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Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization

National Strategy for Combating Corruption in Afghanistan: A Critical Assessment

October 2019 Project Report

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Acknowledgements This report was made possible through financial support from the European Union Delegation – Afghanistan and UNDP – Afghanistan. About the Researchers The researcher for this report were Obaid Abdi and Ismael Zahid. This report was authored by Obaid Abdi, Dana Holland and Sarah Pugh About Citizens’ Forum Against Corruption (CFAC) Citizens’ Forum Against Corruption (CFAC) was established in late 2015 to build on the momentum to fight corruption in Afghanistan through a civil society driven initiative. CFAC acts as a forum through which civil society organizations, businesses, international donors, and ordinary citizens could protect themselves on legal grounds against extortion by corrupt officials and demand legislative reform and other actions to curb corruption. To this end, CFAC has a mandate to: • Identify the capacity needs of NGOs, private sector entities, and local and national authorities in conduct of

good governance practices with a focus on anti-corruption, knowledge of the policy process, and legal literacy and awareness raising on the utilization of the existing legislation against corruption.

• Strengthen civil society’s oversight of policy processes and government reforms on anti-corruption with a focus at the local level through needs-based capacity building interventions.

• Strengthen accountability, transparency, and thus legitimacy of local and national authorities through informed, pragmatic and constructive advocacy messaging by civil society (including the private sector) on anti-corruption, and adequate and accountable response to these messages from governmental authorities.

Activities of CFAC are conducted through the Anticorruption Sub-committee of the National Advocacy Committee for Public Policy (NAC-PP). For more information on CFAC and NAC-PP, see: www.nac-pp.net About APPRO Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO) is an independent social research organization with a mandate to promote social and policy learning to benefit development and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and other less developed countries through conducting social scientific research and monitoring, evaluations, and training and mentoring. APPRO is registered with the Ministry of Economy in Afghanistan as a non-profit non-government organization and headquartered in Kabul, Afghanistan with offices in Mazar-e Sharif (north), Herat (west), Kandahar (south), Jalalabad (east), and Bamyan (center). APPRO is the founding member of APPRO-Europe, registered in Belgium and acts as the Secretariat of NAC-PP. For more information, see: www.appro.org.af and www.appro-europe.net Contact: mail@appro.org.af Photo: Oriane Zerah APPRO takes full responsibility for all omissions and errors. © 2019. Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization. Some rights reserved. This publication may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted only for non-commercial purposes and with written credit to APPRO and links to APPRO’s website at www.appro.org.af. Any other use of this publication requires prior written permission, which may be obtained by writing to: mail@appro.org.af

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Table of Contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4

Fighting Corruption: Selected Examples ........................................................................................... 5

Fighting Corruption: Informal Measures .......................................................................................... 8

Fighting Corruption: Government Ministries .................................................................................... 9

Objectives, Methodology and Scope ...................................................................................... 10

Administrative Corruption in Afghanistan ............................................................................. 11

Adoption and Assessment of NSCC ........................................................................................ 12

NSCC Implementation Reports 2018-2019 ...................................................................................... 13

Analysis of Primary Data ....................................................................................................... 16

NSCC: Drafting Process ................................................................................................................... 16

NSCC Implementation .................................................................................................................... 17 Implementation: Government Views ................................................................................................................ 19 Implementation: Non-government Views ......................................................................................................... 21

NSCC and Changes in Knowledge, Attitude and Behavior ................................................................ 22

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 22

Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 23

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Introduction

One outcome of Afghanistan’s turbulent period from the early 1990s until 2001 was its emergence as a hub for illicit economic activities, namely opium production and cross-border smuggling.1 By 2001 corruption had been redefined as a key security issue, with international approaches to anticorruption targeting the nexus between “terrorism, narcotics, organized crime and ‘state failure’.”2 A central focus of reconstruction efforts upon entering Afghanistan in 2001 was thus to counteract the rise of narcotrade and the corrupt practices that facilitated it, primarily through poppy eradication and reforms targeting key institutions and administrative processes. National and international efforts aimed at curbing corruption have included capacity building, technical assistance, and mentorship for such governmental entities as the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, the Office of the Attorney General, Control Audit Office, and several others. Key administrative areas such as customs, business licensing, and tax collection have benefited from infrastructural improvements, rationalization of laws, and streamlining of procedures. In 2006, a report by the United States Congressional Committee on International Relations led to a change in corruption-related programming. The Committee’s report focused on the increasing prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan, concluding that a lack of basic democratic structures, such as political parties, had facilitated the institutionalization of corruption through the development of otherwise unlikely multi-party alliances.3 By 2007, the systematic nature of corruption in Afghanistan came to be recognized as a major problem for both the public and private sectors, including but also surpassing pre-existing concerns about narcotrade and smuggling. At a donor conference in Paris in 2008, the blatant and endemic nature of corruption had taken center stage. Facing increasing pressure from their own constituents, international donors made it clear to the Government of Afghanistan that corruption would have to be tackled more visibly, directly and systematically to ensure continued funding. This pressure brought about the launch of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO) in 2008 to replace the General Independent Administration for Anti-Corruption (GIAA), which had proved impressively impotent since being established in 2004.4 By 2009 Afghanistan was already ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption had become systematic and entrenched in public service delivery and government, with no apparent will by the government to address it.5 A the Tokyo Conference of 2012, continued international aid was conditioned on the government’s will to fight corruption. Calls for fighting corruption were renewed at the London Conference (2014), Brussels Conference (2016), and Geneva Ministerial Conference (2018).

1 Goodhand, J. (2002). Aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in Afghanistan. Third World

Quarterly, 23 (5), pp 837–859, 838. 2 Le Billon, Philippe (2008). Corrupting Peace? Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Corruption. International

Peacekeeping, 15 (3), pp 344-361, 344. 3 Committee on International Relations (2007). Afghanistan: Five Years after 9/11. Hearing before The Committee

on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session. Serial No. 109–230. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office).

4 Bertram, C. (2011). Corruption in Afghanistan among the most important problems for development: Interview, accessible at: http://www.boell.de/worldwide/asia/asia-corruption-afghanistan-interview-torabi-12589.html

5 Ibid

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The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) was established in 2011 through a Presidential Decree, and as a result of pressure by the international community on President Karzai, to monitor and evaluate the Government of Afghanistan’s progress in fighting corruption. MEC was created as an agency to function without interference, and independent, from the Government of Afghanistan and the international donors.6 In September 2014, after the formation of the National Unity Government, President Ghani reopened the infamous Kabul Bank case and made a firm commitment to tackle corruption. The National Procurement Commission, later named the National Procurement Agency (NPA), was created to mitigate political influence in public procurement and centralize the awarding of contracts. The Anti-corruption Justice Center (ACJC) was established in late 2016 with a mandate to “eliminate corruption and to [bring] government servants accused of corruption [to] justice.” ACJC has representation from police, prosecutors, and judges, Attorney General Office and courts.7 The effectiveness of NPA and ACJC in tackling corruption have been questioned, however.8 In 2017, the Government of Afghanistan renewed its commitment to fight against corruption by adopting the National Strategy for Combating Corruption (NSCC), consistent with its commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).9 This strategy is also a follow up to commitments made by the Government of Afghanistan at the Brussels Conference.

Fighting Corruption: Selected Examples

Administrative corruption is a byproduct of “failed governance.”10 Bolstering rule of law and adopting anticorruption legislation and policies are key formal measures for corruption control. Also important are informal and non-legal forms of control, such as values, cultural factors, and public trust that can provide normative restraints and internal discipline and control over potentially corrupt actors.11 Anticorruption strategies generally consist of specific institutional arrangements and intentional distribution of responsibilities to take on different aspects of the fight against corruption. Anticorruption strategies require three prongs to be effective: investigation, prevention, and education. Each can have varying manifestations, but experts agree that the education component should include a focus on the general public to obtain buy-in and support in curbing corruption.12 In some countries, a single anticorruption lead agency is created or designated, while in other settings multiple agencies play different roles. Anticorruption approaches also range from a single national strategy to a set of measures to promote transparency and accountability.

6 For more information, see: http://www.mec.af/ 7 For more information, see: http://www.afghan-

bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=3573&task=view&total=3673&start=381&Itemid=2 8 UNAMA. (2017). Afghanistan’s Fight Against Corruption: The other battlefied. 9 Government of Afghanistan. (November 2018). Afghanistan National Strategy for Combating Corruption. 10 Roopinder Oberoi. (2014). Mapping the Matrix of Corruption: Tracking the Empirical Evidences and Tailoring

Responses. Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 49(2) 187–214. 11 Abdullah, Nik Rosna Wan. (2008). Eradicating corruption: The Malaysian experience. JOAAG, 3, 1: 42-53. 12 Quah, J.S.T. (2011). Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? Bingley: Emerald Group

Publishing.

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Assessments by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have shown that anticorruption strategies are easier to implement when they are incorporated within broader national development initiatives. For example, in Malaysia anticorruption is one of the key national results areas pursued through the Government Transformation Program, which aims to contribute to making the country a high-income nation as prioritized in its Vision 2020. This approach also contributes to a longer-term approach to fighting corruption. Similarly, anticorruption strategies formulated in Indonesia, Maldives, and Papua New Guinea span from five to twenty years. One risk associated with linking anticorruption strategies to development agendas is that strategies, like development plans more generally, can become “wish lists” without corresponding effort to translate goals into action plans for implementation.13 Some argue that corruption cannot be fought successfully by a single agency or even multiple agencies, but instead requires a coalition of social partners. The partners should be the executive branch of government as well as the judiciary, legislature, private sector, professional bodies, civil society organizations, international agencies, media and the public.14 There is substantial variety in how countries structure their strategies and institutional arrangements to fight corruption. For example, Bulgaria has pursued anticorruption measures through existing law enforcement agencies.15 Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong have pursued the implementation of comprehensive anticorruption laws through a single, specific anticorruption agency. Some Asian countries have anticorruption laws, but no specific agency that enforces those laws. Philippines, China and India have anticorruption laws and multiple anticorruption agencies.16 A key factor in the fight against corruption is the existence of freedom of information laws and initiatives. The public is provided with recourse through a freedom of information mechanism when dealing with government units and can use the law to secure access to basic information about the status of a requested public service.17 Another key factor is political will, demonstrated by support from the highest levels of government and coupled with a legislative framework, realistic anticorruption targets and indicators, and sufficient resources for a systematic anticorruption program. Singapore and Hong Kong are often held up as examples of governments with a political will to tackle corruption:

Singapore and Hong Kong are more effective in corruption control because their governments have demonstrated their commitment by enforcing the comprehensive anti-corruption laws impartially and providing the [anti-corruption agencies] with adequate personnel and budget to enable them to perform their functions effectively. In contrast, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Taiwan are less effective in curbing corruption because their governments lack the political will as reflected in the higher staff-

13 Beth-Seo, Elodie and De Jaegere, Samuel (eds). (n.d.). Anti-corruption strategies: Understanding what works,

what doesn’t and why? Lessons learned from the Asia-Pacific region. United Nations Development Programme. 14 Man-wai, Tony Kwok. (n.d.) National Anti-Corruption Strategy: The Role of Government Ministries. The Eleventh

International Training Course on the Criminal Justice Response to Corruption Visiting Experts’ Papers. 15 Afzali, Sayed Ikram, and Timory, Mohammad Naser. (November 2016). Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan:

Solving the Institutional Puzzle. Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan. 16 Quah, Jon S.T. (2003). Curbing Corruption in Asia: A Comparative Study of Six Countries. Singapore: Eastern

Universities Press. 17 Peisakhin, Leonid and Pinto, Paul. (2010). Is transparency an effective anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a

field experiment in India. Regulation & Governance. 4(3): 261–280.

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population ratios and lower per capita expenditures of their anti-corruption agencies and the selective enforcement of the anti-corruption laws.18

A lesson learned from combating corruption in Hong Kong is that political will to fight corruption needs to place equal emphasis on public and private sector corruption.19 The case of Hong Kong also suggests that putting a single agency in charge of coordinating and fighting corruption is more effective than having multiple agencies charged with the responsibility. This is because with multiple agencies the likelihood of confusion over roles, responsibilities and accountability tends to be higher. In an examination of anticorruption efforts of Georgia, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Tanzania and Zambia, the following problems were identified as factors that undermined implementation and impact:20

• Lack of attention to the political dimension of anti-corruption initiatives. • Lack of active participation of ministries and public agencies, resulting in lack of buy-in. • Lack of prioritizing and sequencing activities and lack of adequate resources to implement plans • Insufficient attention to external review and self-assessment of anticorruption performance.

An additional weakness identified in the anticorruption strategies of many countries concerns monitoring and evaluation. Two factors account for inadequate monitoring and evaluation.21 First, lack of coordination of efforts in situations where multiple agencies are responsible for implementation disallows effective and adequate design of monitoring and evaluation. Second, an anticorruption strategy might assign overall responsibility for implementation to a specialized agency that lacks the necessary authority or leverage to demand actions from line ministries and other entities. The Hong Kong model has three necessary components of an anticorruption strategy – deterrence, prevention and education. These are embedded in Hong Kong's institutional arrangements for fighting corruption through three departments at the Anti-Corruption Commission:22

The Anti-Corruption Commission consists of three separate departments: the Operations Department to investigate corruption; the Corruption Prevention Department to examine the systems and procedures in the public sector, to identify the corruption opportunities and to make recommendations to plug the loopholes; and the Community Relations Department to educate the public against the evil of corruption and to enlist its support and partnership in fighting corruption.

Deterrence and enforcement, through the work of the Operations Department, receives 70 percent of the anticorruption budget in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong model has both a public complaint system and an elaborate check and balance system overseen by the Operations Review Committee. Although its effectiveness is not yet certain, China’s anticorruption strategy has prominently included all three necessary components. The strategy is being implemented in the overall form of a campaign

18 Quah (2011); Quah, Jon S.T. (2017). Learning from Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy: Policy

recommendations for South Korea. Asian Education and Development Studies. 6,1: 17-29. 19 Man-wai, T.K., 2006. Formulating an effective anti-corruption strategy–The experience of Hong Kong

ICAC. Resource Material Series, 69, p200. 20 Hussman & Hechler (2008) 21 Beth-seo & De Jaegere (n.d.) 22 Man-wai (n.d.)

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promoting the impartial application of anticorruption laws. The efforts of high-level officials and local civil servants are guided by a context specific application of the three components necessary to fighting corruption: investigation, prevention and education.23 Some fear, however, that given the political environment of China, the campaign can be used in a discriminatory manner to target political rivals, rather than reducing corruption and creating opportunity for new leaders to rise who are not corrupt.24 A final example of a country-specific application of the three necessary components to an effective anticorruption strategy is Malaysia. For a number of years, a criticism of the Anti-Corruption Agency of Malaysia was that despite numerous formal complaints of corruption and abuse of power, none was vigorously pursued by the Anti-Corruption Agency. For example, between 2001 and 2004 the agency received 38,471 complaints of which only 3,761 were investigated.25 As a result, the revised anticorruption strategy of Malaysia was based on the three components of detection, in the form of the imposition of severe punishment when corruption is detected; prevention, in the form of increasingly competitive salaries for government employees; and education, in the form of the likelihood of negative publicity in the mass media and negative public reaction when corruption occurs.

Fighting Corruption: Informal Measures

Many countries' experiences with anticorruption strategies illustrate that the mere existence of anticorruption laws, agencies, and policies does not assure success in fighting corruption. Informal or intangible factors are also necessary. These factors may include education, public awareness campaigns, and negative publicity initiatives. They are typically designed to change the views, knowledge, beliefs and thus behavior, of individuals regarding their actions toward corruption.26 In Malaysia, education and training remain as prominent features of anticorruption efforts. Also, the legislation on access to information has had an indirect but significant role in formalizing information provision by the government to the public about government activities and raising the expectation of the public about transparency and accountability in government procedures.27 Investigative journalism by the media and, by extension, the existence of freedom of press, also plays an important role in uncovering and publicizing corruption.28 One conclusion of the failed anticorruption strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the need for using education and public campaigns to change the public’s attitude regarding corruption and the importance of reporting corruption.29 The role of using education and religious teaching as tools for fighting corruption was researched in Afghanistan in 2017, underlining the need for early education on

23 Siddiqui, M.S. (November 2016). Anti-corruption strategy of Xi Jinping and Sheikh Hasina. The Asian Age. 24 lonescu, Luminita. (2016), Has China's Anti-corruption Strategy Reduced Corruption or Purged Political Rivals?

Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice. 8(1): 245-251. 25 Abdullah (2008) 26 Ibid. 27 Zemanovičová, Daniela, Sičáková, Emília, & Beblavý, Miroslav. (n.d.). Building an Anti-Corruption Strategy. CED -

Transparency International Slovakia. 28 Lee-Jones (2018) 29 Lee-Jones, Krista. (2018). Bosnia and Herzegovina: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption. U4 Helpdesk

Answer. Chr. Michelsen Institute.

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virtues of anticorruption and drawing on Islamic principles.30 Islam is seen as denouncing injustice, corruption, ethnocentrism, ignorance, poverty, discrimination, nepotism, bribery, deception and misusing public property [bait-ul-mal]. However, a key finding from the research was that methods of delivering Islamic teaching and values, which include clear provisions on anticorruption, are consistently unimaginative, ineffective, and done by unqualified instructors who fail to discuss the implications of Islamic provisions in practical, every-day, terms. The methods used in teaching Islamic virtues through education are seen by many as uninspiring, unengaging, rote-learned, and delivered and received by the disinterested.

Fighting Corruption: Government Ministries

Within government, when anti-corruption measures are led by an independent agency the role and responsibilities of individual ministries in fighting corruption are not always clear. Experts observe that sometimes government ministers do not see anticorruption measures as their responsibility. Based on the Hong Kong experience, a number of actions can be taken by government leaders to fight corruption through prevention, prosecution and education as follows.31 Prevention-related:

• Establish a ministerial level Anti-Corruption Steering Group. • Review procedures and systems to increase their transparency and accountability. • Formulate tailor-made codes of conduct and include regulation on acceptance of gifts and

entertainment. • Introduce a declaration system for conflict of interest. • Practice an open and fair recruitment and promotion system and include integrity checking. • Promulgate a zero-tolerance policy on corruption.

Prosecution-related:

• Establish an internal monitoring unit on corruption and an internal audit unit. • Enhance and promulgate a public and internal confidential complaint channel with a complaint

hotline. • Ensure prompt referral of cases to the anticorruption agency. • Fully cooperate with investigation of corruption cases.

Education-related

• Train personnel on ethics and methods of preventing corruption. • Institute leadership by example practices to educate personnel.

Many of these actions, which can be taken as standards of best practice at the ministry level, can also be adopted and implemented at the provincial and district levels of ministry operations. While these strategies might require some development of new departmental units or reallocation of staff responsibilities, many can be implemented through existing units and staff positions. For example, existing educational units, human resource departments, and media and public relations departments

30 APPRO (2017). Education and Anti-corruption: A Case Study, available from:

http://appro.org.af/publications/education-and-anti-corruption-a-case-study/ 31 Man-wai (n.d.)

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within ministries would assume important roles producing and disseminating anticorruption information and expectations, while finance and procurement departments would have a role in internal audit. The Hong Kong experience also highlights the need for strategies to overcome resistance to change, at both the individual and institutional levels:

Organizations, like individuals, also sometimes resist change because of fear of the cost, or a perception that they do not have the necessary resources. Sometimes key decision-makers fail to understand the alternative. Subtle resistance is often embedded in the resource allocation procedures, with reluctance to adopt new policies or refusal to change an established policy. Resistance typically involves affected groups such as middle managers, supervisors, units or groups who are opposed to a given corruption prevention strategy.32

Recognizing and managing this kind of resistance was an important aspect of Hong Kong’s success in combating corruption. Strategies to overcome this resistance included involving “the client” as deeply as possible to gain commitment to a successful outcome, setting standards, objectives and timelines against which progress could be assessed so that implementation could be monitored, and having in place standard follow up procedures to track the level of acceptance of report recommendations and their implementation.33 Drawing on attempts to fight corruption in other contexts, this research was carried out to assess efforts to implement Afghanistan’s National Strategy for Combating Corruption.

Objectives, Methodology and Scope

This research was carried out with the following objectives:

• Identify the internal and external actors and factors that shaped the drafting of NSCC. • Assess NSCC implementation in different ministries and agencies. • Identify issues for consideration in future anticorruption policymaking. • Make recommendations on closing the gap between NSCC objectives and outcomes.

The research is informed by a literature review focusing on the general scope of anticorruption strategies in other contexts and lessons learned. Data were collected during March 2019 in Kabul from key informant interviews with government, CSO, private sector, and international community representatives.

32 Chan (2000) 33 Ibid.

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Administrative Corruption in Afghanistan

The vast majority of Afghans today, over 80 percent, believe that corruption is a major problem for Afghanistan.34 Administrative corruption directly affects more than a quarter of the population.35 While the public is well aware of high profile cases of grand corruption, many Afghans suffer most directly from “petty corruption” in access to various basic services. Some additional noteworthy aspects of public sentiment about corruption in Afghanistan include the following:

• 52 percent of do not believe that the international community is serious about fighting corruption in Afghanistan.

• 62 percent agree with the statement that corruption within the state is facilitating the expansion of the Taliban.

• 44 percent see corrupt leadership as precipitating corruption. • Relatively few Afghans believe that government ministers, legislators or CSO workers are truly

committed to the interests of the public good and are instead motivated largely by self-interest and thus vulnerable to corrupt practices.36

Aside from these statistics, there is dearth of knowledge in Afghanistan about where and how corruption operates and sustains itself.37 Although some studies have been conducted about corruption in specific sectors and ministries such as education,38 security forces,39 taxation,40 and mining,41 additional research is needed for a better understanding of the drivers, the political economy and the psychology of corruption. In addition, there has been little effort by the government and international donors to incorporate empirical insights and expert opinion about administrative corruption in different sectors and contexts into anticorruption strategies.42 In 2009, USAID sponsored an assessment of the status of corruption in government under President Karzai.43 Decades of conflict, rising opium cultivation and heroin processing, and the size and diversity of international assistance had each contributed to increasing the country's vulnerability to corruption. Efforts to combat corruption, including through the High Office of Oversight, were constrained by

34 Asia Foundation. (December 2018). A Survey of the Afghan People. 35 Integrity Watch Afghanistan. (2018). National Corruption Survey 2018. Afghans’ Perceptions and Experiences of

Corruption. 36 Integrity Watch Afghanistan. (2018). National Corruption Survey 2018. Afghans’ Perceptions and Experiences of

Corruption. 37 APPRO (May 2017). Re-conceptualizing Corruption in Afghanistan: An Institution of Bad Governance. Kabul:

APPRO. 38 Centner, Adam J. (2012). Implementing International Anti-Corruption Standards to Improve Afghanistan’s

Education System. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 44. 39 Singh, Danny (2014) Corruption and clientelism in the lower levels of the Afghan police. Conflict, Security &

Development, 14:5, 621-650; Giustozzi, Antonio & Isaqzadeh, Mohammed. (2013). Policing Afghanistan: The Politics of the Lame Leviathan. London: C. Hurst.

40 APPRO (May 2017) 41 USIP (June 2017). Industrial-Scale Looting of Afghanistan’s Mineral Resources. United States Institute of Peace

Special Report. 42 APPRO (2017) and Abdi, O. (July 2018). Annotated Bibliography: Multi-agency Reporting on Anti-corruption in

Afghanistan. Kabul: APPRO. 43 Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. (2009). Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan. Kabul: Checchi and

Company Consulting, Inc.

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limited capacity, lack of authority, rivalries, and poor integration. Anticorruption laws, policies and procedures were slow to be developed and were poorly implemented. A lack of political will to fight corruption was evident. Patronage networks were strong and resistant to reform. Moreover, the “box-ticking” approach by donors focused on technical compliance more than the comprehensive organizational change necessary to end corruption.44 On the whole, prior to the current administration, anticorruption efforts have failed despite the fact that Afghanistan has been party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) since 2004.

Adoption and Assessment of NSCC

The National Strategy for Combating Corruption (NSCC) is generally aligned with the thematic areas identified in UNCAC, covering prevention, enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance. But the framework for engaging the general public through education is yet to be materialized in the strategy. NSCC is also aligned with Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework and advances key commitments made by the Afghan government in the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF) adopted in 2015. The legal basis of the NSCC resides in several Presidential Decrees. Overall responsibility for monitoring NSCC implementation is with the Anti-Corruption Commission, expected to be established in 2019. The Special Anti-Corruption Secretariat (SACS), which oversees the implementation of NSCC, coordinates with ministries and reports on NSCC implementation. SACS is to be consolidated with the Anti-Corruption Commission but is currently situated in the Office of the President. The High Council for Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption and the High Economic Council also have roles in monitoring the pace and effectiveness of NSCC implementation and assessing progress at ministry levels. The High Council, authorized under a Presidential Decree, has responsibilities to enforce rule of law and strengthen and reform the judicial system.45 The longer term vision for NSCC is that all anticorruption agencies will be consolidated under the Office of the Attorney General, and that the Attorney General will appoint a new Deputy for Anti-Corruption. Although the final institutional arrangements and distribution of responsibility and authority for NSCC are not yet fully realized, a number of observers are concerned about NSCC’s multi-institutional arrangements as being potentially confusing and leading to an ad hoc approach in fighting corruption.46 NSCC identifies the drivers of corruption as political and social fragmentation, institutionalized capture of government units and service provision, and impunity from prosecution of perpetrators of corruption. There does not appear to have been a serious attempt by the authors of NSCC to establish linkages with previously initiated efforts in the ministries to eradicate corruption. For example, the detailed Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Ministry of Public Health is not mentioned in NSCC or formally incorporated into the strategy or its benchmarks.47

44 Afzali & Timory (2016); Singh (2016) 45 Jennett, Victoria, Matthews, Alison, Arib, Edris, & Shinwari, Mohammed Naeem. (2016). From Promises to

Action: Navigating Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Commitments. Transparency International. 46 Afzali & Timory (2016) 47 See: MoPH (2017). Anti-corruption Strategy 2017-2020: Laying the foundations for zero tolerance of corruption in

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Some progress has been reported in the development of ministerial anticorruption plans though the quality and level of commitment is unclear.48 It is not clear, for example, whether ministry action plans are based on international anticorruption standards, reflect accurate analyses of organizational vulnerabilities and opportunities, build on previous anticorruption efforts, or advance a comprehensive approach to anticorruption. There are questions over how NSCC will involve the National Assembly, CSOs, the private sector and the public more broadly. To be successful, most observers believe that NSCC must transition to a longer-term comprehensive strategy that will oblige future administrations to maintain its commitments.49

NSCC Implementation Reports 2018-2019

The Afghan government has been monitoring the implementation of NSCC, reporting on a quarterly, biannual, and annual basis. The Annual Report for the Fiscal Year of 2018, for example, reports against all six pillars of NSCC and includes performance summaries for 26 ministries and their administrations as annexes.50 Of the 102 benchmarks in the revised strategy, this report notes that 40-44 benchmarks had been completed by the end of the Fiscal Year 2018 while the other 58 would be completed and reported on in the next phases of implementation:

…progress in implementation of benchmarks/indicators of the National Strategy for Combating Corruption has been remarkable during the fiscal year 1397 (2018), especially in the implementation of action plans to combat corruption in the ministries and directorates.51

The report noted that there was a need for the ministries and directorates to give more attention to the implementation of benchmarks and indications in their anticorruption action plans. There have been delays in reporting from some ministries and directorates, a lack of familiarity within some ministries and directorates about how to report anticorruption activities, lack of capacity or adequate cooperation regarding reporting, delays in the formulation and follow up of plans, lack of prioritization and adequate attention to anticorruption activities in some ministries’ internal directorates, and low quality and detail and level of supporting evidence in some of the reports from ministries and directorates. Some ministries and directorates have shown improvement in their reporting capacities, however. The Audit Report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in May 2018 reported on the performance of the government to implement NSCC, focusing on the extent to which the government had:

the health sector.

48 Special Anti-Corruption Secretariat. (2018). First Semiannual Report of fiscal year 2018 on the Implementation of National Strategy for Combatting Corruption.

49 UNAMA (2018); SIGAR. (May 2018). Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Efforts: The Afghan Government Has Begun to Implement an Anti-Corruption Strategy, but Significant Problems Must Be Addressed. SIGAR 18-51 Audit Report.

50 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2018). Office of Chief of Staff for the President, Deputy of Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation, Special Anti-Corruption Secretariat. Annual Report of Fiscal Year 2018 on the Implementation of National Strategy for Combating Corruption.

51 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2018), NSCC Annual Report.

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• Had met the anti-corruption deliverables it agreed to under the Self Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF)

• Had created an anti-corruption strategy that meets international anti-corruption strategy standards and best practices

• Is implementing its anti-corruption commitments in the anti-corruption strategy and benchmarks, and

• Has made progress or experienced challenges in implementing anti-corruption reforms.52 The report found that while implementation of anticorruption strategy had begun, alongside other reforms, there were remaining questions regarding the government’s ability to fully implement the strategy, and “to demonstrate a lasting commitment to combatting corruption.”53 The report also found that as of February 28, 2018, two of the 20 anticorruption benchmarks due by that date had been met. On receipt of the draft report from SIIGAR, the government completed an additional 12 benchmarks by May 14, 2018, bringing the total number of completed benchmarks to 14 out of 20. In similar fashion, the draft of the SIGAR audit found that 22 of 58 Afghan government entities had created anticorruption plans by February 2018. After receiving the draft report, the government showed that 26 additional ministries had submitted their action plans, bringing the total up to 48 out of 58. Despite these measures, the SIGAR report concluded that:

By completing 12 benchmarks between 3 and 6 months after their deadlines, and not completing the additional 5 as of the publication of this report, the Afghan government risks losing the momentum needed to effect lasting change.54

NSCC did not meet some international standards and best practices such as fully engaging civil society organizations as well as ministries even though some of those ministries would hold responsibility for the implementation of the strategy. A key omission is the role of the Ministry of Defense.55 Five major challenges continue to limit the government’s ability to combat corruption, including: 1. Key anticorruption institutions such as ACJC and [Major Crimes Task Force] MCTF lack the capacity,

resources, or security to perform their functions 2. Despite efforts by the Afghan government to clarify the law, Afghan officials have differing opinions

about when the MCTF’s detective role ends and when the AGO’s investigative role begins, which has led to recurring conflict between the two organizations;

3. Afghanistan’s law enforcement and judiciary often avoid investigating, prosecuting and punishing powerful individuals;

4. Unqualified and potentially corrupt actors continue to operate in key Afghan anti-corruption institutions … This, combined with reports of reprisals against reformers and whistleblowers, enables corrupt actors to control anti-corruption bodies and discourages those who would challenge them.

52 SIGAR (2018) 53 Ibid.54 Ibid, p21 55 Ibid, p2

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5. Finally, U.S., international, and Afghan officials all expressed skepticism about parliament’s willingness to support anti-corruption reforms.56

In its conclusion, SIGAR calls for SMARTer indicators to measure progress against each benchmark, inclusion of multiple stakeholders such as civil society and the Ministry of Defense, streamlining formal anticorruption government agencies including deciding which government function will assume responsibility for the role of the High Office of Oversight, increasing technical training and education on anticorruption, provisioning adequate resources, stricter measures to ensure the recruitment of adequate staff by conducting polygraph tests of personnel, and taking appropriate action against those that fail such tests. In a written response to the draft of the SIGAR Audit, the Afghan government concurred with most of the matters put to it for consideration by SIGAR.57 The government agreed that anticorruption bodies should be granted the necessary resources and specialized staff, and that training was needed to carry specialized anticorruption functions. However, the government argued that all anticorruption bodies were already secure, well-trained and well-resourced. In May 2019, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also released its report on anticorruption, with the aim of supporting Afghanistan’s anticorruption reforms “by assessing the impact of anti-corruption measures through the collation and analysis of available data and by providing concrete recommendations.”58 The UNAMA report noted that in 2018 and early 2019, Afghanistan’s anticorruption reform efforts had “come a long way towards establishing a robust anti-corruption framework and dedicated institutions to implement it.”59 As examples of these efforts, the report highlighted the coordination of anticorruption reforms at the highest level in the High Council for Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption, alongside “the work of a dedicated Anti-Corruption Justice Centre.” It also pointed to the codification of all mandatory corruption offences in line with the UNCAC in the new Penal Code, Afghanistan’s adoption of a dedicated anticorruption strategy and anticorruption law, and an increase in the numbers of officials, including parliamentarians, who have undergone asset registration and verification. However, the UNAMA report also noted that the implementation of these strategies and operationalization of these institutions to produce the desired outputs “requires persistent effort,” noting that during the review period, there was “growing impatience that results from these laws and strategies were not materializing quickly enough.”60 It suggested that the 20-21 October 2018 parliamentary elections, the 27-28 November 2018 Geneva Conference on Afghanistan and the acceleration of the peace process had all impacted the pace of anticorruption reforms. UNAMA, like SIGAR, also notes difficulties in the execution of ACJC arrest warrants, and a high number of defendants being tried in absentia.61

56 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress. July 30 2019. p. 20-21. Available at: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2018-07-30qr.pdf,57 Ibid., p.42 58 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Afghanistan’s Fight Against Corruption: Groundwork

for Peace and Prosperity. May 2019. p7. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afghanistans_fight_against_corruption_groundwork_for_peace_and_prosperity-20_may_2019-english.pdf

59 Ibid., p3 60 Ibid., p3 61 Ibid., p4

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The tracking system established by the government to monitor the Strategy is “unprecedented.”62 The report notes disagreement from civil society regarding the government’s quantification of implementation progress against benchmarks in its reporting, streamlining and defining goals and benchmarks, streamlining ministries’ and institutions’ anticorruption plans, and incorporating new priorities along with other adjustments.63

Analysis of Primary Data

NSCC: Drafting Process

NSCC is guided largely by the government’s SMAF commitments. The timetable for implementation was slightly delayed from initial plans to launch in mid-2017. The strategy’s drafting was driven by the President’s Office and the document was finalized by an international adviser at the President’s Office.64 The process is described as “rushed”, compromising the time made available for consulting with stakeholders and developing associated benchmarks.65 CSO consultation during the NSCC drafting process consisted of one or two meetings held to solicit input and refine benchmarks once they were already identified.66 Consultations did not include private sector representatives, although some believe this was not necessarily an omission.67 The Parliament and local government authorities were not included in consultations and there is no evidence of anticorruption policy measures at the provincial level.68 Critics assert that the lack of consultation in developing NSCC resulted in missing an opportunity to build public support for anticorruption measures.69 It is unclear whether a political economy analysis, or other forms of analysis, formed an empirical foundation for developing NSCC. Some see the process as seriously lacking:

Drafting an anticorruption strategy is a process that actually needs time. The way that I would have wanted to see it would have been that the independent institutions draft their parts of the strategy and that draft would be [a source of consultation] with the other institutions under the eye of High Council for Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption. It should then also be consulted over in the provinces and with civil society and the private sector.70

A total of 52 ministries and agencies were said to have been involved in the development of NSCC, with 15 playing particularly important roles. One government respondent characterized the five pillars of the strategy as each having particular relevance to one or more government unit. NSCC implies that leadership for anticorruption is centralized and applies primarily to the President's Office, rather than being decentralized and applying to all leading government ministries, agencies, and departments. A

62 Ibid., p15 63 Ibid., p1664 KI-F-Kab-NGO-4 – See Appendix for coding keys. 65 KI-F-Kab-NGO-4, confirmed by 1 KI in Kabul 66 KI-F-Kab-NGO-1, confirmed by 2 KIs in Kabul 67 KI-F-Kab-NGO-5 68 KI-F-Kab-NGO-1, confirmed by 2 KIs in Kabul. KI-F-Kab-NGO-4 69 KI-F-Kab-NGO-1, confirmed by 3 KIs in Kabul 70 KI-F-Kab-NGO-4

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potential limitation of NSCC noted by government respondents is the absence of a mechanism to monitor people’s experiences with corruption in particular government entities.71 Some ministry involvement in drafting NSCC pertained to the benchmarks identified based on the Vulnerability to Corruption Assessments conducted by the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC):

Following from the MEC assessment, areas that could be vulnerable to corruption were identified. Based on [these vulnerabilities] the strategy for our ministry was developed. The benchmarks covered both the senior leadership and the provincial offices.72

One important aspect of NSCC implementation to date is that it has not been associated with any increased budget allocation for completing benchmarks or initiating action plans. Instead, each ministry and agency is expected to complete requirements and achieve benchmarks as part of its current operational budget.73 This sometimes has involved reallocating resources to new priorities.74 NSCC required each ministry to appoint a focal point to oversee ministry-specific NSCC responsibilities. This process has been uneven and in some cases these staff members are only superficially aware of the strategy or their ministry’s obligations.75

NSCC Implementation

The strategy focuses on a few government ministries, specifically those dealing with security, public finance, and justice. While in some ways this is a limitation and risks undermining a comprehensive approach to fighting corruption, at the same time these sectors are the most consequential to creating a broader enabling environment for security and stability.76 NSCC incorporates deliverables, in the form of benchmarks, as “tangible and achievable”, an approach commended by some.77 Lack of political will by senior government officials remains a challenge in implementing NSCC. This has been evident, for example, in slow efforts to reform the tax collection system and tax administration processes.78 Problems remain with mid-level leadership’s incompetence, lack of attention, or purposeful corruption in the tax department and with changing procedures.79 External factors also have a major bearing on efforts to implement NSCC:

I also think that the focus on the strategy has been a bit overridden by other events. I mean in general there is the stated commitment that this strategy will be further pursued, but then there is the election,

71 KI-M-Kab-GO-1 72 KI-M-Kab-GO-3 73 KI-M-Kab-GO-1, confirmed by 4 KIs in Kabul 74 KI-M-Kab-GO-6 75 KI-M-Kab-GO-776 KI-M-Kab-NGO-1 77 KI-M-Kab-NGO-2 78 KI-F-Kab-NGO-5, confirmed by 1 KI in Kabul 79 KI-F-Kab-NGO-5

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the peace process and other priorities in between. And I do think that since September 2017 it has lost a bit of attention.80

To a large extent it remains difficult to establish whether and how most of the benchmarks have been completed. The institutional form, membership, appointment protocols, and authority of the anticorruption commission – the National High Council for Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption – are not clear.81 SACS continues to consume day-to-day work of the NSCC, disallowing sufficient time and resources dedicate to monitoring and reporting compliance.82 There is concern that even if benchmarks are achieved, these are limited to changes in procedures and process and will not bring about more systematic change.83 In other words, in the parlance of performance management, the current anticorruption strategy emphasizes activities and outputs, but neglects longer-term outcomes and impacts. Many believe that having NSCC signifies serious high-level commitment to fighting administrative corruption within the Government of Afghanistan.84 At the same time, however, there remain a number of approach-related weaknesses that compromise NSCC implementation and impact. For example, NSCC benchmarks are based almost entirely on findings from vulnerability assessments conducted by MEC without efforts to conduct supplementary research, such as political economy assessments, or further analysis using basic tools such as SWOT analysis.85 NSCC has established committees and extended authority to individuals within ministries for carrying out tasks without paying close attention to their history, tasks they are expected to carry out, or whether and how tasks delegated to them are actually being implemented.86 In addition, senior ministry officials and departmental heads have not consistently prioritized or committed to anticorruption practices. This lack of commitment could stem from managerial dysfunction and genuine lack of capacity to undertake change. It could also be a result of efforts by corrupt individuals in leadership positions:

Corrupt individuals have years of experience and understand how to misuse authorized responsibility while those working to tackle it have limited experience and courage to fight it.87

In part, shortcomings in implementation efforts are attributed to insufficient resources being allocated to implement NSCC. The government’s position is that implementing NSCC should be an integrated aspect of programming and strategy making by governmental entities and, as such, should not require ear-marked funds, unless such funds are used to employ qualified technical experts.88

80 KI-F-Kab-NGO-4 81 KI-F-Kab-NGO-4 82 KI-F-Kab-NGO-4 83 KI-M-Kab-NGO-3 84 KI-M-Kab-GO-6 85 I-M-Kab-GO-6 86 KI-M-Kab-GO-2, confirmed by 1 KI in Kabul 87 KI-M-Kab-GO-1 88 KI-M-Kab-GO-1, confirmed by 1 KI in Kabul

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Implementation: Government Views

The government is more positive than civil society organizations about the progress made in the implementation of the NSCC. Government representatives claim that under Pillar 1, changes in the law for processing legislative amendments has been a particular accomplishment, particularly in relation to creating a means for citizens and CSOs to provide input into drafting and amending laws. In addition, citizen confidence in the justice sector has improved, indicated by growing case logs in comparison to previous years.89 Aspects of NSCC that have encouraged human resource management reform were viewed as particularly important as were elements strengthening the integrity of senior government office holders. Efforts to enhance financial transparency were equally prioritized in importance.90 Reference is made by government officials to the Asset Registration Department in the Administrative Office of the President, the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARSC) and the Ministry of Defense.91 The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) continues to expand installation of complaint boxes and other measures to address corruption despite mounting security problems in health service delivery. The Attorney General’s Office (AGO) has been lauded for completing nearly all – 36 of 40 – benchmarked activities assigned to it under the NSCC.92 Progress has been slower in the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) while a key challenge in the implementation of NSCC has been lack of access to and the sheer size and scope of the Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs, however.93 In addition to bolstering the legal framework to fight corruption and cracking down on private provision of public services by government employees, ministries have pursued staffing changes and effected improvements in corruption reporting in response to NSCC requirements. In one entity, a new director level leadership was introduced with the new director firmly committed to enacting anticorruption reform. This change in leadership approach has inspired staff members to take corruption more seriously. Also, upwards of 40 managers have been replaced by employees with better skills and stronger commitment to reform.94 Another ministry introduced a system for prioritizing and tracking the implementation of development projects. As part of this initiative, citizens can now monitor the progress of projects in the provinces.95 In another entity, complaint boxes continue to be installed for the public to report grievances and instances of corruption. Staff members are also now less likely to advise clients to seek services from private providers.96 Understaffing has constrained the Special Anti-Corruption Secretariat (SACS) in playing its intended role of oversight.97 The timeframe of two years for NSCC is insufficient to allow for orderly recruitment,

89 KI-M-Kab-GO-6 90 KI-M-Kab-GO-4 91 KI-M-Kab-Go-1 92 KI-M-Kab-Go-3, confirmed by 1 KI in Kabul 93 KI-M-Kab-GO-1, confirmed by 1 KI in Kabul 94 KI-M-Kab-GO-4 95 KI-M-Kab-GO-7 96 KI-M-Kab-GO-3 97 KI-M-Kab-Go-1

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capacity development, and overcoming institutionalized resistance to reform.98 Despite these challenges, the number of cases referred to AOG has increased significantly.99 Government respondents were uniform in also identifying staffing and staff capacity as paramount in NSCC implementation. Specifically, one benchmark in the strategy anticipates the retirement of 5,000 government employees who are to be replaced with better trained and more skilled public servants. However, until this pool of employees has cycled out of the workforce, substantial resources are needed for capacity building.100 In particular, NSCC success requires analytical skills – for tasks such as reviewing and amending laws and procedures, conducting internal audits, human and management information systems, and assessing research and monitoring reports – which are contingent on advanced and specialized academic training.101 Given the importance of human resource availability and expertise for effective anticorruption strategy implementation, the lack of prospects for additional and committed human and financial resources was seen as a source of concern. The ministry focal point staff members are referred to as “volunteers” and many are not sufficiently or adequately skilled to carry out the tasks demanded of them. A case in point is the installation of the many complaint boxes to collect complaints, but not having adequate human, technical and financial resources to analyze and conclude from the data collected from the complaints and, ultimately, taking action. Overseeing how government services are provided at the local level in provinces and districts also requires transport and related resources for vehicles, fuel, drivers and ability to process the collected information.102 Internal organization dysfunction, including poor coordination among departments and across units and ministries create numerous opportunities for corrupt civil servants to continue their corrupt practices unimpeded.103 Given this lack of internal order, NSCC was viewed by the old guard as another attempt to address corruption destined to fail:

Because it was the first time that such a strategy was established, or such a process was being carried out, some officials didn’t take this seriously. It was not properly implemented in the early days and government employees were not responsible for it.104

Resistance and wariness to change, even by those who are not corrupt, has been a common reaction within government to toward the implementation of NSCC. Ministries were typically requested to create action plans, usually at the ministerial level. The actual task of creating action plans was left with the Director of Planning, Director of Policy, or the Director of Internal Audit.105 For many observers, this manner of pushing down implementation responsibilities within ministries has contributed to the reluctant response to NSCC by various ministries.106

98 KI-M-Kab-Go-6 99 KI-M-Kab-Go-2, confirmed by 2 KIs in Kabul 100 KI-M-Kab-Go-1 101 KI-M-Kab-GO-4 102 KI-M-Kab-GO-3, confirmed by 1 KI in Kabul 103 KI-M-Kab-GO-4 104 KI-M-Kab-GO-4 105 KI-M-Kab-Go-1 106 KI-M-Kab-Go-4

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Government respondents offered a number of recommendations for improving and extending the impact of NSCC. There is recognition, however, that time and patience are necessary and that expectations should be adjusted to the scope of the benchmarks and short duration of implementation.107

Implementation: Non-government Views

From a civil society perspective, the merit-based government hiring process is laudable despite the fact that it applies only to lower ranks of employees. Corruption and nepotism among higher ranks of government employees continue unabated.108Progress has been made in reducing the processing time for judicial cases and there is optimism about the eventual establishment of independent oversight mechanisms.109 However, the scattered nature of NSCC benchmarked activities has led to some skepticism about NSCC’s overall approach to fighting corruption.110 NSCC’s reliance on pillars and benchmarks is seen by some as being at the expense of enforcement and good governance practices.111 NSCC requires all government units to produce an action plan aligned to its benchmarks. Ministries have received workshop training to undertake this task. As required, most ministries and agencies have created action plans. However, the ministries have not consulted with CSOs or other stakeholders in the preparation of their action plans. The result is that the public is unaware of the ministries’ lower level efforts, or obligations, to fight corruption and can be misled about what is being done by the government to address corruption.112 NSCC is aligned with national development priorities but it “falls short” in meaningfully addressing the larger purpose of eradicating administrative corruption. Reasons for this shortcoming are a lack of technical capacity among government employees, lack of political will, lack of financial resources, and limitations inherent in pursuing anti-corruption strategies through small and scattered activities rather than a holistic approach involving all government agencies.113 Implementing the benchmarks of NSCC will not necessarily result in reaching the larger goal of eradicating corruption, given the complexities of administrative corruption and the short, two-year, period granted to NSCC to address corruption.114 Ministry staffing, staff capacity, and technical limitations should be addressed more fully in NSCC implementation.115 Emphasis should also be placed on the benchmarks for the justice sector on investigating and prosecuting corruption cases in a timely manner.116 Future anticorruption strategy development and implementation should be more independent of the government and more inclusive of multiple stakeholders, though this would require a stronger political will.117

107 KI-M-Kab-Go-1 108 KI-F-Kab-NGO-1 109 KI-F-Kab-NGO-1 110 KI-F-Kab-NGO-3 111 KI-F-Kab-NGO-4 112 KI-M-Kab-NGO-1 113 KI-M-Kab-NGO-1, confirmed by 2 KIs in Kabul 114 KI-F-Kab-NGO-4 115 KI-M-Kab-NGO-3 116 KI-M-Kab-NGO-3, confirmed by 1 KI in Kabul 117 KI-M-Kab-NGO-3

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NSCC and Changes in Knowledge, Attitude and Behavior

All government respondents interviewed for this research believe that some changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior have resulted since the initiation of NCSS. They also uniformly agree that it is too early to discern real change, given how recently the strategy was launched. Because of NSCC, many believe that there is now a view that the Afghan government is taking corruption seriously. Knowledge about the NSCC initiative has grown within government entities and quarterly reports are undertaken with care.118 There has also been an increase in cooperation with NSCC, sometimes as a result of punitive incentives built into implementation of NSCC. For example:

During the inception of asset registration of high-ranking government officials, these individuals were very defensive and opted to not cooperate with the asset registration department of the [Administrative Office of the President]. [In one ministry] it took a lot of time to convince the Minister to register his assets and wealth. It was even more difficult to approach members of Parliament…. A meeting was organized and all individuals were briefed about the importance of asset registration. [It was communicated that] cases of non-compliance [will result in being] barred from some government [services], like access to a diplomatic passport, which would prevent travel outside Afghanistan, and penalties. As a result, they all started registering their wealth and bank accounts with the related department.119

NSCC implementation has increased cooperation among ministries and within individual ministries regarding anticorruption, despite the fact that the legal status of NSCC is unclear.120 Some attribute the success of NSCC to providing “a guiding framework that obliges government entities to be proactive in dealing with the menace of corruption.”121 Commentators from civil society also view NSCC as having succeeded in generating positive ministry level change. References are made to the relatively more transparent manner in which recruitment takes place in different ministries and fewer reports of misuse of public assets by public servants.122 At the same time, there is agreement that it is too early to assess changes in petty corruption in the provision of services to the public. It is particularly hard to know if corruption and corrupt practices hav been affected at the provincial and district levels.123

Conclusion

One overarching finding from this research is the symmetry in views of government officials and civil society on limitations and opportunities in attempts to combat corruption based on the experience of NSCC to date.

118 KI-M-Kab-Go-1 119 KI-M-Kab-Go-1 120 KI-M-Kab-Go-2, confirmed by 3 KIs in Kabul 121 KI-M-Kab-GO-7 122 KI-M-Kab-NGO-1 123 KI-M-Kab-NGO-3

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NSCC was not intended to be a long-term comprehensive strategy for eradicating administrative corruption in Afghanistan. Instead, its design appears intended to jump start the process in terms of planning and institutional arrangements as well as achieving measurable results in areas that, once reformed, should make ensuing corruption control more effective. A key challenge will be converting the limited success of NSCC into institutional reform to sustain efforts to eliminate administrative corruption.

Recommendations

Sustain High-level Commitment to Anticorruption: One strength of NSCC has been in sending strong signals throughout government institutions that corruption is being taken seriously. This was largely due to the fact that the President made it explicit that he was firmly behind NSCC. To sustain this energy, care should be taken that the current attention on anticorruption is not overshadowed by other issues. Decentralize Leadership for Anticorruption: Corruption as a systemic and systematic problem needs to be fought based on sound strategy, imposed from above, and coordinated action at lower levels. Maintaining integrity and serving the public interest is the responsibility of every government employee, not only “focal points” or those who are directly involved in NSCC benchmarks. Anticorruption guidelines and requirements should be incorporated into every job description and code of professional conduct, civil service entry and promotion exams as well as induction procedures, performance review assessment and promotions, and capacity development programming. These inclusions would operationalize political will and institutionalize zero tolerance. Educate Civil Servants and the Public about What Corruption Entails: NSCC embraces the notion that the causes of corruption are specific to the national setting. However, the strategy does not acknowledge that fighting corruption requires contextually and historically nuanced approaches. Uniform definitions of what is and what is not corruption should be developed and disseminated. Concrete, sector specific, examples of corruption and corrupt behavior should be used for illustrative purposes. Education on anticorruption is more likely to succeed if linked to personal and national pride, as well as how uncontrolled corruption contributes to insecurity, bad governance, and social injustice. Bolster Corruption Research and Analysis: NSCC was based on analysis conducted by the MEC. While this is appropriate, the elimination of administrative corruption in Afghanistan requires not only more analyses, but by multiple sources. To be effective, the fight against corruption in Afghanistan also needs repeated applications of standard assessment tools such as SWOT and situation analyses. Align Ministry Level Anticorruption Action Plans with International Standards: Government units in Afghanistan must learn from the lessons and wisdom of other national settings that have proven successful in limiting administrative corruption. Recognize Limitations of a Technocratic Approach in Fighting Corruption: It is not entirely clear how NSCC relates to advancing good governance more generally. One way to rectify this is to take seriously the expert view that “corruption is a by-product of failed governance” and determining what this means in the Afghan context both generally and in particular organizational settings within government. A particular area requiring attention, from a good governance perspective, is the inclusion of civil society in decision making on anticorruption.

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Put Anticorruption on National Political Agenda: proactively engage the public through media and public awareness messaging that corruption is detrimental to the security of the country and provide full publicity on prosecuting cases of corruption within the government as a means to associate being corrupt with being dishonorable, shameful, contrary to Islam, and the antithesis of serving the Afghan people. Match Political Will with Adequate Resources: Political will is more than a leader voicing anticorruption messages or leading by example. To effect political will, there needs to be sufficient human, technical, and financial resources. At the same time, not every anticorruption reform requires new financial resources. A strong indicator of serious political will is reallocation of existing funds to fight corruption. Formalize Anticorruption within Legal Framework: NSCC is seen by many government entities as “voluntary” and without full legal authority. The legal and official status of the NSCC needs to be formalized to increase authority and legitimacy. Acknowledge and Incentivize Good Practice in Anticorruption: Promising efforts to combat corruption in government units should be identified, publicly acknowledged and disseminated broadly. Integrity awards and public service awards should be presented annually in each ministry and agency. Confront Parochialism in Adopting International Standards to Combat Corruptions: A popular trend among state authorities and civil society alike is that the specific conditions of Afghanistan disallow using lessons learned from other contexts in Afghanistan, including in combating corruption. To overcome this prejudice, SACS needs to intensify its efforts in engaging a coalition of social partners in anticorruption strategies, and pursuing the three components of investigation, prevention, and education – all of which are universal. SACS might consider creating an anticorruption framework not around pillars and benchmarks, but around the international standard of a comprehensive framework including investigation, prevention, and education.

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Appendix: Coding Descriptions KI-F-Kab-NGO-1 (Key Informant, Female, Kabul, Non-government Organization, 1 = Sequence) KI-M-Kab-NGO-1 (Key Informant, Male, Kabul, Non-government Organization, 1 = Sequence) KI-F-Kab-GO-1 (Key Informant, Female, Kabul, Government, 1=Sequence) KI-M-Kab-GO-1 (Key Informant, Male, Kabul, Government, 1= Sequence)