Agreeing to Disagree the Political Reality of ASEAN Econ Cooperation 1993

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Agreeing to Disagree: The Political Reality of ASEAN Economic Cooperation Author(s): Bilson Kurus Source: Asian Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring, 1993), pp. 28-41Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172173Accessed: 24-10-2015 10:31 UTC

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Agreeing to Disagree: The Political Reality of ASEAN Economic Cooperation

BILSON KURUS

T he Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) signed at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore

in January 19921 is just the latest and no doubt the most notable manifesta- tion of ASEAN's always stressed but ever-slowly achieved objective of economic cooperation. Justifiably or not, the association is in the enviable position of being portrayed as a model of third world cooperation. Yet, having just celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary, ASEAN's achievements in the economic arena remain patchy at best. Although it has become a key actor in the Asia-Pacific region and a significant global one, twenty-five years of off-again, on-again efforts to foster intra-ASEAN economic cooperation have produced numerous agreements but few concrete results. The AFTA agreement is significant in that it both provides a means to at- tain it, the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), and a specific date (2008) by which it is to be achieved, but in view of the lackluster performance of ASEAN in the area of economic cooperation up to this point, one cannot help but view its full implementation with some skepticism.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that AFTA was negotiated amid fears of economic regionalism elsewhere. This raises the interesting possibility that given the rapidly changing regional and global economic and political environment, economic cooperation may now be increasingly viewed by the ASEAN states not so much as an organizational objective but rather as a necessity to their and ASEAN's future. Still, as with the broader issue of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation, the implementation of AFTA is not so much a question of want or desire but one of political will and political capacity. Though political will has been frequently cited as the obstacle to

28



Agreeing to Disagree 29

the progress of ASEAN economic cooperation, political capacity goes hand in hand with political will and is therefore equally pertinent. Thus, the key issue as to whether or not the ASEAN states are capable of mustering the re- quisites of effectively transforming AFTA and, by extension, intra-ASEAN economic cooperation into a reality remains. The answer to this crucial question requires a consideration of how contending perceptions of national interests have so far resulted in a gap between what the ASEAN states want and what all are willing to accept and implement in pursuing ASEAN's stated objectives of fostering intra-ASEAN economic cooperation.

The ASEAN Milieu

A discussion of the political reality of ASEAN economic cooperation has to begin with the diversity of the ASEAN member states and how this has influenced the ASEAN environment as a whole. At the inception of ASEAN in 1967, just about the only over-arching commonality among the charter member states was their mutual experience with communist in- surgency.2 Sukarno's "Crush Malaysia" campaign still loomed large in the background,3 the Philippines' claim to Sabah (formerly North Borneo)4 re- mained an active issue, and relations between Malaysia and Singapore were still strained in the aftermath of the latter's forced withdrawal from the Malaysian Federation.5 Added to this uneasy early atmosphere were the tense political ripples emanating from the Vietnam War.6 Even though the ASEAN states have since resolved or minimized their initial differences, distinguishing political, economic, and social characteristics remain strong.

Although the need for political survival was clearly an important mutual consideration in such an uncertain environment, the motivations of In- donesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (Brunei became a member in 1984) in creating ASEAN were uniquely influenced by their respective perceptions of national interests.7 Indonesia, ASEAN's de facto leader, saw in ASEAN a way to rejoin the political mainstream of the region after Konfrantasi with Malaysia and an instrument to safeguard its own security interest from the threat of communism, B la the Chinese variety. Malaysia recognized in ASEAN a vehicle to safely redirect In- donesia's aspiration for regional preeminence as well as a tool to govern both the internal and external relations of the Southeast Asian states. For Singapore, the smallest ASEAN state in terms of geography, ASEAN was a means to deflect its fear of being seen as a potential Chinese fifth column. And, finally, both the Philippines and Thailand saw in ASEAN a potential grouping that each could fall back on in the event that circumstances might dictate that ties with the United States take a different turn.

The mixture of a volatile regional political environment and the contending interests and motivations of the ASEAN states in creating ASEAN



30 Asian Affairs

contributed to two crucial aspects of the association that continue to shape it today. First, in line with the Asian way of avoiding controversy, the creators of ASEAN decided to operate on the basis of consensus, or musyawarah dan mufakat.8 By its very nature, decision making by consensus is a protracted and time-consuming process because it requires that key decisions be made and arrived at only after all the member states are in agreement. This lowest common denominator arrangement implies that the preference of the member state that stands to benefit the least from any given activity will serve as the basis of the group's decision. Rather than being confronted, issues that are controversial tend to be shelved for fear of disrupting regional cohesion and unity. Consequently, matters brought to the discussion table are usually those that are known in advance or items that each member state can agree upon.

The second important outcome of the national-interest basis of ASEAN is the primarily economic tone of its aims and purposes. The economic emphasis of ASEAN is all the more noteworthy given that the motivations of the ASEAN states in creating ASEAN were inspired as much, if not more so, by political considerations as by economic factors.9 Although the much- trumpeted ideals of economic integration undoubtedly may have their influence, fear of aggravating the People's Republic of China (seen as a source of moral and material support for local communist insurgencies) was a powerful incentive for the political leaders of ASEAN to steer clear of any overt political pretensions for their nascent regional organization.

The Political Reality of Intra-ASEAN Economic Cooperation

The differing interests and motivations of the ASEAN states in the area of economic cooperation were and still are patently relevant. Indeed, these differences have proved to be major impediments to the progress of intra- ASEAN economic cooperation. The key issue is not so much whether to pursue economic cooperation but rather agreeing on the best course of action to take. The main points of contention cluster around the central issue of the distribution of expected national gains and losses.'" Economic cooperation is perceived as involving national interests and priorities in a very real sense, and consensus does not necessarily equal compromise." As Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad candidly put it, the "reality is that we are separate nations with the interest of our own people at heart. We are not about to discard our new-found nationalism in favour of uncertain regional loyalties."'2

Given their overriding desire to magnify national gains, it is not surpris- ing that the attitude of the ASEAN states toward intra-ASEAN economic cooperation tends to correspond directly with their individual perceptions of national economic well-being.'3 For instance, with its worldwide trading




links and interests, Singapore maintains an open and outward-looking approach to trade. It has much to lose from any major diversion of trade toward less-cooperative neighbors. Though it would favor abolishing intra- ASEAN trade barriers, it is not willing to do so at the cost of erecting trade barriers against its extra-ASEAN trade partners. On the other side is In- donesia, the largest but least economically developed ASEAN state, which maintains a protectionist policy. It has been reluctant to grant access to its domestic market to other ASEAN producers because it feels that its own industrial development entails preserving its domestic market for its own industries. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand all occupy a more or less middle position. They are more ambivalent about outward-looking and inward-looking approaches to trade policy and are more willing to con- template the costs of trade diversion than is Singapore. However, although they are also less concerned than Indonesia about preserving their domestic markets for local production, calculations of national advantage weigh very heavily in their own economic outlook.

Not surprisingly, the notion that lack of political will is responsible for the inability of the political leaders of ASEAN not only to agree on concrete and effective economic cooperation measures but also to implement them is not only generally cited in the literature on ASEAN but also frequently ex- pressed by the political leaders of ASEAN themselves.14 Yet when lack of political will is mentioned, its underlying causes or what the concept itself entails has rarely been forthcoming. What is apparent, however, is that the perceived lack of political will is being blamed for both the inability of the ASEAN states to agree on the course of action to take as well as their reluctance to implement agreed upon economic cooperation measures. This is an important consideration because the formulation of economic cooperation measures and their subsequent implementation are part and parcel of the slow pace of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation.

Political Will and Political Capacity

To get a better sense of the political obstacles surrounding intra-ASEAN economic cooperation, it is useful to look at how the two concepts of political will and political capacity have been used in the context of the model of regional economic integration itself, the European Community (EC). In his study of how domestic politics have affected international cooperation (and vice-versa) among the EC member countries, Puchala makes a distinction between political will and political capacity."5 He points out that political will is more appropriately used when it explicitly implies failed will--i.e., political leaders do not cooperate because their national interests essentially prevent them from doing so. On the other hand, political capacity is tied to the ability of a member government to overcome



32 Asian Affairs

resistance from domestic forces that seek to prevent it from cooperating with other member states. Consequently, political incapacity arises when a member government is held back by domestic opposition from cooperating with other member governments. (Among others, Puchala cites the British refusal to join the Common Market in the late 1950s and the difficulty of the Italian government in introducing the community-wide value-added tax in the 1970s as respective examples of failed will and political incapacity.)

One way to ascertain if Puchala's distinction between the two concepts of political will and political capacity is relevant to the experience of ASEAN is to look at the major problems that have confronted and continue to confront intra-ASEAN economic cooperation. This should allow us to get a better grasp of the underlying factors behind the reluctance of the ASEAN states to subsume their respective national interests under the broader notion of regional ones. At the same time, this should also enable us to deter- mine if the perceived lack of political will on the part of the political leaders of ASEAN may be sometimes mistaken for political incapacity. More important, such an approach should give us some insights into the potential impacts that political will and political capacity will have on the implementation of AFTA specifically and the future direction of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation in general.

A good place to start is the cornerstone of ASEAN industrial cooperation, the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs).'6 The AIPs agreement was a direct offshoot of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, signed at the First ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976. A key concern among the ASEAN states then was the potential negative ripples of the just-ended Vietnam War on their own internal security, and mutual economic prosperity was seen as the most feasible way to deal with the new challenge to regional stability. Toward this end, each of the five charter member states of ASEAN designated an AIP: the urea project (Indonesia and Malaysia), the super- phosphate project (The Philippines), the diesel-engine project (Singapore), and the soda ash project (Thailand). Under the AIPs agreement, the host country was to contribute 60 percent of the necessary capital for an AIP with the other four member states each contributing 10 percent.

The large-scale nature and regional scope of the original AIPs indicate that the ASEAN states were in general agreement on the need to get intra- ASEAN economic cooperation moving after a decade of relative inactivity. But as has since become quite clear, the desire and action of the ASEAN states in pursuing intra-ASEAN economic cooperation have yet to coalesce effectively. Of the five initial AIPs, for example, only the two urea projects (both of which were already slated as national projects when they were designated as AIPs) in Indonesia and Malaysia have become fully opera- tional (urea is a nitrogen compound used in fertilizer and animal rations). The Philippines and Singapore have since changed their AIP to a copper




fabrication project and a hepatitis B vaccine project, respectively, whereas the AIP for Thailand has been abandoned."7

Political incapacity, not a lack of political will, appears to be responsible for the failure of both the original AIPs for Singapore and Thailand to ma- terialize.18 Thailand's abandonment of its original AIP, for instance, stemmed directly from domestic political and economic considerations. The problem emerged out of an internal disagreement over the location as well as profitability of the soda ash project. On the other hand, Singapore's decision to withdraw its original AIP was the result of direct opposition from both Indonesia and the Philippines. The main point of contention was the insistence of both countries that the proposed diesel-engine project for Singapore only manufacture diesel engines of 200 horsepower or more. Their insistence stemmed from the fact that their own diesel-engine industries were already producing the smaller diesel engines. (It is interesting to note that the smaller engines have a higher demand in the region and, therefore, were more profitable whereas the more powerful engines have a more limited market in the ASEAN region.)

In response to the insistence of both Indonesia and the Philippines, Singapore eventually decided to designate its diesel-engine project as a national project rather than as an AIP. In addition, Singapore registered its true feeling when it subsequently decided to drastically scale down its expected 10 percent equity contribution to the other four AIPs to a symbolic 1 percent. It takes no great imagination to see that the controversy surrounding Singapore's original AIP was influenced by a strong desire to max- imize expected national gains and minimize expected national losses among those parties involved. Both Indonesia and the Philippines saw the potential adverse effects on their own diesel-engine industry if Singapore were to manufacture the smaller diesel engines and benefit from the ASEAN Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTA). Although there is no clear evidence that the opposition of domestic economic (and political) elites prompted In- donesia and Thailand to take their hard-line position, it is quite plausible that both countries were influenced by such internal factors.

In addition, by its very concept of including every member state in a project, the AIP arrangement reflected the deep-seated reluctance of the ASEAN states to sacrifice national priorities for ASEAN. This was no doubt necessitated by the need to soothe nationalistic feelings and to protect domestic industries. In this instance, the requirement of consensus dictated that political considerations, not economic rationales, serve as the basis for the type of projects to be selected, who gets to produce what products, and the question of market sharing."9 These same considerations were equally obvious in the ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC) and ASEAN In- dustrial Joint Ventures (AIJVs), both of which have yet to be fully im- plemented. And herein lies a major problem for the ASEAN industrial



34 Asian Affairs

cooperation scheme in general: although the ASEAN states all recognize the potential benefits of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation and have signed a number of economic agreements toward this end, it continues to be difficult for them not only to agree on the most feasible steps to take but also to implement already agreed upon economic cooperation measures.

In a similar vein, the relative ineffectiveness of the ASEAN Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTA), introduced in 1977, in fostering intra-ASEAN trade can also be traced to a reluctance to sacrifice any degree of national priorities for the broader notion of regional interests. This reluctance is manifested by a provision under the PTA agreement, which gives the ASEAN states the convenient option of excluding products each deems "sensitive" from the PTA scheme. As a result, though the PTA covered nearly 20,000 items by the 1987 Manila Summit, its actual impact on intra- ASEAN trade was minimal." In this case, the problem clearly lies with the reluctance of the ASEAN states to include those items that are extensively traded within the region under the PTA scheme. Although it may be argued that the so-called "sensitive" items provision was not intended to be liberal- ly applied as the case has proved, the fact that such a provision was included to begin with seems to be a reflection of the ASEAN states' lack of political will to pursue effective tariff liberalization measures.

The inability of the ASEAN states to create a region-wide shipping network also appears to be a case where a lack of political will has been the stumbling block. The ASEAN states had long recognized that a regional shipping network would lend a helping hand to intra-ASEAN trade. Toward this end, discussion to formulate a regional shipping policy started as early as the 1970s, but has faltered due to the inability of the ASEAN states to overcome their conflicting national priorities. In this respect, the observation of the Far Eastern Economic Review in 1979 is still valid today. As the Review explained then, the "disagreement is natural enough con- sidering that Indonesia and the Philippines are archipelagic states and must develop and protect this trade; that Malaysia, through an accident of geography, is split into peninsular Malaysia and Sabah and Sawarak, and that Thailand exports predominantly foodstuffs and bulk cargoes, with Singapore fortuitously straddling one of the world's most lucrative trading routes, acting as the region's entrep6t. This has left a situation where individual maritime aspirations are predicted by the economic plans of each country rather than ASEAN as an identity."21

The more recent and ongoing discussion surrounding the implementation of AFTA provides additional insights into the relevance and applicability of political will and political capacity in the ASEAN setting. Along with the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) and the Growth Triangle Concept, AFTA was among the key economic proposals discussed by the ASEAN economic ministers during their annual meeting in Kuala Lumpur




in October 1991.2 The original AFTA proposal envisaged a ten-year implementation period. Although the external impetus of a changing regional and global environment no doubt contributed to the eventual decision by the ASEAN heads of states to sign the AFTA agreement (albeit with some adjustments, including the longer implementation period of fifteen years) at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992, it is interesting to note the leading role of Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun in pushing AFTA.

To begin with, Anand's two short terms (both by appointment rather than election) in office are seen as among the most productive in recent Thai history. His domestic economic reforms are mirrored at the regional level by his leadership role in pushing the idea of AFTA. His leadership role in pushing for the acceptance and, until stepping down for the second time, the implementation of AFTA appears to buttress the notion that political will and capacity are both relevant as well as used interchangeably in the ASEAN setting. For example, notwithstanding the fact that the implementation period of AFTA was lengthened, its acceptance does indicate that the political will to cooperate on the part of the political leaders of ASEAN is not entirely lacking. (Or, in terms of the broader picture, the various economic agreements such as the PTA, AIPs, AIJVs, and AIC could be taken as an indication that the political will of the ASEAN states to pursue economic cooperation has not been totally absent.) The more pertinent issue now, it seems, lies with the implementation of AFTA. It is in this respect that the question of political capacity has been and will be most crucial.

For instance, an editorial in the Singapore Straits Times"23 ventured that "bureaucratic will" rather than political will may have been the culprit for the lackluster performance of ASEAN in the economic sphere. Noting the leading role of Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun during his first term in office and the subsequent indications of hesitancy on the part of the new Thai political leadership in the aftermath of the March 1992 election to implement AFTA, the editorial explained:

Mr. Anand could afford to move boldly on AFTA because, being a technocrat, he was not beholden to any of the constituencies that tie Thai politics up, and down. His senior civil servants, who understood the need to look at the larger picture, supported him. A general election later, a new political leadership is in place.... [w]ithout questioning the politician's right to make decisions, it must be hoped that the bureaucrats will be able to convince them of the need to continue with policies that go beyond sectoral interests and touch Thailand's economic future as much as the reality of ASEAN's economic life [emphasis added] .24

In this instance, the issue appears to be tied to the perceived incapacity of the new Thai political leadership (which, incidentally, was subsequently



36 Asian Affairs

voted out of office in the aftermath of the bloody military crackdown in May 1992) to follow through with the implementation of AFTA. This same issue reemerged at the ASEAN economic ministers gathering in Manila in October 1992, when the newly elected Thai political leadership again showed signs of backtracking on AFTA. Though they explained their position as a matter of getting their own house in order, this did not prevent Malaysia's international trade and industry minister, Datuk Rafidah Aziz, from reminding the Thais not to sacrifice the interests of ASEAN to "bureaucratic constraints.""25 The apparently strong reaction of the other ASEAN states prompted the new Thai political leadership to publicly state that they remain committed to the process of implementing AFTA.

At another level, the growth triangle between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia has been suggested as a more promising model for economic cooperation among the ASEAN member states.26 Although the concept has its merits and may turn out as a better approach to intra-ASEAN economic cooperation, some caveats must be kept in mind. To begin with, by its very nature, the Growth Triangle Concept cannot collectively include all the ASEAN states in one particular grouping. As such, though it appears to be a feasible way to foster meaningful economic linkages among the ASEAN states, it cannot be truly called ASEAN economic cooperation in the way envisaged by AFTA. More important, even within the Growth Triangle Concept, it is worth noting that the question of national control, as opposed to state or provincial control, remains paramount. In this sense, the Growth Triangle Concept may also be limited by the willingness of the national political leadership of the ASEAN states to forgo some degree of control to their component states or provinces that are directly involved in a triangle.

Thus, although this issue may be less relevant in the case of Singapore, a triangle between Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia or between Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, for example, is likely to be constrained by this consideration. In addition, the triangle between Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, considered the core ASEAN states, has been also influenced by the leading role of Singapore (with its relatively abundant capital and ex- pertise), which sees the triangle as crucial to its national political, economic, and strategic survival. For Singapore, the success of a triangle with its im- mediate neighbors may be a question of necessity rather than a luxury. As such, the ingredients for the triangle's apparent success among these three ASEAN states may not necessarily be replicated in other cases. Though these considerations do not detract the obvious advantages of a growth triangle, they do serve as reminders that the political reality of ASEAN economic cooperation is still pertinent even in such a smaller scale.

Clearly, political will and political capacity are both important in understanding the past and, most likely, the future of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation. From the discussion above, it appears that political




will revolves around the difficulty of the ASEAN states to formulate concrete economic cooperation measures whereas political capacity is related to the effective implementation of such measures. Given the role that both occupy in the decision making process, the presence of both is crucial, indeed a necessity, if economic cooperation among the ASEAN states is to move with a greater sense of purpose and urgency. Have the ASEAN states reached the point where achieving a balance between the two is possible? In other words, have the political leaders of ASEAN reached the point of being able to sufficiently close the gap between what they want and are willing to accept and implement in pursuing ASEAN's stated economic cooperation objective? Recent statements from within the ASEAN circle suggest that the verdict is still far from certain.

For instance, commenting on the AFTA agreement, a Thai academic, Sukhumbhand Paribata, pointed out that although the act of creating AF- TA is an important step, the real test lies on whether the political leaders of ASEAN have the political will to push ahead with the substance of AFTA.27 Similarly, Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also stressed the necessity of having political will, adding that political will "depends not only on the personal courage of the leaders, but also their assessment that their action is politically advantageous, or at least not too costly."28 Along the same lines, an editorial in the Jakarta Post noted that "although it is true that it still remains to be seen whether political will can now be generated to implement the plan, the step is obviously a landmark in intra- ASEAN cooperation.""'29 In their respective speech commemorating the twenty-fifth aniversary of ASEAN, both Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun also stressed that political will was crucial to making AFTA a reality.30 The more recent observation made by Malaysian International Trade and Industry Minister Datuk Rafidah Aziz may be a fitting summation of the ASEAN predica- ment. As she put it, "Let it not be said of ASEAN that the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak."31

The preceding statements suggest that for AFTA (and by extension, intra- ASEAN economic cooperation) to succeed, the key ingredient lies in a willingness on the part of the ASEAN governments to muster the political wherewithal to implement the provisions of AFTA. At the same time, however, it is equally obvious that the requirement of consensus, which demands that the national interests of each member state must be taken into account, still looms large in the picture and may yet steer AFTA to the way of earlier economic agreements. In this regard, the caution offered by In- donesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaadja during the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Manila in 1985 is worth noting. As he put it then, the "basic philosophy of ASEAN cooperation is based on the concept of regional cooperation rather than integration. The need for pro-



38 Asian Affairs

tecting national interests of individual countries... and the pursuit of national aspirations are important objectives in the nation-building process of ASEAN member countries."32 Clearly, if the pace of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation is to move faster, the major hurdle of economic nationalism would have to be dealt with satisfactorily.

Looking to the Future

It appears that the pace of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation has been slow precisely because economic cooperation or even integration in the ASEAN context must be "sieved" through the powerful and contending economic nationalism of the ASEAN member states. In this sense, the ASEAN states' own desire to foster and protect their respective economic development and well-being continues to influence the direction and pace of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation. The dynamics created by the interplay of the desire of the ASEAN states to pursue ASEAN's economic cooperation objective on the one hand and their reluctance to disrupt the cohesion of ASEAN on the other hand convey a sense of commitment to inaction; political harmony and the willingness to cooperate, even if actual cooperation is slow, is both valued and projected. In this atmosphere, the requirement of consensus has served as a "braking mechanism" that allows the ASEAN states to "agree to disagree." The frequency with which the ASEAN states have availed themselves of this convenient mechanism appears to have been influenced by their political will-the will to look beyond short-term gains in favor of longer-term benefits, to look beyond national priorities into regional priorities, and to replace rhetoric with concrete ac- tions-and their capacity to muster the necessary resources to implement agreed upon economic cooperation measures.

It is of interest that the major decisions on intra-ASEAN economic cooperation have corresponded directly to external impetus. Over the past quarter of a century, for example, the ASEAN heads of government have met only four times. At the Bali and Kuala Lumpur Summit in 1976 and 1977, respectively, intra-ASEAN economic cooperation was prompted by the need for regional resilience through national resilience, which in turn was to be achieved through national economic development. At the Manila Summit in 1987, economic cooperation was again discussed by the ASEAN heads of government because of the fear that the dwindling Cambodian conflict might leave them with no common concern. During the 1992 Singa- pore Summit, the Cambodian conflict was essentially a non-issue, but fear of economic regionalism elsewhere was. As a result, notwithstanding the fact that some ASEAN countries, as well as individuals within each ASEAN country, were more enthusiastic about greater intra-ASEAN economic cooperation than others, it appears that the ASEAN political leadership has to




be "dragged" or prompted by external impetus into confronting the issue of economic cooperation.

The notion that ASEAN has to be prompted by external events into ad- dressing its always stressed yet ever-slowly achieved objective of economic cooperation gives the impression that economic cooperation is dealt with only when it must be confronted because it remains as the public goal of ASEAN. If ASEAN is to move further along on the economic front, it must take the initiatives on its own and exhibit a greater willingness to confront the difficult political decisions to go beyond the comparatively safe confines of agreeing to disagree. More to the point, the changing regional and global environment may require that the continued relevance of ASEAN depends on the progress it makes on the economic arena. This latest externally generated push for intra-ASEAN economic cooperation is different from previous impetuses in that it may have a direct bearing on both the future of ASEAN as well as the economic well-being of its member states. As such, the need for political will and political capacity may no longer be a choice but a pressing necessity if ASEAN is to continue as an important regional and global actor.

If the future of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation is to be judged strict- ly on the strength of its past record, the prospects are not very bright. Nevertheless, there are some reasons for optimism. For one thing, the performance of ASEAN in the economic sphere cannot be assessed in isolation of the broader ASEAN achievements in fostering a more peaceful and stable regional environment. By the same token, the ASEAN mode of making decisions by consensus has also necessitated a more gradual and in- cremental approach to ASEAN economic cooperation. In this sense, the ASEAN experience should not be judged on the basis of what is or is not achieved but rather in terms of what is now and will be possible. Viewed as such, the decision by the ASEAN heads of government at the Singapore Summit to sign CEPT and AFTA, to strengthen the ASEAN secretariat, to upgrade the ASEAN secretary-general to a ministerial rank, and to institu- tionalize their summit by now meeting every three years can be taken as both the culmination of twenty-five years of ASEAN interaction as well as part and parcel of the "ASEANization" of Southeast Asia.33 These decisions may be a sign that the ASEAN states are now in a better position to view economic cooperation with more pragmatism and urgency. In short, their political will and capacity may now be moving in the same direction-toward each other.

NOTES

1. Asiaweek, 7 February 1992. 2. See, for example, Lim Joo-Jock (with Vani S.), ed. Armed Communist



40 Asian Affairs

Movements in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Gower: Issued under the auspices of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).

3. For a discussion of the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, see, for example, J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974) and Arnold C. Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Ar- chipelago (New York: Praeger, 1966).

4. For a discussion of the Philippines' claim to Sabah, see, for example, M. O. Ariff, The Philippines' Claim to Sabah, Its Historical, Legal and Political Implica- tions (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1970) and Lela Garner Noble, Philippine Policy Toward Sabah: A Claim to Independence (Tucson, Az.: University of Arizona Press, 1977).

5. See, for example, Nancy McHenry Fletcher, The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1969).

6. Shee Poon Kim, "A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977," Asian Survey 17 (August 1977), 753-70.

7. For a more detailed discussion of the different threat perceptions of the ASEAN states, see, for example, Robert O. Tillman, Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1987) and Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN States: No Common Outlook," International Affairs (London) 49 (October 1973): 600-07.

8. Selo Soemardjan, "Introduction," in R. P. Anand and Purificacion V. Quisumbing, eds., ASEAN: Identity, Development & Culture (Manila: Sison's Printing Press, 1981), xiii-xiv. Also see Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990).

9. See, for example, Michael Haas, ed., "Association of Southeast Asian Na- tions and Its Antecedents," in Basic Documents of Asian Regional Organizations, vol. 4, (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publishers, 1974), 1229-84.

10. Hans H. Indorf, Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).

11. Harold Crouch, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Cooperation (Singapore: ISEAS, 1984).

12. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, March 1987, 14. 13. Crouch (note 11). Also see H. W. Arndt and Ross Garnaut, "ASEAN and the

Industrialization of East Asia," Journal of Common Market Studies 17 (March 1979): 191-212.

14. See, for example, Nordin Sopiee, Chew Lay See, and Lim Siang Jin, eds., ASEAN at the Crossroads (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies [ISIS] Malaysia, 1989) and Linda G. Martin, ed., The ASEAN Success Story (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1987).

15. Donald J. Puchala, Harmonization in the European Communities (London: Frances Pinter, 1984), chapter 1.

16. Majorie L. Suriyamongkol, Politics of ASEAN Economic Cooperation: The Case of ASEAN Industrial Projects (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988).

17. Srikanta Chatterjee, "ASEAN Economic Co-operation in the 1980s and 1990s," in Alison Broinowski, ed., ASEAN into the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

18. Crouch (note 11). 19. Suriyamongkol (note 16). 20. Chatterjee, (note 17). 21. Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 9 February 1979, 44.




22. FEER, 25 July and 1 August 1991. Also see Arab News, 8 and 9 October 1991. 23. Straits Times (Overseas Weekly Edition), 2 May 1992. 24. Ibid., 12. 25. Bernama Overseas Services (distributed by the Malaysian Embassy,

Washington, D.C.), 23 October 1992, 2. 26. For a discussion of the Growth Triangle Concept, see Pushpa Thambipillai,

"The ASEAN Growth Triangle: The Convergence of National and Sub-National In- terests," Contemporary Southeast Asia 13 (December 1991): 299-314.

27. As reported in the Asian Wall Street Journal, 27 January 1992. 28. As quoted in the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service Daily Report-East

Asia, 25 February 1992, 46. 29. Ibid., 10 February 1992, 44. 30. Straits Ties (Overseas Weekly Edition), 15 August 1992. 31. Bernama Overseas Services, 23 October 1992, 2. 32. As quoted in FEER, 5 September 1985, 54. 33. For a more detailed analysis of the Singapore Summit, see Michael Antolik,

"ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 14 (September 1992): 142-53. Also see Leszek Busynski, "Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security," Asian Survey 32 (September 1992): 830-47.



Agreeing to Disagree the Political Reality of ASEAN Econ Cooperation 1993

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