1

National Housing Authority v Allarde

Facts:

Private respondent Rufino Mateo had lived in the disputed lots since his birth in 1928. In

1959, he started farming and working on a six-hectare portion of said lots, after the death of his

father who had cultivated a thirteen-hectare portion of the same lots. On September 1, 1983, the

National Housing Authority notified the respondent spouses of the scheduled development of the

Tala Estate including the lots in question, warning them that it would not be responsible for any

damage which may be caused to the crops planted on the said lots. In 1989, private respondent

Rufino Mateo filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the award to them of

subject disputed lots under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). In January

1992, petitioner caused the bulldozing of the ricefields of private respondents, damaging the

dikes and irrigations thereon, in the process. On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses, relying

on their claim that subject lots are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP, brought

before the respondent Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages with prayer for a writ of

preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from bulldozing further and making constructions

on the lots under controversy. Petitioner contended that the said lots which were previously

reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and resettlement purposes are not covered by the

CARP as they are not agricultural lands within the definition and contemplation of Section 3 (c)

of R. A. No. 6657. The RTC issued the writ.

Issue:

Whether or not the disputed land is covered by CARP

Held:

Lands reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies other

than the Department of Agrarian Reform, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 are

not considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the ambit of said law.

Thus, since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate was reserved, inter alia under Presidential

Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the National Housing Authority, the same has

been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c)

of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARL.

2

Isidro v CA

Facts:

Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of land. In

1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed

petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land. The occupancy of a portion

of said land was subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand.

Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond.

In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land,

but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent

effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful

detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court

(MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The trial court dismissed the case because it ruled that it is an

agrarian dispute, hence not cognizable by civil courts. Private respondent appealed to the RTC

which affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the trial court

was reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence not cognizable by civil courts

Held:

No. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an

agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is

agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law

provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural

is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a

tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such

arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. Tenancy is not a purely factual

relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal

relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their

written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more

important.

3

Suplico v CA

Facts:

Isabel Tupas leased her landholding for the amount of P10, 000.00 to petitioner Enrique

P. Suplico, her brother-in-law, under a contract that was set to expire on 31 May 1982. Some

time in 1979, respondent Armada started tilling an area of 32,945 square meter of the farmland

under an agreement with Enrique Suplico. Petitioner was to receive from the respondent 62

cavans from the palay harvest per crop yield by way of rental for the use not only of the land but

also of the work animals and a hand tractor. Private respondent resided with his family in a

farmhouse on the land. When, years later, petitioner threatened to eject respondent from the

property, the respondent initiated an action for damages and injunction against petitioner in the

Court of Agrarian Relations.The complaint averred that respondent was the tenant-farmer of

around 2.5 hectares of the property of Isabel Tupas having been instituted as such tenant in 1979

by her administrator, herein petitioner Enrique Suplico, to whom he religiously paid the fixed

rental of 62 cavans of palay per crop yield. On 18 January 1990, the trial court rendered its

decision declaring private respondent a bona fide agricultural lessee. On appeal, the decision of

the trial court was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is a tenant of the subject land

Held:

Tenancy did exist between the parties. Firstly, private respondent was in actual

possession of the land, and he there resided, with his family, in a farmhouse just like what a farm

tenant normally would. Secondly, private respondent and his wife were personally doing the

farm work of plowing, planting, weeding and harvesting the area. The occasional and temporary

hiring of persons outside of the immediate household, so long as the tenant himself had control

in the farmwork, was not essentially opposed to the status of tenancy. Thirdly, the management

of the farm was left entirely to private respondent who defrayed the cultivation expenses.

Fourthly, private respondent shared the harvest of the land, depositing or delivering to petitioner

Enrique Suplico the agreed 62 cavans of palay per crop yield.

4

Bejasa v CA

Facts:

On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her

attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the disputed land. On October 26, 1984,

Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime’s wife

with a term of one year. On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,

000.00 in consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of one

year. After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria’s demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas

continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of

rent or a shared harvest. On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of

Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery

of damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan, amd the trial court ruled in favour of

the Bejasas. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas

Held:

The elements of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the

tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural

production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. Candelaria and

the Bejasas, between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner never gave

her consent. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land

to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.

5

Almuete v Andres

Facts:

The subject property was awarded by the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation

Administration (NARRA) to petitioner Rodrigo Almuete. He and his family farmed the subject

property peacefully and exclusively for some twenty-two years. On August 17, 1979, an

Agrarian Reform Technologist filed a field investigation and inspection report stating that the

whereabouts of Rodrigo Almuete, was unknown and that he had waived all his rights as a

NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control and financial hardship. The

technologist also stated therein that the actual occupant of the land is Marcelo Andres since April

1967 to date. Thereafter, a homestead patent was issued in favour of Andres. Marcelo Andres

gained control, and took possession, of approximately half of the subject property. Consequently,

Rodrigo Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an action for reconveyance and recovery

of possession against Marcelo Andres with the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela which

rendered a decision in favour of Almuete. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the decision

of the trial court NULL and VOID because the case is an agrarian dispute, hence it falls within

the jurisdiction of DARAB.

Issue:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a tenancy relationship between the

parties. The following elements are indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship: (1) The

parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of the

relationship is an agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;

(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is personal

cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between

the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. The Court of Appeals gravely erred when it

granted the petition for certiorari and held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the action between petitioners and respondent since there is no tenancy relationship

between them. The action filed by petitioners was cognizable by the regular courts.

6

Monzanto v Zerna

Facts:

Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna were charged with qualified theft for stealing the

coconut harvests from the plantation of petitioner Monzanto. The spouses were the overseer of

the land owned by the petitioner. After trial on the merits, the RTC acquitted them of the charge.

The total proceeds of the copra sale alleged in the Information were P6, 262.50. However, the

awarded amount was only P5, 162.50 which was deposited by private respondents with the

barangay secretary on March 2, 1995, after deducting P340 for harvesting cost and P760 for

labor cost. Thus, petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration praying that the remaining

sum of P1, 100 be returned to her. In its September 4, 1996 Order, the trial court granted the

Motion and ordered private respondents to return the amount of P1, 100.10. On appeal, CA ruled

that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order private respondents to pay petitioner the amount of

P1, 100 because the dispute involved an agricultural tenancy relationship; the matter fell within

the jurisdiction of DARAB.

Issue:

Whether or not the award of the civil liability in this case is agrarian in nature

Held:

An agrarian dispute existed between the parties. First, the subject of the dispute between

them was the taking of coconuts from the property owned by petitioner. Second, private

respondents were the overseers of the property at the time of the taking of the coconuts. A

tenurial arrangement exists among herein parties as regards the harvesting of the agricultural

products, as shown by the several remittances made by private respondents to petitioner. These

are substantiated by receipts. In any event, their being overseers does not foreclose their being

also tenants.

7

Daez v CA

Facts:

Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa,

Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio

Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said

land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as

amended by Letter of Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by the

respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers, Eudosia Daez applied for

the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for

the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the petitioner was

denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally

denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time

under R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Regional Director allowed Daez to retain the subject land but

the DAR Secretary reversed that decision. She appealed to the Office of the President which

ruled in her favour. Respondents appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the Office of

the President.

Issue:

Whether or not the denial of application for exemption under PD 27 would bar an application for

retention under RA 6657

Held:

The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and

those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner’s right of retention are

different. Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for

retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does

not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment

to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland,

even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final

and executory.

8

Paris v Alfeche

Facts:

Petitioner is the registered owner of two parcels of land situated at Paitan, Quezon,

Bukidnon. The said parcels are fully tenanted by private respondents herein who are recipients of

Emancipation Patents in their names pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27.

Petitioner alleged that she owns one of the subject property as original homestead grantee who

still owned the same when Republic Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is entitled to retain the

area to the exclusion of her tenants. The Adjudicator a quo rendered a decision in favour of the

petitioner but that decision was reversed by DARAB. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court

rejected the claim of the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act are automatically

exempted from the operation of land reform

Held:

Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original

homesteads, only for "as long as they continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of land are

covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of land

reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory

heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.

9

Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v Secretary of DAR

Facts:

Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc.

and petitioner-in-intervention Archie’s Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the

aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16

(d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in

Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the

Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional. they contend that R.A. 6657, by including

in its coverage, the raising of fish and aquaculture operations including fishponds and prawn

ponds, treating them as in the same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates the

equal protection clause of the Constitution and is, therefore void. During the debates of the

Constitutional Commission, it shows that the intent of the constitutional framers is to exclude

industrial lands, to which category lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms

belong.

Issue:

Whether or not fishponds and prawn ponds are included in the coverage of CARL

Held:

On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881 was approved by Congress amending

some provisions of RA 6657. The provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and

prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question

concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic with

the passage of R.A. No. 7881.

10

Republic v CA

Facts:

Private respondent is the owner of the five parcels of land in issue which have a

combined area of approximately 112.0577 hectares situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of

Jala-Jala, Rizal. The tax declarations classified the properties as agricultural. On June 16, 1994,

petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory

acquisition pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II of R.A. 6657. On July 21, 1994, private respondent

filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from agrarian

reform. Private respondent alleged that the property should be exempted since it is within the

residential and forest conservation zones of the town zoning ordinance of Jala-Jala. On October

19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application for exemption of private

respondent. On appeal to the CA, the decision of DAR was reversed. Petitioner DAR maintains

that the subject properties have already been classified as agricultural based on the tax

declarations.

Issue:

Whether or not the land classification on tax declarations are conclusive

Held:

There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in a tax

declaration is conclusive and final, nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax

declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land. In fact, DAR

Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be

submitted when applying for exemption from CARP.

11

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two

parcels of land with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are

watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community. Petitioner alleged

that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem.

Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court

seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim,

however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the ejectment

cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform for the compulsory acquisition

of the SRRDC property under the CARP. The landholding of SRRDC was placed under

compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the property

contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in

terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were

not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the

CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.

Issue:

Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire

property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657

Held:

Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We

cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be

protected for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of

water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but

cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be

answered now.

12

Luz Farms v DAR Secretary

Facts:

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands

to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section

16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 and of the Guidelines and Procedures

Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 and the Rules and Regulations

Implementing Section 11 thereof. Petitioner prayed that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be

declared unconstitutional. It argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the

mandate of the Constitution in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and

swine in its coverage.

Issue:

Whether or not lands devoted to livestock and poultry business are included in the coverage of

CARL

Held:

From the discussion of the Constitutional Commission that Section 11 of R.A. 6657

which includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-

raising in the definition of commercial farms is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-

industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is

simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock,

poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated

in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional.

13

Alita v CA

Facts:

Private respondents' predecessors-in-interest acquired the subject parcel of lands through

homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents

herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying

on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316. On June 18, 1981, private respondents instituted a

complaint for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and

General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to lands obtained through

homestead law. The RTC dismissed the complaint but on motion for reconsideration it declared

that P.D. 27 is not applicable to homestead lands. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the RTC

was sustained.

Issue:

Whether or not lands acquired through homestead law are covered by CARP

Held:

Petitioners is correct in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from

the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping

social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the

Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the

enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Philippine Constitution

likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants

guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. Provided, that the original homestead grantees or

their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of

this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

14

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v DAR Secretary

Facts:

Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur, with a total

area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land, 249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while

the remaining 19.5432 hectares are planted with coconut trees. In 1985, Archbishop several

petitions for exemption of certain properties located in various towns of Camarines Sur from the

coverage of Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27. Two of these petitions

were denied in an Order dated November 6, 1986, issued by the Regional Director of DAR,

Region V, Juanito L. Lorena. Archbishop appealed from the order of the Regional Director

contending, inter alia, that they are used for charitable and religious purposes. The appeal was

denied by the DAR Secretary. On appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject lands are exempt from the coverage of CARP

Held:

Archbishop cannot claim exemption in behalf of the millions of Filipino faithful, as the

lands are clearly not exempt under the law. The laws simply speak of the landowner without

qualification as to under what title the land is held or what rights to the land the landowner may

exercise. There is no distinction made whether the landowner holds naked title only or can

exercise all the rights of ownership. Archbishop would have the Court read deeper into the law,

to create exceptions that are not stated in PD 27 and RA 6657, and to do so would be to frustrate

the revolutionary intent of the law, which is the redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit

of landless farmers and farmworkers.

15

Land Bank v CA

Facts:

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and

subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6,

Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and sought to compel the

DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just

compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts

respectively earmarked, reserved and deposited in trust accounts for private respondents, and to

allow them to withdraw the same. Petitioner DAR maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is

a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the

DAR maintained that the issuance of the Certificate of Deposit by the Landbank was a

substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.

Issue:

Whether or not the opening of trust accounts is a valid payment for just compensation

Held:

It is very explicit from the provisions of RA 6657 that the deposit must be made only in

cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made

in any other form. If it were the intention to include a trust account among the valid modes of

deposit that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared

from which it can be fairly deduced that a trust account is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity

in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term deposit.

16

Roxas & Co. Inc. v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three

haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of

Nasugbu, Batangas. On May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to

sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and

Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with

the CARL. Petitioner tried to withdraw the VOS of Hacienda Caylaway but the sane was denied.

Thereafter, petitioner sought the conversion of the three haciendas from agricultural to other use

but the petition was likewise denied.

Issue:

Whether or not process of land acquisition under CARL should observe due process

Held:

For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice

of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the

representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties; and (2) the

Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. They are steps

designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The taking

contemplated in Agrarian Reform is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required

is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights

accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that no

person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The CARL was

not intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of

eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.

17

Sigre v CA

Facts:

Private respondent Gonzales, as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed

with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to prohibit the Land

Bank of the Philippines from accepting the leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre, and for LBP to

turn over to private respondent the rentals previously remitted to it by Sigre. It appears that

Ernesto Sigre was private respondent’s tenant in an irrigated rice land located in Barangay Naga,

Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously paying private respondent a lease rental of sixteen cavans per

crop or thirty-two cavans per agricultural year. In the agricultural year of 1991-1992, Sigre

stopped paying his rentals to private respondent and instead, remitted it to the LBP pursuant to

the Department of Agrarian Reform’s Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, which set

the guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmer-beneficiaries under the

land transfer program of P.D. No. 27. CA declared that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional in laying

down the formula for determining the cost of the land as it sets limitations on the judicial

prerogative of determining just compensation.

Issue:

Whether or not PD 27 is unconstitutional

Held:

The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets limitations on the judicial

prerogative of determining just compensation is bereft of merit. The determination of just

compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not

final or conclusive. Clearly from the provisions of the two laws, unless both the landowner and

the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land

Production and the DAR, the parties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the

appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court.

18

Association of Small Landowners v DAR Secretary

Facts:

These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform

Program. The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the provision of RA 6657

regarding the modes of payment of just compensation is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the

owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money,

which is the only medium of payment allowed. RA 6657 allows the payment of just

compensation by means of LBP Bonds, Shares of Stocks in government-owned or controlled

corporations, and tax credits.

Issue:

Whether or not payment of just compensation other than money is allowed

Held:

It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is

money and no other. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of

eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of

relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps

local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. Agrarian Reform

program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the

vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of

billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially

appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact

not even fully available at this time. It is assumed that the framers of the Constitution were aware

of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government.

It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed,

they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but

a less conventional if more practical method.

19

Land Bank v CA and Jose Pascual

Facts:

Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three parcels of land located in Guttaran,

Cagayan. Pursuant to the Land Reform Program of the Government under PD 27 and EO 228,

the Department of Agrarian Reform placed these lands under its Operation Land Transfer. After

receiving notice of the decision of the PARAD regarding the value of just compensation, private

respondent accepted the valuation. However, when the judgment became final and executory,

petitioner LBP as the financing arm in the operation of PD 27 and EO 228 refused to pay thus

forcing private respondent to apply for a Writ of Execution with the PARAD which the latter

issued on 24 December 1992. Still, petitioner LBP declined to comply with the order. Private

respondent filed an action for Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the

valuation determined by the PARAD which the appellate court granted.

Issue:

Whether or not the LBP can refuse to pay the landowner of the value of just compensation

Held:

Once the Land Bank agrees with the appraisal of the DAR, which bears the approval of

the landowner, it becomes its legal duty to finance the transaction. In the instant case, petitioner

participated in the valuation proceedings held in the office of the PARAD through its counsel,

Atty. Eduard Javier. It did not appeal the decision of PARAD which became final and executory.

As a matter of fact, petitioner even stated in its Petition that it is willing to pay the value

determined by the PARAD provided that the farmer beneficiaries concur thereto. These facts

sufficiently prove that petitioner LBP agreed with the valuation of the land. The only thing that

hindered it from paying the amount was the non-concurrence of the farmer-beneficiary. But as

we have already stated, there is no need for such concurrence. Without such obstacle, petitioner

can now be compelled to perform its legal duty through the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

20

Santos v Land Bank

Facts:

The lands of petitioner were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 in 1972. Regional Trial

Court, sitting as an Agrarian Court rendered judgment fixing the amount of P49, 241,876.00 to

be the just compensation for the irrigated and unirrigated ricelands of the petitioner. A

preliminary valuation in the amount of P3, 543,070.66 had in fact been previously released by

the Land Bank in cash and bond; thus deducting it from the total amount adjudged, the balance

unpaid amounted to P45, 698,805.34 which was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be paid

in accordance with RA 6657. Petitioner claimed that the payment of P41, 128,024.81 in Land

Bank Bonds was not acceptable to him and that the said amount should be paid in cash or

certified check. Initially, the RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner but on motion for

reconsideration it ruled otherwise and declared that the unpaid balance should be paid in

accordance with RA 6657. On appeal to the CA, the ruling of the trial court was upheld.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can refuse the LBP Bonds as payment of just compensation

Held:

RA 6657 is clear and leaves no doubt as to its interpretation regarding the manner of

payment of just compensation. The provision allows the landowner to choose the manner of

payment from the list provided therein, but since plaintiff had obviously wanted payment to be

made in cash, then the trial court had only to apply Section 18 of R.A. 6657 which provides for

the payment of a percentage thereon in cash and the balance in bond.

21

Estribillo v DAR

Facts:

Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc. requested that 527.8308 hectares of its

landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation

therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the

same may be covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entire

area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs

covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In

December 1997, HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage

under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed

that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no

compensation was paid therefor. RARAD rendered a decision declaring as void the TCTs and

EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and

neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners. Petitioners

appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal to the CA, the same

was dismissed. Petitioners contended that the EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of one

year from their registration.

Issue:

Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after their issuance

Held:

After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,

otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree where the DAR is required to issue the

corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with

Presidential Decree No. 27, the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same

protection accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and

incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the

issuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a

cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.

22

Vda. De Tangub v CA

Facts:

Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the RTC of Lanao del

Norte in March, 1988 an agrarian case for damages by reason of their unlawful dispossession, as

tenants from the landholding owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. On August

24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint declaring that the

jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the

Department of Agrarian Reform by virtue of Executive Order No. 229. On appeal to the CA, the

appellate court agreed with the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was correct in dismissing the case. It being a case

concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special

jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the

exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of

the Department.

23

Quismundo v CA

Facts:

On February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a complaint

with the trial court praying that their relationship with petitioner be changed from share tenancy

to a leasehold system, pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. On March

16, 1988, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action since the

law that should allegedly govern the relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by

Commonwealth Act No. 271, and not Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. The trial court denied

the motion for lack of merit. On June 18, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of

the denial order, invoking as an additional ground the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the

case under the authority and by reason of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Pending the resolution of said motion for reconsideration, private respondents filed another

motion dated November 9, 1988, for the supervision of harvesting. On December 6, 1988, the

trial court granted the motion of private respondents and denied petitioner's motion for

reconsideration. On appeal, the CA upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

With the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987,

the regional trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.

The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform. Thus, the Regional

Trial Court of Angeles City, at the time private respondents filed their complaint, was already

bereft of authority to act on the same. The allegation of private respondents that their complaint

was filed on November 3, 1987, and not on February 13, 1988 is immaterial since as of either

date Executive Order No. 229 was already in effect.

24

Machete v CA

Facts:

On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of

back rentals and damages before the RTC against petitioners. The complaint alleged that the

parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to private respondent's landholdings.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court

over the subject matter. They contended that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian

relations; hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the

Department of Agrarian Reform. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal to the

CA, the ruling of the RTC was reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

There exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable by

the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with

private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to

resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the

authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an

administrative body of special competence.

25

DARAB v CA

Facts:

Private respondents filed a complaint with the PARAD, praying that they be maintained

in the peaceful possession and cultivation of a portion of the land in question. Private

respondents alleged that they are farmworkers and occupant-tillers of the land in question and

that the portion of the land they were cultivating had been bulldozed at the instance of Federico

Balanon and other individuals acting in behalf of the petitioner BSB Construction. On March 10,

1993, the Provincial Adjudicator issued an order enjoining the BSB Construction and all persons

representing it “to cease and desist from undertaking any further bulldozing and development

activities on the property under litigation or from committing such other acts tending to disturb

the status quo.” On March 12, 1993 petitioners filed a complaint with the DARAB in which they

sought the nullification of the restraining order issued by the PARAD. On May 6, 1993, the

DARAB issued a status quo order. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court declared that the

DARAB has no jurisdiction to issue SQO.

Issue:

Whether or not the DARAB can take cognizance of a pending case under PARAD

Held:

All actions pursued under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR, in accordance with

Section 50 of RA 6657, must be commenced in the PARAD of the province where the property

is located and that the DARAB only has appellate jurisdiction to review the PARAD’s orders,

decisions and other dispositions. Consequently, the DARAB was not possessed of jurisdiction to

take cognizance, in the first instance, of the BEA Case. Neither may the DARAB now claim that

it issued the SQO in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, since it recognized, as an original complaint,

the BEA Case.

26

Celendro v CA

Facts:

Private respondent is the surviving spouse of the late Florencio Guevarra, an awardee

under the Homestead Law. Petitioner occupied and tilled two hectares of private respondent’s

property through the latter’s tolerance, with the express condition that if and when that portion of

the land should be needed by private respondent, the latter needed only to demand its return.

When the private respondent started to demand, the petitioner requested for extension until

finally the former wrote a formal letter of demand. When said demand remained unheeded, a

case for unlawful detainer was commenced by private respondent before the Municipal Circuit

Trial Court of Wao, Lanao del Sur against petitioner. The trial court rendered a decision in

favour of the private respondent. On appeal to the RTC, the decision was affirmed. Upon

learning of the issuance of a writ of execution, petitioner filed a Petition to Quiet Title before the

Provincial Adjudication Board which office rendered a decision granting the petition. Private

respondent appealed to the DARAB but the decision was affirmed. When private respondent

went to the CA, the decision of DARAB was reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the trial court can be reversed by the DARAB

Held:

Petitioner cannot question before an administrative body the final decision of the MCTC

or the RTC. A final judgment can no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or

indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official,

branch or department of Government. This particular injunction against administrative bodies is

based on the principle of separation of powers, which presupposes mutual respect by and

between the three departments of the government. The DARAB, which is under the Department

of Agrarian Reform in the executive branch, must accord due respect to the MCTC and the RTC,

which are both instrumentalities of the judiciary.

27

Centeno v Centeno

Facts:

The parcels of land owned by private respondent were the subject of an earlier case filed

by respondent against petitioners before the DAR for cancellation of certificates of land transfer.

In said case, it was established that petitioners, through fraud and misrepresentation, obtained

CLTs in their names. The DAR issued an order directing the recall and cancellation of

petitioners' CLTs. The aforesaid order was affirmed by the Office of the President in its decision

dated July 8, 1987, which had become final and executory. Despite the decision of DAR,

petitioners have interfered with and prevented respondent from exercising acts of possession

over the landholdings earlier adjudicated to her. This prompted the private respondent to file a

complaint with the DARAB for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining

Order/Preliminary Injunction, Ejectment and Damages. A decision was rendered by the

Provincial Adjudicator in favour of the respondent which was affirmed by DARAB. On appeal

to the CA, the same was affirmed. Petitioners are contending that the DARAB has no jurisdiction

over the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The present case for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for restraining

order/preliminary injunction is a mere off-shoot of the suit for cancellation of Certificates of

Land Transfer (CLTs) filed by herein respondent against herein petitioners before the DARAB.

That previous case culminated in a decision upholding respondent's entitlement to an award of

the subject landholdings under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Since the instant case

is related to and is a mere off-shoot of the said previous case for cancellation of CLTs which was

decided in favour of herein respondent, the Court believes and so hold that the DAR continues to

have jurisdiction over the same.

28

Ocho v Calos

Facts:

Respondents, all surnamed Calos, filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian

Reform Provincial Adjudicator entitled “Annulment of Deeds of Assignment, Emancipation

Patents and Transfer Certificate of Titles, Retention and Recovery of Possession and Ownership”

against petitioner Ocho and other farmer-beneficiaries on the ground that the original farmer-

beneficiaries unlawfully conveyed their respective rights over the lands granted to them to third

persons. The Caloses also posited that the subject land was beyond the coverage of the agrarian

reform law as the same was covered by a homestead patent. The Provincial Adjudicator

rendered a decision in favour of the respondents. When the case was elevated to the DARAB, the

decision of the Provincial Adjudicator was reversed. On appeal to the CA, the decision of

DARAB was substantially affirmed except that the appellate court declared that petitioner and

Vicente Polinar are not qualified beneficiaries as they are already owners of other agricultural

lands. Petitioner contended that the claim of the Caloses that he is owner of three parcels of land

which matter was already determined and decided with finality in the Resolution of DAR cannot

be subject to review by any court.

Issue:

Whether or not the findings of DAR regarding qualification of petitioner constitute res judicata

Held:

Yes. There is no question that the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other

agricultural lands had already been passed upon by the proper quasi-judicial authority. Said

decision became final and executory when the Caloses failed to file an appeal thereof after their

motion for reconsideration was denied. Applying the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, the

issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated.

29

Gonzales v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales received two Orders from the Regional Office of the

Department of Agrarian Reform directing her to surrender the titles to her land and to submit the

other requirements of the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said bank was

ordered to pay the petitioner an aggregate amount of P55, 690.74 as compensation for the two

parcels of land. On December 20, 1991, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to restrain the

enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional Director on the ground of

lack or excess of jurisdiction, alleging that the petitioner never filed a land transfer claim and

was not notified of nor heard in the execution of the final survey plans and the valuation of her

land. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated June 29, 1992, denying due course to, and

dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies

Held:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case. The

proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a reconsideration of the

orders of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the DARAB, or to its executive adjudicator

in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. Prior resort to these administrative

bodies will not only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may likewise

prove advantageous to the parties as the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not

be limited by the technical rules of procedure and evidence. From there, the petitioner has yet

another forum available, the Special Agrarian Courts which are the final determinants of cases

involving land valuation or determination of just compensation. Moreover, the petitioner has not

obtained any exception to the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

30

Cabral v CA

Facts:

On January 16, 1990, petitioner Victoria Cabral filed a petition before the BARC for the

cancellation of the Emancipation Patents and Torrens Titles issued in favour of private

respondents. The patents and titles covered portions of the property owned and registered in the

name of petitioner. On February 11, 1990, Regional Director Eligio Pacis issued an order

dismissing the petition for cancellation of Emancipation Patents. The Regional Director likewise

denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated July 11, 1990. Consequently, petitioner filed

a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional

Director and claiming denial of due process. On January 8, 1991, the appellate court dismissed

the petition for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction to decide on the petition

Held:

The DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case. It is amply clear from

the provisions of CARL and other pertinent rules that the function of the Regional Office

concerns the implementation of agrarian reform laws while that of the

DARAB/RARAD/PARAD is the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. The first is essentially

executive. It pertains to the enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them into

practical operation and enforcing their due observance. Thus, the Regional Director is primarily

tasked with implementing laws, policies, rules and regulations within the responsibility of the

agency, as well as the agency program in the region. The second is judicial in nature, involving

as it does the determination of rights and obligations of the parties.

31

Tirona v Alejo

Facts:

On March 25, 1996, petitioners sued private respondent Luis Nuñez before the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela for ejectment. Petitioners claimed to be owners of

various fishpond lots located at Coloong, Valenzuela. They alleged, among others that on

January 20, 1996, private respondent Nuñez, “by means of force, stealth, or strategy, unlawfully

entered the said fishpond lots and occupied the same” against their will, thereby depriving them

of possession of said fishponds. Private respondent raised the defense that the MeTC had no

jurisdiction over the case, for petitioners’ failure to allege prior physical possession in their

complaint. The MeTC rendered a decision in favour of the petitioner but in the case of Ignacio

the MeTC, the trial court declared otherwise. The two cases were decided jointly in the RTC

where the MeTC’s declaration regarding the prejudicial question was affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the rule

is no different in actions for ejectment. All that is alleged in the complaint was unlawful

deprivation of their possession by private respondents. The deficiency is fatal to petitioners’

actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela. Such bare allegation is insufficient for

the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction. No reversible error was, therefore, committed by the RTC

when it held that the Metropolitan Trial Court acquired no jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos.

6632 and 6633 for failure of the complaints to aver prior physical possession by petitioners.

32

Calvo v Vergara

Facts:

On October 21, 1972, the lots of Milagros Lebumfacil were placed under the Operation

Land Transfer program of the Department of Agrarian Reform Presidential Decree No. 27,

which deemed the tenant-farmers as owners of the land they till. Due to poor health and senility

of the prospective farmer-beneficiaries Baguio and Apan, they waived their rights over the said

lots. Consequently, the DAR awarded the lots to the Vergara spouses and to the Basalo spouses.

Despite the coverage under the OLT program of the parcels of land, Lebumfacil still sold them

on to petitioner spouses Benny and Jovita Calvo. Subsequently, on October 2, 1991, petitioners

filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Toledo City a complaint for illegal detainer against

private respondents praying for their eviction from their homelots. As the dispute was agrarian in

nature, the MTC forwarded the case to the PARAD which declared that the coverage of the

subject land under Operation Land Transfer as valid and legal. Petitioners appealed to the

DARAB which affirmed the above decision with modification. On appeal to the CA, the decision

of DARAB was affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondents are tenant-farmers and are thus qualified as reallocates

Held:

Being a question of fact, it is beyond the office of this court in a petition for review under

Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, where only questions of law may be raised. Petitioners, in

raising the above issue, is in effect questioning the factual findings of the DARAB, contrary to

the doctrine that findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect,

if not finality by the courts because of the special knowledge and expertise over matters falling

under their jurisdiction.

33

Nuesa v CA

Facts:

On May 25, 1972, an Order of Award was issued in favour of Jose Verdillo over two

parcels of agricultural land of the Buenavista Estate with the conditions that within a period of

six months from receipt of a copy, the awardee shall personally cultivate or otherwise develop at

least one-fourth of the area or occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and

pay at least the first installment. On August 26, 1993 private respondent filed an application with

the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of said lots claiming

that he had complied with the conditions. Petitioner filed a letter of protest against private

respondent claiming it is him who had been in possession of the land and had been cultivating

the same. On January 24, 1994, petitioner, the Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa,

promulgated an Order cancelling the award to private respondent. Respondent sought relief to

the Provincial Adjudicator which reversed the decision of the Regional Director. On appeal to

the DARAB, the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator was affirmed. The Petition for Review

filed by herein petitioners with the Court of Appeals was denied due course and ordered

dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not the DARAB can take cognizance of the case

Held:

The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the

Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and

its adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the

case. In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any

agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between them within the

ambit of the definition of agrarian dispute. Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over

the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent’s petition in the first

place.

34

Sarne v Maquiling

Facts:

On February 17, 1998, private respondents filed a complaint for redemption and damages

against petitioners before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Dumaguete City. In their

complaint, they alleged that as tenants of the subject parcel of land, they have the right of pre-

emption and redemption pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 of R.A. No. 3844 otherwise known as

the Code of Agrarian Reform. The Adjudicator ruled in favour of the respondents. Petitioners

alleged that the Adjudicator has no jurisdiction because the land in question was not under the

administration and disposition of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the

Philippines. On appeal to the CA, the jurisdiction of DARAB was upheld.

Issue:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

It is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB in this case is anchored on Section 1,

paragraph (e), Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure covering agrarian disputes

involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of agricultural

lands under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws. There is nothing in the provision

from which it can be inferred that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to agricultural

lands under the administration and disposition of DAR and LBP. We should not distinguish

where the law does not distinguish.

35

DAR v Abdulwahid

Facts:

On December 28, 2000, Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. filed with the RTC a complaint for

Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Violations of R.A. Nos. 6657 and 3844 as amended,

Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary

Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against Buenavista Yupangco

Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc., the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines.

DAR filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Yupangco’s causes of action were not within

the jurisdiction of the RTC. RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court

sustained the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

The complaint in the petition at bar seeks for the RTC to cancel Certificates of Land

Ownership Awards issued to the beneficiaries and the Transfer Certificates of Title issued

pursuant thereto. These are reliefs which the RTC cannot grant, since the complaint essentially

prays for the annulment of the coverage of the disputed property within the CARP, which is but

an incident involving the implementation of the CARP. These are matters relating to terms and

conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agrarian reform beneficiaries over which

DARAB has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction. If the issues between the parties are

intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such

dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.

36

Philippine Veterans Bank v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao. The

lands were taken by the DAR for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to R.A. No. 6657.

Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the Philippines

and the DARAB, petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its

property with the RTC which dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the

15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can still appeal after the 15-day period for filing appeals

Held:

Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that “the decision of

the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just

compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional

Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the

notice thereof.” The petition in the RTC was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule

XIII, Section 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the

case.

37

Samahang Magbubukid ng Kapdula Inc. v CA

Facts:

The members of petitioner Samahang Magbubukid Ng Kapdula, Inc. were the tenants on

the two parcels of land formerly owned by Macario Aro. When Mr. Aro sold the said parcels of

land to Arrow Head Golf Club, Inc., the members of petitioner were evicted. The parcels of land

were later leased to the spouses, Ruben Rodriguez and Gloria Bugagao and were then developed

into a sugarcane plantation, with private respondents as the regular farmworkers. The same

property was acquired by the Philippine National Bank at a Sheriff’s auction sale. The ownership

of subject parcels of land was later transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust which conveyed

the same to the Republic of the Philippines. On March 26, 1991, in furtherance of its objective of

instituting agrarian reform in the country, the DAR issued Certificate of Land Ownership for the

said parcels of land in favour of the petitioner. Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari

on CA which ordered the respondent DAR to conduct a hearing, with due notice to the herein

petitioners, to determine the rightful beneficiaries of the subject parcels of land in accordance

with R.A. No. 6657.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a need for the private respondents to exhaust administrative remedies

before filing their petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals

Held:

Time and again, the Court has ruled that in cases of denial of due process, exhaustion of

available administrative remedies is unnecessary. Records show that the letter which was

supposed to be the notice to the private respondents regarding the inclusion of subject properties

in the CARP was ineffective. There is thus a need for further hearings to determine the

beneficiaries of subject parcels of land. In such hearings, the private respondents, who were

deprived of an opportunity to be heard before the DAR, should participate.

38

Greenfield Realty Corporation v Cardama

Facts:

Private respondents filed with the Provincial Adjudicator of Sta. Cruz, Laguna against

Independent Realty Corporation, among others. Respondents claimed to have already been

issued their respective Certificates of Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27

which took effect on October 21, 1972, thus subject landholdings can no longer be covered by

the CARP law. Respondents also claimed to have succeeded their father who died on January 9,

1989 in the latter’s tenancy rights, and should be declared now as leasehold tenants and actual

tillers of the subject irrigated riceland. Judgment was rendered in favour of the private

respondents by the Provincial Adjudicator. On appeal to the DARAB, it was declared that the

respondents are not bona fide tenant of the subject property. When the case was brought to the

CA, the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator was reinstated.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the DARAB is based on substantial evidence and thus should

become final and conclusive upon the court

Held:

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. Even if we consider that the evidence presented is relevant,

they are not adequate to support the conclusion reached by the DARAB. On the other hand, the

records of the case are replete with relevant evidences which are adequate to support the

conclusion that Hermogenes Cardama is the bona fide tenant of the subject property. Thus, the

evidences on which DARAB based its decision are not relevant and adequate to support its

conclusion.

39

Bernarte v CA

Facts:

On October 5, 1989, Estrella Arastia filed a complaint for violation of Section 73 (b) of

RA 6657 before the RTC in its capacity as a Special Agrarian Court. The complaint alleged that

petitioners illegally intruded into the land of Arastia, burned the existing sugarcane plants and

started to cultivate small portions thereof. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on

the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction as it was the DARAB, pursuant to Section 50 of

RA 6657, which had jurisdiction over the case. The motion was dismissed by the RTC.

Meanwhile a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Arastia from preventing their re-entry and

re-occupation of the landholdings pending the resolution of the case was also obtained by

petitioners from DARAB. When the petitioners were arrested by the police officers for their

refusal to leave the property, and was thereafter criminally charged, they asserted that the

preliminary injunction obtained by them in the DARAB was the one valid since the trial court

has no jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held:

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint.

Petitioner’s raising the issue of jurisdiction in their answer to the complaint did not automatically

divest the lower court of jurisdiction over agrarian case filed by Arastia. The court had to

continue exercising authority to hear the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not

it had jurisdiction over the case. It should be pointed out that in filing the case, Estrella Arastia

was merely ejecting petitioners from the land on the ground that no tenancy relationship existed

between them. However, her invocation of Sec. 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 which

considers as a prohibited act “forcible entry or illegal detainer by persons who are not qualified

beneficiaries under this Act to avail themselves of the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform

Program,” obviously led the court to docket the case as Agrarian Case No. 2000 and assume

jurisdiction over it as a special agrarian court.

40

Land Bank v De Leon

Facts:

Respondent spouses Arlene and Bernardo de Leon filed a petition to fix the just

compensation of a parcel of land before the RTC of Tarlac acting as a Special Agrarian Court.

On December 19, 1997, the agrarian court rendered summary judgment fixing the compensation

of the subject property. The DAR and LBP both filed separate appeals using different modes.

DAR filed a petition for review while LBP interposed an ordinary appeal by filing a notice of

appeal. The appeal by the DAR was given due course, while that of the LBP was dismissed on

the ground that LBP availed of the wrong mode of appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not an ordinary appeal was the proper mode to appeal the decision of the RTC

regarding just compensation

Held:

On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657

regarding the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the

conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the

wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on a ruling of the CA regarding the

same issue, LBP acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner

to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. While the Court holds that petition for review

is the proper mode of appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, and such is a rule of

procedure which affects substantive rights, it should not be applied to the case of LBP since this

case was still pending when said doctrine was decreed.

41

Laurel vs. Garcia

Facts:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their

representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square

meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21,

1990 or the Roppongi property acquired by the Government from Japan. Laurel states that the

Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership under

Article 420 of the Civil Code. He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by

anyone can attach to it, not even by the State. Hence, it cannot be appropriated, as it is outside

the commerce of man. The respondents refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the

subject property has ceased to become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial

property because it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over

thirteen years now and because the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to

convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts, one of which is the enactment by the

Congress RA 6657 which contains a provision stating that funds may be taken from the sale of

Philippine properties in foreign countries

Issue:

Whether or not the Roponggi property can be alienated and sold for funding purposes of the

CARP in accordance with Section 63[C] of RA6657?

Held:

No. Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 which provides as one of the sources of funds

for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in

foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of public

dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties

which are alienable and not to those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657,

therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely

enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment the Agrarian Reform Fund created

under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot

be tapped as a source of funds.

42

Rovillos v CA

Facts:

Sometime in 1971, petitioner's predecessor started tilling and cultivating a portion of

private respondent's land under a share-crop agreement. On December 30, 1979, petitioner and

the private respondent entered into a contract which stipulated that the former was to be

contracted as a farm laborer or helper responsible for the cultivation of two hectares of the four

hectare land. When petitioner no longer cultivated the land in question in his capacity as a farm

laborer but as a tenant, with the corresponding right to exclude the private respondent from the

land, private respondent demanded from the petitioner to desist from further cultivation of the

said land. These demands proved futile. Private respondent then filed a complaint against the

petitioner for Recovery of Possession with Damages with Motion for Issuance of Writ of

Preliminary Injunction. On February 20, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision finding that

petitioner was not a tenant but a mere farm helper or laborer of the private respondent. The

decision of the RTC was affirmed by CA.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 6657 has repealed the provisions of PD 27

Held:

The Supreme Court pointed out that the land in question is covered by Presidential

Decree No. 27, which, incidentally has not yet been repealed by Republic Act No. 6657. The

provisions of PD 27 shall have a suppletory effect.

43

Reyes v Reyes

Facts:

On April 22, 1991, Dionisia Reyes filed a complaint for reinstatement with DARAB

against private respondents, her four younger brothers. She alleged that her father, the late

Felizardo Reyes, was the tenant of a two-hectare agricultural lot owned by Marciano Castro.

After her father’s death, she and Marciano Castro executed a leasehold contract naming her as

the agricultural lessee of the property. However, sometime before the start of the planting of the

dry season crop in 1989, respondents forcibly entered the area and occupied a one-hectare

portion of the property. They claimed to be the tenants thereof. Respondents then paid rent to

the Castros’ overseer and continued to occupy half of the property to petitioner’s damage and

prejudice. Respondents denied Dionisia’s claim that she was the bona fide leasehold tenant. They

claimed that they inherited the lease rights to the property from their deceased father. They

likewise averred that they were the ones actually cultivating the portion occupied by them.

Hence, petitioner’s claim to be the lawful agricultural lessee had no basis, either in fact or in law.

Issues:

Whether or not the RA 6657 has suppletory character with that of RA 3844 insofar as the

determination of leasehold agreement is concern?

Held:

The present dispute involves an agricultural leasehold. The governing law is R.A. No.

3844, which, except for Section 35 thereof, was not specifically repealed by the passage of the

R.A. No. 6657, but was intended to have suppletory effect to the latter law. Under R.A. 3844,

two modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by

operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act or (2) by oral or written agreement,

either express or implied. By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural

share tenancy system and the conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The

other method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing. In the

instant case, it is not disputed that an agricultural leasehold contract was entered into between

petitioner and Ramon Castro.