African-Americans and the New Deal Coalition 2.1

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ILRLR 3860

Professor Salvatore

18 November, 2011

African-Americans and the New Deal Coalition

The identification of the Republican Party as the Party of Abraham Lincoln and, by

extension, of the Emancipation Proclamation persisted for decades after Lincolns death. Over the

course of only two decades, however, this perception was shattered. Throughout the 1920s, the

Republican Party began to take the black vote increasingly for granted. This callous disregard for

decades of support allowed many African Americans to consider breaking with the Republicans and

during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and later Harry Truman, they did just that. After

1936, blacks voted for the Democratic Party in record numbers. While the transition was not

instantaneous, it was the inevitable result of two major features of the Roosevelt and Truman

administrations as well as Republican neglect. First, the New Deal, though imperfect, provided

economic opportunities and services desperately needed during the depths of the Depression. More

importantly, however, was the willingness of both presidents to break with Southern Democrats to

cooperate with African American leaders and take concrete action on specific civil rights issues.

Despite the legacy of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the

Emancipation Proclamation, by the 1920s , many in the Republican Party paid only fleeting attention

to the concerns of African Americans. The Harding and Coolidge administrations both dedicated

significant effort towards cultivating a lilywhite Southern Republican Party in order to crack the

Democrats Solid South. 1 To avoid alienating potential Southern voters, Harding, and later

Coolidge, avoided taking any significant civil rights action. For example, while both men publicly

abhorred the practice of lynching, neither seriously pushed for a federal anti lynching law even

after 1922 when the Dyer bill passed the house.2


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Given the Harding Coolidge record, it is hardly surprising that some African Americans

were beginning to distrust the Republican Party. Northern Democrats, like New York Governor Al

Smith, sensed an opportunity to break part of the Republican coalition. After being nominated for

the presidency in 1928, Smith contacted Walter White, then assistant executive secretary of the

NAACP, about managing a campaign among blacks. 3 White saw the arrangement as an opportunity

to [wrest] domination of the Democratic Party from the southern bourbons and [vest] it in the

hands of the North and East. 4 Smiths running mate , however, Sen. Joseph T. Robinson of

Arkansas, convinced Smith to drop the idea. 5

Nevertheless, Smiths campaign attracted significant support among urban blac ks compared

to previous years. In Chicago, for example, not only did the Defender endorse Smith, but the

Democratic ticket received 27 percent of the vote in black precincts compared to 11 percent in

1920 and 10 percent in 1924.6 In Harlem, 28 percent of blacks voted for Smith; 28 percent also

voted Democratic in 1924, but only 3 percent had in 1920.7 Ultimately, Smith was reluctant to

seriously risk the support of white voters to court African Americans. Since neither Smith nor his

opponent, Herbert Hoover, were willing to speak substantially about civil rights or other key issues,

black voting patterns remained essentially unchanged.8

Unfortunately for African Americans, Hoover proved to be no better than his predecessors.

Not only did he continue to build a lily white Southern Republican Party, he relied on those white

Southerners to shape his response to racial issues, introducing new offenses as well. In 1930,

Congress appropriated money for women who had lost sons and husbands in World War I to travel

to Europe to visit the graves; the War Department ordered these Gold Star Mothers to be

segregated on the voyage overseas.9 The NAACP bitterly protested this decision, but Hoover

declined to intervene. Many black women chose not to go rather than endure the insult. 10


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Hoover s record on appointments was also dismal, specifically his nomination of John J.

Parker to the Supreme Court. Parkers views on race were questionable at best. While running for

governor of North Carolina in 1920, Parker was quoted as saying, The Negro as a class does not

desire to enter politics. The Republican party of North Carolina does not desire him to do so. We

recognize that he has not yet reached the stage in his development when he can share the burdens

and responsibilities of government. 11 In response to these comments, the NAACP launched a

vigorous lobbying effort to block Parkers confirmation12 Moreo ver, after Parkers confirmation was

defeated, the Association organized a campaign against four pro Parker senators in the elections of

1930 which helped two to lose their seats.13 These political campaigns galvanized African American

voters in the lead up to the 1932 presidential elections.

Many African Americans, however, still distrusted the Democratic Party. In 1932, the

Democrats nominated another New York governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt. In contrast to the

Catholic, immigrant background of Al Smith, Roosevelt was an American patrician with little

personal experience in the problems of race relations.14 Moreover, Roosevelts running mate,

Speaker of the House John Nance Garner of Texas, inspired little confidence of a renewed

Democratic attitude towards African Americans; the Democratic equal rights plank did not even

mention race.15 Nevertheless, Roosevelt displayed a remarkably progressive attitude towards racial

issues and his comments foreshadowed his later action. In Detroit, for example, Roosevelt stated

that, I believe in equal economic and legal opportunity for all groups, rega rdless of race, color or

creed. 16

Meanwhile, Hoover continued to mismanage the issue of race. The Republican equal rights

platform was no more than a vague appeal to history and, according to the Chicago Defender , a

worthless political sop to members of our Race. 17 Additionally, his lackluster response to the

Depression was compared to his maladministration of the 1927 Mississippi flood relief as Secretary


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of Commerce, both of which disproportionately affected blacks.18 Later in the campaign, an editorial

in the Kansas City American exclaimed that while Roosevelt may be unknown, nothing could be

worse than Hoover. 19 Yet on Election Day, though Roosevelt won an overwhelming victory, most

blacks chose to remain with the Republican Party. Only in New York City, with the help of

Tammany patronage, were the Democrats able to obtain greater than 50 percent of the black vote. 20

In fact, in Chicago, Cleveland and Knoxville, the Republicans surpassed their 1928 percentages.21

Given the slights of the Hoover administration and the depth of the Depression, Roosevelt

was presented with an opportunity to permanently alter black voting patterns. It certainly helped

that expectations were low for a Democrat; Walter White commented that while Democrats may

not do much nationally for blacks, they would also likely not do much active harm which, he said,

will be a vast improvement over the past four years. 22 Roosevelts programs to help the forgotten

man therefore greatly exceeded expectations. African Americans, already on the economic margins

of society were devastated by the Depression. By 1931, unemployment rates had reached 60.2

percent among black men in Detroit, compared to 32.4 percent among white men; in Chicago, the

rate was 43.5 percent to 29.7 percent and in New York it was 26.8 percent to 21 percent.23

As New Deal relief programs began operation, African Americans began to see a new

Democratic Party. Prominent members of the Roosevelt administration were well known to be

friendly to black advancement. Harold Ickes, for example, was Roosevelts Secretary of the Interior

and responsible for running the Public Works Administration; he had also been president of the

Chicago branch of the NAACP during the early 1920 s.24 The P.W.A. was an absolutely massive

program its $3.3 billion appropriation was worth 5.9 percent of 1933 GDP and Ickes made sure

that blacks could find employment on its projects.25 The P.W.A. issued a prima facie definition of

discrimination which established minimum payroll quotas for both skilled and unskilled black


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workers.26 In 1977, one Sterling Tucker recalled that, when I was a kid, P.W.A. meant, Poppas

working again. 27

Other programs of the New Deal had similar, immediate effects on African American

families. The Civilian Conservation Corps not only paid a wage but taught skills as well. By 1936,

there were CCC camps run entirely by black officers and the program itself was 10 percent black.28

According to one observer, young blacks who joined the CCC gained significant prestige, [it] was as

important as going to Princeton University they had status. 29 Along with the CCC, the National

Youth Administration performed a similar task; additionally, NYA administrator Aubrey Williams

was equally if not more concerned with racial equality than Harold Ickes.30 The NYA also had a

Division of Negro Affairs which provided part time employment for black high school and college

students as well as tuition assistance. Through the influence Williams and the Division, the NYA

became one of the most forward thinking agencies in the government. 31

No program, however, rivaled the size and influence of the Works Progress Administration.

The W.P.A. was funded by a $4.88 billion emergency appropriation worth 6.7 percent of 1935

GDP.32

While W.P.A. administrator Harry Hopkins was not as vigilant in preventing discrimination

as Harold Ickes, the W.P.A. nevertheless provided life altering jobs and relief. One former W.P.A.

worker remembered that while discrimination existed, before [the W.P.A.] blacks had no bread.

Black folk have never been so crazy as to wait for things to be perfect. 33 Other W.P.A. workers

directly correlated their votes with their work as the 1936 presidential election approached. A worker

in Springfield, Ohio wrote to President Roosevelt saying, I was suffering when you took your seat,

but now I eat and live so much better I am insisting everybody I can to vote for you. I dont think

its fair to eat Roosevelt bread and meat and vote for Gov. Landon. 34

The success of these New Deal programs in reaching African Americans should not be

misconstrued to say that there were no problems of racial discrimination. Indeed, many New Deal


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Programs were designed with loopholes that allowed the defecto exclusion of many blacks. Local

control of WPA projects allowed hiring and pay discrimination and the Social Security Act and

Wagner Act both excluded agricultural and domestic workers.35 These compromises were due to,

among other things, lengthy tenure among Southern Democrats. Congressional seniority rules gave

long serving Southerners control of powerful committees; for example, the Senate Finance

Committee was chaired by Sen. Byron Harrison of Mississippi, the Senate Majority Leader was Sen.

Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, and in the House, Rep. Howard W. Smith of Virginia chaired the

Rules Committee.36

Simply focusing on the racial compromises of the New Deal, however, misses a fundamental

point as to why the relief that was provided to African Americans was so important. The vast

majority of blacks had been all but excluded from public life by every administration since

Reconstruction. Under the New Deal, blacks were once again brought into public life. Charles

Matthews, the first black Democratic ward chairman in Newark, explained that, discrimination or

not, we were participating . 37 Moreover, given the severity of the Depression, even the smallest bit of

participation had the potential to save lives. Bishop William J. Walls, a key figure in the African

Methodist Episcopal Zion Church and a lifelong Republican, explained his party switch in exactly

those terms; by reaching for the forgotten man with the arm of the government [Roosevelt] kept

millions of people from starving. 38

Not all establishment black Republicans, however, followed Bishop Walls example. Black

Republican leadership had ossified during the generalneglect of the 1920s into a self interested

group of men whose only job was to secure the black vote in exchange for patronage jobs for

friends and relatives.39 This system further pushed blacks, especially the young and college educated,

away from the Republican Party. All of us were completely disgusted with and critical of the so

called Republican Negro leaders, recalled Robert C. Weaver, who had a doctorate in economics


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from Harvard. 40 As the New Deal began to make an impact, insurrection against these leaders

became practical. In Chicago, Republican congressman Oscar DePriest, the first black congressman

elected since reconstruction, lost the 1934 election to Arthur W. Mitchell, who became the first

black Democratic congressman ever.41

The Roosevelt administration made its case to African Americans on more than just the

economic grounds men like Harold Ickes and Aubrey Williams controlled. First Lady Eleanor

Roosevelt in particular provided an example of interracial friendship and cooperation never before

seen in the White House. Mrs. Roosevelt maintained close relationships with important black leaders

both within and without the administration such as Walter White and Mary McLeod Bethune. 42

Ordinary blacks as well admired her for her dedication to service. In a letter to the President, one

woman wrote, if you cant help me, write and let me know, so I can write Mrs. Roosevelt, for I am

sure she can help me. 43 The First Lady was also happy to speak at largely black crowds, such as the

Urban Leagues twenty fifth anniversary conference in 1935 or at a fundraising drive for the

Washington branch of the NAACP. 44 The Pittsburgh Courier called her, a living exampleof what

interracial relations should be and her actions certainly shaped black perceptions of the New Deal

and the Democratic Party. 45

President Roosevelt was willing to make unprecedented appearances as well, though

sometimes to a lesser degree than the First Lady. On a 1933 trip to Nashville, for example,

Roosevelt stopped at Fisk University to hear the Jubilee Singers; similarly, on a trip to Atlanta, he

stopped at Atlanta University and addressed a crowd of 20,000 blacks assembled on the athletic

fields.46 An editorial in the Baltimore Afro American declared Roosevelt to be setting, an example of

interracial behavior unprecedented in recent memory. 47 As president, however, Roosevelt could

also do much more than his wife by creating positions for blacks within the government itself. In an

effort to combat the loopholes for discrimination Congress created, Roosevelt did exactly that and


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began appointing racial advisers to both New Deal agencies and regular government

departments.48

While the position of racial adviser was created to enforce the official policy against

discrimination in relief programs, the advisers themselves coalesced into an unofficial Black

Cabinet. By creating the position of racial adviser, Roosevelt also created by default a prominent

coterie of highly educated black civil servants which greatly aided in bringing blacks into the public

life of the New Deal. Whereas black Republican leadership stifled opportunity for young blacks

interested in civil service, Roosevelt created brand new positions.49 Many members of the cabinet

also developed close working relationships with the President himself, which simply had not

happened under previous administrations.

Connections between the White House and the Black Cabinet, however, often extended

beyond simple working relationships. Mary McLeod Bethune, Director of Negro Affairs for the

NYA, recalled a dinner party where she was seated next to her friend Eleanor Roos evelt, I can

remember, too, she said, how the faces of the Negro servants lit up with pride when they saw me

seated at the center of that imposing gathering.50

Prior to her involvement in the Roosevelt

administration, Bethune had also been a Republican. Describing the reasons for her switching

allegiance, Bethune described the potential Roosevelt represented, We have seen the path of our

opportunities broadened into a wide thoroughfare. He believes truly that all men should have

equality of opportunity regardless of race, creed, or color. 51

Between the economic relief of the New Deal, the prominence of the Black Cabinet, and the

inability of the Republican Party to adjust its racial politics, the election of 1936 proved to be a

decisive turning point in black voting patterns. At the Republican Convention, credentials fights

erupted between lily white and black and tan delegations, while the Democratic Convention not

only seated accredited black delegates for the first time, but allowed a black clergyman, Marshall L.


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Sheppard, to deliver the invocation for one session as well.52 The invocation did prompt a walk out

by Sen. Cotton Ed Smith of South Carolina , but his protests only served to highlight the changing

direction of the Democratic Party.

On the campaign trail, the disparities between the two parties continued to accumulate.

Republican nominee Alf Landon refused to answer an Afro American reporters questions on

lynching and equal opportunity hiring in the civil service. Landon also provided segregated meals

and accommodations at a Topeka rally. 53 Moreover, while black members of the White House staff

cheerfully campaigned for Roosevelt, Landons black employees confided to a Pittsburgh Courier

reporter that they were underpaid and supported Roosevelt since Roosevelt would actually do

something for the race.54 On Election Day, Franklin D. Roosevelt won the largest percentage of the

popular vote popular vote in history, 60.8 percent. 55 Equally impressive were the gains the

Democratic Party made among black voters. Nationally, 71 percent of blacks voted for the

Democrats. 56 In areas like Harlem, the totals rose as high as 81 percent.57

Yet despite the record breaking electoral performance of 1936, the majority of African

Americans still did not identify themselves as members of the Democratic Party.58

The unwillingness

of blacks to self identify as Democrats is unsurprising when one considers that men like Sen.

Cotton Ed Smith were still powerful members of the party. Roosevelt and liberal Democratic

strategists, however, had a different idea. Just as the Roosevelt administration stood up for

economic rights, so too would it attempt to stand against the conservatism of Southern

Democrats especially on civil rights.

In order to further the New Deal and protect it from congressional conservatives, Roosevelt

and his advisors singled out Democratic primaries where conservatives would be vulnerable in 1938.

Among those targeted were Sen. Walter George of Georgia, Sen. Cotton Ed Smith of South

Carolina, and Rep. Howard W. Smith of Virginia, all of whom opposed parts of the New Deal. 59


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More significantly, however, Roosevelt came out against the poll tax as inevitably contrary to the

fundamental democracy in which we believe. 60 Unfortunately for Roosevelt, all three men returned

to Congress and the administration was forced to back away from attacking the poll tax.61 While the

campaign to completely liberalize the Democratic Party was a failure, it at least indicated that the

New Deal administration was no friend of Southern racism.

The Southern rebuke did not discourage the Roosevelts, least of all Eleanor. In 1939,

Howard University attempted to host a concert for Marian Anderson. Anderson had already sung at

the White House, but when Howard approached Constitution Hall, the Daughters of the American

Revolution refused to rent the building.62 Eleanor Roosevelt, herself a member of the D.A.R., was

incensed. Not only did Mrs. Roosevelt publically resign from the D.A.R., she suggested that Howard

and the NAACP contact Harold Ickes and the Department of the Interior about a concert at the

Lincoln Memorial.63 The efforts of Mrs. Roosevelt and Harold Ickes once again reaffirmed the

administrations commitment to racial tolerance. A letter to Secretary Ickes read, If we h ad more

leaders of the type that you, Sen. Wagner, and our beloved President and Mrs. Roosevelt are, what a

grand and glorious country this really would be for the minority groups.64

For the president though, the domestic events of 1939 were largely overshadowed by the

beginning of a new European war and preparations for American defense. Roosevelt also won a

third term in 1940 with a slightly lower popular percentage among both blacks and whites, though

he still won 81 percent of the black vote in New York and 82 percent in Pittsburgh. 65 As in 1936,

Roosevelt won the national black vote without the majority of blacks identifying as Democrats.66

Blacks were, as Walter White pointed out, [still] more Rooseveltianthan Democratic. 67 The

coming of war, however, allowed Roosevelt to accomplish more on race than his abortive Party

purge in 1938. As the war intensified, so too did defense spending. Lucrative government


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contracts greatly expanded manufacturing industries and subsequently employment unless, of

course, you were black.68

Discrimination in hiring plagued many industries in the United States, but no industry in

1940 received more federal money than defense. A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood

of Sleeping Car Porters, saw an opportunity to advance the working lives of blacks by getting the

same standard of non discrimination that was applied to relief to be applied to defense contracts as

well.69 Randolph and the NAACP began their campaign through Mrs. Roosevelt, who they invited to

speak at the Brotherhoods annual convention in Harlem; Mrs. Roosevelt, in turn, organized a

meeting with the president.70

While Roosevelt initially resistedRandolphs demand for a non discrimination clause in

federal contracts, Randolph and Walter White threatened a 100,000 man march on Washington

D.C.71 In order to avoid an embarrassing protest march, and with full knowledge of Southern

opposition, Roosevelt, Randolph, and White drafted Executive Order 8802, affirming as, the policy

of the United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense

industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin.72

The Order even created

a Fair Employment Practices Commission to enforce its provisions. Mary McLeod Bethune spoke

for many when she called the Order, a refreshing shower in a thirsty land. 73

As the war progressed, Roosevelts rhetoric returned to the days of the early New Deal. In

the 1944 State of the Union Address, Roosevelt described his vision of a second economic Bill of

Rights, under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all regardless of

station, or race or creed. 74 Roosevelt further underscored the sincerity of this proposal with his

actions at the Democratic Convention. Despite being forced to drop Henry Wallace as his running

mate because of Wallaces liberal views on race, Roosevelt successfully pushed for the strongest civil

rights plank ever put in a Democratic platform. 75 Many blacks and liberals, however, were


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disappointed at the loss of Wallace; according to the Chicago Defender , it was Wallace who

represented more than any platform exactly what the Negro want ed from the Democratic Party. 76

Sen. Harry S. Truman of Missouri, Roosevelts handpicked successor, would have to prove himself.

Unfortunately, Trumans opportunity to lead came all too soon. He and Roosevelt won an

election with similar results to 1940. Again, the Democrats won the black vote without a majority of

blacks considering themselves Democrats.77 Then, on April 12, 1945, Franklin Delano Roosevelt

died in Warm Springs, Georgia and Harry S. Truman became the President of the United States. 78

For a compromise candidate between the South and Northern liberals, Truman already had a

surprisingly good record on race. In the Senate, Truman had stood strongly against the poll tax.79 He

was also known for a speech given to black delegates at the Democratic Convention of 1940.80

When the responsibilities of ending World War Two were over, Trumans dedication to civil rights

would become more apparent.

By December, 1946, Truman was anxious to return to a peacetime agenda. While the war

had ended in August, 1945, the process of demobilization and the reconversion of the economy

from military to civilian production kept the nation in an atmosphere of crisis; then, in a serious

blow for the new president, the Republicans won control of Congress for the first time since 1930. 81

Truman, however, was fearless, and issued Executive Order 9808, which established a multiracial

Presidential Committee on Civil Rights.82 Trumans motivation stemmed from a September, 1946

meeting with Walter White and other members of the NAACP. Whites report on increasing racial

violence particularly against returning veterans enraged Truman, who right then decided

something must be done. 83

As the Civil Rights Committee prepared its report, Truman continued his efforts to advance

the cause of civil rights. On June 29, 1947, Harry Truman became the first president to address the

NAACP since its founding in 1909.84 Trumans address, delivered on the steps of the Lincoln


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Memorial, committed himself, the federal government, and, for as long as he was its standard

bearer, the Democratic Party to the cause of civil rights for all Americans. Trumans speech called

for federal action against lynching and the poll tax as well as equal opportunity in education and

employment, we cannot wait another decade or another generation to remedy these evils. 85

Trumans speech galvanized his audience . It reminded Walter White of the Gettysburg

address. While Whiteconsidered Lincolns prose superior, [Trumans speech] had been a more

courageous one in its specific condemnation of evils based upon race prejudice and its call for

immediate action against them. 86 To White, Truman said he meant every word of itand Im

going to prove that I do mean it. 87 The speech itself was broadcast live nationwide at prime time on

four major radio networks; it set the stage for October when the Civil Rights Committee would

release its report.88

To any careful observer of American race relations, the report issued by the committee did

not come as a surprise. The committee enumerated four basic rights: the right to safety and security

of person, the right to citizenship and its privileges, the right to freedom of conscience and

expression, and the right to equality of opportunity.89

That for many Americans, these rights did not

exist was the subject that filled the 178 page report.90 Truman, a veteran of WWI, was especially

upset by the treatment of black veterans, my very stomach turned over when I learned that Negro

soldiers, just back from overseas, were being dumped out of army trucks in Mississippi and

beaten. 91 In his 1948 State of the Union, Truman promised to deliver a special message solely on

the subject of civil rights so that congress might consider the issue with the urgency it deserved.92

Truman delivered his special message less than a month after the State of the Union. It was

nothing short of a bombshell. To African Americans it offered the chance for full and open

citizenship; for Southern Democrats, it threatened to end a way of life. The message contained a ten

point program on civil rights which Truman urged Congress to pass immediately.93 Among the ten


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points were the establishment of a Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice, a federal anti

lynching law, a permanent Fair Employment Practice Commission, and an end to segregation in

interstate travel.94

The reaction was immediate. Not even Roosevelt had proposed such an audacious plan.

While Southern Democrats talked of a third party and the Republican majority dragged its feet, Mary

McLeod Bethune, now a private citizen, wrote to Truman on behalf of the National Council of

Negro Women, your insistence upon passing the ten points of the Bill of Rightsis the greatest

possible sword and ammunition that can be usedto give America its rightful leadership on the

affairs of world unity and brotherhood. God bl ess you, Mr. President. 95 Bethunes optimism was

further supported at the 1948 Democratic National Convention. The young mayor of Minneapolis,

Hubert H. Humphrey, won a civil rights plank that fully endorsed Trumans ten point plan; in front

of the entire convention, Humphrey said, the time has arrived for the Democratic Party to get out

of the shadow of states rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights. 96

Humphreys convention battle finally established that which even Franklin Roosevelt could

not create a Democratic Party independent of its Southern branch. Following the convention,

Trumans impatience with Congress inspired him to issue Executive Orders 9980 and 9981,

integrating not only the federal workforce, but the military as well.97 No amount of Southern rage

would stop him. Harry S. Truman won the election of 1948 in a spectacular four way upset. Equally

impressive, however, was that for the first time in history, the majority of blacks identified

themselves as Democrats and 77 percent of them voted for Truman 6 percent more than voted

for Roosevelt in 1936.98

The ability of the Democratic Party to turn from its roots in the Old Confederacy into the

Party of Civil and Human Rights is one of the most impressive political stories of the 20th century.

The economic opportunities provided by the New Deal, flawed as it was, created the opportunity


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for Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats to permanently change the racial composition of political

coalitions. Roosevelt, and especially his successor Harry Truman, seized that opportunity by

choosing to work with African American leaders and on their own to fully extend the rights of

American citizenship to all Americans, regardless of their color.


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1 Nancy J. Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR, (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1983), 6.2 Ibid, 6; ibid, 99.3 Ibid, 7.4

Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Ibid, 10-11.7 Ibid.8 Ibid, 11.9 Ibid, 16.10 Ibid, 17.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Ibid.14 Ibid, 20.15 Ibid.16 Ibid, 24.17 Ibid, 22.18 Ibid, 16.19 Ibid, 27.20 Ibid, 30.21 Ibid.22 Ibid, 33.23 Ibid, 300.24 Ibid, 51.25 Jason Scott Smith, Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works 1933 1956, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2; Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 51.26

Ibid.27 Ibid, 53.28 Ibid, 55; ibid, 200.29 Ibid, 53.30 Ibid, 174.31 Ibid.32 Smith, Building New Deal Liberalism, 2.33 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 211.34 Ibid, 214.35 Nick Salvatore, The New Deal. ILRLR 3860. Cornell University. Ithaca, 26 September 2011. 36 Ibid; Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 106-107.

37 Ibid, 211.38 Ibid, 21339 Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era, (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 48.40 Ibid.41 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 84.42 Ibid, 126.43 Ibid, 127.44 Ibid, 125.


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45 Ibid, 122.46 Ibid, 41-42.47 Ibid, 42.48 Ibid, 136.49

Sullivan, Days of Hope, 48.50 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 143.51 Ibid, 144.52 Ibid, 185.53 Ibid, 195.54 Ibid, 201.55 Ibid, 205.56 David A. Bositis, Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, (Washington D.C.: JointCenter for Political and Economic Studies, 2004), 9.57 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 205.58 Bositis, Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, 9.59 H.W. Brands, Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin DelanoRoosevelt, (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 500.60 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 250.61 Ibid.62 Brands, Traitor to His Class, 517.63 Ibid.64 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 265.65 Ibid, 287.66 Bositis, Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, 9.67 Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln, 292.68 Brands, Traitor to His Class, 711.69 Ibid.70

Ibid.71 Ibid, 712.72 Ibid.73 Sullivan, Days of Hope, 13674 1944 State of the Union Address, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, accessed November 30,2011, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/011144.html75 Salvatore, The New Deal. 76 Sullivan, Days of Hope, 186.77 Bositis, Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, 9.78 Brands, Traitor to His Class, 812.79 David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 323.80

Ibid.81 Ibid, 467-524.82 Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks,(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), 15.83 Ibid, 16.84 Ibid, 28.85 McCullough, Truman, 570.86 Ibid.87 Ibid.


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88 Ibid; Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights, 29.89 Ibid, 51.90 Ibid.91 McCullough, Truman, 588.92

Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights, 68.93 Ibid, 80.94 Ibid.95 Ibid, 2-3.96 McCullough, Truman, 639.97 Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights, 105.98 Bositis, Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, 9.


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Bositis, David A. Blacks and the 2004 Democratic National Convention, Washington D.C.: Joint

Center for Political and Economic Studies, 2004.

Brands, H.W. Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano

Roosevelt, New York: Doubleday, 2008.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library . 1944 State of the Union Address. Accessed November 30,

2011. http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/011144.html

Gardner, Michael R. Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks, Carbondale:

Southern Illinois University Press, 2002.

McCullough, David. Truman, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

Smith, Jason Scott. Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works 1933

1956, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Sullivan, Patricia. Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era, Chapel Hill: University

of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Weiss, Nancy J. Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR, Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1983.

African-Americans and the New Deal Coalition 2.1

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