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AIRPOWER
IN THREE WARS
GENERAL WILLIAM W. MOMYER
USAF, RET.
Reprint Edition
EDITORS:
MANAGING EDITOR - LT COL A. J . C. LAVALLE, MS
TEXTUAL EDITOR - MAJ OR J AMES C. GASTON, PHD
ILLUSTRATED BY:
LT COL A. J . C. LAVALLE
Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
April 2003
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Disclaimer
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely thoseof the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the UnitedStates Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.Cleared for public release.
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Air University Library Cataloging Data
Momyer, William W.Airpower in t h ree war s / William W. Mom yer ; m an aging editor, A. J . C.
Lavalle ; textu al editor, Ja m es C. Ga ston ; illu str at ed b y A. J . C. Lavalle
Reprinted.p. ; cm .
With a new preface.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 1-5856 6-116-31. Airpower. 2 . World War , 19391945Aer ia l opera t ions . 3 . Korean War .
195 01953 Aerial opera tion s. 4. Vietna m ese Con flict, 1961 197 5Aerial oper-ations. 5. Momyer, William W. 6. Aeronau tics , MilitaryUnited States . I. Tit le.II. Lavalle , A. J . C . (Ar thu r J . C .), 1940 III. Gas ton , J am es C.
358 .4 / 009 / 04dc21
Air Un ivers ity Press131 Wes t Shu ma cher Avenu e
Maxwell AFB AL 361 12 -661 5
ht tp : / / au press .maxwell.af.mil
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TO . . .
a l l th ose brave airm en wh o
fought th eir ba t t les in th e
sk ies for com m an d of th e
air in World War II, Korea,an d Vietna m .
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PREFACE 2003
Wh en I received th e requ est to u pd ate m y 1978 foreword to th is
book, I thought it might be useful to give my perspective of some
as pects on th e emp loym ent of airpower in th e Persian Gu lf War, th e
Air War over Serbia (Operation Allied Force), and the war in
Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom). It is not my intent to
analyze air operations in these wars but to see if there are trends
th at m ight b e app ropriate for an other war. I was p articu larly in ter-
ested in th e application of esta blish ed a irpower doctrine sin ce I was
deeply in volved with it th rou ghou t m y car eer.
The Gulf War, in many respects, had many features of World
War II. The first requirement in World War II was to gain and
maintain air superiority to have freedom of action to carry out
th e destr u ction of Germ an ys a bility to wage war a n d to creat e
th e m ost favorable con ditions for th e in vas ion of Eu rope (Opera tion
Overlord). It was mandatory to establish air superiority so that
th e Germ an air force wou ldn t be a ble to att ack t h e h ighly vu l-
nerable landing force and the subsequent breakout. A vigorous
in terdict ion cam pa ign was in it ia ted 60 da ys prior to th e in vas ion
to seal off th e lan ding areas . J u st p r ior to the as sa u lt , a l l a ir-
power was tu rn ed to direct s u pp ort of th e lan ding force. As h is-
tory records , a ir su periority was esta blish ed an d m ainta in ed; th e
ar ea was su ccessfu lly sealed off from Germ an forces tryin g to get
at the landing force; and all Allied airpower was directed to close
a ir su ppor t u n t il the m ain force ha d landed an d opera t ions were
u n derway to en gage the m ain forces of th e Germ an s. It is of spe-
cial interest that the German air force was able to fly only a few
sorties, and those had no significant effect.
The Gulf War followed the same general pattern. First, we
destr oyed th e air defens e system an d gained con trol of th e air prior
to the introduction of ground forces. We exploited that air superi-
ority by systematic attacks on the command and control system,
the governmental supporting structure, and the deployed military
forces. Particular attention was given to the mechanized forces of
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the elite Revolutionary Guard. All of these attacks, as in World War
II, were inten ded to pa ve th e way for ou r grou n d forces. As t h e in va-
sion approached, the major effort was devoted to attacks against
the lines of communication that would be used by the reserve
forces. As the assault on enemy defense lines began, all of the air-
power was d evoted t o h elping our grou n d force breach th e defens e
and begin the exploitation. Airpower was a dominant factor
throughout the campaign, in which there were fewer casualties
th an in all of ou r pr eviou s wars .
Every war has i t s own charac ter is t ics , but a common thread
on t h e emp loym en t of airpower seem s t o emerge. As in dicated in
th is br ief review of World Wa r II a n d th e Gu lf Wa r, th ere s u r fa ces
a comm on opera t iona l doctr in e. To be su re, th e tact ics were n ot
al ike b u t th e resu lts obtained ap pear very s im ilar . Air s u perior-
i ty made i t possible to sustain at tacks against the core of the
enem ys s tren gth an d a bility to wage war a n d, a t t h e sam e t im e,
to su pport a t tacks again st en emy forces in th e fie ld.
In the Air War over Serbia, the first requirement again was to
n eu tra lize th e Yu goslavian Air Force an d r en der t h e air defen se
system in effective. In m an y ways, th e air defen se s ystem was far
more sophis t ica ted than the one in Opera t ion Deser t Storm.
Although the number of enemy aircraft was not large, i t pos-
sessed some state-of-the-art jet fighters. The elimination of this
flying force was quickly accomplished, but the air defense sys-
tem, with its large nu m bers of rad ar , presented a m u ch m ore dif-
ficu lt p roblem. Th e problem was m ad e m ore com plicated b y the
large number of antiaircraft artillery and air-to-surface missiles,
including the man-pack infrared ones. The air defense system
was never wholly eliminated, but it was neutralized to the extent
that All ied airpower could carry out i ts mission without unac-
ceptab le loss es or in ter feren ce. Significan tly, however, the enem ys
m u ltifaceted d efen ses forced operat ion s a bove 15 ,00 0 feet wh ere
th e th reat of th eir weapons was m in im ized.
With air superiority, the Allied Air Force could devote a major
effort to the strategic objective of destroying the capability and
will of th e Yu goslavian govern m en t t o contin u e th e war. Th is was
m u ch like th e objective of th e St ra tegic Air Force in World Wa r II.
Alth ou gh Germ an y didn t su e for peace as a r esu lt of airpower
attacks, a irpower did weaken the German economy and infra-
s t ru c ture to the exten t th a t th e cou n try could no longer su s ta in
its military forces in the field at a strength needed to defeat the
oppos in g Allied force. Some eviden ce in dicated t h e sa m e tren d in
Yu goslavia, even th ou gh s u pp ort of m ilita ry forces was n ot an
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issue since the bulk of its ground forces were not engaged in
combat. Consequently, the airpower at tack there should be per-
ceived a s a st ra tegic att ack on t h e n at ions a bility to fu n ction .
Since no Allied ground forces were involved, most of the air
a t tacks were aga ins t grou n d force bases an d rou tes u sed to move
uni ts f rom the nor thern par t of the country into the combat
areas of Kosovo. Hence, there was no interdiction effort in the
tradit ional sense s ince there were not that many targets .
However, significant effort was devoted to small engagements
throughout the area. Many of these at tacks were in close prox-
im ity to civilian s, an d, t h erefore, requ ired a forward air con troller
to con tr ol s trikes . With on ly a s m all por tion of th e Yu goslavian
army in the f ie ld, only a small number of tanks, armored per-
son n el vehicles , an d s u pp ly trucks were destroyed. Bu t th ese air
at ta cks were of su ch precis ion th at an y large-scale deploym ent of
Yu goslavian grou n d force clearly wou ld h ave met t h e sa m e fat e
as befell th e Ira qi ar m y. Airp ower, in m y view, wa s t h e comp ellin g
force th at br ou ght th e war to a close. Airp ower d id in Yu goslavia
wh at a irm en h ad h oped i t would be able to do aga ins t Germ an y
in World War IIavoid a ground war.
The Afghanistan War, Operation Allied Force, exhibited some of
the features of previous wars, but in many ways it was entirely dif-
ferent. Control of the air was the first requirement, but air opera-
tions were made difficult by the long distances to bases and the
location of th e Navy car rier ta sk force. Fortu n at ely, the Taliba n air
force con sisted of on ly a few fighters , which were destr oyed, a n d th e
air defense s ystem in n o way in tegratedwas r ap idly n eu tra lized.
Th e ma n -pack in frared m issiles posed a thr eat th roughou t th e war,
again forcing Allied air forces to fly above the effective altitudes of
these weapons. But in a real sense, there were no restraints on
Allied u se of th e airsp ace over th e coun try.
With such complete control of the air, the objective of destroy-
ing the Taliban government and el imination of the terroris t
organization and i ts leader were pursued with minimum expo-
su re. Th e prim ary grou n d ba tt le was fough t between Taliba n an d
North ern Allian ce forces, both of which con sisted of a n u m ber of
indigenous forces. These forces were deployed along a defended
line of trenches, bunkers , and other obstacles that the Northern
Alliance was unable to break through. Without airpower, i t is
quest ionable whether the Northern All iance would even have
been able to hold its position. To complicate matters, various
warlords were fighting among themselves and with Taliban ele-
men ts th roughou t the res t of the cou n try.
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It was in this setting that the Central Intelligence Agency and
Special Forces team s were placed in th e cou n try. Th eir ta sk was
not only the production of intelligence, but also the establishing
of frien dly relation s with th e var iou s war lords . It was th ese team s
that identif ied targets suitable for a t tack. These teams also
estab lish ed relat ion s with th e Norther n Allian ce leader a n d con -
vin ced h im wha t a irpower could be to s u pport h is forces.
In Afghanistan, a new level of close air support was developed
com pa red t o al l previou s wars . With precis ion weap ons , pa rt icu -
lar ly th e J oin t Direct Atta ck Mu n ition (J DAM) an d its Globa l
Positioning System (GPS)-aided inertial navigation, strikes could
be made extremely close to friendly troops. With all types of
str ike a ircra ft circlin g overh ead , weap ons cou ld b e on a ta rget ina matter of a few minutes . Also new was the use of unmanned
aer ial veh icles (UAV) to d eliver wea pon s an d to gen era te r eal-time
ta rgets. Th is was m an ifested in UAVs s en ding tar get da ta t o an
HC-130 overhead, which could engage without delay.
I wou ld like to con clu de th ese n ew pers pectives with th e obser-
va t ion th a t th e fu n dam enta ls tha t a irm en h ave he ld onto in the
employment of a irpower were demonstrated in our recent wars
without qualification. Airpower accomplished what it was capa-
ble of doing, and what many of us thought i t could doindeed,what many of us had hoped it would do in World War II. These
were abbreviated warsabbreviated by the wedding of estab-
lished airpower doctrine with dramatically new technologies. To
be su re, we would h ave ach ieved su ccess with out th e new tech -
n ologies , bu t it would ha ve taken m ore t im e and p recious h u m an
resources. But the doctr ine that has guided airpower employ-
ment , i t seems to me, remains an endur ing foundat ion tha t
bodes well for the integration of air and space assets into one
cohesive force.
WILLIAM W. MOMYER
General, US Air Force (retired)
December 2002
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am indebted to many colleagues who have encouraged me
during the writ ing of this book. On numerous occasions I have
sought their views on their perspective of airpower from their
tours of duty in command and staff in peace and war. I t shouldbe u n derstood th at t h e views h erein express ed ar e solely those of
th e au th or an d a re not th ose of th e Departm ent of th e Air Force.
Without the use of the extensive materials from the USAF
Archives and the close assistance of the Office of History, this
st ory of airpower in th ree war s wou ld h ave been s eriou sly in com-
plete. Th e CORONA HARVES T report s were p a rticu la rly valu ab le
in docum enting m an y of th e operat iona l as pects of th e Vietna m
War. Add itiona lly, th e ser vices of th e USAF p h oto dep ository an d
the English and History departments a t the Air Force Academywere welcomed participants in the production of this book. My
sp ecial tha n ks to Major J am es C. Gaston , professor of En glish at
the Academy, for his extensive assistance in the textual editing
of the manuscript . Of course, there were othersmy thanks to
them a lso.
Finally, I wish to express special appreciation to my assistant
an d m an agin g editor, Lt Col A. J . C. Lavalle, for h is u n tirin g
efforts in every ph as e of th e prepa ra tion of th is b ook, an d to Mrs.
Donn a Ca ldwell for her p at ien ce in typin g th e ma n y dr afts it tookto reach th e fin al produ ct .
WILLIAM W. MOMYER
General, USAF (Retired)
1 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 8
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FOREWORD
I began working on th is book some month s ago wh en a n u m-
ber of colleagues asked me to record my thoughts about the
employment of airpower, especially tactical airpower, after 35
year s in th e profess ion. I ha dn t a n y illu sions of being bless edwith special wisdom, but , as they said, no one else shared
exactly my perspective on tactical airpower, and other profes-
sion al a irm en m igh t fin d i t u sefu l to kn ow h ow I sa w things, pa r-
t icularly during the Vietnam years , whether they happened to
ap pr ove of m y perception s or n ot. Very soon I rea lized t h at m y
perspective was in fact several perspectives, and none of them
could be maintained in perfect isolat ion from the others . I had
watch ed s tra tegy, tactics, an d tech n ology evolve, an d a ll th ree of
th ese evolu tion s fas cin at ed m e in recollection. I h ad seen ta cticalairpower from the viewpoints of the greenest fighter pilot (in
1939), the senior a ir commander in our longest war, and almost
every position in between: dozens of pers pectives t h ere, an d a ll of
th em seem ed valid an d im portan t to me. So my problem becam e
one of choosing from among my many perspectives the few that
seemed likely to offer the most to other airmen.
Although I take most delight in recalling my experiences as a
youn g figh ter pi lot , I h ad to ad m it th at th eres proba bly n othing
u niqu e about th a t perspec t ive . Hun dreds of others sh ared abou t
the same experiences and could describe them as well or better
than I. Thus I turned away (fellow fighter pilots will understand
how difficult this was) from the temptation to spin stories about
those days .
On th e oth er h an d, if th eres lit t le ju st ification for m y dis-
cu ss ing m an y of th e th in gs I do r ecall from World War II, th eres
little point , eith er, in a ttem pt in g to an a lyze wha t I didn t k n ow (or
kn ew on ly by readin g abou t it lat er) ab ou t a irp ower in World War
II. My exper ien ce was in North Africa a n d Ita ly; I didn t p ar tici-
pate in, for instance, the combined bomber offensive against
Germ an y or th e B-29 offens ive again st J ap an . I h ave som e
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s t rong opin ions a bout th e mis tak es an d su ccesses of those cam-
pa igns , opinions which Ill sh ar e with oth er airm en in p rivat e,
bu t I don t wan t th ose ju dgmen ts lyin g arou n d in a book like th is
one wh ere fu tu re a irm en m igh t see them an d su ppose they were
ba sed on au th orita t ive, firs th an d observation.
I examined and discarded many other approaches us ing this
sa m e filtering pr ocess avoid discu ss in g wh at I dont k n ow from
m y own experience an d th e experiences of m y compa n ions , an d
cons ider t ellin g wh at I do k n ow on ly if fu tu re a irm en m ight pr ofit
from seein g h ow th ose even ts looked from a p ersp ective th at wa s
uniquely, or almost uniquely, mine. This filtering process kept
m e away from persp ectives th at wou ld in clu de s u ch large topics
as ou r em ploym en t of th e at omic bom b in World War II (n o firs t-
h an d k n owledge of th e decis ion process), an d s u ch p ersona l top-
ics as th e ways in wh ich Presiden t J ohn son s eem ed to h ave aged
between Decem ber 196 7 when I ta lked with h im a t length a bou t
the bombing campaign and the defense of Khe Sahn as we f lew
from Korat to Cam Ranh Bay and October 1968 when I spoke
with h im for th e las t t ime a t th e Wh ite Hou se (n ot likely to be of
profession al in terest to fu tu re a irm en).
What the filtering left me with were the perspectives you find
in this book, the major preoccupations of my years as a senior
comm an der : s t ra tegy, comm an d an d control, cou n ter a ir opera-
t ions, interdict ion, and close air support . Most of my unique
opportu n it ies to perceive airpower occu rred d u rin g my tenu re as
Com m an der of 7th Air Force in Vietna m from J u ly 1966 u n til
Au gu st 1 968 , an d you ll see h ere mostly wha t I sa w then . But
some of my perceptions from earl ier and la ter years must be
recorded, too, to place my observations from the Vietnam years
in context . My perspective on command and control when I ran
7th Air Force wa s certain ly affected b y m y earlier obs ervat ions in
19421944 when I was a f ighter group commander in North
Africa an d t h ose in 1 94 4194 6 when I was Ch ief of th e Arm y Air
Forces Board for Combined Operations. While I was Assistant
Chief of Staff at Tactical Air Command headquarters between
194 6194 9, I u n dou btedly picked u p m an y of th e ideas reflected
in m y appr oach to close air su pp ort in Vietna m . Also, as a m em-
ber of the faculty of the Air War College from 19501953, I was
ideally s i tuated to observe the command and control re lat ion-
sh ips an d th e com plexit ies of th e in terdict ion, c lose air su pport ,
an d cou n ter air miss ion s d u ring th e Korean War. After a s eries of
tours in which I commanded the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing and
the 314th Air Division in Korea, and the 312th Fighter-Bomber
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Win g an d th e 83 2n d Air Division in th e U.S., I served as Director
of Plans, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, from 1958 unti l
1961. There I saw firsthand the effects on our tactical air forces
of both th e Eisen h ower adm in istra t ions em ph as is on n u clear
weapons an d th e Kenn edy adminis t ra t ions enth u s iasm for the
weapons and techniques of sub-l imited war. During my tour in
the Air Staff from 19611964 I was directly involved in the dis-
cu ss ion of cou n terin su rgen cy an d th e forces th at were needed for
the developing war in Vietnam. My assignment in Vietnam was
preceded by a two-year tour as Commander of Air Training
Command. As Commander of Tactical Air Command from the
time I re turned from Vietnam in 1968 unti l I re t ired in 1973, I
rem ained in tima tely in volved in t h e plan n in g for all of ou r ta cti-cal air operations in Vietnam.
What I offer in this book, as fairly and as clearly as I can, is an
account of the way airpower looked to me from the perspectives I
th in k will m at ter m ost to airm en . I don t record th ese views in th e
h ope th at a irm en , even m y frien ds , will ap pr ove them . In fact I h ope
that all of our airmen who examine them will do so critically. We
m u stn t r ely ent irely u pon yest erda ys idea s to fight tom orrows
wars, a fter all, bu t I h ope our airm en won t pa y the p rice in com ba t
again for what some of us have already purchased.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
CHAPTER I: STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Nu c lea r Wea p on s a n d Ta ct ica l Air For ces . . . . . . . 1
Kor ea n Wa r A Dilem m a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ya lu Con t a in m e n t of MIGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Im p a ct of Kor ea n Wa r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Th e Fr en ch In In d och in a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
S EATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Wars of Libe ra t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
J u ng le J im Fir s t Com ba t D ep loym e n t . . . . . . . . 11
J oin t Ta s k F or ce 1 16 Res p on s e t o Cr is is in La os . 1 2
A Cha n ging RoleThe U.S . To Figh t . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Bom b t h e Nor th ? No Agr eem e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6
The G u lf of Tonk in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
St ra tegyReta lia tory At tacks in North Vie tna m . . . 17
G ra du a l Es ca la t ion R ep la c es Re ta lia t ion . . . . . . . . 20
Air C a m pa ign Pla nPr opos ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Grou nd Forces DeployedPr ior ity Set . . . . . . . . . . 23
Reque s t To S tr ike Air fie lds C on t inu es . . . . . . . . . . 24
S t ra t egy Slowly Cha n ges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
TETStra tegy Cha nged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A Ne w S t ra t egy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Air S t ra tegy Adopted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Footno tes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
CHAPTER II: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER . 43Prior to Vie tna m War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Nor th Afr ica The Fou nda t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
OVE RLORDTh e Ar gu m en t s Ab ou t C om m a n d . . . 5 0
Air m a n Dep u t y Th e a ter Com m a n d er . . . . . . . . . . 5 4
Com p on en t Com m a n d sCon t in u in g Is su e . . . . . . 5 6
Kor ea St ru c tu r e of a The a t er of O pe ra t ions . . . . . 58
Ta r get ingJ u r is d ic tiona l Qu es t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
O per a t iona l Con t r ol With in FEAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Con tr ol of St ra tegic Air F orces in a
Th e a ter of Op er a tion s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2
Con trol of Naval Avia t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
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Page
Control of Marine Aviation In A Theater
of Opera t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Footno tes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
CHAPTER III: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER
IN THE VIETNAM WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Com m a n d S tr u ct u r eTh e Begin n in g . . . . . . . . . . 7 4
2n d Air Division ADVONTh e Beginn ing of a n
Air Com p on e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5
MACVA S u b -Un ified C om m a n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8
PAC AF Vie w Of Com m a nd Or ga n iza t ion . . . . . . . . 79
J TF-116A New Elem e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 n d Air Divis ion E xp a n d ed Au t h o rit y . . . . . . . . . 8 2
Air m a n As D epu ty MACV Pr opos e d . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
MACV As Un ified Comm a n d Un der
J C SA Pr opos a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
D epu ty Com m a nde r For Air Oper a t ions . . . . . . . . . 85
Role of CINCPAC Com p on e n t Com m a n d s . . . . . . . 8 8
Air Dep u t y Pos it ion E s ta b lis h e d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1
Cont ro l of Arm y Helicopter s an d Mar ine Airc ra ft . . 91
Fu rt h er Defin ition of 2n d Air DivisionRespons ib ilit ie s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
C on t r ol Ar r a nge m en t s For Oper a t ions In La os . . . . 95
Control of Navy Strike Aircraft Diverted
F rom Nor th Viet n a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9
Cont ro lling The S t r ikes Up Nor th . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Coordina t ing Au thor ity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Rou te Pa c ka ges A Con t r ol Ar r a ngem e n t . . . . . . . 104
Com m an d of Bom ber ForceCon tin u in g
Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Sum m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
CHAPTER IV: THE COUNTER AIR BATTLE (AIR
SUPERIORITY) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5
Air Su per iority, World War II8t h & 9t h
Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Air Su per ior ity Korea5th Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Air SuperiorityNorth VietnamA New
Dimen sion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
The North Vie tna mese Air Defense Sys tem . . . . . . 133
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Nor th Vie tna mese Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
An ti-Aircra ft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4
SAMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6C ou n te r m ea s u r es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Wild Wease lIron Han d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
SAM Opera tors Cou nte r tact ic s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Ru les of En gagem en tA Cont in u in g SAM
Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Losses to SAMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
MIGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
MIG Airfie lds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7
MIG Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8Seventh Air Force Deals With the MIGs . . . . . . . . . 162
BOLOA Figh ter Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
The Battle ChangesMissiles And
Hit -and -Ru n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Cont ro l In The Targe t Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Con siderat ions Affectin g Kill Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5
Sum m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
CHAPTER V: INTERDICTION (World War II, Korea,
CHAPTER V: an d Vie tna m 19641968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
OVERLORD An d Interdict ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3
OVERLORDs Lesson s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7
Re trea t to Pu san . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Chinese Cross the Ya lu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
In te rd ic tion Begins Vie tna m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Nor th Vie tna mese Logis t ica l Sys tem . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Var iab les Influ enc ing the In te rd ic tion Campa ign . . 197
All-Weath er Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 0
Ear ly Deve lopment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
F-111 O per a t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Ra ilroad Sys tem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Road Ne tworkKey Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
In terdic t ion Zon es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Sor t ie Frequ ency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
C om m a nd a nd Con t r ol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Some Tact ica l In n ovat ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Nigh t Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Sum m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
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Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
CHAPTER VI: INTERDICTION (Vietn am 19 68 19 72 ) . . . . . 23 7Lase r & AC-130sNew Sys tems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
1968 B om bing Ha ltIm pa c t on In t e r d ict ion . . . . . 241
Str ikes Below Th e 20th Para lle l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Bomb in g In Route Package VI A (Hanoi Area) . . . . 246
St r ike Force Compos it ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Pene t ra t ing The Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Impor tance of Tan ker Supp or t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
Wea the r Informat ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Lack of Su rpr ise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259Reconn aissa n ceCover in g Th e Targets . . . . . . . . . 261
Reconn aissa n ce Tact ics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Fina l Days1972 Bombing Offens ive . . . . . . . . . . 266
Sum m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
CHAPTER VII: AIRPOWER AND THE GROUND BATTLE . . 277
Inc reased U.S . Involvement in Vie tna m . . . . . . . . . 277
Deve loping The Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280FARM GATEA Force For Coun ter in su rgency . . . . 282
Tac t ica l Air Cont ro l Sys tem Bui lds . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Evolu t ion Of Sys tem For Air Su ppor t . . . . . . . . . . . 287
North Afr icaTh e Class room For Vie tnam . . . . . . . 287
Eu ropeRefinement Of The Sys tem . . . . . . . . . . . 288
Adapting The Air-Ground Operations System To
Vie tnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
The B a tt le Cha n ge s Ne w De m a nds . . . . . . . . . . . 295
No Batt le Lin esFACs Come Of Age . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8
J e ts Are Approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
Th e Air - Gr ou n d O per a tion s S ys t em E xp a n d s . . . . 3 0 6
2n d Air Divis ion Becomes 7 th Air Force . . . . . . . . 308
Employing the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Advan tages Of Aircraft Ordn an ce Over Artillery . . . 31 3
Daylight Figh ter Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4
Night an d Bad Wea the rSpec ia l Techn iques . . . . . 315
B-52s And The Grou nd Ba t tle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
Navy and Marin e Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Sum m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
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CHAPTER VIII: BLUNTING THE ATTACK WITH AIRPOWER
CHAPTER VIII: (J UNCTION CITY, Kh e Sa n h , Tet, Ea s ter
CHAPTER VIII: Offens ive) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327Air Operat ionJ UNCTION CITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8
En emy Probes For An Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
KHE SANHAirpower in the Forefront . . . . . . . . . 340
Prelu de To Tet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
TetTh e Offens ive Begin s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 0
Prepa r ing For Withdrawa l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Excurs ion In to Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Withd rawalAn Un easy Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Easter Offens iveA Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364The As s e s s m en t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 7
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
1 . Nor th Kor ea n In va s ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 . Dien B ien P h u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 . Air Com m a n d o an d H is Air cr a ft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3
4 . 94 -Ta r get S t ra t egy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5 . P-40s In Nor th Afr ica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6. North west Africa Air Force After Cas ab lan ca
6 . Confer enc e (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7 . Pr op os ed Or ga n iza tion F or Th e In va s ion o f E u r op e . . . 5 2
8 . B-1 7 s Wit h Th eir Figh t er E s cor t E n rou t e To E u r op e . . 5 4
9 . O rga n iza t ion For O VERLORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10 . F ina l Or ga n iza t ion Aft er Inva s ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1 1 . Com m a n d O rga n iza t ion Kor ea (1 9 5 0 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9
1 2 . Fa r Ea s t Air For ce Com m a n d (1 9 50 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2
13 . NAVFE View Of Areas Of Respons ib ility . . . . . . . . . . . 68
14. J oin t Policy Agreemen t For Con trol Of
14 . Air cr a ftKor ea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
15. Military Ass is ta n ce Advisory Grou p
14 . (Air E lement )1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
16 . MAAG To MACV (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
17. Proposed Organ iza t ion For Vie tnam And
14 . Tha ila nd (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
18 . CINCPAC Com m a nd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
19. Target Request An d App roval Net For North
14 . Vie tna m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
20 . Air Comm an d Arrangements Sou theas t As ia
14 . (19661972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
21 . Heavy Tra ffic Along Ho Chi Minh Tra il . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
22 . U.S. Navy A4-C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2 3. U.S.S. Cora l S ea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
24. U.S. Navy A-7 Bombing Bridge In North Vie tna m . . . . 105
25 . Rou te Pa c ka ge Sys t em . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2 6 . Ta r get Req u es t S ys t em t o Wh it e Hou s e . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3
27. MACV Proposa l For Contr ol Of Rou te
14 . Package II (1966 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
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2 8 . Com m a n d a n d Con t r ol Of Air Op er a tion s (1 9 7 2 ) . . . . 1 2 0
2 9 . MIG-1 5 Bein g Sh o t Down Over Nor th Kor ea . . . . . . . 1 2 9
30 . F -86s Pa t rolling The Sk ie s of Nor th Kor ea . . . . . . . . . 13031. Ya lu Rive r Fighte r Sweeps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
32. Gaggle Of F-86s En ter in g MIG Alley . . . . . . . . . . . 132
33 . Nor th Vie tna m es e Ra da r C over a ge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3 4 . S ta t u s / AAA In Nor th Viet n a m (Ma r ch 1 9 6 8 ) . . . . . . . 1 3 7
35. North Vie tna mese 57mm AAA Ba t te ry (1965) . . . . . . . 138
36. Soph is t ica ted AAA Emplacement (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . 138
37. SAM Sites And Coverage , Nor th Vie tna m (1969) . . . . . 140
38 . Ene m y SAM S it e Ne a r Ha no i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
39. Close-Up Of Early North Vietna m ese SAM14. Site (1965 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
40 . Typ ica l St r ike For m a t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
41. Chaff Cor r idorLinebacker I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
42. Chaff C lou dLinebacker II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
43. Air -To-Grou nd Miss ile S t reaking For Ta rge t . . . . . . . . 14944 . AAA Em pla c em e n t s O n D ike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15144 . [S ic] SA-2 Miss i le Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
45. North Vie tna mese SAM Effect iveness (19651972) . . . 154
46. USAF F-4 Being Hit By SA-2 Miss ile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15547. MIG 21 Over North Vie tna m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
48. MIGs In Revetments At Phu c Yen Air fie ld . . . . . . . . . . 158
49. North Vie tna mese Air fie lds (1966 & 1972) . . . . . . . . . 16050. Nor th Vie tnam ese Air Force Comb at In ventory14 . (1964 1972 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
51. F-105s In F ligh t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
52. F-4s In F ligh t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
53 . MIG-17 Ma k ing Fir ing Pa s s a t U SAF F-105 . . . . . . . . 167
54. Rada r CoverageITACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17055 . Sou the a s t As ia S t r ike Con t r ol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
56. WATERBOY At Dong Ha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
57. EC-121 College Eye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17258. F-4 Retur n ing To Home Base In Tha ilan d14 . After Miss ion Over Nor th Vie tnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
59. USAF Air -To-Air Weapons Kills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6 0 . Bom b D a m a ged Ra ilr oa d Ya r d s In Fr a n ce . . . . . . . . . 1 8 461. Bom b Dam aged Mars h allin g Yard , Folligny,
14 . Fran ce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18562 . The Tr a ns port a t ion P la nIn t e r dict ion In Eu r ope . . 18663. Resu lts Of AAF Figh ter Attacks On Retreatin g14 . Germ an Colu mn s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
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6 4 . Nor th Kor ea n S u p p lies B u r n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 9
65. S tab ilized Line Of Contac tKorea (Dec 1950) . . . . . . 190
66. F-51s From th e 18th F ighte r -Bomber Wing,14 . 5th Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
67. Sm oke Billows From Bomb in g Of Targets In
14 . Pyongyan g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
68. Result s of S t r ikes On Machine FactoryPyongyan g . . 193
69. Sm oke Billows From Bomb in g Of Kep Mars h allin g
14 . Yard April 196 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5
70. North Vie tna ms Ra ilroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
7 1 . Res t rict ed Zon e s Ar ou n d Ha n oi An d H a ip h on g . . . . . 2 0 9
72 . Por t ions O f Pa u l D ou m e r Br idge Des t r oyed . . . . . . . . 21073 . Re bu ild ing Of Sever a l Spa ns Of D ou m e r Br idge . . . . . 210
74. The Key Bridges In North Vie tna m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
75. Direct Hit s On Tha i Ngu yen S teel Mill . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
76. Enemy Tra ffic F low (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
77 . Ba n La boy In t e r d ict ion Poin t , Ba n Ka r a i Pa s s . . . . . . 215
78 . Clos e -u p O f B a n La boy In t e rd ict ion Poin t . . . . . . . . . 215
79 . Sou thwe s t Mons oon En e m y Tr a ffic Flow . . . . . . . . . . 217
80. En emy Road Network Th rough Laos An d
14 . South Vie tnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2188 1 . Tr u ck Con voy On Rou t e 13 7 , Ba n Ka ra i Pa s s . . . . . . 2 1 9
82. Areas Of Opera t ion In Laos (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
83 . Ar ea s o f O pe ra t ion In La os (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
84 . Ar ea s o f O pe ra t ion In La os (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
85 . USAF C-130 Air bor ne C om m a nd Pos t (AB CCC) . . . . . 227
86 . S t a tions Ins ide ABC CC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
8 7 . B-5 7 On B om b R u n In S o u t h Viet n a m . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 2
88. AC-130 Spect re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
89. Close -u p Of AC-130 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
90. En emy Sup ply Areas Developed After Bomb in g
14 . Halt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
91 . USAF EB-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
92. EB-66 Radar (ECM) Pa t te rn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
93 . Typ ica l S t rike Pene t ra t ion And Egr es s . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
94 . F -105s B om bing Unde r Ra da r Con t r ol . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
95. Bas ic Miss ion Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
96 . Air R efu eling Tr a cks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
97 . F -105s Refu eling Fr om KC -135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
98. F-4s Approaching Refu e ling Boom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
99 . Nor th Vie tna m es e Ea r ly Wa r n ing Sys t em . . . . . . . . . . 261
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100 . Rec onn a is s a nc e Clos e-u p O f 57m m AAA S it e . . . . . . 264
101 . RF-4 B eing Rea d ied For Re cce Mis s ion . . . . . . . . . . 265
102 . Mom yer s In t e r d ict ion Fun ne l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268103 . 20 th Pa r a llel In t e rd ict ion Fun ne l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
104. Major Target AreaLin ebacker II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
105 . Clos e-u p O f H a noi Ra il Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
1 0 6 . Bom b D a m a geGia La m R ail Ya r d An d S h o ps . . . . 2 7 3
107 . U-10 Psychological War fare Aircraft Over S out h
14.7 Vie tnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
108. USAF A-26 Await ing Days Miss ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
1 0 9 . C-4 7 Us ed By Th e Air Com m a n d o Un it s . . . . . . . . . 2 8 4
110 . USAF T-28Ear ly Mains tay Of Air Com m an do14.7 Figh ter Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
111 . Monke y Mou n ta in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
112. Organ iza t ion For Air Opera t ions , Nor th Afr ica . . . . . 289
1 1 3 . J oin t O p er a tion s Cen t er, Kor ea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 1
114. USAF A-lE Loaded To Th e Hilt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
115. USAF A-lE En rou te To Suppor t Groun d
14.7 Opera t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
116. Sou th Vie tna ms Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
11 7. O-1 Bird Dog Wat ch in g Over U.S. Arm y14.7 Specia l Forces Cam p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
118 . Air - Gr ou nd Sys t em , U .S . And Vietna m es e (1968) . . . 307
119. P-40s Taxiing In to Pos it ion , North Afr ica . . . . . . . . . 309
1 2 0 . B-2 4 s Bom b in g Ger m a n P os it ion s In F r an c e . . . . . . 3 1 1
121 . USAF AC-47 And Cr ew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
1 2 2 . B-5 2 s Bom b in g Su s p e ct ed Viet Con g Pos it ion s . . . . 3 2 0
123. U.S . Mar ine A-6 In t ru de r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
124. War Zone C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
125. F-100 Delive ring Iron Bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
126. J UNCTION CITY, Ph ase I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
127. J UNCTION CITY, Pha se II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
128 . The B a tt le For Ap Sou i Tr e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
129. Opera t ions TALLY HO An d NEUTRALIZE . . . . . . . . . 339
130 . USAF C-130 La nd ing At Khe Sa nh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
131. Khe San h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
132. U.S . Organ iza t ion (In I Corps ) For TET Offens ive . . . 352
133. 1968 TET Offens ive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
134 . La m Son 719 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
135 . 1972 Spr ing Offe ns ive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
136. USAF A-37 Bombing Vie t Cong Pos it ions . . . . . . . . . 367
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137 . USAF C-130 Deliverin g Sup plies to Vietna m ese
14.7 Troops At An Loc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
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Chapter I
STRATEGY
My vantage point in World War II, as Commander of the 33rd
Figh ter Grou p in North Africa, Sicily, an d Ita ly, gave m e a good view
of m ore Germ an an d Italian Figh ters th an I really cared to see, bu t
n ot ma n y opport u n ities to witn ess t h e ma king of Allied air str at egy.However, every pilot knew that our strategy embraced two funda-
m enta l featu res: attacks a gains t th e en emy heart lan d (with which I
had little to do, either in Europe or the Pacific) and participation
with su rface forces to destroy th e opposin g forces or ca u se th em t o
surrender. The first priority of our air strategy was to gain control
of the air. Then we concentrated our efforts on isolating the battle-
field an d pr oviding close a ir s u pp ort. Th is air s tra tegy pr ovided flex-
ibility to the Allied armies in their ground campaigns and guaran-
teed a m in im u m of in terference from th e Germa n Air Force. By th etime I returned to the U.S. in 1944 to become Chief of Combined
Operations on the Army Air Forces Board, our Airpower had virtu-
ally destr oyed th eLuftw affe in th e Mediterran ean th rou gh a ir -to-air
engagements and attacks on airfields and logistical bases; and we
h ad repeatedly cu t th e enem ys a ir, sea, a n d lan d lin es of com m u -
n ication, en ab lin g ou r a rm ies to ca ptu re North Africa a n d Sicily an d
to in vad e sou th ern Italy.
At about the time I was leaving Europe, our B-29s in the Pacific
were begin n in g th eir atta cks against J ap an from ba ses in Ch in a. InNovemb er 194 4, B29s from Ch in a a n d th e Marian as raided Tokyo,
an d in March 194 5, Major General Curt is E. Lema y began th e deci-
sive cam pa ign of n ight, low-level in cend iar y att acks. Th e a ir wa r in
th e Pacific culmina ted with th e dropp in g of atom ic bomb s on 6 a n d
9 August, events which profoundly affected U.S. air strategy.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES
With n u clear weapon s a reality in th e lat e forties an d early fifties,
many strategists urged that we evaluate all military forces in light
of their ability to contribute to a general nuclear war.1 But other
planners disagreed. A reduction in the size of U.S. armed forces,
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and our increasingly heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons,
prompted a debate which brought out basic differences among the
service chiefs and within the Air Force itself, I was uniquely situ-
ated to view this debate. Having been assigned as Assistant Chief
of Staff of Tactical Air Command in 1946, I was at Hq TAC when
the Air Force separated from the Army in 1947, and I remained
with TAC u n til goin g to th e Air War College in 19 49 .
Th e Arm y mainta in ed th at s u bs tan tial conven tiona l forces would
be needed to fight limited wars. To evaluate all forces on the basis
of th eir cont ribu tion to a genera l n u clear war with th e Soviet Union
would be imprudent, they said. Several air strategists replied that
with nuclear weapons, it no longer made sense to maintain large
conventiona l forces since su ch forces cou ldn t su rvive in a n u clear
war. Fu rth erm ore, Airpowers cap acity to elim in at e the com m an d
centers of an enemy made extensive surface campaigns unneces-
sary. Airmen conceded that some conventional forces would be
needed for limited wars, but said that these forces need only be
large enough to force the enemy into tactics that would produce a
target for our nuclear weapons. They doubted, too, that a limited
war cou ld rem ain lim ited ind efin itely. Either th e employm en t or th e
threat of nuclear weapons would halt the conflict, or the conflict
would rapidly expand to a general war.
Bu t even with in th e Air Force du rin g the la te 19 40s an d ear ly
19 50 s, th ere was fu n da m en ta l differen ce of views on lim ited war.
Many tactical airmen, including Lieutenant General Elwood R.
Quesada and Major General Otto P. Weyland, believed that non-
nuclear war was the most probable type of future conflict. These
airmen argued that l imited wars of the future would be fought
with out n u clear weap ons becau se n ation al leaders wou ld real ize
that once nuclear weapons were introduced, i t would become
impossible to prevent the escalation of any conflict into general
nuclear war: If the initial employment of small nuclear weapons
didnt p rodu ce the d esired effects , comm an ders wou ld s u rely
str ike add it iona l targets with m ore an d larger weapons . With th e
explosion of a n u clear device by th e Soviet Union in 19 49 , it was
clear th at n u clear weapon s were no lon ger a U.S. mon opoly, an d
tactical a irm en a rgued t h at we h ad to prepa re for lim ited wars in
which both s ides would voluntari ly refrain from using nuclear
weapons. We had to maintain sizeable tactical forces capable of
fightin g with conventiona l weap ons .
At a t ime when the Air Force was shrinking and funds were
sh ort, th ou gh, it was n t eas y to fin d m oney for conven tion al tac-
tical weapon systems. Understandably, most of the Air Force
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budget was earmarked for that part of the force which would
have to deter or win a general nuclear war with the Soviet
Union.2 Strategic forces received most of the Air Force dollars,
an d on ly those ta ct ical forces th at h ad a n u clear cap ab ility could
deman d a n d get su bs ta n t ia l fu n din g. Other e lements of th e tac-
tical force h ad to forego m odern izat ion .
Despite our n ation al em ph as is on s tra tegic nu clear forces, tac-
t ical a irmen continued to press for the restorat ion of a non-
nuclear capabil i ty such as we had possessed during World War
II . They stressed that the type of command and control system
needed in a th ea ter n u c lear war was th e sam e as th a t n eeded for
non-nuclear war. If the tactical air force were to conduct a the-
ater n u clear cam pa ign , it wou ld requ ire a m odern ized com m an dand control system and procedures for c lose coordination with
ground forces, irrespective of the intensity and duration of the
conflict. To carry out a theater nuclear strategy, precise control
of Airpower would be essential to prevent fallout and casualties
to ou r own air an d groun d forces.
It seemed to th ese airm en th at th e ess entia l e lemen ts of a ta c-
tical air force wou ld b e th e sa m e wheth er th e force were des igned
for a nuclear or non-nuclear situation. They believed, further,
th at a l thou gh ad dit iona l a ircrew trainin g wou ld b e n ecessa ry forsome aspects of nuclear operations, basic tactical skills would
remain the same. Tactical training would simply omit certain
aspects of non-nuclear weapons delivery and emphasize a few
basic techniques such as dive bombing and low alt i tude bomb-
ing which were common to tact ical nuclear and non-nuclear
weapons delivery. Thus it would be feasible to maintain non-
n u clear pr oficien cy with ou t d egra ding a n aircrews ab ility to
deliver tactical nuclear weapons.
In th e year s pr ecedin g th e Korean War, ta ctical air forces werebeing cu t b ack in accorda n ce with th e overall n at iona l policy fol-
lowing World War II. Even with these reduced forces and the
emp h as is on n u clear operat ions , however, there rema in ed a h igh
residuum of experience in non-nuclear operations from World
War II. Despite a shortage of equipment, the high level of experi-
ence permitted expansion and modernization of the tact ical a ir
forces when they were needed in Korea.
KOREAN WARA DILEMMA
When the North Koreans invaded South Korea on 25 June
1950,3 U.S. defense planners carefully evaluated our strategy for
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cond u ctin g lim ited n u clear wa r: Was th e str at egy feas ible in Korea?
Would it be acceptable to our allies? On both counts the strategy
was deficien t. There were few at tra ctive ta rgets for ta ctical n u clear
weapons because of the lack of concentration of North Korean
forces and the many alternative routes of advance afforded the
enemy by the Korean terrain. Further, the Allied forces were
retreating in such disarray that it was unrealistic to suppose that
we cou ld pr omptly tur n them arou n d for a cou n terattack in which
nuclear weapons could provide the basic firepower.
By the time the Allied forces had withdrawn into the Pusan
perim eter, th e employm ent of n u clear weapon s was n ot a r ealis-
t ic option because of the poor targets and the at t i tude of our
al l ies toward these weapons. Air s tra tegy, then, was based onnon-nuclear weapons , and i t comprehended the same miss ions
that tactical air forces had performed in World War II. With the
North Korean Air Force neither a significant threat nor within
range of the retreating Allied forces, air strategy focused initially
on choppin g off the su pply lin es to the Nor th Korean groun d
forces, m ak in g it imposs ible for th ese divis ion s to m ou n t a su s-
tained offensive against the Pusan perimeter. Also a part of this
stra tegy, of cou rse, was a d irect a t tack a gains t as sa u lt in g grou n d
forces. American airmen maintained complete control of the airfor the Inchon invasion and the subsequent advance into North
Korea. Air s tra tegy was an ess en tial pa rt of th e join t s tra tegy.
When the Chinese communists invaded Korea in October
1950 ,4 however, the Allies had to make major revisions in their
strategy. As the enemy forces moved across the border, i t
appeared that Airpower would have to be employed much more
broadly to reduce the numerical superiori ty of the Chinese.
MacArthur proposed that the bridges and l ines of communica-
t ion used by Chinese entering North Korea be subjected to sus-
tained air attack. He felt i t imperative to deny these forces the
san ctua ry they then enjoyed.
Among airmen the question of how Chinese and Soviet Air-
power cou ld b e con ta in ed a lon g the Yalu was deba ted with vigor.
Som e airm en , in clu ding Majors Genera l Em m ett ODonn ell, J r.,
believed it would be necessary to strike the airfields and engage
th e fighters deep in t h e rear a rea s if contr ol of th e air were to be
estab lish ed. (All agreed th at su ch con trol was ab solu tely essen -
t ia l to ou r retreat ing grou n d forces, who were so ba dly out n u m -
bered t h at m an y Am erican s were qu est ioning wheth er th e Allies
could h old a n y position in Korea.)5 ODonn ell an d oth ers ins isted
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tha t the enemy mu st n ot be perm it ted a san c tua ry from which to
attack the Allied air forces and our forward bases.
After cons idera ble delibera tion , th e J oin t Ch iefs r ecom m en ded
th at Far Eas t Comm an ds a ir offens ive n ot be exten ded b eyond
th e Yalu into Man chu ria u n less th e en emy lau n ched m as sive air
at tacks against our forces, in which event American airmen
would destroy the airfields from which the attacks originated.6
For airmen in Korea, the recognit ion of an enemy sanctuary
acros s th e Yalu posed a terrific pr oblem : How were we to conta in
a numerically superior enemy fighter force when all of our for-
ward bases and l ines of communication were open to at tack?
YALUCONTAINMENT OF MIGS
Clearly we had to shift from an air strategy oriented primarily
towar d close su pp ort of ou r groun d forces to a n ew strategy featu r-
in g (1) offen sive figh ter p a trols a lon g th e Ya lu , (2) at ta cks agains t
forward st agin g bas es from which MIGS m ight s trike 5th Air Force
airfields and the 8th Army, and (3) intensive attacks against the
m ain s u pp ly lin es of th e advan cin g Ch in ese ar m y. Th ese air opera-
tions becam e th e prim ary m ean s of preventing th e enem ys a ir a n d
ground forces from pushing the Allied army out of Korea. The 8th
Arm ys ob jective was to h old, ra th er th an to defeat or d estr oy, th eoppos in g grou n d forces. This objective evolved from t h e pr agm at ic
observation that a much larger ground force would be needed to
defeat the enemy. Such a ground campaign would be too long and
too cos tly.
Main tain in g contin u ous pressu re on th e enemys rear ar ea, his
lines of communication, and his engaged troops, Airpower helped
persuade the enemy to cut his losses. The North Koreans were
finally persuaded that they should seek an end to the war at the
conference table rather than on the battlefield, and negotiationsended the conflict on 27 July 1953 after three years of fighting. 7
IMPACT OF KOREAN WAR
With th e end of th e Korean War, defen se plan n ers r eevalu at ed
our s tra tegy for employing Airpower. Perhaps the paramount
qu estion of th e t im e was wh ether we sh ould pr epare to figh t l im -
ited as well as general wars. After the agony and expense of
Korea, an understandably popular posi t ion was that we would
never fight, nor should we prepare to fight, another war like
Korea. Add in g to th e popu lar ity of th is p osition wa s t h e fact th at
it could be used to justify a reduction in defense forces and
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expen ditur es . If a l im ited war sh ou ld br eak ou t , proponen ts s aid,
nuclear weapons could end i t quickly. But the way to prevent
such wars would be to maintain mil i tary and poli t ical pressure
against potential instigators. If the outside support for a limited
conflict were neutralized, the conflict itself would soon die for
lack of weapons and other resources. Most a irmen consented to
the idea th a t n u c lear weapons sh ould be the ba s is of our d efense
strategies , but the Army and Navy maintained that l imited con-
flict was most likely and that limited wars would, at least ini-
tially, be fou ght with con ven tion al weap ons .
Once again nuclear forces were accepted as the dominant ele-
m en t of ou r n at iona l defens e, an d a ll forces were evalu at ed in light
of th eir u sefu ln ess in th e event of n u clear conflict. Resou rces a llo-cat ed to n onn u clear forces were s u fficien t on ly to fight a b rief, very
lim ited war. Th rou ghou t th e m id-fifties, all of th e services a ccepted
the nuclear war premise in their yearly budget arguments. The
Army, however, continued to press for sizeable forces capable of
fighting a limited non-nuclear conflict. Army spokesmen feared
tha t th e domina nt con cern abou t n u clear war was oversha dowin g
the need for ground forces capable of fighting in situations other
th an n u clear b att lefields in Eu rope. Neverth eless , th e su rvivab ility
of forces on a nuclear battlefield continued to be a major concernof m ost s trategists du rin g the p eriod.
THE FRENCH IN INDOCHINA
In 1953 on the eve of Dien Bien Phu, U.S. defense planners dif-
fered widely in th eir op in ions ab ou t t h e a pp ropr iat e role of Airpower
in low sca le conflict. Severa l Ar m y plan n ers felt th a t Airpower cou ld
opera te on ly as a su pp ortin g force. Th e m ain role of Airpower was ,
in their view, the delivery of supplies, equipment, and personnel,
and the support of civic action measures. Whatever firepower was
requ ired to dea l with gu errilla actions wou ldn t d ema n d th e soph is-
ticated weapons of our Airpower arsenal. Based on these views of
Airpower, and the experience of ground warfare in Korea, the pre-
vailin g view in th e U.S. milita ry esta blish m en t was th at U.S. forces
sh ould n ot becom e engaged in Vietna m an d Laos; rath er, we sh ould
continue to support the French in their expansion of Vietnamese
forces to cou n terbalan ce the Viet Min h th reat.
However, some elements of the U.S. military were not con-
vinced the French were making sufficient progress in building
self-sufficiency into the Vietnamese armed forces. They felt that
the French were placing too much emphasis on tra ining for a
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m it m ilitar y forces, it left t h e way open if th e Congress su pp orted
su ch a n action. In one respect, the treaty was essen tially a war n -
in g to the North Vietn am ese th at if th ey att emp ted m ilita ry action
in South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, the members of the treaty
organization might respond with military force. U.S. policy at this
point, therefore, was to provide assistance to the French while
th reaten in g to u se greater force if th e North Vietn am ese continu ed
their effort to undermine the governments of South Vietnam and
Laos by covert and overt military actions. Our strategy was based
on th e hope tha t the in su rgen cy wou ld be con tained by the Sou th
Vietna m ese an d Laotian forces a n d th at th ese coun tries of Sou th -
east Asia would eventually achieve a peaceful political accommo-
dat ion a m ong them selves.Contrary to our hopes, it soon became clear that the Soviets,
Chinese, an d North Vietna m ese were not ab out to discontinu e their
support of the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong. Military supplies and
weap ons from th e Peoples Repu blic of Ch in a an d th e Soviet Un ion
made their way through North Vietnam into Laos and South Viet-
n am with in creased frequ ency. By th e begin n in g of 196 1, th e situ -
ation in Laos and South Vietnam had become so critical that
deployment of U.S. forces was under serious consideration.9 Ou r
level of logistical and training support was no longer adequate toh alt th e enemys a dvan ces in Laos a n d Sou th Vietnam , an d th e
th rea t of re ta lia t ion con ta in ed in th e SEATO trea ty was h avin g
little in flu ence on th e North Vietna m ese-ba cked insu rgen ts.
WARS OF LIBERATION
In 19 61 , Kh ru sh ch evs sp eech pr oclaiming wars of libera tion
as th e wars of th e fu tu re an d Presiden t Kenn edys con fronta tion at
Vienna with the Soviet leader led to a vigorous re-examination of
U.S. milita ry str at egy.10 Presiden t Kenn edy then directed t h e expe-
ditious development of U.S. forces with special skills in the con-
duct of counterinsurgency or sub-limited wars. The intention of
his planners was that indigenous forces would suppress guerrilla
activities while our specialists did the training and assisted in
n ation bu ilding.
This reorientation of our defense priorities toward smaller con-
flicts prompted considerable debate about how best to cope with
th ese wars. In th e Arm y, m ost believed th at it was n ecess ary to cre-
ate Special Forces (Green Berets) specifically trained and organized
for counterinsurgency activities. In the Air Force, many believed
th at existing tactical forces cou ld a djus t to coun terin su rgen cy war-
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for gu errilla wa r fa re s in ce World War II. Man y sen ior a ir m en st ill
quest ioned the wisdom of invest ing in such units , but Secretary
McNam ara s ta ted th at th e Vietna m ese con flic t sh ould be a lab -
oratory for the development of organizations and procedures for
the conduct of sub-limited war,13 an d we respon ded with an al l-
out effort to put together a unit of World War II aircraft capable
of fightin g su b-lim ited war s. Ou r efforts were spu rred , too, by th e
visit of Walt W. Rostow and General Maxwell D. Taylor to South
Vietna m in October 19 61 . Th ey recom m end ed m ore aid for Sou th
Vietnam and supported the decis ion made earl ier in the month
to deploy U.S. troops for logistical support and training. By
November, we were ready to deploy a combat unit of Air Com-
m an dos equipped with T28s , 1J -26s , an d oth er vin tage aircraft .J UNGLE J IM was th e nickn am e given th is u n it , an d th e detach-
ment that deployed to South Vietnam was dubbed FARM GATE.
FARM GATEs pu rpos e was to tr ain Sou th Vietn am ese p ilots,
bu t ou r crews soon fou n d th ems elves flyin g comb at m iss ions in
response to emergency requests . The South Vietnamese Air
Force (VNAF) simply could not provide all of the help that was
urgently needed by the South Vietnamese Army. FARM GATE,
therefore, was engaged in combat operations before the close of
196 2, an d U.S. forces p as sed from t h e gray area of tra ining in toa lim ited com ba t r ole in a su b-lim ited wa r.
JOINT TASK FORCE 116RESPONSE TO CRISIS IN LAOS
Most U.S. defense planners considered Laos to be an area of
s t ra tegic imp or tance becau se of it s loca t ion b e tween Chin a an d
Th ailan d. In th e event of war b etween th e U.S. an d Ch in a, Laos
could delay Chinese forces seeking to overrun Thailand. Realis-
tically, we cou ld n ot expect Laos to be ou r a lly, bu t Laotian n eu -
trality, at least, was essential to the security of Thailand. How-
ever, by the spring of 1962, the North Vietnamese supported
Pathe t Lao appeared about to capture most of the impor tant
ar eas of th e cou n try. Th rea ts of U.S. in terven tion , im plicit in th e
SEATO Treaty, ha d n o sign ifican t imp act on th e con flict or on t h e
peace n egotiat ion s th en tak in g place in Geneva.
The Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) had developed var-
iou s cont in gen cy plan s for Sou th eas t Asia, one of which ad dres sed
precisely th e situ at ion t h en existing in Laos. Increas in gly alar m ed
by events in Laos, President Kennedy activated the plan, thereby
directing th e deploymen t of a J oin t Task Force to Th ailan d. J TF-
11 6 cons isted m ostly of air u n its, a n d th e possibility th at th is force
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migh t be emp loyed again st th e Path et Lao was, an d was in tend ed
to be, appa rent to all. Wh ether a cau sa l relation sh ip or m ere coin -
ciden ce was at work, th e Com mu n ist n egotiators in Gen eva foun d
th e proffered pea ce agreem en t in creas in gly attra ctive as J TF-l 16
moved into Thailand. An agreement to abide by the 1954 Accord
was sign ed on 23 J u ly 196 2. Th e U.S. had n ot been a s ignatory to
th e Accord, b u t we agreed to accept its p rovision s.
Unfortu n at ely, th e North Vietn am ese willin gnes s t o avoid J TF-
11 6 far exceeded t h eir willin gnes s to comp ly with th e Geneva Agree-
ment. Our own efforts to comply now seem almost pathetically
naive in comparison with the open contempt for the agreement
dem ons trat ed by th e North Vietna m ese. Wh ile we began with dra w-
in g ou r a dvisors from Sou th east Asia in accorda n ce with th e agree-
m en t, th e North Vietn am ese were with dr awin g n one of th eir forces.
Furthermore, based on our interpretation of Articles 17-19 of the
original accord, we deferred the modernizing of FARM GATE units
in South Vietnam with jet aircraft. Basically, the articles restricted
th e replacemen t of worn -ou t equipm ent with n ew types of ar m s a n d
materiel to a piece-by-piece basis. These articles were particularly
troublesome to our Air Force planners, but much less so to the
North Vietna m ese who s im ply ign ored th em from th e out set.
13
An Air Commando poses in front of his U-10 Psywar aircraft somewhere in the
heart of South Vietnam.
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So desp ite th e Geneva Agreemen t, it was eviden t th at th e s i t-
u ation in Sou th east Asia was n ot im provin g. By m id-196 2, ma n y
other senior a irmen and I were of the opinion that a ir s tr ikes
against the North Vietnamese homeland would be necessary if
th e war in Sou th Vietna m were to be en ded. Th e only al tern ative,
in our view, would be the deployment of numerous American
ground forces. But even as early as 1962, opinion was sharply
divided on th e iss u e of Airp owers a bility to s top th e figh tin g in
South Vietnam. Among those who disagreed with our posit ion
was Secretary McNamara, who said that while naval and air
su pp ort ar e desirab le, they wont win th e war.14 Par ad oxically, a
figure who offered cons iderab le su pport to our con tention ab ou t
the importance of the revolutionary base in North Vietnam wasGen era l Vo Ngu yen Giap , th e ar ch itect of th e victory at Dien Bien
Phu an d in 196 2 Comm an der of th e North Vietna m ese Arm y. He
was a lways clear ab out th e facts th at North Vietna m was th e rev-
olu tiona ry ba se an d th at th e su ccess of com m u n ist m ilitar y oper-
at ions in Laos and South Vietnam depended direct ly upon the
support and employment of North Vietnamese forces. In 1962,
however, relatively few senior DOD officials thought seriously
about a strategic air offensive against North Vietnam. For the
time being, our efforts and our strategy were limited to SouthVietnam.
Th rou ghou t 19 63, th e Nor th Vie tna m ese con t in u ed to in fil-
t r a t e pe r s onne l a nd e qu ipm e n t . Fu r the r m or e , t he im pr ove d
qua l i ty of the i r weapons ind ica ted tha t more modern a rms
were be ing shipped f rom China and the Sovie t Union. Most
sen ior U.S . comm an ders with whom I t a lked in 19 63 fe lt su re
tha t the war in South Vie tnam was rap id ly expanding in to a
conven t ion al conflic t , a lth ou gh a n u m ber of DOD plan n ers s t ill
be l ieved the war was pr imar i ly an insurgency tha t could bebrou ght u n der con t ro l with in Sou th Vie tna m if we t ra ined a n d
equipped t h e Sou th Vie tna m ese pr ope r ly. Sec re ta ry McNam ara
sa id th a t Sou th Vie tna m i s a t e s t cas e for the n ew Com m u n is t
s t ra tegy,1 5 by wh ic h h e s e em e d to m e a n tha t Sou th Vie tna m
would be a tes t case , too, for his s t ra tegy of graduated
respon se to pr ovoca t ion .
A CHANGING ROLETHE U.S. TO FIGHT
Early in 19 64, th e J oin t Ch iefs of Staff recom m end ed th at t h e
U.S. take over the fighting in South Vietnam. They had previ-
ously directed Admiral Harry D. Felt, CINCPAC, to update con-
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t ingency plans and to propose a s tra tegy for an air campaign
against North Vietnam. Felt proposed a series of measures
designed to seal off North Vietnam by mining harbors and
atta ckin g sh ipping an d s elected l in es of com m u n ication. 16 Senior
airm en a greed with Felts p roposals bu t a dded th at i t wou ld a lso
be n ecessa ry to cu t off th e in filt ra t ion of m en an d equ ipm ent in to
South Vietnam by at tacking the North Vietnamese homeland.
Cutting lines of communication (LOCs) would be relatively inef-
fective because most of them were hidden by jungle growth and
becau se th e North Vietna m ese cou ld m u lt iply th em a lm ost in def-
initely simply by pressing more porters into service. In accor-
da n ce with DOD policy, h owever, Felts s tr a tegy was requ ired t o
be one of graduated response: Air strikes would begin on targets
close to the DMZ, gradually working toward the North Vietnam-
ese hear t lan d with an in creasing sort ie ra te .
Alth ough th e J oin t Ch iefs a greed th at th e U.S. wou ld h ave to
intervene if South Vietnam were to be saved, they were not in
complete agreement on precisely how we should intervene. Gen-
eral Curtis E. LeMay, USAF Chief of Staff, argued for a concen-
trated at ta ck again st t argets in th e hea rt of North Vietna m . In di-
rect a t tacks in South Vietnam and Laos, in his judgment, were
n ot ap t to be d ecisive.17 He recomm ended tha t a min imu m n u m-
ber of troops be deployed to South Vietnam immediately to
secure the main airf ie lds and other s tra tegic areas. Then we
should conduct a swift, devastating air offensive against North
Vietn am s st ra tegic ta rgets. All of h is experien ce h ad ta u ght h im
th at su ch a ca m pa ign would end th e war. If th is s tra t egy fai led,
h e sa id, we sh ould th en h ave to cons ider wh ether we were will-
ing to deploy a large ground force to Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, General Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of
Staff , thought i t necessary for U.S. t roops in South Vietnam to
take on more of the combat role. An air campaign, he believed,
sh ould be directed at th e lin es of com m u n ication n ear th e border
of Sou th Vietna m , bu t n ot a t th e hea rt lan d of North Vietna m . Th e
m ain emp h as is s h ou ld be on th e Ho Chi Min h Trail an d th e logis-
tical network south of Vinh. Most senior Army officials believed
tha t the war had to be won in South Vie tnam and tha t the a i r
campaign should support the in-country war chiefly through
close air su pport .18
The Army view was essentially that of Secretary McNamara. He
believed th at th e war s h ould be fought in Sou th Vietnam an d th at
the main roles of Airpower should be close air support and inter-
diction of lin es of com m u n ication sou th of th e 20 th pa rallel an d in
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Laos. The Secretary felt that the threat of air attacks on military
and industrial targets could influence the North Vietnamese to
restrain their support of the Viet Cong, but he disagreed with
LeMay and other senior airmen who insisted that the only way to
end the North Vietnamese pressure on South Vietnam was to
destr oy th e war -related in sta llation s in North Vietna m .
On 1 June 1964 a top-level strategy conference convened at
CINCPAC Headqu arters in Hon olu lu . Th ose in atten da n ce in clu ded
General William C. Westmoreland who was about to replace Gen-
eral Paul D. Harkins as Chief of Military Assistance Command,
Vietn am (MACV); Genera l Maxwell D. Taylor, Cha ir m an of th e J oin t
Chiefs of Staff; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge; Secretary of State
Dean Rusk; and Secretary McNamara. Before the conference,LeMay an d Gen eral Wallace M. Green e, J r., Com m an da n t of th e
Marine Corps, had been pressing the view that air attacks against
the North Vietnamese were essential to halting the war in South
Vietnam.19 Admiral David L. McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations,
agreed ess en tially with LeMays a n d Green es view, bu t h e wou ld
have placed more emphasis on sealing off North Vietnam from
external support, and less emphasis on attacks against industrial
targets. At the conference, however, Taylor questioned whether we
sh ould a ttack North Vietna m at all. He agreed with th e Secretar y ofDefense that our main efforts should be designed to bolster the
forces of South Vietnam and to cut the lines of communication in
Laos. If attacks were to be made against North Vietnam, Taylor
believed th ey sh ou ld b e n ear th e DMZ, u sing U.S. an d Sou th Viet-
n am ese aircraft to demon stra te ou r join t resolve to expa n d th e con-
flict if it continued in Laos and South Vietnam.
BOMB THE NORTH?NO AGREEMENT
The U.S. strategy that emerged from the June 1964 Honolulu
Conference differed in no important way from our pre-Conference
strategy: We would build the South Vietnamese armed forces; pro-
vide combat support when the South Vietnamese were unable to
handle the situation; and, if air attacks against North Vietnamese
targets should be necessary, we would select only targets near the
DMZ an d would u se both U.S. an d Sou th Vietna m ese aircraft.
Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, who replaced Admiral Felt as
CINCPAC shortly after the Honolulu Conference, believed that
this s tra tegy would not force the North Vietnamese to s top the
fightin g in Sou th Vietna m an d Laos. Th u s h e add ed h is voice to
those of LeMay and Greene, urging that Airpower and naval
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power be applied directly against North Vietn