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After Mosul: A Grueling Start Down a Very Long RoadMatt Brown

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About the series

The Centre of Gravity series is the flagship publication of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) based at The Australian National University’s College of Asia and the Pacific. The series aspires to provide high quality analysis and to generate debate on strategic policy issues of direct relevance to Australia. Centre of Gravity papers are 3,000-4,000 words in length and are written for a policy audience. Consistent with this, each Centre of Gravity paper includes at least one policy recommendation. Papers are commissioned by SDSC and appearance in the series is by invitation only. SDSC commissions up to 10 papers in any given year.

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Author bio

Matt Brown is a Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University’s Coral Bell School of Asia and Pacific Studies. Over two postings to Jerusalem and one to Beirut as the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Middle East Correspondent, he has spent most of the past decade reporting from the Middle East. He’s also served as the ABC’s Indonesia Correspondent and National Security Correspondent. He’s interested in the relationship between organised criminal activity and insurgency, familial relations and radicalisation and Australian foreign and national security policy. Matt has won four Walkley Awards, Australian journalism’s highest accolade, for reports on conflict, terrorism and insurgency in the occupied Palestinian territories, Turkey, Syria and Iraq. He was the inaugural winner of the Australian Political Studies Association’s Journalist of the Year award in 2016. The views expressed here are his own, not those of the ABC or the ANU.

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The eye of the storm

With combat operations underway in west Mosul, Iraqi security forces will later this year regain control of the city. But what comes next will be crucial, affecting the utility of the costly international intervention against ISIS, the chances of stability in Iraq and the risk of terrorism beyond its borders for decades to come.

The maelstrom has already swept over the east of the city and when I visited in January, the relative calm was unnerving. Debris lined the streets. Residents wondered about repairing their lives, their businesses, their community, and maybe even their nation. They also had sharp memories of a recent past blighted by corruption, abuse and murder.

In three trips to Iraq in October and November of 2016 and January of 2017 I saw evidence of a grueling fight which has taken a substantial toll.

The true cost to civilians is difficult to gauge but over the past two years the national civilian death toll has hovered around 600 a month. When the battle began, that shot up to over 1100 and Mosul and its surrounding Nineveh province accounted for more than half the total.1 Traumatised civilians have also found medical aid in short supply.

After Mosul: A Grueling Start Down a Very Long RoadMatt Brown

Executive Summary

òò The battle for Mosul has resulted in fewer civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure than many first feared.

òò After government forces recapture the city ISIS is likely to continue to stage attacks and seek influence through extortion, intimidation and corruption.

òò Civilians have been scarred by previous abuse at the hands of the security forces and ISIS but are receptive to reconciliation with the government.

òò Fears that security forces would engage in sectarian violence have not been realized but sectarianism remains a threat.

Policy Recommendations

If Iraq requests ongoing international security assistance Australia should:

òò Support measures to encourage inclusive governance in Iraq at the national and provincial level.

òò Advocate and contribute to training for the security forces which focusses on intelligence-led action against organised crime and insurgent networks, incorporating human rights and the rule of law as the foundations for national security.

òò Encourage development aid which focusses on small projects in response to localised needs, minimising opportunities for corruption and extortion.

I saw evidence of a grueling fight.

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A resident of the outer suburb of Gogjali, the first to be breached during the battle to enter the city in late October, told me, “There are no doctors in our region… There is no medical assistance”. Civilians were especially vulnerable because, “life under Da’esh governance went from bad to worse… They would only heal their own people. They had many hospitals (but) we had only a little assistance.”2 I saw one child who died from injuries sustained in a mortar attack after being turned away from a military hospital closer to the front line.

A Non-Commissioned Officer in a battalion sized unit of around 400 men in the Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) told me he had lost 18 dead and 100 wounded in less than three months.3 But the exact toll the fight has taken on the Iraqi Security Forces is unknown because the Government of Iraq won’t publish casualty data. It angrily disputed a UN estimate of 1959 killed nationally in November last year which is likely to have consisted mainly of deaths in Mosul.4 It was a big spike and may have been an outlier but the estimate of security force casualties has broadly tracked the more finely estimated civilian toll over the past three years. One look at the battle weary soldiers, the wreckage of bombed and burned out Humvees, and the shattered glass of most vehicles, hit by sniper fire, testifies to the tough road they’ve been down, through Tikirt, Ramadi and Fallujh to Mosul.

The battle for the west of the city, which began in February, has been even more intense, causing much greater civilian displacement. In response to concern about civilian casualties caused by US-led coalition airstrikes the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein, noted that ISIS is using civilians as human, but warned the strikes “may potentially have a lethal and disproportionate impact on civilians”. In short, civilians and the security forces have paid a heavy price for this looming victory and it will be just the first phase in a much longer campaign.

For ISIS, the next phase is already underway. A Captain who hosted us in a house just outside Mosul was later killed by a grenade dropped from an ISIS drone. A market down the road had been targeted by a suicide bomber a few weeks after the suburb was liberated and a restaurant we ate at in January was bombed a few weeks after we left. Urban centres to the south west in Anbar province, which were liberated much earlier, in more controversial operations, are already the scene of renewed insurgency.

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ISIS won’t give up on Mosul

When ISIS seized control of Mosul in 2014 the catastrophe shocked much of the world’s media but it didn’t come out of the blue and the history of the city offers ample evidence that ISIS will try to regain influence and control.

Mosul offers ISIS the chance to make money, and lots of it. Captured documents from its predecessor organization, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), show it, “resembled a ruthlessly violent and effective organised-crime syndicate” that was self-financing, generating US $4.8 million dollars in revenue between August 2008 and January 2009.5 In that same 5 month period, the jihadists earned US $1.83 million from extortion alone, including from construction projects, “typically demanding 10 to 20 percent of a contract’s value, in exchange for protection.”6 Senior ISI officials gained positions in provincial institutions and formed plans to infiltrate higher levels of government, aiding the misappropriation of funds from construction work and other government projects, demonstrating the need to bolster the fight against insurgency with an integrated fight against organised crime and corruption.

As Iraq’s largest Sunni dominated city, Mosul also offers the Sunni extremists of ISIS a potentially receptive population. The city has frequently been the scene of rebellion and insurgency. After the US-led invasion in 2003 it is where Saddam Hussein’s sons Uday and Qusay were found and killed in a gun battle with US forces and it became an important hub for jihadists moving into and out of Iraq.

In 2004, in an extraordinary prelude to the fall of the city a decade later, insurgents mounted sustained attacks on the police and most of the 4,000 strong force deserted, requiring a major effort by the US military to bring Mosul back under control with the aid of Kurdish militias. Then, as US forces ‘surged’ into Iraq in 2007, insurgents staged their own surge in Mosul and by the end of 2007 Nineveh was the most violent province in Iraq. After the Americans regained control the jihadists maintained the capability to launch attacks. There’s even evidence that in 2009, the man who would go on to lead ISIS, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, under his previous nom de guerre, Abu Du’a, was made the Nineveh emir of ISI.7

Mosul has been home to a significant military elite since Ottoman times. Thousands of military officers, Saddam loyalists and Ba’athists lived there when the US invaded and, as well as other insurgent groups, many later joined the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order (JRTN), which played a critical role in the insurgency. After the Americans withdrew in 2011 and the Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, intensified his pro-Shiite sectarian agenda, the JRTN seized the opportunity, taking a lead role in anti-government protests and, eventually, in alliance with ISIS to capture the city. “People at first didn’t understand Da’esh. When Mosul fell, they thought it was a tribal revolution, and the Baath Party was behind it,”8 one resident told me. It’s not clear if that wishful interpretation was widespread but there was general confusion about the ultimate agenda of those seizing control of the city in 2014.

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Cooperation and crossover between Ba’athists, who have historically been avowedly secular, and jihadist Salafists of the Al Qaeda lineage has been the subject of debate and, in some cases, surprise, because of their doctrinal differences. However, experts had identified examples nearly ten years before ISIS seized Mosul.9 Individuals have shifted views in a complex mix of expediency and ideology. Today, it is clear that the conflict has radicalised former Ba’athists over a long period and the Salafists have become more flexible and adept at building alliances.10 Once government forces were pushed out of Mosul, ISIS promptly turned on other groups including the JRTN and crushed any hopes the Ba’athists could return to power.

Mosul’s defences had been weakened on two critical fronts. The Shiite dominated security forces did not enjoy the support of the population and they had been hollowed out by cronyism and corruption. As Maliki pursued his sectarian agenda and consolidated power he promoted acolytes over competent officers. Staff Lieutenant General Mahdi Al Gharawi, commander of the 3rd division of the Iraqi Federal Police, who’d been accused of overseeing the torture and abuse of Sunnis in Baghdad, and was reluctantly sidelined by Nuri al Maliki until the Americans left, was appointment in 2011 to lead the security effort in Mosul. It was part a trend that unraveled four years of US military efforts to stabilize the city and integrate Sunnis into the security structures. Corruption, sectarian behavior, and outright abuse soon returned.11

A former Mosul policeman, Ala’ Mekdad Mustafa, told me, “they would hold people without charge… they considered themselves above the law. (An officer) would open a trunk, throw in a weapon and then tell the driver, to give money or he will be punished.”12 As the security forces alienated the population, the civil war in neighbouring Syria gave ISIS the chance to regroup and grow stronger.

Along with a revived insurgency, a Sunni protest movement was also gaining momentum. When Iraqi government forces attacked a Sunni protest camp at Hawija in mid-2013 violence escalated further and Mosul was at the epicenter. The death toll recorded at the Mosul coroner’s office was telling. By 2013, the province, “experienced 592 explosion-related fatalities, more than the total number recorded from all eight (provinces) in each of the previous two years.”13

The bombers were back with a vengeance and their intentions were clear but Maliki did not change course. By the time ISIS moved on Mosul in June of 2014 the security forces had been drained of legitimacy, resources and manpower, exacerbating absenteeism, leaving a weak force with little will to fight.

The Salafists have become more flexible and adept at building alliances.

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More good reasons to ‘protect the population’

Corruption and physical abuse don’t just undermine support for a given government, they undermine support for the system of government as a whole.14 Crucially, the disaffection caused by the behavior of the security forces did not disappear once ISIS was in charge. While its abuse of minorities, including the attempted genocide perpetrated against Yazidis, is infamous, ISIS also persecuted its core constituency, Sunni Arabs, with brutality15 and callous exploitation, giving rise to an important opportunity for the government.

Isra Ali, a woman who fled the battle to recapture Mosul to take refuge in a camp to the east told me she and her shepherd husband initially hoped ISIS would improve their lot after the years of mistreatment by the security forces. “We were happy to have someone who’d ensure our security, our independence, our comfort. My husband didn’t have a salary and we thought if he could get work, he’d have money.” But that hope quickly soured. When an ISIS fighter saw her washing dishes in her own yard, wearing a headscarf but not a full-face veil, he rebuked her. “We couldn’t even leave our own room! It was as if women had no value at all.”16 ISIS confiscated her husband’s ID and imposed a fine, a substantial punishment for people already living on the margins. ISIS fighters also smashed the family’s satellite TV dish as part of a broader campaign to censor the outside world.

Arbitrary and predatory behavior by ISIS fighters was a common complaint of residents and those who fled its rule.17 Local businessmen reported arbitrary fines and even losing businesses to ISIS allied local powerbrokers. To them, these were simply cases of extortion and theft.

After years of mistreatment by government forces and ISIS, the government now has a chance to reset relations with the people of Mosul.

ISIS also persecuted its core constituency, Sunni Arabs.

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Getting back to work

For all of the attention given to the extremism and brutality of ISIS rule, the most common complaint I heard was about the lack of money and jobs. There is an urgent need to stimulate the economy and ensure that spending is spread around.

In the middle of a bustling open air market in the liberated east of the city, as vendors sold everything from second hand clothes to fresh fruit and vegetables, a Mosul local, Saad Mohammed, told me that under ISIS, “You couldn’t buy anything because there was no money. Salaries were cut. Only limited numbers of people were working.”18

In Mosul’s north, as the Army battled ISIS forces in the next suburb, Ahmad Hassan, a former public servant, was already looking forward to restored cash flows. “Before, it was organized: salaries were paid, the people were living. But when Da’esh came, the people were made to suffer. We lost work, people were going hungry. But, thanks to God, the situation will improve (now) and all service men will get back their salaries.”19

Delivering on those hopes won’t be easy. The government will be trying to revive the economy amidst an incipient insurgency in a city where standard security measures are especially hated by residents. Most have bad memories of the check-points and barriers imposed prior to 2014, which gave the security forces more opportunities for extortion and abuse. Carefully tailored security measures will be crucial.

Carefully targeted spending will also be crucial because ‘hearts and minds’ cannot simply be bought. Raising employment doesn’t automatically lower violence20 and spending huge sums of cash is no panacea. The rise in violence as the US government spent US $29 billion in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 is evidence enough of that. But there is also evidence that ‘less is more’. Analysis of the US $2.9 billion spent on smaller projects, especially through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program indicates that projects focused on improving local government services, delivered quickly in response to local needs, and in conjunction with a substantial security effort can lower levels of violence.21

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Troubling signs remain

Sectarianism is the lifeblood of ISIS’ narrative. It added fuel to the violence that exploded after the 2003 invasion and a return to sectarian abuse by the security forces would fatally undermine stability. In that sense, the relative success of the Mosul operation to date presents something of a paradox because signs of sectarian identity are everywhere. Shiite banners, especially of Imam Hussein, fly from checkpoints dotted around the city. They also fly from military vehicles, patrolling the streets and in combat. Australian-trained troops in the 9th armoured division and the ISOF units who did most of the fighting for east Mosul flew large ‘Hussein’ flags from their armoured vehicles. Some even proudly showed me the headband of the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF), the controversial, Shiite dominated militia. Mosul residents told me these symbols irked them. They suspended judgement because the symbols were not accompanied by widespread abuse, but that good will could easily evaporate.

Foreign military training has not turned these units into a highly disciplined force. I saw several instances of soldiers spraying un-aimed machine gun fire over populated suburbs. They rarely spoke to fleeing civilians to gather information about them or the disposition of ISIS forces nearby. When I did witness such an exchange it was initiated by the civilian who had emerged from a suburb under attack to complain that, while no ISIS fighters were near his house, it had been hit. The soldier didn’t ask for the location or follow up in anyway.

Of much greater concern, I witnessed Iraqi army soldiers shouting Shiite slogans as war cries before battle and saw a soldier shoot over the head of a child who was fleeing the fighting shout, “Praise the Shia!”. Two ISOF soldiers showed me personal videos depicting themselves and colleagues mistreating and abusing prisoners. One showed a detainee being kicked while bound by a long length of rope trailing from his ankles. Another, showed a detainee belted about the head with the butt of a handgun. When I asked one soldier if he would share the video with me his NCO intervened and stopped him, warning of the reaction from, “NGOs, Human Rights Watch”. It’s not a surprise because prior to the Mosul operation ISOF officers were accused of serious abuses,22 but it’s striking that these men are far and away the best of the lot.

Their relatively benign behavior during the campaign has sent an important signal to the people of Mosul.

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The good news

For now, however, there’s evidence that efforts to train the security forces to respect human rights and prioritise the protection of civilians23 have had a positive effect. The civilian population of Mosul currently views the security forces with some respect and views ISIS as a negative force.

Interviews with internally displaced people in camps, residents in Mosul and individuals fleeing active front lines elicited similar responses. ISIS warned them that the Shiite dominated security forces and the Shiite dominated militia, (PMF), would be brutally sectarian, punishing the Sunni community for acquiescing to ISIS rule. Instead, the PMF has been kept out of major combat operations in the city itself, and the security forces have devoted time and resources to aiding civilians during combat and generally refrained from sectarian motivated violence. On several occasions I watched NCO’s carrying white flags in front of columns of civilians to help them leave a suburb safely.

The ISOF is the most multi-ethnic element of the security forces, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. Their deployment, and most importantly, their relatively benign behavior during the campaign, has sent an important signal to the people of Mosul. A young ISOF soldier, a Shiite from the south, framed the battle this way: “I am very proud for the sake of my country and for the sake of the innocent citizens who were attacked by the terrorists who killed their children. With God’s will, we are able to bring back a little bit of joy for the people of Mosul and the families of innocents.”24

One Australian-trained senior officer from the 9th Armoured Division told me, “civilians are in the area, that’s why we cannot move fast. We have to protect the residents of the city of Mosul… we have the means to progress wherever we wish, but the civilians, that’s what’s slowing us down. We fear for their lives.”25

As the operation to clear the area surrounding Mosul began, a 9th Armoured Division Colonel, Sadek Rayssan Mouhanna, who said he had been trained by Australian advisers at Taji, cast sectarianism as a construct imposed by ISIS. “We are all Iraqis and we have rules. However, Da’esh has imposed his dominance and his power on our brothers living in these regions. So the people had to abide by that and for us as Iraqis, we don’t have this kind of sectarianism.”26

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A turning point?

The government’s commitment to liberate Mosul, its efforts to minimise civilian casualties, and its raw military success, have sent a powerful message. People from all walks of life now talk of reconciliation.

As Iraqi troops marched into his neighbourhood, abandoned the previous day by ISIS fighters, a Mosul resident, Samer Ra’ad told me, “Mosul (has) now become ‘one hand’! Maybe three years, four years ago we were Sunnis, Shias, Kurds. (But) now we all one. So we learned, we learned a lesson from Da’esh!”27

And this is not just a case of residents nervously voicing support for their latest conquerors. Even as ISIS was consolidating its grip on Mosul in 2014, evidence emerged indicating Iraq’s Sunni community was still open to some sort of reconciliation. A public opinion survey which, by chance, was conducted in phases before and after ISIS captured Mosul, prompting the replacement of Nuri al-Mailiki, recorded a significant change. With Maliki gone, support for armed opposition groups in Sunni communities fell from 49% to 29% and support for the government and hope it might address key concerns about security, electricity and employment rose. However, unsurprisingly, perceptions of the government’s legitimacy did not change.28

There’s still a sizeable chunk of the Sunni community which supports armed opposition. But the most recent episode has left their communities devastated. That may simply point to an impoverished, wounded and unreconciled community from which new and radical leaders will emerge. But as the government and its allies seek to stabilize the country they must, at least, offer another path. Amidst an ongoing insurgency, a devastated economy and political instability the mood in Mosul may quickly sour and the current Prime Minister, Haidar al Abadi will need to find a way to overcome Shiite resistance to reconciling with those Sunnis who are prepared to do so.29

A long road

The Iraqi government and its partners are about to enter a tricky phase in the battle for Mosul: winning the peace.

The involvement of the US-led Coalition, including Australia, in airstrikes and military training is well documented. I’ve seen Western soldiers engaged in direct combat outside Mosul, firing on ISIS positions, and came across US soldiers, one wearing the insignia of the 82nd Airborne Division, less than a kilometer from the front line. There’s been a substantial investment in this fight. But, as the focus shifts away from combat, that involvement must get deeper. Encouraging the putative turn away from sectarianism, and building discerning security forces that respect the rule of law and can fight organised crime and corruption as well as insurgency.

With Maliki gone, support for armed opposition groups in Sunni communities fell from 49% to 29%.

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Policy Recommendations

If Iraq requests ongoing international security assistance Australia should:

òò Support measures to encourage inclusive governance in Iraq at the national and provincial level.

òò Advocate and contribute to training for the security forces which focusses on intelligence-led action against organised crime and insurgent networks, incorporating human rights and the rule of law as the foundations for national security.

òò Encourage development aid which focusses on small projects in response to localised needs, minimising opportunities for corruption and extortion.

Based on the history of development and conflict in Mosul, tightly targeted spending and development offers the best chance to deliver development that matters and keep the flow of cash away from what is likely to be a powerful ISIS extortion network.

The consistent complaints of Mosul residents and the performance of security forces before and after the fall of Mosul point to the need for a sustained commitment to capacity building in the Iraqi security forces, including the police, focusing on counter-insurgency and counter-organised crime capabilities. Specialists in Iraq and counter-insurgency operations have argued this in some detail.30

And, critically, just as crimes committed by ISIS fighters must be prosecuted, alleged abuses by government forces must be investigated and prosecuted. Consistent justice is increasingly acknowledged as crucial to government legitimacy and stability just as impunity for serious abuses of human rights undermines it.

There are also the bigger questions: of how the powerful Shiite militias and their political wings will behave and how they will fare in forthcoming elections; how the Kurds will handle their ambitions for self-determination; and what role foreign powers will play. All will rely on larger grand bargains and trade-offs, and the prospect of growing confrontation between Tehran and Washington under the Trump administration adds a further complication.

There are many threats and none of what’s required will be achieved quickly.

The UN Secretary General’s Special Representative, Jan Kubis, told the Security Council in February: “In the post-Da’esh period, Iraq will need continuous, substantial and substantive support and assistance from the international community, including its regional partners. Any abrupt scaling down of engagement or support would mean repeating mistakes of the past: mistakes that have had grave consequences for stability and security well beyond the borders of Iraq, even globally.”31

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Endnotes

1 UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Civilian Casualties (updated monthly) http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&layout=category&task=category&id=159&Itemid=633&lang=en

2 Gogjali resident, Ibrahim Makram, interviewed east of Mosul on 27 November 2016.3 ISOF NCO interviewed east of Mosul on 23 January 2017.4 It’s such a politically sensitive topic that when the GoI hotly contested the last national estimate of 1959 killed in

November 2016, it caused the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq to state the figures were “largely unverified” and stop publishing them.

5 Patrick B. Johnston, Jacob N. Shapiro, Howard Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Patrick Ryan, Jonathan Wallace, “Foundations of the Islamic State, Management, Money and Terror in Iraq, 2005 – 2010, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016 pp 2, 195.

6 Patrick B. Johnston, Jacob N. Shapiro, Howard Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Patrick Ryan, Jonathan Wallace, “Foundations of the Islamic State, Management, Money and Terror in Iraq, 2005 – 2010, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016 p 198. Note: Michael Knights in “Al-Qa’ida in Iraq: Lessons From the Mosul Security Operation”, CTC Sentinel, June 2008, attributes this information to Lt Col. Eric Welsh, a U.S. Army battalion commander in Mosul.

7 Patrick B. Johnston, Jacob N. Shapiro, Howard Shatz, Benjamin Bahney, Danielle F. Jung, Patrick Ryan, Jonathan Wallace, “Foundations of the Islamic State, Management, Money and Terror in Iraq, 2005 – 2010, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016, p 6.

8 Mosul resident, interviewed in Mosul 24 January 2017.9 Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Iraq, London: C. Hurst and Co., 2006, p. 145; Kirk H. Sowell

in, “Iraq’s Second Sunni Insurgency”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol 17, August 2014, p 62 noted a prominent Salafist’s cooperation with AQI’s rival, the JRTN dominated HCJI: “Abd al-Nasser al-Janabi, a Salafist who recently returned from exile in Qatar to be Duri’s deputy in the HCJI”; Michael Knights, in “The JRTN Movement and Iraq’s Next Insurgency”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 4, Issue 7, July 2011 reported speculation that, as US troops withdrew from Iraq, the group may, “become a more anti-Baghdad organization than anti-American.”

10 Fawaz A. Gerges, “ISIS, a History”, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2016, pp 163-169.11 Former 101st Airborne Commander, and MNFI commander Gen (Ret.) David Petraeus, (interviewed in New York on

24 January 2017) told Four Corners, “I “removed… all of the general officers… including all of the brigadier generals (and) brigade commanders,” of two police divisions because they, “were either corrupt, intimidated by the enemy, incompetent, or just flat abusive or all of the above…Sadly these leaders were brought back some three three and a half years after the surge and… these were among the actions that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took that undid what we fought so hard together to achieve during the surge.”

12 Ala’ Mekdad Mustafa, interviewed in Mosul on 23 January 2017.13 Oleg O. Bilukha, Eva Z. Leidman, Abdul-Salam Saleh Sultan and Syed Jaffar Hussain, “Deaths due to Intentional

Explosions in Selected Governorates of Iraq from 2010 to 2013: Prospective Surveillance”, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol 30, Issue 6, 2015, p589.

14 José Miguel Cruz, “Police Misconduct and Political Legitimacy in Central America”, Journal of Latin American Studies, Cambridge, May 2015, pp. 263-272.

15 Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Sunni women tell of ISIS Detention, Torture”, 20 February 2017 https://www.hrw.org/news/ 2017/02/20/iraq-sunni-women-tell-isis-detention-torture.

16 Isra Ali, interviewed at Khazr refugee camp, 29 November 2016.17 Tallha Abdulrazaq & Gareth Stansfield (2016) The Day After: What to Expect in post-Islamic State Mosul, The RUSI Journal,

161:3, pp16,17.18 Saad Mohammed, interviewed in Mosul 24 January 2017.19 Ahmad Hassan, interviewed in Mosul, 22 January 2017.20 Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and

Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol55, Issue 4, p 508, 516, 519.21 Lt. Col. Mark S. Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program”, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 37,

April 2005, p. 48; Maj. John Bate, “What comes after we retake Mosul? The case for using ‘Tactical Economics’, Foreign Policy, 15 September, 2016; Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, No. 4, August 2011 pp 770, 800, 801, 805; Direct cash payments to residents could also aid recovery and alleviate concerns about uneven distribution and corruption: Robert E. Looney, in Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Under Extreme Adversity: The Problem of Pervasive Corruption in Iraq, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, Issue 3, 2008, p. 437-438, argues for direct distribution of oil revenues to the population in general, but he does not address how to stop the cash being stripped by armed groups in vulnerable communities.

22 David M. Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service”, Centre for Middle East Policy Analysis, Brookings Institute, Monday, March 16, 2015, p18.

23 UN OCHA says, “As part of the humanitarian concept of operations, security forces have committed to alerting residents to developments in the military operation, identifying escape routes when it is deemed safe to do so, arranging transport for highly vulnerable civilians to safety, and putting in place dignified, transparent screening procedures”, “Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Crisis in Numbers”, 2 March 2017.

24 Sgt. Hussein Ali Hassan, Diyala Brigade, ISOF, interviewed at Bartella, 19 January 2017.25 Gen. Kassem al Maliki, said he’d been trained by Australians at Camp Taji. Interviewed at Karemlesh, 27 November 2017.26 Col. Sadek Rayssan Mouhanna,interviewed at Qayarrah air base, 22 October 2016.27 Samer Ra’ad, Mosul resident, interviewed 22 January 2017.28 Christoph Mikulaschek, Saurabh Pant, Beza Tesfaye, report on a Mercy Corps survey which did not cover Nineveh but

did cover provinces including Salahhadin, Diyalla, Baghdad and to a lesser degree, Anbar in, “Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars: Governance, Leadership Change, and Support for Violence in Iraq”, 6 December 2016, p.14, 16, 17.

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29 James Kaelin, “A Government for the People by the People: defeating ISISL with an Inclusive Central Iraqi Government”, Foreign Policy Journal, 13 October 2004, pp 3, 5, 6; Both Gen. (Ret.) David Petraeus, Former 101st Airborne Commander and MNFI commander (interviewed by Four Corners in New York, 24 January 2017); and Dr. David Killculen, former adviser to General Petraeus, interviewed by Four Corners in Sydney, 4 February 2017, argue the need for reconciliation.

30 Michael Knights, “How to Secure Mosul, Lessons from 2008 – 2014”, Research Notes, The Washington Institute for Near East policy, October 2016, pp 16 - 18; Michael Knights, “The ‘End of the Beginning’: The Stabilization of Mosul and Future U.S. Strategic Objectives in Iraq”, testimony to the US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 February 2017, p 5; David Killcullen, Blood Year, Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror, London, C. Hurst and Co., 2016, pp 230 – 232 argues in general for the need to make a long-term commitment to the campaign.

31 Jan Kubis, UNSRSG for Iraq, Briefing to the Security Council, New York, 2 February 2017.

Nomenclature: I have called the Islamic State group “ISIS” because this is its most commonly understood moniker. Where Arabic speakers have used its Arabic acronym, Da’esh, I’ve used that.

STST8013 China’s Defence and Strategic Challenges

Course Convenor: Dr Amy King

China’s re-emergence as a significant economic and political actor is a geopolitical development of the first order. It has been a century since the international system has had to accommodate a wholly new major power with the potential to rival even the weight of the US. Assess the trajectory of China’s current rise to prominence and its probable implications, as well as China’s political, economic and military policies and capabilities, and the development of China’s relations with other key actors.

M A S T E R O F S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

ANU College of Asia & the Pacific

Australia’s foremost Strategic Studies program, offered by the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs

A graduate degree combining the theoretical and practical expertise of leading academics and policymakers. Develop the analytical frameworks you need to tackle the regional and global strategic and security challenges of your career, and graduate a leader in your field. Students looking to undertake a major research essay under the supervision of a leading Strategic Studies scholar should consider the Master of Strategic Studies (Advanced) program.

MO

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STST8002 The New Power Politics of Asia

Course Convenor: Professor Hugh White

Asia is in the throes of a major power-political revolution, as a radical change in the distribution of wealth and power overtakes the old order and forces the creation of a new one. Explore three areas of the new power politics of Asia: the nature of power politics as a mode of international relations; the power politics of Asia today, what is happening and where it is going; and concepts that can help us better understand power politics.

Other courses you can study in your degree include: Strategic Studies; Strategy in Action: Orchestrating the Elements of National Power; Australian Strategic and Defence Policy; Great and Powerful Friends: Strategic Alliances and Australian Security; Strategic Studies Internship; Special Topics in Strategic Studies; Intelligence and Security; Nuclear Strategy in the Asian Century; Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in an Age of Terror; Why and How We Fight: Understanding War and Conflict; Contemporary Issues in Australian Defence Policy.

For more information visit: programsandcourses.anu.edu.au

Course Convenor: Professor Evelyn Goh

Explore inter-disciplinary concepts, theories and methods that inform Strategic Studies academic research. Using the overarching empirical theme of the Cold War, investigate three areas: understanding critical developments during the Cold War; historiographical and methodological debates in the study of the Cold War; and theoretical and conceptual methods employed by scholars in the most influential works in Strategic Studies.

STST8010 Strategic Studies Concepts and Methods

ContactT 02 6125 1164 E sdsc@anu.edu.au W sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au

Major courses include: