After The Event: Rationality and the Politics of Invention - An Interview

RADICAL POLITICS: Let us begin the interview with a question on thenature of the event in your work. You have vehemently denounced in yourwork anti-philosophy and its main thesis: the “impenetrability of God’sdesign”, and the fundamental “inaccessibility that opens the way to aninfinite hermeneutics”.2On the contrary, a philosophical project needs to beanchored within the intelligible. However, you maintain in your Saint Paulthat “The Resurrection … is not of the historical order, is not demonstrable; itis a pure event, an opening of an epoch, a change in the relations betweenthe possible and the impossible.”3; in Ethics you declare that what interestsyou in the figure of Saint Paul, “is the idea that the becoming of a truth, thebecoming of a subject, depend entirely on a pure event, which is itself beyondall the predictions and calculations that our understanding is capable of”.4Could we not say that the event, because it lies beyond our understanding,beyond the order of the demonstrable, is unintelligible? And that ourcommitment to it, because it requires a “certain kind of special passivity”and a “total abandonment”, is, dare we say, religious?

ALAIN BADIOU:It is imperative to understand that anevent is always relative to a situation; it is an event forthe situation, and not above or outside it.Consequently, when I say that an event is beyondcalculation, beyond prediction, this is naturally beyondprediction within the situation of which the event isthe supplement, or the added singularity. As such, theevent is not in itself unintelligible: it is unintelligible inregard to the means of prediction, of forecast, or ofcontinuity that are those of the situation. But theintelligibility of the event is created in the fidelity tothe event. Obviously for the revolutionaries, in the end,the event of “revolution” is intelligible. It is neither amystery nor is it impenetrable. It is impenetrable onlyfor the conservatism of the previous situation.

1The Radical Politics is a group of students inpolitical theory, based at the University ofEssex, UK, whose aim is to carve out a spaceand a forum in which to talk about politics. Itserves as a space defined by a relation of“equality”, and is predicated upon acommitment to the creation of this space. It isalso a way of coming to terms withcontemporary political thought, and ofbuilding up an archive of texts and responsesproduced by students and then disseminated.2 Quoted in Peter Hallward, Badiou: ASubject to Truth, Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press, 2003, p.28.3 Badiou, Saint Paul: La fondation del’universalisme, Paris: Presses Universitairesde France, 1999, p.49.4 Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on theUnderstanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward,London: Verson, 2001, p.123.

AFTER THE EVENT:

RATIONALITY AND THE POLITICS OF INVENTION

AN INTERVIEW WITH ALAIN BADIOU1

by Radical Politics1

What needs to be said, to be more precise on this point, is that an event createsthe conditions of intelligibility of its situation, and these new conditions ofintelligibility are applied, in particular, to itself. Hence, the intelligibility of the eventis neither prospective nor calculative; it is rather retroactive. Therefore, even if Isometimes compare the event to a miracle, a grace, etc., these are only metaphors.Undoubtedly, I remain rationalist in my appreciation of the event, and convincedthat it is intelligible. Yet, precisely because it is an event, it is only intelligibleafterwards, its conditions of intelligibility can never be anticipated.

Consequently, one cannot say that an event is religious, because “religious”always means that something remains unintelligible, that something is definitelymysterious: there is something in God’s design that remains forever inaccessible.This is not the case of the event. There is an intelligibility of the event, but one thatis created, and in many ways this constitutes one of the definitions of fidelity:fidelity is the creation in the future tense of the intelligibility of the event. This is thereason why thinking the intelligibility of the event takes a lot of time and is done insuccessive sequences. For instance, everybody knows that the true understanding ofthe Revolution of 1917 took much time – perhaps it is still not complete – but thisdoes not imply that it is a mystery. In sum, when events are constituted, they werenot calculable, predictable, and were not part of the previous rationality. One mustunderstand that an event is also the creation of new instruments of rationality.

RP:In this same line of thought, does the event of conversion, itself the productof a certain revelation – even if this should be the revelation of the truthfulnessof an event – retain a religious dimension? Is it not, in its essence, somewhatmysterious? AB:There is certainly a mysterious element that remains present as long as

the new conditions of rationality have not been completely deployed. However, thisdeployment is, in a certain way, infinite. Hence, one can always say that thedeployment of these new conditions of rationality is never absolutely complete, andthat there subsists in the event, and in our rallying to it, something that is never quitereducible to rationality. This, however, is not de jure, but de facto. To put it otherwise,de jure, nothing is unintelligible; de facto, the creation of the rationality can be longand complicated. Especially considering that one does not know the paths of fidelity.Thus building the rationality of an event is itself often obscure and complex.

RP:How unique is the event? We ask this, because there seems to be a tensionbetween the historical examples which you give of evental sequences (1871, 1917,1968), and your apparent call for a more localized, interventionist politics.AB:There is indeed a tension here. I think the problem is the following: what

goes on when we are in the saturation or the end of a clearly determined politicalsequence? For instance, I think that the political sequence opened up by the BolshevikRevolution is now saturated, and that we are not faithful to this event anymore, eventhough we still refer to it and that we do not reject it. What is going on here? I believe

An Interview with Alain Badiou _ AFTER THE EVENT: RATIONALITY AND THE POLITICS OF INVENTION _ 181

there are two orientations. The first way is that we remain faithful in an abstract,general way, since the event no longer has a generic reality. In sum, we seek tomaintain its principle, which leads to some sort of dogmatic nostalgia.

The other way is to seek a new activation in a way that is extraordinarilylocal, in extremely precise circumstances, hoping that this filter, that thislocalisation will allow us to work much more acutely within the perspective ofnovelty. We will not create novelty, but we will nevertheless disturb things byworking locally. In other words, I truly believe that when we are short of events,when we are short of what the events provide us with – during intermediarysituations such as we are experiencing nowadays – it is necessary to focus ourthoughts and efforts on local experiences, because really, at a global level, we haveonly lifeless, obsolete ideas; we have ideas that are not sufficiently activated.

RP:So on the one hand, we can think the event through its uniqueness; but thiswould suggest that we cannot be political all the time – that, in following JacquesRanci~re, politics only happens occasionally. On the other, we may say thatevents are everywhere (as you have sometimes suggested). But does this secondoption not mean that the exceptionality of our militancy is undermined? Is therenot a risk in advancing the idea that we can be militant all the time?AB:This is also a tension, this is also a problem. On the one hand, I think that a

political sequence is a sequence that creates its rationality from an event, and once thissequence is unable to create this rationality – either because it doesn’t know how orbecause it simply cannot do it – it is empty. We can thus say that when the politicalfidelity is exhausted, there isn’t really a militant figure anymore. On the other hand,when and how do we decide that it is over? For in a way, because the process is infinite,it is therefore never over! Thus it can be over, generally over, but not absolutely over. Soit is true that on the one hand there is something exceptional in a political commitment;but on the other, there is also a demand to continue; and, granted, this is a tension.

In the end, this is a matter of personal decision, a matter of ethics (as I defineit in my book Ethics). If I take for example my generation, the complete renunciationto politics always carried with it reactionary consequences. It was not only thecessation of politics, but also the rallying to another politics, the rallying to thepolitics of the State. This is why I do not want to stop, because I know that if I do thisI will be like the others. Now the problem for you is much different. The problem isthe following: what experience are you committing yourselves to? What is yourexperience? This leads to a new form of the creation of rationality.

This is typically an ethical problem in the proper sense of the word. Betweenthe imperative to “keep going!”, which is the only categorical imperative of truth,and the conviction that something might truly be over or destitute, there is really acontradiction, and one must decide within this contradiction. There is no generalformula. One cannot say: “We can always militate”, nor can it be said: “We mustalways stop when it is over”. This is a contradiction that needs to be dealt with inconcrete situations, and so there is no general answer to this question.

182 _ PRELOM 8 _ IS IT POSSIBLE TO BE A MARXIST IN PHILOSOPHY?

SIMON CRITCHLEY: It would be interesting to highlight the differencesbetween your thought and that of Ranci~re. AB: It seems to me that Ranci~re’s thought is much more historical than mine.

He suggests that there are political and historical moments, and moments that aren’t.In the end, he does not determine what the subjects of these moments really are. Thereis the moment, and the historical analysis of this moment; there is the militantpossibility of the moment, and the disappearance of it. All this leads back to a historicalobjectivity. My conception is quite different since it is subjective, not historical. Theimportant question is that of the creation of a political subject. However, what interestsmy good friend Ranci~re, with whom I always discuss actively but amicably, is thehistorical conditions of equality. I, on the other hand, ask myself: what is a politicaltruth? So the point of entry into the problem is quite different. Obviously, we sometimesagree. We agree on the central character of the notion of equality, for instance. But theway of treating the issue is not the same. Deep down, the link between history andpolitics is much more tightly knit in Ranci~re than in my own thought.

RP: Is there not a suggestion of an “initial baptism” – that our first experienceof an evental irruption, which forces us radically to reconfigure our whole wayof being, remains primary? And if so, would this not compromise the uniqueand singular character of any subsequent evental sequence? In sum, is not theforce of one’s later “subjectivations” subordinate to one’s original encounterwith an event?AB:This refers to what I have called, in a recent development of my thought,

the bodies (les corps). I call “bodies” the possible supports of a procedure. Until now Ihave not developed a theory of bodies, but I am in the process of doing so. Thisnotion of bodies is fairly complicated; it is not only a biological body (a body can bebiological, collective, etc.); it is, rather, a set of possibilities. The question is thefollowing: can a single body support many sequences? Can it be the support of manysequences? Perhaps of many sequences within the same procedure? Surely it ispossible for a body to commit itself to both love and politics, but it is not the samebody that does so. The bodies are different according to the procedures, so there is notrue problem of supporting many procedures simultaneously. But can a bodyuphold many political events or sequences?

You ask whether there is a first mark, a “birthmark”, and if the body is thenfixed in this mark. I have no answer to this either, no dogmatic answer at least. Iwould say however that this is linked to the fact that there is a variability of bodies,that is, all bodies are not identical. To put this in another way, specific politicalsequences correspond to specific bodies. Let us give an example. In the post-Bolsheviksequence, the fundamental body is the body of the Party. However the body of theParty is not the same body that exists in other political sequences. If we take theFrench Revolution, the bodies are individual bodies; there are no “Party bodies”. Thisis why it is precisely these individual bodies that we kill, that we execute. Theexecution symbolises the fact that the political agent – the support – is truly a body.


The question of a body being capable of supporting many sequences is avery complicated one. Personally, I have no demonstration to this effect, althoughI would tend to answer negatively. In sum, a body can support a determinedprocedure of truth, and once the body abandons this procedure, it comes undone.Hence, if he begins a new experience, it will be under a new form and with a newbody, if I may say so. But the same body is, I believe, profoundly marked by thebaptism of his first event.

RP:Saint Paul tried to “win people over” to the event. But if we have understoodyou correctly, he was not engaging in what Ernesto Laclau calls a “hegemonicoperation”. Rather his only aim is to convince people that he speaks in the nameof the universality of the event. However, can we say that there is any differenceat all between his subjectivation by the event, and the subjectivation of thosewho hear his words and convert subsequently?AB: In principle, there should not be any difference. This is precisely what

Saint Paul himself says. Granted that from time to time he claims to be“exceptional”. I mention this in my book on Saint Paul. But this is not the truelogic. The true logic is: whoever disposes of his body in the new convictionbecomes similar, in a certain sense, to everyone else. This is actually the reasonwhy Saint Paul immediately contests hierarchies: he does not go to see thehistorical apostles, he declares that each and everyone is equal before God, andfor him there are no chieftains. In terms of bodies, this means that if a bodyenters the procedure it is not qualitatively different from others. It is because ofthis fundamental reason that the operation cannot be described as hegemonic.There truly is an effort made for other bodies to be disposed within theprocedure. This is what is sought.

Of course, hierarchies and organisations inevitably follow, but this is theempirical destiny of things. Destiny, in principle, is new bodies having to submitthemselves to the procedure in such a way that their submission makes them all thesame. We work with this “sameness”. If Saint Paul gives much importance to sayingthat in the end, there are no men or women, no Jews or Greeks, it is for this reason.It is to say: no one, no predicate, no characteristic determines in a differentiatedfashion which bodies must enter the procedure. Thus Paul’s words have no privilegein reality (there are no privileges in terms of “right”), and this is what I have myselfexpressed when I say: there is no hero of the event. Obviously, in the imaginaryconstruct, in the narrative, we do encounter a hero of the event. But this is theimaginary, it is not the procedure.

RP: You seem to be saying that: “There is no super subject (…). There is aparticularity of the situation and the subject is a particular subject”. Is this thenecessary particularity of the generic? Or can there be more than one subject ina genre? And if so, will we have to prioritise our various intra-genericsubjectivities (for example, the tension between one’s fidelity to 1917 and 1968)?


AB: The problem is perhaps the following: fidelity is a sequence, but it alsoalways refers back to representations of previous sequences. So the example you giveis very good. There is certainly a very important tension between fidelity to May “68and fidelity to the Bolshevik Revolution, and perhaps even also to Spartacus and theslave revolt or whatever. So every sequence is recalled from within a determinedsequence. Thus you have a tension because the sequence needs to invent its ownrationality, it cannot literally copy the previous one. At the same time, it evokes theprevious situations and uses them precisely to create its own rationality.

Hence, one cannot be a body for two different sequences, but we are stillalways using the representations of previous situations. This path is alwayscomplicated. In particular, in politics, it is absolutely clear that any new sequence isalso, in the creation of its rationality, giving a new meaning to previous sequences.This is practically inevitable. All political sequences simultaneously give a newmeaning to previous ones. The most typical example is of course Lenin who, duringthe Bolshevik Revolution, gives an entirely new meaning to the Paris Commune. Themeaning of the Commune was somewhat wavering, so to speak, and at this momentthere is a break which opens the possibility for a new meaning. The true contradictionis between the impossibility of being a body for two completely different sequencesand the need to use other sequences.

RP: Can we ask how we are to think the relation between set theory andlanguage? There seem to be three logical possibilities here: i) that set theoreticalcategories can be directly expressed in language, ii) that set theoreticalcategories can be expressed in language, but always only imperfectly so, or iii)that set theoretical categories cannot be expressed in language in any way. Wepresume that you would reject the last option, but which of the first two is themost accurate, from your perspective? And how does this help us to understandthe category of the obscure event?AB: I think that the practical hypothesis is the second one. That is to say, it is

certainly possible to use or make appear the categories of set theory in virtual language.I think that an indirect use – a use that is metaphorical, natural, but in the endundoubtedly useful and appropriate – is possible. So without a doubt, the secondhypothesis. Does this have anything to do with the notion of the obscure event?Absolutely! The question of the obscure event is that of an event that, in a certain way,has yet to have really deployed its retroactive rationality. An obscure event is an eventthat occurs, that has a sequence, but whose sequence is, for whatever reason, stoppedprematurely, saturated too early, or that has been the victim of imperfections oflanguage: the system of names, of “nominating”, was not truly efficient. Hence theevent remains obscure, and this is certainly linked to the fact that the ontology of theevent was never truly realised.

RP:What is the status of Capitalism in your project? Can we speak of it in termsof an imaginary formation, or do you see it as, in Slavoj @i`ek’s terms, the real?


That is to say, is there any connection between what you call, in Saint Paul, the“general equivalent of capitalism” and what you elsewhere call “animality”?AB:Capitalism is a situation. It is therefore a situation in the double sense of

being a certain type of multiplicity, and also a certain type of appearance and ofrelation, a certain “being-there”. In the end, I do not apply to the notion of situationLacan’s fundamental distinctions between the imaginary, the symbolic, and thereal. I think they are inadequate. One might say that a situation is imaginarybecause it contains representations; that it is real because it is a “multiplicity” (in theend, actually, it has a true ontology); you can say that it is symbolic because there isalways a state of the situation that presides over the laws of this situation.

So a situation does not fall as such in one of Lacan’s categories. I would not saythat capitalism is imaginary nor would I say that it is real, and finally, I also wouldnot say that it is symbolic, which could also be a hypothesis. (Capitalism could be thesymbolic regime of circulation; this is, after all, a hypothesis that has beenadvanced.) Rather, I would say that it is a situation, and that from the interior of thatsituation you can have relations to capitalism that are either in the realm of theimaginary, of the real, or of the symbolic.

This situation, at the moment, is more and more considered to be a naturalone. This is a very important point, one that Marx had already noticed: although it isa situation, capitalism has a tendency to present itself as natural. This is theconnection with the problem of animality: what is the naturality of capitalism? Whydoes capitalism present itself as natural? In my opinion, it presents itself as naturalin a logic that, finally, is the logic of Darwin, that is, the logic of the species. There isno other naturality in capitalism than the naturality of the species, that is to say thelogic of competition, of the struggle for life, of accumulation, of power, etc. Hence ifcapitalism says that it is natural, very well, but what nature is this? Capitalism’snature is, evidently, nature in the sense of competition, concentration, of the factthat the weak must disappear, and that they have no particular rights.

It is true that I say that certain capitalistic subjectivities can be animalsubjectivities, simply because they present themselves as natural in this sense.What is natural is the fact of exploitation, and that one is the cause of his ownweakness. This is not a biological animality; it is an animality in the sense of acertain conception of nature that, in my opinion, is the conception of the struggle forlife and unbarred competition. Actually, capitalists agree on this point. When theysay that it is natural, they say that, finally, human beings naturally seek profit,competitiveness, rivalry, etc. This is not even polemical. If capitalism is a naturalsituation, then it is, in the end, a situation that does not truly distinguish betweenhumanity and animality. This is actually one of the reasons why there is extensivediscussion, not only on the rights of man, but on the rights of the animal, and that inthe end they are equated: we will all be in the same legal space, and this space is inreality the right of exploitation. This space is the right to live, but this right to live istaken in itself in a competitive sense. So you are correct: there is a link between thenaturality of capitalism as a situation and the question of animality.


RP: Would you not accept that there is a capitulation, even in your self-consciously anti-capitalistic project, to Jameson’s “cultural logic” of latecapitalism? This is not simply a question about, for example, one’s ontologicalassumptions, but also about the nature of one’s political commitments,embodied, for example, in your prescriptions against, rather than theoverthrowing of, the State. (It would be the question that Peter Hallwardsometimes refers to, in relation to maintaining the State apparatus in order tomake prescriptions against it rather than overthrowing it.)AB:This question seems to pertain to the withering away of the State; it is thus

a question of situation. What can we do today? What must we do today? This is not anontological question. Fundamentally, I remain convinced, ideally and strategically,that the existence of the State is a limitation of human existence. More precisely, weare speaking of the State in a political sense. There will always be the state of thesituation: “state” in the true sense of the situation is not necessarily a State in the senseof “State bureaucracy” – here, I refer to the State in terms of State bureaucracy, in thesense of the monopoly of the police, the army, etc. I continue to think (and so remain aMarxist on this issue) that the State is a limitation of human existence; it is not apositive production – it is perhaps necessary, but it is not positive. At the moment, thisidea has no political efficiency because its efficiency in the previous sequence wasentirely linked to the idea of revolution. It was the couplet “State and revolution” thatmattered. Revolution was a clear concept; it was the concentration of the politicalforces on the problem of power, on the problem of the State.

Thus you have a coherent set: State, revolution, class; state of class, theorganisation of the struggle – especially around the question of the power –, thedestruction of the State in power, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and, finally,moving towards the disappearance of the State. It is this set of elements that issaturated. None of the elements of this set is really clear today: neither class in thepolitical sense of the term (class in the social sense certainly remains obvious), nordictatorship of the proletariat, class, party, etc. Thus the problem is that we cannotthink the end of the State. I am all for its disappearance, but we have no politicalavenues leading us to this outcome because this set is not clear anymore.

Consequently, we must work at a distance from the State. We must makepolitics independent from it. Basically, this is to emphasise that we cannot workwithin the logic of the State anymore. With this in mind, we will see what newrelations can be thought of in regard to the State itself, its destiny, its disappearance,etc. It truly is a question of situation. I do not believe that the theme of the end of theState is politically active today. I am favourable to such an outcome, but it is anideology. The most difficult point is to already be in a political subjectiveindependence towards the State. This can be accomplished through local, singularexperiences. It cannot be done in a global way anymore.

RP:By distancing ourselves from the State, are we not conceding to the right aspace that they may appropriate for themselves?


AB:Right? Left? Is this distinction still relevant? The first question is what isthe Left? Blair? Jospin? Mitterand? When you have to create something political thatis not in the space of the State, it is purely a question of the existence of new politics;it is not a question of left or right. In my opinion there is today no politics at all,generally speaking. So it is a question of creation, of invention. And we have to startat the beginning, and the beginning is not within the old politics. What is the oldpolitics? It is a politics about the State, “within” the State, and so on. Left? Right? Ifwe have to struggle against something like the extreme right, we do it naturally. Sofor the space you speak of, you need to fight. But not within the State itself, becausewithin the State itself there are rules, the rules of the old politics. We know perfectlywell that France has a long tradition of treason by the Left. Not only now but for avery long time now. The question is to find a new political axiomatic, not only inabstract terms but as concrete experimentation.

RP:What is so interesting about your work, is your tireless struggle against the Stateapparatus(es). Indeed, you have remarked that one of your main aims has been to“outline in the world an imperative that is able to subtract us from the grip of theState.” With this in mind, can we connect this to the contradictions constitutive ofthe “Anti-globalisation” movement? We mention this because the issue of the“State” has been displaced. No longer is it the case that the State is the site of anirreducible antagonism between the “masses” and the “ruling order”. Instead, onewill often speak of a weak State that either needs to be fully transcended (such is thecase with left liberal cosmopolitans, who talk about a “global civil society’), or to bestrengthened (pertaining to some nostalgia for “social welfarism’). In light of theseremarks, what are your views of existing global struggles against the logic of latecapitalism framed under this banner of Anti-globalisation? These discussions areduplicated at the political level. You have reformist groups who would say that thereis a need for the restructuring of the IMF and the World Bank. You also have somepolitical demonstrators who are vehemently opposed to globalisation and theprescription, for them, would be to strengthen the State.AB: Indeed. We have such movements in France as well. One that seeks to

strengthen the State, the national State against globalisation, against Europeanapparatuses and so forth. It is a very old politics; there is nothing new with that. It isvery difficult to distinguish between that and LePen, for instance. LePen is alsoagainst globalisation, he is a great militant against globalisation!

This is a difficult question. We must start with the contemporary definition ofthe State. This definition must include the economic apparatus. We must notimmediately separate State from economic globalisation. Such a dialectic is wrong. Infact, in the definitions of the different States – that is to say the hegemonic States(American), the intermediary States (European), and the emerging States (Brazil,China) – in the definition of all States, the economic space is present. So there is notrue opposition between, on the one side, the autonomy of the State, the reinforcingof the State or the weak State, etc., and on the other economic globalisation. Each


State, therefore, is interior to a general situation. This is not completely new. Even inthe past, States were always confronted internally to the question of the other States.There were no global politics, and then State politics. Each State was also a verycomplex system of relations with other States. Beforehand, for instance, the generalform was inter-imperialistic competition. Take France and England in the 19thcentury, we see that there was globalisation. Obviously, the French strategic andcolonial policies were completely articulated on the question of the British Empire.

In reality, we need to take the modern definition of the State as being in itselfmarked by the global development of capitalism, that is, by the existence of a globalmarket. A great prediction by Marx! Marx’s observation is much more relevant todaythan it was in his own life-time. This is a typical example of a scientific prediction thatis absolutely remarkable. So I do not think that the problem is at the State and/orglobalisation level, but rather in terms of a new form of the State that is situated inan economic set that is part of the State, and that defines certain strategies. Moreparticularly, the strategy of the dominant States (American), or of emerging Statesthat are virtually powerful – such as China, India, and Brazil – and the strategy ofintermediary States (the European States), are different strategies. The discussion isopen as to how the different States can take strategic decisions in their own context.

An important point is that every State uses propaganda to convince us that allthe decisions they take are necessary. Let us take for instance the French government(although the same could be said about the British government). What is the Frenchgovernment saying to us? As the British government before, it is destroying publichospitals, public schools, etc. It follows the British, and follow it will! What is the Stateexplaining? It is explaining that specific policies must be implemented. It cannot claimthat all this is acceptable, that it is right. So, instead, they claim that such policies aremandatory. But is this truly the case? It is his policy to say that it is necessary, it is theState policy. This is the government’s way of situating this State policy in aneconomical context that is part of State decisions. Therefore, I think that there isn’t anopposition at all between the struggle against the capitalist system and the well-defined political struggle against a well-defined State. In my view, it is the same thing.

I find that it is much more efficient to concentrate your forces on concreteState decisions that we know to be decisions taken by people that are there, that wecan denounce and attack, against whom we have a political space to manoeuvre,rather than organising protests where the great economic leaders are meeting. I aman old Maoist in this respect, and I have retained from Mao this idea: we mustcontrol the area from which we are fighting; never go where the adversary gathers.So I have never been interested in going to Seattle, or elsewhere, simply because theeconomic leaders were present. It is almost as if as soon as the opponent waves hisflag somewhere you must immediately meet them. On the contrary, we need astrategy that allows us to create our own space, to develop our own strategies andpolitical decisions. The question of space is fundamental to politics. For example,who decides where to send the forces? Where do you concentrate your forces? Andpolitical independence is to be able to choose your own space.


One of the aspects of the anti-globalisation movement that I denounce is itsdependency towards the State – if “State” can also be understood as the generaleconomy. This movement depends on the State because it gathers where States gather.This is useless. And to ask for what? What is it going to ask the G8? Here we can organisea protest to demand from Chirac that he changes the law on the sans-papiers. But fromthe G8? What do we demand from them? To change global economic policies? Tochange capitalism? If this is the case, then it is nothing more than reformism! There isactually a whole branch of this movement that asks for reforms regarding internationalcommerce. This avenue is of no interest at all to me; it is not my problem.

To summarise, I would answer in two ways. Firstly, I believe that opposing localState situations contra globalisation is misguided. This is not the true problem; it is notthe right direction. Secondly, I think that, today especially, we need to focus our strengthprecisely on State decisions, because we can measure what is created in this way. At thelevel of the reformation of global capitalism, on the other hand, we have no real power.

SC: Isn’t there, actually, a difference in the political strategy adopted by theOrganisation politique and the anti-globalisation movement? Preciselyregarding the question of the locality of the action?AB:Absolutely. Just as there is a theoretical contradiction between Negri and

Hardt’s conceptions and my own work. Their conceptions are, in my view, systemic,and in the end they replace the vitality of the political singularities by a systemicconsideration. Why are they systemic? Because in reality, what Negri has alwaysbeen thinking is that there is a unique constituting power, and that this uniqueconstituting power, that the creativity of capitalism, has the same origin as thecreativity of communism. This is why he is the philosophical inheritor of Spinoza.There is only one substance! There is truly only one substance! The substance thatcreates the capitalist novelties is the same substance that creates resistance to thenovelties of capitalism. This is thus an anti-dialectical thought in a very importantway; and this is why he attempts to find the point of constituting unity between thefigures of oppression and the figures of the resistance.

I am completely alien to this kind of thinking. I am convinced that there areconstituted dualities, that a true political strength is absolutely heterogeneous to themilitant space. This political strength is not the reverse of the militant space; it is itsconstituting principle, not its hidden secret. From this point of view I think it is quiteimportant to break with this type of inheritance, and consequently with a certainFoucault – after all, they draw quite a lot from Foucault’s work. Foucault is a verycomplicated thinker, especially in politics, where very few risks were taken. But it ispossible to interpret Foucault as someone who says: finally, power and resistance arethe same thing. I think this is not the case at all. I think that we only have resistance tothe State when it is constituted elsewhere, when it is heterogeneous to the nature of thepower. I really believe in the “power of the two”, in the power of difference, but a truedifference, not false difference, such as thinking that we have a single twisted space, asif resistance was the torsion of power. I am not favourable to this idea. I think that on


this point, between a certain Foucault, Négri, a certain interpretation of Deleuze (eventhough Deleuze was quite prudent in politics), and the anti-globalisation movement, allof this is a set that, in my opinion, will not create any real political renewal.

In the end, although this movement claims to be radical, I think it is nothingmore than reformist. It has no other option than to be reformist, than to ask for acapitalism that is not as fierce. This doesn’t create any politics! It creates movements.But it is not the case that if we have movements, we also have politics. This is a veryimportant point. There are innumerable movements that constantly occur; somemovements are renewals of political thought, but this is not the same as simply beinga movement and nothing more. Negri always speaks of the great creativity of themultitudes (multitude is the new name for masses, let us admit to this), but wherehave we seen this creativity? It is not because you’re protesting at Genoa that there isa creativity of the multitude. I have seen hundreds of these type of protests over theyears and can honestly say that there isn’t an ounce of creativity in all of this.

Hence, the problem of creativity at this stage is a problem of knowing whatcreates a political heterogeneity. But to create a political heterogeneity supposesvery complicated and very novel principles of rupture. I am not saying that all thisis easy, on the contrary. But at least we have this idea: we have this experimentalidea of seeing how, on a certain number of issues, in a certain number of spaces, wecan finally create political heterogeneity. Here, there is an empirical rule: I think thatwe can finally create political heterogeneity in continuity only with popularcomponents that are themselves heterogeneous, and that the little civil bourgeoisieis not the one that will create by itself such political heterogeneity. The importantquestion of the “ordinary people”, the “ordinary workers”, the proletariat, remains;this is an empirical question, but it is also more than empirical. The anti-globalisation movement is also a movement that is – in old Marxist terms –bourgeois. Let us put aside this old vocabulary, but let us also admit that anti-globalisation is not a popular movement. This at least is clear! It is perhaps anideological movement, which is interesting, but all in all, I think that it remainsconfined within the categories that are not those of the heterogeneous.

My difference with Negri on this point is almost ontological; it is trulyfundamental. It is really the attempt to create from scratch a substantialist, vitalist, andpolitical – homogenous, finally – vision, whose practical form is in fact the movementitself. There is no other practical form than the movement. But the movement does notresolve by itself the questions of politics. Politics is first and foremost the creation ofspaces: you must create your space. This, you have well understood.

RP: In the Manifesto for Philosophy, there is a moment where you say,“philosophy has a responsibility to maintain its sophistic double rather than toremove it”. Presumably, there is a connection between that and the ethicalinjunction to show reserve. Is this a reserve which is relative to a truthprocedure, that when one is engaged in a truth procedure one shows reserve?This is no concession to the ethical ideologies, which you criticise.


AB:The reserve is not a formal reserve, naturally. It is a reserve immanent toa truth procedure. And it is something like the struggle against “ultra-leftists” that isalways a sort of radical fidelity, a radical fidelity without any consideration for thesituation. So, here there is always the possibility of disaster. Hence, reserve is not aformal principle; it is only a sort of rule for the continuation of the process.

RP: Recently, you described democracy as something like a prohibition onthought. At other moments however (in last year’s Political Theory Conference atthe University of Essex for example), you seemed to leave open the possibility ofa “true democracy” whose exceptionality we might compare with that of a truth-procedure. One obviously thinks, in this connection, of Jacques Ranci~re, forwhom the essence of democracy is its interruptive character. Now, in this sense,could we not say that militancy is the bearer of the democratic sensibility?AB: I can simply answer: Yes! Fundamentally. Exactly. The question of

democracy is a complex one, because in fact there is an anti-democratic traditionwhich is completely reactionary. So when you are in a sort of connection withreaction and tradition it is a problem. In fact, it is imperative that we criticise thedemocratic fetish today, rather than capitalism. Let’s be honest: nobody really lovescapitalism. The subjective propaganda of capitalism is not… capitalism! Capitalismis a so-called “natural necessity”, but everybody knows that there is somethingwrong with it: inequalities, inequities, and so on. So there is no propaganda whichis directly about capitalism. It is rather always about democracy. So politicallyspeaking, the question of democracy is much more important. You have to go fromdemocracy to capitalism and not from capitalism to democracy. And what exactlyis a critique of capitalism? Concretely, political intervention is about decisions thatare taken in a democratic framework, the legitimacy of which is the true question.

But you have to be really clear about the distinction between your critique ofdemocracy and the critique of reactionary political democracies, the Fascist critiqueof democracies, and so on. The Communist movement was not at all democratic; itwas a movement for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for a new form of State, andcannot be confused with democracy.

The critique of democracy is something rather complicated. It is why sometimesI think that we must distinguish between true democracies and false ones. This is an oldproblem. I think that finally, in the text about democracy in Metapolitics, I saysomething like democracies are militancy in itself. Democracies are the “real” of politics(true democracies). There is nothing political about party politics. You can say that thedevelopment of a new political field, the creation of something new, is democratic.

RP: This question touches on a comment you made earlier in the interview,when you asked “The Left? What Left?” Returning to this issue – one couldperhaps say that at the moment, a renaissance of militant political thoughtseems to be taking place. It is easy for the student to be struck, for example, bythe related sets of concerns that play between your work and that of, say,


Ranci~re, Laclau, @ièk, Balibar, etc. In your view, however, is this an accuratedepiction of the contemporary intellectual scene, and if so, is this factor of anyinterest to you? Also, how do you relate to the work of these other authors?AB:There is certainly a new situation concerning the political question. Let us

leave the word “Left” aside for the moment. I think this new situation concerns youmuch more than it concerns us. Because you know, Ranci~re, Laclau, @ièk, Balibar… weare not very young! None of us! All of us are from the Sixties. So the new point is thetransmission to the new generation. Here, there is something new. All of us, we can say:there are some people that are asking for something different in political thought, inyour generation. Ten, fifteen years ago, there was… nothing. But this is over. Thanks toyou! We have continued. But it is true that there is a new situation that is your situation,and your invention. Naturally, you are looking for a transmission of this experience;naturally, in terms of this new situation, we have discussions with those you havequoted. Actually, I think we are like a circus! The political circus! @ièk as the acrobat,Balibar as Monsieur Loyal. When I go to Los Angeles, I see there @ièk and Balibar, andI’m in Switzerland with @ièk and Agamben, and so on. We are a small group and quitedifferent one from another, but finally with time we are also in the same process. Thedifferences are always interesting, but it is like the difference between Marx andFeuerbach. In fact, the difference between Rousseau and, after that, Lenin and Trotsky.

Differences are very important, but let us not forget about the value ofcommunity. Currently, my relation to these others is one of friendship, of fraternity,and of very intense discussions – discussions, I might add, that are more and moreorientated towards you, towards the new generation, in order to transmit both whatis common in our work and what is different.

SC:Who is the intellectual enemy today?AB: There is a hierarchy! But for me, the intellectual enemy is certainly not

@ièk, Balibar and Ranci~re. Discussions are always more heated with your neighbourthan with the one who is far away. So there are intense discussions with Ranci~re, forexample, but I would never say that Ranci~re is the enemy, obviously not. Rather, Iwould say that the enemy is an ensemble that is the conservative political philosophyof today, a political philosophy that is pro-parliamentary, pro-capitalist, pro-occidental. In other words, an academic philosophy. There are no clear enemies.

RP: It is really interesting that you should mention Balibar and Ranci~re andyourself because the thread of continuity that binds you together is theAlthusserian legacy. In the Sixties, you were all involved in the Althusserianproblematic and yet you have taken the project in three different directions. Forinstance, in Ranci~re, Althusser is present in his very absence; there is acomplete rejection of the Althusserian legacy. Whereas with Balibar and youthere is still something retained from that whole discourse.AB: There are different points that I have in common with Althusser. For

instance, the question of the definition of philosophy. When Althusser says that


philosophy is without an object, among other things, my definition of philosophyretains something of this. In particular the fact that there is no proper object ofphilosophy; that philosophy is an act is really something that comes from Althusser.Secondly, despite everything, the importance of science. I have never abandonedscience. Ranci~re, for example, is not interested at all in science; it is absent from histhought. Althusser however gave a lot of importance to science – not in the same wayI did, but he gave it importance, and I have stayed faithful to this. Althusser was alsosomebody who has asked himself whether there is or is not a political subject. This isa great question of Althuser’s. Generally speaking, he has answered in a rathercomplicated fashion. In his view, there is no historical subject. He did not exactly saythat there are no political subjects since there is the subject of the class struggle, andpolitics is precisely class struggle. However the question of whether there is or is nota political subject is a question that I find very interesting, but not one that interestsRanci~re, for instance; and it is one about which Balibar remains somewhat sceptical.

So I have retained many things from Althusser, whom I have also vehementlycontested – but for explicit political reasons.

This interview took place at the University of Essex on 10th of September 2003. Along with Professor Alain Badiou, three members of the Radical Politics group were present

(Tim Appleton, David Payne, and Joël Madore) as well as Simon Critchley, Professor at the University of Essex.


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After The Event: Rationality and the Politics of Invention - An Interview

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Transcript of After The Event: Rationality and the Politics of Invention - An Interview