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Accommodating ChinaAmitai Etzioni

To cite this article: Amitai Etzioni (2013): Accommodating China, Survival: Global Politics and

Strategy, 55:2, 45-60

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There are increasing signs that the United States and China are on a collision

course. Some scholars see this course as following the historical paern by

which a declining power refuses to yield to a rising power, and war ensues.

Yet the collision is by no means inevitable. The United States should be able

to accommodate Chinas rise without compromising its core interests or

its values. Freed from his pre-election necessity to appear tough, President

Barack Obama now has the opportunity to re-examine the pivot to Asia he

announced in 2011 to choose between a quest for a regional accommodation

and a military confrontation.Accommodation should not be misconstrued as appeasement or unilat-

eral concession. It should be conceived, rather, as action in the interests of

both sides that contributes to global stability. It proceeds from the assump-

tion that relations between international powers can benet from signicant

complementary interests, even if other interests conict. Washington and

Beijing share interests in nuclear non-proliferation, securing global com-

merce, stabilising oil markets and preserving the environment, as well as

preventing terrorism, piracy and the spread of pandemics. To these ends,

China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, joined the UN

Security Council in unanimously condemning North Koreas 2012 ballistic-

missile test and January 2013 nuclear test, and conducted its rst bilateral

anti-piracy operation with the US Navy in the Horn of Africa at the end

Accommodating China

Amitai Etzioni

Amitai Etzioni is University Professor and Professor of International Relations at The George Washington

University, Washington DC.

Survival | vol. 55 no. 2 | AprilMay 2013 | pp. 4560 DOI 10.1080/00396338.2013.784466


3/17

46 | Amitai Etzioni

of last year. China is also a member of the World Trade Organisation and

the Financial Action Task Force, and its increased contributions to the

International Monetary Fund in 2012 were of great benet to failing econo-

mies in Europe. Although they have the potential for greater cooperation,the United States and China already work together on many issues.

Strategic assumptions

China is rising as a regional, rather than global, power. It has neither the

capability nor evident desire to establish a new world order and appears

uninterested in exporting its version of authoritarian capitalism to other

nations. China views its key geopolitical interests in a regional context,

focusing on Tibet, Taiwan and the South China Sea, and its military is largely

designed to enhance its power in East Asia, as shown by the deployment of

its most advanced weapons systems near Taiwan and its concentration on

anti-access and area-denial capabilities. Chinas explicit foreign-policy doc-

trine has been one of peaceful rise, more recently evolving into peaceful

development.

Accordingly, in recent decades China has often reached compromises in

conicts with its neighbours, seling them via negotiations or other peace-ful mechanisms.1 Between 1949 and 2005, Beijing seled 17 of 23 territorial

disputes with other governments, in most cases receiving less than half the

land in question.2 It has, to be sure, become more assertive in recent years,

but this has been almost exclusively in regional maers. China shows lile

interest in promoting its ideology of state capitalism globally. Economic

growth is slowing and China faces a range of environmental, demographic,

social and political challenges. It is likely that Beijing will remain preoc-

cupied with domestic maers (although some of these have international

implications, as it will need to ensure access to foreign energy and raw

materials to secure economic growth and political stability). It has very few

allies in East Asia, as most of its neighbours fear and oppose its aempts to

establish regional superiority.

The United States and its allies therefore have lile reason to replay

the Cold War by seeking to contain China. Instead, the West could readily

tolerate some expansion of Chinas regional inuence by allowing it to


4/17

Accommodating China | 47

secure access to vital resources as long as it abides by international law.3

Accommodating such expansion is more likely to lead to a peaceful, limited

rebalancing of power than seeking to block China on all fronts by establish-

ing counter-alliances. Crucially, China does not pose an immediate threat toUS interests in the same way as Iran or Pakistan. It is still in the early stages

of building-up and modernising its military. Rather than rushing to pre-

empt China as a military threat with a more aggressive defence policy, the

United States has time to help bring about a peaceful coexistence.

Easing tensions

Nations can often be caught in a vicious circle in which acts considered

hostile by one state trigger similar moves by a rival, exacerbating resent-

ment on both sides and prompting further such gestures and responses.4

Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter,

is right to argue that the worst outcome for Asias long-term stability aswell as for the AmericanChinese relationship would be a drift into escalat-

ing reciprocal demonization.5 Regreably, this appears to be happening.

A study by senior American and Chinese analysts Kenneth Lieberthal and

Wang Jisi shows that such a cycle of distrust has deep roots in Sino-Americanhistory and has been intensifying since 2008.6 Given such feelings, it is, as

Australian strategist Hugh White puts it, very dicult to accept an outcome

to any contest, however minor, that can be portrayed as a defeat for one side

or a win for the other, and thus it becomes almost impossible for either side

to step o the escalator and start compromising.7

Various measures have been suggested to reverse this trend. Brzezinski

proposes an informal G2, envisioning a comprehensive partnership,

paralleling our relations with Europe and Japan that would involve per-

sonal in-depth discussions not just about our bilateral relations but about

the world in general.8 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger calls for

coevolution, a relationship in which the countries pursue vital domestic

interests, cooperate where interests are shared and adjust policy to avoid

conict.9

White suggests accommodating Chinas regional inuence by forming

an Asian concert of powers comparable to the power-sharing arrangement


5/17

48 | Amitai Etzioni

in post-Napoleonic Europe. He argues that the United States, China, India

and Japan should negotiate a new order on which Chinas authority and

inuence grow enough to satisfy the Chinese, and Americas role remains

large enough to ensure that Chinas power is not misused.10 This wouldrequire China to acknowledge the legitimacy of the US presence in the

Western Pacic, and the United States to allow its rival a sphere of inuence

that reects regional realities. White acknowledges that reaching such a

compromise would be politically dicult for leaders on both sides but may

be possible given that the alternative could be a catastrophic war between

nuclear powers.

Economic and diplomatic accommodation

One may wonder what economic accommodations the United States

could possibly make for China, given the widely held perception that the

laer has the upper hand nancially. Chinas economic success has led to

demands that it allow its currency to freely adjust to market forces, lib-

eralise access to its markets, show higher regard for intellectual property

rights and curb industrial espionage. Nevertheless, the United States could

respond to Chinas concern that its companies are often denied access toWestern markets (an issue rarely discussed in the West). While some of

these limitations stem from legitimate security concerns, the Chinese argue

that their businesses routinely face a welter of federal, state and local regu-

lations that hobble their eorts to invest or market products in the United

States.11 Helping these businesses negotiate such regulations would be a

step towards accommodating China. Washington should also stop obstruct-

ing Chinese energy deals, as it did when the state-owned China National

Oshore Oil Company made takeover bids for American rm Unocal in

200512 and Canadian rm Nexen in 2012. (While the Nexen bid was eventu-

ally approved, the process for the deal [was] more dicult than initially

expected due in part to concerns raised by an inuential US lawmaker.)13

China is eager for the United States to put its scal and monetary house

in order. Washington does need to make adjustments to its nancial policy

but will do so in line with its internal needs, dynamics and timetable. Doing

so will make the United States less dependent on Chinese nancing of its


6/17


debt and reduce concern about the trade imbalance between the countries.

Washington can help Beijing secure the huge imports of energy and raw

materials on which it relies by, rstly, reversing pressure on other nations

to refrain from dealing with China bilaterally rather than through multilat-eral channels or groupings such as ASEAN. The United States should also

continue to strongly support the resolution of territorial disputes in the East

and South China Seas (largely driven by natural resources) through nego-

tiation, arbitration, legal proceedings and other non-violent means, and

discouraging all parties from escalating such disputes through acts such

as the unilateral occupation of contested islands and features. Washington

should welcome Chinas construction of transnational roads, railways and

pipelines, as well as ports, in other countries. Despite claims by, among

others, the Pentagons Oce of Net Assessment and Robert Kaplan, there is

every sign that ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan are intended as commer-

cial hubs and are not currentlycongured for military use.14Such accommodations would consolidate the United States credibility

as a global power by puing it on a more sustainable course. This is crucial

at a time when other nations have reason to doubt Washingtons commit-

ment to international security (let alone the feasibility of it building majornew weapons systems15) in the shadow of urgent domestic issues, such as

deteriorating infrastructure and schools, and concern about excessive mili-

tary spending.

Military strategy

Careful military positioning is a crucial aspect of accommodating China, and

involves combining strategic and symbolic changes in policy. Washington

would be wise in the rst instance to stop the frequent surveillance patrols

of Chinese coastlines by US planes and ships, as suggested by Bonnie Glaser

of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.16 Such patrols are as

provocative to Beijing as regular Chinese patrols close to the US coast would

be to Washington. Moreover, they produce lile strategic added value

above the intelligence gathered by satellite, cyber operations and human

agents; their main utility would be tactical in the event of imminent hostili-

ties. At best, they hint that the United States views itself as the guardian of


7/17

50 | Amitai Etzioni

the worlds oceans and, at worst, reect an assertive and provocative ai-

tude on the part of the US Navy, observable in o-the-record discussions.

They also increase the risk of accidents that compound tensions between the

countries, such as the April 2001 collision of a US EP-3 reconnaissance planewith a Chinese F-8 ghter, which left the laers pilot dead and caused the

11-day detention of 24 US crew members.17

More crucially, the United States should stop the forward positioning of

military assets in the region, the formation of military alliances with Chinas

neighbours and the conduct of joint exercises with nations

such as Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan,

the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia and

India. These military commitments have been extended

since the Obama administrations announcement in

2011 of a pivot or rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacic,

which included the deployment of up to 2,500 marines to

Australia (initially redeployed from Okinawa), an increase

in the proportion of the US eet stationed in the Pacic

to 60%18 and the deployment of four of its new Lioral

Combat Ships to Singapore beginning in 2013.19 China perceives such actsas hostile encirclement.

A new strategic concept, AirSea Bale, included in the 2010 Quadrennial

Defense Review, represents an intellectual pivot in the priority of US strate-

gic thinking from land-based operations and strategies to air- and sea-based

ones.20 This doctrine appears to mark a shift from a focus on combating

insurgents and terrorist groups in the Near East to more conventional

warfare in the Far East. While it is not ostensibly aimed at any particular

country, it is clearly a response to an ascendant China.21 American strate-

gists argue about whether the shift in strategy could lead the United States

to impose a debilitating blockade on China or strike the mainland.22 One

scenario would involve US forces launching long-range strikes against

Chinese area-denial assets, prompting China to respond with every option

available and leading inevitably to full-scale, even nuclear, war.23 Making

preparations for an air-sea bale might make sense if the US government

believes it cannot resolve its dierences with China peacefully. But there is

China

perceives

such acts

as hostile

encirclement


8/17


no evidence that such a conclusion is the product of careful strategic review.

Only the failure of aempts to accommodate China could provide reason-

able justication for such preparations for war.

The departure of US forces from Iraq in 2011 and the impending draw-down in Afghanistan have left many East Asian states concerned that US

commitments to defend them may not be honoured.24 They doubt the

United States would engage in a war with China to prevent the integra-

tion of Taiwan with the mainland, or come to the aid of Japan in the event

of a Sino-Japanese conict over control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Washingtons treaties with many nations in the region are ambiguous, and

agreements with countries such as Singapore and Indonesia provide no

defence guarantees but simply promote strategic cooperation.25

The United States should re-examine the reasoning behind such commit-

ments and its engagement in joint military exercises. If Washington in fact

does not expect to be called on to honour its commitments, or to honour

them if called, they may well be counterproductive. If they are not strategi-

cally useful (many of them, made in a dierent time, may now be obsolete),

scaling them back could go some way to accommodate a China that per-

ceives it is being deliberately encircled.Washington has also encouraged Japan to take on an increasing share of

the costs of its defence, including increasing its military forces. This could,

to be sure, help ease the burden on the Pentagon budget. But such encour-

agement is highly provocative, given Chinese memories of its treatment by

Imperial Japanese forces in the Second World War and rising nationalism in

Japan. If Washington were to abandon this policy, it would signal that the

United States is commied to peaceful accommodation.

The imminent threats to US security lie not in the Asia-Pacic but in

the greater Middle East, and include the possibility of terrorist access to

Pakistans nuclear weapons; Iranian aggression towards Saudi Arabia and

Israel; the Talibans eorts to regain power in Afghanistan; and the resur-

gence of al-Qaeda and its aliates in North Africa.26 Dealing with such

threats calls for a dierent force structure than AirSea Bale, including

greater roles for drones, special forces and covert operations. The United

States should not re-pivot to this region because it would accommodate


9/17

52 | Amitai Etzioni

China, but if such a move is justied by US and allied security interests

anyway, the opportunity to test a policy of accommodation would be a

bonus. Abandoning its focus on the Pacic in favour of these more pressing

concerns might allow the United States to test the accommodation of Chinaas viable policy. (This need not to be formally announced. Budget cuts will

justify reducing the number of US troops in Asia, which exceed 300,000,

and, considering the situation in Syria and Iran, few would object to relocat-

ing naval vessels from Singapore to Naples.)

New domains

Current USChina tensions extend to outer space and cyberspace. Cyber

capabilities are becoming dangerous on a strategic level. In 2012 US

Secretary of Defense Leon Panea warned that the next Pearl Harbor we

confront could very well be a cyber aack.27 Such military options are par-

ticularly alarming in that they greatly favour the nation that strikes rst a

dangerous and destabilising condition. It follows that the United States and

its allies ought to seek ways to limit their proliferation.

Some of Chinas emerging anti-access and area-denial capabilities

involve these domains and are perceived in the United States as threatsto the global commons.28 China, for its part, sees them as responses to US

aggression. Under such circumstances, as Li Yan of the China Institute of

Contemporary International Relations put it, any potential investment by

one side is probably viewed as new threats by the other side.29 In 2007 the

Chinese successfully launched a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons

test, an action the White House described as inconsistent with the spirit

of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area.30 To be

sure, both Washington and Beijing have acknowledged the need for co-

operative frameworks in both cyber and outer space. In May 2012, Panea

said that because the United States and China have developed technological

capabilities in [cyberspace], its extremely important that we work together

to develop ways to avoid any miscalculation or misperception that could

lead to crisis.31 Working alongside Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in

September 2011 China proposed an international code for the regulation of

cyberspace.32

Washington, however, rejected the proposed code because it


10/17


would limit the free ow of information on the World Wide Web and benet

authoritarian regimes seeking to stamp out dissent.33 In 2008 the United

States rejected a draft UN treaty co-sponsored by China and Russia that

would ban weapons in space. The White House said the treaty would beimpossible to verify or enforce, and while Washington was open to discus-

sions aimed at promoting transparency and condence-building measures,

it opposed eorts to prohibit or limit [its] access to or use of space.34 After

the accidental collision of a defunct Russian satellite with a US communi-

cations satellite in 2009, the Pentagon stated that new rules are needed in

space to enhance U.S. national security by encouraging responsible space

behavior by reducing the risk of mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust.35

Observers such as David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders argue that,

since disarmament in outer space or cyberspace is impractical and unveri-

able, the way forward is for Washington and Beijing to exercise mutual

restraint in the use of strategic oensive capabilities.36 In other words, both

countries should pledge not to be the rst to launch aacks against assets in

outer space or cyber aacks against critical infrastructure. Such an under-

standing may be dicult to achieve, but it has a beer chance in the context

of a general policy of accommodation.

International law and the South China Sea

Accommodating a rising regional power should never entail tolerating vio-

lations of international laws and norms. China should be expected to adhere

to World Trade Organisation agreements and the United States should con-

tinue, as it has already done over tyre and steel disputes, to take appropriate

action when it violates them. Washington should also continue to pressure

Beijing to respect intellectual property rights. Above all, aempts to expand

territorial control by military means should be considered gross violations

of international law and beyond the limits of what can be accommodated.

(It is too late, to be sure, to apply this rule to Tibet or, arguably, Taiwan, in

light of the United States One China policy.37)

Beijings claims to islands and features in the South China Sea are not

an inherent violation of international order; such positioning is a common

bargaining tactic. Canada, Russia, Denmark and Norway, for example, have


11/17

54 | Amitai Etzioni

made overlapping claims to the North Pole and parts of the Arctic Ocean,

and have conducted exploratory expeditions and military exercises in the

regionto strengthentheir positions.38 Despite aggressive rhetoric from both

China and its regional rivals, Beijings claims in the South China Sea mayyet be resolved in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the

Sea (UNCLOS).

China has, moreover, recently exhibited a generally positive aitude

towards international organisations and law. This is a marked improve-

ment on past decades, when, as legal scholars Jerome A. Cohen and Jon

M. Van Dyke put it, Beijing rejected what it called the bourgeois rules

and institutions that dominated the world community and

silenced its international law experts.39 They note that China

plays a responsible role in international maritime organisa-

tions, aempting to resolve its many disputes in accordance

with at least its own understanding of international law.

China also participated in the drafting of UNCLOS, ratify-

ing it in 1996 (in contrast to the United States, which has yet

to do so), and has joined regional organisations protecting

maritime environments in East Asia. Other cooperative initiatives Beijinghas participated in include an agreement with Vietnam over their maritime

boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin, dividing the disputed territory equally, and

the development of a joint hydrocarbon project in waterways disputed with

Japan (though this enterprise did not make it past the initial stages).40 China

also peacefully seled a decades-old border dispute with Russia in 2004,

renouncing its claim to large swathes of Siberia that had been annexed by

the tsars in the nineteenth century.41

But there is a possibility that China will aempt to sele its territorial

disputes by force, as it did when the PLA ejected Vietnamese forces from

the Paracel Islands in 1974.42 Acts such as the dispatch of patrol ships to the

Senkakus/Diaoyus (in the wake of the Japanese governments purchase of

three of the islands from their private owner) to show its undisputable sov-

ereignty over them come close to crossing a dangerous line.43 Is the territory

Beijing disputes in the East and South China Seas worth the risk of creating

a conict that could wreak havoc on the global economy and even involve

Washington

is in a

perilous

position


12/17


nuclear weapons? While Senkakus/Diaoyus are currently controlled by

the Japanese and their protection seems to be covered by Japans defence

treaty with the United States, there is historical evidence supporting Chinas

claim. This ambiguity puts Washington in a perilous position, and it needsto either nd a way to clarify the legal status of the islands or facilitate a

long-term negotiated solution between the two sides. If it cannot, it may

have to choose between ignoring military action that outs international

law (and damaging the credibility of its defence commitments) or going to

war over a handful of small, uninhabited islands.

* * *

For many, the idea of cooperating with a regime that routinely violates

human rights runs, as White puts it, counter to their deeply held convictions

about the ways values should underpin foreign policy.44 Such commenta-

tors should note that accommodation does not preclude the promotion of

human rights and democracy through education and cultural exchange pro-

grammes. It does, to be sure, militate against the notion of aempting to

instigate regime change in China. Even were the United States to succeed insuch an aempt, there is no guarantee that a liberal democracy would rise

out of the ashes, as shown by recent interventions in the Middle East. But

the promotion of liberal democracy through non-violent means would not

be hindered by a policy of accommodation.

Avoiding the use of force across borders is one of the major foundations of

global order (with the noted exceptions of breaching territorial sovereignty

to prevent genocide or, arguably, the spread of nuclear arms).45 Abiding

by this principle should be considered the litmus test of a states conduct.

But it is unreasonable to deny a nation the status of responsible member of

the international community for insuciently contributing to peacekeeping

forces or humanitarian aid eorts, or for seeking to secure favourable terms

of trade.46 One should distinguish between law-abiding members of the

international community and those who voluntarily do more than required.

Countries that otherwise abide by international law should not be coerced

by other states, though nations that voluntarily take on such roles should


13/17

56 | Amitai Etzioni

be applauded. As a primarily regional power, Chinas adherence to inter-

national law to the extent it exists should be basis enough for a policy of

accommodation.

A considerable array of options are available to the United States andits allies to avoid a collision with China. But the West must rst acknowl-

edge that there is currently no reason to contain or balance China, as it

has few, if any, global ambitions or capabilities. The West should also

allow China to gain regional inuence commensurate with its growing

power, as long as such expansion does not violate the precepts of global

order. The West should follow what might be called, lacking a beer term,

a multi-track approach. A red light that warns against the use of force by

China to change the status quo; a yellow light for tolerating its increased

inuence in the region, and a green light for Chinas drive to secure the

ow of energy and raw materials it needs. Such an approach may provide

substantive content to the new type of great power relationship47 China

says it seeks.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Ashley McKinless for providing research assistance forthis essay, and Weiming Tu, Charles Glaser and the participants of the Beijing Forum for

valuable discussions on USChina relations.

Notes

1 Zheng Bijian, Chinas Peaceful Rise

to Great-Power Status, Foreign Aairs,

vol. 84, no. 5, SeptemberOctober

2005, pp. 1824.2 M. Taylor Fravel, Regime Insecurity

and International Cooperation:

Explaining Chinas Compromises

in Territorial Disputes, International

Security, vol. 30, no. 2, Fall 2005,

p. 46; Malcolm Turnbull, Power

Shift: High Whites The China

Choice, The Monthly, August 2012,

hp://www.themonthly.com.au/

hugh-white-s-china-choice-power-

shift-malcolm-turnbull-5847.3 See John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan:

The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation

of the American World Order

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 2012).4 Charles E. Osgood,An Alternative to

War or Surrender (Champaign-Urbana,

IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962)

and Amitai Eioni, The Hard Way

to Peace: A New Strategy (New York:

Collier Books, 1962).


14/17


5 Zbigniew Brzezinski, How To Stay

Friends With China, New York Times,

2 January 2011, hp://www.nytimes.

com/2011/01/03/opinion/03brzezinski.

html6 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi,

Addressing U.S.China Strategic

Distrust, John L. Thornton China

Center Monograph Series,no. 4

(Washington DC: Brookings, March

2012), hp://www.brookings.edu/~/

media/research/les/papers/2012/3/30

us china lieberthal/0330_china_lieber-

thal.pdf.7 Hugh White, The China Choice:

Why America Should Share Power

(Melbourne: Black Inc., 2012), pp.

11819.8 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Group of

Two that could Change the World,

Financial Times, 13 January 2009, hp://

www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d99369b8-

e178-11dd-afa0-0000779fd2ac.

html#axzz2AzHiT8ac.9 Henry Kissinger, On China (New

York: Penguin Group, 2011); Michiko

Kakutani, An Insider Views China,

Past and Future, New York Times,

9 May 2011, hp://www.nytimes.

com/2011/05/10/books/on-china-by-

henry-kissinger-review.html.10 White, The China Choice.11 Shahien Nasiripour and Paul Taylor,

Huawei and ZTE face Congressional

Grilling, Financial Times, 14

September 2012, hp://www.ft.com/

intl/cms/s/0/3656bf26-fdc5-11e1-9901-

00144feabdc0.html#axzz2C2QZmU6b.12 David Barboza, China Backs

Away from Unocal Bid, New York

Times, 3 August 2005, hp://www.

nytimes.com/2005/08/02/business/

worldbusiness/02iht-unocal.html.

13 Senator Urges U.S. To Block Chinas

Nexen Deal, CBC News, 27 July 2012,

hp://www.cbc.ca/news/business/

story/2012/07/27/nexen-cnooc-us.

html; David Ljuggren, SIS Warningon China Security Threat dogged

CNOOCNexen Debate in Canada,

Financial Post, 24 December 2012,

hp://business.nancialpost.com

/2012/12/24/csis-warning-on-china-

security-threat-dogged-cnooc-

nexen-debate-in-canada/?__lsa=d931-

7957.14 See China Builds Up Strategic Sea

Lanes, Washington Times, 17 January

2005, hp://www.washingtontimes.

com/news/2005/jan/17/20050117-

115550-1929r/; Robert D. Kaplan,

Chinas Port in Pakistan?, Foreign

Policy, 27 May 2011, hp://www.

foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/27/

chinas_port_in_pakistan; Robert D.

Kaplan, Center Stage for the 21st

Century, Foreign Aairs, MarchApril2009, hp://www.foreignaairs.

com/articles/64832/robert-d-kaplan/

center-stage-for-the-21st-century;

Ashley S. Townshend, Unraveling

Chinas String of Pearls, YaleGlobal

Online, 16 September 2011, hp://

yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/

unraveling-chinas-string-pearls.15 Tim Huxley, Response to PacNet #35

US 1, China 0, Center for Strategic

and International Studies:Pacic Forum,

12 June 2012, hp://csis.org/les/publi-

cation/Pac1235R.pdf.16 Bonnie S. Glaser,Armed Clash in the

South China Sea, Council on Foreign

Relations Contingency Planning Memo-

randum, no. 14 (New York: CFR, April

2012), hp://www.cfr.org/east-asia/

armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883.


15/17

58 | Amitai Etzioni

17 Shirley A. Kan, ChinaU.S. Aircraft

Collision Incident of April 2001:

Assessments and Policy Implications,

CRS Report RL30946, (Washington

DC: Congressional Research Service,10 October 2001), available at hp://

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.

pdf.18 Ma Siegel, As Part of Pact, U.S.

Marines Arrive in Australia, in Chinas

Strategic Backyard, New York Times,

4 April 2012, hp://www.nytimes.

com/2012/04/05/world/asia/us-

marines-arrive-darwin-australia.html.19 Agreement Calls for 4 U.S. Lioral

Combat Ships to Rotate Through

Singapore, Defense News, 2June 2012,

hp://www.defensenews.com/arti-

cle/20120602/DEFREG03/306020001/

Agreement-Calls-4-U-S-Lioral-

Combat-Ships-Rotate-Through-

Singapore.20 The China Syndrome, Economist, 9

June 2012, hp://www.economist.com/node/21556587.

21 US Department of Defense,

Background Brieng on Air-

Sea Bale by Defense Ocials

from the Pentagon, transcript,

9 November 2011, hp://www.

defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.

aspx?transcriptid=4923.22 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes,

Asymmetric Warfare, American Style,

Proceeding Magazine,vol. 138, no. 4,

April 2012, hp://www.usni.org/

magazines/proceedings/2012-04/asym-

metric-warfare-american-style; Geo

Dyer, US Strategic Bale Guidelines

under Aack, Financial Times, 31

May 2012, hp://www.ft.com/intl/

cms/s/0/5e476ed4-ab38-11e1-a2ed-

00144feabdc0.html#axzz2KDpUo8DB.

23 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, Barry

Was and Robert Work,Meeting the

Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge

(Washington DC: Center for Strategic

and Budgetary Assessment, 2003);White, The China Choice, p. 74.

24 Tim Huxley, executive director of the

International Institute for Strategic

StudiesAsia, told a Taiwanese news-

paper that I dont think countries in

the region will ever be convinced [by

the pivot] because everybody knows

the US is a declining power in relative

terms. Quoted in Ralph A. Cossa, US

1, China 0, PacNet Newsleer, no. 35, 6

June 2012.25 Bruce Vaughn, U.S. Strategic and

Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacic

Region, CRS Report no. RL33821

(Washington DC: Congressional

Research Service,22 January 2007),

available at hp://www.fas.org/sgp/

crs/row/RL33821.pdf.

26 Amitai Eioni, Hot Spots: AmericanForeign Policy in a Post-Human

Rights World (New Brunswick, NJ:

Transaction Publishers, 2012).27 David E. Sanger, Mutually Assured

Cyberdestruction?, New York Times,

2 June 2012, hp://www.nytimes.

com/2012/06/03/sunday-review/mutu-

ally-assured-cyberdestruction.html.28 The Dragons New Teeth: A Rare

Look inside the Worlds Biggest

Military Expansion, Economist, 7 April

2012, hp://www.economist.com/

node/21552193.29 Li Yan, Securing the Global

Commons, a New Foundation for

the Sino-US Relationship, ChinaUS

Focus, 19 March 2012, hp://www.

chinausfocus.com/peace-security/

securing-the-global-commonsa-new-


16/17


foundation-for-the-sino-us-relation-

ship/.30 Shirley Kan, Chinas Anti-Satellite

Weapon Test, CRS Report no. RS22652

(Washington DC: CongressionalResearch Service, 23 April 2007), avail-

able at hp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

row/RS22652.pdf.31 Cheryl Pellerin, U.S., China Must

Work Together on Cyber, Panea

Says, AmericanForces Press Service,

7 May 2012, hp://www.defense.gov/

news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116235.32 China, Russia and Other Countries

Submit the Document of International

Code of Conduct for Information

Security to the United Nations,

Ministry of Foreign Aairs of the

Peoples Republic of China, 13

September 2011, hp://www.fmprc.

gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t858978.htm.33 Adam Segal, China and Information

vs. Cyber Security, Asia Unbound,

CFR blog, 15 September 2012, hp://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/09/15/china-

and-information-vs-cybersecurity/.34 Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Weighs

a Ban on Weapons in Space, but U.S.

Still Objects, New York Times, 13

February 2008, hp://www.nytimes.

com/2008/02/13/world/europe/13arms.

html.35 Lisa Daniel, Defense, State Agree

to Pursue Conduct Code for Outer

Space, US Department of Defense,

18 January 2012, hp://www.defense.

gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66833.36 David C. Gompert and Phillip C.

Saunders, The Paradox of Power:Sino

American Strategic Restraint in an Age

of Vulnerability (Washington DC:

National Defense University Press,

2011).

37 US Department of State, U.S.

Relations With Taiwan, updated 20

August 2012, hp://www.state.gov/r/

pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm.

38 In 2010, Russia and Norway wereable to peacefully sele their 40-year

maritime border dispute, spliing the

contested area equally and allowing

for new gas and oil exploration. The

Kremlin told a Russian news agency

this is a practical illustration of the

principle that all disputes in the Arctic

must be tackled by the Arctic nations

themselves by way of talks and on

the basis of international law. Luke

Harding, Russia and Norway Resolve

Arctic Border Dispute, Guardian,

15 September 2010, hp://www.

guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/15/

russia-norway-arctic-border-dispute.39 Jerome A. Cohen and Jon M. Van

Dyke, Finding its Sea Legs, South

China Morning Post, 22 October 2010.

40 Ibid. See also David Shambaugh,Return to the Middle Kingdom? China

and Asia in the Early Twenty-rst

Century, in David Shambaugh (ed.),

Power Shift (Berkeley, CA: University of

California Press, 2005), p. 24.41 Malcolm Turnbull, Power Shift:

Hugh Whites The China Choice,

The Monthly, August 2012, hp://

www.themonthly.com.au/

hugh-white-s-china-choice-power-

shift-malcolm-turnbull-5847.42 The Bully of the South China Sea,

Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2012,

hp://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008

723963904435374045775789535758912

64.html.43 Chico Harlan and Jia Lynn Yang,

China Sends Patrol Ships to

Contested Islands after Japan Buys


17/17

60 | Amitai Etzioni

Them, Washington Post, 11 September

2011, hp://www.washingtonpost.

com/world/china-sends-patrol-boats-

to-contested-islands-chinese-state-

media-says/2012/09/11/83f491ba-f2-11e1-8adc-499661afe377_story.

html. The Japanese move was in fact

intended to pre-empt the intentionally

provocative purchase of the islands by

the far-right governor of Tokyo.44 White, The China Choice, p. 166.45 Amitai Eioni, Point of

Order, Foreign Aairs, vol. 90,

no. 6, NovemberDecember

2011, hp://www.foreignaf-

fairs.com/articles/136548/

amitai-eioni-g-john-ikenberry/

point-of-order.

46 See Robert Zoellick, Whither China:

From Membership to Responsibility?,

Remarks to National Commiee

on USChina Relations, New York

City, 21 September 2005, availableat hp://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/

former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. For

response, see Amitai Eioni, Is

China a Responsible Stakeholder?,

International Aairs, vol. 87, no. 3, May

2011, pp. 53993.47 Michael S. Chase, Chinas Search

for a New Type of Great Power

Relationship, China Brief, vol. 12,

no. 17, 7 September 2012, avail-

able at hp://www.jamestown.org/

single/?no_cache=1&tx_news[_

news]=39820.

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