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Agency Autonomy and Contracting: NASA and the Aerospace Industry

Julianne Mahler,

Department of Public and International Affairs

George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

Prepared for the 2011 Meetings of the Public Management Research Association

June 2-4, Maxwell School of Public Service,

Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY

Abstract: The images of Shuttle launches and earthrise over the rim of the moon are

iconic representations of American strength, technical capacity, and the future of humankind.

Yet NASA itself, the agency responsible for these images, is chronically underfunded, hounded

by low-tech glitches, buffeted by changes in administrative direction, and currently without a

clear next mission. How can this apparent contradiction be explained? Here the relationship

between indicators of agency power, including budget, personnel, and program size measures

and the indicators of size and scope of contracting is explored. I examine the agency’s heavy

reliance on contracting as a possible explanation for the uncertain direction and changes in

course that characterize its recent history. Over time the agency has turned over greater

responsibilities for project design and program management and even program direction to

contractors until it was said, ―People used to come to NASA for information, now they come for

a contract" (NASA 1995, 10). What can we learn about the impact of contracting on American

bureaucratic power and autonomy?

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Agency Autonomy and Contracting: NASA and the Aerospace Industry

The images of Shuttle launches and earthrise over the rim of the moon are iconic

representations of American strength, technical capacity, and of the future of humankind. Yet

NASA itself, the agency responsible for these images, is chronically underfunded, hounded by

low-tech glitches, buffeted by changes in administrative direction, and currently without a clear

next mission (NPR 2010, Achenbach 2010). Most recently, President Obama has proposed the

cancellation of the Constellation program designed to create a permanent human presence on the

moon in preparation for crewed Mars exploration. In its stead, the Administration advocates a

longer time line toward a ―flexible path‖ to other objectives within the solar system including

eventually the moon, asteroids, and Mars depending on technical innovations and the availability

of funding. In addition, it has turned transportation to the Space Station in low earth orbit over to

private aerospace firms. Congressional members whose districts are affected by reduced funding

at NASA Centers, former astronauts and some NASA administrators have been outspoken critics

of these changes (Achenbach 2010, NPR 2010, Clark 2010, Cowling 2010).

Altogether these events call into question the image of the agency as powerful and

autonomous. How can the contrast between the public image of the agency and its political and

bureaucrat realities be accounted for? A number of explanations have been advanced. The

enormous cost of the programs requires the agency to justify its existence on other than scientific

terms. Thus the agency has been forced to operate under a shifting array of externally defined

missions and purposes and to compromise its science and engineering objectives to find enough

support to survive. These missions include preserving the health of the aerospace industry for

economic and military purposes, creating jobs for workers and for new generations of scientists

and engineers, and maintaining national security and national prestige (Kay 2005).

Alternatively, NASA is seen as being more autonomous than it appears by strategically juggling

its missions to maximize external support to acquire resources for its primary objective—the

preservation of a human space exploration program (Handberg 2003).

To this somewhat overlapping set of explanations I add that there have always been

pressures on NASA to support the US aerospace industry sector and to provide opportunities for

contracts for firms across a wide band of congressional districts limits. Over time NASA has

adopted more inclusive and extensive forms of contracting which have reduce its ability to

design programs and vehicles and to establish its own mission trajectory. Thus, might NASA’s

very attractiveness as a source of jobs and contracts have contributed to its political

dependencies? What impact has aerospace contracting had on NASA’s ability to define its own

goals and missions?

In a larger sense, the pattern of enlarging the scope of contracts may shed light on the

evolution of this form of program development and procurement in government. What does this

pattern have to teach us about the sources of agency power and what can we learn about the

evolution of contracting as an institutional form from NASA’s experiences? A brief overview

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of contracting at NASA and an analysis of common indicators of agency power illustrates this

argument.

A History Of Contracting At NASA

Contracting for vehicles and later for program management, project design, launch

services has a complex history at the agency going back to the earliest days of NASA’s

precursor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. But over time the character of

contracting has changed dramatically from an institutional model that put NASA scientists and

engineers in firm control of design to the varied forms of partnership and privatization that

characterize more recent events. Over time, the agency turned over greater responsibilities for

project design, program management and even program definition to contractors until it was

said, ―People used to come to NASA for information, now they come for a contract" (NASA

1995, 10). In fact, five ―eras‖ of relationships with commercial aerospace firms can be

identified, from the industry-supporting research and advisory stance of the NASA precursor

organization, National Advisory Council on Aeronautics, to the recent and much-criticized

decision to turn over to commercial space firms cargo supply and eventually crew transport to

the International Space Station in low earth orbit.

Industry Advisor

The National Advisory Council on Aeronautics was established in 1915 to provide

research support to the fledgling commercial United States aircraft industry. Langley Memorial

Aeronautical Laboratory in Virginia was created in 1917, as an aeronautical test and

experimentation facility, later adding a wind tunnel to study drag and conduct airfoil research.

The agency undertook generic research of use to industry as a whole, but not under any

contractual relationships. Largely self-directed,

―Researchers could develop their own research programs along lines that seemed the

most productive to them, handle all test details in-house, and conduct experiments as they

believed appropriate… Old NACA hands believed that their independence from political

pressures was partly the reason that NACA was the premier aeronautical research

institution in the world during the 1920s and 1930s.‖ (U.S. Centennial of Flight

Commission n.d.)

Prime Contractor

After the Second World War, interest in rocketry soared. NASA was created in 1958

under the National Aeronautics and Space Act that changed its name. Its role changed too,

though not without internal controversy, from industry advisor to active participant in the

design, fabrication and testing of aerospace projects of its own. The new agency, created during

the Eisenhower presidency, was intended to favor contracting as a conservative management

strategy to avoid increasing the size of government and to create a thriving space technology

industry (Bromberg 1999, 40). The first administrator, T. Keith Glennan, commissioned

management studies that concluded ‖Nasa should retain for the time being preliminary

conceptual design and systems integration. Simultaneously, NASA should contract out as much

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as possible using contracts to educate industry , and gradually transferring as much of the space

program as practical to this educated industry‖ (41). Other NASA leaders were skeptical,

however, and feared that the temporary contractors would not develop the expertise for long-

term innovation and quality work (41). Industry, in turn, proud of its own engineering skill,

complained during the development of the Mercury program, that only NASA’s in-house ideas

were accepted and that they were shut out of design work (43).

Initially contracting was practiced at some NASA centers only in a limited fashion. The

Huntsville facility, which became the Marshall Space Flight Center, operated under the Army’s

―arsenal system,‖ in which design and testing was done in-house before turning the project over

to contractors for production. In contrast, the Navy and later the Air Force, without the deep

reserves of engineering expertise the Army had developed with rocketry, relied much more on

contractors for design as well as testing and production, The Air Force ―weapons system‖

contract approach for projects awarded a single prime contractor wide responsibility for design,

testing and production and also for managing the integration of the many subsystems and

subcontractors who would be involved in the project. ―The weapons system concept was a

recognition that the postwar generations of Air Force hardware required more attention to

systems integration‖ (Bromberg 1999, 25), and because ―the old NACA staff lacked the

experience and sometimes the temperament to oversee contractors‖ (65), an admission of the

disjunction between the agency culture and new contact management requirements.

With the complex Apollo moon landing program NASA moved further to greater reliance

on industry contracts for launch systems and a shift toward the Air Force weapons system

contracting model. Administrator Webb saw the Apollo project as bringing together

government, industry and universities to ―enhance American technical capacity‖ (Bromberg

1999, 61) and to create an engine for economic growth across the country. Thus Apollo

illustrated the complex goals under which NASA operated, for reaching the moon, driving

industry, and maintaining the public and governmental political support needed for this very long

and costly mission (Kay 2005).

NASA Entrepreneurship

Even before the successful first Apollo landing, other national priorities and later the cost

of the Viet Nam war cut into support for NASA. The next major large scale project, the Space

Shuttle and plans for a Space Station were immediately hard pressed for funding. And again the

programs had to serve multiple and not always reconcilable objectives, from trying ensure a

stream of projects to maintain the expert work forces at the several NASA centers, to spreading

contracts to foster congressional and White House support, and satisfying military specifications.

Aerospace firms, who stood to gain multi-billion dollar contracts from the projects, lobbied for

both the Shuttle and the Space Station. The shuttle had also to justify itself economically by

promising to efficiently replace non-reusable rockets for launching satellites and providing

laboratory space for materials experiments with potential commercial value for industry. NASA

aggressively marketed these uses of the shuttle in the pro-business era of the late 70’s and the

80s. Selling government services to the private sector was the new entrepreneurship reflected in

the establishment of the NASA Office of Commercial Programs in 1984. It was designed to

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consolidate commercialization efforts across NASA centers and to offset the non-market

focused, research and development culture that permeated the project offices (Bromberg 1999,

122).

Space commercialization grew rapidly too after the loss of the Shuttle Challenger in

1986. Since the Shuttle had not been as frequent or reliable a service as originally planned, the

Department of Transportation created its own office of Commercial Space Transportation to

license and regulate commercial launches (Commercial Space Watch 2006; Bromberg 1999,

150). The Department of Commerce under Malcolm Baldrige established its Office of Space

Services (now Office of Space Commercialization) to support private sector involvement in

space transport and space facilities. Large firms offering launch vehicles, who had feared that

they would go out of business when the Shuttle was slated to serve virtually all users, now

geared up to take up the backlog during the long grounding of the Shuttle.

Contracts for Launch Services

But these large firms, McDonald Douglas, Martin Marietta and General Dynamics,

offered not just to contract for the vehicles used to launch payloads for governmental and

commercial users, but to sell the insertion of satellites in orbit. NASA was reluctant to adopt this

new form of contract because of concerns for the unique specifications and high cost of their

own scientific payloads. However, the Department of Commerce’s Office of Space Services

strongly supported this contract innovation and threatened to cut NASA out of procuring launch

services for NOAA weather satellites altogether if it would not get on board. In the end, NASA

agreed to purchase launch services from venders but acquired a greater degree of oversight of

contractor operations than the norm (Bromberg 1999, 159). These new arrangements were

further entrenched under a Reagan Administration ―Commercial Space Initiative‖ which required

federal agencies to purchase commercial launch services ―to the fullest extent feasible‖ (158). In

only three years NASA’s control over contracts had diminished from purchasing vehicles over

which it had considerable engineering oversight to the requirement that it purchase much of its

cargo launch services from the private sector (159).

Contracts for the Space Station take these developments a step further. Contracting for

the Shuttle program involved complex and conflict-ridden relations among the centers and

contractors as they struggled to coordinate shifting project specifications. In response, NASA

also brought in a new headquarters project head who added two dozen new managers, many of

them from the Air Force with experience in large programs and the ―weapons system‖ model of

contracting. In a replay of this scenario General Phillips, the former Apollo program head

brought back in the aftermath of the Challenger accident, hired a management team led by

Grumman to deal with the interfaces of system engineering for the Space Station.

This trend toward more inclusive contracts continued under Daniel Goldin who stayed on

as administrator under President Clinton, and shifted the emphasis from the large-scale, crewed

exploration projects to smaller and ―faster, better, cheaper‖ scientific projects, to pursue new

innovative technologies (Roy1998; McCurdy 2001). Under his leadership and inspired by his

past success in the aerospace industry with TQM and the government reinvention strategies

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supported by the Clinton-Gore administration, downsizing and contracting flourished. NASA’s

total workforce shrank, and the proportion of the workforce who worked under contract rose

from 87% to just over 90%. Administrator Goldin was also critical of the Space Station project,

especially the resources expended to manage the integration of the many components and

contractors. In response Boeing was selected as the single prime contractor with ―wide

cognizance over systems integration and the work of subcontractors (Bromberg 1999, 180) in

another example of the use of ―weapons system‖ contracting.

In 1995, NASA commissioned the Space Shuttle Independent Review Team, composed

of aerospace executives, former astronauts and former NASA executives, to examine NASA’s

management structure and particularly its relationships with its contractors. Their report

supported the next major change in the contract environment at NASA: the consolidation of 86

contracts and subcontracts with as many as 56 firms (Columbia Accident Investigation Board

2003, 107) to one ―business entity,‖ the United Space Alliance (USA), created by Boeing and

Lockheed-Martin to reduce the number of ―NASA-contractor interfaces‖ and simplify program

management (NASA 1995, 11). This effectively moved the Shuttle program too to the ―weapons

system‖ model, working through one prime contractor.

Partnerships

Work on the next generation of spacecraft to replace the Shuttle system began to emerge

in 1994 in the White House National Space and Technology Council with planning for reusable,

dual-use vehicles for commercial and governmental purposes. Development was to proceed

from industry-led ―synergy teams‖ including NASA and Air Force partners. The work was to be

jointly funded by government and industry, but the new systems would be owned by the private

sector and were intended to eventually be profitable enterprises (Bromberg 1999, 181) since

funding was not available for a government alone to proceed. NASA would partner with

industry, but they would not be project managers. Design contracts were let in 1995, with

NASA paying for but not dictating the designs. The experimental designs, reusable delta-wing

vehicles (X-33 and X-34), were built in part, but they were thought to be too costly and unsafe,

and the agreement between the firm and NASA was terminated in 2001 (NASA 2009b, Warwick

2008). (NASA 2009b, Warwick 2008).

A more ambitious project followed these plans, however. Under the George W. Bush

administration, the 2004 Vision for Space Exploration articulated post-Shuttle goals for returning

to the moon and developing the technology for a sustainable presence there and eventually on

Mars. It also supported robotic exploration and scientific missions to other solar system sites

(NASA 2004b). The Vision, which led to the Constellation program, depended on the

contributions of industry and contractors.

As we move outward into the solar system, NASA will rely more heavily on private

sector space capabilities to support activities in Earth orbit and future exploration

activities. In particular, NASA will seek to use existing or new commercial launch

vehicles for cargo transport to the Space Station, and potentially to the Moon and other

destinations. (NASA 2004b, 17)

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In addition, building on the expertise of universities and industry, NASA initiated a series

of Centennial Challenges that are now part of NASA’s Innovative Partnerships Program

designed to ―Engage private citizens in aerospace technology development, [b]ring fresh ideas

into NASA , [h]elp emerging technologies reach maturity, and [p]romote the growth of a

competitive space industry‖ (NASA 2010a). George W. Bush’s Aldridge Commission also

recommended that NASA use its contracting authority to reach broadly into the commercial and

non-profit communities to create needed technologies. The Commercial Transportation Services

program (COTS) is now collecting proposals from cargo and crew transport systems for serving

the International Space Station (NASA 2010c).

The Obama administration wasted no time in commissioning an independent review of

the most ambitious of the Bush era initiatives: the Constellation program. The 2009 Augustine

report, sponsored by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy begins with the

words: ―The U.S. human spaceflight program appears to be on an unsustainable trajectory.‖ It

criticizes the feasibility of the Constellation program, a decade long plan to ―devote $99 billion

to the human spaceflight program‖ (7). The Report finds that such a level of funding us unlikely

to be available and many unsolved technological problems face the program. It supports, but

with cautionary budget estimates, NASA plans to support the commercial development of cargo

and crew-rated spacecraft to service the International Space Station (70), and funding at the level

projected over the next five years under the COTS program was included in Obama’s 2011

budget.

Reactions to the decisions to cancel the Constellation program and turn over contracts

for ferrying cargo and crews to commercial space firms were strong and negative from within

some parts of NASA, from congressional members whose districts were affected, from aerospace

workers, and from the firms concerned (Clark 2010, Nagesh, 2010). The Senate Appropriations

Committee voted unanimously to require Congressional approval before cutting funds for the

program, and the director of the Constellation project at Houston, Jeff Hanley, was abruptly

reassigned as he resisted the cut and attempted to save the program by altering its budget profile

(Cowling 2010).

The new plans for fostering the development of commercial spacecraft for shuttling to

low earth orbit do however support findings about the state of the U.S. aerospace industry

released in December of 2009 by the White House Office of Space and Technology Policy. They

reported to Congress that the U.S. aerospace industry was in decline with lower demand, fewer

launches and more competition from foreign industry. In addition, they note that none of the

research and development programs currently supported by government of industry ― are

expected to develop fundamentally new propulsion concepts or technologies‖ (Office of Science

and Technology Policy 2009, 11).

This brief overview suggests that not only has NASA become more dependent upon

contractors to provide funds for development and production of projects that the agency, wholly

or with reservations, has agreed to undertake, but it has also had less control over the design of

these projects. In several cases in the past two decades, NASA provided design contracts to

jump-start industry interest in a new vehicle, but it also had to accept a back-seat to industry

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design teams. Current awards and seed money programs go to industry and academia for

innovative designs, including the Innovative Partnerships Program, the Innovation Incubator and

Technology Infusion programs, the Commercial Transportation Services program and its

Commercial Crew and Cargo Program. These illustrate NASA’s efforts to capitalize on industry

developments that support the agency’s science and exploration goals while proving profitable to

industry. This is not necessarily an undesirable strategy, but it does indicate a shift in the locus of

control for NASA contracts. Partnerships, rather than direct NASA-led contract or ―weapons

systems‖ procurement, are now the important contract models.

Sources of Agency Power and Autonomy

How is this contracting trend related to NASA’s power as an agency? The hypothesis

advanced here is that there is a relationship between the growing dependency on contractors and

a decline in agency power. Even though by some standards the agency is a large and powerful

one, its actual autonomy and program control has been reduced over time as the health of the

aerospace industry drives congressional and administration decisions about budgets and mission

directions. In particular, we would expect that contracts would take up a larger proportion of

budgets over time. Similarly earmarks should also grow as Congress seeks to use NASA

programs to support local industrial and educational institutions. Thus, in spite of other standard

indicators of agency power based on public opinion, agency size, cohesion, and leadership,

NASA would lose autonomy even as it gains or maintains funding. Such a relationship could call

into question some of the ways in which we think about the power of agencies linked to military

and industrial development and contracting.

The organizational, political and institutional factors that allow agencies to develop the

capacity for some degree of self-direction have been the controversial subject of a number of

recent investigations of the administrative development of important public agencies from the

Department of Agriculture to the U.S. Army (Carpenter 2001, Amenta et al. 1998, Skocpol

1992). While the idea of agency autonomy is double-edged, research on administrative

development challenges the assumptions of congressional and executive oversight. This research

illustrates the characteristics that enable agencies to shape their mission and bring about

progressive technical and social policy changes, from scientific agriculture, to social welfare

policy. In this case, the capacity of NASA scientists, engineers and their colleagues in other

scientific institutions to shape the research and exploration agendas for the agency is at stake.

Many think principally of NASA’s human crewed space exploration missions, but new

understandings of the origins of the solar system and the cosmos, earth imaging and

environmental monitoring as well as the scientific and technological developments that

accompany and make these projects possible are all potentially part of NASA’s mission and

subject to its fate.

The literature on agency power in Political Science and Public Administration

approaches the subject from several perspectives. Bureaucratic power research examines iron

triangle relationships among agency actors, congressional members and their constituencies.

Many raised concerns that some bureaus have gained considerable power so that existing

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structures are not adequate to ensure proper oversight of agency actions. This version of the "iron

triangle" logic was set forth by William Niskanen in his book Bureaucracy and Representative

Government (1971). Others have found, however, that bureaucrats largely adhere to principles

of executive direction regardless of their own policy predilections (Aberbach and Rockman

2000, Golden 2000). Principal agent theories focus on the incentives of these agencies and their

overseers to create or maintain autonomy in their relationships. Some use longitudinal analysis

to show the agency actions are largely constrained by Congressional and presidential directives

(Moe 1984), while others find that structural agency oversight is inadequate to preserve control

(Huber and Shipan 2002). For example, Eisner and Meier (1990) focus on professionalization in

the Department of Justice Anti-trust division. They consider the influence of changes in

economics schools of thought, rather than Reagan Administration policies, on the agency’s

antitrust actions. They conclude, ―The bureaucracy imposed a coherent and consistent set of

priorities on the [anti-trust] caseload. In short, it set policy‖(284).

Regardless of these differences, however, both the traditional political science literature

on bureaucratic power, principal agent theories, and the political development research identify a

core set of characteristics and capabilities typically associated with agency power and the

capacity to shape the policies and laws under which organizations operate. For Clarke and

McCool’s seven-agency study of bureaucratic power (1996), these include the agency’s expertise

and control of information on the one hand and its political and constituency support on the

other. More specifically, powerful agencies tend to be the result of an organic act rather than a

reorganization, with missions that are pro-development, staffed by dominant, well-established

professionals such as scientists, lawyers or military officers, with strong founders , internal

leadership recruitment, a well defined culture, and a coherent public image. Political factors

include a large, well educated constituency, concrete economic interests (they list defense

contractors) and strong congressional and presidential support. Carpenter (2001) identifies some

similar factors when he compares agencies that developed autonomy and those that did not. They

include the legitimacy of the agency based on its reputation for efficacy, the uniqueness of its

services, the moral protection it offers, and the expertise of its staff (354). The professional

scientific expertise of the early leaders in the Department of Agriculture allowed them to build a

constituency of farmers who saw tangible benefits from the agency’s programs. Other, more

urban constituency groups were created in response to the agency’s work in testing for food

adulteration. This allowed it to create a demand for enlarged legislative authority to regulate

food additives. The agency led the way in defining its services and championing pure and drug

laws.

NASA exhibits many but not all of these institutional sources of power and the potential

for autonomy. The question here is how the trends in contracting noted above related to changes

in these indicators of agency power. Though a pattern of relationship over time is not evidence

of causation, the trends seen in the indicators do raise additional questions about the role of

contracting in defining agency mission and program. The interests of contractors may be

reflected in the policies of presidential administration and congressional decisions about program

authority and budgets.

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Indicators of Agency Power at NASA

Nature of the Mission.

NASA’s was created amid much fanfare in 1958 by the National Aeronautics and Space

Act at the height of concern over the space race. The agency was re-purposed from the National

Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, and its mission changed from generic research and

aeronautical advice to industry to national aerospace research and development. Thus, while it

was not created anew under a new mission, its mission was changed from advice to

development, that is, concerned with the creation of new projects and programs rather than

regulation or government infrastructure maintenance. It provides a service and products, albeit

some that are unrecognized by the public. The value of crewed space exploration, now on hold,

for national prestige and, earlier, for military objectives has attracted more public attention and

offers a more obvious service to the state than its researches into astrobiology or exoplanets. Its

role in climate research is also well known, though more controversial. Its mission is also

expandable, that is, not a simply concluded task with an obvious termination, though at present

the definition of that mission is under debate. Thus perhaps the issue is not so much whether the

mission is expandable as whether it is well defined in the public and political mind.

Public opinion about the mission and the agency is also generally positive. Gallup Polls

show a majority think the costs of NASA programs are justified and for most of the polls, think

that spending should be increased rather than reduced (Jones 2009). Roper obtained reasonably

similar results even in debt-conscious 2010 when it found that 49% of American thought that the

money spent on the Shuttle had been worthwhile (Roper 2010).

Public Opinion regarding NASA, its Benefits, and Views on its Budget

Source: Gallup Polls (Jones 2009)

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Pew researchers, however, did find a 12% decline, from 73% to 61% in the number of

Americans viewing NASA favorably between 1997 and 2010 (Pew 2010), though that figure is

still higher than seen for more than half of the other agencies about which individuals were

polled.

The end of the Shuttle program and the International rather than exclusively US character

of the Space Station may create in the public mind a loss of coherent image for NASA. Many

have commented on the centrality of the human space exploration mission to NASA’s identity

and US prestige (Kay 2005, Handberg 2003). With the winding down of the Shuttle program,

the lack of a US vehicle for ferrying crew and supplies to the space station, and controversy

about the timing and goals for the next space exploration mission, the public image of NASA

may have blurred. These would have to be a relatively recent events, however, and may not have

affected public opinion.

These views that NASA funds are well spent is especially interesting given that the

perception of the NASA budget is very different from reality. A 1997 poll reported that

Americans had an average estimate of 20% for NASA's share of the federal budget, very

different from the actual 0.5% to under 1% that has been maintained throughout the late 90's and

first decade of the 2000s (Launius 2003, 174).

Prestige of Professional Staff and Leadership

Clarke and McCool identify the character of professional staff, their dominance and

prestige, as important to agency status. Scientific, medical, legal and military professionals are

identified as likely agency assets. Similarly, Carpenter sees professional and scientific expertise

put to use to solve what are recognized by a significant constituency as problems to be a source

of agency autonomy. Of course, NASA’s personnel qualify on several grounds. Its staff are

widely considered to be among the most talented and accomplished in the country. They are

rocket scientists. The question of whether they solve what are viewed as problems by a

constituency is more difficult to answer. As noted in the graph above, a majority think money

spent by NASA has been worthwhile, and a near majority think the same of the Shuttle

program.

Along with staffing generally, Clarke and McCool find that astute leadership, strong

founders, and recruitment to leadership positions from within the agency are associated with

agency power. At least one of NASA’s founding leaders, Wehrner von Braun, the first director

of what became the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntville, Alabama, was highly visible

nationally on television and magazines. Von Braun was felt by many to be a charismatic leader

(Dunar and Waring 1999, 49). Of the eleven directors of the Marshall Space Flight Center, for

example, seven were long-time Marshall professional engineers and managers, two held

professional and managerial positions at Kennedy Space Center, and one had worked at

headquarters and at the Stennis Space Center. Only one came from outside of NASA, and he

was from the aerospace industry (Marshall Space Flight Center History Office n.d.). While

center directors are often internally recruited, recruitment of the top agency administrator was

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seldom from within the agency, and most had military or commercial aerospace experience.

Of the eleven NASA Administrators, only four had previously been NASA employees, and two

of these were astronauts (Truley and Bolden). The rest came from the military, from aerospace

firms as researchers and administrators, or from academic research and administration. One,

Sean O’Keefe, came to NASA with a public administration background and from positions in

other governmental institutions (NASA Program History Office, 2009). All of the

Administrators, regardless of NASA credentials, were, of course, political appointees, a

characteristic associated with weaker political agency standing.

Esprit de Corps

Clarke and McCool identify a strong, integrated organization, a coherent public image,

and a well defined agency culture as characteristics associated with agency strength. In this area

too, NASA exhibits some of the characteristics of strong agencies.

NASA’s culture has been the subject of numerous scholarly and popular works, and

while the portrait has not always been positive (Vaughan 1996), the ―right stuff‖ images persist .

(Mahler and Casamayou 2009). McCurdy’s research on changes in staff attitudes over time,

however, demonstrate frustration with changes from hands-on work to desk work and contract

management and clear dissatisfaction among older employees about what they see as excessive

management caution and an unwillingness to take risks with new program technologies (1991).

Since McCurdy’s research the proportion of NASA employees relative to contractors has

declined. The civil service workforce as a whole peaked during the early years of the Apollo

mission and diminished thereafter.

NASA Civil Service Workforce

Number of Civil Service positions at NASA from 1958- 2009. Source NASA Pocket Statistics and

Workforce Information Cubes for NASA1

1 NASA workforce date is recorded in two ways over the years in question. Civil service personnel are listed for

the end of each fiscal year from 1959-1986 at history.nasa.gov.pocketstats/sect D/Per Sum.pdf. From 1987 to 1992,

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The civil service workforce kept pace with the contractor workforce though much of the

1980s, however.

NASA’s Civil Service and Contractor Workforce from 1979-1988

Source: NASA Historical Data Books, 1999 (Chapter 7, p. 463)

The change seen in the late 80s reflects the acceleration of contracting at that time described

earlier. By 2004, about 70% of NASA’s total workforce was composed of contractors (National

Academy of Public Administration, 2005). This development was praised by NAPA as a

workforce adaptation to funding uncertainties.

However, there are other indications that NASA’s esprit de corps is strong. NASA has

received consistently high rankings from its employees in the Partnership for Public Services’

survey of Best Places to Work in the Federal Government, ranking 5th

of 32 large agencies in

2010 (NASA 2004a, 2009a; Best Places to Work in the Federal government 2010). The ratings

in the columns for job satisfaction and commitment, teamwork and leadership represent the

percentage of positive responses (agree or strongly agree) regarding the subject of the

questionnaire item. The survey upon which the results are based is administered by the Office of

Personnel Management and had a response rate of 52% (OPM 2010)

data are listed for permanent employees at the end of the fiscal year and is available at the same location. From1993

to the present, workforce is recorded at the start of the fiscal year for full-time, permanent employees, not counting

part-time, term appointments, students and other non-permanent employees as found at

http://wicn.nssc.nasa.gov/wicn_cubes.html, Workforce Information Cubes for NASA. This appears to be the most

consistent set of statistics though there may be differences in what kinds of non-contract workers are included in

figure 3.

14

Table 1: NASA’s Rankings in the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government

Overall

Ranking

Job Satisfaction

& Commitment

Teamwork Leadership

2003 1 71.6 75.8 62.3

2005 6 69.9 78.6 63.4

2007 4 69.7 78.2 63.6

2009 4 71.7 80.0 65.1

2010 5 72.2 75.9 67.7 Source: Best Places to Work in the Federal government 2010

NASA’s Constituencies

NASA must have one of the most educated and sophisticated constituencies of scientists

in academia and industry, well able to articulate their views. Their work has concrete value for

these constituents as scientific advances and high technology spinoffs. In addition, NASA

programs fund research activities of scientists at universities and scientific institutions. A

frequent justification by NASA researchers for their programs is to support science training and

education in the U.S. and to ensure jobs and careers in advanced science fields.

The aerospace industry also has a major stake in NASA programs as contractors and, as

noted above, partners. The industry stake in the agency can be seen in the record of NASA’s

procurements. Industry procurements rise steadily over time. Other constituencies arise from

the military and foreign policy communities because of the importance of accomplishments in

space to national prestige and national security (Kay 2005). This may be a double-edged

advantage, however. The argument examined here is that military and aerospace interests shape

the trajectory of missions in a kind of iron triangle relationship that results in a new form of goal

displacement for the agency.

However, the data also show that funding for business procurement has declined as a

proportion of NASA payments, while educational and non-profit research organizations, such as

observatories, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a NASA center managed by California Institute

of Technology, have gained as a proportion of procurements. This finding is consistent with the

idea that science goals, originating in academia with or without NASA direction, are gaining in

influence over NASA.

15

Distribution of Direct NASA Procurements, in Millions of Dollars from Business,

Education, Non-Profits, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Other Governmental Sources

( Not Standardized for Inflation).

Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010d. Annual Procurement Report, Fiscal Year

2010 NASA 2010 d,

Looking at the total NASA budget and the funding for business procurements shows a

similar picture. Procurements from business have lagged from overall spending just as the

agency has moved in the direction on broader service contracts and partnerships.

Total Budgets for NASA and Spending for Business Procurement (in Millions, not

standardized)

Source: and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Annual Procurement Report, Fiscal Year

2010; NASA 2010 d; NASA 2011; and OMB i

16

Looking more closely at the domestic non-business procurement shows the relative

growth of the educational procurements in particular. Some of this contracting reflects the

greater NASA attention to earth science.

Distribution of Direct NASA Procurements, in Millions of Dollars from Education, Non-

Profits, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Other Governmental Sources ( Not Standardized for

Inflation).

The relative decline in business procurements is illustrated by the proportion of NASA

procurement budgets that go to business procurments over time. A slight decline is seen

beginning in the 1990s but business procurements recover somewhat in the middle of the first

decade of the 2000s.

Percentage of NASA Procurements going to Businesses from 1959 to 2010

Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Annual Procurement Report, Fiscal Year 2010. NASA

2010d

17

These figures call into question the interpretation of contracting outlined here. Though

the proportion of procurements going to business is still very high, the data suggest that business

contractors are not increasing in dollar terms relative to NASA budgets. The picture that emerges

is of growth in contract procurement and in the number of contract workers relative to civil

service workers, but this growth is not at the rate seen in earlier decades. Of course, at 70-80%

of NASA budgets, more business procurement would be relatively difficult to achieve.

However, these figures do not show that contracting has grown as a proportion of NASA budgets

in the years when NASA’s control over program directions was most linked to contractor

interests. The leveling off and slight decline in the proportion of procurements going to

businesses just as more extensive contracts and partnerships emerge can be interpreted in several

ways. It may be that contractors apply more pressure to control the direction of contracts as their

size levels off so that the firms can make the most of the contracts for their own project

developments. Alternatively, contractors may not exert major control over the size and direction

of programs, but rather that the decline in NASA’s ability to control major mission developments

arises from the mingled influences and cross pressures of multiple constituencies.

Presidential and Congressional Support

Of all of the characteristics of powerful agencies, perhaps the one most questionable in

NASA’s case is presidential and congressional support. As note below, this support has

vacillated greatly. Conley and Cobb (2010) attribute this to the absence of a broad, committed

public constituency for the agency and a consequent weak Congressional support. Handberg

(2010) identifies presidential support as the weak link.

One indication of the weakness of this support is the relatively slow growth and recent

stagnation in NASA budgets over most of its history.

Total NASA Budgets in Millions (Green in constant 2007 dollars)

Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget

18

NASA Budgets as a Percent of the Total U.S. Federal Budget

Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget

The modest budget growth also includes an enormous growth in earmarks, especially

since 1999. In 1997 NASA earmarks totaled around 65 million, while by 2000 they had grown

to 365 million, much of it going to non-space related projects, museums and university facilities

(Lawler 1999). This figure grew in 2006 to $568.2 million, which was 3.4% of NASA budget

(NASA-IG 2008). These earmarks have grown in number and size and have been characterized

as damaging to NASA’s ability to establish control over projects. ―Many earmarks in NASA’s

budget have little to do with the agency’s mission in scientific research, technology

development, and exploration….Some especially damaging earmarks divert funds from critical

NASA needs and reverse good cost management decisions at NASA‖ (United States Budget for

Fiscal Year 2003, 325)

Conley and Cobb demonstrate that with the notable exceptions of the first three years of

the Apollo program, and the year of the Challenger accident, congressional appropriations have

provided less funding than presidential requests. They note, ―In inflation-adjusted dollars, the

[cuts] range from a few million to $4 billion over the agency’s lifespan….despite the articulation

of clear-cut policies by Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush‖ (2010, 18). Their

analysis indicates that the size of the difference between congressional and presidential funding

have tracked with such conditions as competition from other nations for prestigious space

achievements, the cold war, the two shuttle accidents and national debt and inflation.

Conley and Cobb (2010) attribute the lack of reliable congressional support for NASA to

its lack of a constituency. They find that the agency is ―without a core social or geographic

constituency [and thus is subject to], the impact of congressional budget reforms of the 1970s,

and presidents’ relative inattention to space policy since the agency’s inception in 1958‖ ( 2010,

1). As noted above, public opinion about NASA and the Shuttle program in particular as largely

positive. Others see NASA’s interested public constituency as strong but small so that ― Public

opinion therefore does not provide a genuine ―constituency‖ of significant influence over

members of the powerful authorizing and appropriating committees in Congress‖ Conley and

Cobb (2010 8).

19

Presidential support has typically also been lukewarm and inconsistent according to

Handberg’s (2010) study of presidential policies regarding NASA. He reports that presidential

positions have fluctuated widely and have often been a reaction to events that have little to do

with a commitment to space science. Driven by international and domestic policy goals, NASA

has been successful in gaining presidential support only when it it is part of some other

presidential priority such as foreign policy, but this support has been ―fragile and short-term.‖

Of eighteen instances since Eisenhower in which NASA has risen to the presidential policy

agenda, ten were positive positions, adding program support, eight have been negative,

restricting or denying support, and one was neutral.

The large, organized and committed constituency the agency can count on is the

aerospace industry, and the thesis explored here is that this constituency supports funding for the

agency but at the cost of diminished agency control over its programs and missions. The space

and earth science communities also constitute a respected though less organized or powerful

source of support. Their ―share‖ of NASA procurements has increased in proportion to overall

budgets. Their influence and collaboration in defining NASA missions is not well understood

and offers an intriguing next step for research on the constituencies of science and technology

agencies. The link between earmarks and some of the non-profit science organizations such as

observatories and museums is also a growing addition to agency funding, though again this

funding does not typically support NASA-generated programs.

The 2009 Augustine report illustrates NASA’s sensitivity to all of these constituencies in

outlining the benefits of various components of the ―Flexible Path‖ program. The report (41)

compares mission trajectories by comparing their payoffs in terms of space science, human

biological research, their contribution to future exploratory missions and the degree to which the

20

mission might engage the public imagination and so lend support to the project.

Conclusions

NASA exhibits some of the characteristics of a powerful agency. It has an expansive

mission, by design, because its architects did not know ―what we were getting into‖ (Shapiro

2011). Its work is in the realm of research and development and its workforce is composed of

prestigious scientific professionals. It has a relatively good reputation in the public mind and has

had ―in house‖ leadership at the center level if not at headquarters. It has strong esprit de corps

among current workforce, though contract management is not the work envisioned by the old

hands. But its current ambiguous mission trajectory, its stagnant budgets, eroded further by high

levels of earmarks, and the uncertain congressional and presidential support all signal that it is

not among the powerful, autonomous bureaus able to shape their own future. Thus the measures

of agency power tracked here provide some indicators associated with power, but important

21

measures of constituency support in budgets, along with the contracting history, point to

diminished autonomy.

Its most loyal constituencies appear to lie in the aerospace contractors and space and

earth science communities. It does not seem to be the case, however, that agency programs are

directly dictated by the interests of contractors or the congressional members whose

constituencies are linked to the interests of contractors. Often, especially in recent decades, these

hoped-for contract developments have been disappointed, usually as a result of a combination of

contractor’s technical or financial considerations or congressional and presidential budget

decisions. However, it does appear that NASA’s missions have been influenced by the needs of

the aerospace industry. This is clear from early statements at NASA’s founding to current

reports such the most recent Augustine Commission and the White House Office of Space and

Technology Policy. Though the rise in contract funding has not kept pace with NASA budgets,

the level of contracts constitutes 70-80% of all NASA procurements and the contract workforce

dwarfs civil service personnel. And NASA missions have long been shaped by the

congressional and presidential objectives to maintain national prestige and scientific reputation,

as well as for economic, military and national security purposes.

In sum NASA appears to be an agent of multiple principles, inside and outside of

government, that alternatively and with little long term planned goal-setting, apply the agency’s

considerable talents to a variety of ends that in some cases only partially correspond to the

projects the agency would pursue. This suggests a new form of goal displacement linked to

aerospace industry contracting in particular, but perhaps also to the academic scientific and

engineering communities. The agency created to identify and solve scientific and technological

problems of understanding and exploring the cosmos has become the vehicle for supporting a

wide variety of economic and national security objectives. This is possible because of the

evolution from in-house design and testing to the more extensive forms of project contracting

and partnerships. This development is not wholly divorced from the original conditions under

with the agency was founded, but it does affect the capacity of the agency to define national

goals for space research.

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