Former Senior Libyan Intelligence Officer and Bomb-Maker for the Muamar Qaddafi Regime Charged for The December 21, 1988 Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 -Statement of FactsCase: 1 :20- mj- 00252 Assigned To : Faruqui, Zia M. Assign. Date : 12/14/2020 Description: Complaint w/ Arrest Warrant
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
I, Rachel F. Otto, being duly sworn, hereby depose and states as follows:
INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND
1. I have been employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) as a Special
Agent since January 2011 and am currently assigned to FBI Headquarters Cyber Division. I was
assigned to the Washington Field Office from August 2013 through September 2020, on an
extraterritorial investigations squad responsible for international terrorism investigations
emanating from East Europe, Central and South Asia, and North Africa. I am responsible for
investigating violations of the laws of the United States, including the investigation of terrorist
groups or incidents targeting United States persons, both domestically and internationally.
Throughout my career with the FBI, I have participated in investigations of organizations and
individuals engaged in terrorism and terrorist activities. I completed a basic training program at
the FBI academy in Quantico, Virginia. This course provided me with training in investigations
of federal criminal offenses, acts of terrorism, interviews, interrogations, tactical operations, and
firearms.
2. This affidavit is submitted in support of a criminal complaint alleging that Abu
Agila Mohammad Mas’ud Kheir Al-Marimi, a/k/a Abu Agila Muhammad Mas’ud Kheir Al-
Marimi, a/k/a, “Abu Agila Muhammad Mas’ud Kheir,” a/k/a “Hasan Abu Ojalya Ibrahim”
(“MASUD”), committed violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a)(1) & (a)(2) and 844(i), in connection
with the bombing of Pan American World Airways (“Pan Am”) Flight 103, which occurred over
the town of Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988.
3. This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge, information provided to me by
other law enforcement agents and officers, law enforcement records, the factual findings made
by the trial court at Camp Zeist, witness interviews, and my training and experience.
4. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing
probable cause in support of a criminal complaint, I have not included each and every fact
known to me concerning this investigation. I have set forth only the facts that I believe are
necessary to establish probable cause that MASUD violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a)(1) & (a)(2) and
844(i).
FACTUAL OVERVIEW
5. Pan Am Flight 103 exploded into pieces almost instantaneously when a bomb
exploded in the forward cargo area of the aircraft as it traveled over Lockerbie, Scotland, at 7:03
p.m. local time on December 21, 1988, at an altitude of 31,000 feet after 38 minutes of flight.
The plane had taken off from London-Heathrow and was en route to John F. Kennedy Airport in
New York. Of the 270 individuals killed, 259 were passengers and crew, including 190
American citizens. Eleven residents of Lockerbie were killed on the ground as a result of the
bombing. The crime scene stretched for over 840 square miles, nearly the width of Scotland.
6. Immediately following the bombing, law enforcement officers from the Dumfries
and Galloway Constabulary in Scotland, and personnel from various other Scottish law
enforcement agencies, along with FBI agents from the United States, undertook an extensive
joint investigation into the bombing that continues to this day.
7. That joint investigation led to criminal charges, filed in November 1991 in both
countries, charging two Libyan intelligence agents with their roles in the bombing. Those
charges were returned against Abdel Baset Ali al-Megrahi (“Megrahi”) and Lamen Khalifa
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Fhimah (“Fhimah”). The original investigation also uncovered the suspected involvement of a
co-conspirator by the name of “Abu Agela Masud,” but investigators were unable to identify that
person. A trial commenced in May 2000, before a specially established Scottish trial court at
Camp Zeist in The Netherlands, consisting of three judges (but no jury). In January 2001,
Megrahi was convicted on all charges, and Fhimah was acquitted.
8. The joint U.S.-Scottish investigation continued after the trial, including after the
fall of the regime of former Libyan leader Muammar Qadaffi (“Qaddafi”), in or around 2011.
During the course of that investigation, in approximately 2017, the FBI received a copy of an
interview conducted by a Libyan law enforcement officer of MASUD while he was in Libyan
custody.
9. Since learning about the existence of MASUD’s interview, U.S. and Scottish
joint-investigative teams repeatedly endeavored to obtain more specific information concerning
that interview. After numerous attempts to learn more from the Government of Libya
concerning MASUD’s statement, your affiant was able to learn, in March 2020, that the
interview of MASUD actually took place on September 12, 2012. I have reviewed a copy of that
interview, which was provided by Libya in Arabic and subsequently translated to English. I am
aware that also in March 2020, FBI agents and officials from Police Scotland interviewed the
Libyan law enforcement officer who obtained the statement from MASUD. This law
enforcement officer expressed a willingness to testify at a trial if the Libyan Government agrees
to make the officer available.
10. According to that translation, in the September 12, 2012 interview, MASUD
admitted to building the bomb that brought down Pan Am Flight 103 and to working with
Megrahi and Fhimah to execute the plot. He also admitted his involvement in other plots against
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citizens of the United States and other western countries. Additionally, MASUD confirmed that
the bombing operation of Pan Am Flight 103 was ordered by Libyan intelligence leadership.
MASUD confirmed that after the operation, Qadaffi thanked him and other members of the team
for their successful attack on the United States.
11. I have also determined, from my review of other evidence, and speaking with
other investigators from Scotland and the FBI, that MASUD’s confession is corroborated, as laid
out in greater detail below, by evidence gathered by Scottish and American investigators in the
years following the bombing, as well as evidence gathered and provided by other countries.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
12. In 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1) criminalized the willful destruction of “any aircraft
in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or
employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce.” Subsection (a)(2) prohibited the
willful placement of a destructive device on an aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States or on a civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in the interstate, overseas, or
foreign air commerce, if the placement of the destructive device is likely to endanger the safety
of the aircraft.
13. A “civil aircraft” was defined in 1988 as “any aircraft other than a public
aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 1301(17) (1988) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40102(16) today). A “public
aircraft” was defined as “an aircraft used exclusively in the service of any government or
political subdivision thereof . . . but not including any government aircraft engaged in carrying
persons or property for commercial purposes.” 49 U.S.C. § 1301(36) (1988) (modified and
codified at § 40102(41) today). The “special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States was
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defined to include “civil aircraft of the United States.” 49 U.S.C. § 1301(38) (1988) (codified at
§ 46501(2) today).
14. In 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) prohibited, among other things, destruction of a
vehicle or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting
interstate or foreign commerce by means of an explosive.
15. “Interstate or foreign commerce” was defined as “commerce between any place in
a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the United States (not
including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, and commerce between places within the
same State but through any place outside of that State. ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States (not including the
Canal Zone).” 18 U.S.C. § 841(b).
BACKGROUND ABOUT THE EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION
16. In December 1988, the Socialist People’s Libyan Jamahirya (“Libya”) was a
nation located on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa. It was led by Muamar Qaddafi
between in or around 1969 and 2011.
17. The Jamahirya Security Organization, which was sometimes referred to as the
External Security Organization (“JSO” or “ESO”) was the Libyan intelligence service through
which Libya conducted acts of terrorism against other nations and repressed the activities of
Libyan dissidents abroad. From 1979 to 2006, Libya was designated by the United States
Department of State as a state sponsor of terrorism.
18. MASUD is a citizen of Libya. He worked in various capacities for the ESO,
including as a “technical expert” in building explosive devices from in or around 1973 to in or
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around 2011. MASUD earned promotions to the rank of Colonel during his tenure within the
ESO and participated in a number of operations on its behalf outside Libya.
19. Fhimah is a citizen of Libya, and according to the 1991 indictment still pending in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, he was utilized by the ESO in
various cover positions, including at various times as the Station Manager for Libyan Arab
Airways at Luqa Airport in the Republic of Malta.
20. Megrahi was a citizen of Libya and, according to the 1991 indictment,1 was used
in various cover positions by the ESO as well, including serving as Chief of the Airline Security
Section, Operations Division, and as such was familiar with airline security procedures.
SPECIFIC FACTS ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE
21. According to information on file with the Federal Aviation Authority (“FAA”), as
of December 21, 1988, Pan Am was an airline owned by a corporation created under the laws of
a state of the United States and registered under Chapter 20, Title 49 of the United States Code.
Pan American World Airways flew its aircraft in commerce between the United States and other
countries and operated aircraft leased from and owned by a corporation created under the laws of
the State of New York.
22. A Pan Am aircraft bearing tail number N739PA was a civil aircraft of the United
States registered with the FAA. On December 21, 1988, according to records provided by Pan
Am and other documentary evidence, the Pan Am aircraft bearing number N739PA was
operating in foreign air commerce between London’s Heathrow Airport in the United Kingdom
and John F. Kennedy Airport in the United States of America.
The indictment remains pending, with an active arrest warrant for Fhimah. The prosecution of Megrahi was abated in 2015 following his death.
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THE EXPLOSION AND EARLY RESPONSE
23. According to air-traffic control reports from the United Kingdom, including
reports from England and Scotland, Pan Am Flight 103 took off from Heathrow Airport on
December 21, 1988, and it continued in seemingly normal flight until approximately 7:03 p.m.,
local time, when it was in airspace near the town of Lockerbie, Scotland. At that point, the
aircraft abruptly disappeared from the radar screens of air-traffic controllers tracking the flight.
24. According to numerous witnesses who were in Lockerbie and the surrounding
areas on December 21, 1988, shortly after 7:03 p.m., portions of the aircraft began to fall from
the sky, some of which appeared to be engulfed in flames. As pieces of the aircraft hit the
ground, some exploded. One such incident created an explosion that witnesses likened to a
“mushroom cloud,” and left a crater approximately 40 feet deep where, moments before,
residential homes had stood in the town of Lockerbie.
25. Shortly after the plane fell to the ground, scores of Scottish police officers and
first responders responded to Lockerbie and began the process of combing through the wreckage
to attempt to look for survivors, locate personal effects of the victims, and collect evidence to
allow investigators to determine the cause of the crash. The trail of debris left by the wreckage
of Pan Am Flight 103 covered approximately 840 square miles, and it included human remains
of the victims and their personal effects, as well as pieces of the airplane and its contents. I
know from my review of, inter alia, crime scene photographs, reports written during the course
of the initial investigation, as well as multiple conversations with other law-enforcement officers,
that those approximately 840 square miles were searched by law enforcement personnel from
Scotland and England on foot, as well as by other means, such as canvassing by aircraft, and that
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the evidence recovered ranged in size from debris smaller than a fingernail, to pieces of aircraft
fuselage that needed to be moved by crane.
26. A review of Pan Am records, in conjunction with the results of the effort to
recover human remains and personal effects described above, established that 259 people were
killed on board the aircraft, including 190 American citizens. The victims also included citizens
of the United Kingdom, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, India,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Philippines, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
Trinidad and Tobago. This number includes ten individuals whose remains were never found or
never identified. The investigation also established that eleven residents of the town of
Lockerbie were killed as a result of Pan Am Flight 103 falling to the ground and the resulting
explosions. Of those eleven, the remains of seven were never found. A list of all 270 people
killed is below:
John Michael Ahern Sarah Margaret Aicher John David Akerstrom Paula Marie Alderman (Bouckley) Ronald Ely Alexander Thomas Joseph Ammerman Martin Lewis Apfelbaum Rachel Maria Asrelsky Judith Ellen Atkinson (Bernstein) William Garretson Atkinson III Elisabeth Nichole Avoyne Jerry Don Avritt Clare Louise Bacciochi Harry Michael Bainbridge Stuart Murray Barclay Jean Mary Bell Julian MacBain Benello Lawrence Ray Bennett Philip Vernon Bergstrom Alistair Berkley Michael Stuart Bernstein Steven Russell Berrell
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Noelle Lydie Berti Campbell
Surinder Mohan Bhatia Kenneth John Bissett Stephen John Boland Glenn Bouckley Nicole Elise Boulanger Francis Boyer Nicholas Bright Daniel Solomon Browner (Bier) Colleen Renee Brunner Timothy Guy Burman Michael Warren Buser Warren Max Buser Steven Lee Butler William Martin Cadman Fabiana Caffarone Hernan Caffarone Valerie Canady Gregory Joseph Capasso Timothy Michael Cardwell Bernt Wilmar Carlsson Richard Anthony Cawley Frank Ciulla Theodora Eugenia Cohen Eric Michael Coker Jason Michael Coker Gary Leonard Colasanti Bridget Concannon Thomas Concannon Sean Concannon Tracey Jane Corner Scott Marsh Cory Willis Larry Coursey Patricia Mary Coyle John Binning Cummock Joseph Patrick Curry William Alan Daniels Gretchen Joyce Dater Shannon Davis Gabriele Della Ripa Joyce Christine DiMauro Gianfranca Di Nardo Peter Thomas Stanley Dix Om Dikshit Shanti Dixit
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David Scott Dornstein Michael Edward Doyle Edgar Howard Eggleston III Siv Ulla Engstrom Turhan Michael Ergin Charles Thomas Fisher IV Joanne Flannigan Kathleen Mary Flannigan Thomas Brown Flannigan Clayton Lee Flick John Patrick Flynn Arthur Jay Fondiler Robert Gerard Fortune Stacie Denise Franklin Paul Stephen Mathew Freeman James Ralph Fuller Dyane Fuller (Boatman) Ibolya Robertine Gabor Amy Beth Gallagher Matthew Kevin Gannon Kenneth Raymond Garczynski Paul Isaac Garrett Kenneth James Gibson William David Giebler, Jr. Olive Leonora Gordon Linda Susan Gordon Anne Madalene Gorgacz Loretta Anne Gorgacz David J. Gould Andre Nicholas Guevorgoian Nicola Jane Hall Lorraine Frances Halsch (Buser) Lynne Carol Hartunian Anthony Lacey Hawkins Dora Henrietta Henry Maurice Peter Henry Pamela Elaine Herbert Rodney Peter Hilbert Alfred Hill Katharine Augusta Hollister Sophie Ailette Miriam Hudson Josephine Hudson Melina K. Hudson Karen Lee Hunt Roger Elwood Hurst Elizabeth Sophie Ivell
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Khaled Nazir Jaafar Robert Van Houten Jeck Paul Avron Jeffreys Rachel Jeffreys Kathleen Mary Jermyn Beth Ann Johnson Mary Lincoln Johnson Timothy Baron Johnson Christopher Andrew Jones Julianne Frances Kelly Jay Joseph Kingham Patricia Ann Klein Gregory Kosmowski Elke Etha Kuehne Minas Christopher Kulukundis Mary Lancaster Ronald Albert Lariviere Maria Nieves Larracoechea Robert Milton Leckburg, Jr. William Chase Leyrer, Jr. Joan Sherree Lichtenstein (Sheanshang) Wendy Anne Lincoln Alexander Lowenstein Lloyd David Ludlow Maria Theresia Lurbke Lilibeth Tobilla Macalolooy William Edward Mack James Bruce MacQuarrie Douglas Eugene Malicote Wendy Gay Malicote (Forsythe) Elizabeth Lillian Marek Louis Anthony Marengo Noel George Martin Diane Marie Maslowski William John McAllister Daniel Emmet McCarthy Robert Eugene McCollum Charles Dennis McKee Bernard Joseph McLaughlin Jane Susan Melber John Merrill Suzanne Marie Miazga Joseph Kenneth Miller Jewel Courtney Mitchell Richard Paul Monetti Jane Ann Morgan
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Eva Ingeborg Morson Helga Rachael Mosey Ingrid Elisabeth Mulroy John Mulroy Sean Kevin Mulroy Mary Geraldine Murphy Jean Aitken Murray Karen Elizabeth Noonan Daniel Emmett O’Connor Mary Denice O’Neill Anne Lindsey Otenasek Bryony Elise Owen Gwyneth Yvonne Margaret Owen Laura Abigail Owens Martha Ives Owens Robert Plack Owens Sarah Rebecca Owens Robert Italo Pagnucco Christos Papadopoulos Peter Raymond Peirce Michael Cosimo Pescatore Sarah S B Philipps Frederick Sandford Phillips James Andrew Campbell Pitt David Patrick Joseph Platt Walter Leonard Porter Pamela Lynn Posen William Pugh, Jr. Estrella Crisostomo Quiguyan Rajesh Tarsis Priskel Ramses Anmol Rattan Garima D. Rattan Suruchi Rattan Anita Lynn Reeves Mark Alan Rein Jocelyn Reina Diane Marie Rencevicz Louise Ann Rogers Edina Roller Janos Gabor Roller Zsuzsana Roller Hanne Maria Root Saul Mark Rosen Andrea Victoria Rosenthal Daniel Peter Rosenthal Myra Josephine Royal
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Arnaud David Rubin Elyse Jeanne Saraceni Theresa Elizabeth Saunders Scott Christopher Saunders Johannes Otto Schauble Robert Thomas Schlageter Thomas Britton Schultz Sally Elizabeth Scott Amy Elizabeth Shapiro Mridula Shastri Irving Stanley Sigal Martin Bernard Carruthers Simpson Irja Synnove Skabo Ingrid Anita Smith Cynthia Joan Smith James Alvin Smith Mary Edna Smith John Somerville Lynsey Anne Somerville Paul Somerville Rosaleen Later Somerville Geraldine Anne Stevenson Hannah Louise Stevenson Rachael Stevenson John Charles Stevenson Charlotte Ann Stinnett Michael Gary Stinnett Stacey Leann Stinnett James Ralph Stow Elia G. Stratis Anthony Selwyn Swan Flora Margaret Swire Marc Alex Tager Hidekazu Tanaka Andrew Alexander Teran Arva Anthony Thomas Jonathan Ryan Thomas Lawanda Thomas Mark Lawrence Tobin David William Trimmer-Smith Alexia Kathryn Tsairis Barry Joseph Valentino Tomas Floro van Tienhoven Asaad Eidi Vejdany Milutin Velimirovich Nicholas Andreas Vrenios
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Peter Petrisor Vulcu Raymond Ronald Wagner Janina Jozefa Waido Thomas Edwin Walker Kesha Weedon Jerome Lee Weston Jonathan White Brittany Leigh Williams Eric Jon Williams George Waterson Williams Stephanie Leigh Williams Bonnie Leigh Williams Miriam Luby Wolfe Chelsea Marie Woods Joe Nathan Woods Dedera Lynn Woods (Copeland) Joe Nathan Woods Jr. Andrew Christopher Gillies Wright Mark James Zwynenburg
27. Many of the pieces of aircraft and other debris collected from the crime scene
were sent to a forensic laboratory at the Royal Armament Research and Development
Establishment (“RARDE”), at Fort Halstead, England, for analysis. That analysis included a
three-dimensional reconstruction of Pan Am Flight 103 from the recovered wreckage, including
the position of baggage containers within the cargo hold, the suitcase believed to contain the
bomb that brought down the aircraft, and that suitcase’s likely position within the baggage
container. According to records from the original investigation, some of that report’s relevant
findings are summarized below:
a. Pan Am Flight 103 was brought down in a matter of seconds by the detonation of a
powerful explosive in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft, which occurred within a
baggage container labeled “AVE 4041PA;”
b. There were traces of the chemicals pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) and
cyclotrimethylene trinitramine (RDX), used in the manufacture of plastic explosives,
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including Semtex, present on two sections of AVE 4041PA. Follow-on investigation
confirmed this as the primary charge used in the improvised explosive device
(“IED”);
c. The explosive was determined to have originated within a hard-shell “Samsonite”
brand suitcase from the “Silhouette 4000” range (the “IED suitcase”);
d. Investigative and forensic findings indicated that the suitcase containing the explosive
was likely not in contact with the floor of the baggage container and was likely
located in the second layer of luggage in the container. There were at least 13
personal items, which included 12 pieces of clothing and an umbrella that, with “high
probability,” were in the IED suitcase that housed the explosive device at the moment
of detonation;
e. The explosive charge was secreted within a Toshiba RT-SF 16 radio-cassette recorder
possessing a black plastic casing; and
f. The mechanism by which the explosive device was detonated included a long-delay
electronic timer, type “MST-13,” manufactured by the Swiss firm of Meister et
Bollier (“MEBO”).
TRACING THE IED SUITCASE TO MALTA
28. Of the 13 personal items identified by investigators at RARDE as having a high
probability of originating within the IED suitcase, several were identified as coming from a
particular brand (e.g., “Yorkie” trousers or “Slalom” shirt). Many of the brands identified were
known to be either manufactured or sold in the Republic of Malta. Three items were so
fragmented that no brand could be identified, and the thirteenth item was the umbrella.
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29. After RARDE had identified the 13 personal items, investigators traveled to
Malta. One of the 13 items was a pair of “Yorkie” branded trousers, with the number “1705”
stamped on them. When investigators visited Yorkie’s manufacturing facility, they learned that
the “1705” was a unique order number. According to information provided by Yorkie, order
number “1705” was delivered to the proprietors of a store named “Mary’s House,” located in
Sliema, Malta, on or about November 18, 1988.
30. Further investigation at Mary’s House led investigators to recover control samples
of the Yorkie trousers, as well as some of the personal items identified as likely originating in the
IED suitcase. Control samples from Mary’s House and elsewhere in Malta were compared to
evidence recovered from the crime scene. Forensic examiners concluded that multiple control
samples were identical in all material respects to the items of evidence determined to have
originated from within the IED suitcase.
31. Investigators also tried to re-create the path of the IED suitcase from where it
entered the airline baggage system to when it was placed on board Pan Am Flight 103 at
Heathrow Airport. That investigation concluded that the IED suitcase was initially placed
aboard an Air Malta flight, which originated at Luqa Airport in Malta on the morning of
December 21, 1988. The IED suitcase flew, unaccompanied, from Malta to Frankfurt, West
Germany, where it was transferred onto Pan Am Flight 103A, a feeder flight for Pan Am Flight
103. The suitcase then flew unaccompanied from Pan Am 103A to Heathrow Airport, where it
was transferred onto Pan Am Flight 103. Some of the key relevant facts developed during the
investigation that support that conclusion are summarized below.
a. At Heathrow Airport, Luggage Container AVE 4041PA, which investigators later
determined contained the IED suitcase, was first loaded with one layer of luggage at a
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facility that processed interline bags, that is, those bags being transferred from one
airline to another.
b. After AVE 4041PA was loaded at that facility, it was moved to Pan Am Flight 103,
where it was filled with luggage being transferred from Pan Am Flight 103A.
According to my review of records from the original investigation, AVE 4041PA was
then loaded into the cargo hold of Pan Am Flight 103 at the location within the cargo
hold later determined to be where the explosion occurred.
c. At Frankfurt Airport, with certain exceptions for items like “rush” baggage, luggage
was transferred between flights via a computerized baggage system. According to
records provided by the airport and/or its employees, as well as interviews conducted
during the original investigation, Air Malta Flight 180 (“KM-180”) arrived at
Frankfurt airport in Germany from Luqa Airport in Malta at 12:48 p.m. local time on
December 21, 1988. Luggage from that flight was processed into the computerized
baggage routing system at a station known as “V-3, 206,” between approximately
1:04 p.m. and 1:10 or 1:16 p.m.2 KM-180 was the only flight whose bags were
processed at V-3, 206 during that time frame.
d. At approximately 1:07 p.m., an item coded at station V-3, 206 was transferred and
delivered to the appropriate gate to be loaded on board Pan Am Flight 103A.
e. Based on records from the initial investigation, no passenger had a ticket on KM-180,
from Malta, with an onward booking to either London or the United States.
In 1988, there was a known issue with the computer clock that caused it to diverge from the actual time by as much as a few minutes per day.
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f. Documents provided to investigators established that all passengers who were
recorded as having checked bags on Flight KM-180 retrieved their luggage at their
final destination.
g. Indeed, the records for Flight KM-180 show that 55 bags were checked, 55 bags were
on the load plan, and all bags were retrieved at their final destination. Officials in
Malta have denied that an explosive could have been placed on board an aircraft in an
unaccompanied bag at Luqa Airport. The original investigation did not definitively
establish how an unaccompanied bag was actually placed into the airline baggage
stream at Luqa Airport, but based on the facts above, among others, it did establish
that an unaccompanied bag was in fact placed into the airline baggage stream at Luqa
Airport.
LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT – MOVEMENTS OF MASUD, MEGRAHI, AND FHIMAH
32. Investigators requested and received from the Government of Malta a number of
embarkation and disembarkation immigration cards for the months surrounding December 1988.
The cards were required to be filled out by, inter alia, passengers embarking or disembarking an
international flight at Luqa Airport. A review of those cards established the following relevant
facts, among others:
a. On or about December 7, 1988, MASUD and Megrahi traveled from Tripoli, Libya,
to Malta on separate flights;
b. On or about December 9, 1988, MASUD traveled from Malta to Tripoli;
c. On or about December 9, 1988, Megrahi traveled from Malta to Zurich, Switzerland,
and other records show that he continued on to Prague, Czechoslovakia;
d. On or about December 14, 1988, MASUD traveled from Tripoli to Malta;
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e. On or about December 17, 1988, Megrahi returned to Malta from Zurich, and he
continued on to Tripoli that same day; other records established that Megrahi had
returned to Zurich from Prague on or about December 16, 1988;
f. On or about December 18, 1988, Fhimah traveled from Malta to Tripoli;
g. On or about December 20, 1988, Megrahi and Fhimah traveled from Tripoli to Malta
on the same flight; and
h. On or about December 21, 1988, Megrahi and MASUD traveled from Malta to
Tripoli on the same flight.3
33. According to airline records, Flight KM-180, which carried the IED suitcase from
Malta to Frankfurt, opened for check-in at Luqa Airport at 8:15 a.m. local time on December 21,
1988, and closed at 9:15 a.m. Libyan Arab Airways Flight LN-147, which transported Megrahi
and MASUD back to Tripoli, opened for check-in at 8:50 a.m. on that same date and closed at
9:50 a.m. There was thus an overlap of time during which both Flight KM-180 from Malta to
Frankfurt, and Flight LN-147 from Malta to Tripoli were open for check-in.
34. Investigators also recovered a diary from Fhimah’s office in Malta. His business
partner confirmed for investigators that the diary belonged to Fhimah. The diary was generally
in Arabic, and a translation showed the entry for December 15, 1988, stated, “Abdel Baset
[Megrahi] is coming from Zurich . . . take taggs [sic] from the Maltese Airlines[.]” There was
On the December 20 and 21 flights, Megrahi traveled under an alias, “Ahmed Khalifah Abdusamad.” The investigation uncovered no evidence of Megrahi traveling under his true name to and from Malta on those dates. A handwriting analyst compared immigration cards in Megrahi’s name with those in “Abdusamad’s” name and determined that they were likely written by the same person. Additionally, during the trial of Megrahi and Fhimah, the director of the Libyan General Passport and Nationality Department testified that in 1987, the ESO had requested a “coded” passport, i.e., a passport that does not carry the name of its original holder, for Megrahi. He also confirmed that the “coded” passport issued to Megrahi bore the name “Ahmed Khalifah Adbusamad.”
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another undated entry that read, “bring the tags from the airport (Abdel Baset, Abdul Salam).”
As noted above, Megrahi in fact arrived in Malta from Zurich en route to Tripoli on December
17, and Fhimah joined him in Tripoli from Malta on December 18. They both returned to Malta
on December 20. Based on your affiant’s training and experience, I submit that there is probable
cause to believe that, based on those diary entries, Fhimah was making notations indicating that
he was to obtain the tags that would later be used to route the unaccompanied bag that was
eventually loaded onto Pan Am Flight 103.
LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT – MST-13 TIMERS
35. During the search of the crime scene, police officers from Scotland recovered a
piece of charred cloth that was sent to RARDE for analysis. That analysis revealed that the piece
of cloth was from a neckband of a gray shirt. While the cloth lacked identifying features, it
appeared similar in all material respects to the neckband of a “Slalom” branded shirt obtained by
investigators as a control sample. According to records from the original investigation, the
damaged piece of neckband contained severe explosion damage with localized penetration holes
and blackening consistent with explosive involvement. Embedded within it were nine pieces of
black plastic, a small fragment of wire, a small fragment of metal, and a multi-layered fragment
of white paper. All of these items were determined to be fragments from a Toshiba RT-SF 16
and its manual. These and other factors caused forensic examiners to determine that, with a high
degree of probability, this particular piece of cloth originated from within the IED suitcase.
There was also, embedded within that piece of fabric, a green-colored circuit board that would
eventually be labeled for identification purposes as “PT/35.”
36. Photographs of PT/35 were shown to the two principal owners and an employee
of the aforementioned Swiss telecommunications firm MEBO. The original investigation
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concluded that a timer produced by MEBO detonated the explosive material that brought down
Pan Am Flight 103. All three individuals from MEBO identified PT/35 as one of a series of
timers that the firm manufactured in the mid-1980s, known as “MST-13” timers. According to
these interviews, MEBO produced between 20 and 30 MST-13 timers, with varying degrees of
sophistication, although the witnesses differed as to the exact permutations.4 The MEBO
technician who designed the MST-13 timers stated that PT/35 was contained in the early batch of
timers. All of the MEBO witnesses agreed that MEBO did a lot of business with Libya, and one
of the MEBO witnesses confirmed that 20 MST-13 timers were sold to Libya (and, in this
witness’ early statements, only to Libya), although in a later interview he claimed that up to
seven more were sold to East Germany. This same witness also claimed that MST-13 timers
may have been part of a forgery produced by a company in Florida affiliated with the Central
Intelligence Agency.
MASUD’S CONFESSION TO BOMBING PAN AM FLIGHT 103
37. On or about September 12, 2012, while MASUD was in Libyan custody, he was
interviewed by a Libyan law-enforcement officer. As noted above, the interview was transcribed
in Arabic and later translated into English by a translator based in the United Kingdom. All
recitations of that statement in this affidavit come from the English translation of the interview.
As described in further detail below, during the course of the interview, MASUD admitted that
All three of these witnesses provided multiple statements to investigating law enforcement officials, testified at the trial of Megrahi and Fhimah, and at least one has given multiple media interviews. The Scottish trial court stated in its official opinion, regarding the MEBO witnesses, “All three . . . were shown to be unreliable witnesses. Earlier statements which they made to the police and judicial authorities were at times in conflict with each other, and with evidence they gave in court.” In light of these conflicting statements, your affiant is limiting her recitation of the evidence from these witnesses to broad references.
21
4
on orders of the ESO, and other high ranking ESO operatives, he built the bomb that brought
down Pan Am Flight 103.
38. According to the transcript and the interview of the officer who took MASUD’s
statement, the interview of MASUD was one of several conducted by Libyan law enforcement
on September 12, 2012, during which open-ended questions were asked of MASUD. The intent
of the interviews, according to the officer, was to question MASUD and the others to determine
whether they had committed any crimes against Libya and the Libyan people during the 2011
revolution in an attempt to keep Qadaffi in power. Prior to the interview conducted with
MASUD, the officer knew nothing about the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, other than what the
officer had read in the media.
39. MASUD stated that he worked in the Technical Department of the ESO, which
was a section that had several sub-sections. During MASUD’s time with the Technical
Department, he handled Semtex explosives and built bombs on behalf of that department.
40. When asked whether he had participated in any operations in Libya or outside of
Libya, MASUD initiated a response that he had participated in the “Lockerbie airplane
bombing,” among others. MASUD then continued explaining his involvement in narrative form.
41. One of the other operations MASUD admitted to committing was the bombing of
the LaBelle Discotheque, which took place in Berlin, West Germany, shortly after midnight on
April 5, 1986.5 MASUD explained that he was asked by a Libyan intelligence official to travel
to East Berlin to meet with the security officer at the Libyan embassy. When MASUD met with
this person at the embassy, he informed MASUD that MASUD was to build an explosive device
MASUD did not say the name of the nightclub, but he described it as a Berlin nightclub bombing taking place on April 4, 1986.
22
5
to be used against an American target. MASUD prepared the explosive device from plastic
explosive “dough,” as well as a detonating fuse and a timing device that were present at the
embassy. MASUD then instructed the embassy official on how to set the timer. He did not
know who had actually placed the device at the nightclub. MASUD said that the nightclub was
chosen for attack because it was frequented by American military officers. He recalled that four
American officers died, and several were wounded. Your affiant is aware, from his/her review
of FBI documents relating to the LaBelle Discotheque attack, among other things, that two
American service members and one Turkish woman were killed in the attack. Scores more were
injured, including some who were permanently disabled.
42. Regarding the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, MASUD stated that in the winter of
1988, he was summoned by a Libyan intelligence official to meet at that official’s office in
Tripoli, Libya. While in that meeting, which involved additional Libyan intelligence officials,
MASUD was asked whether the “suitcases” were finished. When MASUD answered in the
affirmative, one of the intelligence officials ordered MASUD to take one of the suitcases and
travel with it to Malta. MASUD said that the following day, he traveled to Malta by air, carrying
the equipped suitcase. Based on the context of this statement, as well as your affiant’s training
and experience, I submit that there is probable cause to believe MASUD was tasked to prepare a
suitcase capable of carrying concealed explosives.
43. MASUD recalled that one of the Libyan intelligence officials informed him that
Megrahi and Fhimah would be there to meet him at the airport in Malta, and he stated that the
pair did in fact meet him at the airport. MASUD stated that he stayed at a hotel, pre-arranged for
him by unknown individuals in Libya, which was located about 20 minutes from the airport. He
did not recall the name of that hotel.
23
6
44. MASUD said that after approximately three or four days in the hotel, Megrahi and
Fhimah met him in the lobby, and they told him to be up the following morning at 7:00 precisely.
MASUD said that he was instructed to set the timer on the device in the suitcase so that the
explosion would occur exactly eleven hours later. Megrahi and Fhimah also handed MASUD
$500 to purchase some clothes to put in the suitcase, instead of using his own clothes.6 MASUD
stated that he did as instructed in the morning. He also took a taxi to the airport in Malta,
knowing that the aircraft on which the suitcase would be placed on board would be departing
after MASUD handed the suitcase to Megrahi and Fhimah. He described the suitcase as a
medium-sized Samsonite suitcase that he used for traveling.
45. MASUD told the Libyan officer that he stood at a specified place near the
passenger luggage check at Luqa Airport. He said that after some time passed, both Megrahi and
Fhimah passed in front of him, and Fhimah went to the check-in desk near the luggage conveyor
belt. After Fhimah gave MASUD a sign with his head to bring over the suitcase, MASUD did
so. The suitcase was received by Fhimah, who placed it on the conveyor belt. MASUD then
In the course of the original investigation, investigators interviewed the proprietor of Mary’s House, who provided a description of a Libyan male who bought clothing consistent with many of the items of evidence that with “high probability” were inside the IED suitcase at the time of the explosion. The indictment filed in this Court in 1991, charging Megrahi and Fhimah with their roles in the offense, alleges that as an overt act in support of the conspiracy, Megrahi purchased clothing at Mary’s House on December 7, 1988. The Scottish trial court also found that Megrahi made that purchase. The conclusion that Megrahi purchased the clothing at Mary’s House on December 7, 1988, is the subject of ongoing litigation in Scotland, where Megrahi’s family is pursuing a posthumous appeal of his conviction. The government still believes that this allegation is accurate. Other clothing items that were determined by RARDE to have likely originated from within the IED suitcase probably did not originate from Mary’s House. For example, at least one item of clothing—a shoe—is unlikely to have originated from Mary’s House based on the proprietor’s statement that he never sold shoes at that store. Based on this statement, and your affiant’s review, inter alia, of the other evidence recounted above, it is your affiant’s conclusion that it is possible that MASUD purchased or provided some of the items that were put into the IED suitcase, in addition to those that were purchased by Megrahi at Mary’s House on December 7.
24
left. He was given a boarding pass for a Libyan flight to Tripoli, which he stated was to take off
at 9:00 a.m.
46. MASUD later heard that an American plane was brought down by an explosion,
and he was sure that the suitcase he had prepared earlier had been used in the operation.
MASUD said that “unfortunately” the explosive device was not discovered by airport personnel
despite the fact that he placed the suitcase on the scanner at the airport. He explained that he hid
the detonator and timer in a technical way that would make it difficult to be discovered, by
placing it close to the metallic parts of the suitcase. MASUD said that he used approximately
one-and-a-half kilograms of plastic Semtex, and he added that plastic explosives do not show up
on the airport baggage scanner.
47. MASUD said that he was aware that Megrahi worked for the ESO and was
responsible for the security of airplanes. Fhimah, he became aware later, was part of the Libyan
airline.7 MASUD explained his belief that Fhimah was able to receive the suitcase from
MASUD and place it on the conveyor belt because Fhimah was an employee of the Libyan
airline and was responsible for carrying out check-in procedures for that airline. Additionally,
check-in for a Libyan flight was open simultaneously. Your affiant believes the implication of
MASUD’s statement is Fhimah would have been permitted behind the check-in counter at Luqa
Airport. MASUD stated that Fhimah put a tag belonging to an American airline on the suitcase,
and thus when Fhimah placed it on the conveyor belt, the suitcase was tagged for the Pan
American flight. Masud knew they would target Americans with the explosive device.
According to other evidence gathered in the case, your affiant has learned that Fhimah had previously been employed as the station manager for a Libyan airline at Luqa Airport, but he left that position at some point in 1988 prior to December.
25
7
50. I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided above in this
affidavit is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Respectfully submitted,
RACH L F. OTTO Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation
Subscribed and sworn pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P 4.1 on December 14, 2020.
2020.12.14 17:06:28 -05'00'
26
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
I, Rachel F. Otto, being duly sworn, hereby depose and states as follows:
INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND
1.
1.
1.
I have been employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) as a Special Agent since January 2011 and am currently assigned to FBI Headquarters Cyber Division. I was assigned to the Washington Field Office from August 2013 through September 2020, on an extraterritorial investigations squad responsible for international terrorism investigations emanating from East Europe, Central and South Asia, and North Africa. I am responsible for investigating violations of the laws of the United States, includin
2.
2.
This affidavit is submitted in support of a criminal complaint alleging that Abu Agila Mohammad Mas’ud Kheir Al-Marimi, a/k/a Abu Agila Muhammad Mas’ud Kheir Al-Marimi, a/k/a, “Abu Agila Muhammad Mas’ud Kheir,” a/k/a “Hasan Abu Ojalya Ibrahim” (“MASUD”), committed violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a)(1) & (a)(2) and 844(i), in connection with the bombing of Pan American World Airways (“Pan Am”) Flight 103, which occurred over the town of Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988.
3. This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge, information provided to me by
other law enforcement agents and officers, law enforcement records, the factual findings made by the trial court at Camp Zeist, witness interviews, and my training and experience.
4. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause in support of a criminal complaint, I have not included each and every fact known to me concerning this investigation. I have set forth only the facts that I believe are necessary to establish probable cause that MASUD violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a)(1) & (a)(2) and 844(i).
FACTUAL OVERVIEW
FACTUAL OVERVIEW
5. Pan Am Flight 103 exploded into pieces almost instantaneously when a bomb exploded in the forward cargo area of the aircraft as it traveled over Lockerbie, Scotland, at 7:03
p.m. local time on December 21, 1988, at an altitude of 31,000 feet after 38 minutes of flight. The plane had taken off from London-Heathrow and was en route to John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. Of the 270 individuals killed, 259 were passengers and crew, including 190 American citizens. Eleven residents of Lockerbie were killed on the ground as a result of the bombing. The crime scene stretched for over 840 square miles, nearly the width of Scotland.
6.
6.
6.
Immediately following the bombing, law enforcement officers from the Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary in Scotland, and personnel from various other Scottish law enforcement agencies, along with FBI agents from the United States, undertook an extensive joint investigation into the bombing that continues to this day.
7.
7.
That joint investigation led to criminal charges, filed in November 1991 in both countries, charging two Libyan intelligence agents with their roles in the bombing. Those charges were returned against Abdel Baset Ali al-Megrahi (“Megrahi”) and Lamen Khalifa
Fhimah (“Fhimah”). The original investigation also uncovered the suspected involvement of a
co-conspirator by the name of “Abu Agela Masud,” but investigators were unable to identify that person. A trial commenced in May 2000, before a specially established Scottish trial court at Camp Zeist in The Netherlands, consisting of three judges (but no jury). In January 2001, Megrahi was convicted on all charges, and Fhimah was acquitted.
8.
8.
8.
The joint U.S.-Scottish investigation continued after the trial, including after the fall of the regime of former Libyan leader Muammar Qadaffi (“Qaddafi”), in or around 2011. During the course of that investigation, in approximately 2017, the FBI received a copy of an interview conducted by a Libyan law enforcement officer of MASUD while he was in Libyan custody.
9.
9.
Since learning about the existence of MASUD’s interview, U.S. and Scottish joint-investigative teams repeatedly endeavored to obtain more specific information concerning that interview. After numerous attempts to learn more from the Government of Libya concerning MASUD’s statement, your affiant was able to learn, in March 2020, that the interview of MASUD actually took place on September 12, 2012. I have reviewed a copy of that interview, which was provided by Libya in Arabic and subsequently translated to
10.
10.
According to that translation, in the September 12, 2012 interview, MASUD admitted to building the bomb that brought down Pan Am Flight 103 and to working with Megrahi and Fhimah to execute the plot. He also admitted his involvement in other plots against
citizens of the United States and other western countries. Additionally, MASUD confirmed that
the bombing operation of Pan Am Flight 103 was ordered by Libyan intelligence leadership. MASUD confirmed that after the operation, Qadaffi thanked him and other members of the team for their successful attack on the United States.
11. I have also determined, from my review of other evidence, and speaking with other investigators from Scotland and the FBI, that MASUD’s confession is corroborated, as laid out in greater detail below, by evidence gathered by Scottish and American investigators in the years following the bombing, as well as evidence gathered and provided by other countries.
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
12.
12.
12.
In 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1) criminalized the willful destruction of “any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce.” Subsection (a)(2) prohibited the willful placement of a destructive device on an aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or on a civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in the interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce, if the placemen
13.
13.
A “civil aircraft” was defined in 1988 as “any aircraft other than a public aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 1301(17) (1988) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40102(16) today). A “public aircraft” was defined as “an aircraft used exclusively in the service of any government or political subdivision thereof . . . but not including any government aircraft engaged in carrying persons or property for commercial purposes.” 49 U.S.C. § 1301(36) (1988) (modified and codified at § 40102(41) today). The “special aircraft jurisdict
defined to include “civil aircraft of the United States.” 49 U.S.C. § 1301(38) (1988) (codified at
§ 46501(2) today).
14.
14.
14.
In 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) prohibited, among other things, destruction of a vehicle or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce by means of an explosive.
15.
15.
“Interstate or foreign commerce” was defined as “commerce between any place in a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the United States (not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, and commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside of that State. ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States (not including the Canal Zone).” 18 U.S.C. § 841(b).
BACKGROUND ABOUT THE EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION
BACKGROUND ABOUT THE EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION
16.
16.
16.
In December 1988, the Socialist People’s Libyan Jamahirya (“Libya”) was a nation located on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa. It was led by Muamar Qaddafi between in or around 1969 and 2011.
17.
17.
The Jamahirya Security Organization, which was sometimes referred to as the External Security Organization (“JSO” or “ESO”) was the Libyan intelligence service through which Libya conducted acts of terrorism against other nations and repressed the activities of Libyan dissidents abroad. From 1979 to 2006, Libya was designated by the United States Department of State as a state sponsor of terrorism.
18.
18.
MASUD is a citizen of Libya. He worked in various capacities for the ESO, including as a “technical expert” in building explosive devices from in or around 1973 to in or
around 2011. MASUD earned promotions to the rank of Colonel during his tenure within the
ESO and participated in a number of operations on its behalf outside Libya.
19.
19.
19.
Fhimah is a citizen of Libya, and according to the 1991 indictment still pending in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, he was utilized by the ESO in various cover positions, including at various times as the Station Manager for Libyan Arab Airways at Luqa Airport in the Republic of Malta.
20.
20.
Megrahi was a citizen of Libya and, according to the 1991 indictment,was used in various cover positions by the ESO as well, including serving as Chief of the Airline Security Section, Operations Division, and as such was familiar with airline security procedures.
1
21.
21.
21.
According to information on file with the Federal Aviation Authority (“FAA”), as of December 21, 1988, Pan Am was an airline owned by a corporation created under the laws of a state of the United States and registered under Chapter 20, Title 49 of the United States Code. Pan American World Airways flew its aircraft in commerce between the United States and other countries and operated aircraft leased from and owned by a corporation created under the laws of the State of New York.
22.
22.
A Pan Am aircraft bearing tail number N739PA was a civil aircraft of the United States registered with the FAA. On December 21, 1988, according to records provided by Pan Am and other documentary evidence, the Pan Am aircraft bearing number N739PA was operating in foreign air commerce between London’s Heathrow Airport in the United Kingdom and John F. Kennedy Airport in the United States of America.
The indictment remains pending, with an active arrest warrant for Fhimah. The prosecution of Megrahi was abated in 2015 following his death.
THE EXPLOSION AND EARLY RESPONSE
23.
23.
23.
According to air-traffic control reports from the United Kingdom, including reports from England and Scotland, Pan Am Flight 103 took off from Heathrow Airport on December 21, 1988, and it continued in seemingly normal flight until approximately 7:03 p.m., local time, when it was in airspace near the town of Lockerbie, Scotland. At that point, the aircraft abruptly disappeared from the radar screens of air-traffic controllers tracking the flight.
24.
24.
According to numerous witnesses who were in Lockerbie and the surrounding areas on December 21, 1988, shortly after 7:03 p.m., portions of the aircraft began to fall from the sky, some of which appeared to be engulfed in flames. As pieces of the aircraft hit the ground, some exploded. One such incident created an explosion that witnesses likened to a “mushroom cloud,” and left a crater approximately 40 feet deep where, moments before, residential homes had stood in the town of Lockerbie.
25.
25.
Shortly after the plane fell to the ground, scores of Scottish police officers and first responders responded to Lockerbie and began the process of combing through the wreckage to attempt to look for survivors, locate personal effects of the victims, and collect evidence to allow investigators to determine the cause of the crash. The trail of debris left by the wreckage of Pan Am Flight 103 covered approximately 840 square miles, and it included human remains of the victims and their personal effects, as w
the evidence recovered ranged in size from debris smaller than a fingernail, to pieces of aircraft
fuselage that needed to be moved by crane.
26. A review of Pan Am records, in conjunction with the results of the effort to
recover human remains and personal effects described above, established that 259 people were
killed on board the aircraft, including 190 American citizens. The victims also included citizens
of the United Kingdom, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, India,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Philippines, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
Trinidad and Tobago. This number includes ten individuals whose remains were never found or
never identified. The investigation also established that eleven residents of the town of
Lockerbie were killed as a result of Pan Am Flight 103 falling to the ground and the resulting
explosions. Of those eleven, the remains of seven were never found. A list of all 270 people
killed is below:
killed is below:
John Michael Ahern Sarah Margaret Aicher John David Akerstrom Paula Marie Alderman (Bouckley) Ronald Ely Alexander Thomas Joseph Ammerman Martin Lewis Apfelbaum Rachel Maria Asrelsky Judith Ellen Atkinson (Bernstein) William Garretson Atkinson III Elisabeth Nichole Avoyne Jerry Don Avritt Clare Louise Bacciochi Harry Michael Bainbridge Stuart Murray Barclay Jean Mary Bell Julian MacBain Benello Lawrence Ray Bennett Philip Vernon Bergstrom Alistair Berkley Michael Stuart Bernstein Steven Russell Berrell
John Michael Ahern Sarah Margaret Aicher John David Akerstrom Paula Marie Alderman (Bouckley) Ronald Ely Alexander Thomas Joseph Ammerman Martin Lewis Apfelbaum Rachel Maria Asrelsky Judith Ellen Atkinson (Bernstein) William Garretson Atkinson III Elisabeth Nichole Avoyne Jerry Don Avritt Clare Louise Bacciochi Harry Michael Bainbridge Stuart Murray Barclay Jean Mary Bell Julian MacBain Benello Lawrence Ray Bennett Philip Vernon Bergstrom Alistair Berkley Michael Stuart Bernstein Steven Russell Berrell
Noelle Lydie Berti Campbell
Surinder Mohan Bhatia Kenneth John Bissett Stephen John Boland Glenn Bouckley Nicole Elise Boulanger Francis Boyer Nicholas Bright Daniel Solomon Browner (Bier) Colleen Renee Brunner Timothy Guy Burman Michael Warren Buser Warren Max Buser Steven Lee Butler William Martin Cadman Fabiana Caffarone Hernan Caffarone Valerie Canady Gregory Joseph Capasso Timothy Michael Cardwell Bernt Wilmar Carlsson Richard Anthony Cawley Frank Ciulla Theodora Eugenia Cohen Eric Michael Coker Jason Michael Coker Gary Leonard C
Surinder Mohan Bhatia Kenneth John Bissett Stephen John Boland Glenn Bouckley Nicole Elise Boulanger Francis Boyer Nicholas Bright Daniel Solomon Browner (Bier) Colleen Renee Brunner Timothy Guy Burman Michael Warren Buser Warren Max Buser Steven Lee Butler William Martin Cadman Fabiana Caffarone Hernan Caffarone Valerie Canady Gregory Joseph Capasso Timothy Michael Cardwell Bernt Wilmar Carlsson Richard Anthony Cawley Frank Ciulla Theodora Eugenia Cohen Eric Michael Coker Jason Michael Coker Gary Leonard C
David Scott Dornstein Michael Edward Doyle Edgar Howard Eggleston III Siv Ulla Engstrom Turhan Michael Ergin Charles Thomas Fisher IV Joanne Flannigan Kathleen Mary Flannigan Thomas Brown Flannigan Clayton Lee Flick John Patrick Flynn Arthur Jay Fondiler Robert Gerard Fortune Stacie Denise Franklin Paul Stephen Mathew Freeman James Ralph Fuller Dyane Fuller (Boatman) Ibolya Robertine Gabor Amy Beth Gallagher Matthew Kevin Gannon Kenneth Raymond Garczynski Paul Isaac Garrett Kenneth James Gibson William Davi
Khaled Nazir Jaafar Robert Van Houten Jeck Paul Avron Jeffreys Rachel Jeffreys Kathleen Mary Jermyn Beth Ann Johnson Mary Lincoln Johnson Timothy Baron Johnson Christopher Andrew Jones Julianne Frances Kelly Jay Joseph Kingham Patricia Ann Klein Gregory Kosmowski Elke Etha Kuehne Minas Christopher Kulukundis Mary Lancaster Ronald Albert Lariviere Maria Nieves Larracoechea Robert Milton Leckburg, Jr. William Chase Leyrer, Jr. Joan Sherree Lichtenstein (Sheanshang) Wendy Anne Lincoln Alexander Lowenstein Lloy
Eva Ingeborg Morson Helga Rachael Mosey Ingrid Elisabeth Mulroy John Mulroy Sean Kevin Mulroy Mary Geraldine Murphy Jean Aitken Murray Karen Elizabeth Noonan Daniel Emmett O’Connor Mary Denice O’Neill Anne Lindsey Otenasek Bryony Elise Owen Gwyneth Yvonne Margaret Owen Laura Abigail Owens Martha Ives Owens Robert Plack Owens Sarah Rebecca Owens Robert Italo Pagnucco Christos Papadopoulos Peter Raymond Peirce Michael Cosimo Pescatore Sarah S B Philipps Frederick Sandford Phillips James Andrew Campbell Pitt D
Arnaud David Rubin Elyse Jeanne Saraceni Theresa Elizabeth Saunders Scott Christopher Saunders Johannes Otto Schauble Robert Thomas Schlageter Thomas Britton Schultz Sally Elizabeth Scott Amy Elizabeth Shapiro Mridula Shastri Irving Stanley Sigal Martin Bernard Carruthers Simpson Irja Synnove Skabo Ingrid Anita Smith Cynthia Joan Smith James Alvin Smith Mary Edna Smith John Somerville Lynsey Anne Somerville Paul Somerville Rosaleen Later Somerville Geraldine Anne Stevenson Hannah Louise Stevenson Rachael St
Peter Petrisor Vulcu Raymond Ronald Wagner Janina Jozefa Waido Thomas Edwin Walker Kesha Weedon Jerome Lee Weston Jonathan White Brittany Leigh Williams Eric Jon Williams George Waterson Williams Stephanie Leigh Williams Bonnie Leigh Williams Miriam Luby Wolfe Chelsea Marie Woods Joe Nathan Woods Dedera Lynn Woods (Copeland) Joe Nathan Woods Jr. Andrew Christopher Gillies Wright Mark James Zwynenburg
27. Many of the pieces of aircraft and other debris collected from the crime scene
were sent to a forensic laboratory at the Royal Armament Research and Development
Establishment (“RARDE”), at Fort Halstead, England, for analysis. That analysis included a
three-dimensional reconstruction of Pan Am Flight 103 from the recovered wreckage, including
the position of baggage containers within the cargo hold, the suitcase believed to contain the
bomb that brought down the aircraft, and that suitcase’s likely position within the baggage
container. According to records from the original investigation, some of that report’s relevant
findings are summarized below:
a. Pan Am Flight 103 was brought down in a matter of seconds by the detonation of a
powerful explosive in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft, which occurred within a
baggage container labeled “AVE 4041PA;”
b. There were traces of the chemicals pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) and
cyclotrimethylene trinitramine (RDX), used in the manufacture of plastic explosives,
including Semtex, present on two sections of AVE 4041PA. Follow-on investigation
confirmed this as the primary charge used in the improvised explosive device (“IED”);
c.
c.
c.
The explosive was determined to have originated within a hard-shell “Samsonite” brand suitcase from the “Silhouette 4000” range (the “IED suitcase”);
d.
d.
Investigative and forensic findings indicated that the suitcase containing the explosive was likely not in contact with the floor of the baggage container and was likely located in the second layer of luggage in the container. There were at least 13 personal items, which included 12 pieces of clothing and an umbrella that, with “high probability,” were in the IED suitcase that housed the explosive device at the moment of detonation;
e.
e.
The explosive charge was secreted within a Toshiba RT-SF 16 radio-cassette recorder possessing a black plastic casing; and
f.
f.
The mechanism by which the explosive device was detonated included a long-delay electronic timer, type “MST-13,” manufactured by the Swiss firm of Meister et Bollier (“MEBO”).
TRACING THE IED SUITCASE TO MALTA
28. Of the 13 personal items identified by investigators at RARDE as having a high probability of originating within the IED suitcase, several were identified as coming from a particular brand (e.g., “Yorkie” trousers or “Slalom” shirt). Many of the brands identified were known to be either manufactured or sold in the Republic of Malta. Three items were so fragmented that no brand could be identified, and the thirteenth item was the umbrella.
29. After RARDE had identified the 13 personal items, investigators traveled to
Malta. One of the 13 items was a pair of “Yorkie” branded trousers, with the number “1705” stamped on them. When investigators visited Yorkie’s manufacturing facility, they learned that the “1705” was a unique order number. According to information provided by Yorkie, order number “1705” was delivered to the proprietors of a store named “Mary’s House,” located in Sliema, Malta, on or about November 18, 1988.
30.
30.
30.
Further investigation at Mary’s House led investigators to recover control samples of the Yorkie trousers, as well as some of the personal items identified as likely originating in the IED suitcase. Control samples from Mary’s House and elsewhere in Malta were compared to evidence recovered from the crime scene. Forensic examiners concluded that multiple control samples were identical in all material respects to the items of evidence determined to have originated from within the IED suitcase.
31.
31.
Investigators also tried to re-create the path of the IED suitcase from where it entered the airline baggage system to when it was placed on board Pan Am Flight 103 at Heathrow Airport. That investigation concluded that the IED suitcase was initially placed aboard an Air Malta flight, which originated at Luqa Airport in Malta on the morning of December 21, 1988. The IED suitcase flew, unaccompanied, from Malta to Frankfurt, West Germany, where it was transferred onto Pan Am Flight 103A, a feeder flight fo
103. The suitcase then flew unaccompanied from Pan Am 103A to Heathrow Airport, where it was transferred onto Pan Am Flight 103. Some of the key relevant facts developed during the investigation that support that conclusion are summarized below.
a. At Heathrow Airport, Luggage Container AVE 4041PA, which investigators later determined contained the IED suitcase, was first loaded with one layer of luggage at a
a. At Heathrow Airport, Luggage Container AVE 4041PA, which investigators later determined contained the IED suitcase, was first loaded with one layer of luggage at a
facility that processed interline bags, that is, those bags being transferred from one airline to another.
b.
b.
b.
After AVE 4041PA was loaded at that facility, it was moved to Pan Am Flight 103, where it was filled with luggage being transferred from Pan Am Flight 103A. According to my review of records from the original investigation, AVE 4041PA was then loaded into the cargo hold of Pan Am Flight 103 at the location within the cargo hold later determined to be where the explosion occurred.
c.
c.
c.
At Frankfurt Airport, with certain exceptions for items like “rush” baggage, luggage was transferred between flights via a computerized baggage system. According to records provided by the airport and/or its employees, as well as interviews conducted during the original investigation, Air Malta Flight 180 (“KM-180”) arrived at Frankfurt airport in Germany from Luqa Airport in Malta at 12:48 p.m. local time on December 21, 1988. Luggage from that flight was processed into the computerized baggage routing sy
1:04 p.m. and 1:10 or 1:16 p.m.KM-180 was the only flight whose bags were processed at V-3, 206 during that time frame.
2
d.
d.
At approximately 1:07 p.m., an item coded at station V-3, 206 was transferred and delivered to the appropriate gate to be loaded on board Pan Am Flight 103A.
e.
e.
Based on records from the initial investigation, no passenger had a ticket on KM-180, from Malta, with an onward booking to either London or the United States.
In 1988, there was a known issue with the computer clock that caused it to diverge from the actual time by as much as a few minutes per day.
f. Documents provided to investigators established that all passengers who were
recorded as having checked bags on Flight KM-180 retrieved their luggage at their final destination.
g. Indeed, the records for Flight KM-180 show that 55 bags were checked, 55 bags were on the load plan, and all bags were retrieved at their final destination. Officials in Malta have denied that an explosive could have been placed on board an aircraft in an unaccompanied bag at Luqa Airport. The original investigation did not definitively establish how an unaccompanied bag was actually placed into the airline baggage stream at Luqa Airport, but based on the facts above, among others, it did establish tha
LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT – MOVEMENTS OF MASUD, MEGRAHI, AND FHIMAH
32. Investigators requested and received from the Government of Malta a number of embarkation and disembarkation immigration cards for the months surrounding December 1988. The cards were required to be filled out by, inter alia, passengers embarking or disembarking an international flight at Luqa Airport. A review of those cards established the following relevant facts, among others:
a.
a.
a.
On or about December 7, 1988, MASUD and Megrahi traveled from Tripoli, Libya, to Malta on separate flights;
b.
b.
On or about December 9, 1988, MASUD traveled from Malta to Tripoli;
c.
c.
On or about December 9, 1988, Megrahi traveled from Malta to Zurich, Switzerland, and other records show that he continued on to Prague, Czechoslovakia;
d.
d.
On or about December 14, 1988, MASUD traveled from Tripoli to Malta;
e.
e.
On or about December 17, 1988, Megrahi returned to Malta from Zurich, and he
continued on to Tripoli that same day; other records established that Megrahi had returned to Zurich from Prague on or about December 16, 1988;
f.
f.
f.
On or about December 18, 1988, Fhimah traveled from Malta to Tripoli;
g.
g.
On or about December 20, 1988, Megrahi and Fhimah traveled from Tripoli to Malta on the same flight; and
h.
h.
On or about December 21, 1988, Megrahi and MASUD traveled from Malta to Tripoli on the same flight.
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33. According to airline records, Flight KM-180, which carried the IED suitcase from Malta to Frankfurt, opened for check-in at Luqa Airport at 8:15 a.m. local time on December 21, 1988, and closed at 9:15 a.m. Libyan Arab Airways Flight LN-147, which transported Megrahi and MASUD back to Tripoli, opened for check-in at 8:50 a.m. on that same date and closed at
9:50 a.m. There was thus an overlap of time during which both Flight KM-180 from Malta to Frankfurt, and Flight LN-147 from Malta to Tripoli were open for check-in.
34. Investigators also recovered a diary from Fhimah’s office in Malta. His business partner confirmed for investigators that the diary belonged to Fhimah. The diary was generally in Arabic, and a translation showed the entry for December 15, 1988, stated, “Abdel Baset [Megrahi] is coming from Zurich . . . take taggs [sic] from the Maltese Airlines[.]” There was
On the December 20 and 21 flights, Megrahi traveled under an alias, “Ahmed Khalifah Abdusamad.” The investigation uncovered no evidence of Megrahi traveling under his true name to and from Malta on those dates. A handwriting analyst compared immigration cards in Megrahi’s name with those in “Abdusamad’s” name and determined that they were likely written by the same person. Additionally, during the trial of Megrahi and Fhimah, the director of the Libyan General Passport and Nationality Department testified
another undated entry that read, “bring the tags from the airport (Abdel Baset, Abdul Salam).”
As noted above, Megrahi in fact arrived in Malta from Zurich en route to Tripoli on December 17, and Fhimah joined him in Tripoli from Malta on December 18. They both returned to Malta on December 20. Based on your affiant’s training and experience, I submit that there is probable cause to believe that, based on those diary entries, Fhimah was making notations indicating that he was to obtain the tags that would later be used to route the unaccompanied bag that was eventually loaded onto Pan Am Flight 103.
LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT – MST-13 TIMERS
35.
35.
35.
During the search of the crime scene, police officers from Scotland recovered a piece of charred cloth that was sent to RARDE for analysis. That analysis revealed that the piece of cloth was from a neckband of a gray shirt. While the cloth lacked identifying features, it appeared similar in all material respects to the neckband of a “Slalom” branded shirt obtained by investigators as a control sample. According to records from the original investigation, the damaged piece of neckband contained severe exp
36.
36.
Photographs of PT/35 were shown to the two principal owners and an employee of the aforementioned Swiss telecommunications firm MEBO. The original investigation
concluded that a timer produced by MEBO detonated the explosive material that brought down Pan Am Flight 103. All three individuals from MEBO identified PT/35 as one of a series of timers that the firm manufactured in the mid-1980s, known as “MST-13” timers. According to these interviews, MEBO produced between 20 and 30 MST-13 timers, with varying degrees of sophistication, although the witnesses differed as to the exact permutations.The MEBO technician who designed the MST-13 timers stated that PT/35 was
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MASUD’S CONFESSION TO BOMBING PAN AM FLIGHT 103
37. On or about September 12, 2012, while MASUD was in Libyan custody, he was interviewed by a Libyan law-enforcement officer. As noted above, the interview was transcribed in Arabic and later translated into English by a translator based in the United Kingdom. All recitations of that statement in this affidavit come from the English translation of the interview. As described in further detail below, during the course of the interview, MASUD admitted that
All three of these witnesses provided multiple statements to investigating law enforcement officials, testified at the trial of Megrahi and Fhimah, and at least one has given multiple media interviews. The Scottish trial court stated in its official opinion, regarding the MEBO witnesses, “All three . . . were shown to be unreliable witnesses. Earlier statements which they made to the police and judicial authorities were at times in conflict with each other, and with evidence they gave in court.” In light
on orders of the ESO, and other high ranking ESO operatives, he built the bomb that brought
down Pan Am Flight 103.
38.
38.
38.
According to the transcript and the interview of the officer who took MASUD’s statement, the interview of MASUD was one of several conducted by Libyan law enforcement on September 12, 2012, during which open-ended questions were asked of MASUD. The intent of the interviews, according to the officer, was to question MASUD and the others to determine whether they had committed any crimes against Libya and the Libyan people during the 2011 revolution in an attempt to keep Qadaffi in power. Prior to the interv
39.
39.
MASUD stated that he worked in the Technical Department of the ESO, which was a section that had several sub-sections. During MASUD’s time with the Technical Department, he handled Semtex explosives and built bombs on behalf of that department.
40.
40.
When asked whether he had participated in any operations in Libya or outside of Libya, MASUD initiated a response that he had participated in the “Lockerbie airplane bombing,” among others. MASUD then continued explaining his involvement in narrative form.
41.
41.
One of the other operations MASUD admitted to committing was the bombing of the LaBelle Discotheque, which took place in Berlin, West Germany, shortly after midnight on April 5, 1986.MASUD explained that he was asked by a Libyan intelligence official to travel to East Berlin to meet with the security officer at the Libyan embassy. When MASUD met with this person at the embassy, he informed MASUD that MASUD was to build an explosive device
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MASUD did not say the name of the nightclub, but he described it as a Berlin nightclub bombing taking place on April 4, 1986.
to be used against an American target. MASUD prepared the explosive device from plastic
explosive “dough,” as well as a detonating fuse and a timing device that were present at the embassy. MASUD then instructed the embassy official on how to set the timer. He did not know who had actually placed the device at the nightclub. MASUD said that the nightclub was chosen for attack because it was frequented by American military officers. He recalled that four American officers died, and several were wounded. Your affiant is aware, from his/her review of FBI documents relating to the LaBelle Dis
42.
42.
42.
Regarding the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, MASUD stated that in the winter of 1988, he was summoned by a Libyan intelligence official to meet at that official’s office in Tripoli, Libya. While in that meeting, which involved additional Libyan intelligence officials, MASUD was asked whether the “suitcases” were finished. When MASUD answered in the affirmative, one of the intelligence officials ordered MASUD to take one of the suitcases and travel with it to Malta. MASUD said that the following day, he travel
43.
43.
MASUD recalled that one of the Libyan intelligence officials informed him that Megrahi and Fhimah would be there to meet him at the airport in Malta, and he stated that the pair did in fact meet him at the airport. MASUD stated that he stayed at a hotel, pre-arranged for him by unknown individuals in Libya, which was located about 20 minutes from the airport. He did not recall the name of that hotel.
44. MASUD said that after approximately three or four days in the hotel, Megrahi and
Fhimah met him in the lobby, and they told him to be up the following morning at 7:00 precisely.
MASUD said that he was instructed to set the timer on the device in the suitcase so that the
explosion would occur exactly eleven hours later. Megrahi and Fhimah also handed MASUD
$500 to purchase some clothes to put in the suitcase, instead of using his own clothes.MASUD
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stated that he did as instructed in the morning. He also took a taxi to the airport in Malta,
knowing that the aircraft on which the suitcase would be placed on board would be departing
after MASUD handed the suitcase to Megrahi and Fhimah. He described the suitcase as a
medium-sized Samsonite suitcase that he used for traveling.
45. MASUD told the Libyan officer that he stood at a specified place near the
passenger luggage check at Luqa Airport. He said that after some time passed, both Megrahi and
Fhimah passed in front of him, and Fhimah went to the check-in desk near the luggage conveyor
belt. After Fhimah gave MASUD a sign with his head to bring over the suitcase, MASUD did
so. The suitcase was received by Fhimah, who placed it on the conveyor belt. MASUD then
In the course of the original investigation, investigators interviewed the proprietor of Mary’s House, who provided a description of a Libyan male who bought clothing consistent with many of the items of evidence that with “high probability” were inside the IED suitcase at the time of the explosion. The indictment filed in this Court in 1991, charging Megrahi and Fhimah with their roles in the offense, alleges that as an overt act in support of the conspiracy, Megrahi purchased clothing at Mary’s House on
left. He was given a boarding pass for a Libyan flight to Tripoli, which he stated was to take off at 9:00 a.m.
46.
46.
46.
MASUD later heard that an American plane was brought down by an explosion, and he was sure that the suitcase he had prepared earlier had been used in the operation. MASUD said that “unfortunately” the explosive device was not discovered by airport personnel despite the fact that he placed the suitcase on the scanner at the airport. He explained that he hid the detonator and timer in a technical way that would make it difficult to be discovered, by placing it close to the metallic parts of the suitcase. MA
47.
47.
MASUD said that he was aware that Megrahi worked for the ESO and was responsible for the security of airplanes. Fhimah, he became aware later, was part of the Libyan airline.MASUD explained his belief that Fhimah was able to receive the suitcase from MASUD and place it on the conveyor belt because Fhimah was an employee of the Libyan airline and was responsible for carrying out check-in procedures for that airline. Additionally, check-in for a Libyan flight was open simultaneously. Your affiant believes th
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According to other evidence gathered in the case, your affiant has learned that Fhimah had previously been employed as the station manager for a Libyan airline at Luqa Airport, but he left that position at some point in 1988 prior to December.
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