AES Side Channel Attacks Biru Cui Sam Skalicky. Outline AES algorithm Side channel attacks Side...
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Transcript of AES Side Channel Attacks Biru Cui Sam Skalicky. Outline AES algorithm Side channel attacks Side...
AES Side Channel Attacks
Biru CuiSam Skalicky
Outline
• AES algorithm• Side channel attacks• Side channel attack against AES• Cache-collision timing attack against AES• Countermeasures
AES Algorithm
• Key Expansion• Initial Round
– Add Round Key – bitwise xor
• Rounds– Sub Bytes - Sbox– Shift Rows – rows shifted cyclically– Mix Columns – mixing operation on the columns– AddRoundKey
• Final Round (no Mix Columns)– Sub Bytes– Shift Rows– Add Round Key
Rijndel Starting Data
Rijndel AES Steps
Rijndel Sub Bytes
Rijndel Shift Rows
Rijndel Mix Columns
Rijndel Add Round Key
AES Algorithm
• AES Lookup Table Optimizations– Transposed State by Bertoni• Speedup in decryption
– CAM based by Li• Combined Sbox& inv Sbox into single table
– FPGA implementations• Pre-computed GF ops in LUTs
Attacks on AES
• Brute force• Related Key• Side Channel
Side Channel Attacks
• Attacks through some implementation deficiency– Timing of computations– Power Analysis– Fault Injection– Electromagnetic Radiation– Acoustic Cryptanalysis– Cache
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• Cache collision– Hit– Miss– Time
Process Operation
• Cache observation
Victim Process Spy Process
CFS - Scheduler
Cache
AES Cache Side Channel Attack
• AES-128• Key recovery after observing ~100 encryptions• Implementation in Linux against OpenSSL 0.9.8n• Program does not require special privileges on
the host machine• Linux kernel task scheduler compromised– Observe every memory access– (CFG) Completely Fair Scheduler
AES Cache Attack Features
• No heuristic info about plain/cyphertexts• Works against compressed tables• 2 phase operation:– Observation• ~100 encryptions• ~2-3 seconds
– Analysis• ~3 minutes
Process Operation
• Cache observation
Victim Process Spy Process
CFS - Scheduler
Cache
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• AES: operations on each byte
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• System information– Pentium III 1.0 GHz
• L1 cache 32K (split data/instr.)• L2 cache 256K
– “T” lookup table size 256x256=64k
• Implication– If the table is fully loaded in the cache, then there is
no cache miss. This is important for why we can do first round and final round attack.
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• AES: the computation of every round
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
# of cache collisions
Tim
ing
de
via
tio
n (
cy
cle
s)
Actual Results, Pentium III
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
Table
Key xor
Plaintext
…
Key xor
Table
Table
Key xor
[6]
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
Table
Key xor
Plaintext
…
Key xor
Table
Table
Key xor
If a plaintext byte is known, as well as a first-round table lookup, a key byte is learned
[6]
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• First Round Attack– Spy process flush the cache– The lookup table is not in the cache. In other
words, the cache collision is only due to same lookup table access index.
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• First Round Attack
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• First Round Attack– If cache hits ( access time less than average access
time)– Counts the average encryption time for all and pair. If there is a low average time occurs for a
pair and , there is high probability that .
ip
jp
ip jp
jiji kkpp
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• Final Round Attack– The final round lookup table is different from
previous lookup table , so there is no in the cache. And if there is a collision, it’s due to same lookup table index.
4T
3210 ,,, TTTT
4T
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• Final Round Attack– No MixColumns operations
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• Final Round Attack
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• Final Round Attack– If cache hits ( access time less than average access
time)– Counts the average encryption time for all and pair. If there is a low average time occurs for a
pair and , there is high probability that .
ic
jc
ic jc1010jiji kkcc
Cache-collision timing attack against AES
• ResultAttack Encryptions needed Sample type
Bernstein Plaintext/timing
Tesunoo Plaintext/timing
First/Final round attack
Plaintext/timing
5.272
262
152
Countermeasures
– AES can be performed without using lookup tables– Give OS ability to partition cache between
processes– Put AES table into ROM, add special instructions– Separate AES hardware on chip (new Intel CPUs)
References• [1] Rijndel flash movie:http://www.cs.bc.edu/~straubin/cs381-05/blockciphers/rijndael_ingles2004.swf• [2] G. Bertoni, et al.,"Efficient Software Implementation of AES on
32-Bit Platforms”• [3] H. Li, "A New CAM Based S/S−1-Box Look-up Table in AES”• [4] M. McLoone et al. "Rijndael FPGA Implementations Utilising
Look-Up Tables”• [5] D. Gullasch et al. "Cache Games – Bringing Access-Based Cache
Attacks on AES to Practice“• [6] J. Bonneau et al. “Cache-Collision Timing Attacks Against AES”• [7] Dag Arne Osvik et al. “Cache Attacks and Countermeasures: the
Case of AES”
Backup slides
Original Mix Columns Equations
Revised Mix Columns Equations
FPGA LUT Implementation