Africa and International Relations

8/3/2019 Africa and International Relations

1/13

Africa and International Relations: Regional Lessons for a Global DiscourseAuthor(s): Tandeka C. NkiwaneSource: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.22, No. 3, Transformation of International Relations: Between Change and Continuity.Transformations des relations internationales: entre rupture et continuit (Jul., 2001), pp.279-290Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601487

Accessed: 25/11/2009 02:25

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toInternational

Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601487?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltdhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltdhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1601487?origin=JSTOR-pdf


2/13

InternationalPoliticalScienceReview 2001), Vol 22, No. 3, 279-290

Africa and International Relations:Regional Lessons for a Global Discourse

TANDEKAC. NKIWANE

ABSTRACT.Case studies, theories, and examples from Africa areexceedingly rare in international relations. Indeed, examples from Africaare, at best, valued for their nuisance potential. This article argues thatthe study of international relations is limited by this interpretation ofAfrica, and by a larger ignorance of African contributions. Key debateson the African continent surrounding the central concepts ofmainstream international relations, including the state, power, and self-determination, are interrogated with a view to expanding their use incontemporary international relations. The examples of apartheid SouthAfrica, the African debate on political economy and development, andAfrican perspectives on questions raised by the liberal paradigm, areused to illustrate the importance of the region to the more globaldiscourses. In examining the important contribution of Africanscholarship to debates central to international relations, this articlehighlights the necessity for engaging African scholars in the broaderdiscourses of international relations.Keywords:frica * Political economy * Apartheid International relations

IntroductionInternational relations (IR) involves the study of power between and among states.The concept of power is one open to dispute, and typically theorists have arguedover definitional aspects as well as empirical applications. This article uses poweras a starting-point of analysis, but examines both the power of the discipline ofinternational relations, and power dynamics within the discipline. As posed byKate Manzo, "Just how independent of imperial relations of power is theknowledge produced by moder academic disciplines?" (Manzo, 1999). Whenpower is viewed from this perspective, contestation moves away from states and0192-5121 (2001/03) 22:3, 279-290; 017882 ? 2001 International Political Science AssociationSAGEPublications (London, Thousand Oaks, CAand New Delhi)


3/13

International oliticalScienceReview 2(3)into the realm of what is studied and why. The African continent typically isignored in mainstream IR studies. Phrases such as "off the radar," "Afro-pessimism," and "collapsed states" have come to depict the relationship of theAfrican continent to international relations. Is this because Africa has little tocontribute to IR, or because the power dynamics of the discipline are such thatAfrican voices are not heard? The aim of this article is to outline the contributionof African scholarship to the study of IR, and to highlight the notion that powerdynamicswithin the discipline affects what is studied and why (ibid.).The field of IRis in crisis. Michael Brecher argues that "the clash of paradigmsin International Studies has generated more heat than light for a field in distress"(Brecher, 1999). Indeed, in the new millennium, the paradigmaticdebate must ofnecessity shift from what Brecher describes as "intellectualintolerance," to a morenuanced and global understanding of relations between and among states andtheir citizens. Typically understood as the "canon" of IR, realism, neorealism,liberalism, and to a lesser extent critical theory as derived from Marxism,are allWestern constructs. As Bobrow notes, "for better or worse, Anglo-Americanscholars ... have loomed very large in the development of international relationsas a field" (Bobrow, 1999). Denemark agrees and goes further, noting thatEurocentric approaches define the normative content of what is studied, and why(Denemark, 1999). The globe is laden with hierarchies, stated and unstated, and itis crucial as a starting-point to be clear about the values we place on one form ofinquiry as opposed to another. In this hierarchy of values, mainstream scholars ofIR have tended to place at the periphery the study and utility of Africa as a region.Despite their paradigmatic differences, the "canon" of international relations hasbeen consistent in its dismissal of Africa. I argue that this is to the detriment of IR.For the IRscholar, the significance of Africa lies solely in its disruptive potentialfor neat theoretical paradigms. This article offers the suggestion, on the contrary,that African examples and African scholarship lend important insights andcritiques to the various perspectives on international relations (Sindjoun, 1998;Zeleza, 1997; Grovogui, 1998; Nyango'oro, 1999). From the lessons of colonialismto the problems of resistance as represented in contemporary debates on thecontinent, Africa is a relatively underexplored region with respect to theory-building, and yet offers a powerful understanding of the functioning of states andmarkets,as well as the potential for their failure.This article first discusses some of the postcolonial debates parallel to thedevelopment of IR as a field in Westernscholarship. Second, it examines the mainassumptions and propositions of liberalism, as well as an understanding of thescope of its applicabilityin international relations and in Africaas advocated by itsproponents. Third, it acknowledges African perspectives on internationalrelations, and in particular on liberalism, and discusses some of the importantcritiques offered by scholars of Africa. The article concludes with observationsabout the contribution of Africa to an interrogation of the various assumptions ofinternational relations.

Colonialism, Apartheid, and Framing the DebateA fact that is rarelymentioned in the literature is that colonialism and imperialismin Africa existed parallel to the development of the canon of IR. Following theBerlin Conference of 1884-1885, African colonies were formed as territories ofEuropean conquest and settlement. The colonial state, therefore, wasverymuch a

280


4/13

NKIWANE:Africaand InternationalRelationscreation of European history in Africa; a fact not lost upon many Africans,particularlythroughout the warsof resistance against settler colonialism. From thishistory of violence and imposition, especially in the period following the SecondWorld War, emerged a variety of responses whose significance to the study ofinternational relations would become evident only decades later. In 1945 when theUnited Nations organization (UN) was formed, only four countries in Africa weremember-states, including the Republic of South Africa.1At present there are 53 UNmember-states from Africa, the majority of which gained their independenceduring the 1960s. In 1948, the same year the Universal Declaration of HumanRights was signed, the National Partycame to power in South Africa on a platformof the protection of white privilege, which transformed into the notoriousapartheid policy of separate development and group disenfranchisement of theAfrican population (Black, 1999). The Republic of South Africa was one of thefour African founder member-states of the UN, and its legendary policies of racialdiscrimination and apartheid make it an interesting and ironic study ininternational relations.The response of African scholars and politicians to these anomalies was toembrace pan-Africanism. As Mkandawire notes, African nationalism in itsexpression was both inward and outward looking, or both national andcontinental (Mkandawire, 1999: 32-37). This was in essence the nature of pan-Africanism. A pan-Africanist ethos enveloped the relations between and amongAfrican states as they gained independence and formed the Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU)on 25 May 1963. In order to understand Africa's internationalrelations, it is instructive to look at the Charter of the OAU(Clapham, 1996:108-111; OAU,1992). Of the seven principles guiding the organization, it isinstructive that a commitment to the total liberation of the African continentlooms large. The growing numbers of independent African states (as well as LatinAmerican and Asian states) in the 1960s enabled them to use the principles andestablished forums of international relations and global discourse to advance thecause of sovereignty and self-determination for Africans. The student, everattentive, now became the teacher.In 1963 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscrimination was passed in the UN General Assembly, and came into force in1969. The Africa Group guided the General Assembly in Resolution 2202A(xxi) indeclaring apartheid a crime against humanity. This was expanded in 1969 whenthe General Assembly recognized the South African struggle as one of self-determination and majority rule, as well as a struggle for human rights andfundamental freedoms (Resolution 2506, 21 November 1969). In effect this wasself-determination turned on its head, and used byAfrican countries to assert theirright to independence. At the OAU,during the same year, the Lusaka Manifestowas signed, committing the regional body to ending white minority rule on thecontinent.

During the 1960s and 1970s there were several attempts by the African Groupto spearhead the imposition of mandatory sanctions against South Africa throughthe UN Security Council (Klotz, 1996), attempts periodically thwarted by the tripleveto of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.2 In 1974, followingthe adoption of the International Convention on the Suppression andPunishment of the Crime of Apartheid (Resolution 3068 [xxvIII]of 30 November1973), South Africa was suspended from the General Assembly.South Africa throughout the 1970s systematicallyused the threat or application

281


5/13

282 International oliticalScienceReview 2(3)of force, as well as economic sanctions, as policy instruments in the SouthernAfrican region. This model of aggression, encompassing both military andeconomic measures, was first elaborated by the then South African Prime MinisterJohannes Vorster,who in 1975 proposed the establishment of a Constellation ofAfrican States. P.W.Botha, who took over from Vorster in 1978, expanded uponthe securityproblematic in the sub-region by proposing in 1977, while still defenseminister, the policy of "totalstrategy."The concept of "totalstrategy"was based on South Africa's claim of a "righttointervene" in any African state south of the equator. This, of course, was part ofapartheid South Africa's flagrant violation of, and refusal to comply with, bothtreaties and norms of international law. Between 1975 and 1985 the allocations fordefense rose dramatically, from 692 million rands to 4.27 billion rands, withmilitary incursions into and destabilization of South Africa's neighboring states,including Lesotho, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, and Zimbabwe alsoincreasing.As a political response to both apartheid South Africa and colonial rule insouthern Africa, the Frontline Stateswere born in 1974, spearheaded by Tanzaniaand Zambia, but also consisting of Congo-Brazzaville, Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa),and Botswana. The 1975 fall of the Portuguese colonial regime drasticallyalteredthe regional balance of forces, with Angola and Mozambique included as keymembers of the Frontline States. This also led to the withdrawal of Zaire andCongo-Brazzavillefrom the Frontline States grouping, and an increased effort bySouth Africa to block the efforts of the sub-region to free itself from political andeconomic dominance. The independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, of Namibia in1990, and the democratic election of a South African government in 1994, finallyaltered this regional balance, and led to the disbanding of the OAUliberationcommittee.

Centrality of the Development Debate in African International RelationsThe significance of political independence on the African continent hashistorically defined many aspects of post-colonial and post-apartheid relations.KwameNkrumah, the first president of Ghana, in a famous paraphrasesaid, "Seekye the political kingdom, and all other things shall follow."Questions of poverty,development, and underdevelopment have always been central in the debatesconcerning international relations, more specifically international politicaleconomy in Africa. Is political control central to African governments' ability totackle issues of poverty? From the point of view of many African scholars, theanswer has been "yes,"and this in turn has posed a number of interestingquestions. Many of these questions interrogate the definition of independence inits broadest sense, and examine the concept of neo-colonialism. The Africandebate has been best exemplified by the question of structural adjustmentprogrammes (SAPs),as advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)andthe WorldBank, and whether Africa has reached a "post-adjustment" eriod.One of the most problematic aspects of the position of Western IRtheoristsfrom the point of view of a variety of African scholars is with regard to themarriage of the propagation of democracy to foreign economic and politicalpenetration. The debate on structural adjustment in Africa has outlined thisconcern most clearly.The advocates of liberal market reform in Africa have faced a sustained


6/13

NKIWANE:Africaand InternationalRelationschallenge by Africans on the implications of allowing an unfettered "marketmechanism" to operate in highly dependent and vulnerable economies(Olukoshi, 1999). The sphere of economics throughout the 1980s and 1990s hasbeen characterized by both enforced constraint and market failure, which has ledto the movement towards a post-adjustment discourse in Africa and in theinternational financial institutions.The current transnational neoliberal economic offensive to open Africanmarkets seeks to claim, in the face of strong internal opposition, that Africa isbeing prepared for democracy. Are African countries, then, being designated aschoiceless democracies? (Mkandawire, 1999). In other words, who are the agentsof market reform, and to whom are they responsible? The hostility with whichinternational financial institutions have approached the question of stateintervention in Africa has been the subject of much discussion, particularly withrespect to the economic, social, and political effects of structural adjustment onthe continent.Fukuyama makes an unambiguous argument that modernization theory failedin the 1970s due to attacks from those he terms "generic postmodernists," ordependency theorists (Fukuyama, 1989). He further states that its resurgence is awelcome development. In the liberal position, there is an assumed compatibilitybetween democracy and capitalism in much of the literature; this assumptionunderlying liberal thought has been challenged by African theorists andeconomists at a varietyof levels.The centrality of this economic argument has been challenged from apragmatic perspective, after over two decades of liberal market reform throughoutmuch of Africa. As Claude Ake notes, since the 1970s there have been some partsof Africa that have declined so decisively due to market reforms that they haveestablished once and for all the notion of the reversibility of development (Ake,1995). Samir Amin has further argued that liberalization on the continent merelyreinforces unequal development in Africa (Amin, 1996).The belief in a mythical market that will alleviate the African economiccondition, therefore, is open to empirical contestation. There is no firm consensuson the effects of liberal market reforms in Africa, but a powerful and growingAfrican perspective argues that these reforms have not only failed to improve theAfrican condition, they have actually worsened it. The importance of thisperspective as a criticism of the liberal paradigm cannot be overstated, because iftrue the liberal assumption in international relations of open markets offeringopportunities for mutual gain will of necessity be open to question.African Perspectives on Liberalism in International RelationsThe liberal tradition in international relations looks to individual rights andindividual welfare as the normative basis for international institutions and globalexchange (Keohane, 1990). Although much of liberalism is drawn from the realmof economics, the political realm is increasingly represented as fundamental to itsethos. As a European theoretical tradition, the history of liberalism and theexamples from which it drawsare located largely in the West.Michael Doyle, in his description of liberal regimes, notes four definitionalcharacteristics. These are the presence of private market-based economies, theexistence of external sovereignty, a citizenry with juridical rights, and republicanrepresentative governments (Doyle, 1995). In the field of international relations,

283


7/13

International oliticalScienceReview 2(3)liberalism occupies a central explanatory space in outlining how peacefulcompetition and peaceful common marketization can lead to all round peace.Liberals also make the argument that the democratic ethos can be used to explainthe limits or absence of war, particularlyin the post-cold-warperiod. Liberalismmakes a powerful argument concerning the necessity for an open exchange ofgoods and services. This exchange, liberals argue, along with international rulesand institutions, leads to the promotion of both international peace and economicprosperity.In 1989 FrancisFukuyamapublished "The End of History?",n which he arguedthat Western economic and political liberalism had triumphed over any viablesystemic alternatives (Fukuyama, 1989). In this piece and later works, Fukuyamadraws from Hegelian thought, which traces the evolution of self-awareness andself-esteem to the point of perfection, and which Fukuyama argues has beenachieved in the modern liberal democratic society. Fukuyama contends thatpolitical democratization and consumer capitalism have resolved the maincontradictions over which, throughout history,human beings have been preparedto fight. With the fall of the communist bloc, he further argues, all rival forms ofpolitical identity have been eliminated in the sense that they have failed to satisfyeither the desire for wealth or the desire for freedom. Have we not then,Fukuyamaasks,reached the end of history?Fukuyama's argument has important implications for international relationstheory. First, it implies that peace will be accessible to all nation-states willing toundertake liberal democratic reform. Indeed, this civil peace brought about byliberalism, he argues, should logically have its counterpart in relations amongnation-states. The "theory"of a democratic peace has been the outgrowth of thisproposition, positing that democracies rarely if ever fight each other, tendinginstead to fight undemocratic or illiberal regimes.The liberal perspective in international relations does not take Africa seriously.African examples and perspectives are regarded as primarilyof nuisance value. Inhis "Second Thoughts," Fukuyamastates, "...and sub-SaharanAfrica has so manyproblems that its lack of political and economic development seemsoverdetermined" (Fukuyama,1999:19).Bernard Magubane reminds us that much of the historical literature that hasinfluenced Western thought, and in particular liberal thought, displays anuncritical ignorance of Africa. For example, Hegel in the Introduction o thePhilosophyfHistory tates,

At thispointwe leaveAfrica,not to mention t again.For t is no historical artof the world, it has no movement or developmentto exhibit. Historicalmovement in it-that is in its northern part-belong to the Asiatic orEuropeanworld.... Whatwe properlyunderstandbyAfrica s the unhistorical,UnderdevelopedSpirit,still involved n the conditionsof mere nature,andwhich had to be presentedhere as on the childhood of the world'shistory....The Historyof the World ravels rom East o West, orEurope s absolutelyheendof history;siathe beginning (quoted n Magubane, 999:25 [myemphasisadded]).This disregard for Africa and African contributions in much of the liberaltradition is, in my view, unfortunate. The assumption is made by many liberaltheorists that Africa has little to contribute with respect to either liberal democracyor consumer capitalism. The ignorance ingrained in this assumption exposes

284


8/13

NKIWANE:Africaand InternationalRelationsliberalism not only to a vast array of critiques, particularly from African scholars,but leaves the theory untested in a varietyof important circumstances. The Africancritique, direct or indirect, of liberalism in international relations enhances thebreadth and depth of our theoretical and operational understanding, and offersan important contribution to our interpretation of how nation-states relate. Thefollowing sub-sections examine a number of these critiques.WhoseRights?There have been a variety of important contributions from African scholars withrespect to the question of "rights," a centerpiece of the liberal doctrine. Therecent history of European colonialism of the African continent offers a regime ofrights from which the colonized were excluded (Mamdani, 1999). Thefundamental rights and freedoms advocated by liberal theorists were appliedhistorically in a racialized and exclusive manner in the African context, withliberalism virtuallysilent on this selective application.Mamdani further argues that after independence,

...the defense of racialprivilegecould no longer be made in the languageofracism.Confrontedby a deracialized tate,racismnot only receded into civilsociety but also defended itself in the language of individualrights andinstitutionalautonomy.To the indigenousears,the vocabulary f rights ranghollow,a lullaby orperpetuating acialprivilege(Mamdani, 999:193).Therefore the question of racialized privilege is not only an historical question

eliminated by decolonization; it is a contemporary problem, which liberalism doesnot address conceptually. This is precisely because it is the same discourse andlanguage of rights that is used to protect (usually racialized) privilege. InMamdani's view, this has led to a separation of the discourse of rights from thediscourse ofjustice in the post-colonial African context.The question of historically accumulated privilege is an important question forthe liberal discourse, because it asks, "Whose rights?"The post-apartheid contextin South Africa is interesting in this regard, because the definition of apartheidgoes to the heart of the debate over remedies. If apartheid is understood, as theliberal discourse would have us believe, as the denial of individual civil rights, thenthe restoration of these rights through the legislative elimination of discriminationwould point towards a remedy. If, on the other hand, apartheid is understood as adenial of collective socio-economic and political justice, then a remedy would ofnecessity need to examine the redress of these collective legacies. The South AfricanTruth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in Mamdani's view for example,identified the individual perpetratorsf apartheid abuse, but failed to identify thecollective beneficiariesf apartheid, which may be a more important question.3InterpretationsofDemocracyFukuyama in his definition of democracy outlines an extremely formulaicconstruction, which defines democratic regimes as those that grant their peoplethe right to choose their government through periodic, secret-ballot, multipartyelections on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage (Fukuyama, 1989).This narrow definition would include the vast majority of African countries in thepresent day.

285


9/13

International oliticalScienceReview 2(3)African scholars have led a debate on the substance of democracy that deepensthe liberal construct in meaningful and useful ways.This debate has been cast inthe framework of liberal versus popular or radical democracy (Saul, 1997). There

has been an obvious need, identified primarily by African scholars, to expand thedemocratic space and to discuss democratic attributes in relation to social agents.Indeed, liberal democracy in the African context has tended to be very illiberal,and there has been recognition that the defense of democratic rights cannot bereduced to the question of electoral politics alone.As Richard Saunders argues in the case of Zimbabwe, the liberal democraticconstruct outlines a pro forma democracy that evokes little popular enthusiasmand diminishes the active participation of ordinary Zimbabweans (Saunders,1995). Claude Ake concurs with this viewpoint in arguing the Nigerian case, andnotes that liberal democracy often repudiates popular power. In this casedemocracy then becomes a condition of power (Ake, 1995).The definition of democracy is more thanjust a conceptual question. There arevery real-worldpolicy implications and consequences pertaining to the export ofthe "democratic model" to countries throughout the globe, and therefore aninterrogation of the substance and meaning of democracy becomes crucial. Thedevil indeed is in the details, and a continuing debate on the African continentregarding this democratic substance is an important contribution and critique ofthe liberal paradigm.Challenging the DemocraticPeaceLiberalism claims to explain the systemic outcomes of inter-state actions. Theassumption that systemic predictions can follow from domestic theories ofpreferences is highlighted in much of the literature on the "democratic peace."The logic of the new world order, under the theory of a democratic peace, arguesthat there is a tendency for liberal regimes not to fight each other, as well as atendency for liberal regimes to fight non-liberal regimes. This construct has cometo define the liberal promise of international peace and cooperation through thepromotion of democracy and democratic institutions.Africa is rarelymentioned in the debate over whether democracies fight eachother, because it is asserted that there are no democracies in Africa. As alreadymentioned, not only is this untrue, but the entire notion of democracy is open todisputation. Although the theory of a democratic peace has been criticized on thegrounds that both historicallyand in the present day this debate is veryselective inthe way its proponents use to argue their cases, this criticism is not exclusive toAfrica.The spread of liberal democracy and consumer capitalism has not resolvedmany of the contradictions in Africa, but has rather in many cases exacerbatedinternal sociopolitical struggles, externalized in a varietyof forms. The logic of thenew world order necessarily disenfranchises the poorest regions, and this has ledto an increasing income distribution gap. On the African continent, the prospectsfor peace, arguably,have less to do with democracy in its liberal sense, and more todo with questions of socio-economic distribution, or a deepened understanding ofthe democratic question.The promise of peace to countries that undertake liberal institutional reformhas proven elusive on the African continent. The litmus test for democratic peacetheory is its abilityto define its variablesin a comprehensive format, as opposed to

286


10/13

NKIWANE:fricaandInternationalRelationsdismissing African countries as anomalies. In this sense the relationship betweenpolitical and economic reforms, as well as issues of distribution, must of necessitybe taken into account.

A proper understanding of the historical nature of the state in Africa is key inthis regard. Liberal scholars have here made a concession, in acknowledging thatliberalism can have imperial consequences or can lead to imperial pursuits. AsKeohane puts it, normatively liberalism is "distressingly plastic," andaccommodates too easily to dominant interests seeking to use its institutional skillsto improve the situation rather than fundamentally to restructure them (Keohane,1990: 192). This normative orientation of liberalism is significant in the sense thatthe democratic ethos is a conservative project, and has had contentiousconsequences, from "civilizingmissions"to the promotion of "good governance."From an historical perspective, it is crucial to understand that African nationsand peoples have pursued violent conflict over a varietyof fundamental principles,with the territorial state as not the only strategic representative body. WhereasDoyle makes the argument that democracies have forms of institutionalconstraints, he avoids a crucial question in Africa, where a variety of economicweaknesses have tended to feed other weaknesses in the sociopolitical sphere(Doyle, 1995). Democracy, then, is not necessarily the primaryfactor that preventswar in African international relations; indeed, it can actively promote war.

Understanding the StateThe state is one of the most enduring concepts in international relations, whetherrealists or liberals are discussing it. In what Olukoshi terms the "era of 'basketcase' thesis of Africa" (Olukoshi, 1999: 452), the 1990s were instructive in terms ofour approaches to the question of the state. How can we best understand the statein Africa, and how can this enhance our understanding of the state in thechanging global context? Some Western scholars of IR, in their failure to interpretthe evolution and fluidity of the state in Africa, have deemed it a "collapsed state"or a "failed state."Does this correspond to an empirical reality,or does this perhapsreflect the lack of creativityon the part of some Western-oriented scholars of IR?Mamdani notes that the key problem with the concept of "collapsed states" isthat "it proceeds by making analogies and in the process overlooks what isdifferent about the state in Africa" (Mamdani, 1998). As mentioned earlier in thisarticle, the concept of the state in Africa cannot be separated from its colonialbaggage, and with this colonial baggage came the persistent question oflegitimacy. If Bobrow is correct in his assertion that the state is enduring, yetchanging (Bobrow, 1999: 5), then it is imperative that scholars examine thequestion of the state with a degree of creativity and flexibility. As noted byFerguson and Mansbach, traditionally the central state drew its sovereignty andlegitimacy from its territorial citizens (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1999: 99-100),but in an increasingly globalized world this may be changing. The state may deriveits power from a variety of sources, and in the context of Africa what may appearto be a loss of central state power may in fact be its reconfiguration.ConclusionThe relationship between power, knowledge, and IR is complex, but we doourselves a disservice when we fail to identify the implications of these

287


11/13

International oliticalScienceReview 2(3)interactions. In this piece I have argued that the production of knowledge in thecontext of dominant and imperial relations of power not surprisinglyhas led to askewed view of African contributions to the discipline of international relations. Itis further argued that the contributions of African cases, African debates, andAfrican scholarship enhance theory-building in the field and challenge many ofthe assumptions held by some theorists.Ken Booth makes the point that "whatevertheoretical positions we have, andeven historians cannot escape them, it is an obligation to try to be self-aware,explicit and informed" (Booth, 1996: 334). In the case of international relations,as has been demonstrated, Eurocentric assertions are too often represented asfact, an assertion used to dismiss an entire continent as irrelevant to theories thatexpound a universal message. As has been demonstrated with reference to SouthAfrica, the key concepts of IRwere not developed with decolonization in mind,and indeed were used in an ironic fashion to argue against colonization in Africa.For many scholars of international relations, the relevance of Africa liesessentiallyin its nuisance potential. WhereasAfrican examples and scholarship arenot integrated into the mainstream of international relations' thought andcritique, it is recognized that the disruptivenature of socio-economic and politicalcrises in Africa can lead to serious consequences in terms of policy for manyWestern nations. This article has argued that the positive and negative lessonsemanating from the African continent not only have policy consequences, butmust of necessity lead to a reconsideration of certain theoretical assumptions inthe various paradigms. These theoretical assumptions include the primacy of theunfettered market in guiding economic relations, the liberal democratic constructas the basis of politics, and the European model of the state. The claim of liberalsthat the spread of consumer capitalism can be acclaimed as an asset to peace maybe true in some areas of the globe, but on the African continent it has onlyaccentuated the bitterness of this economic dispute. Ake (1995) argues that globalpolitics are similar to American urban centers, where violence is confined to thepoorer sections. This is a significant statement, since even within nations wherehistory supposedly has ended, the question of povertywill continue to bedevil theliberal paradigm, giving rise to new and meaningful contributions to internationalrelations theory.

Notes1. These four wereSouthAfrica,Egypt,Liberia, ndEthiopia.2. The well-known attempts were in 1970 (Resolution 282) where an attempt to imposemandatory sanctions was defeated by the triple veto of the United Kingdom, the UnitedStates, and France, and on October 30, 1974 when an attempt was made to have SouthAfricaexpelled from the UN.This too was vetoed.3. Mahmood Mamdani expressed these views in a seminar in the Department of SocialAnthropology, Universityof Cape Town, entitled, "FromReconciliation to Renaissance,"18 May1999.ReferencesAke,C. (1995)."TheNewWorldOrder:A ViewFromAfrica."n WhoseWorldOrder?nevenGlobalizationnd the End of the Cold War(H. Holm and G. Sorenson, eds.), pp. 19-42.Boulder:Westview ress.Amin, S. (1996). "On the Origins of Economic Catastrophe in Africa." In The

288


12/13

NKIWANE:Africaand InternationalRelationsUnderdevelopmentfDevelopment: ssays n HonorofAndreGunderFrank(S. C. Chew and R.A. Denemark, eds.). Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage Publications.Black, D. (1999). "The Long and Winding Road: International Norms and DomesticPolitical Change in South Africa."In ThePowerofHuman Rights(T. Risse, S. C. Ropp, andK. Sikkink, eds.), pp. 78-108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Bobrow, D. B. (1999). "Prospecting the Future." InternationalStudiesReview1(2): 1-10.Booth, K. (1996). "75 years on: rewriting the subject's past-reinventing its future." InInternationalTheory:Positivism and Beyond(S. Smith, K. Booth, and M. Zalewski, eds.).Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Brecher, M. (1999). "International Studies in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: FlawedDichotomies, Synthesis, Culmination." InternationalStudiesQuarterly,3: 213-264.Clapham, C. (1996). Africaand theInternationalSystem.Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress.Denemark (1999). "WorldSystems History: From Traditional International Politics to theStudy of Global Relations" InternationalStudiesReview,1(2): 43-75.Doyle, M. (1995). "Liberalism and the End of the Cold War." n InternationalRelationsTheoryand theEnd ofthe ColdWar(R. N. Lebow and T. Risse-Kappen,eds.). New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Ferguson, Y H. and R. W. Mansbach (1999). "Global Politics at the Turn of the Millennium:Changing Bases of 'Us' and 'Them'." InternationalStudiesReview,1(2): 77-107.Fukuyama, F. (1989). "The End of History?"TheNationalInterest, 6: 3-18.Fukuyama, F. (1999). "Second Thoughts." TheNationalInterest, 6: 16-33.Grovogui, S. N. (1998). "Rituals of Power: Theory, Languages, and Vernaculars ofInternational Relations."Alternatives, 3: 499-529.Keohane, R. 0. (1990). "International Liberalism Reconsidered." In TheEconomicLimitstoModernPolitics(J.Dunn, ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Klotz, A. (1996). Norms in InternationalRelations: The StruggleAgainst Apartheid.Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress.Magubane, B. M. (1999). "The African Renaissance in Historical Perspective." In AfricanRenaissance:TheNewStruggle M.W.Makgoba, ed.). Cape Town:Mafube Publishing.Mamdani, M. (1998). "Preliminary Notes on Political Science in Equatorial Africa."Paperpresented at HSRC/CODESRIAeeting 14-18 September, Johannesburg, South Africa(unpublished).Mamdani, M. (1999). "IndirectRule, Civil Society, and Ethnicity:The Africa Dilemma." InOut of One,ManyAfricas:ReconstructingheStudyand Meaning ofAfrica(W.G. Martin andM.O. West, eds), pp. 189-196.Manzo, K. (1999). "The International Imagination: Themes and Arguments inInternational Studies." ReviewofInternationalStudies,25: 493-506.Mkandawire, T. (1999). "Shifting Commitments and National Cohesion in AfricanCountries." In CommonSecurityand Civil Society n Africa (L. Wohlgemuth, et al., eds.).Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.Nyango'oro, J.E. (ed.) (1999). Civil Societyand DemocraticDevelopmentn Africa:PerspectivesfromEasternand SouthernAfrica.Harare:Mwengo.Olukoshi, A. (1999). "State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa: The Complex Process ofRenewal." In State,ConflictandDemocracyn Africa(R.Joseph, ed.), pp. 451-465. Boulder:Lynne Rienner.Organization of African Unity (oAu) (1992). "Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Proposals forAction." Addis Ababa: OAU.

Saul,J. S. (1997). "'For Fear of Being Condemned as Old Fashioned': Liberal Democracy vs.Popular Democracy in Sub-SaharanAfrica."ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy, 3: 339-353.Saunders, R. (1995). "Not ByVotes Alone." AfricanAgenda,1(4).Sindjoun, L. (1998). "L'Afrique dans la science des relations internationales: notesintroductives et provisoires pour une sociologie de la connaissance internationaliste."Paper presented at HSRC/CODESRIAeeting 14-18 September, Johannesburg, SouthAfrica (unpublished).Zeleza, P. T. (1997). ManufacturingAfricanStudiesand Crises.Dakar:CODESRIA.

289


13/13

290 International oliticalScienceReview 2(3)Biographical NoteTANDEKAC. NKIWANEs an assistant professor at Smith College. She is a SocialScience Research Council (ssRC)-MacArthurFoundation Fellow for Peace andSecurity in a Changing World. Her research interests include internationalrelations theory, regional organizations, and Southern African politics. ADDRESS:Department of Government, Wright 228, Smith College, Northampton, MA01063, USA. [e-mail:[email protected] [email protected]]

Africa and International Relations

Documents

Transcript of Africa and International Relations