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Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and

Knowledge Base

Volume II, Number 1

After NATO’s Libya Intervention:

Any Implication for International Law?

Authors:

Dr. Uğur Güngör Chief of Staff of the Center of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT)

Fatih AKGUL Istanbul University

September 2013

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Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base | Volume II, Number 1 | September 2013

2

After NATO’s Libya Intervention: Any Implication for International Law?

Summary

In response to the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings in Libya during February 2011, after the

deployment of a multi-state coalition, NATO then executed military operations (the “Libya

Operation”) to implement the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) Resolution 1973.

But this NATO operation, or, rather, humanitarian intervention (“HI”) which was meant to

protect the civilian population from gross human rights violations, also ended with the

overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. Resulting in a regime change, the Libya Operation

conflicted with a fundamental principle of international law, ‘non-intervention in a sovereign

state.’ Inevitably, this situation fueled debates about the legality and legitimacy of the NATO

operation for such an unauthorized outcome. This article tries to assess the content and nature

of UNSCR 1973 with a view towards whether the operation was in conformity with the

Resolution or whether it exceeded the authority given by UNSCR 1973. Having compared

Resolution 1973 and its implementation by NATO, it concludes that the actors, timing and

declared purpose of the Libya Operation were in conformity with the character of the

Resolution, except for the consequences of its implementation. In other words, NATO

exceeded its authority and in this situation raised some implications for international law,

especially on the rules governing the use of force. In the near future, it may be predicted that

human rights will be the most valid cause for intervening and that the trend of diminishing

state sovereignty in humanitarian matters will continue. The Libya Operation showed that the

dynamics of the current international system and events have made certain human rights

norms more binding. Thus, new operations may occur against non-democratic governments,

especially in the Middle East. Lastly, it should be added that there is an urgent need to revise

the UN Charter and the composition of the UNSC into a more legal and regulatory mode of

decision-making in using force, particularly in HIs.

Key Words

Humanitarian Intervention, NATO, Libya, Resolution 1973.

Introduction

In March 2011, following the intervention of a multi-state coalition, the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) executed military operations in Libya to implement United

Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, on the grounds of protecting the civilian


3

population from gross and systematic human rights violations. The Libya Operation,

authorized by the United Nations, ended with the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. NATO’s

Libya intervention fueled debates involving the concept of humanitarian intervention.

Furthermore, the regime change in Libya resulting from the Libya Operation, spawned

debates on whether this end should be considered as the ‘inherent’ outcome of UNSC

Resolution 1973. Not surprisingly, therefore, many questioned the legality and legitimacy of

the NATO operation for such an unauthorized outcome. The concerns that led to such

discussions are obvious: if it is accepted that the UN Security Council has the power to decide

which regimes countries should have, it is then necessary to reconsider the meaning of the

concept of ‘sovereignty;’ one of the fundamental principles of international law, as well as the

principle of ‘non-intervention’, which flows from the concept of sovereignty. By the same

token, if the NATO operation that aimed at a regime change should be considered as being in

conformity with international law, then again we need to reconsider whether the rules

governing the ‘use of force’ in the UN Charter respond to the needs of our time.

This article aims to assess the content and nature of Resolution 1973 with a view to

exploring whether it is possible to regard NATO’s Libya Operation as a legitimate and lawful

exercise of the authority given by Resolution 1973. In connection with this aim, the article

will also briefly assess what implications this intervention may have on international law,

especially on the rules governing the use of force.

The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention and Rules of Using Force under the

UN Charter Regime

Although the debate on HI has attracted scholarly attention since the 17th

century, as

reflected in the works of Hugo Grotius and Alberico Gentil,, its first encounter with

international politics corresponded to the Greek Revolution of the 19th

century. The

intervention of the United Kingdom, France and Russia in Greece in 1827 (and that of France

in Syria in 1860) supposedly to prevent ‘massacres’ in these areas of the Ottoman Empire, are

accepted as the first examples of humanitarian interventions.1 However, it is necessary to note

1

Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, ‘The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current

Validity under the U.N. Charter’, California Western International Law Review 4 (1974): 203, 212–13 ; T. M.

Ocran, ‘The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of Robust Peacekeeping’,

<http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_1/01_FMS.htm> (accessed 9/13, 2011). A. O.

Enabulele, “Humanitarian intervention and territorial sovereignty: the dilemma of two strange bedfellows,” The

International Journal of Human Rights, 14:3, 2010, p.414; Isiaka Alanı Badmus, “Humanitarian Intervention and

http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bciclr/25_1/01_FMS.htm


4

that in Turkish history books these interventions are solely perceived as pretexts to gain

control over Christian parts of the Ottoman Empire. 2

Indeed at first glance, it is easy to

discern an oxymoron in using the words ‘humanitarian’ and ‘intervention’ in the same

sentence. Also, it can be discerned that the Turkish national memory has images about

humanitarian intervention similar to that of some African countries, like Libya.3

Technically, HI can briefly be described as a military intervention in a state with the

purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.4 According to a

more extensive definition it is the threat or use of force across state borders by a state or group

of states aimed at ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of

individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose

territory force is applied.5 Additionally, it is generally accepted that HIs should be limited,

proportional and short term actions realized by states or recognized international

organizations and based on proven evidence of gross human rights abuses.6 Also, the primary

goal of the intervention must be to protect the welfare and freedom of those in another state,

rather than to secure some advantage to the intervening state or its citizens.7 Authorization is

another important point.. HIs can be defined as unilateral or collective. It is unilateral when

the intervention is carried out by one or more states acting without Security Council

authorization; collective intervention, on the other hand, is one carried out with the

The Protection of Civilian Populations” National Library of Serbia, UDK:172.16:314.04, Biblid 0025-8555,

61(2009) Vol. LXI, br. 1-2, p.10-11. 2 For example see Toktamış Ateş, Siyasal Tarih, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 3rd Ed., 2009, İstanbul, p.213, 383;

Rifat Uçarol, Siyasi Tarih (1789-2001), Der Yayınları, 6.Baskı, İstanbul, 2006, pp.149-151, 239. 3

For example according to Enabulele, “states which had exploited Africa and had accounted for massive losses

of lives for a half century, now became the guardians of the human rights of people of faraway lands and

champions of the Humanitarian Intervention. ... The main motive of this change can be seen as a self-interest of

the global powers in the age of neo-colonialism.” Enabulele, ibid, pp.416-417; and Badmus has paralel ideas in

ibid, pp.17-20. 4

Adam Roberts, 'Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights', International Affairs, Vol. 69,

No. 3, July 1993, p.426. 5 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The humanitarian intervention debate”, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and

Political Dilemmas, Eds. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.18; Allan

Buchanan, Human Rights, Legitimacy, and The Use of Force, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, p.201; Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, Morality and

Politics,” Journal of International Affairs, 37, 1984, p. 311. 6 Ernst B. Haas, ‘Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes Toward the Definition of Justifiable Intervention’,

University of California, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1993, p.17-19. 7

Fernando Tesón, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality’, 2nd

Ed., Irvington-on-Hudson

Transnational Publishers, New York, 1996, p.1–6; A.P.V. Rogers, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International

Law’, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol: 27, No: 3, 2004, p.738.


5

authorization of the United Nations.8

It can be concluded that, in defining HI, the principles of temporality, compulsivity in

action and humanity in intent are generally agreed to be involved. On the other hand, the

necessity of UN authorization, the identity of people who have been assaulted and must be

protected, and the tools and types of intervention to be used are seemingly controversial

issues. Since Libya will be discussed in this article, the concept of HI will be limited to the

use of force authorized by the UNSC, as distinguished from non-forcible interventions, such

as the threat or use of economic, diplomatic or other sanctions.9 Also it will be limited to

situations protecting citizens who have a different ethnic or religious identity from the

interveners.10

Nevertheless, HI is still one of the most controversial subjects of international

law, not particularly because of the accepted definitions but because of some recent practices

of states. This controversy has been basically nourished by two related dilemmas.

First, the sovereignty of the state intervened upon is being violated. Sovereignty has

several meanings; 11

we can define sovereignty simply as the legal independence of a state

from all other states or international organs. As well as independence, the importance of

sovereignty stems from its relationship to the equality of states, which represents the basic

constitutional doctrine of the law of nations.12

As an alternate point of view, the term

sovereignty has been commonly used in at least four different ways: First, domestic

sovereignty refers to the formal organization of political authority within the state and the

ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity.

Second, interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of public authorities to control trans-

border movements such as the flow of information, ideas, goods and people. International

legal sovereignty refers to the mutual recognition of states. And finally, Westphalian

sovereignty refers to the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures within

its territory.13

This principle is also known as ‘absolute sovereignty,’ which is consistent with

8 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, ‘Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention

and the Future of International Law’, in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical Legal and Political Dimensions, J.L.

Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp.177-178. 9

For the opposite ideas see Tesón, ibid; Sean D. Murphy, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an

Evolving Order’, University of Philadelphia Press, Philadelphia,1996. 10

For the opposite ideas see Rogers, ibid, p.736 and Holzgrefe, ibid, pp.18-19. 11

For a detailed description and discussion about sovereignty see Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer, “The

Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations”, Columbia Journal of

Transnational Law, Volume 43, Issue 1, 2004. pp. 141-187. 12

Ian Brownlie, ‘Principles of Public International Law’, 4th

Ed., Oxford University Press, 1990, p.287. 13

Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy’, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1999, pp.3-

5.


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territorial sovereignty.14

These four meanings of sovereignty are embedded in a fundamental distinction between

authority and control. “Authority” involves a mutually recognized right for an actor to engage

in specific kinds of activities. According to Krasner, a loss of control over a period of time

could lead to a loss of authority. And if a mutually accepted rule fails to control behavior, its

authority might be rejected over time.15

If we compare this classification with the perspective of HI, it can be concluded that

external interventions directly violate the domestic sovereignity of a state by preventing it

from exercising control over its country, and the Westphalian sovereignity of that state

directly as an external authority. However, one can infer from this description that

sovereignity is decisive in any approach to HI. For example, accoprding to this view, if a state

loses its authority and legitimacy we cannot acknowledge its sovereignity and thus HI will not

contradict with the principle of the absolute sovereignty of states. The UN Charter system is a

system of independent and equal states whether they are democratically governed or not.

Article 2 of the Charter accordingly adopted the principle of the sovereign equality of all

states. Also, the UN General Assembly has declared:

“No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,

for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. ...

Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference against the

personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements are

condemned.”16

Accordingly, in the UN Charter system, every state has an inalienable right to choose its

political system without interference in any form by another state. For example in the case of

Kampuchea the UN General Assembly consistently called for immediate withdrawal of all

foreign forces from Kampuchea, with reference to the principles of non-intervention and non-

interference. .17

However, since the end of the Cold War there has been some decay in the

absolute sovereignty of nation states, especially in matters involving human rights and

14

Enabulele, ibid, p.409. 15

Krasner, ibid, pp.9-10. 16

UN General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the

Domestic Affairs of States and The Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, 21 December 1965.

Note: All of the documents and resolutions were quoted from UN Official Web Site

<http://www.un.org/en/documents/ >. 17

UN General Assambly Resolution 43/19, The Situation in Kampuchea, A/RES/43/19, 3 November 1988.


7

democracy, with the increasing influence of globalization, individualism, international trade

and the emergence of a multi-polar system.

The second dilemma is the use of armed force, which is been strictly prohibited by the

UN Charter. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against member

states. There are only two exceptions: self-defense as described by Article 51 and actions,

including collective operations, authorized by the Security Council in the framework of

Chapter VII. When the UNSC determines ‘the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of

the peace, or act of aggression’; and deems the measures to be taken as ‘necessary to maintain

or restore international peace and security’ it can authorize intervention.18

So the Charter does

not mention HI directly, but the gross abuse of human rights is constituted as one of the tripod

requirements of Chapter VII.

It is mostly accepted that the UN Charter regime prohibits all unilateral use of force,

including HI. The Charter is also replete with provisions prohibiting the use of force in the

domestic affairs of states. However, in recent years there can be seen an ascending viewpoint

that unilateral HI is legal, or at least, that a limited right to HI exists.19

According to this view,

there are three arguments aimed at reconciling HI with the rules governing the use of force

under the UN Charter regime. First, it is argued that Article 2(4) forbids using force only

when it is directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. So,

unless HI results in territorial conquest or political subjugation, it is not prohibited by Article

2(4). Second, according to Article 1(3) one of the chief purposes of the United Nations is “to

achieve international co-operation in … encouraging respect for human rights and for

fundamental freedoms for all without distinction.” So it can be concluded that HIs are

consistent with the purpose of the UN Charter, whether they are authorized or not. And lastly,

with an expansive interpretation of Article 39 of the UN Charter regarding HI, the use of force

in response to "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" should be

legal.20

Actually, Article 55(c) explicitly states that “respect for, and observance of, human

18

UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 39 and 42. 19

For a detailed discussion about whether Humanitarian Intervention is legal in UN Charter regime see Nicholas

J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics’, (Eds.) John Baylis and Steve

Smith, ‘The Globalization of World Politics’, Oxford University Press, 2005; Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom

Woodhouse, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization’, Polity Press,

Cambridge, 1996. 20

Holzgrefe, ibid, pp. 37-41.


8

rights and fundamental freedoms” is to be promoted. But existent international human rights

law does not establish clear obligations concerning HI on the parts of states. HI is neither

prohibited nor obligatory. Therefore, there is an idea that international law should be modified

so that it imposes clear obligations upon states to engage in HI.21

On the other hand, foreign

intervention in domestic uprisings is prohibited without an explicit invitation from a

recognized government seeking external help. Further, the non-intervention norm applies

without consideration as to the ‘legitimacy’ of the revolt or rebellion. Customary

international law does not accord to states any right to intervene in an internal opposition in

another state. Even if a domestic insurrection leads to the installment of a new government,

other states may refuse to recognize it.22

Current Debates about Humanitarian Intervention

It cannot be said that the UN Charter readily authorizes interventions.23

The most

prominent examples of humanitarian military interventions during the Cold War era were the

intervention of India into East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam into Kampuchea in 1978 and

Tanzania into Uganda in 1979. But all of these interveners justified their actions on

humanitarian grounds and argued that their actions were legal according to UN Charter

Article 51. However there has been seen some variations in HI since the demise of the Cold

War, particularly between 1991 and 1994, including military interventions in Kosovo, East

Timor, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq. All of these were in one way or another collective; the

UNSC defined all humanitarian crises as ‘a threat to international peace and security’ and

military actions were supported widely by the public even though no vital national interests

were at stake. This makes a profound conceptual difference to the whole nature of forcible

HI.24

Of all these, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo during 1999 is the most discussed example

of non-authorized HI in the debate about the legality and legitimacy of HI. Finally, for the

first time, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan officially noted the conflict between the

21

Şaban Kardaş, “Examining the Role of UN Security Council in Post-Cold War interventions: The Case for

Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention” USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law, Vol.3, Ankara,

2010. 22

Christian Pippan, “The 2011 Libyan Uprising, Foreign Military Intervention, and International Law”,

Juridikum, 2/2011, p.161. 23

On the grounds that evolution and classification of the humanitarian intervention concept is so wide and

exceeds the scope of this article, we had to give only chosen examples. On this subject you can see Francis Kofi

Abiew, ‘The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention’, Kluwer Law International,

The Hague; Boston, 1999; Stephen A. Garrett, ‘Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of Humanitarian

Intervention’, Praeger, Westport, Conn, 1999; ‘Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention’,

Jonathan Moore (ed.), Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham MD, 1998. 24

Wheeler, ibid, pp.563-566; Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in

Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization’, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 109.


9

concept of state sovereignty and the moral duty to protect populations at risk.25

Afterwards,

with the experience of Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the UN General Assembly

promoted an ad hoc commission26

aiming to reconcile this conflict. This commission

completed its study and propounded a final report which offers a notion named

“Responsibility to Protect" (RtoP) to resolve the conflict.

The notion of RtoP, after being mentioned in a report in 2001, was officially endorsed

by the UN Summit in 2005.27

At the heart of the notion of RtoP lies the belief that, while

sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their populations from avoidable human

suffering, this responsibility must be borne by the broader international community if states

are unable or unwilling to do so. 28

Ideally, government should exist for the common goods of

people, and its aim is to secure an organized protection of its people and territory. So it is

asserted that if a state intends to eradicate some of their own citizens, the legitimacy and

sovereignty of this state’s government becomes doubtful because sovereignty is not an

inherent right of states. Rather, it derives from individual rights. Accordingly the UN should

intervene in this kind of violation to prevent the situation from developing into a threat to

regional peace and security. Indeed, most civil wars provoke massacres, huge emigration and

refugee problems and create safe havens for terrorist organizations. It should be added lastly

that RtoP is an umbrella concept, embracing not just the “responsibility to react”, but the

“responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild” as well.29

Therefore, according

to this notion, UN Resolutions are essential to carry out HI operations. But sometimes UN

resolutions are not sufficient by themselves and can encounter some obstacles in their

implementation.

There are two main problems about implementing UN resolutions in the context of HI.

First, the size and limits of such operations are sometimes unclear and therefore member

states may be unwilling to participate. Second, these kinds of operations sometimes result in

heavy casualties among the participating members and a more insecure condition overall.

Furthermore, participants sometimes find it difficult to persuade their citizens. For example,

25

Kofi Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, The Economist, 18 September 1999. 26

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which was established by Canada in

December 2001, available at <http://www.iciss.ca>. 27 UN World Summit Outcome Document 2005, UN Doc A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, paras 138-139. 28

Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect: Revisiting Humanitarian Intervention”,

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No.6, November/December, 2002. pp.99-110; Pippan, ibid., p.165. 29

Cf. Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action’, Cambridge: Polity, 2007, pp. 88-118;

Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities’, Cambridge: Polity, 2009,

pp. 66-97.


10

in Darfur or in Rwanda (although 800,000 civilians were slaughtered) few states wanted to

assist with such a costly and risky operation. Moreover, the states which do volunteer

normally take into consideration some economic and political advantages of their own to be

gained as well. Therefore, it is necessary to admit ‘ab initio’ that all participation by member

states in HIs has some tacit political and economic aspects.

At this point we must emphasize another aspect of HI. Even if ‘being governed by law

and a democratic regime’ can be accepted as a human right,30

it is important to distinguish so-

called democratization operations from HI. Because there is another lively debate about

whether the political rights of a procedural democracy are a basic or a derivative human right

and whether the lack thereof is adequate justification for military intervention itself. For

instance, in the 1986 case of the US intervening against the legal government of Nicaragua,

the ICJ held against the US and pointed out that ‘non-intervention is a right of every

sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference’ even if the intention of the

intervener is promoting democracy.31

Likewise, as shown by the case of East Timor in 1999,

although the UN clearly promotes democracy, as well as human rights, it didn’t want to

promote elections in the absence of adequate measures to help protect the civilian

population.32

In a recent example, the UN imposed sanctions on Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 and on

the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, because of his crimes against humanity and his

refusal to give up power to the UN-certified winner of the latest election.33

It can be inferred

from these examples that human rights openly predominate over the democratic rights. In the

case of Libya the rebellion was launched to end the 42 year long dictatorship of Gaddafi and

this was achieved with the help of NATO. The Gaddafi regime was certainly a dictatorship

30

The link between democracy and human rights is captured in Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, which states: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will

be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage.” Also, according

to the UN Human Rights Council, democracy deficits and weak institutions are the main challenges to the

effective realization of human rights. Further, according to some legal scholars an enforcable right to democratic

governance has emerged in international law and thus non-democratic governments should not be recognized as

legitimate by international community and non-defensive international military interventions aiming to establish

democracy may be morally justifiable as humanitarian internvention. About this hypothesis of ‘democratic

peace’ see Thomas M. Frank, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, American Journal of

International Law, 67, 1973; Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, ‘America Alone: Neo-Conservatives and The

Global Order’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 31

ICJ Summary of the Judgment of the Case Concerning The Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against

Nicaragua, 27 June 1986. <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=

70&k=66&p3=5>. 32

David M. Malone, “An Evolving UN Security Council”, The Indian Society of International Law, Vol: 47,

No:4, October-December, 2007, p. 605. 32

For more example about this subject see: Buchanan, ibid, p.265. 33

UN Security Council Resolution 1975 (2011), 30 March 2011.

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=%2070&k=66&p3=5

http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=%2070&k=66&p3=5


11

like Iraq under Saddam Hussein; but it would overstate the situation to say that gross

violations of the human rights of the Libyan people had been observed during this long period

of Gaddafi except during his last month. So it can be argued that all recent HIs also have

aspects of democratization.

Analyzing Libya Operation in the Context of UNSCR 1973

Resulting in a regime change in Libya, this implementation of HI conflicted with two

fundamental principles of international law: non-intervention and state sovereignty. But was

the intervention a corollary of Resolution 1973 or a distortion of it?

In this part, Resolution 1973 and its implementation, namely the first assault of coalition

members and Operation Unified Protector of NATO, will be examined comparatively in

matters of timing, the actors, its purposes and implementation. These aspects have been

chosen to provide a comparison between Resolution 1973 and its implementation. Then, in

light of its findings this part will also discuss and assess the lawfulness and legitimacy of the

overall operations.

Course of Events and Conformity of Timing

After a series of uprisings in different parts of the Middle East, known as the "Arab

Spring", protests also sprang up in Libya in February 2011. The Government responded to

these protests very fiercely and unrest characterized the whole country within ten days.

Afterwards, the UN Human Rights Council emphasized that “gross and systematic human

rights violations” had taken place in Libya, including “indiscriminate armed attacks against

civilians, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, detention and torture of peaceful

demonstrators”;34

and the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 on 26 February

2011, which imposed non-forceful sanctions such as an international arms embargo and

financial sanctions.35

Meanwhile, some of the Libyan rebels established the Transitional

National Council (“TNC”) on February 27th

to act as the political face of the rebellion and to

fight against forces loyal to the Libyan Arabic Jamahiriya. But Libyan authorities responded

to these events by using military aircraft and heavy weaponry against civilians, and the

Council of the League of Arab States called on the UN Security Council to provide for the

34

UN General Assambly Human Rights Council Resolution S-15/1, Doc A/HRC/RES/S-15/1, 3 March 2011. 35

UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011), Peace and security in Africa, S/RES/1970 (2011), 26 February

2011.


12

imposition of a no-fly zone.

Only a few days later, on 17th

March 2011, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973, which

stressed that measures under UN Charter Article 41 had not sufficed, that the situation had

become worse and developed into a regional threat to peace and security. In this way, within

two days, first France, and then the United Kingdom and the USA carried out air strikes. So it

can be seen that, including the first sudden attack by France, the timing of the operation is in

conformity with the resolution. At the same time we can observe the legal process in the use

of force under the UN Charter; first as the precautionary measures of Article 6, then non-

military sanctions and the limited use of military force and only lastly decisive use of force.

However, we must also stress that the period of limited use of force and deterrence was too

short in comparison with former collective operations.

Actors

Resolution 1973 authorized “all members for acting nationally or through regional

organizations or arrangements”.36

Thus, a leading role in the initial air strikes was assumed by

France and the entire operation was later handed over to NATO. At the same time, we saw a

broad participation which has expanded to 16 members of NATO and all of the members of

the Arab Union. For example, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands,

Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom all deployed fighter planes to the region. Turkey and

Greece committed naval assets to enforce the arms embargo. But, France’s actions merit

special attention, as France has been the most prominent actor in the Libya Case.

On March 10th

2011, France became the first country to recognize the Libyan

Transitional National Council “as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people.” On

March 19th

French President Nicholas Sarkozy convened an emergency meeting about Libya

with allied and Arab leaders in Paris. But even as the meeting was still under way, French

planes began to attack Gaddafi forces in Benghazi. Therefore, this attack was reported as a

‘fait accompli', to pressure the attendees to agree about intervention and was criticized by

some of the participants.37

It was also reported that, in this meeting, while French officials had

insisted on striking ground forces that potentially threatened civilian areas, their Turkish

36

UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) on the Situation in Libya, S/RES/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011,

para.4. 37

Jeremiah Gertler and Paul Belkin and Derek E. Mix, “Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and

Issues for Congress”, USA Congressional Research Service Report, No:7-5700, R:41725, 30 March 2011,

Available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41725.pdf>, p.15.


13

counterparts vocally opposed any targeting of ground forces.38

Moreover it was reported in

the international press that France had provided weapons to rebel forces. In this regard, it can

be asserted that France had already lost its neutrality and legitimacy as an actor. But generally,

weather the initial air strike launched by France had a political motive or not, the actors

should be accepted as behaving legally and in conformity with UNSCR 1973.

Purpose

Within a week after passage of UNSCR 1973, both President Sarkozy and British Prime

Minister David Cameron had publicly called for Gaddafi to hand over power and instructed

their military staffs to begin working on plans for a no-fly zone over Libya.39

It can also be

inferred from the Congressional Reports of the U.S. that their government planned to dislodge

Gaddafi by supporting opposition forces, and that they were aware of the possibility of regime

change, even if it might have unpredictable consequences for the long term stability of the

country and the region.

On March 27, after just over a week of the coalition air operation under U.S. command,

NATO took over command and control of ongoing military operations in Libya. NATO

Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stressed the goal of the Operation Unified

Protector: “to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack from the

Gaddafi regime.” This entailed, first, enforcing a UN-mandated arms embargo, then enforcing

a no-fly zone over Libyan territory, and also protecting civilians and civilian population areas

from being attacked by Gaddafi forces. Rasmussen also emphasized several times that neither

Gaddafi nor any other individual was being targeted.40

So it can be concluded that the purpose

of operations, as far as declared, is quite consonant with the aim of UNSCR 1973. On the

other side, though UNSCR 1973 clearly called for an immediate cease-fire and dialogue,

neither Gaddafi in April nor Coalition Forces in August accepted mutual ceasefire offers of

the other. So it can be inferred from the operation design that the coalition was aiming to

overthrow the Gaddafi government from the beginning of the operation.

38

Gertler and Belkin, ibid., p.16. 39


Press Conference by NATO Secretary General on the latest developments in Libya and Operation Unified

Protector, NATO Official Web Site <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_79807.htm> Accessed 18

December 2011.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_79807.htm


14

Implementing UNSCR 1973

Resolution 1973 authorized taking “all necessary measures to protect civilians and

civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”.41

The wording

“all necessary measures” is commonly accepted as a standard phrase the Security Council

uses to authorize states to act militarily.42

Based on this phrase, UNSCR 1973 can be accepted

as the legal basis of the operation.

On the first day of the operation it was reported that Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Misrata and

Zawiya had been identified as safe areas for civilians, and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Army

was asked to pull back from these cities.43

Also, as cited above, the arms embargo and no-fly

zone was expanded in conformity with the resolution. However, on March 27, Rasmussen

announced that NATO would expand the scope of its mission to include air strikes on ground

forces ‘loyal to’ Gaddafi. This was the most controversial aspect of the NATO mission. Since

rules of engagement for the operation were not made publicly available, some participating

governments prohibited their air forces from participating in any attacks on ground forces.44

On the other hand, air forces of the Coalition destroyed Libya’s air defense systems, its

ground based armored vehicles and helicopter forces, all of which had the potential to attack

civilians in the first week.45

So, after the first week of the operation, NATO acted as a partner

of the TNC and considered the whole of Gaddafi’s loyal security forces as potential threat.46

In the end, the loyal Gaddafi forces were gradually weakened by NATO and finally Gaddafi

was captured and killed by TNC Forces on 20th

October 2011.

Discussions and Assessment

In the light of this comparative study it can be assessed that the actors, timing and

declared purpose of the operations were in conformity with the character of UNSC 1973,

except for the ultimate consequences of the implementation. Because it is understood that the

41 S/RES/1973 (2011) p.3. 42

Michael N. Schmitt, “Wings over Libya: The No-Fly Zone in Legal Perspective”, The Yale Journal of

International Law, Vol:36, Spring 2011, p.46, Pippan, ibid., p.160. For example, in December 1992 in Somalia

and April 1993 in Bosnia the Council had authorized the use of “all necessary means” to establish secure

conditions for humanitarian relief and create safe havens in situations of internal conflict. See UN Security

Council Resolution S/RES/794 (1992) and S/RES/819 (1993). 43 Gertler and Belkin, ibid., pp.9-11. 44


Gertler and Belkin, ibid., pp. 9-11. 46

It should be noted that, the reference to “the protection of populated areas” could be interpreted by the

Coalition and NATO as an authorization to attack Libyan security forces not directly engaged in attacks on

civilians, even though they were far from the battlefront. Schmitt, ibid., p.56.


15

general plan was simply to support and protect rebel forces, and to exterminate those of

Gaddafi. But, as stated before, the main objective was supposed to be saving innocent

civilians. Hence it would have been more appropriate to focus on the non-combatant civilian

population. So, it can be asserted that although the operations against the Gaddafi regime

started lawfully in line with UNSCR 1973, they did not stay within it and were not in

conformity with the resolution. By the same token, the

TNC was accepted as the legal

representative of the Libyan people by coalition forces and by NATO as well. But actually the

TNC can be also seen as a non-state actor during the operation.47

Thus media often used the

term ‘civil war’ in defining the situation in Libya. In the opinion of some, NATO’s direct

support of the TNC in an internal armed conflict is reproachable.

The main reason for this situation is that authority for decision making was abandoned

to the sole initiative of military specialists during the operation. Commanders in the battlefield

normally give priority to the survival of their own forces and try to obtain their objectives in

the shortest possible way. To a commander in a battlefield, ‘assaulting the most imminent

threat’ is only a tactical necessity. To illustrate this, it is interesting to see that Ambassador

Rice explained the U.S. vote in favor of Resolution 1973 by stating that the Security Council,

“has responded to the Libyan people’s cry for help with the purpose of protecting innocent

civilians.” while Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz said “U.S. forces have to

first neutralize Libyan air and anti-aircraft sites” on the same day, March 17, 2011. 48

On the

other hand, it must be admitted that UNSCR 1973 clearly prohibited any land operations49

and

achieving the Libya Operation’s objective without any land operation was a difficult question.

But, at least, the rules of engagements for these kinds of operations should be propounded in

depth.

Another reason for NATO’s one-sided attitude may have been to keep civilian

causalities at minimum level. However, media and independent human rights observers

reported some abuses and human rights violations committed by rebel forces against neutral

civilians.50

Also, it was reported in the international press in November 2011 that UN

47

For example according to Geneva Call, “Non-state actors are any armed actor with a basic structure of

command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objectives”.

Geneva Call, Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Geneva: PSIO, 2005 Online,

<http://www.genevacall.org/resources/research/f-research/2001-2010/gc-2005-oct-ansal.pdf> p.10, 12/11/2011. 48


UNSC stated “to take all necessary measures … while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on

any part of Libyan territory.” This is also in fully conformity with the RtoP Concept. 50

For examples of Gaddafi forces and anti-Gaddafi fighters who involved in torture and killings and civil

casualties caused by NATO, see Report of Physicians for Human Rights, Witness to War Crimes: Evidence from

http://www.genevacall.org/resources/research/f-research/2001-2010/gc-2005-oct-ansal.pdf


16

Secretary General Ban Ki Moon reported that some seven thousand people, including mostly

members of pro-Gaddafi Forces, had been exposed to torture in Libyan prisons. Yet the aim

of the operation was to prevent the murdering of innocents, not to replace the old regime with

another also employing torture.

Consequently, in the beginning part of the resolution “the responsibility of Libyan

Authorities to protect its people” is clearly mentioned two times and ‘violation of human

rights’ three times. Therefore it is easy to connect the basis of UNSCR 1973 with the RtoP

concept. But no sign about ‘uncompromising attitudes of the Libyan Government’, right of

self-determination , democracy, or any other phrase implying a shift in the former regime of

Libya can be detected. On the contrary, the resolution reaffirmed “its strong commitment to

the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya,”51

and its intention to “keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under

continuous review" to reconsider the measures imposed by resolution 1973.52

So it can be

established that a regime change was not incorporated in the resolution. To put it differently,

it is possible to argue that the aim that the Libya Operation seems to have had was not in

conformity with the reasons and content of the resolution itself. Thus it is safe to predict that

such an excessive use of power will be consequential not only for the future implications of

HIs, but also on the concepts of the use of force, state sovereignty and the principle of non-

intervention.

What Implications for International Law

First of all, it can be predicted that the trend of diminishing state sovereignty in

humanitarian matters will continue, as it concerns the security of the individual as against that

of the state. The Libya Case showed once more that despite the fact that the UN Charter

stresses the importance of ‘non- interference in the internal affairs’ and ‘non-use of force in

international relations’ principles, the dynamics of the current international system and recent

events have made human rights norms more binding whether or not states have consented. As

well as waxing neo-liberalism, globalization and technological innovations in

communications are indirectly supporting this trend. From the increasing coverage of events

Misrata, Libya, August 2011, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Libya-WitnesstoWarCrimes-Aug2011.

pdf>. Some news about this subject see <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14891913> or

<http://www.onlinecnnnews.com/amnesty-international-libyas-rebel-forces-committed-abuses/>. 51

S/RES/1973 (2011), p.2. 52

S/RES/1973 (2011), p.6.

https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Libya-WitnesstoWarCrimes-Aug2011.%20pdf

https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Libya-WitnesstoWarCrimes-Aug2011.%20pdf

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14891913

http://www.onlinecnnnews.com/amnesty-international-libyas-rebel-forces-committed-abuses/


17

by international television and the internet, people everywhere can see images of gross human

violations which were commonplace in internal crises but could not be seen three decades

ago. Thus, people now perceive these evils not as confined to far away lands but as an

imminent danger near to home and therefore give HI a little precedence over the principle of

state sovereignty.

By the same token, it can also be predicted as well that new operations will occur

involving non-democratic governments, especially in the Middle East. For example, recently

the international community has been debating the situation and human rights abuses in Syria.

But this time, the members of the UNSC are stepping very painstakingly, and, paradoxically,

this situation has been causing more civilian causalities. Above all it should be remembered

that NATO’s Libya Operation succeeded in changing the regime of a country, but did not

succeed in establishing security and stability in the region completely. So it is important to

implement the “responsibility to rebuild” aspect of RtoP in possible later cases.

Finally, as a result of the passing of time, changes in technology and globalization, it can

be argued that UN Charter Regime is today out-dated and cannot respond to the needs of the

international community. In this context it can bluntly be held that the international

community has two options:. first, it could be asserted that the UN Charter should be

renegotiated or be abandoned at least partly or else should be interpreted towards state

practices, especially those of major states, as the 'guiding principles'. The reader can find a

certain resemblance between this approach and the concept of ‘the living law’, which reflects

the Anglo Saxon common law tradition that law has a living and evolving structure in line

with social requirements. So a rule is considered valid and effective only when it is actually

being obeyed and implemented as the norm. Furthermore, the interpretation of rules and the

practices of major states may change according to their national interests, the balance of

power and the conditions of the international system. It may also be asserted that, with respect

to recent cases of HI, states have been reluctant to justify their actions in legal terms, for the

reason that their arguments might be used by other states to justify their actions and a

precedent for the future.53

So this option can lead to major powers using international law as a

53

Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind’: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and

Humanitarian Intervention after Libya”, New York University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory

Research Paper Series, Working paper no. 11-35, June 2011.


18

tool of hegemony54

and an ‘open door’ to politically motivated interventions under the pretext

of protecting human rights.

Second, it has been asserted that there is an urgent need to change the UN Charter and

the composition of the UNSC towards a more legal and regulatory mode of decision-making;

to prevent challenges to its legitimacy and waning role in HIs. This implication is simply very

near the reformist approach. Recently, this approach has entailed enlarging the Security

Council, changing its structure and decision making process, and also establishing new

collective mechanisms to protect human rights and respond to crimes against humanity.55

Moreover, this approach is seen as beneficial in reducing the risk of any abuses if it clearly

highlights the definable procedures and threshold for intervention by the global community.

Apart from these topics, after the Libya Operation fortuitously caused a regime change

in a sovereign country, one can ask a question: what if UNSCR 1973 really implied a regime

change, would it be fair? Does the UN have a right to qualify and choose the right regimes of

countries which were set by their own people? If the answer is yes, then it evokes the Forcible

Democratization Concept, which has come to the fore with recent debates on the ‘Bush

Doctrine’. Actually, it is hard to answer these questions, because there is no consensus about

the perfect model or an ideal description of democracy. Sometimes the UNSC’s own

members, such as Russia and China, are criticized for their understanding of democracy.

Different states have quite different cultures of democracy. Anyway, the Libya Case or rather

the whole Arab Spring has demonstrated that it is not possible to restore a well-established

democratic regime in a country solely via intervention or external support in an internal armed

conflict. It cannot be said that every democratic government equally respects the human rights

of its citizens. Therefore, changing the regime of a country to a more democratic one or

establishing a democratic system should not be the duty of the UN or any other developed

country. Even if parliamentary democracy can be accepted as the most modern system, all

nations have a natural process of evolution to achieve this end and accelerating this process is

not useful in every case.

54

It is also referred in the terms of 'a la carte multilateralism' and ‘exceptionalism’ in international relations.

According to this approach for example USA is the only superpower of the current system and has a duty of

assisting to non-developed countries with providing a peaceful, secure and stable international order. But as an

architect of this system and its uniqueness USA must have some exceptional privileges such as right to act in a

particular manner in changeable attitudes. Also rules designed by international community do not always bind

USA; it can choose and pick the beneficial ones regarding its national interests. 55

For detailed researches about UN’s role in current International Law System see: ‘Reforming The United

Nations: The Struggle For Legitimacy and Effectiveness’, Ed. Joachim Müller, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,

Leiden / Boston, 2006 and Malone, ibid.


19

Conclusion

Since it was authorized by the UNSC and in conformity with UNSCR 1973, the Libya

Operation can be accepted as a collective HI even though it was not clearly mentioned in the

text. The grounds for not mentioning a military operation directly in the UNSC resolution,

and NATO’s not participating in the beginning of the operation, can be interpreted as a tactic

to bypass any veto possibilities in the UNSC. The Libya upraising resulted with a victory of

the rebels, a new government and probably a new regime; but this situation was achieved with

the help of the international community in an unauthorized way, not by a solely inner

endeavor of the Libyan people. But what is more to the point, the Libya Operation showed

that the existing written international law governing the use of force is no longer valid

regarding any violations of human rights. In other words, the practice of states overrode the

rules of international law though UNSCR 1973 was perfectly in conformity with both the

written and customary international law. So it can be concluded at least that the Libya Case

supported the current arguments about the ‘hegemonic international law’ issue. In addition to

this, it can be said that in the near future human rights will be the most valid cause to

intervene in small countries.

As a consequence of these implications of the Libya Case, there are two related choices.

First, the UN Charter should be renegotiated or reinterpreted and the practices of states should

be the guiding principles for using force in HIs. The other choice is to revise the UN Charter

and composition of the UNSC into a more legal and regulatory mode of decision-making for

using force, particularly in HIs. Since the first choice could make the current international

system more chaotic, the better option is in favor of supporting the latter which could be a

more convenient way to observe generally accepted principles and consensus. Actually the

UN Charter, as a production of the winners of the 2nd

World War, today causes some

misapplications and abuses by developed countries with strained interpretations and leads to

debates about the legitimacy of the UN in the current international system. In this way, a more

legal and legitimate UN could be provided and the concept of HI will be prevented from

being used as an instrument of hegemony.

In this context, as shown by the Libya Case, the RtoP concept is useful but not sufficient

in ending debates on the subject of sovereignty versus human rights. The HI concept should

be enacted by explicitly setting out its principles and conditions in the UN Charter and

unilateral interventions should be forbidden. Also, a wider recognition of the International


20

Criminal Court (ICC) may assist to fill this gap, and conditions reported by the ICC; namely,

genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights may give

rise to a right to collective intervention.

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24

July 2011 – July 2013

July 28, 2011: Rebel leader Abdul Fatah Younis is assassinated.56

August 21, 2011: Rebel fighters enter Tripoli.57

August 26, 2011: Rebels move their government to Tripoli.58

September 16, 2011: Rebels advance into Sirte, Gaddafi’s hometown and his last remaining

stronghold.59

October 20, 2011: Gaddafi is killed after being captured by rebel forces. Sirte falls to rebels. 60

October 27, 2011: In a step of reconciliation, NTC vows to prosecute Gaddafi’s killer.61

October 31, 2011: NATO officially ends its military operations in Libya, labeling the mission

a success. 62

January 23, 2012: Massive demonstrations in Benghazi cause chaos for the interim

government. Offices are ransacked and one top leader, Abdel-Hafidh Ghoga, resigns in

response to the outburst. 63

February 10, 2012: Libya expels the Syrian ambassador in Tripoli, in protest of the Assad

regime’s crackdown on demonstrators.64

March 7, 2012: Eastern Libya demands a measure of political autonomy, specifically with

regards to budgetary, police and legal control issues.65

April 10, 2012: A bomb is thrown at a convoy in Benghazi carrying the head of the UN

mission to Libya. The bomb explodes, but no one is injured.66

56

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July 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/29/abdul-fatah-younis-killed-libya. 57

Ulf Laessing and Missy Ryan, “Rebels enter Tripoli, crowds celebrate in street,” Reuters, 21 August 2011,

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“Libya’s rebels to govern from Tripoli,” Al-Jazeera, 26 August 2011,

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/08/201182623316261938.html. 59

Christopher Stephen, “Libyan rebels advance on Gaddafi’s home town,” The Guardian, 24 August 2011,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/24/libya-rebels-advance-gaddafi-home-town. 60

Erik Hayden, “Qaddafi Killed, Say Libyan Officials,” The Atlantic Wire, 20 October 2011,

http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/10/libyan-rebels-capture-sirte-qaddafis-hometown/43901/. 61

Michael Rundle, “Gaddafi’s Killer Will Be Prosecuted When Caught, Libya’s Interim Government Says,” The

Huffington Post, 30 October 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/10/30/gaddafis-killer-will-be-

p_n_1066334.html. 62

“NATO officially ends Libya mission,” Al Jazeera, 31 October 2011,


“Libya: NTC deputy chief Abdel Hafiz Ghoga resigns,” BBC, 22 January 2012,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16671590. 64

“ Libya expels Syrian diplomatic mission,” CNN, 9 February 2012,

http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/africa/libya-syria. 65

“Eastern Libya demands a measure of autonomy,” Tampa Bay Times, 6 March 2012,

http://preps.tampabay.com/incoming/eastern-libya-demands-a-measure-of-autonomy/1218719.

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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/24/libya-rebels-advance-gaddafi-home-town

http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/10/libyan-rebels-capture-sirte-qaddafis-hometown/43901/

http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/10/30/gaddafis-killer-will-be-p_n_1066334.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/10/30/gaddafis-killer-will-be-p_n_1066334.html



http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/world/africa/libya-syria

http://preps.tampabay.com/incoming/eastern-libya-demands-a-measure-of-autonomy/1218719


25

May 2, 2012: Libya removes a ban on forming political parties based on religion, tribe, or

ethnicity.67

May 8, 2012: About 200 former rebels attack the residence of the Prime Minister in Tripoli.

The attack is easily repulsed, though one guard dies.68

May 22, 2012: A rocket-propelled grenade hit the offices of the Red Cross in Benghazi,

leaving a hole in the side of the building. The building was empty at the time of the attack.69

June 4, 2012: Former Libyan intelligence chief Abuzed Omar Dorda is charged with

mobilizing security forces to fire on demonstrators. Dorda is considered to have been a part of

Gaddafi’s inner circle.70

June 4, 2012: 24 men from Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia are imprisoned after being accused

of being mercenaries for Gaddafi during the Civil War. They claim that they are oil workers.71

June 4, 2012: Libyan government forces easily retake the airport in Tripoli after a tribal

militia had briefly seized it.72

June 6, 2012: A bomb explodes outside the U.S. consulate in Benghazi. No one is injured,

though there was slight damage to the building.73

June 10, 2012: Thirteen people are killed in clashed between the Libyan military and tribal

militias in southeast Libya.74

June 11, 2012: Two Libyan members of AQIM are sentenced to 20 years in prison for the

murder of two army officers.75

66

Mohammed al-Tommy and Hadeel Al-Shalchi, “U.N. convoy targeted in explosion in east Libya:

spokeswoman,” Reuters, 10 April 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/10/us-libya-explosion-

idUSBRE8390T220120410. 67

“Libya drops ban on religious-based parties,” Al Jazeera, 2 May 2012,


“Libya PM office attacked by gunmen in Trpoli,” BBC, 8 May 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-

17995427. 69

“Rocket damages Red Cross office in Libya’s Benghazi,” Reuters, 22 May 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/22/oukwd-uk-libya-redcross-bomb-idAFBRE84L0NL20120522. 70

“Libyan intel chief charged in Tropoli,” UPI, 5 June 2012,

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/06/05/Libyan-intel-chief-charged-in-Tripoli/UPI-

66101338918993/. 71

“Libya jails 24 ‘foreign mercenaries’ who Claim innocence,” BBC, 4 June 2012,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18321748. 72

Rami al-Shaheibi, “Libyan government retakes airport from disgruntled militia,” The Christian Science

Monitor, 4 June 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0604/Libyan-government-

retakes-airport-from-disgruntled-militia. 73

Mohammed Al-Tommy, “Bomb targets U.S. mission in Libya’s Benghazi,” Reuters, 6 June 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/06/us-libya-attack-us-idUSBRE8550GX20120606. 74

“Thirteen killed in southeast Libya clashes: officials,” Reuters, 10 June 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/10/us-libya-clashes-idUSBRE85905Y20120610. 75

“Tunisia jails Libyan Al Qaida agents,” Gulf News, 11 June 2012,

http://gulfnews.com/news/region/tunisia/tunisia-jails-libyan-al-qaida-agents-1.1034079.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/10/us-libya-explosion-idUSBRE8390T220120410

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/10/us-libya-explosion-idUSBRE8390T220120410




http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/22/oukwd-uk-libya-redcross-bomb-idAFBRE84L0NL20120522

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/06/05/Libyan-intel-chief-charged-in-Tripoli/UPI-66101338918993/

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/06/05/Libyan-intel-chief-charged-in-Tripoli/UPI-66101338918993/

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18321748

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0604/Libyan-government-retakes-airport-from-disgruntled-militia

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0604/Libyan-government-retakes-airport-from-disgruntled-militia

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/06/us-libya-attack-us-idUSBRE8550GX20120606

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/10/us-libya-clashes-idUSBRE85905Y20120610

http://gulfnews.com/news/region/tunisia/tunisia-jails-libyan-al-qaida-agents-1.1034079


26

June 11, 2012: The British ambassador to Libya’ convoy is hit by rocket-propelled grenades

in Benghazi. Two officers are injured.76

June 12, 2012: One person is wounded in a bomb attack on the Red Cross office in Misrata.77

June 12, 2012: Two militias that had been on opposite sides of the Civil War, fought south of

Tripoli, resulting in two deaths.78

June 18, 2012: Gunmen storm the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi and hold it until Libyan

forces retake it without a fight. No one is injured.79

June 26, 2012: The Tunisian consulate in Tripoli is damaged by a bomb attack. No one is

injured.80

June 27, 2012: A militia blocks a major highway in Libya, cutting off access to one of its

main oil refineries. The group is demanding more political representation.81

July 7, 2012: Libya holds its first elections in the post-Gaddafi era. A secular coalition

(National Forces Alliance) led by Mahmoud Jibril wins the most seats by a large margin.82

July 16, 2012: Gunmen in Tripoli kidnap the president of Libya’s 2012 Olympic Committee.

He is released on the 22nd

.83

July 30, 2012: The convoy of a Libyan general who had been assigned to form a national

army, is attacked in Benghazi. He is not injured.84

August 8, 2012: Power in Libya transfers from the National Transition Council to the

democratically elected government chosen on July 7.85

76

“UK diplomat’s convey attacked in Libya,” Al Jazeera, 11 June 2013,

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/2012611152127356825.html. 77

“Red Cross says one wounded in attack on office in Libya,” Dawn, 13 June 2012,

http://dawn.com/2012/06/13/red-cross-says-one-wounded-in-attack-on-office-in-libya/. 78

“Tribal fighting erupts south of Libyan captial,” Arab News, 12 June 2012, http://www.arabnews.com/tribal-

fighting-erupts-south-libyan-capital. 79

“Gunmen storm Tunisian consulate in Libya’s Benghazi,” AFP, 18 June 2012,

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jAZwCkrE4s_UFJszwuZsT-

DYKYzw?docId=CNG.3b514d3dba56e52a43dabe1d0a85b243.d1. 80

“Bomb explodes outside Tunisian consulate in Tripoli,” Reuters, 26 June 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/26/us-libya-tunisia-attack-

idUSBRE85P1BA20120626?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=

feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FworldNews+%28Reuters+World+News%29. 81

“Libyan group blocks east-west highway,” UPI, 27 June 2012, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-

News/2012/06/27/Libyan-group-blocks-east-west-highway/UPI-23251340827147/. 82

David Kirkpatrick, “ Election Results in Libya Break an Islamist Wave,” The New York Times, 8 July 2012,

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/world/africa/libya-election-latest-results.html?pagewanted=all. 83

“Libya Olympic committee president abducted” Libya Herald, 16 July 2012,

http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/07/16/libya-olympic-committee-president-abducted/#axzz2fAF1UyRI 84

“Convoy of Libyan general attaked in east,” Ynetnews, 30 July 2012,

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4261986,00.html. 85

“UN Welcomes Libya’s tranfer of power to newly elected National Congress,” UN News Centre, 9 August

2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42652& - .UbeMbYUWATY.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/2012611152127356825.html

http://dawn.com/2012/06/13/red-cross-says-one-wounded-in-attack-on-office-in-libya/

http://www.arabnews.com/tribal-fighting-erupts-south-libyan-capital

http://www.arabnews.com/tribal-fighting-erupts-south-libyan-capital

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jAZwCkrE4s_UFJszwuZsT-DYKYzw?docId=CNG.3b514d3dba56e52a43dabe1d0a85b243.d1

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jAZwCkrE4s_UFJszwuZsT-DYKYzw?docId=CNG.3b514d3dba56e52a43dabe1d0a85b243.d1

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/26/us-libya-tunisia-attack-idUSBRE85P1BA20120626?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FworldNews+%28Reuters+World+News%29



http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2012/06/27/Libyan-group-blocks-east-west-highway/UPI-23251340827147/

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2012/06/27/Libyan-group-blocks-east-west-highway/UPI-23251340827147/

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/world/africa/libya-election-latest-results.html?pagewanted=all

http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/07/16/libya-olympic-committee-president-abducted/#axzz2fAF1UyRI

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4261986,00.html

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42652&#.UbeMbYUWATY


27

August 18, 2012: Three car bombs explode near several Libyan government buildings in

Tripoli. Two are killed, and three are wounded.86

August 26, 2012: Armed militias bulldozed a Sufi mosque in Tripoli in the middle of the day,

apparently without any interference from the police.87

August 29, 2012: Islamists attack a Turkish school in Tripoli, burning books and destroying

graves in a nearby cemetery.88

September 11, 2012: U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans are

killed at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi when Islamist militias stormed the

building.89

September 21, 2012: A mob of Libyans protesting the attack on the American Consulate in

Benghazi ten days earlier overrun the headquarters of Ansar al-Sharia without a shot being

fired.90

September 23, 2012: The Libyan government comes to an agreement with militia leaders to

put all militias under the control of the Libyan military or disband them.91

October 13, 2012: A car bomb in Benghazi explodes without killing anyone. The target is a

police colonel who had remained loyal to Gaddafi, but kept his job after the regime fell.92

October 21, 2012: 22 people are killed and about 200 injured in clashes between pro-

government forces and militias in the town of Bani Walid, a former Gaddafi stronghold.93

October 30, 2012: Demonstrators protesting a vote on a new government, storm to Libyan

assembly building in Tripoli, derailing the vote.94

November 4, 2012: Two militias engage in a twelve-hour gun battle on the streets of Tripoli,

firing guns and rocket propelled grenades at each other until the police stopped them.95

86

Taha Zargoun, “Car bombs kill two in Libyan Capital,” Reuters, 19 August 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/19/us-libya-blasts-idUSBRE87I00Y20120819. 87

“Libya militants bulldoze Sufi mosque,” The Guardian, 26 August 2012,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/26/libya-militants-bulldoze-sufi-mosque. 88

Mel Frykberg, “Islamists attack Libyan school, mosques in challenge to NATO-installed government,”

McClatchy Newspapers, 29 August 2012, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/08/29/164133/islamists-attack-

libyan-school.html - .UbeLO4UWATY. 89

“Pentagon releases official timeline of Benghazi attack,” CNN, 23 January 2013,

http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/09/world/africa/libya-benghazi-timeline. 90

“Decrying attack, protesters overtake Islamist group’s HQ in Benghazi,” CNN, 22 September 2012,

http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/21/world/africa/libya-benghazi-counter-protest. 91

George Grant, “All Benghazi militia to be put under National Army control, others to be disbanded: official,”

Libya Herald, 23 September 2012, http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/09/23/all-benghazi-militia-to-be-put-

under-government-control-others-to-be-disbanded-official/. 92

“Libya police colonel targets in assassination attempt,” Reuters, 13 October 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/13/us-libya-benghazi-attack-idUSBRE89C06F20121013. 93

“Libya clashes in ex-Gaddafi bastion Bani Walid,” BBC, 21 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-

africa-20022213. 94

“Libya assembly stormed in new blow to forming govt,” The Daily Star, 30 October, 2012,

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Oct-30/193268-protesters-storm-libyan-assembly-as-it-

votes-on-govt.ashx - axzz2AyvzTbzj.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/19/us-libya-blasts-idUSBRE87I00Y20120819

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/26/libya-militants-bulldoze-sufi-mosque

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/08/29/164133/islamists-attack-libyan-school.html#.UbeLO4UWATY

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/08/29/164133/islamists-attack-libyan-school.html#.UbeLO4UWATY

http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/09/world/africa/libya-benghazi-timeline

http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/21/world/africa/libya-benghazi-counter-protest

http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/09/23/all-benghazi-militia-to-be-put-under-government-control-others-to-be-disbanded-official/

http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/09/23/all-benghazi-militia-to-be-put-under-government-control-others-to-be-disbanded-official/

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/13/us-libya-benghazi-attack-idUSBRE89C06F20121013



http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Oct-30/193268-protesters-storm-libyan-assembly-as-it-votes-on-govt.ashx#axzz2AyvzTbzj

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Oct-30/193268-protesters-storm-libyan-assembly-as-it-votes-on-govt.ashx#axzz2AyvzTbzj


28

November 21, 2012: The head of the Benghazi Security Directorate, Faraj Mohammed Idris

Drissi, is assassinated in a drive-by shooting in front of his house.96

December 17, 2012: Libya announces that it is closing its borders with Niger, Chad, Sudan,

and Algeria because the security situation in the south of the country has deteriorated so

much.97

January 19, 2013: Libyan Defense Minister survives an assassination attempt in Tobruk,

which he later blames on a former deputy.98

February 11, 2013: Libya shuts its borders with Egypt and Tunisia in the run-up to the two-

year anniversary of the beginning of the revolution that toppled Colonel Gaddafi.99

March 6, 2013: Mohammed Magarief, the speaker of the General National Congress, was shot

at, in Tripoli by a mob demanding that former officials associated of Colonel Gaddafi be

banned from holding positions in the new government. No one was injured.100

April 4, 2013: Ten armed men force their way into a police station in Tripoli and free three

prisoners held there.101

April 23, 2013: A car bomb explodes outside of the French Embassy in Tripoli, injuring two

guards.102

April 30, 2013: Armed men surround Libya’s justice ministry and demand that former aides

of Colonel Gaddafi be banned from holding senior government positions.103

May 12, 2013: The protests that started in late April come to an end when a deal is struck with

the former rebels ,when a cabinet shuffle is promised.104

May 12, 2013: Two Benghazi police stations are bombed in the early morning.105

Another is

torched three days later.106

95

Ghaith Shennib, “Rival Libya militias batttle on streets of Tripoli,” Reuters, 4 November 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/04/us-libya-attack-idUSBRE8A306420121104. 96

Maha Ellawati and George Grant, “ Benghazi Security Directorate chief assassinated,” Libya Herald, 21

November 2012, http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/11/21/benghazi-security-directorate-chief-assassinated/. 97

“GNC announces temporary closure of southern borders and declars south a ‘closed military zone,’” Libya

Herald, 17 December 2012, http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/12/17/gnc-announces-temporary-closure-of-

southern-borders-and-declares-south-a-closed-military-zone/. 98

“Defense minister says former deputy behind assassination attempt,” Libya Herlad, 20 January 2013,

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/01/20/defence-minister-says-former-deputy-behind-assassination-attempt/. 99

“Libya to shut egypt, Tunis borders for anniversary,” Reuters, 11 February 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/11/us-libya-security-anniversary-idUSBRE91A14320130211. 100

“Gunmen among crowd of protestors shoot at Libya congress leader’s car,” Reuters, 6 March, 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/us-libya-congress-attack-idUSBRE9250QH20130306. 101

“Gunmen attack Tripoli police station, release detainees,” Reuters, 4 April 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/04/us-libya-attack-idUSBRE9330FN20130404. 102

David Kirkpatrick, “ Car Explodes Outside French Embassy in Libya,” The New York Times, 23 April 2013,

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/world/africa/french-embassy-in-libya-is-attacked.html?pagewanted=all. 103

“Armed men surround Libya’s justice ministry,” Al Jazeera, 30 April 2013,


“Deal with former rebels ends Libya siege,” Al Jazeera, 12 May 2013,

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/05/201351261230257352.html.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/04/us-libya-attack-idUSBRE8A306420121104

http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/11/21/benghazi-security-directorate-chief-assassinated/

http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/12/17/gnc-announces-temporary-closure-of-southern-borders-and-declares-south-a-closed-military-zone/

http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/12/17/gnc-announces-temporary-closure-of-southern-borders-and-declares-south-a-closed-military-zone/

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/01/20/defence-minister-says-former-deputy-behind-assassination-attempt/

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/11/us-libya-security-anniversary-idUSBRE91A14320130211

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/us-libya-congress-attack-idUSBRE9250QH20130306

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/04/us-libya-attack-idUSBRE9330FN20130404

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/world/africa/french-embassy-in-libya-is-attacked.html?pagewanted=all




29

May 13, 2013: 17 people are killed and 30 injured in a massive blast outside a Benghazi

hospital. It is unclear if the blast was an intentional attack.107

May 15, 2013: Protestors force the closure of the Zueitina oil refinery in Eastern Libya. 20%

of Libya’s oil flows through this refinery.108

May 29, 2013: One Libyan soldier is killed and three others wounded when gunmen attacked

their patrol in Benghazi.109

June 9, 2013: Clashes in Libya between militias and protesters kill 31 people. The protests

were over the continued independence of militias from security forces in Benghazi.110

June 15, 2013: Six Libyan soldiers were killed and five wounded in a clash with protesters in

Benghazi.111

June 16, 2013: A judge was shot to death in Derna, Libya by gunmen about a week after the

court there had reopened for the first time after the 2011 revolution.112

June 27, 2013: After clashes between militia groups in Tripoli, the Defense Minster of Libya

resigns.113

July 7, 2013: Libyan protesters call for the disbandment of militia groups that have remained

a factor in the country since the end of the war in 2011.114

July 10, 2013: Libyan government takes back the ministry of the interior building that was

taken by militant forces.115

July 16, 2013: Armed protestors stormed Zueitina, to force workers to stop oil production.116

105

“Benghazi police bombed for second time in three days,” Reuters, 12 May 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/12/us-libya-unrest-idUSBRE94B02X20130512. 106

“Deadly attack on Benghazi police station,” Al Jazeera, 15 May 2013,


“Massive blast outside hospital in Benghazi, Libya, up to 17 dead,” RT, 13 May 2013,

http://rt.com/news/benghazi-hospital-blast-204/. 108

Esam Mohamed, “Protesters close Libyan oil terminal, halt exports,” Yahoo News, 15 May 2013,

http://news.yahoo.com/protesters-close-libyan-oil-terminal-halt-exports-200914779.html. 109

“Libya: 2 killed in an attack on police patrol,” The Daily Star, 29 May 2013,

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/May-29/218745-libyan-soldier-dies-three-wounded-in-

benghazi-attack.ashx#axzz2fBJZClmV. 110

Esam Mohamed, “Libya army chief resigns after clash in Benghzai,” The Daily Star, 9 June 2013,

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Jun-09/219807-28-dead-as-protesters-attack-ex-libya-

rebel-hq-medics.ashx - axzz2Vj6Oc07H. 111

Feras Bosalum, “Six Libyan soldiers killed in Benghazi violence,” Reuters, 15 June 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/15/us-libya-attack-benghazi-idUSBRE95E04Y20130615. 112

“Judge shot dead outside court in eastern Libyan city,” Reuters, 16 June 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/16/us-libya-attack-idUSBRE95F0B020130616. 113

Ghaith Shennib and Marie-Louise Gumuchian, “Libya defense minister removed after Tripoli clashes,”

Reuters, 27 June 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-libya-clashes-idUSBRE95Q0U120130627. 114

“Libyan protestors call for armed militias to be disbanded,” Reuters, 7 July 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/07/us-libya-militias-idUSBRE9660F620130707. 115

“Libyan government takes back ministry from armed group,” Reuters, 10 July 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/10/us-libya-ministry-idUSBRE9690O420130710.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/12/us-libya-unrest-idUSBRE94B02X20130512


http://rt.com/news/benghazi-hospital-blast-204/

http://news.yahoo.com/protesters-close-libyan-oil-terminal-halt-exports-200914779.html

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/May-29/218745-libyan-soldier-dies-three-wounded-in-benghazi-attack.ashx#axzz2fBJZClmV

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/May-29/218745-libyan-soldier-dies-three-wounded-in-benghazi-attack.ashx#axzz2fBJZClmV

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Jun-09/219807-28-dead-as-protesters-attack-ex-libya-rebel-hq-medics.ashx#axzz2Vj6Oc07H

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Jun-09/219807-28-dead-as-protesters-attack-ex-libya-rebel-hq-medics.ashx#axzz2Vj6Oc07H

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/15/us-libya-attack-benghazi-idUSBRE95E04Y20130615

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/16/us-libya-attack-idUSBRE95F0B020130616

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-libya-clashes-idUSBRE95Q0U120130627

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/07/us-libya-militias-idUSBRE9660F620130707

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/10/us-libya-ministry-idUSBRE9690O420130710


30

July 25, 2013: Unknown assailants shot a rocket-propelled grenade at the United Arab

Emirates embassy in Tripoli.117

July 26, 2013: An unknown gunman in Benghazi killed a prominent Libyan political

activist.118

July 27, 2013: More than a thousand inmates escaped al-Kweifiya prison Benghazi119

July 28, 2013: Three explosions went off in Benghazi, “in what appeared to be attacks on

judicial institutions.”120

July 29, 2013: An Islamist party office in Tripoli was attacked.121

July 30, 2013: A car filled with bombs was parked outside a luxury hotel in Tripoli, but was

dismantled by Libyan security forces.122

August 1, 2013: Ahmed Ibrahim a former minister was sentenced to death for inciting

violence against protestors.123

August 2, 2013: Five people were wounded when a bomb exploded outside a police office in

Benghazi124

August 3, 2013: Awad al-Barasi, Libya's deputy prime minister, resigned because he was not

given enough powers to carry out his duties.125

August 5, 2013: The government of Zintan, the Libyan federal government and the

International Criminal Court are arguing over who will charge Saif al-Islam Gaddafi.126

116

“Armed protestors storm Libya’s Zueitina oil port: witness,” Reuters, 16 July 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/16/us-libya-oil-port-idUSBRE96F1BD20130716. 117

Ghaith Shennib and Marie-Louise Gumuchian, “UAE embassy compund attacked in Libyan capital,” Reuters,

25 July 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/us-libya-uae-attack-idUSBRE96O04J20130725. 118

“Libyan activist shot dead in Benghazi,” Reuters, 26 July 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/26/us-libya-violence-idUSBRE96P0QG20130726. 119

Esam Mohamed, “Libya Prison Escape: More Than 1,000 Inmates Break From Jail Near Benghazi,” The

Huffington Post, 27 July 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/27/libya-prison-

escape_n_3664239.html. 120

“Three loud explosions heard in Libya’s Benghazi: witnesses,” Reuters, 28 July 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/28/us-libya-explosions-urgent-idUSBRE96R0B920130728. 121

Ghaith Shennib and Marie-Louise Gumuchian, “Islamist party office attacked as Libya violence persists,”

Reuters, 29 July 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/29/us-libya-benghazi-

idUSBRE96S0XT20130729. 122

Marie-Louise Gumuchian, “Car bomb defused outside hotel in Libyan capital,” Reuters, 30 July 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/30/us-libya-bomb-idUSBRE96T0ZI20130730. 123

“Libyan court sentences former Gaddafi minister to death,” Reuters, 1 August 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/01/us-libya-court-idUSBRE9700GR20130801. 124

“Five wounded in bomb blast at Benghazi police station,” Reuters, 2 August 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/us-libya-bomb-idUSBRE9710PT20130802. 125

“Libya’s deputy prime minister resigns,” Reuters, 3 August 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/03/us-libya-prime-minister-idUSBRE9720CU20130803. 126

Marie-Louise Gumuchian, “Insight: Libya’s turmoil revealed in feud for custody of Gaddafi’s son,” Reuters,

4 August 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/04/us-libya-saif-insight-idUSBRE97302O20130804.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/16/us-libya-oil-port-idUSBRE96F1BD20130716

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/us-libya-uae-attack-idUSBRE96O04J20130725

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/26/us-libya-violence-idUSBRE96P0QG20130726

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/27/libya-prison-escape_n_3664239.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/27/libya-prison-escape_n_3664239.html

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/28/us-libya-explosions-urgent-idUSBRE96R0B920130728

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/29/us-libya-benghazi-idUSBRE96S0XT20130729

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/29/us-libya-benghazi-idUSBRE96S0XT20130729

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/30/us-libya-bomb-idUSBRE96T0ZI20130730

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/01/us-libya-court-idUSBRE9700GR20130801

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/us-libya-bomb-idUSBRE9710PT20130802

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/03/us-libya-prime-minister-idUSBRE9720CU20130803

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/04/us-libya-saif-insight-idUSBRE97302O20130804


31

August 6, 2013: The United States has filed criminal charges on those responsible for the

attack on the American Embassy in Benghazi.127

August 8, 2013: Libya's oil output is at its lowest levels since the 2011 civil war, serious

affecting the economy.128

August 8, 2013: Human Rights Watch said that Libya has no functioning justice system.129

August 8, 2013: At least 51 people have been assassinated in Benghazi and Derna since the

end of the 2011 civil war.130

August 12, 2013: Strikes by Libyan oil workers hit new oil factories

August 13, 2013: Berbers forced their way into the Tripoli parliament building, pressing for

more rights.131

August 13, 2013: Benghazi gunmen kill Khawlija al-Amami, the third journalist to be killed

in the last four days. 132

August 16, 2013: Libya’s Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan, has threatened to use force to prevent

those who were striking from selling the oil ilegally133

August 17, 2013: A bomb exploded at the Egyptian consulate in Benghazi.134

August 18, 2013: Libya's Interior Minister, Mohammed Khalifa al-Sheikh, resigned in protest

of the perceived interference by the prime minister and parliament”135

August 18, 2013: Libyan officials estimate that the country lost $1.6 billion in oil revenues in

just the past month, because of the ongoing oil worker strike.136

127

“U.S. files criminal charges in Benghzai attack: media reports,” Reuters, 6 August 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/06/us-usa-benghazi-charges-idUSBRE97514L20130806. 128

Julia Payne, “Libya’s worst oil unrest since civil war stores up future trouble,” Reuters, 8 August 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/08/us-libya-oil-idUSBRE9770WL20130808. 129

“Justice absent in Libya, human rights group says,” UPI, 8 August 2013,

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/08/08/Justice-absent-in-Libya-human-rights-group-says/UPI-

47431375971455/. 130

“Libya: Wave of Political Assassinations-Lack of Accountability Risks Escalating Violence,” All Africa, 8

August 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201308080262.html. 131

“Protesting Berbers force their way into Libyan parliament,” Reuters, 13 August 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/13/us-libya-parliament-berbers-idUSBRE97C0O520130813. 132

“Benghazi gunmen target third Libyan journalist in four days,” UPI, 13 August 2013,

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/08/13/Benghazi-gunmen-target-third-Libyan-journalist-in-

four-days/UPI-59051376409359/. 133

“Libyan PM Ali Zeidan warns oil port protesters,” BBC, 16 August 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-

africa-23721160. 134

“Bomb injures guard at Egypt’s mission in Benghazi, Libya,” Reuters, 17 August 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/17/us-egypt-protests-libya-idUSBRE97G06820130817. 135

“ Libyan interior minister resigns over ‘interference’,” Reuters, 18 August 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/18/us-libya-politics-resignation-idUSBRE97H05620130818. 136

“ Since 25 July, Libya loses nearly $1.6 billion in oil ports shutdown,” UPI, 18 August 2013,

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/08/18/Since-25-July-Libya-loses-nearly-16-

billion-in-oil-ports-shutdown/UPI-54481376864825/.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/06/us-usa-benghazi-charges-idUSBRE97514L20130806

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/08/us-libya-oil-idUSBRE9770WL20130808

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/08/08/Justice-absent-in-Libya-human-rights-group-says/UPI-47431375971455/

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/08/08/Justice-absent-in-Libya-human-rights-group-says/UPI-47431375971455/

http://allafrica.com/stories/201308080262.html

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/13/us-libya-parliament-berbers-idUSBRE97C0O520130813

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/08/13/Benghazi-gunmen-target-third-Libyan-journalist-in-four-days/UPI-59051376409359/

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/08/13/Benghazi-gunmen-target-third-Libyan-journalist-in-four-days/UPI-59051376409359/



http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/17/us-egypt-protests-libya-idUSBRE97G06820130817

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/18/us-libya-politics-resignation-idUSBRE97H05620130818

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/08/18/Since-25-July-Libya-loses-nearly-16-billion-in-oil-ports-shutdown/UPI-54481376864825/

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/08/18/Since-25-July-Libya-loses-nearly-16-billion-in-oil-ports-shutdown/UPI-54481376864825/


32

August 19, 2013: The Marsa al Hariga port resumed full operations after the workers stopped

their strike.137

August 19, 2013: The Libyan government agreed to open a third border crossing between

Libya and Tunisia.138

August 19, 2013: The Libyan government threatens military action to end the oil workers

strike. 139

August 20, 2013: Libya’s military clash with striking oil workers who were attempting to sell

the oil themselves at the Zueitina oil port.140

August 20, 2013: Libya's navy stopped a tanker from "illegally entering" an Al-Sedra oil

terminal.141

August 20, 2013: Libya prepared to reopen some oil ports after seizing control back from the

workers on strike.142

August 21, 2013: EU Ambassador Nataliya Apostolova vehicle was attacked.143

August 21, 2013: Libya’s state-run National Oil Corp. is no longer able to produce enough oil

to meet its contracts.144

August 23, 2013: A Libyan army colonel was killed in a drive-by shooting after leaving a

Mosque.145

August 26, 2013: Libya warned that it would attack and destroy any tanker trying to illegally

exporting oil. 146

August 26, 2013: Oil exports from Marsa al Brega will begin after the military removed

protestors from the oil port.147

137

“Libya says Marsa al Hariga oil port resumes full operations,” Reuters, 19 August 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/19/wh-libya-oil-idUSL6N0GK1EC20130819. 138

“Libya Approves Decision of Setting Up New Border Crossing Point With Tunisia,” All Africa, 19 August

2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201308192032.html. 139

Essam Mohamed, “Libya Vows to Protect Oil Production,” All Africa, 19 August 2013,

http://allafrica.com/stories/201308200309.html. 140

“ Libya’s struggle with oil workers heats up,” Reuters, 20 August 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/20/libya-oil-idUSL6N0GL19Q20130820. 141

“Libya navy stops tanker entering oil terminal,” Fox News, 20 August 2013,

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/08/20/libya-navy-stops-tanker-entering-oil-terminal/. 142

Mariam Sami, Saleh Sarrar, and Maher Chmaytelli, “Libya Plans to Reopen Some Oil Export Terminals,”

Bloomberg, 20 August 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-20/libya-plans-to-reopen-some-oil-

export-terminals.html. 143

“EU ambassador’s convoy attacked in Libyan capital,” UPI, 21 August 2013,

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/08/21/EU-ambassadors-convoy-attacked-in-Libyan-

capital/UPI-59561377090833/#ixzz2cc366RTn. 144

“Libyan oil export terminals closed,” UPI, 21 August 2013, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-

Resources/2013/08/21/Libyan-oil-export-terminals-closed/UPI-33591377090831/. 145

“Libyan army colonel gunned down in Benghazi: security,” Fox News, 23 August 2013,

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/08/23/libyan-army-colonel-gunned-down-in-benghazi-security/. 146

“Libya warns will destroy tankers illegally exporting oil,” Reuters, 26 August, 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/libya-oil-tanker-idUSL6N0GR1U620130826.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/19/wh-libya-oil-idUSL6N0GK1EC20130819



http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/20/libya-oil-idUSL6N0GL19Q20130820

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/08/20/libya-navy-stops-tanker-entering-oil-terminal/

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-20/libya-plans-to-reopen-some-oil-export-terminals.html

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-20/libya-plans-to-reopen-some-oil-export-terminals.html

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/08/21/EU-ambassadors-convoy-attacked-in-Libyan-capital/UPI-59561377090833/#ixzz2cc366RTn

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/08/21/EU-ambassadors-convoy-attacked-in-Libyan-capital/UPI-59561377090833/#ixzz2cc366RTn

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/08/21/Libyan-oil-export-terminals-closed/UPI-33591377090831/

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/08/21/Libyan-oil-export-terminals-closed/UPI-33591377090831/

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/08/23/libyan-army-colonel-gunned-down-in-benghazi-security/

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/libya-oil-tanker-idUSL6N0GR1U620130826


33

August 27, 2013: Security officials at Libya's Ruwaimi prison thwarted an attempt to break

out some of the prisoners.148

August 27, 2013: An armed group shut Libya’s largest western oil port after an attack on the

pipeline. 149

September 3, 2013: Armed groups are blocking oil fields and terminals choking the output to

1/10th

of normal level and threatening the economy.150

September 5, 2013: Prime Minister Ali Zeidan said his patience was coming to an end with

those who were still holding some of the countries oil ports.151

September 11, 2013: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was partial destroyed by a car bomb.152

September 11, 2013: The Libyan government issued arrest warrants for those who were

leading the strike at the oil ports.153

September 16, 2013: Two unsuccessful car bombs fail to detonate in Benghazi.154

September 16, 2013: A report for the Security Council from the UN’s mission in Libya stated

that “Targeted political assassinations, criminal activity and attacks and threats against the

diplomatic community continue to plague the country, including Tripoli.”155

September 17, 2013: Imraja El-Uraibi, of the Benghazi Criminal Investigation Department

was killed by a car bomb.”156

September 17, 2013: Libya faces terrorism that has come from other counties, “and now it is

trying to find a stronghold in Libya.”157

147

“Libya Oil Exports Resume from Brega,” NASDAQ, 26 August 2013, http://www.nasdaq.com/article/libya-

oil-exports-resume-from-brega-20130826-00246. 148

“Attempted prison break in Libyan capital fails,” UPI, 27 August 2013,

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/08/27/Attempted-prison-break-in-Libyan-capital-fails/UPI-

30971377605954/. 149

Suleiman Al-Khalidi and Julia Payne, “ Libya’s oil chaos deepens as armed group shuts pipeline,” 27 August,

2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/27/us-libya-oil-idUSBRE97Q0TT20130827. 150

Christopher Stephen, “ Libya at a crossroads as strikes threaten oil supplies,” The Guardian, 3 September

2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/03/libya-oil-supplies-tripoli. 151

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/04/us-libya-oil-production-idUSBRE9830WF20130904 152

“Massive car bomb explodes in downtown Benghazi,” Libya Herald, 11 September 2013,

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/09/11/massive-car-bomb-explodes-in-downtown-benghazi/#axzz2f9SMDQjO. 153

Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Libya PM: arrest warrants issued for oil strike leaders,” Reuters, 11 September 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/us-libya-oil-protests-idUSBRE98A12O20130911. 154

Ahmed Elumami, “More car bombs in Benghazi but no one hurt,” Libya Herald, 16 September 2013,

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/09/16/more-car-bombs-in-benghazi-but-no-one-hurt/#axzz2f9SMDQjO. 155

Peter Foster, and David Blair, “UN report paints grim assessment of Libya,” The Telegraph, 16 August 2013,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/10313552/UN-report-paints-grim-

assessment-of-Libya.html. 156

Ahmed Elumami, “CID officer killed in Benghazi car-bomb blast,” Libya Herald, 17 September 2013,

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/09/17/cid-officer-killed-in-benghazi-car-bomb-blast/#axzz2fADjT6oE. 157

Nigel Ash, “Terrorism is trying to find a stronghold in Libya: Zeidan,” Libya Herald, 17 September 2013,

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/09/17/terrorism-is-trying-to-find-a-stronghold-in-libya-

zeidan/#axzz2fAF1UyRI.

http://www.nasdaq.com/article/libya-oil-exports-resume-from-brega-20130826-00246

http://www.nasdaq.com/article/libya-oil-exports-resume-from-brega-20130826-00246

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/08/27/Attempted-prison-break-in-Libyan-capital-fails/UPI-30971377605954/

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/08/27/Attempted-prison-break-in-Libyan-capital-fails/UPI-30971377605954/

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/27/us-libya-oil-idUSBRE97Q0TT20130827

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/03/libya-oil-supplies-tripoli

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/09/11/massive-car-bomb-explodes-in-downtown-benghazi/#axzz2f9SMDQjO

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/us-libya-oil-protests-idUSBRE98A12O20130911

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/09/16/more-car-bombs-in-benghazi-but-no-one-hurt/#axzz2f9SMDQjO

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/10313552/UN-report-paints-grim-assessment-of-Libya.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/10313552/UN-report-paints-grim-assessment-of-Libya.html

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/09/17/cid-officer-killed-in-benghazi-car-bomb-blast/#axzz2fADjT6oE

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/09/17/terrorism-is-trying-to-find-a-stronghold-in-libya-zeidan/#axzz2fAF1UyRI

http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/09/17/terrorism-is-trying-to-find-a-stronghold-in-libya-zeidan/#axzz2fAF1UyRI


34

Disclaimer

The authors, editors, and the research staff cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of

information contained in this publication. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions associated

with this report.

Copyright © 2013 by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies Directed by Professor Yonah Alexander. All rights

reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced, stored or distributed without the prior written consent of the copyright

holder.

Please contact the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 901 North Stuart

Street Suite 200 Arlington, VA 22203

Tel. 703-562-4513, 703-525-0770 ext. 237 Fax 703-525-0299

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