u t i l i ty . There is also no question of thehigh in i t i a l cost and the high operating and maintenancecosts of helicopters in comparison with l ight fixed-wing

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    ai rcraf t" In round numbers,* a fixed-wing a i rc ra f t inthe Malayan operation cost one-tenth the price of acomparable hel icopter , had direc t operating costs ofless than one-half tha t of the hel icopter , and flew half-again as fas t . In terms of in i t i a l cost , operatingcosts , and block times, the fixed-wing a i rc ra f t was30 times as a t t rac t ive as the helicopter . As a resul t ,the t ight control exercised by Air Headquarters overthe employment of helicopters is not surprising.

    In addit ion, the poor load-carrying capabi l i ty of

    *The 8-55 hel icopter was priced a t $137,500, theAuster a t less than $10,000; the cost per hour of operat ion for the 8-55 was $218 and for the Auster $36; the8-55 cruised a t 70 knots and the Auster a t 90 knots. Theat t ract iveness ra t io is then,137,500 x 218 x 90 = 10710,000 36 70

    A similar comparison of the 8-55 and the Pioneer gives,137,500 x 218 x 100 = 12.535,000 98 70

    A conservative compromise in comparing both the Austerand the Pioneer with the 8-55 is used in the text , show-ing an order of magnitude difference in i n i t i a l cost , afactor of two in operating costs , and fixed-wing speedhalf-again as great as hel icopter speed.

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    the helicopters used in Malaya, coupled with the i r highcosts , made fixed-wing escort essent ia l . Although theBri t ish could have armed and armored the i r hel icopters ,the resul tant increase in weight and decrease in payload would have a l l but prohibited f l ight . As a consequence, the Bri t ish flew fixed-wing a i rc ra f t toneutral ize areas of intended helicopter operation and,thereby, protected the cost ly machine and i t s meagerpayload. Similarly, in reconnaissance operations, fixedwing a i rc ra f t made the g ros s exam inations, w ith hel i copters making only detai led observations o f su sp ic iousar ea s a lre ady ident i f ied by fixed-wing machines. Inth is way, Air Headquarters could al locate helicoptersonly to those operat ions which clearly jus t i f ied the i ruse.

    In the area of special a ir missions, a i rc ra f tearned the i r way by delivering a i r -assaul t teams, defol ia t ing edible plant l i fe , and waging psychologicalwarfare. The a ir assaul t depended heavily on droppingparatroops through the jungle with the Abseil loweringgear. These assaul t forces, jumping from Valet tas ,were able to deploy anywhere in Malaya on short notice,

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    without benefit of previously reconnoitered helicopterlanding s i tes , and without the l imitat ion imposed bythe short-range capabili ty of the helicopter. In thedefoliating role, the helicopter had no real subst i tuteand could hover and spray af ter the area had beenneutralized by fixed-wing firepower. The helicoptercould also discharge and recover defoliat ing teams whocould perform a more effective job on the ground. Theemployment of airpower for psychological warfare consis ted of 'Voice' aircraf t and leaflet-dropping. Inboth of these cases, the job could not have beenaccomplished without the airplane.

    In summary, the case study of Malaya demonstratesth at gue rr illa warfare contains no guarantee of success. Effective means can be found to deal withguerri l las. What is required is a workable plan,implemented by dynamic and aggress ive leadersh ip thatrecogn izes the absolute necessity for unity of commandand economy of force throughout a protracted conflicto

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    APPENDIXTYPES OF AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED

    TransportsDakota -- RAF name for the venerable American-madeDC-3 or C-47 twin-engine transport. Nominalload-carrying capabil i ty 5,000 pounds with agross weight of 29,000 pounds.

    Valetta -- RAF twin-engine t ransport made byVickers. Maximum disposable load of over 11,000pounds. Can carry 8,800 pounds 350 miles.Pembroke -- Small RAF twin-engine ut i l i ty aircraf t

    with gross weight of 13,500 poundS. Can be configured for photographic reconnaissance.Bristol Freighter -- Twin-engine, high-wing cargoplane with fixed landing gear. Capable ofcarrying 12,000 pounds for 820 miles; 10,000pounds for 1,250 miles; and 8,000 pounds for1,670 miles. Gross weight: 44,000 pounds.

    BombersBrigand -- RAF twin-engine attack bomber of WorldWar II vintage. Similar in c a p ~ b i l i t y to USAFB-26.

    Mosquito - - RAF World War II plywood, twin-engine,multipurpose aircraf t . Gross weight: 18,450pounds.Lincoln -- A scaled-up version of the World War IILancaster and a standard post-war RAF bomber.

    Gross weight: 82,000 pounds with a maximum bombload of 22,000 pounds. Combat radius of 1,125miles with 14,000 pounds bomb load.

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    Sunderland -- Large, 4-engine flying boat with2,000-pound bomb load and l 3 ~ - h o u r endurance.Gross weight: up to 60,000 pounds.Shackleton -- Large 4-engine RAF bomber with grossweight of 100,000 pounds.Canberra -- RAF twin-jet l ight bomber. Bomb loadsup to 6,000 pounds with maximum gross weight of46,000 pounds.

    FightersHarvard -- RAF name for American-made T-6 Texant rainer. Modified to carry eight 20-pound

    fragmentation bombs in addition to one 7.9-mmmachine gun.Spitf ire - - Famous RAF f ighter of World War II .Carried eight 60-pound rockets, two 20-mm guns,and one SOO-pound or eight 20-pound bombs.Tempest -- Another RAF f ighter of World War I I .Carried eight 60-pound rockets and four 20-mmguns