Doctors For Children Int’l Welcomes You Welcome To Doctors For Children Int’l (DFCI)
Airport Security Conference · Increasing no. of terrorism/ hijackings Newbuild; int’l nuclear...
Transcript of Airport Security Conference · Increasing no. of terrorism/ hijackings Newbuild; int’l nuclear...
Airport Security Conference Vienna, 13 September 2017
Session 1: International Framework and Respective Regulatory Approaches
International Legal Framework for Nuclear Security09:40‐10:20am
Anthony WetherallSenior Research Fellow, Centre for International Law,
National University of Singapore
Safety Security
Safeguards
Liability
Int’l Legal Frameworks
Defintion of nuclear security
“Nuclear security focuses on the prevention of, detection of and response to, criminal or
intentional unauthorised acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities.”
Nuclear Security FundamentalsNSS No. 20 (2012)
Some Nuclear Security Roles and Responsibilities
• Responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State
….. it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled
• Prime responsibility of licensee
Statute
IAEA’s Nuclear Security Mandate
Int’l InstrumentsPolicymaking Organs
Functions PartyBoard of Governors
General Conference
Depositary
Objectives Functions RecognisedRole
..of the IAEA
eg. Nuclear Security Plans,Fundamentals, Recommendations
(INFCIRC/225)
eg. CPPNMAmendment
No explicit reference to nuclear security in the Statute. Mandate and activities inherent in the mandate to contribute to peace, health & prosperity
throughout the world, as derived from Art. II & confirmed by the policymaking organs
eg. PSAseg. ICSANT
eg. CPPNM Amendment
IAEA’s acknowledged central & leading roles
Strengthening the int’l framework
Supporting States in fulfilling their responsibilities
Facilitating & coordinating int’l coop.
incld. info. exchange meetings among various int’l institutions & initiatives with nuclear security mandates
(17th meeting, 2017)
Nuclear Security
IAEA activities: assistance & cooperation
• Facilitating adherence & implementation: International legal instruments
• Developing: Technical guidance ‐ Nuclear Security Series (2006)
• MSs development (with relevant IGOs), MSs comments (120 days)
• NSGC (2012): Relevant IGOs/ NGOs may be invited to attend meetings as observers
• Carrying out on‐request: Peer reviews & advisory services eg. IPPAS, INSServ
• Concluding: National support plans ‐ Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans
• Education & training
• Major public events
• Risk reduction
Nuclear Security Evolution• The Cold War & post Cold War dynamics: Changing actors,different motives and evolving challenges and threat
Focus on physical protectioneg. CPPNM & INFCIRC/225
Concerns re. security of NWs, NFs, RM
unaccounted for & unsecured, illicit trafficking
First comprehensive IAEA programme to combat nuclear terrorism
New/amendment of int’l legal instrumentseg. CPPNM Amendment
Multiple initiatives eg. GICNT, GTRI
1970s 1980-90s Post 9/11 terrorist attacks
Evolving nuclear terrorist threat
Threat to int’l peace & security
Focus beyond physical protectioneg. nuclear forensics, cyber-security
Rise in terrorism, hijackings, nuclear commerce
www.ola.iaea.org
2011
Int’l legal framework for nuclear security
Legally Binding
Legally Non-binding
IAEA IMOUN IAEAICAO
GA UNSC
CPPNMAmend.
CPPNM
Terrorist Bombings Conv.
IMO - SUA Conv.& Protocols
Nuclear Terrorism Conv.
ICAO -Beijing SUA Convention
Int’l legal framework for nuclear security
INFCIRC/225/Rev.5
Code of Conduct - rad. sources
(2003)
Disused Rad. Sources Guidance
(2017)
Import/export Guidance
(2004) (2011)
UNSCR 1373 (2001)
UNSCR 1540 (2004)
Nuclear Security Nuclear Safety Safeguards/ non‐proliferation
Role of the IAEA Significant but advisory, on request “watchdog” (Statute & NPT)
IAEA mandatory reviews Non‐mandatory (but de facto) Mandatory
SGs inspections
IAEA binding technical standards
Non‐binding (but quasi) Non‐binding guidance
Review by others such as States
• Rad. sources code• [Art 16 ACPPNM ‐2021 conf.]
• Art. 14 ACPPNM• UNSCR 1540 (2001)
• CNS/ JC peer review• Rad. sources code
eg. NPT Review Conf.(may also touch on nuclear security)Reporting on
national impl.
Compliance & enforcement mechanisms
No Yes
Int’l Legal Frameworks Comparison
• Int’l framework significantly strengthened post 9/11
• Multiplicity of int’l instruments (binding/ non‐binding) and initiatives incld. the high‐levelNuclear Security Summit process (2010‐16 (end))
• Limited mandatory treaty based peer reviews and reporting on national implementation[BUT….]
• IAEA’s first (physical protection) activities in the 70s. Since the mid‐00s, theIAEA has widely accepted and recognised central roles in nuclear security ‐albeit essentially of an advisory nature (as in nuclear safety)
• Non‐binding security guidance and non‐mandatory IAEA peer reviews [BUT….]
Observations and future perspectives
Observations and future perspectives contd.
• The nuclear terrorist threat is a recognised real threat to int’l peace andsecurity
• In the absence of a nuclear security ‘watershed’ event, positive andprogressive developments continue, driven by this evolving threat
• To‐date, the result inclds. increasing levels of int’l coop and assistance and,strengthened national nuclear security regimes etc
• Still, a critical review continues to reveal fundamental constraints andlimitations incld. issues of State sovereignty and national security and,national sensitivities
• Continued calls in different fora for a more robust int’l framework
• The 2021 review conference of the amended CPPNM may provide a limitedopportunity for re‐evaluation
• Even so, in matters of nuclear security there continues to remain a clear linethat many states are not yet willing and able to cross: the role of the IAEA,standards, peer reviews etc
• What is needed to change the mindset, if that is what is indeed required?
Observations and future perspectives contd.
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
9/11 (01)
(03) Final report on proposed amend. (79)
CPPNM
(03) Rad. Sources Code
ICSANT (05)IMO SUA insts. (05)
ICAO SUA (10)
(97) UN Terrorist Bombings Conv.
Suppl. Guidance (04)
(89) Rev. 2 Rev. 3 (93) (99) Rev. 4
INSPs (06)
IAEA
Int’l
Leg
al In
stru
men
ts
& ot
her t
exts
etc.
(96) IPPAS
Nuclear Security Summits (10, 12, 14 & 16)
[IRRS (05)]
NUCLEAR SECURITY TIMELINE
(57) IAEA
CPPNM Amend. (05)
(06) Nuclear Security Series
UNSCR1373 (01)
UNSCR(04) 1540
NS Fundamentals (12)
(03) INServ
IMDG Code (02 & 04)
(03) PSI (16) Contact Group
Chernobyl (86)[safety event]
UN, IM
O,
ICAO
etc.
Nucle
ar
powe
rTe
chni
cal g
uida
nce,
revie
ws/
advis
ory s
ervic
es
Fukushima (11)Pelindaba nuclear facility,
South Africa - break‐in (07)
(14) INFCIRC/869 initiative
(13) Division of Nuclear Security
(08) WINS
(03) EU WMD Strategy GTRI (04) GICNT (06)
NTI (01)
Global Partnership (02)
UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy (06)
UN High level meeting (12)
EifCPPNM (87)CP
PNM
& Am
end.
IEC (05)
NISGS(16)
(16) IAEA Summit Action Plan
IPPAS int’l seminars(13) & (16)
(GOV/2017/4 (17)) Disused Radioactive Sources Guidance
Early Notification & Assistance Convs. (86)
[Practical arrangements e.g. RANET(13), IEComm (12), J-Plan (17) etc.]
AdSec (02)
(03) Cat. of rad. sources
[(99) EPREV]
Boom to decline - Western Europe and USA with limited
exception e.g. France
Stagnation for newbuilds -Western Europe and USA, even
more so post-ChernobylRenewed interest, continued growth in Asia
e.g. China, RofK, nuclear newcomers
INF Code (01) ISPS Code (02 & 04)
Continued interest post-Fukushima, continued expansion in Asia, nuclear newcomers e.g. UAE, Belarus, Bangladesh, Turkey
03
03 04 05
0596 9995
Initi
ative
s
[(09) INIR]
1614
Expansion in Asia e.g. Japan, RofK, China, India
PP recomms. (72)
72
86 97 10
Info. Exchange Meetings [13th meeting (17)] ‘20/20’ review (08)
(68)NPT
NPP Vendor Principles (11)
(78) NSGGuidelines INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)
(97)INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) (72 )
(96 Pelindaba & (06) CANWFZeif
9692
93 08
Commercialization -optimism, reality,
expansion
Optimism -Atoms for
Peace
57
68 72
8975
78 01
06
09 16 17
13
1st Review Conf. NPT
(75)
(78) RERTR [Research reactor HEU minimization –
subsumed into GTRI]
NSS. No. 14 & NSS No. 15 (11)
Atoms for Peace Speech & Program (53) [export of NPPs & HEU for research reactors]
Evolving nuclear terrorist threat; broad acceptance & recognition of IAEA’s central roles; evolution from physical protection to a broad range of subjects
incd. forensics and cyber-security; high-level political attention (to 16) – nuclear security summit
process; post-summit developments
Evolving terrorist threat; post-9/11 strengthening; new/amendment instruments; strengthened IAEA mandate; new initiatives; rejection of binding standards & mandatory IAEA &
treaty based peer review (03)
Concern re. PP of RM, NIs, NWs; illicit trafficking increase (95)
3S synergies [IAEA GC resolution] (03)Office of Physical
Protection & Material Security,
(99) Dept. of SGs
Increasing no. of terrorism/ hijackingsNewbuild; int’l nuclear transports; internationalization
(89) Fall of the Berlin wall
Non-state actors - Low density, Low intensity, Malicious, Higher probability, Diversification of risks, Unpredictable
Cold War int’l security concern: fear of nuclear war & spread of NWs End of the Cold War (91)
[Nuclear security definition(state focused)]
[Nuclear security working definition ((03) IAEA programmatic)]
Limited scopeScope expanded to incld. domestic use, storage & transport & NFsRejected proposals – negative list
Calls for mandatory standards/reviews
75
Rad.
sour
ces
AQ Khan network (04)
Draft
1: A
. Weth
erall
, Sing
apor
e (Se
pt. 20
17)
Rev. 5 (NSS No. 13) (11)
CTIFT (05)
NAM Summit (12)
(16) UNGA A/RES/71/38[terrorists & WMD]
(14) UNGA A/RES/69/50[terrorists & rad. sources]
14
(15) & (16) Points of Contact meetings (16) Eif CPPNM Amend.
Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Program (91)
UNGA A/RES/51/210 (96) &A/RES/49/60 [int’l terrorism] (94)
94
Review Conf. (92)
Nation states, Bio-polar, High intensity, High density, Lower probability, Geopolitical, Predictable
Y-12 National Security Complex, USA - security breach (12)
NNSA Megaports Initiative,USA (03)
CBP Container Security Initiative, USA (02)
GC resolution RES/15 (94) [measures against illicit trafficking]
1st “Security of Material” Programme(97-98)
Board endorsed protection prog.
(95)
(95) ITDB
94 97
Physical protection objectives & fundamental principles (01) NSGC (12)
NSPs (02-05, 06-09, 10-13, 14-17 & 18–21)[Nuclear Security Fund (01); Dept. of Nuclear Safety and Security & Office of Nuclear Security (01)]
Rad. sources tripartite initiative (02)
17
INSEN (10)
Rev. 1 (77)
INFCIRC/225(75)
Formalized info exchange process (06)
1211
TMI(79)[safety event]
Thank you for your attention
Anthony Wetherall
Email: [email protected]
ESI‐CIL Nuclear Governance Project
www.nucleargovernance.sg