Advisory Opinion - Leaglity of Nuclear Weapons

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION

transmitted to the Court under the United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/75 K

of 15 December 1994

LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

REQUÊTE POUR AVIS CONSULTATIF

transmise à la Cour en vertu de la résolution 49/75 K de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies

du 15 décembre 1994

LICÉITÉ DE LA MENACE OU DE L'EMPLOI D'ARMES NUCLÉAIRES

1994 General List

No. 95

1. T H E SECRETARY-GENERAL OF T H E U N I T E D NATIONS TO T H E PRESIDENT OF T H E INTERNATIONAL

C O U R T O F JUSTICE

19 December 1994.

1 have the honour to inform you that al ils 90th meeting held on 15 Decem- ber 1994, under its agenda item 62 entitled "General and Complete Disarm- ament: Report of the First Committee" (A/49/699), the General Assembly adopted resolution 49/75 K. "Request for an Advisory Opinion from the lnternational Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons". The tex1 of the resolution is attached.

In this resolution, the General Assembly decided, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations:

"to request the lnternational Court of Justice urgently to render ils advisory opinion on the following question: '1s the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?"'

Pursuant to Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat is now in the process of preparing a dossier containing "al1 documents likely to throw light upon the question", which will be transmitted to the Court as soon as possible.

(Signed) Boutros Bournos-GHALI.

11. RÉSOLUTION 49/75 K ADOPTÉE PAR L'ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE À SA 90E SEANCE PLENIERE

LE 15 DÉCEMBRE 1994

Demande d'avis mnsultati/de la Cour internationale de Justice sur la légalité de la menace ou de l'emploi d'armes nucléaires

L Xssemblée générale,

Considérant que l'existence des armes nucléaires et la poursuite de leur mise au point font courir de graves dangers à l'humanité,

Sachant que les Etats ont en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies I'obligation de s'abstenir de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout Etat,

Rappelant ses résolutions 1653 (XVI) du 24 novembre 1961, 33171 B du 14 décembre 1978,34/83 G du 11 décembre 1979,35/152 D du 12 décembre 1980,36192 1 du 9 décembre 1981,45159 B du 4 décembre 1990 et 46/37 D du 6 décembre 1991, dans lesquelles elle a déclaré que l'emploi d'armes nucléaires constituerait une violation de la Charte et un crime contre I'huma- nité,

Se félicitarondes progrès accomplis en ce qui concerne l'interdiction et l'éli- mination des armes de destruction massive, notamment la conclusion de la convention sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication et du stockage des armes bactériologiques (biologiques) ou à toxines et sur leur destruction' et de la convention sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication, du stockage et de l'utilisation d'armes chimiques et sur leur destruction*,

Convaincue que l'élimination complète des armes nucléaires est la seule garantie contre la menace d'une guerre nucléaire,

h'orant l'inquiétude exprimée lors de la quatriéme conférence des parties '31res chargée de l'examen du trait; sur la non-prolifér31ion dr., armes nucli

devait le oeu de oroerès accomolis vers-l'élimination comolète des armes nucléaires'dans lei mgilleurs dél&s,

Rappelant que, convaincue qu'il faut renforcer la primauté du droit dans les relations internationales, elle a déclaré la periode 1990-1999 Décennie des Nations Unies pour le droit international3,

Notant qu'elle peut, en vertu du paragraphe 1 de I'article 96 de la Charte, demander à la Cour internationale de Justice un avis consultatif sur toute question juridique,

' Résolution 2826 (XXVI), annexe. 2 Voir D-ments ofineh de lilssembléegénérole. quarante-seplieme session. supplémeni

n" 27 (A147/27), appendice 1. Résolution 44/23.

Recallingthe recommendation of the Secretary-General, made in his report entitled "An Agenda for Peace" ', that United Nations organs that are authorized ta take advantage of the advisory competence of the lnternational Court of Justice turn ta the Court more frequently for such opinions,

Welcomingresolution 46/40 of 14 May 1993 of the Assembly of the World Health Organization, in which the organization requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on whether the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed coniiict would be a breach of its obligations under international law, including the Constitution of the World Health Organization,

Decider. Dursuant to Article 96. DaramaDh 1, of the Charter of the United Nations. to request the lnternatio~al &UA of Justtce urgcntly ta render its advisory opinion on the following quesrion. "Ir the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance peÏmLtted under international law?",

Rappelanr que, dans son rapport intitulé «Un agenda pour la paix*', le Secrétaire général a recommandé aux organes des Nations Unies qui sont autorisés à demander des avis consultatifs à la Cour internationale de Justice de s'adresser plus souvent à la Cour pour obtenir d'elle de tels avis,

Se félicranr de la résolution 46/40 de l'Assemblée de l'Organisation mondiale de la Santé, en date du 14 mai 1993, dans laquelle l'organisation demande à la Cour internationale de Justice de donner un avis consultatif sur la question de savoir si l'utilisation d'armes nucléaires par un Etat au cours d'une guerre ou d'un autre conflit armé constituerait une violation de ses obligations au regard du droit international, y compris la Constitution de l'organisation mondiale de la Santé,

Décide, conformément au paragraphe I de l'article 96 de la Charte des Nations Unies. de demander à la Cour internationale de Justice de rendre dans les meilleurs délais un avis consultatif sur la question suivante: «Est-il permis en droit international de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi d'armes nucléaires en toute circonstance?))

UNITED NATIONS

LEGALlTY OF THE THREAT

OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION)

Documents relathg to the Question on which an Advisory Opinion is requested by General Assembly resolution 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, transmitted to the International Court of Justice by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with paragraph 2, Article 65 of the Statute of the Court

,: Table of Contents

Document No.

Introductory Note

Part 1 General Assembly resolution 49/75 K and Documents relating to the proceedings leading to the adoption thereof

A. Text of General Assembly resolution 49/75K

B. Proceedings in the First Committee

Discussion at the 3rd meeting Discussion at the 5th meeting Discussion at the 6th meeting Discussion at the 7th meeting Submission of the draft resolution Introduction of the draft resolution at the 15th meeting Discussion at the 22nd meeting Discussion at the 24th meeting Discussion at the 25th meeting Report of the First Committee (A/49/699)

C. Proceedings at the 90th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly Verbatim Record of the 90th Meeting

Part II General Assembly Resolutions referred to in Preambular Paragraph 3 of General Assembly Resolution 49/75K and the documents relating to the legislative history thereof

A. General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961

1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI) 13 2. Agenda items 72 and 73

a. Request by United Kingdom and United States of America for inclusion of agenda item 72 (A/4799) 14

b. Request by India for inclusion of agenda item 73 A/4801 and Add.1) 15

3. Draft Resolution (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) 16 4. Verbatim Records of Proceedings in the First

Committee a. Introduction of draft resolution at

1189th meeting b. Discussion at 1189th meeting c. Discussion at 1190th meeting

d. Italian amendments (A/C.l/L.295) to draft resolution 19

e. Discussion at 1191st meeting 20 f. Discussion at 1192nd meeting 21 g. Explanations of vote before the vote at

1193rd meeting 2 2 h. Explanations of vote before the vote at

1194th meeting 2 3 i. Voting on Italian amendments at 1194th

meeting 2 3 j . Voting on draft resolution at 1194th

meeting 2 3

5. Report of the First Committee (A/4942/Add.3) 24 6. Verbatim Record of Proceedings at the 1063rd

Plenary Meeting a. Introduction of Report of the First

Commi ttee 25 b. , Explanations of vote before the vote 25 c. voting on Draft Resolution II 25 d. Expianations of vote after the vote 25

B. General Assembly Resolution 33/71 B of 14 December 1978

1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 33/71 B 2. Draft Resolution (A/C.1/33/L.2) 3. Verbatim ~ecords of Proceedings in the First

Committee a. Introduction of draft resolution at 18th

meeting 28 b. Co-sponsor8s statement on draft resolution

at 19th meeting 29 c. Oral revision of draft resolution at 51st

meeting 30 d. Explanations of vote before the vote

at 51st meeting 3 O e. Voting on draft resolution at 51st meeting 30 f. Explanations of vote after the vote at 51st

meeting 30 4. Report of the First Committee (A/33/461) 3 1 5. Verbatim Record of Proceedings at the

84th Plenary Meeting a. Introduction of Report of the First

Committee 3 2 b. Voting on Draft Resolution B 32

C. General Assembly Resolution 34/83 G of 11 December 1979

1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 34/83 G 3 3 2. Report of the Secretary-General on "Non-use of

nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear waru of 28 September 1979 (A/34/456 and Add.1) 3 4

3. Draft Resolution (A/C.1/34/L.26) 3 5 4. . Verbatim Records of Proceedings in the First


meeting 36 b. Oral revision of draft resolution at 42nd

meeting 37 c. Voting on draft resolution at 42nd meeting 37 d. Explanation of vote after the vote at 42nd

meeting 37 5. Report of the First Committee (A/34/752) 38 6. Verbatim Record of Proceedings at the 97th

Plenary Meeting a. ' Introduction of Report of the First

Committee 3 9 b. Voting on Draft Resolution G 3 9

D. General Assembly Resolution 35/152 D of 12 December 1980

1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 35/152 D 40 2. Draft Resolution (A/C.1/35/L.22) 4 1 3. Verbatim Records of Proceedings in the First


meeting 42 b. Explanations of vote before the vote at

39th meeting 4 3 c. Voting on draft resolution at 39th

meeting 43 d. Explanations of vote after the vote at

39th meeting 4 3 4. Report of the First Committee (A/35/665/Add.l) 44 5. Verbatim Record of Proceedings at the 94th


Committee b. Voting on Draft Resolution D

E. General Assembly Resolution 36/92 1 of 9 December 1981

1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 36/92 1 2. Draft Resolution (A/C.1/36/L.29)

3. Verbatim Records of Proceedings in the First Committee a. Introduction of draft resolution at 32nd

meeting b. Voting on draft resolution at 40th

meeting c. Explanations of vote after the vote

at 40th meeting 4. ,Report of the First Committee (A/36/752) 5. Verbatim Record of Proceedings at the

91st Plenary Meeting a. Introduction of Report of the First

Committee b. Voting on Draft Resolution 1 c. Expianation of vote after the vote

F. General Assembly Resolution 45/59 B of 4 December 1990

1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 45/59 B 2. Draft Resolution (A/C.1/45/L.25) 3. Verbatim Records of Proceedings in the First


meeting b. Expianation of vote before the vote at

34th meeting c. Voting on draft resolution at 34th

meeting d. Explanations of vote after the vote

at 34th meeting 4. Report of the First Committee (A/45/779) 5. Verbatim Record of Proceedings at the 54th


Committee b. Voting on Draft Resolution B

G. General Assembly Resolution 46/37 D of 6 December 1991

1. Text of General Assembly Resolution 46/37 D 2. Draft Resolution (A/C.1/46/L.20) 3. Verbatim Records of Proceedings in the First

Committee a. Introduction of draft resolution at 31st

meeting b. Voting on draft resolution at 33rd

meeting c. Explanations of vote after the vote at

33rd meeting 4. Report of the First Committee (A/46/674)

5. Verbatim Record of Proceedings at the 65th Plenary Meeting a. Introduction of Report of the First

Committee b. Voting on Draft Resolution E

Part III Texts of Conventions referred to in preambular paragraph 4 of resolution 49/75K

A. Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction

B. Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction

Part IV Final Document of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and Excerpts £rom Statements made therein

A. Text of the Final Document of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Oraanization and Work of the Conference

B. EXCerDts of statements made at the ~onfekence pertaining to the wconcerns.w ex~ressed in the Fourth Review Conference of-the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

- /

Part 1

PART 1 p q

to the ~roceedinss leadins to the ado~tion thereof

Document No.

A. Text of General Assembly resolution 49/75K 1

B. Proceedings in the First Committee

Discussion at the 3rd meeting Discussion at the 5th meeting Discussion at the 6th meeting Di,scussion at the 7th meeting Submission of the draft resolution Introduction of the draft resolution at the 15th meeting Discussion at the 22nd meeting Discussion at the 24th meeting Discussion at the 25th meeting Report of the First Committee (A/49/699)

C. Proceedings at the 90th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly Verbatim Record of the 90th Meeting 12

A. General Assemblv resolution 49/75 K

1. General Assembly resolution 49/75 K entitled l1Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weaponsl, (No. 1) was adopted at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly on 15 December 1994 under agenda item 62 entitled "General and Complete Disarmamentr1. The legislative history of the resolution is as follows . 2. This item, which consists of ten sub-items, was included in the provisional agenda of the forty-ninth session pursuant to resolutions of the previous sessions.

3. On the recommendation of the General Committee, the General Assembly included the item as item 62 in its agenda and allocated it to the First Conimittee.

B. Proceedincrs in the First Committee

4. The First Committee decided to hold a general debate on al1 disarmament and international security items allocated to it (a total of 20 items), which included item 62. The general debate on those items took place at the third to tenth meeting, £rom 17 to 24 October 1994. Discussions of specific subjects took place from 25 to 27 October and on 31 October and 1 November. Consideration of draft resolutions on those items took place at the 12th to 16th meeting, on 3, 4, 7 and 9 November. Action on draft resolutions on those items took place at the 19th to 25th meetings from 14 to 18 November. The following paragraphs refer only to those which are particularly relevant to the present request.

5. At the 3rd meeting on 17 October, a statement was made by Benin (No. 2).

6. At the 5th meeting on 18 October, a statement was made by the United Arab Emirates (No. 3).

7. At its 6th meeting on 19 October, statements were made by Zimbabwe and Namibia (No. 4).

8. At the 7th meeting on 20 October, statements were made by Tanzania and Malaysia (No. 5).

9. On 3 November 1994, Indonesia submitted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.36 entitled "Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of ~ustice on the legality of the threat or use of. nuclear weaponsw (No. 6) on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. -

10. At the 15th meeting on 9 November, Indonesia introduced draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.36 (No. 7).

11. At the 22nd meeting on 17 November, statements were made by Malaysia, Senegal, Chile, Morocco, Benin, the Untied States of America, and Mexico (No. 8).

12. At the 24th meeting on 18 November, statements were made by Papua New Guinea and Senegal (No. 9, p. 1).

13. At the same meeting, Morocco proposed not to take action on the draft resolution (No. 9, p. 1). Germany and Hungary spoke in favour of the motion; Indonesia and Colombia spoke against the motion (No. 9, p. 2).

14. At the same meeting, the motion was rejected by a recorded vote of 67 votes to 45, with 15 abstentions (No. 9, p. 3).

15. At the same meeting, explanations of vote before the vote was made by the Russian Federation, France, Malta, Germany, United Kingdom, Iran, Mexico, United Arab Emirates and Benin (No. 9, pp. 3-6).

16. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.36 in a recorded vote by 77 votes to 33, with 21 abstentions (No. 9, p. 7).

17. At the same meeting, explanations of vote after the vote were made by Canada, Australia and Sweden (No. 9, pp. 7-8).

18. At the 25th meeting on 18 November, explanations of vote after the vote were made by Chile, Japan and China (No. 10).

19. The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.36, which was submitted as draft resolution K in paragraph 60 of the Report of the First Committee on item 62 (A/49/699, No. 11, p. 43).

C . Assembly

20. At the 90th meeting of the General Assembly, on 15 December 1994, the Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced the Report of the First Committee on item 62 (No. 12, pp. 13-14).

21. At the same meeting, France moved that no decision be taken on draft resolution K (No. 12, p. 25). Germany and Hungary spoke in support of the motion; Malaysia and Indonesia spoke against the motion (No. 12, pp. 26-27). The motion was rejected in a recorded vcke by 68 votes to 58, with 26 abstentions (No. 12, p. 27).

22. At the same meeting, France then submitted an oral amendment calling for the deletion of the word "urgentlyn from the text of the operative paragraph of draft resolution K (No. 12, pp. 27-28).

Indonesia moved that no action be taken on the French amendment (No. 12, p. 28). France and the United States spoke against the motion: Malaysia and Iran spoke in favour of the motion (No. 12, p. 28). The motion was adopted in a recorded vote by 61 votes to 56, with 30 abstentions (No. 12, p. 29).

23. At the same meeting, Maldives explained its vote before the vote on draft resolution K (No. 12, p. 30).

24. At the same meeting, draft resolution K was then adopted in a recorded vote by 78 votes to 43, with 38 abstentions (No. 12, pp. 35-36). It became General Assembly resolution 49/75 K.

25. At the same meeting, Sweden spoke in explanation of vote after the vote (No. 12, p. 39).

UNlTED NATIONS

A

General Assembly

D i s t r . GENERAL

A/RES/49/75 9 January 1995

Forty-ninth session Agenda item 62

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY TüE GENERAL ASSEneLY

[on t h e report of t h e F i r s t Cornittee (A/49/699)]

49/75. General and cemulete diaarmament

Beauest f o r an adviaorv 0a-n f r m the Internat ional Court OC Jus t i ce on t h e l e a a l i t v of t h e th rea t o r u s e of nuclear weawne

me General Aseembly,

Consciou* t h a t t h e continuing existence and d e v e l o p n t of nuclear weapons pose ser ious r i s k s t o humanity,

nindful t h a t S t a t e s have an obligation under t h e Câarter of t h e United Rations t o r e f r a i n frcm t h e th rea t o r use 02 force agaFnSt t h e t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o r p o l i t i c a l independence of any Sta te ,

peca- its resolut ions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961. 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 351152 D Of 12 December 1980, 36/92 1 of 9 December 1981, 45/59 B of 4 Decamber 1990 and 46/37 D of 6 December 1991, i n which it declared t h a t t he u s e of nuclear weapons voul'd be a v io la t ion of t h e Charter and a crima against humanity,

A/ReS/49/75 Page 16

W-w t h e progreee made on t h e prohibition and elimination of weapons of niaes destruction, including t h e convention on the Prohibition of the Developent , Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction a/ and the Convention on t h e Prohibition of t h e Developent, Production, Stockpiling and U s e of Chernical Weapons and on Their Destruction,

Çonvinceq t h a t t h e complete elimination of nuclear weapons is t h e only guarantee against t h e threa t of nuclear war,

t h e concerns expreased i n the Pourth Review Conference of t h e Pa r t i e s t o t h e Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapona t h a t i n su f f i c i en t progresci had been made towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons a t t h e earliest possible tirna,

B B Ç k J J t ha t , convinced of t h e need t o strengthen t h e r u l e of law in in te rna t ional re la t ions , it ha6 declated t h e period 1990-1999 t h e United Nations Decade of Internat ional Law, W

&!&g t h a t A r t i c l e 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter ampowers t h e General Aasembly t o request t h e Internat ional Court of Jus t i ce t o give an advieory opinion on any leqa l question,

t h e recommandation of t h e Secretary-General, made i n hie repor t e n t i t l e d 'An Agenda fo r mace', W t h a t United Nations organe t h a t a r e authorized t o take advantage of t h e advieory competence of the Internat ional Court of J u s t i c e turn to the Court more frequently f o r such opinions,

r e m l u t i o n 46/40 of 14 üay 1993 of t h e Assembly of t h e World Eealth Organization, Ln which the organization requested t h e In terna t ional Court of J u s t i c e t o q ive an advieory opinion on whether t h e use of nuclear waponi by a S t a t o Ln war o r other armsd conf l ic t would be a breach of its obl iga t ions under in te rna t ional Law, including t h e Constitution of t h e World Bealth Orqanization,

m, purauurt t o Ar t ic lb 96, paragraph 1, of t h e Charter of the United Nations, t o rrquemt the Internat ional Court of Jus t i ce urgently t o rendez it8 advisory opinion on t h e f o l l w i n g question: '1s the t h r e a t o r use of nuclear ueaponm i n iny circumetance permitted under in te rna t ional law?".

See P f f i c i a l ~ e c o r d a of t- Session, Suu~lement No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix 1.

w Resolution 2826 (UVI) , annex.

?p/ Reaolution 44/23.

w A/47/277-S/24111.

United Nations A;C. I I ~ ~ : P V . ~

General Assembly Fony-ninih session

First Cornmittee 3 r d Meeting Monday. 17 ûctober 1994. 10 a m . New York

cia al Records

~ h r delcguion of h i n u.ould litc u, ihiwld svoid =y initiative which wuld bc e-

pi,duriivc ud whicb might irceuiuie a iegrl dmg from 1 1 ~ Intniutiod C O U ~ of J ~ i a on quatima a cruniidly politicai io iUnUC. nich as cbw ofthe k@y of the use or i thrut of ck use of nuclcar weapoœ. & ~r . p p m p r i . c i i m t m y d e ~ o n a r i l l r c i r e n r c ~ ~ ~ mr Govnnmmi cm ibii initiarive M. in the ainrm ~ I U i of ongomg ~ i o n t . u w l i t l y Io f r ü i proara O tk be of@ ad amplde & d r iacanniod comd.

United Nations A!C. 1149-pv.5

General Assembly Fony-ninih session

First Cornmittee 5ih Meeting Tuesday. 18 Oclober 1 W . 3 p.D New York

O&iai Records

in thii cainenion. I wish IO rcfer io the need IO

pmmote tbe mle a d ihe work of the International Coun of Jwia m tba 11 may wniribute io the wttlement of dispufa bavem Suta.

In our vicw. ruch pnclicc and m u r e r e p e n t the mi al of oflaxing ihc tensions that mise fmm disputes iad friction bsueai Siam uid rrrolving such disputa by pesccful mcim and ~ O I by Ibe w or t h m t of the use of force or of anrponr of msc datruclion. This mcasure wili effatively contribute to errating r round international environment. thai is frre fmm threm and risks. an environment of disamaumü. developmoi. Mirity and siabiliiy.

United Nations AJC. I /49.'PV.6

L?gicial Records - Forty-ninh Session

6ih Mecimg Wcdncday. 19 Octokr 1994. 3 p.m. New York

..a

We should likc to rciunte thu nuclcar di~armamcni is a rnultilucnl issuc and nota billural one. In iùis regard; ihc unanimous dccision laken by the Meeting of Minisien of Forcipn Affain of the Non-Aligncd Movemmi in Cairc in lune ihis yca - and rcaïfirmed unanimously by ihc Meeting. only iwo wccks ago. on 5 Oclober 1%. of Foreign Minisien and HcPds of Dclegation of the Non-Aiigncd Movemmt to rbe foiry-ainiù session of Ihc Cenerai Aucmbly - io m b m i t and brhg m tbc vote tba dmï molution aking ihe Gencnl Aucrnbly io n q u a t m advisoy opinion from iùc Intcmatiod Coun of Justice ofi ihe lcgality of the use or of use of nuclear wcapoar undcr iotcrnational Iaw is boiù appropriate and timcly.

United Nations A/C.1119/PV.7

General Assembly Fort)-nindi Ersion

First Committee 7th Mming Tburday. 20 Ocrober 1994. 3 p.m. New York

WR. IIWAKAWAGO, üNITBD RRRJBLIC OP TANZAWIA (p.2)

1 also wisb to draw !he Cornmine's anmiion to th- dairioo ial;cn at the Elc\cnih Ministcriai M a i n g of the Non-Aiigocd Movemenr. held in Cairo lait lune. to R-submit and pur to the vote the dafi rcsolution wcUng an advisory opinion h m the Lnicmational Coun of Justice on rhc legaiity of the thm or use of nuclcar weaponr. This movc is imponant beuuse it will hclp to wnsirize the internationai wmmunity to ihe nced for toial eliminarion of nuclcar arsmais. . . .

S . .

AS is w d knoooam. tbc I n - d Cour< of Justice har bsen rrquarsd by tbc World Hcairh Og.nintion to give an dvirory opinim on ihe legiliry of rhc uu of nuclear weapom. In thü conncuion. Malaysia haS m f l y made a subuision to rbe Coun .rguing rhm che use Of

nuclear weapom U ülegd. Coatistmr Mth rhis dsirion. We look foward to the submiuion of tbe rmolution of the Movemcnt of Non-Ali@ Counrria on this issue to t h i ~ Cornminec.

UNITED NATIONS

e General Assembly Distr. LIMITED

A/C.1/49/L.36 3 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-ninth session FIRST COMMITTEE Agenda item 62

GENEPAL AND COMPLETE DIS-

Reauest for an advisorv ouinion from the International Court of Jf

Conscious that the continuing existence and development of nuclear weapons pose serious risks to humanity,

Mindful that States have an obligation under the Chartèr of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

Recallinq its resolutions 1653 IXVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of II December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980, 36/92 1 of 9 December 1981, 45/59 B of 4 December 1990 and 46/37 D of 6 December 1991, in which it declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Welcominq the progress made on the prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destmction.

+ On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

A/C.1/49/~.36 English Page 2

Convinced that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against the threat of nuclear war,

Notins the concerns expressed in the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that insufficient progress had been made towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time,

Recallinq that the General Assembly, convinced of the need to strengthen the rule of law in international relations, has declared the period 1990-1999 the United Nations Decade of International Law, &/

that Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations empowers the General Assembly to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question,

Recallinq the recommendation of the Secretary-General, made in his report entitled " A n Agenda for Peace", 2/ that United Nations organs that are authorized to take advantage of the advisory competence of the International Court of Justice turn to the Court more frequently for such opinions,

Welcominq resolution 46/40 of 14 May 1993 of the Assembly of the World Health Organization, in which the organization requests the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on whether the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations under international law, including the Constitution of the World Health Organization,

Decides, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter, to request the International Court of Justice urgently to render its advisory opinion on the following question: "1s the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?".

&/ Resolution 44/23.

1/ A/47/277-S/24111.

United Nations A~C.I~W{PY.I~

General Assembly Fom-nintb Session

First Cornmittee 15ih Meeting Wedneday. 9 November 1994. 10 a.m Ncu York

Offrciol Records

h i Mdcniiblc Ihu rhrou#nw hinoy mmluad br( oadew>..cqaiimcaiad.iiulidin(mlclar~. l b c d ' o f H i m d N q n & . i c a m r o f

, b& 'e ad bmor. pwidsd r mpri

poiaoidP-=J* of vhi iI, Dy I O d a y ' l -mcw d r m d a m r c i v c -. B h p p b r p i m d c b c ~ ~ p d o x p o t ~ c b i a r b P i n d ~ 0 f t b p c i r o e v e a o ~ b m ~ r i r t o i b c ~ m o k r i n c b a wigoi,bW-m&udiophinYaioo.h CP M m i+@y bc n id bur btrmairy continua w k ~ b y Q d ~ o f u l f ~ 0 1 .

United Nations AIC. I/~YPV.LZ

2 2 ~ Meeting n u d y . 1 7 Novcmkr 1994. 10.30 a.m New York

1 ~ d l i k c i o m J c a siarement on dnfr raolution A!C.IH95.36. eririrld (kropmafia~ F d J : My

-Rcqunt for an advisory opinion from the Inrcmuio<ill aemion propoicr mm cbc camL.iasc ponpos?

Coun of lustice on ihc legaiiry of rhe IIUUI or uw of -identi i of dnft molutiao A/C.1/49R.36. on tht leylily of the thrrP or uu of Oirlar wcipom in ordn 10

nuclev weaponr'. &le deleguim to annimie tbei mnnilwioar.

Malaysia would welwmc ao d v w i y opinion on Ihe legai stanir of rhe uu of nuclar W4mm. a il d a i m world order a d legai clariry on rhc puatioo of the uu of nuclcar wupool. m. LARBAIU, QI= (P.4)

Although rhe nile of i o ra rdau i Iaw md kwwldge ii(Vefpruda JCw. +ishi: 1 of the Iaw may lppu unimporunt Io ik oucleu h m . "PPon ife P- b~ tht rrpfacamive of k g a i Ihat ir is inditpcnwble 10 rbr m d Q ' of S d l a h o m . ~-iaoofdrrllrtso~u<ioa N C . 1/49R.36 bedefemd so which fœl md niloaibk in smrld in wùicb asrog inumt fa lhnbcr~ut ios . s t u d lhrras of nuclcar aonihihoa uc rppucmly rllowed

The Governmmr of Whysia believa rbn m h- cawropbe in he b e 0 V of mmtiad cm be wmpued io che conxqu- of a ouclcar w u . An undmuadin(r of the causirophic lwch of destruchoo. duih md LrrmrdLble suffering u a d t of au qlœic io of r single mvlar w u h d rn a popiluad arca mmplr oaiy onc wnclusion: m nich explosioo onui ers *. arhaber by r r idmt . through a m r i a n or in w9.

Although Ihe end of rhe wld w u h a coaridenbly rsduced the cklnca of a globai nuclair wu. rhe ouclcar- w q o Srara sril1 subscribc ro ~ I C straugy of m v l w deumnce. in rhe ptxsm~ p a d - w u climuc. <he lctJ opinion of ihe IntermriouJ Coun of Juscicc iould mrlrc au important contnburioo IO ibe rul iuion of 1 ouclar- wupons.fret world. Ir wuld m< q lxe nuclcar disarmaocni uutiarives. but ir ccuid provide a e legil md mnl parameters withio whicb such Iiririuiva wuld succeed.

Ur. Amar (Momcco) (inrerprcrririon fmm French): Thc delegation of Moroa~o fully suppoa the proparal by the reprcsentative of h c g d that action on drnfr rrsolution A/C. 1!19!L.36. 'Rcqwst for an sdvisory opinion from the Inlemtiond Coun of Justice on the legdiry of rhe thrru or uu of nuclcar weaponr'. k defemd so that bmader wnsultation will be possible.

Mr. WhnaDocl (Benin) (inierprnm'onfmm Fr&): We join the delegaion of Morocco in supponing the pmposal ihil <bc Cornmince defer i u decision on dnn r ~ l u t i o n AIC.11495.36.

. LEDûGAR, UNI* STATES OF -CA (p-6)

MI. Ledogu (UMd Sura of Amnu): Tbc U n i d States will votc ignimt d d l w l u t i o n AIC.11495.36. by which the Grnent Asrmbly would q u a t an dvisory opinion fmm I n t e m a t i d Corn of Justice on the legllity of the ihrrp or use of nuclcar Wespoar. in our v-. it would k inappropriate to ot the Coun for m dnsory opinion on such an absMt. hypothetiuil md -iiaJly pol i t id il. Funhr. i legai opinion wodd hive no p m i u i l effsc.

Succasa nrhid o v e the ycus in limiting d banning weapons !WC m u i d fmm the ncgotiation of mia. The drafi molution w d d w t wntribute to funha m m agreements on d u r wcdpcm.

The spotsrnui for the sponsors rrcognurà this tact lm ycar in a starcmcnt in the Fint Comminee. in u hich bc welcomcd

'the broadening and dccpening of the dimensions of disannament^

and explaincd that Ihc Non-Aligned Slovement would not p m s for a votc

'in orQr to p r a m e the morneunun and progress genentcd by theu initiatives".

Givcn mU viav. i~ u cvcn barder IO f a h m the plrpow of r dnA rcrolution requesting nich an opinion h m the luemaiid Coun of Justice this yur . wbcn funher s tep Io w n d md elhinate nuclcar wcapons arc b e i g takcn. ncgotiatcd a mntemplatui.

The United Stater thrcfore u rga States to abstain or vote 'No" on this dnR molution. It prefen to xe energy md ancntioa devoced macsd to achicving w n m t e results in the ma of imu comm) md disannament.

MR. MARIN BOSCH, MEXICO (P.7)

linicrprcraion from S ~ i s h ) : At the stan of the meeting b i s morning. MI. C h a i m ~ ~ . you indicarcd that u e would tale action or. a number of draft resolutions. In the course of our discussions this morning some deleparions sucgesied POslpOniBg anionon drafl rcsolution AIC. 11.l9;L.36. Dws <hi mcan that action is k ing postponcd until this aftcmoon's meeting? Will ii be put off uniil iomorroul What is meant by ' psrponement '7

The Chairman (inrcrprcrarion from Sponish): A numkr ofdelepations pmpowd ibe postponernent of action on dnfl molution A/C.1/49/1.36. 11 would be my hopc thu this draft w l u i i o n muld be voied u p n durinp this

afternoon': meeting. if WC have an afternwn m i i n p . or ;it tomorrnw rnominp's meeting. Of ccursc. l hopc thai uie delcpations concemed will lx kind mough to indicate uhether drah resolurion AIC.11491L.36 will k ready io be ,oied on and that it 1s not naces- to continue the consultations to which delegaiions have referrcd.

1s this explanaiion satisfactory IO the representative of Mexico?

MI. Marin Barh (Mexico) (inrerpreroiion /rom Sponish): Ir is satisfactory. Sir. The only thing I do not ùnow is whem theu consultations uc taLing place.

The Chsimm finrnpreIm'onfmm Sponish): II is my undenundmg Ihu interestcd dcleguionr will ùnow wberc Ihe consultations uc llking place.

'Ibc Chilrmin. S o m dclegarioiu have rcquuted the postponewni of r t i on m drafî molution AIC. 11495.36.

United Nations

24th Meeting Friday. 18 Novembcr 1954. 10 a.m. New York

HR. YARXA, PAPUA NEW WINBA (p.3)

1 nih 0 p l v r on record my deleguion's position oii tbc dnn molution containcd in d o c . t AiC.1149lL.36. wbicb rrlita m the 'Rqutst for m adviwry opinion fmm ihe IntanMid Coun of Justice on thc legrlity of the rhrcu or UIC of nuclear wupons".

My delegaion MU v a e in nVw of Q drafi rcsolution. Howcvn. 1 arirb d the ou- m milrr il quiic clear thu our nippon W d a01 in any way k *cd a m anempt to pftjudice the v i o n of the Inmmiod Coun of Justice. Nor l o u l d our nippon k pmeiwd a m anempr to excn polit id ~KSSW on tbe Coun m a m c to a panicular decision on ch- iwua. The Coun W d and must miniain its tradition of impsnirlity d œuuility.

Papua New (niiau Mly wpeEu and nippons rhc wmplete sovcrci&nty d indepeadcna of ihe Gnui in- rcaching a dsision ihu b u l d MI k viewd u bcuq :

influenccd by my extermi forca or c i f c u m s w . Our own national Comtimtion dm guuinim mJ rrrpeu the abmlute independence iDd integrity of the judiciay syaem. and we would nsnunlfy be compllcd m uphold ihu pnnciple.

Our suppon for the dm? molution is purely bavd on and in wnfoniity with Our ovenll standing policy on toul d~smamenr and our wntinued i u t e ~ t ~ r in and daire to sec the establishment 01 a giobai environml ihat pcrpctuaies and guaranta wmplete peau and swip. We rhcrciore bclicvc thar an opinion from the Iniemational Coun 01 Justice would surcly facilirate. among other thingr. hinher progrcss rowuds the strengthcning of the.Trcaty on the Non-holifemion of Nuclcar Wcapons and cornpletc disamarneni.

( i iuerpm'onfmrn Frrnch): I shdl k brKf. Dapite rcpued rppulr by ihe delegaiion of Smgrl. sonr dcfeguiopc b v c felt thu ihey should submir d n i i moluiion AiC.lI491L.36 on W f of ihe rnembcrs of Oc Mov- of Non-Ali@ Couritna. My wuntr). m ody deploirr rhir but w d d like. ar the same timc. Io nac dm we a n w t in my way aippon che dnfi rcsolution.

(inmpmarion from French): I rbaild liLc m mke romc conunmu on d d ~ remlurion NC.li49L.M. w b i à ~ daides IO m p s t ihe Lniemiond Cam of lunsc io rrida rn dvicory opinion on the t h n i or me d m*lar wtlponr. Tbc Kingdom of M o m waJd pcopor dm tbc Cbmiw MI ukc r i ion oa ihe dniï faohüh, p d c u i u l y s k Ibc u m ~ s u r on this nibjaâ amag tbc Movuœu of Non-Ali@ Counrries har b rnaiily erodcd. and thu the rasons behind poqkdo# tbc rmnn ai the fonylighih session a~ slill Ibar. We wûuid w v e thai rhc Cornmitte noi take r i ion oa tbc ddl rrrolution in m dlow for funhrr ~ISUIU~OIU bawcai ihe munuia involvcd. We hopc lhar chL mo<ion m to ukc bon will k supponcd by dl the nrmbm of ibc Cornminec.

My dcleyrion wooden wh&cr the introduction of nicb ddl molution cnily serves ihe wisha of the First Co- wiih rrrpsa to nuclcrr disumament. Momco MLva rhm ir wouid k inippropriarc to rcqueu ihe Lnunmbd Cain of Jwk LO mula an advimy opinion on nrb m absuma and ( b s o m gunrion a ihe leglliry of tbe rhrrm or wc of m l u r wcapoas in any ciraimamcn. In 1993. the World Hulth Organization (WHO) dopcd a rrrolution r q m t i n g che Coun IO rcnder m dvimy opinion on this wm question. lùat opinion is still undu conrideruion. rad rbt ICI is cumntly examinine the henrmorial MI by at l a i 27 wuntries. We feel that ci

new palttical initiative within the Fint Commirtœ aimcd al bringing an ideniid question beforc the Coun should be \.iewec JS ai aitempr Io prejuoge die opinion of the Coun wiik recxd ic the reqUCSl bu WHO.

Adoption of this drah resolution would be a clear dendriir~iion that polirical motivations are involved and could be inrerpretcd as a desire to exen pressure on the ICI wiih a view io obtaining a panicular niling. The delegarion of \lorocco f a l s thai an dvirory opinion on a qucsrion tha! is essentially a politicai one thac b u given rise Io many coniroversies will have no practicai effst. rince we do noi believe thar any wupons have evcr ban limited or pmhibired by any wna< other rhan the negoiiating of a rreaiy. We fœl thu this initiative will not help diplowic efforu m w d e r way to fighr the prolifemion of nuclur wupom. Stsres with nuclur w q o n s u well u those uithout thcm rhould have rhe politid will Io make progres, in chis a m .

1 hope bac my motion not to uke n i o n on the dm7 resoluiion will bc adopted pnthout a vote.

ik Cimirman: The rcprrrcntuive of Mo- hu moved. wiibio the l e m of nile 116 of the da of procedum. rbrr no action be ukm on Q q u a ! mnuiDcd in document N C . 1149lL.36. Rule 116 rrdc al f o l l m :

'Dun- thc dircuuion of my murp. r rcpmeocuive may move tùe djoummcm of the debnte m thc item under dircuuian. Ir> sdd ih IO the ptoporer of thc m e . IWO r e p u m a i v a my spuk i n f i ~ ~ ~ l ~ f . ~ I W ~ ~ . t ù e m a i o a , r f t a ~ the m n w a sball k immcdiucly pu IO the Me.'

. ., 1 now d l upon thc fint rrpiaeniuivc s/irbinp to

spak in f a v w of the maioii.

With rrrpcn to dru? rcrolution NC.1149lL.36. requating m d v w y opinion from the Iniemuionai Cavt of luaicc on the legdity of thc h r or uu of auclcar waponr, I a u r i i t e myvlf with the r c p r e ~ u t i v e of M o m a and wirh IO nippon his p r o p d IO move thu m vrion be takcn on thc dru? molution wiihio ihe u m of nile I I6 of the n i la of procedure.

1 would like IO poim out ihu COI only Germiny but the mtirc E u m p a UNon u well rcgm ùaving faiicd IO

wnvincc the spoaron of d n f ~ molution L.36 Io withdnw it and have dsidcd rhat they ctnn~ suppon il.

1 belicvc t h the subjm of this drafr rcsolurion ij no! appropriate for the Fint Commina. At ihe 1993 World Health Asxmbl. a ruclution war adopred :cek,:.~ the opinion of the International Coun of Jusrice on the Iegalir!. of the use of nuclear wupons. A funher drah rsrolulion along rirnilar lines w u submiiicd by the non-aliened counrrie5 at this Conunirtee's 1993 session. I I was not pur io a vote. Rogrcss widi the W0:ld Healih ssembl! requesi is such chu the Lutemional Coun of lusiice is nom examining submissions made IO I I bu ai learr 27 States. ..\n! hnher initiative !n the Finr Cornmitin IO ask a sirnilar question of the Coun wuld be wen as an attempr io prcjudicc the V ~ C W of the Coun O n the World Healih Assembly rrquai.

A United Nuiom molution would do nothing IO help Ihe ongoing c.unsidrmion of the questions by the lntmuriorui Coun of Junicc a d might advcnely affect Ihe standing of both the f i t Cornmince and the Coun itself. 11 could d ro hive widn d v e n e implications on non- pmlifemioo goab aibicb WC dl rhuc.

Very briefly. rny delegation w a i u c s iuclf fdiy witb the mit ion jwt prevnted by rhe reprrreniuive of Gcrmmy. Ipuluag on b e u f of the Eür0pan Union. mtlmnhg rbe =nt of the drah m o l ~ t i ~ ~ u u i u k d indocumcat AIC. 1f49lL.36. a n d l y . and m m imponmn. Q dc*gation of Hungsry is fuliy a u c i o u of the r m œ u for Q mMi0~ put forwud by the mpmanative of M- md. in apprrciaion of those manma. md in-withnile 116of the ni la of pmcrdurc. Qdckgaimof H u u g y r v ù h a t o ~ e ~ o d the motion on m *on.

a ~biirmu: h amir d z m ~ with nile 116. the Cornmincc bP bCPd ni0 rpaLcn in hvour of thc motion. Irbilla>arclllontborcrrprrsenuovawhowishtorpak agrinrt it.

1 would like 10

pu il on ihu my ddeytico opp03u the motion on no n i o n mnved by thc dclelPion of MO~OCCO.

(interpre~uion fmmSpMirh): Iopporethemaionihumu<ionbeiIkni on d d molution N C . 11495.36. a d Colombia will vote agiiou ihu mmion. movd by Momoo.

Tbe Cb.lrman: The Comminœ will now rake a decision on the motion ~ b m i n c d by thc repwntative of M o m ihu m n i o n bc rnlrm on drift resoluiion

h fovour: Andorra. Argentina. A m i a . Ausidia. Bclarus. Belgi-m. Bulearia. Canada. C m h Rrpublic. Denmark. Esroniz. Finland. Franir.. Georgia. Geman?. Grrœe. Hune.. Ifeland. Isracl. I d y . Japan. Larvia. Luxembourg. Mali. Malu. Marsball Islmds. Microncria iFedemal States on. Morocui. Nehe~lands. Nonva?. Poland. Portugal. Rcpublic of K o m . Romnia, Russian Faleruion. Sencgal. Sicm Leone. Slovakia. Slovcnia. Spun. The Former Y u g o s h Rcpublic of MaccQnii. TurLey. Ui;nioe.

Unitcd Kmgdom of Grur Briuin and Nonhem Ireland. United States of Amaiu

Agaimf: Afgbuustsn. Algeria. Bahima. B.ngldnh. Bbuua, Bolivù. Botswana, B d . B d Dinuulim. BUnmdi. Cipe V d . W. cOl0mbi Cuhi. CYPN. D e w m t i c Peopk'i Rcpublic of Kom, EnuQr. Egypt. Gu* Guy- Haiti. Hoodurro. india, bhes ia . Ina (Wlmic RcpiMi 00. Irq. Jordan. Kenya. Lesotho. Libyao Anb Jamahiiiya, M d r g a c P . Malaysia, Maldim. Maintiur. MW. MoaSdY. M o u m b i i , MF, Namibii N q d . N i a n p . Nigeria. Qum. Plaain. Prmmi. Pqor N e w C k i i n . R n s u y . F s r S P h l l i p p i n a , ~ S m d i A R b ~ S i . s O l 0 ~ k l ~ S i i L c b Sudm.Surinimc.snrilird.Thhd,'Riniddmd Tobqeo. United A n b e m m o P ; : V n l p p ~ , s f Tmsm4 Umgoy. Veocmdi. Vin N ~ L Y- Zmibir-

Abnailùng: -sui and Wuda, A- Azainijaa, Canmma. . . . Cdtc d'lvoirc. El Salvrdm, Irr*od, . Jlmriu. Licshtanuin.' Lithuani& New Zcrhd. N i m . Re~ublic of Moldova. SPn Maino. ,@des! .. .. .,: ., . .. ..,,

.. - .. . . . nuntoaonth,nmocnocnm~~',t"on~mdwion A/C.I/49L.M was ~ ' e a e à by 67wa ro 45, via JS absfmtiom.

ïk Chahmm 'lbe Cornmittee aill n o w u t e a decision on dnfi raolution A149L.36. 1 shill mw d& those reprercnutiva who Msù to explab tbeir votes kforc rbe voting.

(rnicrpnrtUion Rom Rusian): Since the propsal that no action bc taken Qn dafi resclurion AIC.!/49/L.36 was Wected înd the drafi rrsolution wili. unfomnalely. be pur ro a vote. wr would Iike to explain die rasons for our vote on Ihe drafi rexilution beforr the votinp.

Tbe Russian delcgaiion will $,oie agains: the d a f i molution. We believc thai the question of the advisability of the use of nuclear wcapons 1s above al1 a political. no1 a legal problem. This is bawv of the nature and significaoœ of ouclear weapons lbcmuives. which have no1 ken uwd sincc thc wu. S k thc Chinu of the United N ~ i o d t h e a u u t a o f t b e h m u t i 4 C a u i o f J u s u œ amcimofo~~,mwlmwupoarbivckcmaincidadin Sma'dwr iucsoam~aamcrnrof iv i rhrrbuta a d a a r r n t b o w n . e i p c e i l l y g l o b r l ~ . ' I b y P c t ù a e f o r e ~ f i o m o Q a ~ . m t h u t b y b i v c a poiirical funai00 in thc w d d tcday.

Tbevay-ofmrka- i s r c c p c d i n IntAnuionrl L R I d tbQcis1widenngeofintonai~ awmr r e m mcm. There irc mniy mbxive m t a n p i o n i l b i l l a i l r n d m u l r i l i r a i l ~ i n f ~ ~ , aimKdinpmiailn.thc . . non- dcplw-. - . . . afd-=2apom,

t s l b m c d ~ a m I d r o v c r < & w ~ . F u n b c r p r o l p a r ~ ~ - , t b m i i e b ~ r b c - i t g m i c . d i p a r i c i i l r r . p i v i q l r $

&ai h d . ~ l u b c d o m i n m c m d c r ~ o f d l & - ~ Stma.wad. iooldbeQtamarr l i ib* \ lymrid m m L i n d d m c m d a r M .

U r b m m d y , d d i AIC.II49IL.M iw maberpupac.whirbmitsitmipon1~lariurn

-- arppon it. WC thiU vote agaim th dnfl molution.

HR. ERRERA, FRANCE (p.7)

(Uunpmm'on from French): Rining dnn molution NC.1149iL.36 to the vote is a rcgrcnable rrion. d o s e impliutions should be thomughly watiderrd. Fnace wüi vote lgunS1 the dm7 rcsolution.

II MU do m. fun. kuurc th marier it posiu is iuelf unaccepuble. Tbe vay quai for an dvisoy opinion ai the iegdity of a @ailu utegory of iniu is taaiamml to questionhg the lnrlimable ri@ of sny State or p u p of Stptg to rcrmin rovcrcign. as long as they ooutply with inteniatiod Iaw. in the choiœ of k i r munr of defeoa. Such ao appmacb is i blataut violation of the United Nations Chann. It goer agiinst l m ; it goer againrt r e m .

sly country bas d i o u n Io bzu its d e f c ~ ~ c on nuclcar denmence - in aber w0rd.S. on 1 doclrine 0li~nted n a towarbc vicron in baiile. but iowards avoidinp u.a. This docrrlne h s made ii possible 10 nisure uid stabili- in Eurcp. It remains Ihe cornersione of w r sauriy.

n o s e who III* chat th? un den! sovereign S n t a ihrir nghr to defend Ih~rnSClva by ui!' mcans ltCOgnued b! applicdble interrmional instmmnrs. or who hi& that a tribunal should bc aubl i rhed 10 prorecute rknowledged nuclcar P o w m . s b u l d cbialr mice. One &y, I k y rhemcelver d d k ailcd upoa to defend rbe l e g i w of chcmuarthcyuuIOcnnuc<bciruairiIy.

S o w e e t n o a l y ~ w h r i ~ ~ f ~ ~ ~ p m u , t b e W C i C P P a r e n . i a < i m c ~ t b y ~ ~ t e ~ ~ . n t u l l y ~ c b c i i rcrpomib'ilit*r d <hi tbey pc amding lbUy bCbd ibcir commitmcnts. Ir Chi8 ddl ~ ~ W l i n i o n tryhg IO cell ibcm Iht iheir efforts arc Pror<hlar. Iht <by ~CSCIW aabing but cmaue?Orirewcmuakrrrmdihm.uthevcrymommi vlbm dirarmammr à studily bamming 1 rulity. u>me long for ibe + whm it wa mlbing more Ibio a r t i a o r i d Unw? Ale ibae aluwks - mr rrdy to c O ~ m i d e P d a c ~ - a f n i d ~ f ~ u , ~ t k & ~ ~ ~ o f m p c m s i b i i i t y ? A ? c i b y p a h p r ~ to amcrrl ihc fm tüa~ in mmy q i o m of bu wrld, bu hiildup of e ~ a d d d c m pmgr tmma 10 rquirr w u p o m of Mu dauuç<ion md k i r dclivny synerm ire a 1-1 in ibe pmliferntion of -nia ard a s ign of kgemonir clainu mtmiiacd by Som.

France will vote q u h c t ibis d n h rcsoluiion I l s ~ keclusc. i f WC wan: progrns ibrards a Mfcr and cMre cquiiablc world. evcFonc mus1 mognize tbe nccrsstr? for responsibilities aud obliguions ro k shared. Ii would m d e no wiiw IO ariyone thai the nuclcar Power, alone should he the only o n a ro bave to =pond ro the new expcctationr of ihe intemaiional wmmunity. wbile otherr would icmain fret to play the gamcs of the pas[.

Whm the rpirit of Rspoaribiity exists. it leads 10 real pmgrry. La ur m< in chic collective effon by obroleie umbds. whicb might pcrw cbc puposes of r f w . but wbicb m c w n l y cocimry w rhc i n u m of ï& c4aww&gmqairy.

For tk 1 bave pomicd out. lk Gmpa Unim md i u applicant States

d d l rcrohuion NC.ll49n.36.

SIR IUCBAKt mmw, rmfPB> KIR- (P.8)

Tbc Unitcd Kinedom hinity owmad thii drift mlutim AK.1149L.36 cm make m positive w n l r i m ~ ~ ~ ~ e f f ~ r ~ . ( n i ~ COU"ay. i 1 U n i a i m i m b a o l M a u riska whicù wc bop dei+Bafionr will amrida e f u i i y bcforc ibey v a e .

Fim. the dnfr rcsolutim cm do mWmg io help the ongoing work by tbe Internuiad Coun of Juriice on the similu question h m the World Health h m b l y . On the convuy. it risks king reca as r delibenie atiempt io cxen politiul pmsurc over ibe Coun UJ prcjudicc i u rcsponx. This couid have scriou impliwiom for the standing of the Geoenl Asscmbly and. hdced. of the Coun i lulf .

Seeondly. Ihic dnfl molution up do noihing io funher the v a n o u positive diplomaiic efforts uoder way in ihe field of nuclur d i sumunnt . anru wntrol and non- prr. ifcraiion. noubly on a'wmprchensive test-ban trcary. On the contr.. al a tim when r d pmgrcss is k ing achieved in a range of m. il un only serve IO wnfuw and complicate the basis on which wuntr ia enter into such negoriaiions aod 10 hardm positions.

Thirdly. this d n h molution cm do noihing to funher elobal peace md m r i t y . On tbe wntrary. a legal opinion on ihis essentially po l i i id and hypothetical quesiion "sks seriouslv undermiaing confidence in exlting muliilaterd ireaiies. This in oim could serve to undermine ihc scsuriry of al1 those who pui thcir u i u t in these ircatia.

Founhly. rhù draii molution risks vrving the intemrr of those who wirb to d i t Onnition h m the doubiluing rnrmulation of convnrtionai anus and from clarniurim p m g m m r s Umsd at acquiring weapom of mzcs da tmnion and dmloping delivery system.

This draït molution amid impose huvy cour. II o f f m ao bcœfiü in mutu. l u wider implications wuld ~ r i a u l y affen the -ry of ur au. We thercforc urge deleguions m< to q n ir.

1 W d likc IO give my dclcgmiou's position sa dnfr molution A/C.1/49/L.M. mtiticd ' R a p a for an d v b y opinion f r o m r h e i n ~ C G l n o f I u a i c e o n r h c legaiityof the Uuut or use of n u l u r wuponr".

My delcgatioa fully nippon, chir âmfi manlurion. Thir iuuc hu bscD Ovm u tms ive by fhe mcmben of cbc Na-Alignrd MovcmCm. tvhicb kd to lk m. ~ ~ W i n o f t h i r â m f i r r r d u t m ~ y m r . W e m o f t h c vicw thoc the i n t e r a n i c d mmmunity in gcœni dm- loving auions in puiicuiu M d explore evuy avmuc to c m t e i world frec [rom d u r w u p s d o t b wapons of rmu dcunr<ioa. -

Ln suhmining nich dnn rrroluuoar. hcir spmson arc e m u i n g cbeir nghu unda ibc Unitcd N n i m Chuter. which muraga Mcmber Suin to sœk dvi lûry opinions h m the lolannionil Coun of Juuicc on unin ihi cby d a m important. We b e l i m thu rhc ânfi raoluticpr do noi nui conuary to cbc malution idop<ed l u t y u r by the W d d H d t h ûrgmhioo on fhe be hueianic. but ùdd c o m p l e m t arid supplunaii them. Monover. on the w e of the 1995 Non-Roliferuion Trury Reviw end ëxtnuion

Conferencethis dran resoluiion 15 a posi i i~~~onir i t>u<&?c that Conference as wcll

My delegaiion will voie in favour of this dran rcsolution. and enwurages other rnembers o i fhe Cornmittee io cas1 a positive vote on il.

M1- lURTN BOSCH, MEXICO ( p . 9 )

(inlerpmarion f rom Spanish): Tbe States Membcrs o i che United Nations. a u e were renunded today. are comrruttcd IO defending rhe rule of Iaw. In Our cespoctive counrrics. ihcrc are couns of la% rcsponsiblc. inter alia. for considering dl rypes of legal maiten. sometimes v e q deliuic ones. and for handing d o m opinioos on &cm.

The founden of the United Nations wished io give the OrglnuVion a sirmlar legai body: hence. the close rclationship in the Cbuter kwecn the United Nationr and the International Coun of luricc. Dnfr molution A/C.ll49/L.36 is pan of rhir rclationship and unnoi bt qualifiai or de r r iba l in the t e m which were u d by somc this m m h g and whicb othen uek to impou. The dnfl molution was origiDnlly submined las1 year: in lhe mcmùmc. with the fum suppon of the Govemment of Mexico. the Wodd H d t h Organization h a alrudy formuiucd a rcquat to rbe Coun umcrning similu. but mi idenucal. rtpccu of tbir m e r . WC h v e no fear of nvning 10 the hcbtempnonll Cwn of Jwt iœ in order io +<k it to nur impanillly iü position on this qucsrion of hinr(rmrnul irnpomncc.

My &legalion will voie in favour of the dnfi molutkm md rrkc rll hosz muatria whicb .re committed io imanaionai Itgiiimuy rad lhc nile of law Io do the YIIIC.

(inropmation fron Arabic): My delcguion will m i prnicipau in the votiag on drafl molution NC.)/495.36.

(i)~~eipmrulon /mm F r m h ) : My deltgmim wisha to Ipulr in explmuion of voU on drafl molution N C . 1149lL.M.

Benin's conmiann i to cbc pbilmphy and principlu of non-lligamni u wcll-lmoam ta his body. The Movenmt of Non-Ni@ Couutria bu made a conuibmioa to rhc multipollnrotion of inremaiionai rclsiiom and to the u t a b l i t of m e n of m d u d nsk of global confrontuion. With comp<aice aed dediaion. indo& hrs led the Movemmt's work sIince iis tenh historic summii meeting in J l t u u . in Scptember 1992. Ir

has contributcd 10 a irnovd of multilatenlism artd h simi~thened thc abiliry of the United N u i m IO m e t eifectively and npidly the challenger cumndy f ~ i n g il. such as diunnmient and development. The delegaiion of Benin is graieful ro the rcpracntuive of Indoneria for the effons he has made IO preserve the Movemt ' s uniry of action and crcdibiliry.

The delegation of &in wisher IO cake the oppomniry of the First Commirte's action on dnfi rnoluiion A!C.1/49/L.36 IO make known. ac mounced during the genenl debue. the views of i u ûovemmnit on the substance and fonn of ihe issues to be submined for the consideration of the International Coun of Justice. natwly. whethn t h m ut circumt- in whch in~emdtional Iaw authorizcs UIC be or use of nuclcar wupons. We mut ask ourselva above dl wbahn thi appmscb sema the w e l l - ~ W I ORïœrm of che non-digocd counuia wih regard to n w l m diwmirmmt in partinilu

Indeed. we arc wcll a w m the politid position of the mn-digncd coualries in the field of d i t hn always kai in f a v w of g m m l and cocompe disamanml under i n t e m i o d contml. ThU explains ou1 qua Io e l i m i e al1 nuclur arscnals. which pose a IIUUI iad a connmt danger to the mtirc in<erpmiod oommunify. if oniy becau of the rirk of sccidcni. Tbe q u d o a IO k put io Ihe Coun d o a not toucb upon sucb hdmuuù i s u a as thc tcsting. production, stakpiling. pmlifention md dissemimion of nwlear wcipom. Any rrrpoarc from rhe Cain couid ~ p m a i t . in au view. m m ~ ~ c rhm m i i q d i t iü thc p- of rh e l i of thU -*-'"W.

Furrhermorr. ontheppmsrdvnl I m l . a n & m I M thù uep per tko t or rclevrnt, in hm aü dclcgaioa, bm. evn sina rhç Qd of rhe a l d wu. e x p r m d &Mi u the vuiolu initiaiva in thc conml md limiutioa of ummaiu. Momver. UIC Cod- m ühmuœm. enuwccd wirh negot l l r i . on k h l f of fbt imaooionil communiry. multilucrsl lgrocmmrr m dir of r u n i v n v l ~ m u c d s m p c s u c b n r h e m c m f b t prohibition on chcmicd iwerpoar. ho, infer ah. bcpa

test-bm tmiy. dmcd üxniq it imo 1 ûaty on r wmprchcnsive hn. did na mrlrc pmgfus kcavc of fbt relu-. and ffm <hc opposition. of m w l c a r - w q Su i a . which. beuw of rhç positive duaga hm bm taken p l v r on <he i n t e m i o d veae - mac md characterizcd by understmding. didogue ind

coopcntim - have now kgun IO show a spirit of opennesr.

Funbermore. in accordance with the ddnh resoiution contained in d o c u m A(C.1149lL.31. rhe ûeneral Assembly would. in the course of ils nimnt foq-ninth session. reitente iu rquest IO the Conferencc on Disamiamnit 10 undenlke mgoriations. as a matter of priority. in order IO reacb agreement on an international agreement pmhibiting the use or k a t of u x of nuclcar wespons in any cirrumtanccs.

The intemional community al% aspires IO sirengthen the Trury on the Non-Roliferuion of Nuclcu Weapons (NPT). Disamamml is a politicai p- of negotiating tmdiàg towudc the conclusion of binding agreements by the pania hvolved. which arc co& p r i d l y for rheir 0- Muiy. b' it m imponinc to avoid any posibility of i ncw iniewioarl rivaiy. which would u r t a Ihrdolv o v n al1 positive dcvelopmmu? &in is w n v h c d thu <be force d the effectiveneu of dilvmuDcnt rncirumd and agramcnu lie more in the rcccpilwc by UIC panier cmcerned of the concluions of their negotiuions lhrn in my legd opinion. which. in the W anaiysis. u n nile on oniy one upx of a subjst thu ù of grru a > m for the internacional community.

Multiluml dirpnnammt u k e plioc wirhà the global f n u ~ ~ ~ o r k of tbe n i n t i a of the (jeocrPI Asumbly. where Memb~ï %fU eXSICi&? k i r $ O v d @ rigbt. A Nling. even m &uny opinion. by fbt Caun d d wnstiNte a pr&edcni thu ivould prqudkc thu rigbt. The praait situation Ihu rapllm m - whuevn IO the humutid Cauc of lucice ooc of UIC prcveotive mrnircr ldvouted by <hc Ssnury-ûa~~nl in bis imponmt repon. 'An Agcadi for Pcrc". d rndoned in puticula by molution 47IlXl of 18 D&cmkr 1992 and 471120 B of 20 Sepicmber 1993.

In vm of lu rhe forcgoing. lk dekgeguioD of Benin. wbich UmYX adone MY inifililve (hlt is i n d q u u e or i m p p o m m c m d ~ ~ r c m < i n r b t g m m l ~ ~ . would have p f d na to have thU drift molution submined oa i u bebif. àu my deleguion emuld dm have w i d d thi irhemaioawu>ui;cnionbrd~Idopt~.Lilre rhe delegnim of M m . we fœl Ihm lk motion ml Io uke n i m w l d h v e made it possible Io go bwk Io informil anuuluiioac for Ilnher discussion. But dl theSe anempu w m uasucarrfui. and thii is why our deleguion will vote this drift mlu t ion .

Tbccb.lisu:TbcCommmscwillamrpmcadto tate m i m m dnfi moluùm ~ C . l l 4 9 n . M

Mr. Kbadi (Sscmuy of the CoUUUitt~): m e voiuig will now commcna on dnf~ remluiion A/C.1/49/L.36. mtiiled 'Reguat for m dviwry opiaion h m the I n i e w i o d C o u of Justice on the legdiry of ihe dura or uu of nuclur wctpopr'. This dnfi maluiion w u inimducd by the r c p ~ ~ ~ u t i v e ,of indonesia. on behdf of the S r ü a Membm of tk U n i d Nuions chu uc mcmbm of the Movcmmc of Non-Ali@ Counuia. the Cornminse's 1501 &in.$ ca 9 Novembcr 1991. md is s p o m d by irdoaaia on bchilf of the Suvs Membm of the United Nuiom thu uc mcmbcn of the Movcmmt of Non-hligned Couutria.

v a s a d o ~ t e d bv 7 7 v o t e s t o 3 3 , w i t h 21 a b s t e n t i o n s

WR. WlWi"i'AL, CANADA (p.13-14) ..* Bîih rrspn IO d n f ~ msuluioa AiC.1;49/L.M.

cmrd. ha km a leding propowt of negocuiiom and of ~ o o i l m i a UIWJ u eliminuing ihe number md r k pmlifanion of nucleu .uerpom. We arc sirmu d v a u i a of ao W f i n i u exiension of. and u n i v d m i o n to. the Non-Rolifemion T m and of tiw d w i o a of nego<*tiot~ on a comprrbmrive teu-bm W .

We du, vigomudy uippon imanriooil ngociuioar IO p e m tbc [-fer of mular -veqam Irchoology ad mPai.lr. in rrduce ind evanuUy dimiaar existimg stncka md IO ban tke pmduaion of Iivilc mmirlr for awlm- ~ p u p a c r .

Tbe C1Di.db Minkm of F d p Aflain. Mr. Aadrt Ouclla. moa r a f d y rcitcnred my Govemmcnl's wmmiimmt ta rbac g d s io bu sufrmaii IO ihe ûenenl hrvmbly in Sepeuber. We klievc iha the negotiuion of. md dbcrracc Io. b i i i ng muliilileni ircltia of the kind juw mmticaed amsirule a mon

effective appmxh io the uilimue climuurion of nuclur wupom an adviwry opinion of the intemationd C o u of Justice.

We funher believe chu the number md p u e of cumni nc:onaiions on sucb t ruies unply dem~nsinte chc commj~ment on the pan of ail S u t a to such negoriarions.

Canada is aiso cnncerned ihat the procac of r o e h g an advisory opinion of the internaiionai Coun could have

1 a negaiive mpwi on ceruin of thev ongoing oegoiiuions by divming uteniion h m them.

F i l y . givm ihar the quaMn povd in the dnfi ~ ~ o l u u o n u for 111 iniaiu md purpna purpovr before the Coun. md chu Suter chu w i d IO Lü& mbmbsioru on the issue have done w drrdy. WC d m quation wberha the dnfi molution ma a whrl purpov u rhU rime.

Givea rhcv wmidauions. G d a absbruined on the dnfr msulurion.

1 rbaild iiLc ta explrin Stwsdm's vote on dnlL raahrrion NC. 1149L.36. d t l e d ' R q u t for m miviamy +on hem the Imenuliod Cam of l w i ~ c on the I g d t y of the ihrru or use of nuclar wapoar" .

It is well lmwn ibai for decades Swcden hu workcd rtivcly and wmisun<ly for nuclcar diramiamml and for ao uliimue totai ban on rmclear weapoar. but my Gvvcmmcnt rbniioed on the dnn rcsolurion. It is the view of my Govenumu rhr. ukiag into vcount the ruent requat made to ibe i n u m u i d Court of lustia by the World H41b Orgmimion on this topic. onc funher q u a to the be d d pmbobly uirre la unfortunate &lly in the ongoing work of rh Court on the issue of Ihe lepdity of thc usc of wlur weapom. My G o v e m ~ l u is of the opinion ibai the use of nuclcar weapoas would w t comply with htmurioanl law, and is amiou ihai the legai sinuion be clarifiai a mon a possible by the Coun.

in ihis mntext. the Swedirh Govemmcnt would like Io d ihu l u t lunc. in connaion with a rcquest from the Worid H d t h Orgmuion , Swrdn, officiaily siared to the intemarional Coun of Justice that the use of nuclear m

would mr k in rcordaau with intemiuiod Lw. This rcply w a bucd on a repon by cbc S w Cornminec on Foreign Affain of thc S d u h Pariiuocnt. which w u appmved by ow Puli- lasa lm.

General Assembly Fony.ninth Seunon

Firsr Cornmittee

Friday, 18 November 1994. 3 p.m. New York

)IR. ESPINOSA, CHILE (p .1 )

linceqretation from Spanishl: I ehould

like to erplain Chile'e vote on draft reeolution A/C.l/49/L.36.

My delegation believes that it is diffimlt to .?are the

-est for an advisory opinion f r m the International Court of

J u ~ t i C e on the legality of the threat or use of force with the

-e#t of the World Bealth Organization through a draft resolution

prohibitirig certain reapons. m c h ia draft reeolution

~/c.l/49/L.31. Bowever. my delegation voted in favour of that drafr

rwolution as it felt chat it should k guided by the wjority

orientation Of the Wovcmcnt of Non-aligncd Countriee.

uiuiu, JAPM (p.2)

J should lits to explain Japanes

abstention in the votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/49/L.ZS/ReV.l

md A/C.1/49/L.36. - -

Japan, with its unique past experienc., honestly desires that

the use of nuclear weapons, vhich vould cause unspeakable human

sufferinp, should never ba repeatad. It thus attaches qreat

F.portance to tbm effort. directmi towards the ultimate elimination

of nuclear weaponm.

with respect to k a f t resolution Alc.l/4s/L.l6, Japan

considus that, i n the present international situation. pursuinq

the qyestion of the leqality of the use of nuclear veapons may

simply result in confrontation between countries. Japan therefore

believes that it is more appropriate to steadily promote realisric

and specific disarmament measures.

1 should like to srplain the poslrion

of rny deleqation on draft rmsolutions A/C.l/49/L.36 and L.331Rev.l.

First, let ne refer to L.36. He are avare cf the arguments

raised by several States, notably those of the European Union. in

relation to this issue. Ue share some of their concerns, inasmuch

as ue believe it might have been preferable to avait the decision

of the International Court of Justice in relation to the request of

a similar, thouqn not identical, nature made by the Assembly of the

worlù Health Oraanization (WHO).

Houever. ve voted in faVOUr of the draft resolution because ve

do not believe ve should deny the rights of an express group of

States to have the International Court of Justice give its advlsory

opinion about a juridical question of evident interest to the

international conimunit~. a right which is clearly spelt out in

Article 96 of the Charter. Brazil does not believe that this

measure can harm international efforts towards non-proliferation

and disanament. On the contrary, we cal1 upon al1 states to look

upon this request as a further appeal to redoubling efforts in

international negotiations, consolidating non-proiiferation and

leadinq to the gradua1 elimination of al1 nuclear weapons.

(interptation from chinese) : The

chi- deleqation did not participite in the vote on draft

-1iitiM AIC.1149lL.36. We would 1 U e to aake eh. follwing

explanetion. CbiA fully understand. th. m e n t rish for the prohibition of

the urs 0f.nuClaar inapoiu on th. part of non-nuclear States. China

bas consistantly advoçated the coiprshensive prohibition and

complet. elhination of miclur waaporu. . - - - . . ..

Qdna hopes that rhira fu~.mr promoting nuclear disarmament LPd th* prevention OC mclear rar. the W t e d Nations General

w h l y the Pimt C d t t e e , the Disa-nt C d a s i o n and the

Qpierence on D i m a ~ t . w h i c h have alraady played an Lnportant

1 ri11 continue to do mo. At the s.ms t i w , Chine ha8 eauistently supportad al1 tha coilstructive bilateral, regional and

nulcilateral effort8 mide in thie ragarâ. Since the day of the poeession of nuclear weapons hy China. ve

bn sol-ly declared that under no circumtances and at no tirne

ri11 ra bc the first to use nuclear weapons. China has also made a

c d r a n t not to uee or threaten to use nuclear weapons on non-

micleax neapon States or nuclear-free zones. we appeal to other

micleax-neapon States to make similar cwmitments and to negotiate

and mign a treaty On the non-use of nuclear reapons on each other.

Y b e l i m that if re Can reach these objectives. this ri11 in

pmctice eliminite the posaibility of the use or the threat of the

use of nuclear reapons.

A/49/699 English Page 2

was included in the provisional agenda of the forty-ninth session in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 42/38 C of 30 November 1987, 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, 47/52 L of 15 December 1992 and 48/75 A to L of 16 December 1993.

2. At its 3rd plenary meeting, on 23 September 1994, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda and to allocate it to the First Committee.

3. At its 2nd meeting, on 13 October 1994, the First Committee decided to hold a general debate on al1 disarmament and international security items allocated to it, namely, items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153. The deliberations on those items took place at the 3rd to 10th meetings, £rom 17 to 24 October (see A/C.1/49/PV.3-10). Structured discussions of specific subjects on the adopted thematic approach took place £rom 25 to 27 and on 31 October and 1 November. Consideration of draft resolutions on those items took place at the 12th to 16th meetings, on 3, 4, 7 and 9 November (see A/C.1/49/PV.12-16). Action on draft resolutions on those items took place at the 19th to 25th meetings, from 14 to 18 November (see ~/~.1/49/PV.19-251.

4. In connection with item 62, the First Committee had before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the Conference on Disannament; &/

(b) Report of the Disannament Commission; 2/

(c) Report of the Secretary-General on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in al1 its aspects (A/INF/49/3) ;

(d) ~eport'of the Secretary-General on regional disarmament (A/49/202 and Add.1) ;

(e) Report of the Secretary-General on a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines (A/49/275 and Add.1);

(f) Report of the Secretary-General: report on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development (A/49/316) ;

(g) Report of the Secretary-General on measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional a n s (A/49/343);

(h) Report of the Secretary-General on transparency in armaments - United Nations Register of Conventional Anns (~/49/352 and C0rr.l and Add.1 and 2);

&/ &, suuuiement No. 27 (A/49/27).

2/ Ibid., Su~ulement No. 42 (A/49/42)

UNITED 13

NAllONS A General Assembly

Distr. GENBRAL

A/49/699 7 December 1994

ORIGINAL: BNGLISH

Porty-ninth session Agenda item 62

GENERAL AND COMPLBTB DISARMAMENT

Report of the First Conmittee

Ramorteur: Mr. Peter GOOSEN (South Africa)

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The item entitled:

"General and complete disarmament:

"(a) Notification of nuclear tests;

"(b) Relationship between disarmament and development;

"(c) Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in al1 its aspects;

"(d) Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes;

"(e) TranSparenCy in armaments;

"(f) International illicit a m traffic;

"(g) Regional disarmament;

"(h) Measures to curb the illicit tranafer and use of conventional arms;

i Conventional anns control at the regional and eubregional levels;

"(j),Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

94-48521 B) 121294 I11111111111111111/11 IIIII IIIII IIIII 1111 1111

14/12/94


(i) Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between disarmament and development (A/49/476);

(j) Note by the Secretary-General on notification of nuclear tests (A/49/68 and Add.1) ;

(k) Note by the Secretary-General on notification of nuclear tests (A/49/420) ;

(1) Note by the Secretary-General on prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (A/49/97-S/1994/322);

(m) Letter dated 24 January 1994 £rom the representatives of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (~/49/66-~/1994/91);

(n) Letter dated 3 February 1994 £rom the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/49/69-S/1994/117);

(O) Letter dated 4 February 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/49/73);

(p) Letterdated 21 February 1994 £rom the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/49/80-S/1994/204);

(q) Letter dated 31 March 1994 £rom the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/49/117-S/1994/395);

(r) Letter dated 21 April 1994'from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the secretary-General (A/49/132);

(s) Letter dated 10 May 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (~/49/155-S/1994/556);

(t) Letter dated 17 May 1994 from the representatives of Ukraine and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/49/162-S/1994/596);

(u) Letter dated 23 May 1994 £rom the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General fA/49/166);

(v) Letter dated 24 May 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (~/49/165-S/1994/616);


(w) Letter dated 25 June 1994 £rom the Minister for Foreign Affairs Of Egypt to the Secretary-General (A/49/287-S/1994/894 and Corr.1);

(x) Letter dated 8 July 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the secretary-General (A/49/222);

(y) Letter dated 12 July 1994 £rom the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General fA/49/228-S/1994/827);

( 2 ) Letter dated 8 August 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/49/302);

(aa) Letter dated 8 August 1994 £rom the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/49/307-S/l994/95e>;

(bb) Letter dated 5 September 1994 £rom the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/49/381);

(cc) Letter dated 17 October 1994 £rom the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations addreseed to the Secretary-General (A/49/532-S/1994/1179).

II. CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS

A. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.3

5. On 28 October, the Gambia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the African Group of States, submitted a draft resolutionentitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes (A/C.1/49/L.3), which was later also sponsored by u. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the Gambia at the 20th meeting, on 15 November.

6. At its 19th meeting, on 14 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.3 without a vote (see para. 60, draft resolution A).

B. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.4

7. On 28 October, Niaeria submitted a draft resolution entitled "Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade", which was later also sponsored by Benin. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Nigeria at the 15th meeting, on 9 November.


8. At its 20th meeting, on 15 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.4 by a recorded vote of 111 to 4, with 27 abstentions (see para. 60, draft resolution B). The voting was as follows: 3/

In favour: Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia. Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam. Bulgaria. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China. Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte djIvoire, Cuba, Cyprus. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait. Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia. Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain. Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania. Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

Aqainst : France, Marshall Islands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaininq: Albania, Argentina. Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan. Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Samoa, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine.

C. Draft decision A/C.1/49/L.6

9. On 31 October, Colombia submitted a draft decision entitled "International illicit anns traffic" (A/C.l/49/L.6), which read as follows:

"The General Assembly, recalling its resolutions 48/75 F of 16 December 1993, entitled 'International arms transfers', adopted without a vote, and 48/77 A of 16 December 1993, entitled 'Report of the Disarmament Commission', adopted without a vote, as well as the report of the Disarmament Commission contained in the Officia1 Records of the General Assembly, fortyrninth session, Supplement No. 42 (A/49/42), decides to

2/ Subsequently, the delegation of Zambia indicated that, had it been present, it would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.


include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled 'International illicit arms traffic'."

10. At the 19th meeting, on 14 November, the representative of Colombia withdrew draft decision A/C.1/49/L.6.

D. Draft resolution A/C. 1/49/L. 18 and Rev. i

il. On 2 November, Arqentina. Australia. Austria. Bahamas. Belarus. Belqium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulqaria, Cambodia, Canada. CaDe Verde. Chile. Costa Rica. the Czech Re~ublic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiii, Finland, France, Georsia, Germanv, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana. Honduras. Hunsarv. Iceland. Ireland. Italv, JaDan, Kazakhstan. Kvrwzstan. Latvia. Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourq, Malavsia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands. Namibia. Ne~al, the Netherlands. New Zealand, Nicarawa, Niqer, Norwav, Panama, PaDua New Guinea, Peru, Poland. Portusal, Re~ubïic of Korea, Re~ubïic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation. Sierra Leone. Sinqa~ore. Slovakia. Slovenia. Solomon Islands. Spain, Sweden. the former Yuqoslav Re~ublic of Macedonia, Turkev. Ukraine, the United Kinsdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America submitted a draft resolution entitled "Transparency in ammenten (A/C.1/49/L.18), which was later also sponsored by Albania. Andorra. Cameroon, Haiti, the Phili~~ines. South Africa and Turkmenistan. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the Netherlands at the 13th meeting, on 4 November.

12. on 3 November, Alseria. Indonesia. Iran (Islamic ReDubiic of). Mexico, Mvanmar. Niseria and Sri Lanka submitted amendments (A/C.1/49/L.45) to draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.18, by which:

(a) At the end of operative paragraph 4 (a), the following words would be added: "including its expansion to cover weapons of mase destruction";

(b) Operative paragraph 4 (b) , which read:

"(b) Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 1996 on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Dieannament and the views expressed by Member States, for submission to the General Assembly with a view to a decision at its fifty-first session";

would be replaced by:

"(b) Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the views expressed by Member States, for. submission to.the General Assembly with a view to a decision at its fifty-third session";

(cl Operative paragraph 6 would be deleted and the remaining paragraphs renumbered accordingly.

/ . . .


13. The amendments contained in document A/C.1/49/L.45 were introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 15th meeting, on 9 November.

14. On 15 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution (~/c.1/49/L.18/Rev.l), which contained the following changes:

(a) ûperative paragraph 4 (a), which read:

"(a) Requests Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development" ;

waa revised to read:

"(al Requests Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and on transparency meaeures related to weapona of mase destruction'' ;

(b) ûperative paragraph 4 (b), was revised to read:

"(b) Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 1997, on the-basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. taking into account work of the Conference on Disarmament, the viewsexpreased by Member States and the 1994 report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, with a view to a decision at its fifty-second session";

(cl ûperative paragraph 6, which read:

"Encourases the Conference on Disarmament to continue its work undertaken in the field of transparency in annaments",

was reviaed to read:

"Invites the Conference on Dieannament to consider continuing its work undertaken in the field of traneparency in aimaments".

15. At the 25th meeting, on 18 November, the repreaentative of Mexico made a statement on behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.45 that they intended not to press the draft resolution to vote.

16. At the same meeting, the Committee voted on draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.18/Rev.l as f~llows:

(a) ûperative paragraph 4 (b) was adopted by a recorded vote of 114 to 1, with 22 abstentions. The voting was as follows:


In favour: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, ust tria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, ~ulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cypms, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Gennany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

-: Iran (Islamic Republic of).

Abstaininq: Algeria, Angola, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland.

(b) Operative paragraph 6 was adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to 4, with 15 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon


Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Asainst : Ugeria. Cuba, Indonesia, Mexico.

Abstaininq: Angola, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador. El Salvador, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan.

(CI Draft resolution A/C.l/49/L.lB/Rev.l as a whole was adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to none, with 17 abstentions (see para. 60, draft resolution C. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, B e l a ~ S , Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation. Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain. Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Aqainst : None

Abstaininq: Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic.


E. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.19

17. on 1 November. Afahanistan. Arqentina. Austria. Bahamas, Bhutan, Bolivia, BL Re~ubiic, Denmark. El Salvador. Eritrea. Germanv, Ghana, Greece. Guatemala, Guvana. Honduras. riunaarv. Iceland. Ireland. Italv. Kazakhstan. Liberia. Luxembourq, Madaqascar. Maldives. Malta. the Marshall Islands, Mauritania. Nepal, Netherlands. New Zealand. Nicarama. Norwav. Panama, Philip~ines, Poland. portusal. the n h Africa. Suain. S w e d e n n the United Kinqdom of Great Britain and Northern Irelan&,the United States of America, Vanuatu and submitted a draft resolution entitled "Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines" (A/C.1/49/L.19), which was later also sponsored by Albania. Armenia. Azerbaiian. Belaium, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Georaia, Guinea. JaDan. Jordan. Kenva. Kuwait. India. Malavsia. Monqolia, Namibia and the Niqer. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the United States of America at the 12th meeting, on 3 November . 18. At its 19th meeting, on 14 November, the.Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/~.19 without a vote (see para. 60, draft resolution D).

P. Draft decision A/C.1/49/L.24

19. On 2 November, Mexico submitted a draft decision entitled "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in al1 its aspectsn (A/C.1/49/L.24). The draft decision was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 15th meeting, on 9 November.

20. At its 20th meeting, on 15 November, the Committee adopted draft decision A/C.1/49/L.24 by a recorded vote of 98 to 1, with'42 abstentions (see para. 61, draft decision). The voting was as follows: 4/ '

In favour: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belanis, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C8te d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana. Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico. Mongolia, MorOCCO. Mozambique, yranmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar,

o/ Subsequently, the delegations of Djibouti and Zambia indicatedthat, had they been present, they would have voted in favour of the draftresolution.

/. . .


Republic of Korea, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname. Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania. Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

Asainst : United States of America.

Abstaininq: Andorra, Argentina. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Pinland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, . Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Pederated States of), Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republ~c of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, the former YugoSlav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

G.. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.25 and Rev.1

21. On 2 November, Brazil, Colombia, Eqvut. India, Indonesia. Malaysia, Mexico, Niseria and Zimbabwe submitted a draft resolution entitled "Step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threatn (A/C.1/49/L.25), which was later also sponsored by Ecuador and the United Re~ublic of Tanzania. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 14th meeting, on 7 November.

22. On 16 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution (A/c.1/49/L.25/Rev.l), which was later also sponsored by Alseria. The draft resolution contained the following changes:

(a) In operative paragraph 3 (a), the words "operative paragraph 1" were replaced by the words "paragraph 1 of the present resolution";

(b) In operative paragraph 3 (b), the word "operative" was deleted;

(c) ûperative paragraph 4. yhich read:

"4. Reauests that the Conference in Disarmament include in its 1995 report to the General Assembly a section on efforts undertaken in accordance with the above recommendation."

was revised to read:

"4. Reauests the Conference on Disarmament to include in its 1995 report to the General Assembly a section on efforts undertaken in accordance with the recommendation set out in paragraph 3";

'(d) An additional paragraph was added reading as follows:

"5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session an item entitled 'Step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threattn.


23. At its 24th meeting, on 18 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.25/Rev.l by a recorded vote of 91 to 24, with 30 abstentions (see para. 60, draft resolution E) . The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Paso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, CyprUS, Democratic People Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, 51 Salvador, ~thiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordari, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan. Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone. singapore, soiornon ~siands, south Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan. Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, ~ o g o , Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Aqainst : Andorra, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, ~uxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great ri tain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaininq: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Georgia, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Pederation, Slovenia, Swaziland, Sweden. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine.

H. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.27

24. On 2 November, Australia, Austria. Belqium. Bulaaria. Canada, Denmark, Pinland. France. Gennanv. Greece. Hunsarv, Iceland, Ireland. Italv, Luxembours, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norwav. Poland. Portuqal, Romania. S~ain, Sweden and the U n i t e d a submitted a draft resolution entitled "Code of Conduct for the international transfers of conventional weapons", which was later also sponsored by w, the Moldova. Slovakia and Slovenia. The draft resolution, which was introduced by the representative of Gennany at the 12th meeting, on 3 November, read as follows :


"The General Assembl~,

"Recallinq its resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, 47/52 L of 15 December 1992 and 48/75 E of 16 December 1993, concerning transparency in armaments, and 46/36 H of 6 December 1991 and 48/75 P of 16 December 1993 concerning international arma transfers,

"Considerinq that an enhanced level of openness and transparency with regard to international transfers of armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States, eases tensions, strengthens regional and international peace and security, could serve as a useful tool in facilitating non-proliferation efforts in general and could contribute to restraint in military production and the transfer of arms,

"Welcominq the work of the Conference on Disarmament on its agenda item entitled 'Transparency in armaments',

"Reaffirminq the inherent right to individual or collective self- defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which implies that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to defend themselves,

"Recoqnizinq the need for Member States to exercise responsibility and restraint in transfers of conventional arme,

"Stressinq its strong belief that excessive and destabilizing accumulations of a m pose a threat to national, regional and international peace and security, particularly aggravating tensions and conflict situations, and give rise to serious and urgent concerns,

"Affinninq the need for effective national mechanisms for controlling the transfer of conventional arma and related technology and for transfers to take place with those mechanisms,

"1. Calls upon al1 Member States to consider the establishment of a voluntary, global and non-discriminatory Code of Conduct for international conventional arms transfers with a view to promoting voluntary restraint and responsibility in conventional arms transfers;

"2. Considers that a Code of Conduct for international arms transfers be elaborated in the most appropriate forum;

113. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled 'Code of Conduct for the international transfers of conventional weapons'".

25. At the 23rd meeting, on 17 November, the representative of Gennany stated that the sponsors intended to request the Committee not to take action on draft resolution ~/C.1/49/L.27.


1. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.28

26. On 2 November, Indonesia, Mexico. Namibia. Niqeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe submitted a draft resolution entitled "1995 Review and Extension Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (A/C.l/49/L.28), which was later also sponsored by the United Re~ublic of Tanzania. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Nigeria at the 14th meeting, on 7 November.

27. At the 22nd meeting, on 17 November, the Secretary of the Committee made a statement concerning the programme budget implications of draftresolution A/C.1/49/L.28 (see A/C.1/49/PV.22).

28. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.28 by a recorded vote of 77 to 39, with 32 abstentions (see para. 60, draft resolution F). The voting was as follows:

In Cavour: Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana. Brunei Darusaalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Colombia. Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,.Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,.Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland. Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Aqainst : Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Eetonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Gennany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaininq: Argentina,. Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti. Dominica, Egypt, Guyana, India, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Samoa, San Marino, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine.


J. Draft resolution A/C.l/49/L.30 and Rev.1 and Rev.2

29. On 2 November, Mali submitted a draft resolution entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them" (A/C.1/49/L.30) .

30. On 7 November, Mali joined by Burkina Faso, C8te d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau. Mauritania, the Niqer and Senesal, submitted a revised draft resolution A/C.l/49/L.3O/Rev.l. It was introduced by the representative of Mali at the 16th meeting, on 9 November. and contained the following changes:

(a) The original seventh preambular paragraph, which read:

"Notinq with satisfaction the actions taken and those recommended at the meetings of the States of the subregion held at Banjul, Algiers and Bamako to establish close regional cooperation with a view to strengthening security, and the interest shown by other States of the subregion in receiving the United Nations Consultative Mission",


"Takins note also of the interest shown by other States of the subregion in receiving the United Nations Consultative Mission";

(b) The original operative paragraph 1, which read:

"1. Welcomes the actions taken by the Secretary-General leading to the initiation of preventive diplomacy in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion",


"1. Welcomes the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small arms and their collection in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion";

(c) The original operative paragraph 2, which read:

"2. Also welcomes the initiative taken by Mali and the appreciable help given by the Government of Mali to the United Nations Consultative Mission',


"2. Also welcomes the action taken by the Secretary-General in implementation of this initiative";

(d) A new operative paragraph 3 was added, reading:

"3. Thanks the Government of Mali for the appreciable help which it has given to the Consultative Mission and welcomes the declared readiness of other States of the subregion to receive the Mission";


(e) The original operative paragraph 3, which read:

"3. Reauests the Secretary-General to continue his action, providing the necessary assistance to Mali and to al1 other Member States requesting it, with a view to curbing the illicit circulation of small arms and ensuring their collection",

became operative paragraph 4 and was revised to read:

" 4 . Encourases the Secretary-General to continue his action, with the support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in close collaboration with the Organization of African Unity, by providing the necessary assistance to Mali and to al1 other States concerned which request it, with a view to curbing the illicit circulation of small arms and ensuring their collection";

(f) The original operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 were renumbered as paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 respectively.

31. On 17 November, the sponsors submitted a second revised resolution (A/C.l/49/L.3O/Rev.2), which was later also sponsored by Benin, Burundi, Cambodia. Cameroon. Chad. Diibouti and m. The draft resolution contained the following changes:

(a) Operative paragraph 4 was further revised as followa:

"4. Conqratulates the Secretary-General on his action within the context of the relevant provisions of resolution 40/151 H of 16 December 1985, and encourages him to continue his efforts to curb the illicit circulation of small arms and to ensure their collection in the affected States which so request, with the support of the United Nations Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity";

(b) Operative paragraph 5 (former operative paragraph 4). which read:

"Invites Member States to take al1 necessary measures to curb the illicit circulation of small arms, in particular by halting their illegal export" ;


"5. Invites Member States to implement national control measures in order to check the illicit circulation of small arms, in particular by curbing the illegal export of such arms".

32. At the 22nd meeting, on 17 November, the Secretary of the Committee made a statement concerning the programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.30/Rev.2 (see A/C.I/~~/PV.~~).

33. At its 25th meeting, on 18 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.30/Rev.2 without a vote (see para. 60, draft resolution G).


genéral and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" ,


"2. Calls uuon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue their efforts for nuclear disarmament with the ultimate objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons in the framework of general and complete disarmament, and also calls upon al1 States to fully implement their commitments in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructionp.

36. At its 24th meeting, on 18 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.33/Rev.l by a recorded vote of 140 to none, with 8 abstentions (see para. 60, draft resolution H). The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanietan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Annenia, ~ustralia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus. Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, nonduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan -ab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Noway, Oman, Pakistati, Panama. Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, P e n , Philippines, Poland, Portugal. Qatar, Republic of ~orea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Bmirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Aaainst: None

Abstaininq: Brazil, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.


L. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.34 and Rev.1

37. On 2 November, Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" (A/C.1/49/L.34), which was introduced by its representative at the 15th meeting, on 9 November.

38. On 15 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution (A/C.1/49/L.34/Rev.l), which contained the following changes:

(a) The third preambular paragraph, which read:

"Reiteratinq its conviction that the implementation of disarmament measures, particularly nuclear disarmament, is essential for achieving global peace and security",

was deleted;

(b) ûperative paragraphs 1 and 2, which read:

"1. Decides to convene in May/June 1996 the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

"2. Further decides to establish a preparatory committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament open to al1 States with the mandate of examining al1 relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and submitting to the Assembly at its fiftieth session appropriate recomendations thereon", -

were revised to read:

"1. Decides to convene in 1997 the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

" 2 . Further decides that at its fiftieth regular session it will establish a preparatory committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament open to al1 States with the mandate of examining al1 relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and submitting to the Assembly at its fifty-first session appropriate recomendations thereon";

(c) ûperative paragraphe 3, 4 and 5 were deleted and operative paragraph 6 was renumbered as paragraph 3.

39. On 17 November, Belqium. Canada, Denmark, Finland. France, Hunqarv. Iceland, Ireland, Italv, Japan. Norwav. Poland. Portuqal. Turkev. the United Kinadom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America submitted amendmenta (A/C.1/49/L.52) to the revised draft resolution (A/C.1/49/L.34/Rev.l), by which:


(a) In the fourth preambular paragraph. the word "central" would be deleted;

(b) Operative paragraph 1 would be replaced by the following:

"1. Decides in principle to convene a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament at an appropriate date to be determined following consultations";

(c) Operative paragraphs 2 and 3 would be deleted.

40. At the 25th meeting, on 18 November, the representative of India proposed oral amendments to the revised draft resolution (A/C.1/49/L.34/Rev.l), by which:

(a) Operative paragraph 1 would be amended to read:

"1. Decides, in principle, to convene, in 1997 if possible, the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the date to be determined at the fiftieth regular session";.

(b) Operative paragraph 2 would be deleted and operative paragraph 3 would be renumbered as paragraph 2.

41. At the same meeting, the representative of the United Sta-tes of America made a statement on behalf of the sponsors that they intended not to press the amendments contained in document A/C.1/49/L.52 to a vote.

42. The Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.34/Rev.l, as orally amended, without a vote (see para. 60, draft resolution 1).

43. On 3 November, Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development" (A/C.1/49/L.35), which was later also sponsored by u. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Indonesia at the 15th meeting, on 9 November .

44. At its 20th meeting on 15 November. the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.l/49/L.35 without a vote (see para. 60, draft resolution J).

N. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.36

45. On 3 November, Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Request for an advisory opinion £rom the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons' (A/C.1/49/L.36). The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Indonesia at the 15th meeting. on 9 November.


46. At its 24th meeting, on 18 November, the Committee acted on a no-action motion on draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.36, which was proposed by the representative of Morocco. The motion was rejected by a recorded vote of 45 to 67, with 15 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In faveur: Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria. Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, ïsrael, Italy, Japan. Latvia, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, . Romania. Russian Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northeni Ireland, United States of America.,

Asainst : Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal. Nicaragua. Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Abstaininq: Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Cate d'Ivoire, El Salvador, Ireland, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, New Zealand, Niger, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Sweden.

4 7 . At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.36 by a recorded vote of 77 to 33, with 21 abstentions (see para. 60, draft resolution K). The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji. Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait. Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, P e , Philippines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname. Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and


Tobago, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Auainst : Andorra, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark. Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland. Israel. Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaininq: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentins, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cameroon, Canada, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Niger, Norway, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Sweden, Ukraine.

O. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.38

48. On 3 November. Indonesia, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament" (A/C.1/49/L.38). The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Indonesia at the 15th meeting, on 9 November.

49. At its 23rd meeting, on 17 November. the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.38 without a vote (see para. 60, draft resolution L).

\

P. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.40 and Rev.1

50. On 3 November. Afqhanistan and Colombia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms" (A/C.1/49/L.40), which was later also sponsored by Ecuador. Guatemala, Sri Lanka, the çudan and Zimbabwe. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Afghanistan at the 15th meeting, on 9 November.

51. On 10 November, the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution (A/C.l/49/L.40/Rev.l), which was later also sponsored by Botswana. Costa Rica, El Salvador, South Africa and Swaziland. The revised draft resolution contained the following changes:

(a) The original third preambular paragraph, which read:

"Realizinq the urgent need to resolve conflicts and to diminish tensions with a view to maintaining regional and international peace and security" ,



"Realizinq the urgent need to resolve conflicts and to diminish .tensions and accelerate efforts towards general and complete disarmament with a view to maintaining regional and international peace and security";

(b) The original fifth preambular paragraph, which read:

"Stressinq the need for international regulation of the transfer of conventional weapons",


"Stressinq the need foreffective national control measures on the transfer of conventional weapons";

(c) The original seventh preambular paragraph, which read:

"Convinced that peace and security are imperatives for economic development and reconstruction",


"Convinced that peace and security are inextricably interlinked with and in some cases imperative for economic development and reconstruction";

(d) The original operative paragraph 2, which read:

"2. Invites Member States to provide the Secretary-General with relevant information on national regulations on arms transfers with a view to preventing illicit arms transfers, and, in this context, to take immediate, appropriate and effective measures to ensure that illicit transfers of arms are discontinued",


"2. Invites Member States to provide the Secretazy-General with relevant information on national control measures on arms transfers with a view to preventing illicit arms transfers, and, in this context, to take immediate, appropriate and effective measures to seek to ensure that illicit transfers of arms are discontinued";

(e) The original operative paragraph 3. which read:

"3. Reauests the Secretary-General to:

"(a) Seek the views of Member States on effective ways and means of collecting illegal weapons in countries concerned, as well as on concrete proposals concerning measures at national, regional and international levels to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms;

"(b) Study, within the existing resources, upon request £rom the concerned Member States, the possibilities of illicit arms collection in the light of the experience gained by the United Nations and the viewa


expressed by Member States and to submit a report on the result of his study to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session",


"3. Resuests the Secretary-General to:

"(a) Seek the views of Member States on effective ways and means of collecting weapons illicitly transferred in interested countries, as well as on concrete proposals concerning measures at national, regional and international levels to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms ;

"(b) Study, within the existing resources, upon request £rom the concerned Member States, the possibilities of the collection of weapons illicitly transferred in,the light of the experience gained by the United Nations and the views expressed by Member States and to submit a report on the result of his study to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session".

52. At its 19th meeting, on 14 November. the Committee adopted the revised draft resolution (A/C.l/49/L.40/Rev.l) without a vote (see para. 60, draft resolution M) .

Q. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.42

53. On 3 November. Albania. Armenia, Benin. Bosnia and Herzeqovina. Cameroon, Canada. Caue Verde, Chile, Colombia. Costa Rica, the Czech Re~ublic. Eswt, Ghana. Guinea, Honduras, Italv. Lesotho, Madaqascar, Mali. Malta. Mauritania, Neual. New Zealand, the Niser. Pakistan. Pauua New Guinea. Poland, Seneqal. Sri Lanka. the Sudan. Suriname. Swaziland, Toqo, Tunisia. Turkev, Ukraine, the United States of America. Zambia and Zimbabwe submitted a draft resolution entitled "Regional disarmament" (A/C.1/49/L.42), which was also later sponsored by Belqium, Bolivia, Brazil. Haiti, Kenva, the Reuublic of Moldova and Turkmenistan. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the 19th meeting, on 14 November.

54. At its 19th meeting on 14 November, the Conunittee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.42 by a recorded vote of 140 to none, with 2 abstentions (see para. 60, draft resolution N). The voting was as follows: s/

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina. Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belams, Belgium. Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam. Bu1garia;Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt,

5/ Subsequently, the delegations of Djibouti and Paraguay indicated that, - had they been present, tt~ey wuuld have voted in favour of draft resolution.

/. . .


El Salvador. Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary. Iceland, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal. Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines. Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Rirkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Aqainst : None.

Abstaininq: India, Nigeria.

R. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.43

55. On 3 November, Haiti, Pakistan and Swaziland submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levelsn (A/C.1/49/L.43). The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the 19th meeting, on 14 November.

56. At its 19th meeting, on 14 November, the Committee adopted the draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.43 by a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 11 abstentions (see para. 60, draft resolution O ) . The voting was as follows: 5/, Z/

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's

5/ Subsequently, the delegations of Djibouti and Paraguay indicated that, had they been present, they would have voted in favour of draft resolution.

z/ Subsequently, the delegation of Venezuela informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.


Republic of Korea, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain. Sri Lanka. Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic. Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Rirkey, Ukraine, United Arab hnirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Abstaininq: Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Singapore.

S. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.44 and Rev.1

57. On 3 November, the Russian Federation, the United Kinqdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America submitted a draft resolution entitled "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament" (A/C. 1/49/L. 44) .

58. On 8 November, the sponsors, joined by Belqium, Greece and Norway submitted a revised draft resolution (A/C.1/49/L.44/Rev.i). which was later also sponsored by Arsentina. Armenia, Australia, Bulqaria, the Czech Reuublic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germanv, Hunsarv, Ireland, Italv, Jauan, Luxembours, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway. Poland, Portuqal. Suain. Sweden and Turkey. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the United States of America at the 23rd meeting, on 17 November, and contained the following changes :

(a) The original ninth preambular paragraph, which read:

"Welcominq the steps that have already been taken by those States to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons from a deployed status, and bilateral agreements on the issue of de-targeting strategic nuclear missiles",


was revised as follows:

"Welcominq the steps that have already been taken by those States to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons £rom a deployed status, and bilateral agreements on the issue of de-targeting strategic nuclear missiles";

(b) The original eleventh preambular paragraph, which read:

"Notins also that the Russian Federation and the United tat tes of America concurred that, once the START II Treaty is ratified, the Russian Federation and the United States of America would proceed to deactivate al1 strategic delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from alert status",


"Notinq also that the Russian Federation and the United States of America concurred that, once the Treaty between them on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was ratified, they would proceed to deactivate al1 strategic delivery systems to be reduced under the Treaty by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from alert status";

(cl The original twelfth preambular paragraph, which read:

"Notinq further the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces",


"Notinq further the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation, including the possibility, after ratification of the Treaty on the hirther Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of further reductions of and limitations on remaining nuclear forces";

(d) In the original operative paragraph 1, the words "the Presidents of" were added after the words "the trilateral statement by";

(e) In the original operative paragraph 6, the word "Further" was deleted.

A/49/699 mglish Page 28

59. At itS 23rd meeting, on 17 November, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.44/Rev.l by a recorded vote of 122 to none, with 2 abstentions (see para. 60, draft resolution P). The voting was as follows: g/

In favour: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina. Armenia, Australia, Austria. Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium. Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria. Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cate d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus. Czech Republic. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti. Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland. France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Guyana. Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, 1srael;Italy. Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco. Mozambique, Myanmar, Netherlands, New zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Noway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania. Russian Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

Aqainst : None.

Abstaininq: India, Namibia.

8/ Subsequently, the delegations of Bahrain, Guatemala, Iraq, Kuwait, Nepal, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates indicated that, had they been present, they would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.


III. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE

60. The First Comnittee recomnenda to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolutions:

General and com~lete disarmament

The General Assembly,

Bearins in mind resolutions CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII) of 1988 2/ and CM/Res.l225 L of 1989, U/ adopted by the Council of Ministera of the Organization of African Unity, concerning the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa,

Welcominq resolution GC(XXXIII)/RES/509 on the dumping of nuclear wastes, adopted on 29 September 1989 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-third regular session, II/

Welcomins also resolution GC(XXXIv)/RES/530 establishing a Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, adopted on 21 September 1990 by the General Conference of the International Atomic mergy Agency at its thirty-fourth regular session, =/

Considerinq ita resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it requested the Conference of the Conmittee on Disarmament, -/ inter alia, to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare,

2/ See A/43/398, annex 1.

IO/ see A/44/603, annex 1. - 1 See International Atomic Energy Agency. Resolutions and Other -

Decisions of the General Conference. Thirtv-third Reuular Session, 25-29 September 1989 (GC(XXXII1) /RESOLUTIONS (1989) ) .

12/ Ibid., Thirtv-fourth, 17-21 September 1990 (GC (M[Iv) /RESOLUTIONS (1990) ) .

13/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on - Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.


4. Calls uvon the Disarmament Commission to include in its assessment relevant matters which, in the view of Member States, require such review;

5. Reauests Member States to submit to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on such a review no later than 30 April 1995;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to give al1 necessary assistance to the Disarmament Commission in implementing the present resolution;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session an item entitled "Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade".

Transvarencv in armaments


Recallins its resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, 47/52 L of 15 December 1992 and 48/75 E of 16 December 1993 entitled "Transparency in armaments" ,

Continuinq to take the view that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States and that the establishment of the Register of Conventional Arma -/ constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters,

Welcominq the consolidated report of the Secretary-General on the Register of Conventional Anns, =/ which includes the returns for 1993 of Member States,

Welcominq the response of Member States to the request contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 46/36 L to provide data on their imports and exports of arms, as well as available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies,

Stressinq that the continuing operation of the Register and its further development should be reviewed in order to secure a Register which is capable of attracting the widest possible participation,

Takins note of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its agenda item entitled "Transparency in armaments", -/

171 Resolution 46/36 L. - / A/49/352 of 1 September 1994.

19/ See Officia1 Records of the General Assemblv. Fortv-ninth Session, - Suvvlement No. 27 iA/49/27), chap. III, sect. H.


1. Reaffirms its determination to ensure the effective operation of the Register of Conventional Arms as provided for in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 46/36 L;

2. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development =/ and the recommendations contained therein;

3. Calls upon Member States to provide the requested data and information for the Register, on the basis of resolutions 46/36 L and 47/52 L and the annex and appendices to the report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, to the Secretary-General by 30 April annually;

4. Decides, with a view to further development of the Register, to keep the scope of and participation in the Register under review, and, to this end:

(a) Requests Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and on transparency measures related to weapons of mass destruction;

(b) Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 1997, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account work of the Conference on Disarmament, the views expressed by Member States and the 1994 report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, with a view to a decision at its fifty-second session;

5. Reauests the Secretary-General to ensure that sufficient resources are made available for the United Nations Secretariat to operate and maintain the Register;

6. Invites the Conference on Disamment to consider continuing its work undertaken in the field of transparency in armaments;

7. Reiterates its cal1 upon al1 Member States to cooperate at the regional and subregional levels, taking fully into account the specific conditions prevailing in the region or subregion, with a view to enhancing and coordinating international efforts aimed at increased openness and transparency in armaments;

8. Reguests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session on progress made in implementing the present resolution;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled "Transparency in armaments".

20/ A/49/316 of 22 September 1994 -


Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines

The General Assemblv,

Recallins with satisfaction its resolution 48/75 of 16 December 1993, by which it, inter alia, called upon States to agree to a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines that pose grave dangers to civilian populations, and urged States to implement such a moratorium,

N m that there are approximately 85 million or more anti-personnel land-mines in the ground throughout the world and that many thousands of such mines continue to be laid in an indiscriminate manner,

Exuressinq deep concern that anti-personnel land-mines kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly unarmed civilians, obstruct economic development and reconstruction and have other severe consequences, which include inhibiting the repatriation of refugees and the return of internally displaced persons,

Welcominq the programmes of assistance which exist for demining and humanitarian support for the victims of anti-personnel land-mines,

~ravelv concerned with the suffering and casualties caused to non-combatants as a result of the proliferation, as well as the indiscriminate and irresponsible use, of anti-personnel land-mines,

Recosnizinq that States can move most effectively towards the ultimate goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines as viable and humane alternatives are developed,

Recallins the report of the Secretary-General =/ concerning progress on the initiative in the aforementioned resolution,

Convinced that moratoriums by States exporting anti-personnel land-mines that pose grave dangers to civilian populations are important measures in helping to reduce substantially the human and economic costs resulting from the use of such devices,

Notinq with satisfaction that many States already have declared moratoriums on the export, transfer or sale of anti-personnel land-mines and related devices, with many of these moratoriums being declared as a result of the aforementioned resolution,

Believinq that ongoing efforts to strengthen the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed


to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, a/ particularly Protocol II, a/ are an important part of the overall effort to address problems caused by anti-personnel land-mines,

Recallins with satisfaction its resolution 48/7 of 19 October 1993 calling for assistance in mine clearance,

1. Welcomes the moratoriums already declared by certain States on the export of anti-personnel land-mines;

2. Urses States that have not yet done so to declare such moratoriums at the earliest possible date;

3. Recwests the Secretary-General to prepare a report on steps taken by Member States to implement such moratoriums, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament" ;

4. Em~hasizes the importance of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its Protocols as the authoritative international instrument governing the responsible use of anti-personnel land-mines and related devices;

5. Urses States that have not done so to adhere to the Convention and its Protocols;

6. Encouraqes further international efforts to seek solutions to the problems caused by anti-personnel land-mines, with a view to the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines.

Steu-bv-steu reduction of the nuclear threat

The General Assembly.

Bearinq in mind the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Desirinq to reduce, progressively and systematically, the threat posed by nuclear weapons,

Welcominq the respite from the intense competition in the accumulation of yeapon-grade fissile materials, in the production of nuclear warheads and in the deplopent of nuclear-weapon systems which characterized the cold war,

22/ See The United Nations Disamment Yearbook, vol. 5:1980 (United - Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.4). appendix VII.

23/ Ibid., Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ,of Mines, - Booby Traps and Other Devices.

~/49/699 English Page 36

Mindful that processing of special fissionable material for weapon purposes and production of nuclear warheads continues at a steady Pace in some States, and that many thousands of nuclear-weapon systems remain deployed at the brink of war,

Welcominq also the standing down of some nuclear-weapon systems from full alert and the elimination of certain types of weapons,

Mindful also that the military doctrines regarding the threat of use of nuclear weapons remain unaltered, and that most agreed reductions do not entai1 destruction of the nuclear warheads or delivery vehicles,

Welcominq further the steps taken to increase transparency in armaments and the emerging pattern of closing or converting nuclear-weapon production facilities,

Mindful further of the continuing lack of internationally verified inventories of the nuclear arsenals and that plans for the redirection of nuclear-weapon facilities to the task of dismantlement of the nuclear arsenals are only at an early state of development,

Wishinq to,further current efforts regarding multilateral negotiations and agreements, and conscious of the urgent need for expeditious action for this purpose.

Confident that the Conference on Disarmament can serve as an effective multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, as envisioned at its 1978 special session devoted to disarmament -/ and as evidenced recently by the successful conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, =/

Persuaded that agreement upon a five- to ten-year agenda on nuclear arms control would provide a needed, overall sense of direction to global disarmament efforts,

Convinced that the successful pursuit of such an agenda would significantly advance the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals,

1. Identifies the following general areas for step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat:

Area A. Steps to counter, inter:

(a) The acquisition and processing of special fisaionable material for nuclear-weapon purposes;

24/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 120. - 25/ See s, -

(~/47/27), appendix 1.

/ ,


(b) The manufacture and testing of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles;

(c) The assembly and deployment of nuclear-weapon systems;

by such means as:

(i) Prohibiting the test explosion of nuclear weapons;

(ii) Cutting off the production of special fissile materials for weapon purposes;

(iii) Ending production of nuclear warheads;

(iv) Ending the production and testing of intemediate- and long-range ballistic missiles for nuclear-weapon purposes;

(v) Effective legally binding measures to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(vi) Other related measures;

Area B. Steps to actuate, inter:

(a) The withdrawal £rom deployment and disassembly of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) The secure storage and dismantlement of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles;

(c) The elimination of special fissionable materials for nuclear- weapon purposes;

by such means as:

(i) Standing down nuclear-weapon systems from high-alert status;

(ii) Separating nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles;

(iii) Placing nuclear warheads in secure storage;

Liv) Converting delivery vehicles, where appropriate, to peaceful uses;

(v) Removing special nuclear materials from warheads;

(vi) Converting special nuclear materials to non-weapon purposes;

(vii) Other related measures;


Area C. Steps to prepare, under international auspices:

(a) An inventory of the nuclear arsenals, including:

ii) Al1 special fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles;

(ii) Al1 facilities devoted to the processing, manufacture, assembly and deployment of those items;

(b) A reorientation of those facilities necessary to the task of implementing measures relating to area B;

(c) The closure or conversion to peaceful purposes of al1 other such facilities in furtherance of measures relating to area A;

2. Member States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to consider steps which they might take unilaterally, bilaterally, or in cooperation with other States, to promote progress in the identified areas, and fully to inform the international community of any steps taken in this regard;

3. Recommendq to the Conference on Disarmament that in 1995 it:

(a) Develop £rom the three general areas identified in paragraph 1 of the present resolution a comprehensive set of practical, verifiable measures for possible negotiation in their next five- and ten-year periods;

(b) Determine from that set a year-by-year sequence and combination of negotiations on specific measures to be commenced during the next five- &d ten-year periods, with due regard to steps taken pursuant to paragraph 2;

4. Resuests the Conference on Disarmament to include in its 1995 report to the General Assembly a section on efforts undertaken in accordance with the recommendation set out in paragraph 3;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session an item entitled "Step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat".


Recallinq its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the annex to which contains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Notins the provisions of article X, paragraph 2, of that Treaty, which stipulates the holding of a conference twenty-£ive years after the entry into force of the Treaty, to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods,


Desirous of ensuring the consolidation of the Treaty with a view to achieving ultimately the elimination of nuclear weapons,

of the need for the Treaty to attain universality of membership,

Convinced that the decision on the extension of the Treaty should lead to further progress in nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the preamble and article VI of the Treaty,

Notinq, therefore, the necessity of giving careful consideration to al1 possible options in order to take a decision that is appropriate and capable of strengthening the non-proliferation regime in the pursuit of the ultimate objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons,

Conscious of the fact that there are various interpretations which have been expressed concerning the application of article X, paragraph 2,of the Treaty,

1. Calls upon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to give appropriate consideration to the import of the Treaty in its entirety and with special attention to its article X , paragraph 2;

2. Invites States parties to provide their legal interpretations of article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and their views on the different options and actions available, for compilation by the Secretary-General as a background document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, well before the holding of that Conference.

Assistance to States for curbinq the illicit traffic in small arms and collectinq them


Recallinq its resolutions 46/36 H of 6 December 1991, 47/52 G and 47/52 J of 9 December 1992 and 48/75 A and 48/75 J of 16 Decemher 1993,

Çonsiderinq that the circulation of massive quantities of small arms throughout the world irnpedes development and is a source of increased insecurity,

Considerinq also that the illicit international transfer of small arma and their accumulation in many countries constitutes a threat to the populations and to national and regional security and is a factor contributing to the destabilization of States,

Basinq itself on the statement of the Secretary-General relating to the request of Mali concerning United Nations assistance for the collection of small arms ,


Gravely concerned at the extent of the insecurity and banditry linked to the illicit circulation of small anns in Mali and the other affected States of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion,

Takinq note of the first conclusions of the United Nations Advisory Mission sent to Mali by the Secretary-General to study the best way of curbing the illicit circulation of small arms and ensuring their collection,

Takinq note also of the interest shown by other States of the subregion in receiving the United Nations Advisory Mission,

Notinq the actions taken and those recormnended at the meetings of the States of the subregion held at Banjul, Algiers and Bamako to establish close regional cooperation with a view to strengthening security,

1. Welcomes the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small anns and their collection in the affected States of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion;

2. Also welcomes the action taken by the Secretary-General in implementation of this initiative;

3. Thanks the Government of Mali for the appreciable help which it has given to the United Nations Advisory Mission and welcomes the declared readiness of other States of the subregion to receive the Mission;

4. Conqratulates the Secretary-General on his action within the context of the relevant provisions of resolution 40/151 H of 16 December 1985, and encourages him to continue his efforts to curb the illicit circulation of small anns and to ensure their collection in the affected States which so request, with the support of the United Nations Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity;

5. Invites Member States to implement national control measures in order to check the illicit circulation of small arms, in particular by curbing the illegal export of such anns;

6. Also invites the international community to give appropriate support to the efforts made by the affected countries to suppress the illicit circulation of small anns, whic'h is likely to hampes their development;

7 . Reauesta the Secretary-General to report to it on the question at its fiftieth session.


elimination of nuclear weaDons

The General Assembiy,

pecosnizinq that the end of the cold war has increased the possibility of creating a world free from the fear of nuclear war,

Welcominq the efforts of the Russian Pederation and the United States of America for nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of the two treaties on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START 1 and START II), and looking forward to their early entry into force,

Welcominu also the efforts of other nuclear-weapon States in the field of nuclear disannament,

pttachin m qreat imortance to the contribution which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has made to the peace and security of the world since its entry into force in 1970,

Welcominq the positive developments in the negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty based on the consensus achieved at the forty-eighth session of the General Aesembly.

1. Urqes States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede to it at the earliest possible date, recognizing the importance of the universality of the Treaty;

2 . Calls uuon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue their efforts for nuclear disannament with the ultimate objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons in the framework of generaland complete disarmament, and also calls upon al1 States to fully implement their commitments in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Convenins of the fourth suecial session of the

The ~eneral Assembly,

Recallinq that three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were held in 1978, 1982 and 1988, respectively,

Bearinq in rnind the Final Document of the Tenth Special session of the General Aesembly, -/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, and


the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Welcominq the recent positive changes in the international landscape, characterized by the end of the cold war, the relaxation of tensions at the global leveland the emergence of a new spirit governing relations among nations,

Stressinq the central role of the United Nations for the promotion of disarmament, peace and security,

1. Decides, in principle, to convene, in 1997 if possible, the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the date to be detennined at the fiftieth session;

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session an item entitled "Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" .

Relationshi~ between disarmament and develovment

The General Assemblv,

Recallinq the provisions of the Final Document of'the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly -/ concerning the relationship between disannament and development,

Recallinq also the adoption on 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, -/

Recallinq further its resolution 48/75 A of 16 December 1993,

Bearinq in mind the final documents of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, a/

Stressinq the growing importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development in current international relations,

27/ Ibid. -

28/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8. - 29/ A/47/675-S/24816, annex. -

A/49/699 Snglish Page 43

1. Welcomes th8 report of the Secretary-General 30/ and actions undertaken in accordance with the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development;

2. Reauests the Secretary-General to continue to take action, through appropriate organs and within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference; a /

3. Also reauests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General hsembly at its fiftieth session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

Reauest for an advisorv opinion from the International Court of Justice on the lesalitv of the threat or use of nuclear weapons


Conscious that the continuing existence and development of nuclear weapons pose serious risks to humanity,

Mindful that States have an obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

Recallinq its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 Deceaber 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980, 36/92 1 of 9 December 1981, 45/59 B of 4 December 1990 and 46/37 D of 6 December 1991, in which it declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter and a crime against humanity,

Welcominq the progress made on the prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destniction -/ and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, =/

a / United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8, para. 35.

32/ Resolution 2826 (XXVI)

33/ See s, - Sup~lement No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix 1.


Convinced that the complete eliminationof nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against the threat of nuclear war,

Notins the concerns expressed in the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that

'

insufficient progress had been made towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time,

Recallinq that the General Assembly, convinced of the need to strengthen the rule of law in international relations, has declared the period 1990-1999 the United Nations Decade of International Law, %/

Notinq that Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter empowers the General Assembly to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question,

Recallinq the recommendation of the Secretary-General, made in his report entitled "An Agenda for Peace", %/ that United Nations organs that are authorized to take advantage of the advisory competence of the International Court of Justice turn to the Court more frequently for such opinions,

Welcominq resolution 46/40 of 14 May 1993 of the Assembly of the World Health Organization, in which the organization requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on whether the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations under international law, including the Constitution of the World Health Organization,

Decides, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice urgently to render ita advisory opinion on the following question: "1s the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?".

Bilateral nuclear-arms neqotiations and nuclear disarmament

The ~enerai Assembly,

Recallinq its previous relevant resolutions,

Recoqnizinq the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, which have permitted agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear armaments of the States possessing the largest inventories of such weapons ,

34/ Resolution 44/23. -

35/ A/47/277-S/24111. -


Mindful that it is the responsibility and obligation of al1 States to contribute to the process of the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Stressinq the importance of strengthening international peace and security through disarmament,

hlahasizinq that nuclear disarmament remains one of the principal tasks of our times,

Stressinq that it is the responsibility of al1 States to adopt and implement measures towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

A~~reciatinq a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular the treaty between the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the united States of America on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, o/ and the treaties on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive a m ,

Notinq that there are still significant nuclear arsenals and that the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons, rests with the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the largest stockpiles,

Welcominq the steps that have already been taken by those States to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons £rom a deployed statue, and bilateral agreements on the issue of de-targeting strategic nuclear missiles,

Notinq the new clirnate of relations between the United States of America and the States of the former Soviet Union, whic'h permits them to intensify their cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear weapons,

Notinq also that the Rusaian Federation and the United States of America concurred that, once the Treaty between them on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Anns was ratified, they would proceed to deactivate al1 strategic delivery systeme to be reduced under the Treaty by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from alert statua,

Notins .further the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete ateps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices and both sides to the changed international security situation, including the possibility, after ratification of the Treaty on the Further Reduction and

X/ See A/47/965-S/25944; see Officia1 Records of the Securitv Council, Fortv-eishth Year. SuD~lement for Avril, Mav and June 1993, document S/25944.


Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of further reduction of and limitations on remaining nuclear forces,

Urqinq the further intensification of such efforts to accelerate the implementation of agreements and unilateral decisions relating to nuclear-arma reduction,

Welcominq the reductions maae by other nuclear-weapon States in some of their nuclear-weapon programmes, and encouraging al1 nuclear-weapon States to consider appropriate measures relating to nuclear disarmament,

Affirminq that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament should facilitate and complement each other,

1. Welcomes the actions taken towards the ratification of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on 3 1 July 1991 by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and the protocol to that Treaty signed at Lisbon on 23 May 1992 by the four parties-thereto, and urges the parties to take the necessary steps to ensure its entry into force at the earliest possible date;

2. . Also welcomes the signing of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Purther Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in Moscow on 3 January 1993, and urges the parties to take the steps necessary to bring that Treaty into force at the earliest possible date;

3 . ' Bmressea at the continuing implementation of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, =/ in particular at the completion by the parties of the destruction of al1 their declared missiles subjectto elimination unaer the Treaty;

4 . Encouraues the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Belanis, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to continue their cooperative efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons and etrategic offensive arms on the basis of existing agreements, and welcomes the contributions that other States are making to such cooperation as well;

S . Also encouraues and sumorts the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their efforts to reduce their nuclear armaments and to continue to give those efforts the highest priority in order to contribute to the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons;

6 . Invites the Russian Federation and the United States of America to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in their discussions and in the implementation of their strategic offensive arms agreements and unilateral decisions.


Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms

, , The General Aesembly,

Recallinq its resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1 9 9 1 and its decision 47/419 of 9 December 1992 on international arms transfers. . .

Recallins also its resoïutions 48/75 P and 48/75 H of 1 6 Deceder 1993 on international arms transfers and measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional weapons. respectively,

Realizinq the urgent need to resolve conflicts and to diminishtensions and accelerate efforts towardsgeneral and complete disannament with a view to maintaining regional and international peace and security,

Recwnizinq that the availability of massive quantities of conventional weapons and especially their illicit transfer. often associated with destabilizing activities, are most disturbing and dangerous phenomena, particularly for the interna1 situation of affected States and theviolation of human rights,

, . Stressinq the need for effective national control' meastires on the transfer

of conventional weapons.

Recwnizinq the curbing of the illicit transfer of arma as,an important contribution to the relaxation of tension and peaceful reconciliation grocesses,

Convinced that peace and security are inextricably interlinked with and in some cases imperative for economic development and reconstruction,

1. Invites the Disarmament Commission to:

(a) Expedite its consideration of the agenda item on international arms transfers, with special emphasis on the adverse consequences of the illicit transfer of arms and ammunition;

(b) Study measuree to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms ;

2 . Invites Member States to provide the Secretary-General with relevant information on national control measures on arms transfers with a view to preventing illicit arms transfers, and, in this context, to take immediate, appropriate and effective measures to seek to ensure that illicit transfers of arma are discontinued;

3. Reauests the Secretary-General to:

(a) Seek the views of Member States on effective ways and means of collecting weapons illicitly transferred in interested countries, as well as on

A/49/699 English Page 50 '

in the post-cold-war era arise mainly among States located in the same region or subregion,

that the preservation of a balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments would contribute to peace and stability and should be-a prime objective of conventional arme control,

of promoting agreements to strengthen regional peace and security at the lowest possible level of armamente and militàry forces,

Believinq that militarily significant States, and States with larger military capabilities, have a special responsibility in promoting such agreements for regional security.

Believinq also that one of the principal objectives of conventional arma control should be to prevent the possibility of military attack launched by surprise,

1. Decides to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;

2. Reauests the Conference on Disannament, as a firststep, to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looks fomard to a report of the Conference on this subject;

3. Decidesto include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled "Conventional arma control at the regional and subregional levels" .

The ~eneral Assembly,

Recallinq its previous relevant resolutions,

Recwnizinq the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, which have permitted agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear annaments of the States possessing the largest inventories of such weapons ,

Mindful that it is the responsibility and obligation of al1 States to contribute to the process of the relaxation of international tension and to the etrengthening of international peace and security,

Stressinq the importance of strengthening international peace and security through disannament,

Emhasizinq that nuclear disarmament remains one of the principal tasks of our times,


streèsinq that it is the responsibility of al1 States to adopt and implement measures towards the attainment of general and complete disannament under effective international control,

A~~reciatinq a number of positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular the Treaty between the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on. the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles %/ and the treaties on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arme,

Notinq that there are still significant nuclear arsenals and that the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons, rests with the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the largest stockpiles,

Welcominq the steps that have already been taken by those States to begin the process of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and removing such weapons from a deployed status, and bilateral agreements on the issue of de-targeting strategic nuclear missiles,

Notinq the new climate of relations between the United States of America and the States of the former Soviet Union, which permits them to intensify their cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear weapons,

Notins also that the Russian Federation and the United States of America concurred that, once the Treaty between them on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was ratified, they would proceed to deactivate al1 strategic delivery systems to be reduced under the Treaty by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them £rom alert statue,

Notinq further the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation, including the possibility, after ratification of the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of strategic Offensive Anns, of further reductions of and limitations on remaining nuclear forces,

Vrsins the further intensification of such efforts to accelerate the implementation of agreements and unilateral decisions relating to nuclear-arms reduction,

Welcominq the reduction made by other nuclear-weapon States in some of their nuclear-weapon programmes, and encouraging al1 nuclear-weapon States to consider appropriate measures relating to nuclear disarmament,

=/ The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 12: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.2), appendix VII.


Affirminq that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament should facilitate and complement each other,

1. Welcomes the actions taken towards the ratification of the Treaty between the former union of Soviet Socialist Republice, and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991, and the protocol to that Treaty signed at Lisbon on 23 May 1992 by the parties thereto, inter alia, the trilateral statement by the Presidents of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America signed on 14 January 1994, a/ and urges the parties to take the necessary steps to ensure the Treaty's entry into force at the earliest possible date;

2 . Also welcomes the signing of the Treaty between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in Moscow on 3 January 1993, and urges the parties to take the steps necessary to bring that Treaty into force by the earliest possible date;

3. Emresses its satisfaction at the continuing implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, a/ in particular at the completion by the parties of the destruction of al1 their declared missiles subject to elimination under the Treaty;

4. ~ncouricres the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Beiarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to continue their cooperative efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms on the basis of existing agreements, and welcomes the contributions that other States are making to such cooperation as well;

5 . Welcomes the accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons =/ of Belarus and Kazakhstan as non-nuclear-weapon States and would welcome similar action on the part of Ukraine;

6. Encourases the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their efforts to reduce their nuclear armamente and to continue to give those efforts the highest priority in order to contribute to the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons;

7. Invites the Russian Federation and the United States of America to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in their discussions and in the implementation of their strategic offensive arma agreements and unilateral decisions.

61. The First Committee ale0 recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft decision:

40 / ~/49/66-s/1994/91, annex. -

41/ Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. -


5 4 of vehicles for their delivew in al1 its asoects

The General Assembly, recalling its resolution 48/75 C of 16 December 1993, decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftieth session the item entitled "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in al1 its aspectsn.

United Nations ~149r~v.90 12

- 1 Forty-ninth Session

Thursday. 15 ~ecember 1994. 3 p.m. New York

President: Mr. Essy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The meeting wac called to order ai 3.25 p.m.

Agenda item 14 fcontinued)

Report of the international Atomic Energy Agency

Draft resolution: AI49L.2IRev.2

Amenàments: ~ 1 4 9 n . i ~ m ~ . l and ~149n .22

ThePresident (intnprnofionfrom French): Members will recall that the debate on this item was concluded on Monday. 17 October.

1 cal1 on the repnsentative of Turkey to inûuduce draft resolution Ai49lL.21Rev.2.

Mr. Guven (nirkey): After lengthy discussions the sponsors of draft resolution Al491L.2 have ttied to accommodate tbe concems of some delegations. We have introduced a new paragraph in the preambular pan and extended the mpe of some of the existing paragraphs. In this context 1 would like especially to refer to the t h i i and eleventh preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution as now contained in document Ai49L.2/Rev.2.

In the preambular paragraph we have added new language to underline the nght of those couniries that have concluded relevant safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 10 develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in wnformity with

m c i a l Records

. . . . . (Cate d'Ivoire)

articles 1 and II of the Trcaty. otber relevant articles and witb the object and purposes of the Treary.

By including the eleventh pmmbular paragrapb in the tex1 of the draft resolution before us. the sponsors intended to emphasii the meehanism for consideration of the enlargement of the Board of Governors of the ~g'ency.

The sponsors arc wnvinced that with these ammdmc111S ihe wncems of wmc delegations have baen adequately addressed. ln the same way. by insening 'and other relevant intemationally legally biidiig agreements" in the fourth and firth lia of the third preambular paragraph. the sponsors accommodated the c o n c m of some countries that an parties to regional treaties c&g nuclear-weapon-fm mues - that is to Say, the Tmty of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga. to which IAEA safeguards apply.

It is the wish of the sponsors that the draft resolution be adopted hy wnsaisus.

The Pmldent (interpretaiion from French): I cal1 next on the repnsentative of Iraq, to introduce proposed amendments to draft molution A/49/L.2/Rev.2. conrained in document Ai491L.22.

Mr. Hasan (Iraq) (interprcfan'on from Arobic): Before introducing the pmposed amendments to draft resolution Ai49lL.21Rev.2. contained in document Ai49L.22. my delegation wishes to express its great

QA5767L IF1 -. 'This record contabu lhe original art of rpccches delivcrcd in English d intcrprrations of speeches deliveml in the other luigiuges. Comtions should k wibmiacd IO original spcches oniy. Thcy

- ~ - shodd be inwipomicd in a wpy of the m r d Md k seni d e r sigranin of i mcmkr of the delegation wncemed. wühu one nwNh of the d m of Lc m&g. IO the Chief of the Verbah Rcponing Section. Rwm C-178. Comtions will k issucd aftcr ihe end of the wuion in a conrolidared comigcndum. When the rrailt of a mrded andlor mllczll vote is follawcd by an asicrisk. wt m e x IO the mrd. ..

General Assembly Fortv-ninth session

appreciation for the mle of the lntektional Atomic Energy Agency (iAEA) in the quest for a world ftee of nuclear weapons and for widespread peaceful use of nuclear energy. P r o c d i g from this understandimg of the Agency's role. my wunuy has smngly opposed attempts at politicizing the IAEA and using it as wver for actions that serve the political intetests of this or that State.

In document Al49lL.22, my delegation proposes two amendments to draft resolution Al49lL.21Rev.2. The fmt relates to the eighth preambuiar paragraph, which c ~ m n t l y reads as follows:

Spoke in English.

"Noting h m the Director General's statement that the Agency is now in a position to implement its ongoing monitoring and verification plan in Iraq". (A/49L.ZDZev.Z, eighth preambuhr para.)

That paragraph is intentionally vague. To which suement of the Director Generai does the paragraph refer, and when was it made? Fuibermore, the word 'now" in this paragraph is also intentionaily ambipous. The fact is that the D i t o r General stated in paragraph 49 of his sixth report to the Sefurity Council. ~ansmitted to the Couricil on 10 October 1994. that

'with the establishment at the end of August of the iAEA wntinuous presence in Iraq. al1 elements of the IAEA Plan are now in place". (S/1994/1151, anna, para. 49)

Thus. my delegation proposes replacing the eighth preamhular paragraph with the following factual paragraph:

'Noting h m the report of the Diwtor General to the Security Council dated 6 October 1994 [(S11994/1151, annex)] that al1 elements of the Agency's ongoing monitoring plans in üaq have been in place since the end of August 1994". (A/49&.22, para. 1)

This amendment represenis a just and fair reference to the Director General's report:

ïhe second amendment we are pmposing relates to the end of operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, which nimntly reads as follows:

' . . . siresses the need for Iraq to cooperate Mly with the Agency in achiwing the wmplete and long-tenu

90th meeting 15 Decemher 1994

.implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions" . (A/49L.2/Rev.Z, para. 7)

This wordiing does not reflect the facts. The report of the D i o r General to the Security Council. transmitted on 10 October 1994, States that

"The ensuing series of high-level technical talks marked a huning-point in the level of cooperation and support extended by the Iraqi authorities to IAEA and the Special Commission. This change in the Iraqi attitude has enabled inspectors' work to be wnducted effecîively and has wntributed significantly to expeditkg the process of establishing ongoing monitoring and verification, as called for in thé a t y ~ouncil resolutions" . (S/1994/1151. anna, para. 4)

in the light of this cleax statement about lraqi cooperation. o u delegation suggests replacing the words 'the need for Iraq to wbperate fully" with the words 'the need for Iraq to continue its cooperation" (A/49L.22. para. 2).

Spoke in Arabic.

These amendments do not reflect Iraq's views; they reflect those of the IAEA. They make the text less ambipous and more realistic. We therefore hope that al1 delegations will view our proposed amendments favoutably.

The Resident (interpretarion from French): The Assembly will now tale action on draft resolution Al49L.2/Rev.2 and on the amendments proposad in document Al49lL.22.

The following wuntries have become sponsors of drafi resolution Af491L.21Rev.2: Lithuania and South Africa.

Before callig on the first speaker in explanation of vote hefore the vote. 1 would remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited IO 10 minutes and that delegations should make their statements from their seats.

Mr. Pak (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea believes that there are no legal grounds whatsoever for the inclusion of serious political issues such as the nuclear issue in draft resolution AI49fL.2iRev.2 on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an

General Assembly Forty-ninth session

agency that spec ia l i i in science and technology. We therefore reiterate our stmng demand for the unconditional deletion of those paragraphs relating to the nuclear issue.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has stated its position time and again: that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula should be resolved bilateraily by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. Paitidarly, it ha . long opposed wnsideration of the nuclear issue by the General Assembly or the Security Council, and has categorically rejected al1 unreasonable resolutions regarding this issue.

Previous consideration of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula al the United Nations pmved to be of no help to the resolution of the issue. Rather. it was misused hy insidious elements in theu anempts to block a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue, with the sole intention of increasing pressure upon us and aggravating tensions on the Korean pcninsula to the extreme.

Ail these facts have clearly shown that the nuclear issue on the K o m peninsula can be resolved only through the talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America. not at the United Nations. It is well known that the delegations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. at the Geneva talks held from 23 September to 21 October 1994, M m e d the DPRK-USA joint statement of l l lune 1993 and signed the agreed framework on the final resolution of the nuclear issue.

It is legally stipulated in the framework agned between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States that the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is one to be resolved between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States and that those two couutries are responsible for it.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States are holdiig expert-level talks on implementation of the agreed framework, having already taken some measures to implement what is envisaged therein.

There is no justification whatsoever for the adoption of a draft resolution aimed at puning pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at a time when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States are undenaking practical measures to implement the a'greed framework.

8 * !, ;.,:. .:,,* .S.., '. ,, ,:...:!.7,;

90th meeting 15 December 1994

If the United Nations, which ha . an obligation to help to senire negotiated settlements to disputes. ignores this agreed framework and adopts a draft resolution whose purpose is to put pressun on a party to the dialogue. it will only impede the implementation of that agreed framework. This will amount to wanton violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and of international law and practice.

If thc sponsors of the draft resolution want a fair solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula they will not hlock but. rather, will facilitate implementation of the framework agreed between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States.

For those reasons the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will vote against the ninth preambular paragraph and paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/49/L.2iRev.2. which was introduced by Turkey.

Mr. Kumar (India): India has been a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since the inception of that body in 1957. We have wnsistently attached the highest importance to the objectives of the IAEA. and we are active participants in its activities. Since this drafi resolution concerns the activities of the IAEA as a whole - somethiig to which we attach great value - we are inclined to go dong with it. However, we have considerable difftculty with the thid preambular paragraph.

The draft resolution on the IAEA is a traditional one. The language of the third preambular paragraph of draft resolution Al491L.2iRev. 2 implies a link between adherence to the Treaty' on the Non-holiferation of Nuclear Weapons (NP') and freedom to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaeeful purposes. In this regard. it is pertinent to point out that Article II of the IAEA's stanite. referring to the Agency's objectives, States explicitly that it

"shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace. health and pmsperiiy thmughout the world".

Article 11 wntinues:

'It shall ensure, so far as it is able. that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purposes."

General Assembly Fom-ninth session


The purpose of article II of the IAEA's StaNte is obviously to encourage access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, without any discrimination whatsoever.

By implying that adherence to the non-pmliferation Treaty - a maner on which my Government's views are wcll known - has a bearing on access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the drait resolution gws beyond the scope of the iAEA statute. We are therefore constrained to cal1 for a vote on the third preambular paragraph.

MI. Leahy (United States of America): It is the position of my delegation that the amendments that have been submitted in document Ai49lL.22 are not accurate. A rcview of the entire report h m which they are & a m reveals.instances in which the International Atomic Encrgy Agency (IAEA) determined that Iraqi officiais either had been less than fonhcoming or had attempted to conceal faets.

The United States applauds the diligence and determination of the IAEA in its pursuit of facts in Iraq. but we camot support amendments to this draft resolution that, taken out of the context in which they were originally presented, distort the degr& of Iraqi woperation with IAEA ipspecton.

In our view, the language regardiig Iraq is seriously deficient. 1t would be fax more appropriate for this draft resolution IO cal1 upon the Governent of Lraq to 'improve its cooperation" witb international inspectors.

The President (inierpretaiion Rom French): The Assembly will now take action on drah resolution Ai49L.2iRev.2 and on the amendments contained in documents Ai49L. 15iRev.l and N49lL.22.

In accordance with d e 90 of the niles of proecdure. the amendments will be voted on first. Rule 90 also stipulates:

"When two or more amendments are moved to a proposal. theCeneral Assembly shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposai and then on the amendment next funhest removed therefrom. and so on until al1 the amendments have been put to the vote."

The Assembly will therefore take a decision first on the amendment circulated in document Ai49lL. l5IRev. 1.

1 d l on the repnsentative of Germany, who wishes to raise a point of order.

MI. Rudolph (Germany): 1 should like, on behalf of the European Union and its acccding States - Ausuia. F i a n d and Sweden - and the other sponsors of draft resolution N491L.2iRev.2, to raise a point of order in co~ec t ion with the amendment contained in document Ai49lL. lSiRev.1, which was submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On behalf of the Eumpean Union and its acceding States and the other sponsors, 1 fomiaily move. under the terms of d e 74 of the General Assembly's niles of procedure. that no action be taken on that amenciment.

1 should also l i e to request a recorded vote.

The amendment contained in document A/49/L. 15iRev. 1 raises an issue that is not relevant to the General Assembly's anaual resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The new operative paragraph pmposed in the amendment goes beyond IAEA issues to the question of expori licensing, for which the iAEA has no mandate. Export lieensing arrangements derive hom obligations under anicles 1. II and III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Wcapons. They are not withii the pwiew of the IAEA and are not relevant IO this rirafi resolution.

'Ibe language of the proposed amendment emphuizes the rights of recipient States without reference to the supplier States' comspondiig duty to ascenain whether the potential recipient State is adhering to non- prolifcration obligations. The proposed amendment sbeh to undermine the bmad international recognition amrded to the work of the IAEA each year by the Gtneral Assembly. This serves neither the IAEA nor the international community. whose secwity interests are well served h u g h the IAEA's safeguvds system. We should also l i e to highlight the significant work perfomed by the iAEA in the framework of its technical cooperation programme to pmmote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Such highly divisive language as that wntained in N49lL. 15iRev. 1, far from beiig helpful in this regard, would severely jeopardize the IAEA's role in effectuating the uansfer of nuclcar techniques for peaccful purposes. in this conneaion. we should like to emphasize that the sponson have made every effort to accommodate

.-.-i.:. . . . . ,

ûeneral Assembly Forty-ninth session

wncems about this point in the text of the dralt resolution.

At a time when the central element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is heiig asked by the international wmmunity to penorm new and expanding tasks, it would be partimlarly unforninate if the General Assembly were not to adopt the annual IAEA dralt resolution with the customary support. We therefore hope that the pmposed amendment wntained in doniment A!49lL.l5lRev.l will be njected.

The F'resident (inierprelmion from French): Wiihin the terms of d e ' 7 4 of the mles of procedure, the representative of Germany has proposed that no action be taken on the amendment wntaincd in doniment Al49lL. 15lRev. 1. Rule 74 Mds as follows:

'During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjoununent of the debate on the item under discussion. In addition to the proposer of the motion. two representatives may speak in favour of. and two agaiast. the motion, alter which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote."

1 shall now cal1 on the two representatives who have asked to speak in favour of the motion.

Mr. Keating (New Zealand): The annual draf~ rewlution on this agenda item has traditionally been uncontroversial. It has b e n an opponunity to recognize and express suppon for the important and valuable work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Up until very recently this annual draft resolution was wnsistently adopted by wusensus. L a t year it was adopted with the near unanimous support of the General Assembly . Sponsors last year, like those this year. were drawn from every continent. and only one delegation opposed the draft molution.

This year a number of amendments were proposed by various delegations. The sponsors have worked hard to include in the drafî resoluiion those amendments which w d d reasonably be related to the work of the Agency. The sponsors have sought to put together a dralt resolution which could wmmand broad suppon from the international community .

Some amendments, however. wuld no1 be inwprated into the text. In this regard. my delegation believes that the amendment proposed in document AI49lL. 15/Rev. l should not be included. We believe it

90th meeting 15 Dccember 1994

introduces a divisive politicai element into a resolution which shodd be seen as a consensus expression of suppon for the IAEA.

The proposed amendment in document AI49lL. 15lRev. 1 seeks to assert a right of westricted aeccss to nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technologicai information. While it refers to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. the amendment does not take into account the specific provisions of the Treaty. This omission speaks volumes.

Let us remember that anicle 1 of the Tmty obliges nuclear-weapon States to ensure that any nuclear technology thcy provide is not used dinctly or indirectly for prolifcration purposes. Sccondly. article II obliges non-nuclear-weapon States not to manufachue or otherwise acquin nuclear weapons. And, thirdly, article III obliges recipient States to a ~ c e p t IAEA safeguards. This anicle explicitly rejects any suggestion that tradc in nuclear technology can be ~ u i c t e d . So. 100, does anicle IV, which the amendment now before us quots h m seltxtively and inmmpletely.

In the text submined by the sponsors. the issue of technical woperation and access to nuclear technology without discrimination is already dealt with. The third preambular paragraph of the draft molution in document Al49IL.2lRev.2 reflects in an appropriately b a l a n d fashion any legitimaie concems on this issue. Most importantly. the sponsors' preambular paragrapb does what the amendment fails to do: it refers explicitly to articles 1 and II and other relevant articles of the Non- Roliferation Treaty.

The sponsors of this dralt resolution have twice offered compromise language to specifically address the issues raised in the text of document AI491L.15lRev 1. Despite the sponsors' best efforts at compromise. we are still faced with essentially the same amendment. Therefon we can only conclude that the amendment containcd in document AI49IL. 15IRev. 1 is not aEceprable.

This is a critical period for nuclear non-proliferation. For this m o n , we believe it is very important that the work of the IAEA enjoy the full confidence of the General Assembly. The Agency is playing a vital monitoring mle around the world. Il is increasingly heiig asked to perform more and more cnicially Unportant tasks. Al1 of us therefore have a common intenst in supponing the Agency's work.

General Assembly Foq-ninth session

Consequently, we urge delegations to support this no-action motion. By voting in favour. the General Assembly will collectively be afifming that peacefui nuclear cooperation should wnthue in a safe and responsible manner.

Mr. Tuma (Czech Republic): As one of the sponsors of the draft resolution (A1491L.ZIRev.2) on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1 wish to speak in favour of the no-action motion in respect of the pmposed amendment to the draft resolution, which was submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran and is wntained in document AI49IL. 15IRev. 1.

We have agreed to speak in support of this no-action motion because of the seriousness with which we view the amendment wntained in document A/49/L.15/Rev.l. My delegation considers that this amendment m s wunter to the purpose and objective of this euentially procedural d d t resolution. which serves as an important endorsement of the work of the IAEA by the Gencral Assembly.

The sponsors have made wnsiderable efforts to take account of the issues which are the subject of the amendment submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution the reference to the importance of access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by al1 States which have wncluded safeguards agreements with the Agency has b e n included in recognition of the importance many developing wuntries attach to it. We regret that we have had to conclude <bat the language pmposed by Iran in A1491L. 15IRev. 1 is an unacseptable deviation from language a g d by 168 wuntries in treaty fom.

In the same spirit of woperation the sponsors have added a new preambular paragraph that refers to the resolution on the amendment of article VI of the statute of the Agency adopted by its General Conference in September of this year. My delegation is aware that this is a matter that is of wncern to many countries. and we therefore believed it was appropriate to refer to it in the drah resolution. In so doing, my delegation believes that the sponsors have responded to the original second amendment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner which does not encroach upon the authority and responsibility of the Agency.

In wnclusion, the Czech Republic attaches great importance to the adoption of the draft resolution with the bmadest possible support. It is vital that the work of the Agency, which has played an indispensable role in the


nuclear-pmliferation regime, receive the support and encouragement of the Gtneral Assembly . 1 therefore wish to ask for the suppon of delegations for this no-action motion.

The R a i d e n t (interpretation m m French): We have just heard two speakers in favour of the motion submined by Germany. Does any other member wish to speak?

MI. Takht-Ravanehl (Islamic Republic of Iran): First, 1 would like to emphasize the fact that the wmments made by the representatives of G e m y and New Zeaiand am irrelevant to this subject because they addressed the contents of our original amendment in Ai49lL.15, which is no longer before the Assembly. This is perhaps due to the fact that my delegation has not been given a chance Io i n t d u c e the revised version of OUI

amendment. wntained in doniment Al49lL. 15IRev. 1.

The delegation of the lslamic Republic of Iran rejets the motion of non-action moved by the representative of G e m y on the amendment contained in document A/49/L.lSIRev. 1 for the following reasons:

The Islamic Republic of Iran. as a wmmined Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), f i d y believes that the rights of developing wuniries Parties to the NPT and IAEA to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes am denied by cenain developcd wuntries that, in violation of their obligations under the relevant legal instruments, are determined to perpeNafe discrimination in intemational relations through the proliferation of exporteontrol measutes, closeddoor clubs and ad hoc regimes such as the London Suppliers and Australia Gmup.

The draft resolution in document Al49lL.2 and its revised version. L.2.Rev.2, despite some wsmetic changes, fails to raopnÙc explicitly and reaffirm the rights of States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Tredy and IAEA to use nuclcar energy for peaceful purposes. The first paragraph of our original amendment in document L. 15. dated 8 November 1994, was taken h m the substantive paper submitted by the group of non- aligned and other States to the Third Preparatory Committee of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, document NPTICONF.1995/TC.3/13. of 14 September 1994. It was nothiig but a d i m a t i o n of the rights of States Parties under article IV of the NPT and a cd1 for the

General Assembly Fonv-ninth session


removal of discriminatory restrictions tbai affect the inalienable nghts of Parties under that article.

The second paragraph of the original amendment called for an early decision on the expansion of the Board of Govemon of the IAEA. which was dictated by such new realities as the increasing disparity between the overall membership of the Agency compared to the current composition of the Board of Govemors, which was establisbed more than 30 years ago.

The sponsors of the draii resolution refrained h m negotiations on our amendment until 8 December 1994, wben they approached the Chaimiao of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to work on a compmmim language. Subsequently, a small group of the Movement of Non- Aligned Countries and a small gmup of sponsors met on 8 and 9 Decemberand negotiated and agreed, ad r@erendum, on Iwo compromise operative paragraphs which would q l a c c out original amendment, namely, L.15. Unfottunately, the subsequent response of the sponsors to the compromise formulations was negative. and they reneged on the agreement and dsided not to continue the negotiations. Therefore, one cannot but doubt Ihe sincerity of Ihe move made on 8 December to work on a compromise language.

In light of the foregoing. my dele~ation. after consultations with some of the members of the Non- Aligned Movement, decided to submit a revised version of L.15 based on the compromise language negotiatod between a small group of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and a small group of the sponsors on Friday. 9 ~ e c e k b e r 1994. Moreover. we decided not to insist on the second compromise language on the expansion of ihe Board of Govemors for the time being, in order to enhance the chance of a smooth adoption of the draft resolution. The amendment wntained in A./49/L.15iRev.l is consistent with anicle IV of the Non-hliferation Tmiy and the t h t of the draft rrsolution. We do ncommmd to Member States, in panicular the developing countries, to support this amendment in its entirety and to reject the motion of non-action by casting a negative vote on it.

The Presldent (interpretationfrom French): 1 should simply like to note that the amendment in AI49IL. 15IRev. 1 was not introduced because there was no request to do so. unlike the case of Al49lL.22, intrcduced by Iraq.

Does any other delegation wish to speak against the motion?

S i c e that is not the case. 1 shall now put to the vote the motion submitted by the r epmta t ive of Gtrmany tbai no action be taken on the amendment contained in ~ 1 4 9 n . 15iRev. 1.

A m r d e d vote has bœn requested on the motion.

A rewrdeà wte wos takm.

In fawur: Albania, Andorra. Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia. Ausualia, Austria. Bahamas, Barbados, Belanis. Belgium. Belize. Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada. Chie. Costa Rica, CBte d'Ivoire, Cmatia, Czah Republic, Denmark. Dorninica, El Salvador, Eritrea. Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland. France, Gabon, Gambia. Germany, Grcece. Grenada. Guatemala, Guinca, ~ b ~ a n a . Haiti, Honduras. Hungary, Iceland. Ireland. Is~ael, Italy, Jamaica. Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait. Laivia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg. Maldives, Malta. Marshall Islands, Micmnesia (Fedcrated States of). Monaco, M o m . Nuherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Nonvay. Papua New Guinea, Paraguay. Poland, Pottugal, Republic of Kom. Republic of Moldova, Romania,

. . Russian Federation, Saint Kim and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint V i n t and the Grenadii . Samoa, San Marino. Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sigapore, Slovakia. Slovcnia. Solomon Islands. South Africa. Spain, Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden, Thailand, The Fortmx Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago. Turkey. Ukraine. United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Notthem Ireland, United S a e s of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan. Vanuatu. Zambii

Againsr: Colombia, Cuba. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador. Egypt. Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Lebanon. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Syrian Arab Republic, Ugaoda, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yemen. Zimbabwe

Absraining: Afghanistan, Botswana. Br&. Brunei Darussalam. Cameroon, Georgia, Ghana. india, Kyrgyzstan. Lesotho. Mali, Mauritius. Myanmar. Namibia, Nepal. ~ i g e r . Nigeria. Pakistan. Panama. Pen, Phüippines. Scnegal. Sri Lanka, Tunisia. Venemela

General Aswmbly Fony-ninth session

The motion was &ptd by 103 votes to 17, with 25 abstentions.

The Resident (interpretaîionfrom French): Since the motion for no action is adopted. no action will be taken on the amendment contained in document AI49JL. 15Aiev. 1 .

The Aswrnbly will next proceed to take a defision on the amenciments wntained in doniment Al49lL.22.

A separate vote has km requested on each mepiment. As 1 hear no objection, 1 shall put each amendment to the vote.

1 first put to the vote the amendment wntaincd in paragraph 1 of document Al49lL.22.

A m r d e d vote has km requested.

A recorded wte was taken.

In favour: Algeria. Brazil. C h i . Cuba. Ecuador. France. Gabon, Guyana. Indonesia, üaq, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia. Mali, Mauritania, Mexiw. Monaco. Myanmar, Oman, Qatar. Russian Federation, Singapore. Spain, Sri Lanka, Tajüristan. Thailand, Tunisia. Turkey, Viet Nam. Yemen. Zimbabwe

Against: Antigua and Barbuda. Belize, Dominica. Grenada, Guinea, Honduras. Israel, Kuwait. Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micmnesia (Federated States of). Netherlands. Nicaragua. Pem, Republic of Moldova, Saint Kitts and Nevis. Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenaiines, Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa. Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago. United Arab Emirates. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United S w of America, Umguay. Uzbekistan. Vanuatu. Venezuela. Zambia

Abstoining: Afghanisian. Albania, Andorra. Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria. Bahamas. Barbados. Belanis. Belgium, &nin. Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana. Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria. Cambodia, Camemon. Canada, Central African Republic, Chile. Colombia. Comoms, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire. Cmatia, Czech Republic. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark. El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia. Ethiopia. F iand .

90th meeting 15 Dccember 1994

Gambia, Gtorgia. Germany . Ghana, Greece, Guatemala. Haiti. Hungary. Iceland. india. Ireland. Italy, lamaica, Japan. Kazakhstan. Kenya. Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nwbia , Nepal, New Zealand, Niger. Nigeria, Nonvay. Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea. Panguay, Philippines, Poland, Pomgal, Republic of Korea. Romania, Samoa, San Mhno. Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Sweden. The Fomer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo. Ugai~da, Ukraine. United Republic of Tanzania

m e amendment was rejecfd by 32 wtes to 31. with 87 abstentions.

Tùe M d e n t (intepreîation fmm French): 1 will next put to the vote the amendment wntained in paragraph 2 of document A149lL.22.

A mrdeà vote has been nquested.

A recorded wte was taken.

In favour: Algeria. Botswana. Brazil. China. Colombia. Comoms. Cuba. Ecuador. France. Gabon, Honduras. Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali. Mauritania. Mexiw. Monaco, Myanmar. Niger, Oman. Pakisian, Qatar, Russian Federation. Spain. Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tunisia. Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania. Viet Nam. Yemen. Zimbabwe

Againsr: Antigua and Barbuda. Bahamas, Barbados. Belize, Canada, Dominica, Grenada. Guinea, Israel, Japan. Kuwait, Maldives. Manhall Islands, Micronesia (FederatedStates of), Nethcrlands, Nicaragua, Pem. Saint Kins and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadiies, Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa. Suriname. Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago. United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Zambia

Abstaining: Afghanistan. Albania. Andom, Argentina, Armenia, Australia. Austria, Belams, Belgium, Benin. Bhutan. Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam,



Bulgaria, Carnbodia. Cameroon. Central Afncan Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark. El Salvador, Eritrea. Estonia. Ethiopia, Fiji. F i a n d , Gambia, Georgia. Germany. Ghana. Greece. Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland. Lndia. Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein. Lithuania. Luxembourg. Malta. Mauritius. Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Notway. Panama, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Philippines, Poland, Portugal. Republic of Korea. Republic of Moldova, Romania. Samoa. San Marino. Singapore. Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Sweden, Thailand. The Former Yugoslav Republic of MaCedonia. Togo, Uganda. Ukraine, Umguay. Uzbekistan. Vanuatu, Venezuela

The amendment was adopted by 37 votes to 31. with 84 absfenrions.

The President (inretpretarion from French): A separate vote has been requested on operative paragraph 7, just amended. of draft resolution A149lL.21Rev.2.

A separate vote bas also been requested on the third and ninth preambular paragraphs and on operative paragraph 6 of drafi resolution Al49lL.21Rev.2.

As there appears to be no objection. 1 shall put those paragraphs to the vote first.

1 shall put to the vote first the third preambular paragraph of drafi resolution A/49/L.2/Rev.2.

A recorded vote has b e n requested

A recorded vote was raken

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra. Antigua and Barbuda, Argentins, Armenia, Australia. Austria, Bahamas. Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados. Belanis. Belgium, Belize. Benin. Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Danissalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon. Canada. Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia. Cornoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cypms. Czech Republic. Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland. France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana. Greece, Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana. Haiti,

Honduras, Hungary. Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica. Japan, Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgytstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia. Maldives. Mali, Malta. Marshall Islands. Mauritania. Mauritius, Mexiw. Micmnesia (Federated States 00, Monaw. Mongolia, Morocco. Myanmar, Namibia. Nepal. Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria. Norway. Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Pem, Philippines, Poland. Porîugal. Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova. Romania. Russian Federation. Saint Kits and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Samoa, San Marino. Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore. Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname. Swaziland, Sweden. Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Madon ia , Togo, Tnnidad and Tobago. Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine. United Arab Emirates. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhern Ireland. United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Umguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia. Zimbabwe

Absraining: Algena, Cuba. Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Pakistan

The third preambular paragraph was adopted by 154 votes ro 2. with 4 abstenrions.

The President (inrctprerarian from French): 1 next put to the vote the niIIth preambular paragraph of draft resolution Al49lL.21Rev.2.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan. Albania. Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia. Australia, Austria. Bahamas, Bahrain; Barbados, Belanis, Belgium, Belize. Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana. Brazil. B m e i Dmssalam, Bulgaria, Canada. Central

GeEeral Assembly ~onv-&th session

901h meeting 15 December 1994

. African Republic, Chile. Colombia. Comoros, Costa Rica. Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia. Cypm, Czech Republic, Dtnmark. Djibouti, Dominica. Eniador, El Salvador. Eritrea. Estonia. Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon. Gambia. Georgia; Germany, Grecce. Grenada, Guatemala. Guinca, Guyana. Honduras. Hungary. Iceland, Indonesia. ireland. Israel, Italy, Jamaica. Japan. Kazakhstan. Kenya, Kuwait. Kyrgywtan. Latvia, Lesotho. Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives. Malta, Marshall Islands. Mauritius, Mexiw. Micronesia (Federated States of). Monaco, Mongolia. Moroeui. Myanmar. Namibia, Nepal. Netherlands, New Zealand. Nicaragua, Niger; Nigeria, Nonvay. Oman, Panama. Papua New Guinea, Paraguay. Peru, Philippines. Poland, Portugal. Qatar. Republic of Korea. Republic of Moldova, Romania. Russian Federation. Saint Kilts and Nevis, Saint. Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadi i , Samoa, San Marino. Saudi Arabia, Scncgal, Sierra Leone. Sigapore, Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa. Spain, Sn Lanka. Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailaad. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey. Turluuenistan, Ukraine. United Arab Emirates. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhem ireland, United States of America. Uruguay. Uzbckistan. Vanuatu. Venezuela. Yemen. ZPmbia

Against: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Abstaining: Aigeria. Bangladesh, Camemon. Chi, Cuba, Ghana. India. Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mali. Pakistan. Uganda, United Republicof Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe

The ninth preatnbuiarparagraph war aàopteà by 137 wtcs IO 2. with 14 abstentions.

The F'resident (interprctm'onfrom French): 1 now put to the vote operative paragraph 6 of drafi rcsolution Ai49iL.2lRev.2.

A m r d e d vote has b&n requested.

A recordcd vote wac taken.

In fawur: Afghanistan. Aibania. Andom, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia,. Ausualia. Austria, Bahamas. Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus. Belgium, Belize, Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Braul, Brunei Danissalam, Bulgaria. Camemon, Canada, Chile. Colombia. Comoros, Costa Rica. CBte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cypnis. Czech Republic. Denmark. Djibouti. Dominica. Ecuador. Egypt, El Salvador. Eritrea. Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland. France. Gabon, Gambia. Georgia. Germany. G m , Grenada, Guatemala. Guinca, Guyana. Honduras. Hungary,. Iceland. Indonesia. Ireland. Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan. Jordan. Kazakhstan. Kenya, Kuwait. Kyrgywtan, W i a . Lesotho, Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia. Maldives. Mali. Malta. Marshall Islands, Mauritius. Mexiw. Micronesia (Federated Stats of), Monaco. Mongolia, Moroeui, Myanmar. Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands. New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger. Nigeria. Nonvay, Oman, Panama, Papiia New Guinea. Paraguay. Peru. Philippines, Poland. Portugal, Qatar. Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova. Romania. Russian Federation, Saint Kins and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Samoa. San Marino. Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Sierra Leone. Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia. Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sn Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan. Thailand. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine. United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhem Ireland. United States of Amcrica. Umguay. Uzbekistan. Vanuatu. Veiemela. Yemen. Zambia, Zimbabwe

Againrr: Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Abstaining: Algeria. Chi, Cuba, Ghana, India. Lao People's Demkratic Republic. Pakistan, Uganda. United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam

Operative paragmph 6 wac adoptad by 142 wtcs IO

2. with I O abstentions.

The Resident (interpretation from French): 1 now put to the vote operative paragraph 7, as amended, of draîi resolution A/49/L.2/Rev.2.

General Assembly Foh-ninth session

90th meeting 15 ~esember 1994

A recorded vote has been requested. . . . .

A recordcdwte wm taken. . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . .

. . ln fawur: Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Bahrain. Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana. Brazil, Brunei Damsalam. Cambodia. Camemn, Colombia. Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cypms, Dominica. Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, ' France, Gabon, Gambia. Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia. Iraq. Jordan, Kenya, 'Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco. Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama. Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation. Saudi Arabia. Sierra Leone. South Afnca, Spain, Sri Lanka. Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu. Yemen. Zambia

Against: Antigua and Barbuda

Abstaining: Albania. Andorra. Argentina. Australia. Bahamas. Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan. Bulgaria, Canada. Chile. Croatia. Cuba, Czech Republic. Denmark, Eritrea. Estonia. Ethiopia, F i a n d . Georgia. Germany. Ghana, Greece. Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti. Hungary, Iceland, india. Ireland. Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan. Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia. Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands. Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Namibia, Nepal, Nethedands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nonvay, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova. Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Singapore. Slovakia, Slovenia. Solomon Islands. Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden. Thailand. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhern Ireland, United States of America. Uruguay, Uzbekistan. Venezuela. Zimbabwe

Operaiive paragraph 7. m amended, wm ndopted by 63 votes to 1, with 84 abstentions.

The President (interprefmion fiom French): 1 now put to the vote drafî resolution A/49/L.42iRev:2 as a whole. as amended. . . . , . . .

. . . . A ncorded vote has been requested. , . .

. . . A recorded vote wm taken.

ln fawur: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria. Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia, Australia. Austria. Bahamas, Bahrain. Bangladesh, Barbados, Belms, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, .Burundi, Cambodia. Camerwn. Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile. Colombia, Comoros, Congo. Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire. Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic. Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt. El Salvador. Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji. Finland, France. Gabon, Gambia, Georgia. Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea. Guyana. Haiti. Honduras. Hungary, Iceland, india, indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel. Italy, Jamaica. Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan. Latvia. Lebanon. Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar. Malaysia, Maldives, Mali. Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico. Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco. Mongolia. Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia, Nepal. Netherlands, NewZealand. Niwagua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman. Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea. Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation. Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal. Sierra Leone. Singapore, Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa. Spain. Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey. Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates. United Kingdom of Great Bntain and Northern Ireland. United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen. Zambia. Zimbabwe

Against: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

. General Assembly Fony-ninth session

Abstainin8: . C h i . Cuba. Ghana, Iran (lslamic Republic of). Lao

. People's Democratic Republic. Viet Nam

Dr@ resolution A/49L.2LRev.2, as a whok. ar amendai, was adopteà by 161 wtcr to 1, wiih 6 abstentions (molution 49/65).

Tite m i d e n t (inferpretaiion from French): Several representatives wish to s@ in explanation of vote. May 1 remind delegations that explanaiions of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from theu seafs.

Mr. Leahy (United Statesof America): My delegation was pleased to join others in support of this molution, which r e c o p k s the importaot work of the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The diverse programmes of the IAEA serve the intemts of the international mmmunity in many ways. Countless individuai lives on al1 continents benefit from IAEA-supported programmes such as nuclear medicine, agriculture, animal husbaudty and p s t wntrol. The safety with which nuclear materials and technology are managed worldwide is cnhanced daily by ïAEA-sponsored vaining and guidelines. International secwity is reinforced through the ongoing application of lAEA safeguards.

The United States is proud of its long and well- estahlished record of svong support for the IAEA, and 1 should like to reiterate my Govemment's wmmitment to wntinuing thii support. We look forward to workhg with others to suengthen funher the work and role of this vital international institution.

Mr. Wu Chengjiang (China) (inierpretation from Chinese): The Chinese delegation abstained on &aft resolution A/49/L.21Rev.2. on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). in that co~ect ion , 1 wish to state the following. .

Fit. our abstention on the draft molution does not affect the Chinese delegation's view of the work of the IAEA. in out statement in the general debate on ihis item on 17 Cktober lasi. we gave a wmprehensive and positive appraisal of the work of the IAEA over the past y=.

Secondly. as regards the individuai resolutions refemd to in the resolution adopted by the Agency's Board of Governors ai the General Conference. the Chinese delegation rserves its views as expresscd in the relevant forums.

, 90th meeting , 15 December 1994

M y . the Chinese delegation believes that the General Assembly resolution on the Agency's annual report should not enter into the specifics of the work of the Agency, espeçially on issues as conmversiai as the Korcan nuclear question. This is not helpful when the parties wncerned am wnducting negotiations.

Founhly. the Chinese delegation would like ro reiterate China's principled position on the Korean nuclear question. We have always supported the denuclearization of the Korean peuinsula. We welwme the negotiations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 'and the United States and the progress that has been made, and we support the various parties in making funber efforts to promote a mmprehensive, just and reasonable solution of this question at an early date through patient negotiations and multations.

Mr. Jacob (Israel): Israel votcd against the third preambular paragaph of the draR resolution just adopted. lsrael believes that al1 States members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, without discrimination, and regardless of whether or not they are parties to the Treaty on the Non-bliferation of Nuclear Weapons or other relevant intemational agreements. should enjoy the full rights envisaged in the Agency's statute. The language of the third preambular paragraph is not clear enough in this regard. Therefore. Israel voted against this paragraph.

Mr. Kumar (India): An important area of the work of the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relates to the application of safeguards, and the Agency has embarked upon a major exercise on the strengthening of the safeguards system. We attach importance to lhis exercise. which is aimed at making the safeguards system more efficient and costeffective.

in this context, one of the recuning themes over the past year in the meetings of the Agency's Board has b m the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This is a mmplex and substantive issue in which there have been many developments, both technical and political. Our point of view has been consistent. We believe that the best way in which this difficult issue can be molved is through patient discussions among ail the concerned parties. We have supported a policy of cooperation and dialogue, rafher than confrontation and deadlines. and in this spirit have welwmed the discussions betwecn the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

General Assembly ' Forty-ninth session

It was for that reason that in the Board we abstained on those resolutions thai we felt were not wntributing to a positive result. We had sirnilar reservations concerning the ninth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution Al49L.2IRev.2, and therefore we abstained on those paragraphs.

Nevenheless. since the resolution concerns the activities of the IAEA as a whole, to which we attach g m t value. we wmt dong with it.

MI. Moradi (Islamic Republic of Iran): The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches g m t importance IO the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and we have therefore wnsistently supponed iu activities.

1 should I i e to refer to our statement on 17 October last, before the Assembly, under agenda item 14. when we took note with satisfaction of the report of the Agency and the staiement of Mr. Hans Blix. ils Dimtor,General.

However. rny delegation abstained on the draft resolution contained in document Al49lL.21Rev.2, for the reason that we explained earlier today - namely. the lack of any reference to the rights of the States panies Io the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to use and have access 10 nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, frœ fmm discriminatory restrictions promoted hy certain developed counlries.

The Rgident (interpretafion from French): May 1 iake it that it is the wish of the Assembly to wnclude its wnsideraiion of agenda item 14?

Introduction of the reports of the F i Cornrninee

The Rg iden t (interpretation from French): The Assembly will now consider the rrpons of the First Committee on agenda items 53 and 64 (f). 54 Io 73 and 153.

1 request the Rapporteur of the Fini Committee to Uitroduce the reports of the First Committee in one intervention.

Mr. Goosen (South Africa). Rapporteur of the First Comminee: Il gives me great pleasure to introduce to the General Assembly the reports of the First Committee on agenda items 53 and 64 (0. 54 IO 73 and 153. Those reports are contained in documents Al491690 to Al49171 1.

90th meeting 15 Decemher 1994

Responding to the Assembly's appeal that i t wnduct ils work in a spirit of rationalization and make better use of the Organization's resowces, the Committee funher reduced the numher of its meetings and wncluded its work in the Course of 26 forma1 and eight i n f o d meetings. in order to enhance its effectiveness, the Committee this year adopted a new format, which included a stmctured discussion of specific subjects on the thematic appmach. That has lent a higher degree of cohesiveness to the discussions and made them more focused and action-oriented. II may he pertinent to note in that wnnection that. for the first tirne in the annals of the First Committee. the relevant drafi resolution entitled 'Rationalization of the work and refom of the agenda of the First Committee" was adopted - in fact. without a vote.

The Committee wnsidered 46 drafî resolutions and two draft decisions altogether. while one drafî resolution and one draft decision were withdrawn by the respective sponsors. Twenty-four, or 60 per cent. were adopted without a vote.

The disannament calendar for 1994 has been very intensive. During this las1 year. Member States have been addressing issues that range across the fui1 spectnim of disarmament questions. The debates of the Fint Committee were a nflection of this. and the statements that were made by Member States were characterized by a large measure of wnsensus on the issues that need to be focused upon. Some of the issues thai were rnost widely referred to included the following.

One issue was the recognition of the disannament- related advances that have been achieved over the las1 y w . A numher of delegations. however, noted that the high e'xpectations thai prevailed following the end of the cold war have become subdued. They also noted that there is a disturbing escalation in atmed conflict around the world.

Another issue was the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Tmty on the Non-Roliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which will be reviewing the Treaty's operation and which will also be deciding on the extension of the life of the NPT. Vinually every delegation that spoke during the debates referred to the NPT and its extension. Also. negotiations for a wmprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) are k ing conducted within the Conference on Disannament in Geneva. Many delegaiions made a point of noting that the drafî CTBT text is still heavily bracketed.

General Assembly Fony:ninth session

Other issues included the pmposed Veaty for the pmhibition of the production of fissile malerial for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices; calls for the early conclusion of legally b i i g nuclear security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States; the recognition by most delegations of the importance of nuclear- weapon-free wues as a means to achieving international peace and security; and the chemid weapons Convention and the work which is beiig done in The Hague with regard to the establishment of the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Another issue was the establishment of the Ad Hoc Gmup of Govemmeatal Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention. The pmgms which was made at the September 1994 Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention in Geneva was wmmended by most of the sp&ers.

With respect to transparency in armaments with spccific reference to the Register of Conventional Arms, the mle lhat greater transparency plays by inspiring confidence was generally recognized. The imponant mle of the United Nations Register in this process was also raised by most speakers. It was, bowever. acknowledged thal the Register as it is now sîntctured can be impmved.

A f d issue was the international wmmunity's concern about the carnage that is being caused by anti-personnel land-mines and the ongoing negotiations currently under way concerning. inter alio, Protowl II of the Convention on certain conventional weapons.

Fifieen out of 45 resolutions that were adopted dealt with nuclear-related issues. The Non-Proliferation Treaiy waa the focus of two drafï resolutions. 1 should Iüre to take rhis opportunity to draw members' attention in particuiar to the accession to the NPT by a number of new Stam Parties. and in this context the Ukraine's accession as a non-nuclear-weapon State deS.e~e.9 special mention.

As was the case 1s t year, the issues relatcd to the comprehensive test ban treaty wmmanded kœn attention h m the Conunittee. The Comminee once again adopted a consensus drarï resolution on the CTBT. in which it welcomed the pmgress achieved in the course of negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disannament and urged the Conference

'10 negotiate intensively. as a high pnority task' (Al49/694, para. 4).


Other nuclear-related draft resolutions that were wnsidcred and adopted by the Committee were IWO draft resolutions on bilateral nuclear arms negotiations. The draft resolutions on nuclear-weapon-free wnes in Africa, the Middle East and Latii America were adopted without a vote. Two others on such wnes in South Asia and the South Atlantic attracted wide support.

A new dran resolution in which the Comminee has requested an advisory opinion h m the international Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons was introduced.

Draft resolutions w a also intruduced on the "step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat", on "Weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery" and on "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination on nuclear weapons". The first two draft resolutions are somewhat similar in conceptual thnist and ah at the desîntction pmper of certain types of weapons and their delivery means within an agreed t h e frame.

On regional disarmament measures issues. thm dran remlutions were adopted: the 'Regional confidence- building mcasures" dran resolution, which was adopted by the Comminee without a vote; and the "Regional disarmamat" and 'Conventional arms conml on regional and subregional levels" draft resolutions. which canied by a cornfortable majority of votes.

As was expected, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms received considerable attention. The confidence-building potential of the Register was emphasized by some delegations. At the same time. wncem were expressed at a number of issues relating to the Register and its implementation. This included the lack of agreement by the Gmup of Governmtal Experts on recommendations for the expansion of the Register to include other categories of weapons in it, as well as data on promement and military holdiigs.

Two draft res@utions. respectively calling for a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines and welwming the pmgress achieved in reviewing the Convention on chernical weapons. were adopted without a voie. Then was general outrage at the buman suffering caused to innocent civilians by these weapons. In this co~ection, the report of the Secretary-General on the subject was highly appreeiated by the Comminee.

@nerai Assembly Forty-ninth session


Once again this year the Committee look up the issue of science and technology. As.in previous years. il was not possible to have a unified drafi resolution on this issue. The substantive work that was done during the last year, especially withii the United Nations Disannament Commission, bowever, ensured chat the differences betweni the two were less pronound.

The debate on the dran resolution on the biological weapons Convention was mainly focused on the recent Special Conference. The establishment of a working gmup to wnsider appropriate measures, includig possible verification measures, and draft proposais to strengthen the Convention in a legally binding instrument had a positive influence on the debate and enabled the Committee to adopt the relevant draft resolution without a vote.

The Comminee funhermore adopted a draft resolution on the wnvening of the founh special session devotcd to disarmament. The fact that it was adopted without a vote is proof of the need for a renewed focus on disannament and international security issues.

1 tum now to the First Committee's work related to agenda item 67 'Question of Antarctica". It sbould be noted with satisfaction that for the fmt lime the relevant dr& resolution was adopted without a vote. The statements made during the debate on this issue show the shared conviction that for the benefit of mankind Antarctica must be presemed as a zone of peace, where the environment is protected and freedom of scientific research exists. Under the draft resolution the Assembly would welwme the provision by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to the Secretary-General of the fmal report of the Eighteenth Consultative Meeting. It would alsn enwurage close mperation between the Antarctic Treaty Parties and the United Nations Environment Programme.

Let me now briefly turn to a few errors of a technical nature wbich have crept into the texts of the following reports:

In document N49/692. part III, 'Resnmmendation of the First Committee", operative paragraph 4 of the drah remlution should begin with the words "Also invites".

. In document Ai491700, pan III, "Resnmmendation of the First Comminee". the text of draft resolution C, 'Regional wnfidence-building measures", should be corrected as follows: operative paragraph 4 should begin 'Takes note OF; operative paragraph 8 should begin 'Also

requests"; and operative paragraph 9 should begin "Funher requesu".

In document Ai491704. pan III, 'Rmmmendation of the Fint Comminee". operative paragraph 1 of the dran resolution should begin: " T h note of the repon of the Secretary-General on Anwctica and of the report".

I would ask detegaiions to take note of those technical corrections.

Before concludiig. 1 should like to pay a well- deSemcd tribute Io al1 the delegations that panicipated in the work of the Committee for their spirit of mperation in the common search for a better, safer and more stable world.

1 should like to make special mention of the Chairman of the Committee, His Excellency Ambassador Luis Valencia-Rodriguez. wbo, with his intimate knowledge of disarmament and international security matters as well as his generai diplomatic skills provided the Committee with vision and able leadership.

Let me also thank the Comminee's Vice-Chairmen. Mr. Thomas StelIer and Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka, who were most effective in discharging their duties.

1 should aisn like to express my appreciation to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Marrack Gouldig, for his valuable contribution, and to the Acting Director of the Centre for Disamiament Affairs, Mr. Prvoslav Davinic.

In that comection, special thanks go to the Secretary of the First Committee, Mr. Sohrab Kheradi. wbose vast experience and high degree of cornpetence made a significant contribution to the successful outcome of the Committee's work.

1 should also like to express my gratitude to MI. Kheradi's staff. includig Mr. Mobammad Sartar, Mr. Tirnu Alasaniya, Mr. Francesu, Cottafavi, Mrs. Ruby Kulanusontit and Mrs. Anna Nania.

The Resident (inretpreration from Frendr): If there is no proposal under d e 66 of the rules of p r d u r e , 1 sball take it that the General Assembly decides not to disniss the reports of the First Committee that are before it today.



It was so decided.

The Prrsident: ~tatements will therefore be limited to explanations of vote or position.

The positions of delegations regardmg the recommendations of the Committee have b e n made in the Committee and are reflected in the relevant ofiïcial records.

May 1 remind members that under paragraph 7 of decision 341401 the Assembly agreed that

'When the same draft resolution is considered in a Main Comminee and in plenary meeting, a delegation should, as far as possible. expiain its vote only once. Le.. either in the Comminœ or in plenary meeting unless that delegation's vote in plenary meeting is different h m its vote in the Committee."

May 1 also remind delegations that. also in accordan& with Gcneral Assembly decision 341401, explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seau.

Before we begin to take action on the recommendations contained in the repons of the Committee, 1 should like to advisc representativea that we shall pmceed to take decisions in the same manner as in the Conunittee, except in those cases where delegations have already notifmi the Secretariat that they wish to do otherwise. This means that where recorded or separate votes were taken, we shall do the same.

1 also hope that we can proceed to adopt without a vote those recommendations that were adopted in the First Comminee without a vote.

Agenda items 53 and 64

Reduetion of müitary budgets: report of the Fimt Commitîee (N49169û)

Review of the implementation of the recommendatiom and deeisioos adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special sesion

(0 Implementation of the gnidelines and reeommendatiom for objective information on military maners: report of the Fimt Commitîee (A149169û)

The Resident (interpretation from French): The Assembly will now take action on the draft resolution recommended by the First Couunittee in paragraph 10 of its report.

The dran molution, entitled 'Objective information on military matters, includmg transparency of military expendihms", was adopted by the First Committee without a vote. May I consider that the General Assembly wishea to do the same?

îhe drofr reolution was adopted (resolution 49/66).

The Resident (interpretationfrom French): May 1 take it that it is the wish of the Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 53?

II was so decided.

The President (interpretation from Frenchj: The Assembly bas thus concluded thii stage of its consideration of sub-item ( f ) of item 64.

Agenda item 54

Sdentlfic and tcfhnological developments and their i m p d on Intemational senirity: report of the First Commiltee (N491691)

The President (interpretation from French): The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the F i t Committee in paragraph 7 of its report.


A record& vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan. Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda. Armenia. Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, &ngladesh. Barbados, Belarus. Belize. Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana. Brazil, Brunei Darussalam. Burkina Faso. Burundi, Camhodia. Cameroon. Central African Republic. Cbile. China. Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Spm. Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Djibouti, Dominica. Ecuador. Egypt, Ei Salvador. Ethiopia, Fiji. Gabon. Gambia. Ghana. Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana. Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq. lamaica. lordai, Kazakhstan. Kenya, Kuwait,


Kyrgyutan. Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho. Libyan Arab lamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives, Mali. Marshall Islands. Mawitania. Mawitius. Mexiw. Micmnesia (Federated States of). Mongolia. Morocco, Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia. Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger. Nigeria. Oman, Pakistan. Panama, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Pem. Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Samoa; Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles. Sierra Leone. Sigapore, Solomon Islands. Sri Lanka. Sudan. Suriname. Swaziland. Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Turkmenistan. Uganda, United Arab Emirates. United Republic of Taruania, Umguay. Vanuatu. Venezuela. Viet Nam. Yemen. Zambia, Zimbabwe

Againsr: France. Israel, United Kingdom of Gmt Britain and Northem Ireland. United States of America

Abstoining: Albania. Andorra. Argentina. Australia. Austria. Belgium. Bulgaria. Canada, Côte d'Ivoire. Cmatia. Czech Republic, Denmark. Estonia. Finland. Georgia. Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland. Ireland. Italy, Japan, Latvia. Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg. Malta, Netherlands, New Zeaiand. Nonvay. Poland. Portugal. Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania. Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa. Spain. Sweden, Tajikistan. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, furkey. Ukraine, Uzbekistan

The drofr rcsolution war adoptai by 118 wtes to 4. with 47 abstentions (resolution Al49167).

The Resident (interpretation from French): May 1 take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to wnclude its wnsideration of agenda item 54?

It wac so decided

Agenda item 55

The mle of science aiid teehnology in the context of international seeurity, disarmament and other related fields: report of the First Comminee (A1491692)

The h i d e n t (interpretation from French): The Assembly will w w take a decision on the draft resolution

9ûîh meeting 15 December 1994

recommended by the First.Committee in paragraph 7 of its report.

Separate votes have been requested on the seventh and the eighth pnambular paragraphs and on operative paragraph 3.

There appears to be no objection to that request.

1 sball tint put to the vote the seventb preambular paragraph of the draft resolution recommended by the Fint Comminee in paragraph 7 of its report.


A recorded vote war taken.

In favour: Afghanistan. Albania. Algeria, Andona. Antigua and Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia, Australia. Austria, Azerbaijan. Bahamas, Babain. Bangladesh, Barbados, Belanis, BeIgium. Belize, Benin. Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria. Burkina Faso. Burundi, Cambodia, Camemn, Canada. Central African Republic, Chile. China. Colombia. Comoms. Congo. Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire. Cmatia, Cypms. Czech Republic. Denmark. Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador. El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia. Ethiopia, Fiji, Finiand. Gabon, Gambia. Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana. Haiti, Honduras, Hungary. Iceland, Indonesia. Iraq, Ireland. Israel. Italy. Jamaica, Japan. Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon. Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein. Lithuania. Luxembourg. Madagascar, Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta. Marshall Islands, Mauntania, Mauritius. Micmnesia (Federated States of). Mongolia, Momcco, Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia. Nepal, Netherlands. New Zealand. Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria. Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Pem. Philippines. Poland. Pomigal. Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Samoa, San Marino. Saudi Arabia, Senegal. Sierra Leone. Singapore. Slovakia. Slovenia. Solomon Islands. South Africa. Spain. Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden, Syrian &ab Republic, Taristan, ?nailand, The


Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Umguay , Uzbekistan, Vanuatu. Venezuela. Viet Nam, Yemen. Zambia, Zimbabwe

Againsr: Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Abstaining: Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France. hdia. Mexico, Panama. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United States of America

The seventh preambuiar paragraph was ndoprcd by 159 votes to 1. with 8 abstentions.

The Presldent (inrerpreration from French): 1 shall now put to the vote the eighth preambular paragraph of the drait resolution mmmended by the First Cornmittee in paragraph 7 of i u report.

A m d e d vote has b e n requested.

A recorded wre was taken.

In fawur: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antiguaand Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan. Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados, Belanis, Belgium, Belize, Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana. Brazil, Brunei Da~ssa lam, Bulgaria. Burkina Faso, Bunmdi, Cambodia, Cameroon. Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros. Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cypms. Czech Republic. Denmark. Djibouti. Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador. Eritrea. Estonia. Ethiopia, Fiji, F i a n d . Gabon. Gambia, Genrgia. Germany. Ghana. Greecc, Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana. Haiti. Honduras. Hungary, Iceland. Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland. Italy, Jamaica, Japan. Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait. Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyao Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg. Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives. Mali. Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauntania. Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of). Mongolia. Morocco. Mozambique. Myanma, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, NewZealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Nonvay, Oman. Pakistan, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,


Portugal. Qatar. Republic ofKorea. Republic of Moldova, Romania. Russian Fcderation, Saint Kins and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenad i i . Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Sierra Leone. Sigapore. Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa. Spain. Sri Lanka. Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Turkey. Turkmenistan, Uganda. Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuam. Venezuela, Viet Nam. Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Againsr: Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Absraining: Algeria, Côte d'lvoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France, India, Israel, Mexico, Panama, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhern Ireland, United States of Amenca

Thc eighth preambuiar paragraph was adopted by 156 wres to 1, with 11 abstentions.

The F'resident (inteiprernrionfrorn French): 1 shall ncxt put to the vote operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution recommended by the First Comminee in paragraph 7 of i u report.



In fawur: Afghanistan. Albania, hdo r r a , Antigua and Barbuda. Argentins, Armenia, Australia, Austria. Azetbaijan, Bahamas. Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados, Belanis, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia. Botswana, Brazil. Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Camemon, Canada. Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia. Comoros. Congo. Costa Rica. C6te d'lvoire, Cmatia, Cypm. Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica. Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea. Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana. Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary. Ieeland. Indonesia, Iraq. Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,

Generai Assembly Fortv-ninth session


Jordan, Kazakhstan. Kenya. Kuwait. Kyrgyzstan. Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lwia. Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Anb Jamahiiya, Liecbtnistein. Lithuania, Luxembourg. Madagascar, Malawi. Maldives. Mali, Malta. Marshall Islands. MaUritania. Mauritius. Micronesia (Federated States of). Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands. New Zealand. Nicaragua. Niger. Nigeria, Nonvay, Oman. Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay. Peru, Philippines. Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea. Republic of Moldova, R o d a . Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal. Sierra Leone. Singapore. Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain. Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia, Turkey , Turkmenistan. Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates. United Republic of Tanzania. Umguay. Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam. Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Againil: Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Abstaining: Algeria, Cuba. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, France, India. Israel, Malaysia. Mexico, Panama, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland. United States of America. Vanuatu

Operaiive paragraph 3 was adopieà by 155 wtes to 1, with 13 abstentions.

The Resldent (interpretm'on from French): 1 shall now put to the vote the drafi tesolution as a whole recommended by the F i t Comminee in paragraph 7 of its repo't.


A recorded voie was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania. Algeria. Andorra, Antigua A d Barbuda, Argentins, Armenia. Australia, Austria. Azerbaijan. Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados. Belanis. Belgium, Belize. Benin. Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana. Br&, Bnuiei D d a m . Bulgaria.

Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia. Cameroon, Canada. Cape Verdc. Central African Republic. Chile, Cbina. Colombia, Cornoros, Congo, Costa Rica. Côte d'ivoire. Cmatia. Cuba. Cypm. C z s h Republic. Denmark. Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador. Egypt. El Salvador. Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji. Finland. Gabon. Gambia, Georgia. Germany. Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras. Hungary. Iceland, India, Indonesia. Iraq. ireland, Israel. Italy. Jamaica. Japan, Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait. Kyrgyzstan, Lao Pwple's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon. Lesatho, Libyan Arab Jamabiriya. Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives, Mali. Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania. Mauritius, Mexico. Micronesia (Federated States of). Mongolia, Moroa'o, Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal. Netherlands. New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger. Nigeria. Nonvay, Oman, Pakistan. Panama, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Pem, Philippines. Poland, Pomigal. Qatar. Republic of Korea. Republic of Moldova, Romania. Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vinent and the Grenadines. Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabi. Senegal. Seychelles. Sierra Leone, Singapore. Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa. Spain. Sri Lanka. Sudan. Suriname. Swaziland. Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic. Tajikistan. Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Turkey, Turkmenistan. Uganda. Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan. Vanuatu, Venezuela. Viet Nam. Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Abstaining : Democratic People's Republic of Korea, France. Iran (Islamic Republic of). United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, United States of America

ntc drq? resolution as a whole was adoptcd by 166 wies to MIIC. wifh 5 absimn'o~ (resolution 49/68).



The President (inferprerarion from French): May 1 take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude i u consideration of agenda item 55?

II was so decided.

Agenda item 56

Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere. in Outer Space and under Water: report of the First Cornmitîee (A1491693)

The Resident (inteprelation from French): The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Fint Committee in paragraph 8 of iîs =l'on.

A recorded vote has been requated.


In favour: Afghanisian. Algeria. Antiguaand Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados, Belize, Benin. Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana. Brazil. Brunei Danissalam. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia. Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile. Colombia, Cornoros, Congo, Costa Rica, CBte d'Ivoire. Cuba, Cypms, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt. El Salvador. Eritrea. Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon. Gambia. Ghana. Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras. India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republicof), Iraq, Jamaica. Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait. Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lebanon. Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia. Maldives. Mali, Mauritania. Mauritius. Mexico, Mongolia. Morocco, Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan. Panama. Papua New Guinea, Paraguay. Pem, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitu and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sigapore. Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland, Synan Arab Republic, Thailand. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, uniguay, Uzbekistan. Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen. Zambia, Zimbabwe

Againsr: Israel, Russian Federation, Unitcd Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of AmenCa

Absraining : Albania. Andorra, Argentina. ArmeNa. Australia. Austria. Azerbaijan, Belms. Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cmatia. Czech Republic, Denmark. Estonia, Finland, Georgia. Germany. G m . Hungary, Iceland, Ireland. Itaiy. Japan. Latvia. Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands. Micronesia (Federatcd States of). Netherlands. New Zealand. Nonvay. Poland, Portugal. Republic of Korea. Republic of Moldova. Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. Sweden, Tajikistan. 'Ibe Former Yugoslav Republic of Madon ia , Twkey. Turlunenistan, Ukraine, Vanuatu

The drufi rcsolution was adopled by 116 wta ro 4. wirh 49 absrenrions (nsolution 49/69).

The Resident (ituerpreraionfrom French): May 1 take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 56?

It war so decided.

Agenda item 57

Comprehensive test-ban treaty: reporî of the Fïrst Cornmittee (A1491694

The Resident (ituerprerafion from French): The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee in paragrapb 9 of its report.

The draii resolution entitled 'Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty" was adopted by the First Comminee without a vote. May 1 consider that the Assembly wisha Io do the same?

The drafi rcsolurion war adoptcd (resolution 49/70).

The Resident (interpretaiion from French): May 1 take it th% it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 57?

II w+s so decidcd.


Agenda item 58

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free wne in the region of the Middle East: report of the FCrst Committee (A/49/695)

The President (interpretation from French): The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution ncommended by the First Committee in paragraph 10 of its report.

The draft resolution was adopted by the kt Committee without a vote. May 1 take it that the Assembly wishes. to do likewise?

nte drap resolution w m adopted (resolution 49/71).

The M i d e n t (interpretation from French): May 1 take it that it is the wish of the Generai Asscmbly to wnclude its consideration of agenda item 58?

It was so decided.

Agenda item 59

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free wne in South Asia: report of the Fimt Committee (A/49/6%)

The. President (interpretation f b m French): The Assembly will now take a decision on the d m i resolution recommended by the First Committee in paragraph 7 of its report.


A recorded vote was tdien

In fawur: Afghanistan, Albania, Andona. Antigua and Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belanis, Belgium. Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Danissalam, Bulgana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia. Camemn, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, C h i . Colombia, Comoms. Congo, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire, Cmatia. Czech Republic, Denmark. Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador. Egypt, El Salvador, Entrea, Estonia, Ethiopia. Fiji. Finland. France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany. Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras. Hungary. Iceland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,


Jamaica, Japan. Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait, Kyrgyutan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho. Libyan Arab lamahiiya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi. Malaysia. Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands. Mauritania, Mcxiw, Micmne-sia ( F e d e r d States of), Monam. Mongolia, Mo-. Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand. Nicaragua. Niger. Nigeria, Noway, Oman, Pakistan. Panama, Papua N w Guinea, Paraguay, Peru. Philippines. Poland. Portugal, Qatar. Republic of Korea. Republic of Moldova. Romania, Russian Federation. Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadiies, Samoa. San Marino. Saudi Arabia, Senegal. Sierra Leone, Siagapore, Slovakia, Slovenia. Solomon Islands, South Afiica, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistau, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Turkey, Turlanenistan, Uganda. Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdomof Great Britain and Nonhem Ireland. United Republic of Tanzania. United States of America, Uruguay. Uzbekistan, Venezuela. Yemen. Zambia, Zimbabwe

Abstaining: Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Cypnis, Indonesia. Lao People's Democratic Republic. Madagascar, Myanmar, Vanuatu, Viet Nam

The drap resolution was adopted by 156 wtes to 3, with 10 abstentions (resolution 49/72).

The President (intetpretationfiom French): May 1 take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to wnclude its wnsideration of agenda item 59?

It was so decided.

Agenda item 60

Conciusion of eîïeetive international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the w o r threat of use of nuciear weapous: report of the Fimt Committee (A14916971

The President (inierpretation fiom French): The Assembly will now take a decision on the d m i resolution


90th meeting 15 December 1 994

recommended by the Fint Committee in paragraph 7 of its Abstaining: report. France. United Kingdom of Grea~ Britain and

Northem Ireland, United States of h n e r i ~ A rewrded vote has been requested.

The drafl resolution wnr adoptai by 168 votes to A recorded vote was taken. none, wirh 3 abstentions (resolution 49/73).

In fawur: Afghanistan, Albania, Algena, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austna, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados. Belanis. Belgium, Belizc, Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana, Brazil. Brunei Darussalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon. Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile. China, Colombia. Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica. Càte d'Ivoire. Croatia, Cuba, Cypms, Czech Republic. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica. Ecuador. Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia. Georgia. Germany. Ghana. Greece, Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti. Honduras, Hungary. Iceland. India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland. Israel. Italy, Jamaica, Japan. Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait, Kyrgyutan, Lao People's Democratic Republic. Latvia. Lebanon. Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahinya. Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia. Maldives. Mali, Malta. Marshall Islands. Mauritania. Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Nonvay, Oman. Pakistan, Panama. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Pem. Philippines, Poland. Portugal, Qatar. Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania. Russian Federation, Saint Kim and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino. Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sigapore, Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands. South Africa. Spain. Sri Lanka. Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Synan Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey. Turkmenistan. Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates. United Republicof Tanzania, Umguay, Uzbekislan. Vanuatu, Ven~uela. Viet Nam. Yemen. Zambia. Zimbabwe

Againsr: None

The Presldent (intetpretotionfrom French): May 1 take it thaî it is the wish of the General Assembly IO

wnclude its consideration of agenda item 60?

Ir wnr so decidai.

Agenda item 61

Prevention of an arms race in outer space: report of the First Cornmittee (A1491698)

The Resident (interpretation from French): The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Fint Committee in paragraph 7 of its repon.

Separate recorded votes have been requested on the eightee& preambular paragraph and on paragraphs 8 and 10.

1s there any objection to that request?

As then is no objection, 1 shall put to the vote Fust the eighteenth preambular paragraph.

A recordeà wte was taken.

In fawur: Afghanistan. Algeria. Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas. Bangladesb. Barbados. Belanu, Belize. Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana. Brazil, B m e i Danusalam. Burkina Faso, Burundi. Cambodia. Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde. Central Africao Republic, Chile, China. Colombia. Comoros. Congo, Costa Rica, Cbte d'Ivoire. Cuba, Cypm, Democratic People's Republic of Kom, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador. Egypt, El Salvador. Ethiopia. Fiji, Gabon. Gambia. Ghana, G d , Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana. Haiti. Honduras. India. Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of). Iraq. Jamaica, Jordan. Kazakhstan. Kenya. Kuwait. Kyrgyutan. Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya. Madagascar. Malaysia, Maldives, Mali. Marshall Islands. Mauritania,


General Assembly Foriy-ninth session

Mauritius, Mexiw. Micronesia (Federated States of),. Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia, Nepal. New Zealand. Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria. Oman. Pakistan, Panama. Papua New Guinea, Paraguay. Pem, Philippines. Qatar, Republic of Korca. Russian Federation, Saint Kim and Nevis. Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa. San Marino, Saudi Arabia. Scnegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands. South Ahica, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziiand. Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan. Thailand. Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan. Uganda. Ukraine, United Arab Emira~es. United Republic of Tanzania. Umguay, Uzbekistan. Vanuatu, Venezuela. Viet Nam, Yemen. Zambia. Zimbabwe

Againrr: United States of America

Absraining: Albania. Andorra, Austria. Belgium, Buigaria, Cmatia, Czeeb Republic. Denmark. Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia. Gerrnany, Greece. Hungary, Iceland, Ireland. Israel, Italy, Japan. Laivia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg. Malta, Monaco. Netherlands. Norway. Poland. Portugal. Republic of Moldova, Romania. Slovakia. Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Turkey. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland

The ciglueenth preambubrparagraph was adoptcd by 128 wtes to 1. with 39 abstentions.

The Rgiden t (interpretation Jrom French): 1 shall now put to the vote paragraph 8.

A recordcd wte was taken.

In fawur: Afghanistan. Aigeria. Antigua and Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia. Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas. Bangladesh. Barbados, Belanis, Belize, Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazii. Btunei Darussalam. Burkina Faso. Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde. Central African Republic. Chile. C h i . Colombia. Comoros, Congo. Costa Rica. C6te d'Ivoire. Cuba, Cypm, DemocAic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Eniador, Egypt, El Salvador. Ethiopia; Fiji. Gabon, Gambia. Georgia, Ghana. Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India. indonesia.

Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq. Jamaica, Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan. Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lebanon, Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahiiya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali. Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius. Mcxiw. Microncsia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Mo-. Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia. Nepai, New Zealand. Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Oman. Pakistan. Panama. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Pem. Phiiippincs. Qatar. Republic of Korea. Russian Federation. Saint Kins and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia. Senegai, Sierra Leone, Singaporc, Solomon Islands. South Africa, Sri Lanka. Sudan, ,Suriname, Swaziland. Syrian Arab Republic. Tajikistan. Thailand. Togo, Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda. Ukraine. United Arab Emirates. United Republic of Tanzania. Umguay. Uzbekistan. Venezuela. Viet Nam. Yemen, Zambia. Zimbabwe

Againri: United States of Amcnca

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra. Austria, Belgium, Buigaria. Cmatia. Czech Republic. Denmark. Estonia. Finland. France. Germauy, Greece, Hungary. Iceland. Ireland, Isracl. Italy. Japan, ktvia, Liechtenstein. Lithuania. Luxembourg. Malta. Monaco, Ncthcrlands. Nonvay. Poland, Portugal. Republic of Moldova, Romania. Slovakia, Slovenia. Spain. Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey. United Kingdom of Grrat Brilain and Northem ireland

Paragrogh 8 was adopted by 129 wtes ro 1, wirh 38 abstnnnnons.

The M d e n t (interprnm'on Jrom French): 1 shall next put to the vote operative paragraph 10.

A recordcd wte war taken.

In fowur: Afghanistan, Algeria. Antigua and Barbuda. Bangladesh. Barbados, Belanis. Belize. Benin. Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana. Brazii. Brunei Darussalam. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Camemon, Cape Verde, Central A f r i e Republic, Chile, China. Colombia. Comoms, Congo. Costa

General Assembly Fony-ninth session


Rica, Cuba, C y p ~ s , Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador. Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of). Iraq, Jamaica. Jordan. Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of). Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay. Perd. Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone. Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa. Sri Lanka. Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Uganda, United Arab Emirates. United Republic of Tanzania, Umguay. Venezuela, Viet Nam. Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Againsr: United States of America

Absraining: Albania. Andorra, Argentina, Armenia. Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic. Denmark. Estonia, Finiand, France. Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel. Italy. Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea. Republic of Moldova. Rornania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey. Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uzbekistan

Operative paragraph 10 was adopted by 111 votes fo 1. with 54 abstenrions.

The President (inrerpreration from French): 1 shall now put to the vote the draft resolution, as a whole.


In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Anrigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia. Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas. Bahrain. Bangladesh, Barbados. Belanis, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil. Brunei Darussalam. Bulgaria, Burkiia Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colornbia, Comoros. Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cypms, Czech Republic, Dernocratic People's Republic of Korea. Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt. El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Gerrnany. Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea. Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary. Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy. Jamaica, Japan, Jordan. Kazakhstan. Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic. Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives. Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania. Mauritius. Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia. Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia. Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Norway. Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Perd. Philippines, Poland, Pomgal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova. Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles. Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain. Sri Lanka. Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic. Tajikistan. Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, United Repiiblic of Tanzania, Umguay, Uzbekistan, Vanudtu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Absraining: United States of America


General Assembly 90th meeting Forty-ninth session 15 December 1994

The drafl resolufion. m a whole, wm adoprcd by 170 votes fo none, with I absfenfion (resolution 49/74).

The Resident (iNerprefOnonon from French): May 1 take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 61?

Ir wm JO decided.

Agenda item 62

General and complete disarmament: repori of the Fint Cornmittee (A/49/699)

The President (inferprerationfrom French): 1 cal1 on the representative of France. on a point of order.

Mr. Ladsous (France) (interprefation from French): This year some delegations in the Assembly chose to submit in the First Comminee drafl resolution AIC.1149lL.36, entitled "Request for an advisoiy opinion from the International Coun of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons". m i s draft resolution was submined for wnsideration despite the fact that the Assembly of the World Health Organization had adopted a similar nsolution in 1993. n i e International Coun of Justice is at this vety time considering that request by the Assembly of the World Health Orgaaization for an advisory opinion, as well as the memonals already transmitted by more than 27 States.

On a number of occasions my delegation bas drawn accent-n to what we believe to be the inappmpnate. supemuous and ill-founded submission in this body of anothei request for an advisory opinion. At the time of the voting on the draft resolution in the First Commirtec. France wmmented at length on the underlying motives of the sponsors of the text, and 1 will not go over chat again.

However. the draft resolution that is now before us - although the Coun has not yet replied to the fia request - is once again airned at obtaining an urgent response on a matter that. as al1 of us in the Assembly are awam. is purely politicai and has k e n the subject of numemus controversies. This situation is particularly regrettable in the light of the fact that the authonty of the decisions of the tribunal in The Hague, which is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. is based on ils handimg d&vn decisions founded on law and taking care not to make political judgements.

'Ibis state of affairs is well h o w n to al1 delegations. includiig the sponsors of the draft resolution. However. on the eve of the 1995 extension Conference, there is a desire to put in the dock the nuclear Powers rewgnized by that insuurnent of international law known as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed by more tban 160 wuntries; and this is done ai the vety lime wben it is clear that those nuclear Powers are fully shouldering their responsibiiity and remabhg faithful to their wmmitments. This desire to accuse the nuclcir Powers secms to ounveigh respect for the indepeodence of one of the most essential institutions of the United Nations system.

Those who wish to use for partisan purposes an institution as respected as the international Coun of Justice are indeed assuming a senous responsihility - and 1 insist on the word 'senous", for, hy attempting to bring hitheno unwitnessed pressure to bear in order to diven chat juridiction h m ils exclusive mission. the sponsors of draft resolution K will do senous and lasting damage to the credit of the International Coun of Justice and to its image as an impartial body.

For those reasons. therefore, my delegation, regretfully. is forced. in accordance with d e 74 of the ûcneral Asscmbly's des of procedure. to move the adjoumment of draft resolution K in paragraph 60 of the First Comminm's repon (Al491699). My delegation would also move that a recorded vote be taken on tbis motion. For its part, France hopes tbat the largest possible number of delegations, aware of the responsibiiity incumbent upon them. will vote in favour of this motion for non-action.

The President (imerpretarion from French): The repremtative of France has moved, in acwrdance with d e 74 of the Assembly's d e s of procedure, that no decision be taken on drafi remlution K in paragraph 60 of document Al491699. Rule 74 reads as follows:

'During the discussion o f any matter, a representative may move the adjoumment of thc debate on the item under discussion. in addition to the proposer of the motion, two representatives may speak in favour of, and hvo against. the motion. after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. .. ."

1 shall now cal1 upon hvo dclegafions wishing to speak in favour of the motion.


but note that there is a profond division withii the Assembly on the appropriateness of this drakï resolution.

1 have already strongly emphasized the French delegation's wncem that the International Court of Justice not be put in the situation of being pressured by a specific group. This desire therefore prompts my delegation to propose to the Assembly an .amendment to drafi resolution K. This amendment wouid delete from the request to the Intemational Court of Justice in the operative paragraph of the draft resolution the word 'urgently". Funhermore, my delegation would like this amendment, which would ensure the freedom of a jundical body to make its own assessment, to be submined to a ncorded vote.

The Prsident (interpretation from French): The representative of France has submitted an oral amendment to the operative paragraph of draft resolution K. calling for the deletion of the word 'urgently" from the text of the operative paragraph.

1 cal1 on the representative of Indonesia on a point of order.

Mr. Wiranataatmadja (Indonesia): For the reasons 1 described earlier. my delegation wishes to make a motion for no action on the amendment proposed by France. This is for the simple reason that a decision has b m made at two Ministenal Meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement. If, for example. a country intends to wme up with compromise language in good faith, this should be done prior to the action we are taking now.

Mr. Razali (Malaysia): The Malaysian delegation fully suppons the motion made by the delegation of Indonesia. We totally oppose this attempt to amend the drafi resolution before us. We would appeal to al1 members of the General Assembly to take into account the fact that the First Cornmittee has pronounced itself on this dmîl resolution and that an attempt just now to make a motion for no action was defeated. We wouid now urge that no funher devices be allowed to prevent the adoption of this draft resolution.

The President (intepretation from French): The representative of hdonesia, seconded by the representative of Malaysia, has moved. withii the ternis of mle 74 of the mles of procedure, that no action be taken on the oral amendment submitted by the representative of France. Rule 74 reads as follows:


'Dunng the discussion of any matter, a r e p m t a t i v e may move the adjoumment of the debate on the item under discussion. In addition to the pmposer of the motion, two representatives may speak in favour of. and two against, the motion, akïer which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote."

1 now d l on the two representatives who wish to speak against the motion.

Mr. Ladsous (France) (intepretation from French): My delegation notes with regret the wish expressed by the delegation which submined draft resolution K that no indepth wnsideration be given to the amendment submitted by France. This wnfirnis both that there are those who fear that the Assembly will opt for a reasonable attitude and the intention of the sponson of the drafi resolurion to exert pressure on the International Court of Justice.

In these circumstances, my delegation can only oppose the motion for no action that has been made and we hope that a recorded vote can be taken to that effect. My delegation takes this oppomuiity to appeal to delegations that have so far supponed us to oppose the motion when it is put to the vote.

Mr. Gelber (United States of America): The United States delegation will oppose the pmposed motion for no action on the French amendment. We believe that the French amendment will at least temper an inappropriate use of the International Court of Justice, a respected legal institution, for what can only be seen as political purposes. The removal of the word "urgently" fmm the draft resolution would shield the Court's calendar from unnecessary political pressure and chaos.

Mr. Moradi (Islamic Republic of Iran): 1 am speaking to support the motion for no action proposed by the r e p m t a t i v e of lndonesia on the amendment pmposed hy France.

First. we think that members of the international wmmunity should be able to explore every avenue to establish a world free from the threat. use or deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass desuuction. Sewndly, the sponsors of dmîl resolutions before the Assembly have submitted them in exercise of their inalienable right under the Charter of the United Nations enwuraging Staîes to seek advisory opinions on issues whenever they deem nccessary. ï h e Charter does


General Assembly Fony-ninth session -

not exclude recourse to an advisory opinion on the legality of the use or thrcat of use of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, this issue, namely to seek an advisory opinion on the legality of the tbreat or use of nuciear weapons bas been considered seriously at the highest level among the members of the Non-Aligned Movement. which represent the will of the overwbelming majority of the international wmmunity .

ïherefore, we support the mtion for no action proposed by Indonesia, and we urge other Member States to support it by casting a positive vote.

The Resident (interpretationnfrom French): We have just hcard Iwo speakers in favour of the motion and Iwo against.

1 shall now put to the vote the motion submitted by the representative of Indonesia that no action be taken on the oral amendment submined by the representative of France.

A record4 vote has b a n rcquested on this motion.


In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria. Bahamas. Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam. Burkina Faso, Burundi. Colombia, Cuba, Cypms, Democratic People's RepuMic of Korea, Eniador, Egypt, Grenada, Guyana. Honduras. India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of). Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Libyan Arab lamahiriya. Malaysia. Mali, Mexiw. Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal. Nigeria, Oman. Pakistan. Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenad ' i , Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Anica. Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swedcn, Synan Arab Republic. Thailand, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Umguay, Viet Nam. Yemen. Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Albania, Andom, Argentins, Armenia, Australia, B e l m , Belgium. Benin. Bulgaria. Cambodia, Canada. Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Eritrea, ~sto&a. Finland, France. Gabon, Georgia. Gennany. Greece. Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Luxembourg. Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauntania, Monaw, Moroceo, NecherIaods,

Norway. Poland. Pomigal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia. Spain, Tajikisuin. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo. Turkey, Ukraine, United KinHom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Austria. Azerbaijan, Baiuain, Belize, Camemon. Chie, Cmatia. Dominica, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Ireland, Jamaica, Kuwait. Kyrgyzstan. Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Micronesia (Federatcd States of). New Zealand, Niger, Pem, San Marino. Saudi Arabia, Swaziland. Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Vmzue1a

The motion was aàopfad by 61 wtes IO 56, wirh 30 abstentions.

The President (interpretntion from French): Since the motion has been adopted, no action will be taken on the oral amendment submined by the reptesenîative of France.

Under this item, the First Comminee, in its report (A/49/699), has rewmmcndcd to the Assembly the adoption of 16 draft resolutions. wntained in paragraph 60. and one draft deçision, wntained in paragraph 61.

1 shall now cal1 on tbose repmentatives who wish to explain their votes before the voting.

Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine): 1 would l i e to thank the Rapporteur of the First Cornmirtee, who menlioncd my wuntry in wnnection with its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The recent accession of Ukraine to the NPT repments a dccisive contribution to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime on the eve of the 1995 NPT review and extension Conference. This historic step has opened up a new era and has given great impenis Io the process of nuclear disarmament. It e l i t e d the last obstacle in the way of implcmenting START 1 and opened up oppottunities for the prompt ratification of START 11. It reafîim the fact that Ukraine wntinues to be a responsible member of the international wmmunity and a reliable international p m e r .

This decision was taken by the Ukrainian leadership in the midst of a complex economic and political simation in Ukraine. Its implemmtation will require additional



expenditure and economic sacrificc~ on the pan of the Ukrainian people. In taking this historic decision. the Parliament of Ukraine was wunting on an appmpriate response fmm the world mmmunity to our State's voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons. This is something that had never becn done before in the hiitory of mankind. With regard to disarmament issues. the delegation of Ukraine is aware of the greai responsibiiity borne by every Member State, in t e m of Ihc preacrvation of the Tmty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Zaki (Maldives): My explanation of vote refers to drafi resolution K. entitled "Raquest for an advisory opinion from the International Couri of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons", in document Al491699.

The question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons is one that maalciid has long sought to resolve. Today. in the d e m u t h of the wld war when bopes for a new world order arc beiig raised, the answer to the question has been very clear. Maldives is very glad to note that positive efforts are beiig made towards overall disarmament, in particular with regard to nuclear weapons. In this respect. the 1995 NPT review and extension Conference and the ongoing negotiations on a wmprehensive test-ban tmty withii the framework of the Conference on Disarmament can be noted with satisfaction. Nevenheless, my delegation believes that the use of nuclcar weapons or any weapons of mass destruction is a crime against humanity and shouid not be permined under any circumstances. We feel that the world shouid not only wndemn the use of such weapons but also wnsider the development. production and use of such weapons as illegal and immoral.

That is why Maldives supported in the First Cornmittee the draft resolution now before us entitled 'Request for an advisory opinion fmm the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons".

However, owing to the lack of wnsensus wncerning the p rodure of asking the International Coun of Justice (ICI) for an opinion at this time, and k i n g awan in particular that the ICJ is engaged in the consideration of a similar subject. wnsidered by some Members as identical, my delegation now feels that the General Assembly may pmdently defer taking a decision on this draft resolution this year. Therefore. my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution K.

Mr. Rudolpb (Germany): 1 have the honour to speak on behalf of the Ewopean Union and the a c d i g States, Austria. Finland and Sweden.

We strongly welwmed the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State on 5 December 1994. We acknowledge the speedy implementation of Ukraine's conunitment to become a State free of nuclear weapons. We are wnvinced that this important step will prepare the path for the full implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Taiks (START) tmties. and the continuation of the nuclear disarmament pmcess.

We cal1 upon Ukraine to wnclude as soon as possible a full-scope safeguards- agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) acmrd'ig to article 3 of the NPT.

The President (interprerarionfrom French): 1 shall now put the 16 draft resolutions and the draft decision to the Assembly one by one. Once ail the decisions have been taken. representatives will again have the oppominity to explain their votes.

We shall first turn to draft resolution A, entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes".

The First Cornminez adopted draft resolution A without a vote.

May 1 take it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?

Drafr resolurionA wa~odoptcd (resolution49175 A).

The Resident (inrerpretation from French): Draft resolution B is entitled 'Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Thiud Disarmament Decade".

A recordcd voie has been requested.

A ncorded vote was taken.

In fawur: Afghanistan, Algeria. Andorra. Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize. Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Danissalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia. Camemon, Cape Verde, Central Afncan Republic. Chile, China, Colombia, Comorw,


Congo. Costa Rica, CBte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cypm, Czech Republic, Democmic People's Republic of Korea. Djibouti. Dominica. Ecuador. Egypt. W Salvador, Eritrea. Estonia, Erhiopia. Fiji. Gabon, Germany. Ghana, Grnec, Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea. Guyana. Hairi. Honduras. India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland. Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyut&, Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lebanon. Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Liechtenstein. Madagascar, Malaysia. Maldives, Mali, Malta. Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius. Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Mo-. Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia. Nepal. Nicaragua. Niger. Nigeria Nonvay, Oman. Pakistan, Panama. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Peru. Philippines. Portugal, Qatar, Romania. Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint Vimt and the Grenadhes. Samoa. San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Scnegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone. Sigapore. Slovakia, Slovenia. Solomon Islands. South Africa. Spain, Sri Lanka. Sudan. Suriname. Swaziland. Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic. Thailand. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia, Turkmdstan. Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan. Vanuatu, Venezuela. Viet Nam. Yemen. Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhem Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Albania. Argentins, Belanis, Belgium, Canada. Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Hungaty. israel. Japan. Kazakhstan. Lamia. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands. New Zealand, Poland. Republic of Korea. Republic of Moldova. Russian Federation, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine

Drafr resolution B was adopfui by 139 w t u to th?@?, with 26 nbsrenn'o~ (resolution 49/75 B).

The Rgident (interpretation from French): Drafi mlu t ion C is entitled 'Transparency in armaments".

Separate, reeorded votes have been requested on operative paragraphs 4 @) and 6.

1s there any objection to this request?

Sice that is not the. case, 1 fmt put to the vote operative paragraph 4 @).

A recordai wte was takcn.

In favour: Albania. Andorra. Antigua and Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azcrbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain. Bangladesh. Barbados. Belanis, Belgium, Belize, Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia. Botswana. Brazil. Brunei Danusalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso. Cambodia, Camemn, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic. Chile. Comoms. Congo. Costa Rica. CBte d'Ivoire. Croatia, Cypm. Czech Republic. Denmark, Djibouti, Dominifa, Eniador. El Salvador, Entrea. Estonia, Ethiopia. Fiji. F i and . France. Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany. Greecc. Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana, Haiti. Honduras. H u n g q , Iccland, Ireland, Israel. Italy. Jamaica, Japan. Ka.mkbtan. Kenya. Kuwait. Kyrgyutan. Latvia. Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg. Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia. Maldives. Mali, Malta. Marshail Islands. Mauritania. Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia. Morocu>. Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger. Nigeria, Nonvay. Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Pem, Philippines. Poland. Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania. Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint V i n t and the Grenadines, Samoa. San Marino. Senegal. Sierra Leone. Singapore, Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands. South Afnca, Spain, Suriname. Swaziland. Sweden, Tajikistan. Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, nirkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda. Ukraine. United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Notthern Ireland. United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America. Uruguay, UzbeaStan. Vanuatu. Venezuela, Zambia. Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining : Afghanisian. Algeria, China, Colombia, Cuba. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India. Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of). Jordan. Libyan h b Jamahiriya, Mexico. Myanmar, Pakistan. Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan

General Assembly Forn-ninth session

90th meeting IS December 1994

Operative paragraph 4 (b) war adopted by 145 votes to none, with 17 abstenrions.

The President (inrerpretafionfrom French): 1 now put to the vote operative paragraph 6.

A recordai vote was taken.

ln fawur: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, AImenia. Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas. Bahrain. Bangladesh. Barbados. Belarus, Belgium. Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana. Brazil. Brunei Dmssalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso. Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde. Central African Republic, Chile. Comoros. Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire. Croatia. S p m s , Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti. Dominica, Ecuador. El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France. Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana. Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland. Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia. Lesotho. Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated S u e s of). Monaco, Mongolia. Morooco. Mozambique, Namibia. Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Nonvay, Oman. Panama. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Pem, Philippines, Poland. Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, R o d a , Russian Federation. Saint Kitis and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Samoa. San Marino. Senegal. Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname. Swaziland. Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, The Fonner Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda. Ukraine. United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America. Umguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia. Zimbabwe

Againsr: Algena. Cuba, Indonesia, Mexico

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Ch&, Colombia, Democratic Pwplc's Republic of Korea, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of),

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar. Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Sudan

Operariveporagraph 6 war dopied by 145 votes to 4, with 11 absre~m'ons.

The Resldtnt (inierprefluionfrom French): 1 shall now put to the vote draft resolution C. as a whole.



In favour: Albania. Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan. Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados, Belarus, Belgium. Belize, Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Damsalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi. Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde. Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire. Croatia, Cypms, Czech Republic. Denmark. Djibouti. Dominica. Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea. Estonia. Ethiopia. Fiji, Finland. France. Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany. Ghana. Greece, Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea. Guyana, Haiti. Honduras, Hungary. Ifeland. Ireland. Israel. Italy, Jamaica, lapan, Kazakhstan. Kenya. Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, LaNia. Lesotho. Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg. Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania. Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco. Mongolia. Morocco, Mozambique. Namibia. Nepal. Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway. Oman, Pakistan. Panama, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Pem. Philippines. Poland. Portugal. Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romauia, Russian Federation. Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sigapore, Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands. South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden. Tajikistan, Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Turkey. Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland. United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Umguay. Uzbekistan, Vanuatu. Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe


Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria. Cuba. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt. India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico. Myanmar. Saudi Arabia. Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic. Yemen

Dra9 resolution C, as a whole, was adoptai by 150 votes to none, with 19 abstentions (resolution 49/75 C).

The F'resident (inrerpretation from French): Drafi resolution D is entitled "Moratorium on the export of anti- personnel land-mines".

The Fint Comminee adopted drafi resolution D without a vote. May 1 take it that the Assembly wisbes to do the same?

Draji resolution D was adopted (resolution 49/75 D).

The Rg iden t (inrerprerarion from French): Drafi resolution E is entitled "Step-by-step reducîion of the nuclear threat " .



In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain. Bangladesh, Barbados. Belanis. Belize. Benin, Bhum, Bolivia. Botswana. Brazil. Brunei Dmssalam, Burkina Faso. Burundi. Cambodia. Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, Chia . Colombia. Cornoros. Congo. Costa Rica, Cuba. Cypm. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti. Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji. Gabon. Gambia. Ghana, Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India. Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica. Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyum, Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius. Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia. Nepal. Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan. Panama. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Pem, Philippines, Qatar, Saint


Kitts and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grenadiies, Samoa. Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles. Sigapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa. Sn Lanka, Sudan. Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Uganda, United Arab Emirates. United Republic of Tanzania, Umguay. Uzbekistan. Venezuela, Vie1 Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium. Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland. France. Cemany, Greece. Hungary, Israel, Italy. Luxembourg. Malta. Monaco, Netherlands, Norway. Poland, Pomigal, Republic of Moldova, Romania. Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, UnitedKingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra. Argentina. Armenia, Australia, Ausiria. Azerbaijan. Bahamas, Bulgana. Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia. Estonia, Gwrgia. Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan. Latvia. Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of). New Zealand, Republic of Kom, Russian Federation. San Marino. Slovenia. Sweden. Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Ukraine. Vanuatu

Dra8 resolution E was adopted by 111 wtes to 24, with 33 abstentions (resolution 49/75 E).

The Resident (interpretafion from French): 1 shall now put to îhe vote draft resolution F, entitled '1995 Review and Extension Conference of States Parties to the T m on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

A rmrded vote has been requested.

A recordai vote was taken.

In fawur: Afghanistan, Algeria. Antigua and Barbuda. Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados. Belize, Benin. Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana, Brunei Dmssalam. Burkina Faso. Burundi, Cambodia. Central African Republic. China, Colombia, Cornoros. Congo, Costa Rica. Cypm, Dernocratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica. Ecuador. Egypt. El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon. Gambia. Ghana. Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana. Haiti. Honduras. Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of).




A recorded wre was raken.

h fawur: Afghanisian. Algeria, Bahamas, Bangladesh. Barbados. Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil. Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Colombia, Congo. Costa Rica, Cuba, Cypm, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Eniador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eihiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Grenada. Guatemala. Guyana. Haiti. Honduras. India. Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of). Iraq, Jordan. Kenya, Lebanon. Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahtriya, Malaysia, Mali. Marshall Islands, Mexiw, Mozambique. Myanmar. Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria. Oman, Pakistan. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Pen. Philippines. Saint Kim and Nevis. Saint Lucia. Saint Vincent and the Grniadines. Samoa. San Marino. Saudi Arabia. Sierra Leone, Sigapore, Solomon Islands. South Afnca, Sri La&, Sudau. Suriname. Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Uganda. United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela. Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Againri: Albania, Andom. Argentina. Belgium. Benin, Bulgaria. Cambodia. Comoms, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti. Estonia, F i a n d , France, Gabon. Georgia, Germany, G m , Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia. Luxembourg. Malta. MaUritania, Monaco. Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea. Romania, Russian Federation. Senegal. Slovakia, Slovenia. Spain. Tajikistan. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Madonia. Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhem Ireland. United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia. Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belanis, Belize, Cameroon, Canada, Central Afncan Republic, Chile. Cmatia, Dominica. Enwea, Ghana, Guinea. ireland, lamaica. Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Maldives. Micmnesia (Federated States of), Niger, Nonvay. Republic of Moldova, Swaziland. Sweden. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Turkmenistan. Ukraine. Uzbekistan, Vanuatu

Drafr rccolurion K was adopred by 78 vores to 43. wiih 38 absienrions (resolution 49/75 K).

The Resident (interpreraiion from French): Draft nsolution L is entitled "Bilateral nuclear-amis negotiations and nuclear disarmament".

The First Committee adopted draft resolution L without a vote. May 1 take it that the Assembly wishes to do likcwix?

Drap resolurion L was adopred (resolution 49/75 L).

The Resident (inrerpretaion from French): Dr& resolution M is entitied 'Measuw to curb the illicit transfer and use of wnventional anns".

Draft resolution M was adopted by the First Comminœ without a vote. May 1 take il that the Assembly too wishes to adopt the draft resolution?

Drafr rccolurion M was adopred (resolution 49/75 M).

The Presldent (inrerpretation from French): Draft resolution N is entitled 'Regional disannament". A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was raken.

In fawur: Afghanistan, Albania. Algeria, Andorra. Antigua and Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia, Australia. Austria, Azerbaijan. Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados. Belarus, Belgium, Belize. Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia. Bosnia and Hemgovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso. Burundi. Cambodia. Cameroon. Canada, Central Afncan Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoms, Congo, Costa Uica. Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia. Cuba. Cypnis. Czech Republic. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti. Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Entrea. Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Fdand, France. Gabon. Gambia, Georgia, Germany . Ghana. G m . Grenada, Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana. Haiti. Honduras. Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic. Latvia. Lebanon, Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg.



Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia. Maldives, Mali. Malta, Marshall Islands. Mamitania. Mauritius. Mexiw, Micmnesia (Federated States of), Monaco. Mongolia. Mo-, Mozambique. Myanmar. Namibia. Nepal. Netherlands. New Zcaland. Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Nonvay. Oman. Palllstan. Panama. Papua New Guinea, Paraguay. Pem. Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania. Russian Federation, Saint Kins and Nevis, Saint Lucia. Saint

and the Grenadines. Samoa. San Marino. Saudi Arabia. Senegai. Seychelles, Sierra Leone. Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain. Sri Lanka. Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden. Syrian Arab Republic. Tajikistan. Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Turkey. Tur!mmistan, Uganda. Ukraine. United Arab Emiraîes, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhem Ireland. United Republic of Tanzania. United States of America, Umguay, Uzbekistan. Vanuatu, Venezuela. Viet Nam. Yemen, Zambia. Zimbabwe

Drap resolution N was adopred by 171 voles to none, wirh 1 ObsIemion (resolution 49/75 N).

The Resident (inierprerafion from French): Draft molution O is entitled 'Conventional arms wntrol at the regional and subregional levels". A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded wrc was taken.

In fawur: Afghanisw. Albania. Algeria. Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia. Ausualia. Austria. Azerbaijan. Bahamas. Bahrain. Bangladesh. Barbados. Belanis. Belgium, Belize, Benin. Bbutan, Bolivia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana. Brunei D~ussalam. Bulgaria, Burkina Faso. Burundi, Cambodia. Cameroon. Canada. Cape Verde. Central Afncan Republic. Chie. China. Colombia, Comoms. Congo, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire. Cmatia, Cypnis. Czeeh Republic. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica. Egypt.

El Salvador. Entrea. Estonia. Ethiopia. Fiji. Finland, France. Gabon, Gambia. Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Gr-, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana. Haiti, Honduras. Hungary. ,

Iceland. indonesia, Iran (lslamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland. Israel, Italy. Jamaica, Japan. Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya. Kuwait, Kyrgyutan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg. Madagacar, Malawi. Malaysia. Maldives, Mali, Malta. Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco. Mongolia, Momcco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger. Nigeria, Nonvay, Oman. Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Pem, Philippines. Poland, Portugal. Qatar, Republic of Korea. Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation. Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa. San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone. Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa. Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic. Tajikistan. Thailand, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo. Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Turkey, Turkmenisw. Uganda. Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Greac Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania. United States of America. Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu. Yemen, Zambia. Zimbabwe

Abstaining : Brazil. Cuba. Eeuador, India. Mexiw. Singapore, Venezuela

Dmp resolution O was adopred by 164 votes to none, w'fh 7obsrenriom (resolution 49/75 0) .

The President (inrerpretaion from French): Draft resolution P is entitled "Bilateral nuclear-amis ncgotiations and nuclear disannament". A remrded vote im been requested.

A recorded vote was raken.

In fawur: Afghanistan. Albania, Algeria. Andorra. Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Armenia. Australia.

General .Assembly Foriy-ninth session

Austria. .Azerbaijan. Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. . . Barbados, Belam. Belgium, Belize, Benin. Bhutan,

. . Bolivia, Bosnia and Hemgovina, Botswana. Brzzil, Brunei Dmsalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso. Burundi. Cambodia, Cameroon. Canada, Cape Verde. Central Afncan Republic. Chile, China. Colombia. Comoms, Congo, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire. Croatia, Cuba. Cypnis. Czech pepublic. Democratic People's Republic of Kom. Denmark. Djibouti. Dominica, Mar. Egypt. El Salvador. Eritrea, Estonia. Ethiopia. ,Fiji. F i a n d . France. Gabon, Gambia. Georgia, Gemiany. Ghana. Greece. Grenada. Guatemala, Guinea. Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary. Iœland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of). Iraq. Ireland. Israel. Italy, Jamaica, Japan. Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait. Kyrgyutan. Latvia. Lebanon. Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg. Madaga~car, Malawi, Malaysia. Maldives, Mali. Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mawitius, Mexico. Micronesia (Federated States 00. Monaco. Mongolia. Morocco. Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal. Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria. Norway, Oman. Pakistan. Panama. Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru. Philippines. Poland, Pomigal, Qatar, Republic of Kom. Republic of Moldova, Romania. Russi* Fedetation. Saint Kitts and Nevis. Saint h i a , Saint Vicent and the

,. - Grenadines. Samoa. San Marino, Saudi Arabia. Senegal. Seychelles, Sierra Leone. Sigagore, Slovakia. Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain. Sri Lanka, Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan. Thailand, ï h e Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emintes. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Inland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay. Uzbekistan. Vanuatu, Venezuela. Via Nam. Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Abstaining : lndia

Drar resolufion P WPT adopted by 171 wtes to none. wifh 1 abstemion (molution 49/75 P).

The President (imerpretation from French): The Assembly nuns now to the drafî decision recommended by

90th meiig 15 December 1994

the First Cornmittee in paragraph 61 of its report (Af491699). The draff decision is entitled "Non- pmiiferation of weapons of $as's destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in al1 its aspects".

~ ' recorded vote has been requ&ted.

A recorded wte w u taken.

In favour: Afghanistan. Albania, Algeria. Antigua and Barbuda. Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan. Bahamar, Bahrain. Bangladesh, Barbados. Belanis. Belize. Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia. Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam. Burkina Faso. Burundi, Cambodia. Camemon, Central African Republic. Chile. Ch ia , Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, C y p ~ s , Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica. Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador. Eritrea. Ethiopia, Fiji. Gabon, Gambia, Ghana. Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan. Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait. Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon. Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahhiya. Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia. Maldives, Mali. Mawitania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia. Mo-, Mozambique, Myanmar. Namibia. Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Niger. Nigeria, Oman. Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea. Paraguay. Peru. Philippines, Qatar. Republic of Korea. Saint Kitts and Nevis. Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa. San Marino. Saudi Arabia, Senegal. Seychelles, Sierra Leone. Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa. Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic. Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Uganda, United Arab Emuates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela. Viet Nam. Yemen. Zambia. Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Andom, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia. F i a n d , France. Georgia, Gennauy, Greece, Hungary. Iceland, Ireland. Israel, Italy, Japan, ïatvia, Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg. Malta. Marshall Islands. Micronesia (Federated


States of), Monaco, Netherlands. Noway. Poland, Pomigal. Republic of Moldova. Romania, Russian Fedetaîion. Slovakia. Slovenia. Spain, ~weden, Tajikistan. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey. Ukraine. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Vanuatu

lXe drap decision war adopred by 123 wtes to 1, with 45 ab~tentiom.

The Rg iden t (intepretation from French): 1 cal1 now on representatives wishiig to speak in explanation of vote after the voting.

Mr. Ryberg (Swédm): 1 wish to explain the vote of my delegation on dr& resolution K.

lt is a well known fact that for decades Sweden has worked actively and wnsistently for nuclear disarmament and for an ultimate total ban on nuclear weapons. However, Sweden abstained in the vote on draft resolution K. It is the view of the Swedish Government that, taking into account the ment request made to the international Court of Justice by the World Health Orgauization on this topic. one furthet request to the Court would probably cause an unfomtnate delay in the ongoing work of the Court on the issue of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, if the General Assembly daides to request the Court to render an advisory opinion on the question set out in the draft resolution. it is important that the Court give its opinion without unnecessary delay. Hence Sweden was against the deletion of the word 'urgently" from the text of the operative paragraph of drafî resolution K.

The Swedish Government is of the opinion th$ the use of nuclear weapons would not be in wmpliance with international law and is anxious that the legal s i m i o n be clarified by the Court as soon as possible. in this wntext, the Swedish Government would like to recail that last June Sweden, in wmection with the request from the World Health Orgauhtion. officially stated to the international Court of Justice that the use of nuclear arms would not be in accordance with international law. This reply was based on a report by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament, approved by Parliament last June.

The Parliament stated, inter alia, that ever sioce the nini of the c e n ~ r y there has existed in intemationai law a

9ûîb meeting 15 December.1994

. . p ~ c i p l e under which belligerents do not have an unre.stricted right to choose weapons or methods of combat. in the Parliament's opinion, the use of nuclea~ weapons would be restncted by t h e priaciples of distinaion and proponionaiity uoder customary international law, as they relate in particular to civilian pobulations and property. and by 0th- general fundamental legal p ~ c i p l e s recognized by civilized nations.

The Parliament, in ils report, notes funher that the pMciple of proportionality is embodied in the law of the Charter of the United Nations. Reprisais that are dispmportionate by wmparison with the provocation that preceded them are prohibited. It would be dificult to regard this p ~ c i p l e as coqsistent with the use of nuclea~ weapons in retaliation against an anack using w n v e n t i d weapons.

The President (iniepreration from French): May 1 take it that it is the wish of the Generai Assembly to wnclude its wnsideration of agenda item 62?

It war so decided.

Agenda item 63

Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the Genersl Assembly: report of the First Committee (A149/7ûû)

The h i d e n t (inrerpretation from French): The Assembly bas before it five draft resolutions raeommended by the First Committee in paragraph 17 of its report.

1 shall put the five draft resolutions to the Assembly one by one. After al1 the decisions bave been taken. representatives will have an oppominity to explain their votes.

We tum fim to drafî resolution A entitled 'United Nations Disarmament inforn ion Programme".

The First Committee adopted dr& resolution A without a vote. May 1 take it that the Assembly wishes to do likewise?

Drap resolution A war adopted (remlution 49/76 A).



The F'resident (inrerprdarion from Frmch): May 1 take it that il is the wish of the Gcneral Asscmbly to wnclude its wnsideration of agenda item 64 as a whole?

Ir war so decidai.

Agenda item 65

Ismeli nuclear armament: report of the &~ommittcc (M49/702)

The Resldent (inrerprdan'on from French): 'lbe Assembly will now <akc a decision on the d d ~ resolution reeommended by the First Committa. in paragraph 8 of iw report.

1 cal1 on the reprcsentative of Boîswana for an explanation of vote before the voting.

Mr. Boaq (Botswana): Although my dclegation will vote in favour of the draft rtsolution wntained in documau AiC.1149iL.ll1Rev.l and in paragraph 8 of doaimmt Ai491702. mtitlcd 'ïbe risk of nuelear pmliferation in thc Middle East", we ~IC wmpcllcd to doubt the faimeM of operative paragrapb 1. We would have wisbcd that thc paragraph mention by name. if such namczallii was consideml necessary. al1 the Stata nupected of developing, pruducing, tcsting or othcrwiac acquiring nuclear weapons.

The Resident (inrerpretationfrom Frmahj: I mrï put to the vote the draft resolution rsommcnded'by the F i t Committa. in paragraph 8 of iw rrpon. It is mtitled 'Thc risk of nucluir pmliferation in tlk Middle East".

A reeorded vote has been iquated.

A recordai wte wai taken.

In favouc Afghanistan, Algcria, Azerbaijan. ' Bahrain. Bangladesh, Benin. Bbutan. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Botswana. Brunei Danissaiam, Bu- Faso. Burundi. China. Colombia, Cuba. Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Eniador. Egypt. Guatemala. Guinea. Indonaia. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq. Jordan. Kuwait. Lebanon. Lesotho. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi. Malaysia, Maldiva. Mali. Mauritania. Mexico. Mongolia, Morocco. Mozambique, ~amibia, Niger. Oman. Pakistan. Philippines. Qatar. Republic of Korea. &di Arabia, Senegal. Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka. Sudan. Syrian Arab

Republic. Tbailand, Tunisia. Turkey. Uganda. Unitcd Arab Emhla , United Republic of Tanzania. Venezuela. Viet Nam. Yemea, Zimbabwe

~ ~ a i m t : Isratl, Marshall Islands, Micmmsia (Federated States of), United Statea of America

AbstaiN'n8: Albania, Andona. Antigua and Barbuda. Argentina. Armenia, Ausaali, A u h a , Babamas, Belanw, Belgium. Belize, Bolivia. Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Camemon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile. Comoms, Congo, Costa Rica. CO<e d'lvoirc. C d , Cypru?. Czah Republic. Dnimarlr, Djibouti, Dominica, El Salvador, Eriuea. m a , Ethiopia. Fiji. F i a a d . France, Gabon. Georgia. Germany. Ghana. Graece, Grenada. Guyana. Haiti. H o m , Hungary, Iccland, India, k l d , ltaly. Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyntsn, Latvia, Liechteustein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta. Mauritius, Monaco, Myanmar, Ncpal. Netherlands, New Zeaiand. Nicaragua, Nigcria. Nonvay, Panama, Papui New Guinea, Paraguay, R N , Poland, Portugal. Republic of Moldova. R o d a . Russian Federation, Saint Kim d Nevis. Saint Lufi. Saint V i t and the Gmadims, Samoa, San -Marino. Siapore. Slovakia. Slovmia. Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Surhame. Swedea. Tajikistan. î l e Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo. Trinidad d Tobago. Ulrraine. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem I~eland. U~guay . Uzbekistan, Vanualu. Zambia

ï k d m resolun'on wai adoptai by 60 wtes to 4, with 100 abstentions (rtsolution 49/78).

l a e Residmt (inrerprRofion from French): May 1 takc it ihar it is chc wish of the General Assembly to wnclude iw wusideration of agenda item 65?

Agen& item 66

Coavmtion on Roblbiîlom or Restricîiom on the Use d CertPln Conventional Weapom Which May Be Drcmed to Be Excesdvely hJurious or to Have lndlPerlmlnate ERsts: report of the Flmt Cornmittee (N49nû3)

Tbe Rsldeii t (Uueprwation from French): The Asscmbly will now take a decision on the draft ~esolution

General Assembly Fonv-ninth session

901h meeting 15 Deamber 1994

rewmmended by the F i t Commitîee in paragraph 8 of its mit.

The Committee adopted the dran moluti& without a vote. May 1 take it that the Generai Assembly wishes to do the same?

The dr@ rcsolurion wac adopfed (molution 49/79).

Tùe Rerident (inferpraarion from F m ) : ' M ; ~ 1 takc it that it is the wish of the Gmcral Assembiy to conclude its wusideration of agenda item 66?

. . if was so decided.

Agenda item 67

Question of Antarcüca: rep01I of the F M Committee (A/49)704)

The Rerident (inferpram'on from French): The Assembly will now take a deciiion oi the drafi molution rccotnmended by the First Comminee in paragraph 7 of its mit.

The First Comminee adopted the draft resolution without a vote. May 1 take it that the Genaal Aasembly wishes to do the same?

. , 4. .

The Resident (inferprefafion from ~rmd;): May 1 takc it that it is the wish of the General Ammbly to wnclùde its wusideration of agenda item 67?

Agenda item 68

Strengthening of sectuity and coopwatbn' in .tbc Meditmanean reglon: repor< of the Fkî CommIth (A1491705)

The Resident (inrerprctotion from French): The Assembly will now take a decision on the drift molution rccommended by the F i Commitîee in paragraph 9 of its npon. . .

The draft molution was adopted 'by the F i Comminee without a vote. May 1 amsider that the Asscmbly wisba to do the same?

The P d d e n t ( i ~ e r p r a o h ' o n ~ m French): May 1 take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to wncludc its wusideration of agenda item 68?

Ir w so decided.

Agenda itan 69

Implementation of the De&mtion of the indian Ocean. as a Zone of Peace: report of the Fû-st commiace (A/49/706)

, .

Tbe Resideat (inf~rpreI&ioII fiom French): The Assembly will w w takc a decision on the draft miution mpmmnded by the F i t Comminec in paragraph 7 of its repart.


. . , . ' . A &n*d wre w ruken. . .

~n f&r: : ,.~fghauistm.' Algeria, ~ n t i & and Barbuda, Argentina. M a , Austraiia, Azerbaijan.

. Èahamas. Bahrain. Bangladesh. Barbados. Belans. Bel?. Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana. Brazil. . , Brunei Darussalam. Burkina' Faso. Burundi. Cambodia. Camemon. Canada, Cap Verde. Centrai African Republic. Chie. China. Colotnbia. Comoms. Congo. Costa'Rica,Cbte d'Ivoire. Cuba.

. . Cyprui, Deuxmatic People's Republic of KOM. Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador. Egypt. El Salvador. Eriaca, Ethiopia, Fiji. Gabon, Gambia, 'Ghana. Grenada. Guatemala. Guinca. Guyana. Haiti, Honduras, India. Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of). Iraq, Jamaica. lapan, Jordan. Kazakhstan. Kenya. Kuwait. Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lcsotho, Libyan

. . Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi. Malaysia. Maldives. Mali. Marshall Islands. MaUritania. Mauritius. Mexico; Micmmia (Federated States of). Mongolia, M o m . Mozambique. Myanmar, Nagibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Niwagua. Niger, Nigerja, Oman. Pakistan, Papua New Guinea.

, Panama. Paraguay, Pem, Philippines, Qatar, Rcpublic of KOM, Russian Federation, Saint Kim and Nevis. Saint Lwia, Saint' Viœnt and the Grmadines, Samoa. San Marino, Saudi Arabia,

'

ScMgal. Seychelles. Sie* Leone. Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surioame. Syrian Arab

General Assembly 90th meeting Forty-ninth session 15 Deœmbet 1994

Statemmt by the Resident

The Resident (interpretofl'onfrom Frmah): 1 Msh to welwme the signing by Ulraine of the Tnaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclcar Wcapons. 1 believe that this signature opens a new and historic era in the pnrcss of the e i i i i o n of nuclear wcapons. 1 wish to congratulate Ukraine's leaders for this courageous act.

nie meeting rose ai 7.20 p. m.

PART II

A. - G E N H W ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1653 1 XVI 1

General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) entitled "Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons" (No. 13) was adopted at the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly on 24 November 1961 under agenda items 73 and 72. The legislative history of the resolution is as follows:

1. On 15 July 1961, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America requested the inclusion in the agenda of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international controln.(A/4799) (N0.14)

2. By letters dated 17 and 28 July 1961, India requested the inclusion in the agenda of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal." (A/4801 and Add.1) (No.15)

3. At its 1014th plenary meeting held on 25 September 1961, the General Assembly included in its agenda the items mentioned above as items 72 and 73 respectively, and at its 1018th plenary meeting on 27 September 1961, the General Assembly allocated the items to the First Committee for consideration and report.

4. At its 1169th meeting on 18 October 1961, the First Committee decided by 83 votes to 10, with 4 abstentions, to list item 73 as the first item on its agenda. At the same meeting, it decided by 54 votes to 13, with 31 abstentions, to list item 72 as the second item,on its agenda and to discuss it simultaneously with item 73.

5. Draft resolution (A/C.l/L.292) entitled "Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weaponst* concerning items 73 and 72 was submitted on 24 October 1961 by Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, the Sudan and Tunisia. Guinea, Liberia, and Togo also joined the sponsors (A/C.l/L.292/Add.l-3). (N0.16)

6. At the 1189th meeting of the First Committee, on 8 November 1961, Ethiopia introduced draft resolution A/C.l/L.292. (No.17, paragraph 4)

7. Discussion on draft resolution A/C.l/L.292 took place from the 1189th to the 1194th meeting, held between 8 and 14 November 1961. At the 1189th meeting, on 8 November 1961, statements were made by Senegal (N0.17, paragraph 5), the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (No.17, paragraphs 10 and 13), and Poland (No.17, paragraphs 15 and 18).

8. At the 1190th meeting, on 9 November 1961, statements were made by the United Kingdom (No.18, paragraphs 3 and 6-8), Romania (No.18, paragraph 9), Czechoslovakia (No.18, paragraphs 12 and 13), the United States of America (No.18, paragraph 15), Pakistan (No.18, paragraphs 18 and 19), Iraq (No.18, paragraphs 27 and 28), Cuba (No.18, paragraph 30), and Ivory Coast (No.18, paragraphs 31 and 32).

9. On 9 November 1961, Italy submitted amendments (A/C.l/L.295) to draft resolution A/C.l/L.292. (No.19)

.IO. At the 1191st meeting, on 10 November 1961, Italy explained its amendments (A/C.l/L.295) to draft resolution A/C.l/L.292 (No.20, paragraphs 1-3) and statements were made by the Dominican Republic (No.20, paragraphs 4 and 7), Ethiopia (No.20, paragraphs 8, 9 and 32), Italy (No.20, paragraphs 10, 28 and 31), Albania (No.20, paraqraphs 12-14), Mongolia (No.20, paragraphs 20 and 21), Tunisia (No.20, paragraphs 22, 27, 29 and 30), and Australia (No.20, paragraphs 34, 37 and 38).

11. At the 1192nd meeting of the First Committee, on 10 November 1961, statements were made by the United States (No.21, paragraphs 1-9), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (No.21, Paragraph Il), Cyprus (No.21, paragraphs 13 and 14), and India (No.21, paragraphs 15 and 16).

12. At the 1193rd meeting of the First Committee, on 13 November 1961, explanations of vote before the vote on the draft resolution and amendments thereto were made by the United Kingdom (No.22, paragraph 4), Hungary (No.22, paragraphs 5 and 6), Japan (No.22, paragraphs 7 and 8), France (No.22, paragraph 9), Burma (No.22, paragraph 12), Brazil (No.22, paragraph 13), Philippines (No.22, paragraphs 14 and 15), Senegal (No.22, paragraph 17), Ireland (No.22, paragraphs 18-20), Afghanistan (No.22, paragraphs 21-23), Sudan (No. 22, paragraphs 24 and 25), Yugoslavia (No. 22, paragraph 26), Italy (No.22, paragraphs 27 and 58), Saudi Arabia (No. 22, paragraph 28), Tunisia (No.22, paragraph 29), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (No.22, paragraphs 30 and 32), Peru (No. 22, paragraphs 33 and 34), Argentina (No.22, paragraphs 35 and 36), Uruguay (No.22, paragraphs 37 and 38), Canada (No.22, paragraphs 39-41), Spain (No.22, paragraphs 42-44), Denmark (No.22, paragraphs 45 and 46), China (No.22, paragraphs 47-50), Pakistan (No.22, paragraphs 51-54) and Venezuela (No.22, paragraphs 55-57).

13. At the 1194th meeting of the First Committee, on 14 November 1961, explanations of vote before the vote on the draft resolution and amendments thereto were made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (No.23, paragraphs 1 and 15-16),

Nigeria (No.23, paragraph 6), the United Kingdom (No.23, paragraphs 8-10), Turkey (No.23, paragraphs 11 and 14), Italy (No.23, paragraph 21), Upper Volta (N0.23, paragraphs 22 and 25), Colombia (No.23, paragraphs 26 and 27). Dominican Republic (N0.23, paragraphs 28 and 29), Cyprus (No.23, paragraphs 30 and 31), and Ethiopia (No. 23, paragraph 32).

At its 1194th meeting, on 14 November 1961, the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution and related amendments. (N0.23, paragraph 39)

Japan requested a separate vote on the first part of the sixth Italian amendment (see No.19 above). It was voted upon separately and rejected by a roll-cal1 vote of 50 to 25, with 25 abstentions. (No.23, for result of voting see paragraph 39)

The remaining Italian amendments were voted upon as a whole and rejected by a roll-cal1 vote of 50 to 28, with 22 abstentions. (No.23, for result of voting see paragraph 40)

Draft resolution A/C.l/L.292 was then put to the vote and adopted by a roll-cal1 vote of 60 to 16, with 25 abstentions. (No.23, for result of voting see paragraph 41)

The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of the draft resolution which was submitted as Draft Resolution II in Part IV of the Report of the First Committee (A/4942/Add. 3). (No.24)

The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced Part IV of the Report of the First Committee at the 1063rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on 24 November 1961. (No.25, paragraphs 1 and 2)

At the 1063rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly, explanations of vote before the vote on the draft resolution were made by Canada (No.25, paragraphs 4-9), the United States of America (No.25, paragraphs 10-22), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (No.25, paragraphs 34-37 and 40- 61), the United Kingdom (No.25, paragraphs 70-83), Pakistan (No.25, paragraph 84), Poland (No.25, paragraphs 90 and 96- 100), Thailand (No.25, paragraphs 102-105), Spain (No.25, paragraphs 106-log), and Ethiopia (No.25, paragraphs 110- 119).

At the 1063rd plenary meeting, the General Assembly voted on Draft Resolution II. A vote in parts was requested as well as a roll-cal1 vote on the operative paragraphs and on the draft resolution as a whole. (No.25. DaraaraDhS 122-126) . - - . The result was as follows:

Preambular Paraqra~hs

The first paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 62 votes to none, with 28 abstentions.

The second paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 63 votes to none, with 29 abstentions.

The third paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 63 votes to 1, with 31 abstentions.

The fourth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 62 votes to none, with 28 abstentions.

The fifth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 61 votes to 6, with 25 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (a) was adopted in a roll-cal1 vote by 56 votes to 19, with 26 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (b) was adopted in a roll-cal1 vote by 59 votes to 17, with 19 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (c) was adopted in a roll-cal1 vote by 63 votes to 12, with 24 abstentions.

Sub-paragraph (d) was adopted in a roll-cal1 vote by 52 votes to 20, with 23 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 1 as a whole was adopted in a roll- call vote by 56 votes to 19, with 26 abstentions.

Owerative Paraaraoh 2 Operative paragraph 2 was adopted in a roll-cal1 vote

by 53 votes to 19, with 29 abstentions.

The Draft Resolution Draft resolution II as a whole was adopted in a roll-

call vote by 55 votes to 20, with 26 abstentions. It became General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI).

22. After the vote, the United States of America (No.25, paragraphs 128-132) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (No.25, paragraphs 134-137) spoke in exercise of their right of reply. Upper Volta spoke in explanation of vote after the vote (No.25, paragraphs 139-142).

B. G ENEXAL ASSEElBLY RESOLUTION 33/71 B

General Assembly resolution 33/71 B entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear warn (No. 26) was adopted at the Thirty-third Session of the General Assembly on 14 December 1978 under agenda item 125 entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session." The legislative history of the resolution is as follows:

1. The above-mentioned item was included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third session in accordance with paragraph 115 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), adopted on 30 June 1978.

2. At its 4th and 5th plenary meetings, on 22 September 1978, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item 125 and allocate it to the First Committee.

3. The general debate on item 125 took place at the 4th to 19th meetings, from 16 to 27 October. The views expressed therein are contained in the verbatim records of those meetings (~/C.1/33/~~.4-19).

4. Draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2 entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" was submitted on 20 October 1978 by Algeria, Argentina, Cyprus, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Yugoslavia (No.27). The draft resolution was subsequently also sponsored by Angola, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burundi, Colombia, the Congo, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guinea, Jordan, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay and Zaire.

5. At the 18th meeting of the First Committee, on 27 October 1978, India introduced draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2. (No.28, pages 73-77)

6. As CO-sponsor, Ethiopia also made a statement on 27 October 1978 concerning draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2. (No.29, pages 24-25)

7. At the 51st meeting of the First Committee on 27 November 1978, India orally announced a drafting change to operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2. (No.30, pages 51-52)

8. At the 51st meeting, explanations of vote before the vote on the draft resolution, as orally revised, were made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (No.30, pages 53-56), and the United States of America (No.30, pages 56-57).

9. The First Committee adopted the draft resolution, as orally revised, by a recorded vote of 84 to 16, with 18 abstentions. (No.30, for the result of the voting see pages 57-60)

10. At the 51st meeting, explanations of vote after the vote on the draft resolution, as orally revised, were made by China (N0.30, pages 58-60), Japan (No.30, page 61). the United Kingdom (N0.30, page 61), Finland (No.30, page 62), Sweden (N0.30, page 62), and Viet Nam (No.30, pages 63-65).

11. The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2 which was submitted as raft Resolution B in paragraph 33 of the Report of the. First Committee on item 125 (A/33/461). (No.31)

12. The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced the Report of the First Committee on item 125 at the 84th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 14 December 1978. (No.32, paragraphs 54, 70, 73 and 74)

13. Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure, the Report of the First Committee was not discussed by the General Assembly .

14. At the 84th plenary meeting, there were no speakers who wished to explain their votes on Draft Resolution B. In a recorded vote, Draft Resolution B was adopted by 103 votes to 18, with 18 abstentions (No.32, for the result of the voting see paragraph 221). It became General Assembly resolution 33/71 B.

C. GENHUU, ASSEXBLY RESOLUTION 34/83 G

General Assembly resolution 34/83 G entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" (No. 33) was adopted at the Thirty-fourth Session of the General Assembly on 11 December 1979 under agenda item 42 entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special se~sion.~~ The legislative history of the resolution is as follows:

1. The above-mentioned item was included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-fourth session in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 33/71 B, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, M and N of 14 December 1978.

2. At its 4th plenary meeting, on 21'September 1979, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item 42 and to allocate it to the First Committee.

3. At its 3rd meeting, on 1 October, the First Committee decided to hold a combined general debate on the items allocated to it relating to disarmament, namely, items 30 to 45, 120 and 121. The general debate took place at the 4th, bth, 8th to 13th and 15th to 30th meetings, from 6 October to 5 November. The views expressed therein are contained in the verbatim records of those meetings (A/C.1/34/PV.4, 6, 8- 13, and 15-30).

4. In connection with item 42(d), the First Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General on non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war (A/34/456 and Add.1) (No.34). This report contained the views of 13 States on the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters as requested in operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 33/71 B of 14 December 1978. (For the relevance of this report, see text of General Assembly resolution 34/83 G in No. 21 above.)

5. Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26 entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear warn was submitteà on 15 November 1979 by Argentina, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia (No.35). The draft was subsequently also sponsored by Qatar and Uruguay.

6. At the 36th meeting of the First Committee, on 16 November 1979, India introduced draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26. (No.36, pages 31-35)

7. At the 42nd meeting of the First Committee, on 26 November 1979, 1ndia orally revised draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26. (No.37, page 36)

8. At the 42nd plenary meeting, the First Committee proceeded to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26. The United States Of America requested a recorded vote. The draft resolution, as orally revised, was adopted by a recorded vote of 100 to 16, with 14 abstentions. (No.37, for the result of the voting see page 37)

9. At the 42nd plenary meeting, explanation of vote after the vote on the draft resolution were made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (No.37, pages 38-40), Ireland (No.37, page 41) and Sweden (No.37, page 41).

10. The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.26 which was submitted as Draft Resolution G in paragraph 38 of the Report of the First Committee on item 42 (A/34/752). (N0.38)

11. The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced the Report of the First Committee on item 42 at the 97th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 11 December 1979. (No.39, paragraphs 2-4, 17-18, and 2'3-24)

12. Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure, the Report of the First Committee was not discussed by the General Assembly.

13. At the 97th plenary meeting, there were no speakers who wished to explain their votes on Draft Resolution G. In a recorded vote, Draft Resolution G was adopted by 112 votes to 16, with 14 abstentions (No.39, for the result of the voting see paragraph 69). It became General Assembly resolution 34/83 G.

D. GENERAL ASSEWBLY RESOLUTION 35/152 D

General Assembly resolution 35/152 D entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear waru (No. 40) was adopted at the Thirty-fifth Session of the General Assembly on 12 December 1980 under agenda item 44 entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special sessi~n.~ The legislative history of the resolution is as follows:

1. The above-mentioned item was included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-fifth session in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 33/71 H (sect. III) and L, 34/83 B, C, D, G, H, 1, J and M and decision 34/422.

2. At its 3rd plenary meeting, on 19 Se~tember 1980, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item 44 and to allocate it to the First Committee.

3. At its 3rd meeting, on 9 October, the First Committee decided to hold a combined general debate on the items allocated to it relating to disarmament, namely items 31 to 49 and 121. This general debate took place at the 4th to 12th and 14th to 28th meetings, from 15 October to 4 November 1980. The views expressed therein are contained in the verbatim records of those meetings (A/C.1/35/PV.4-12 and 14-28).

4. Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22 entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" was submitted on 14 November 1980 by Algeria, Angola, Argentina, the Congo, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Madagascar, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire (No. 41). Bhutan, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Malaysia, Qatar and Yemen subsequently joined the sponsors.


6. At the 39th meeting of the First Committee, on 21 November 1980, explanations of vote before the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22 were made by Ireland (No. 43, pages 57-65) and Japan (No. 43, pages 63-65).

7. At its 39th meeting, the First Committee voted on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22. The draft resolution was adopted by 101 votes to 19, with 15 abstentions. (No. 43, pages 63- 65)

8. At the 39th meeting, explanations of vote after the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22 were made by the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics (N0.43, page 66), Sweden (N0.43, page 67), and Finland (No.43, pages 68-70)

9. The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22 which was submitted as Draft Resolution D in paragraph 27 of the Report of the First Committee on agenda item 44 (A/35/665/ Add.1). (NO.44).

10. The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced the Report of the First Committee on agenda item 44 at the 94th plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on 12 December 1980. (N0.45, paragraphs 1, 4, 17, 23 and 27)

11. Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure, the Report of the First Committee was not discussed by the General ~ssembly .

12. At the 94th plenary meeting, there were no speakers who wished to explain their votes on Draft Resolution D. In a recorded vote, Draft resolution D was adopted by 112 votes to 19, with 14 abstentions (No.45, for the result of the voting see paragraph 108). It became General Assembly resolution 35/152 D.

E. GENERAL ASSEMûLY RESOLUTION 36/92 1

General Assembly resolution 36/92 1 entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" (No. 46) was adopted at the Thirty-sixth Session of the General Assembly on 9 December 1981 under agenda item 51 entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session." The legislative history of the resolution is as follows:

1. The above-mentioned item was included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly in accordance with its resolutions 34/83 K of 11 December 1979 and 35/152 A, B, C, D, E, F, H, 1 and J of 12 December 1980.

2. At its 4th plenary meeting, on 18 September 1981, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item 51 and to allocate it to the First Committee.

3. At its 2nd meeting, on 7 October 1981, the First Committee decided to hold a combined general debate on the items allocated to it relating to disarmament, namely, items 39 to 56, 128 and 135. The general debate took place at the 3rd to 26th meetings, from 19 October to 4 November 1981. The views expressed therein are contained in the verbatim records of those meetings (A/C.1/36/PV.3-26).

4. Draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.29 entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear warw was submitted on 16 November 1981 by Algeria, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nigeria, . Peru, Romania, Yemen and Yugoslavia (No.47). Bangladesh, the Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the Niger, Qatar, Rwanda and Sri Lanka subsequently joined the sponsors.

5. At the 32nd meeting of the First Committee, on 17 November 1981, India introduced draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.29. (No.48, pages 36-40)

6. At its 40th meeting of the First Committee, on 23 November 1981, the First Committee proceeded to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.29. A recorded vote waç requested. The draft resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 99 to 18, with 5 abstentions. (No.49, for the result of the voting see page 21)

7. At the 40th plenary meeting, explanations of vote after the vote on the draft resolution were made by the German Democratic Republic (No.49, page 22), Sweden (No.49, pages 22-23), and Ireland (No.49, page 23).

8. The First Comrnittee recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/36/L.29 which was submitted as Draft Resolution 1 in paragraph 32 of the Report of the First Committee on agenda item 51 (A/36/752). (No.50)

9. The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced the reports of the First Committee at the 91st plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 9 December 1981. (No.51, paragraphs 1-3, 6 and 7)


11. At the 91st plenary meeting, there were no speakers who wished to explain their votes before the vote on Draft Resolution 1 . In a recorded vote, Draft Resolution 1 was adopted by 121 votes to 19, with 6 abstentions (No.51, for the result of the voting see paragraph 133). It became General Assembly resolution 36/92 1.

12. At the 91st plenary meeting, an explanation of vote after the vote on Draft ~esolution 1 was made by Greece (No.51, paragraphs 146-149).

P. GENHULL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 45/59 B

General Assembly resolution 45/59 B entitled "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" (No. 52) was adopted at the Forty-fifth session of the General Assembly on 4 December 1990 under agenda item 57 entitled "Review and implementation of the concluding document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly: Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons." The text of the draft Convention was annexed to the draft resolution. The legislative history of the resolution is as follows:

1. The above-mentioned item was included in the provisional agenda of the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly in accordance with its resolutions 44/117 A, C, D, E and F of 15 December 1989.

2. At its 3rd plenary meeting, on 21 September 1990, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item 57 and to allocate it to the First Committee for consideration and report.

3. At its 2nd meeting, on 9 October 1990, the First Committee decided to hold'a combined general debate on the disarmament items allocated to it, namely, items 45 to 66. The deliberation on those items took place from the 3rd to the 23rd meetings, from 15 to 30 October. Consideration of and action on draft resolutions on those items took place from the 24th through 39th meetings, from 2 to 16 November. The views expressed therein are contained in the verbatim records of those meetings (A/C.1/45/PV.24-39).

4. Draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25 entitled "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" was submitted on 31 October 1990 by Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt! Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia. (N0.53)


6. At the 34th meeting of the First Committee, on 12 November 1990, an explanation of vote before the vote on A/C.1/45/L.25 was made by Hungary. (No.55, page 23)

7 . At its 34th meeting, the First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25 by a recorded vote of 106 to 17 votes, with 10 abstentions. (No.55, for the result of the voting see page 28-30)

8. At the 34th meeting of the First Committee, explanations of vote after the vote on the draft resolution were made by Poland (No.55, page 42), Sweden (No.55, pages 42-43), and China (No.55, pages 46-47)

9. The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25 which was submitted as Draft Resolution B in paragraph 15 of the Report of the First Committee on agenda item 57 (A/45/779). (N0.56)

10. The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced the reports of the First Committee at the 54th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 4 December 1990. (No.57, pages 3-10)


12. At the 54th plenary meeting, there were no speakers who wished to explain their votes on Draft Resolution B. In a recorded vote, Draft Resolution B was adopted by 125 votes to 17, with 10 abstentions (No.57, for the result of the voting see page 63). It became General Assembly resolution 45/59 B.

G. GENERAL ASS-LY RESOLUTION 46/37 D

General Assembly resolution 46/37 D entitled "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" (No. 58) was adopted at the Forty-sixth session of the General Assembly on 6 December 1991 under agenda item 61 entitled "Review and implementation of the concluding'document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly. The text of the draft Convention was annexed to the draft resolution. The legislative history of the resolution is as follows:

1. The above-mentioned item was included in the provisional agenda of the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly in accordance with its resolutions 44/117 B of 15 December 1989 and 45/59 A, B, C, D and E of 4 December 1990.

2. At its 3rd plenary meeting, on 20 September 1991, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda as item 61 and to allocate it to the First Committee.

3. At its 2nd meeting, on 10 October 1991, the First Committee decided to hold a combined general debate on the disarmament items allocated to it, namely, items 47 to 65. The deliberation on those items took place from the 3rd through 24th meetings, from 14 to 30 October. Consideration of and action on draft resolutions on those items took place from the 25th through 37th meetings, from 4 to 15 November. The views expressed therein are contained in the verbatim records of those meetings (A/C.1/46/PV.25-37).

4. Draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20 entitled "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weaponsw was submitted on 31 October 1991 by Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia. (No.59). Bolivia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic subsequently joined the sponsors.

5. At the 31st meeting of the First Committee, on 7 November 1991, India introduced draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20. (No.60, pages 20-23)

6. At its 33rd meeting, on 11 November 1991, the First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20 by a recorded vote of 96 to 17, with 20 abstentions. (No.61, for the result of the voting see page 13)

7. At its 33rd meeting, explanations of vote after the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20 were made by ~ulgaria (No.61, pages 31-33), China (No.61, pages 34-36), Czechoslovakia (No.61, pages 36-37), and Finland (No.61, pages 41-42).

8. The First Committee recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20 which was submitted as Draft Resolution E in paragraph 20 of the report of the First Committee on agenda item 61 (A/46/674). (No.62)

9. The Rapporteur of the First Committee introduced the reports of the First Committee at the 65th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 6 December 1991. (No.63, pages 3-4 and 6-8)

10. Pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure, the Report of the First Committee was not discussed by the General Assembly.

11. At the 65th plenary meeting, there were no speakers who wished to explain their votes on Draft Resolution E. In a recorded vote, Draft Resolution E was adopted by 122 votes to 16, with 22 abstentions (No.63, for the result of the voting see page 36). It became General Assembly resolution 46/37 D.

The Ceneml Assembly, Mindfrrl of its mponsibility under the (aa. of

the United Nations in the maintenance of innrnationd peace and security, as weil as in the wnsidcration of principles governing disarmament.

Grauely concemed tùat, while negotiations on dL- armament have not so far achieved satisiadov d b , the armaments race. particularly in the nudear and thermo-nuclear fields. has rrached a dangvotu dagc requiring dl possible precautionary m u r m to tect humanity and civilbahon frnm the nuclear and thermo-nudcar catastrophe,

& Recalling that the use of weapom of masa *c-

tion. causing unnecessary h u ~ sufferhg, w a ~ in the past prohibited, as king ~011- to the laws of ity and to the printiplea of international kw, by international declantions and binding agreements, such as the ~edarat ion of St Petersburg of 1868, the Declara- tion of the Brussels Conference of 1874. the Gmnn- tions of The Hague Peace G n f m of lm and 1907, and the Geneva Pmtowl of 1925, ta which the majority of nations are still &es,

Conridering that the w of nudcar and . th- . nuclwr weapons wouid bring about indis.- suffering and destruction to m d b d a d a d i d o n to an even greater extent than the use of +se anapoPs dedared by the aforcmmtioned internanonal dcdan- tions a d agreements to be wntmy to the la* of humanity and a crime undu international kw,

, . on the rohibition of , a d tg--+ 13

Belinring tùat the use of weapons of mas9 da<nrc- tion. such as nudcar and thumo-nudear weapons. ia a dirm ncgation of the high ideais and objediva wbich tbe United Nations &a been utabikhcd ta achiem through the protection of su&g gmuations from the scourge of war and thmugh the prescrvatioa and promotion of th& cultures.

1. Dechrcs t&t : (a) The use of n u d k and thenno-nudear weapolls

is contrdry to the spirit, letter and aima of the United Nations and, as such. a direct vîoiation of the Charter of the United Nations;

( b ) The use of n u d a r and thumo-nudear would acced ep.m the sfope of war and ~t ise m- discriminate mffeMg and despuaion to mankind and àvilization and. as such, is ow to the & of intemationai ky and to the laws Y humanitg;

( E ) nie use of nndear and thumo-nudear weapons ia a war directed MI against an cnemy or d u aione

but Y- st i t d in guiual, since the p p h of the wor d not inmlved in sncb a war arin be abject- ed to aü the cvils gmerated by the use of such wzapons;

( d ) Any State ntide;u and thcmo-mdear weapor ia to be oxd u riolahg the Qnnr of the United Nations, u acting wntmy m the h m af humani9 .and a ummitting a crime agaiprt mui- land and avdkiion;

2. Requests the SecruaryGencral to amuit tbe &-ma of Member Statu ta o~certain their vie- on the possihiiiiy of wnmtmg a mnf- for signing a convention on the prohi inon of the use of auclcar and t h c r m o - n u k weapons for war porpo~o and to report on the resulb of nich wnsultation m the k e a i Assunbly at its seinntcuith session.

1 United Kingdom of Great Britaiti and Northern Irelaad and Uaited States of Ameriea: reqaest for the inciusion of an item in the provisional agenda of the sir<eenth saision

; [Agenda item 721 [OrigËial text: Englisli] 14

115 Julv 1961 1

On the instmctions of Our respective Governments ire have the honour to request that an item entitled

' T h e urgent need for a treaty to ban nudear weapons tests under effective international control" be included in the agenda of the sixteenth session of the Generai -4ssembly.

.%ri explanatory memorandum is attadied in acaord- ance with d e 20 of the tules of procedure of. the Gcneral Assembly.

(Signed) P. DEAN Ptrmanenl Represcntah7:t of the

United Kingdom of Great Britain and iVor thm Ireland io the United .Votions

(Signed) Francis T . P . PLIYF-TON Deputy Pertnunent Representaiivr of

the U n i t d States of A>nmi-a Io the United Nahons

A n n u u (XVI ) 73 and 72

EXPLANATORY YEXORANDUY

1. At its past six sessions. the General .4ssembly has given serious consideration ro the problem of the ces- 'ation oi nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons tests. In a iiiimber oi resolutions-the last of which was adopted on 70 December 1960-the .4ssembly has recognized the imperative and urgent need for agreement l>y treary on stich a bai. To this end. it has urged the three Srares negotiariiig in Gmeva to make every effon to 2chiej.e stich agreeiiient iinder coriditions oi appropriate iiiteriiational control. .\t the sanie tinie. while iiegoiintioiis ivere in progress. the Gcneral .\ssembly urged the negotiating States t o refrain vo lu i~ r~ i ly froiii the testing of niiclear and thermo-nuclear iveapons.

7. The Cnited States and the C'nited Kingdom GOV- erniiients are conscious of their responsibility hefore the ititernarional community and of the importance Of a test han agreement to general world peace and securit:. For these reasons the? have negotiatcd patient!? with the Soviet Union in Geneva for nearly three yexs to achicïe a ban on nudear weapons tests which would be open for adherence by al1 States. For these reasons the? have reirained {rom coiiducting iiuclear and thermo- nuclear test5 sirice negotiations commenced iii October !'IjS. During al1 this period. however. there has Ixeii I IO iiiternational rerification to eyi t re that no clandes- tine nuclenr Lveapons tests are being conducted by any iiation. The Soviet Union has ;teadfastly resisted !he adoption of key mevures of international control which alone could d o r d a reasonable degree 01 assurance, to al1 States that the parties to a treaty are adhertng to their obligations. It niust be recognized that the voliintary forbearance of the United States and the Knited Kingdom to conduct nuclear weapons tests. iinder such conditions. involves a serious risk to their security.

. 3. In keeping with General .4sscmbly resolutioii

1578 ( X V ) of 20 Dceember 1960. the United States and the Vnited Kingdom introduced at Geneva. on 21 Jlarch and 29 'ilay 1961. a large number of far- reaching compromise proposals dealing with the principal issues unrsolved between them and the Sovict C'niort. These proposals would not only give the Soviet L:tiion and States associated with it a position of ab- solute equality with the United States, the Cnited Kingdom and States associated with them on the policy- making control commission and throughout the control system: they would alsogo as far as possible. consistent ivith the technical and organizational rquircments of effective control. to accommodate Soviet sensitivities on the subject of control. hioreover. the United States and the Vnited Kingdom introduced on 18 April 1961 a complete compromise treaty text which they are prepared to sign immediately or to use as a basis for iurther serious negotiation. A copy of this treaty was circulated to the Munbers of the United Xations on 3 Jiine 1961 (A/4772).

4. The Soviet Union. on the other hand. did na heed the counsd of the General Assembly "to make evew effort to reach agreement as sam as possible". It has failed to respond constnictivcly to the initiative oi its two negotiating parmer? I t has not introduced a single positive proposal within the past year and a half. Instead, since 21 March 1 x 1 , the Soviet Union has retreated from agreements dready rcachcd. Its niost significant badcward step was a new proposal that &y-by-day executive authority over the international control s y s t ~ k urcrOscd bv a three-rnankr administrative council (including rcpraatat ives of the two nuclear s i du and a neutral represmtative) whjdi could act only by unanimous consent. ï h i s proposa] retracted the Soviet Union's earlier agreement on a single administrator. who would be appointeri with the concurrence of the Soviet Union, who would cary out the directives of the treaty m d of the policy-making control commission, and who would be responsible to, and op ra t e u n d a , the supervision of the control commission. While such a single administrator could take action rapidly and impartially, under the three-man administrative council proposa1 any action could be blocked, or delayed by any of its members.

5. The Soviet Union justifies its proposal for a three-member administrative council by assming that "no person can Iive in a society without being influennd by same ideology o r othei and by the rcbmonships - . e~is t ing hetween differmt groups within that society. That is a h y there are neutral countries but there are, and a n be, no neutral persans."'

6. 'The United States and United Kingdom Gov- ernments categondly repudiate any suggestion that there are no people capable of exercising independent judgement on behalf of the international community. Indeed, the whole history of international organizations bears witness to the contrary. The two Governments believe that the Çoviet rejection of the idea of an international civil servant acting impartially under guidance from international policy-making organs can only h viewed as an attack upon the executive capacity of any international organization to act effmively.

7. The United States and the United Kingdom reject the Soviet proposal for the appointment of three- iiian committees. composed of representatives of States or of suppsed blocs of States, in whidi al1 action would have to be taken hy unanimous consent of $1 three-a further opportunity to add to the many individuai vetoes the Soviet has cast in world d a i r s during the post-war period. They a re convinced that al1 iiations which do mot wish the domination of great Powers will likewise r e j m it.

8. The Soviet Union's position is further based on other inadequacies which frustrate the concept of effective internationd control. Chief among these are: (a) the determination to limit inspection of suspicious events in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to three annually: ( b ) the demand for a delay of four years after treaty ratification M o r e control operations could begin; and (c) insistence on provisions permining self-inspection, for example, by turning over direction of ail controi posts and inspection t m s in the Soviet Union to nationais of the Soviet Union. Moreover. in introduung the specious cun- tention that the control arrangements proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom could be misused for espionage purposes, the Soviet Union has not only overlooked the far-reaching safeguards biOlt into these arrangements to obviate any nich danger, but has also, in effect. repudiated a contml system of the scope recommwded by the Grneva conference of experts in August 1958.

9. Confirming its unwillingness to comply with the numerous Gencrai Assanbly resolutions urging ewly

reement on a nuclear weapons test ban. the Soviet ag . LILIOII now disinisses the significance of a separate [ e t y . I t proposes instead thai a treaty banning nuclear .tapons tests should await agreement on. and perhaps indecd implementation of, general and complete dis- ,rmaiiient. This proposal reverses the Soviet Unioii's ,arlier position; it can only k concluded that this is king done in order to avoid any cominitment now on , iiuclear iveapons test ban to which al1 States could ,ccede. The IJnited States and the United Kingdom 3re opposed to delaying a test ban treaty until agree- i,ieiit on total disarmament can be worked niit. The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear \\'eapons Tests has shown that a treaty under reasan- ,ble and effective international mntrols is possible: beiore the soviet Union started reversing its positions. the conference had such a treaty well within its reach. The United States and the United Kingdononi believe !ha1 the progress made in nearly three years of nego- :+aiion should not be given up, but that efforts shoiild continue until an agreement has been reached. They belirve that an adequately coiitrolled nuclear lveapons :est k i i agreement conclitded at an early time would be oi inestimable value for (a) halting dangeroiis prolifera- lion in nuclear weapn capabilities; ( b ) eliininating br ever conceni over fail-out; (c) providing an ngreed

tirsi step toward controlled disarmament : and f d ) geii- erally comiiienciiig a process which could build con- fideiice ainong nations and decrease the danger oi rvar.

10. The present attitude of the Soviet Union. as iiiiderliiied by recent notes o i its Governnient. does norhing to iiarrow differences between the two sides: iiidce<l. it h s enlarged them. Consequenrly a seriour impasse has been reached. Recognizing the importance oi thrse negotiations to the security and peace of the intertintional com~nunity. the Go~ernments of the L'iiited States and the Ciiited Kingdom believe that the Geiieral .\ssenibly should coiisider at its sixteenth seijion the critical situation that now confronts the coiiierence. The two Governments are prepared to pre- jeiit 3. iiill espositioii. of their petiormance in carrying oint the General Assenibly maiidair. It is the hope of 110th (;overnments that a treaty for cessation of nuclear weqmis tests iinder adeqiiate international control may \.et he xchieved and the' stand reaiy to coiitiniie nezo- tiatio;is at Genera to this end. The importance oi such ni i agreement as a first step in reversing the dangeroiis aiid I~iircleiisome amis race can hardly he over- estiniated. The nations of the a.orld miist take this opportiiiiity of taking a first significant step townrd endiiring world peacc.

. 1 Note by the Govemmurt of the Soviet Union to tk Gamm- ment of the United States of Amen- datcd 5 Jdy 1961, mb mittefi bp. the USSR dei+eatiar at the 91«i meain d the Gaion Gnference on the Disanrtinuance of Nudeu keapoa, Tes& (GES/DNT/I13).

DOCUMENTS A / 4 8 0 1

India: request f o r the inclusion of an item in the pi rovisional agenda of the sixteenth sesnion l il

[.ignida itein 731

Document A / 4 8 0 1

Letter dated 17 July 1961 f rom the representative of lndia to the Seeretary-General

[Original tr.rt: Englisli] [ l 8 Jirlv 1961 1

1 have the lionour. iiiider the instructions of my Gov- rrniiient. to propose for inciiision in the provisioiial qenda of the sisteenth session of the General .issembly rie item "Siispension of niiclear and thernio-nuclear ICSIS".

. i n esplanatory ineiiiorniidiiiii will follow shortly.

(Siqned) C. S. JHA Per~~ionent Rzpresentatiue oj India

to the United Nations

Document A/4801 /Add.I

h r dated 38 July 1961 f r o m ' t h e np r r sen ta r ive of India to t he See re t a ryCenerd

[Original tr.rt: English 1 . (28 Julv 1%11

1. 1 have the honour to refer to my letter dated :7 July 1961 yroposing that the item "Suspension of nudear and themo-nuclear tests" be included in the provisioiial agenda of the sixteenth session of the General .4ssembly.

2. 1 have now to request. under the instructions of my Government, that the title of the item should be changed to read as follows:

"Contiiiu~tion of siispension of nuclear and thermo- nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewai".

3. .An explanatory memomdum in accordance uith rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the. &neni .%ssembly is attached.

(Signed) C. S. J H A

Prr i~ ianr~i t Reprrsmiatire of lndia to the United "fations

1. .At its 933th pienary meeting. on 20 December 1960. the Gencral Assembly adopted two resolutiona (resolutions 1577 (XI') and 1578 ( X V ) ) urging the States concerned to coiitinuc the present voluntsry suspension of nuclcar and thermo-nuclear tesü. Reso- lution 1578 ( X V ) further rquested other States to . reirain from undenaking such ta t s . The resolutions referred to the progress that had been made towaids agreement regarding the discontinuance of t h a e tests by the parties concerned a t the Ceneva negotiations and urged the successful completion of their endeavours.

2. Though prorrafted discussions in Gcnora have resulted in agreement in regard to a numbcr of dauses of the proposed draft of a wcaty, the negotiations. which were raumcd in Mardi 1961, have reached a stale- mate which thretens to endanger evcn the uneasy "moratorium" on t h a e tats . Statcrnents on behaif of the differcnt parti- concerned about the possible re- newd of tests in case agreement is nnt reached. as well as the contemplateri limitation of the period of moratorium. give a u s e for serious anxiew.

3. The Government of India, in commoii with large nuinbers of Mmber States as wdl as an ovenvhelmiiig volume of tvorld opinion. is deeply concerned at the danger that tests may be conducted either by those ob- scrviiig the presmt moratorium or by States no: yet parties to i t It may still lx hoped that the Powers with greater rcsponsibility will find ways and means of implementing the successive resolutions of the United Sations. more rticularly Cenerai .4ssenibly raolutioii 1578 (XV). Xwever , the failure to reach agrnment and the circumstances tvhich have led to and sustained the sialmate are aknning. They do not at present appear to be amenable to the various efforts at compromise that have been made at Geneva.

4. In view of the technological advances. the spread of the relevant knowledge to an increasingly large number of nations. the continuance of worid tensions and the indication of desire on the pan of nuclear Powers to renetv tests whether or not another coitntry indulges in t h , it has hecme imperative to ensure rheir prohibition. It is the view of the Covemmrnt of India that any State which resumes these t s t s would. bcconie pnmarily responsible for the detefioration af the entire position. They consider it essenhal not only that the attempts to reach agreement .on a treaty bc resiimed withont delay but that. pending such result, the States principally concerned. as well as al1 other States. should undertake not to contempiate the uni. Iateral resumption of .tests. They are convinced that a considered appeal to ail States by the Assembly, particularly those most directly concerned. to take no initia. tive in re-starring nuclear or therm~nudear tests would have the ovemhelming support of world opinion. It would act as an effective restn.int on those who. for ivhatever reasons. are wnsidering or may m~isider the resumption of tests unilaterally.

5. The Government of India, therefore. submit foi incliisioii in the agenda of the sixteenth session of the Geiieral Assembly ail item embodying these considen- tioiis entitled "Continuation of suspension of nuclcar ancl therino-nuclear tests and obligations of States to reimin from their renewal".

Slxteetitb. sesalon FIRsT COMCTPEE Agsn& i t r ~ and 72

CC'ZINLUITION CF SSPEIISION OF WCIEAR AND THTRl!O-NUUZRR TBT3 Mill OBLTGA2ïO:iS OF S'IATES 'RI RERULN iTOM RFNtWAL

Ceylan,. EtUopla, Ghane,Wbya. Rigeria, Somlia, Suclan, Tunisia and Indonesia: d m f t reeolutlon

The General Aeserribi:~ - Mindful of its responsibility under the Cherter of the Lh:ted Nations in --

the maintenance of infernationa1 peace and secÜrity, as ve l l as i n the

consideration of principies gave* disarmament,

Gravely cencerned that vbile negotiatione on disarmamen', have not, eo far, achieved satisfactory resulte, the anasmente race, particularly i n the rmcïear

and thermo-nuclcar ficlLe, ha8 reached a âangemue stage requirlng a l l possible

precautionary meaeurea t o pmtect httmenîty and i t e civ',lîzation frum the hazard

of nuclear and thernr>-nuclear catastrophe,

Recaiiing t+t the use of veapoas of &se destniction, causiilq unneceasory

human sufieri& nas, i n the paet, pmhibited ae belng contkr-y to the l a w s of

humanity and t o the principles of international h w , by internafiou81 d e c l a r a t i o ~

and binding agreement, such as the Dechration of St. Petersburg of z68, the

Dechration of the Brussels Conference of l874, the Convention8 of The Bague

Peace Conferences of a 9 9 and 1907, and the Genm Protocol of 1925, to vhich

the majority of nations are a t i l l partiee,

Considering that the uee of wciear and thermo-niiclear weapone Muld bring

about Indiecrinrinate euffering and deetmction to mankind and l t s civillzatlon

A,&. i;;t. ' 9 2 ~# E3gUsh '

Page 2

t o an even g rea te r extent t b n the uee of those waponî dcclsred by t i e

aforeeentioued interuatLonal d e c h r a t i o n s asd agreezcnts t o be cont raq- t o t t e

h % r s o f humcnity iind a c r i ze under in te rna t ional l a w ,

E e l l e v i q tha t t he use of weapons o f mas destmction, such a s nuclear and

thema-nuclear voapons, is a d i rec t regation of t h e h i * i d e d s and objectives

vhich the Ucited Zations has Seen establ ished t o achieve t trough the protection

of succeeding gcneratiocs ?rom the scourge o f vs r and through t h e prescrvetion

and'prormtion o f t t e i r c d t u r e s ,

1. Declares:

( a ) l t a t t h e use of nuchar & thenno-mxlesr weaCons is contra:y t o the

s p i r i t , l e c t a r and aima of the W t e d Hat?.om and, a s such, a diroc? vLo,et:cn

o i the United Nations Charter;

(b) Tha? t h e use of nvciesr ,and the--ouclear veocns i -~idd exceod even

the s c ~ p e of ,Jar ecd cauze i n a l s ; r i r d s t e suffer ing and destrrrczion t o mckicd

and i ts c i v i l i z e t i o n an?, w such, 1s contraAg t o the d e s of in t c rna t ioae l L w

and t o the la;rs O? h-kity;

(c ) lüat t h e ase o i m i c l c s r and thermo-auclear wea?ons 1s a var dl rec ted

not 'against a n en- o r enemies alone but 8J.60 again& rpaGkind i n gencrsl , since

the peoplee of the vorld mt. involved i n such war vlll be subjactéd t o a ï i the

evils generated Ly t h e use of euch veapons;

(d) That any S t a t e using nuchar and thermo-miciear weapons 1s to be

ennsiaered to v l o l a t e the Charter of t h e ünited &tiona, to a c t c o a t r o r j t o the

lave o f humanity and ' t o c d t a crime age ins t mmkinl and its ci-rlLizatioz;

2. Reauests the Secretarj-Ceneral to c o n s d t the Covernments O? :&&ber -- States t o a s c e r t a i n t t e i r v i e ~ on t k s p o s s i b i u t y of ccn-?eni= a s p î c i s l

conference f o r s igning a convention on t h e pmhibi t ion of the use o f nu-lerr and

thermo-mclear weapons f o r war purposes and t o report on thc r e s u l t s of ou:h

consuLtation t o t h e seventeenth session of the General Asaenbly.

u H , r ~ . ~ j,j'À'y(o~s. Matr.

G E N E R A L LPrrPeD . .

A S S E M B L Y ' . ~ / ~ . 1 / ~ . ~ 2 / A d d . l 9 October 1961

ORIGINAL: ENCLEH

sixteefith sess ion rniT cor.?,amE .4;er..la items 73 and 72

CObmIPilJATIGN OF SUSPENSION OF NCCLEAR AND TREKJ-NCCLEAR TESIS AND OBLIGATIOllS OF STATES !iü REFRAIN FROM 'IHEIR RENEWAI.

THE URGENT NEED FOR A mn TO PAN N'CW GIEAFOP~S IBIS UNDER EFFECTIVE IhTERNATlONAL CONTROL -

Ccylon, Ethiopia, Chana, Libye, Nigeria, Soinilia, Suàan, n i n i s i a and Indonesia: draft resolution

idd Guinea to the l i s t of sponsors o f the draft resolution.

U N I T E D N A T I O N S Mstr. LMTED

G E N E R A L A/C. I/L. 292/:idd.2 . .

A S S E M B L Y 8 November 1961

ORIGINAL : ENCLlSH

5ixreezt.i s e s s ion FiRST COI,IAlT!I'E .kgenEs items 73 and 72

COBTI?R'ATICN OF ÇGSFLt:SICN OF NCCLEAR AND Ti3ZRM3-,WCLEAR TESTS Ai'D OELI~TIOXS OF STATES TO i E 7 R A I N FROM THEIR RENEWAL

T E üRCEI;T NEED FOR A TXATi' Tû WN NtCLE4R lJEAFONS TESE UNLE27 rnPECTIVE IN'WNATIONAL CONrnOL

Ceylon. E th iop la , Ghana, Cuinea. Libya, Niner ia , Somalia, Çudan,Tunisiaand Indonesia: d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n

Aùd L i b e r i a t o t h e l i s t of sgcnsors of the d r a f t r e so lu t ion .

-----

United Nations

GENERAL ASSEMBLY Sl.YTE.?3TH SESSION

~, . ofiid Recordt NEW Y O R K

CONTENTS

,qgenda items 73 and 72: Continuation o f suspension o f nuclear and

Idermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain fmm Weir renelval (con- w e d ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

nie urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weamns tests under effective international 10. *. 'I3MUF'laN (Uaton <rl Soviet F+ control (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . publics) said that hie deleptionls attitude ta k e hm

draft resolutimui More the Committea defi-d direct-

Cïuzinner: Mr. Marfo AMADEO (Arqentlna).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72 Continuation of suspension of nuclear ond thennonuclear

tests and o9ligotlons of Swm to nfrain fm choir m- newal (Al4801 and Add.1, A / C I / L 2 3 1 / R n . l , A/C1/ L292 md gd.1) (continued) .

The urgent naed for a tnaty to ban noclwr weapons t e s i under .Hectiv. intemotional ontiol (A/4799, A/Cl/ L.292 and Add.1) (continuid) ., . ..

4. Mr. (IEBRE-EGZY (Ethiophl ;id that the draft m soi ut ion t b t aow appersdindoormutnt~/~.lh.292 and ~dd.1 had orfginally been nibmittedtotheAssem- bly at ito mteenth KSS~OILY ~hepurpose &the dechration It mnbœUed was 0 p h i M t ths use of d e a r and the-nuclear weapona for nnp mason ahatao- ever. It did not lnsist upon the conclusion of a heaty at the present Jrmchuc. but Its ndOptiûn WOLII~ be an effective f lrst step bwnrds the UlUmate pmMbima by treaty d the use ai d e a r w q o ~ ta rettle disputes between nations. Be mged the Camnitî8e to put the M t msolutlon to the n>te as soon as possible.

S. Mr. CISSE (Senelpl) safd that bie Megation, t ~ - gether with a mrmber al other Africao dalegatim.

. had submitted an sinendment (A/C.lh.293 and Addl and Add.l/Corr.l) to draft nsolutlun A/C.l/ï.291 and Add-l Now that tim sponsors bsd submftted a reviscd version (A/C.lh291/Reo.U d tbat M, b mked for the vote an it to be postponed paadfne consultation btween the sponsors d the amendment. That. however. shouïd not stand in the way d a vote on draft resolutlon AfC.lh232 aad Ml. .ma . ~

- -- -. - - - - ly ïmm the prtndpies rmder~yl=~ ovietforeippoiicy, the xnain praposee of whicb were to defend pence. to remove the threat d war and to p m o t e the peacefui coexistence d Statas with düferent social systems. The %ml& Unton had almye supported and muid olwaya support any cansmictive measPreshavingthose aima. It b l f e d that a aeatyonganeraland complete Qtaarmameni shouïd b concluded without &lay. and had frequentiy madn spscfiio pmpoaah ta that ad- pmposa1s aihich toolq hto accormt au the pcsitive! slements in the position of the Western Pomrs. The programme for -rai and complet4 diammuent aibmitted by the Chairrmn of the CormcflofWsters ûi the USSR, &. Khruahchev. at the theteenth session ûi the ûeneral AaaemblyU muid souad basls for asmemmt: the h e t Uiiimi WM ta aie a tre.5 d ganeral and complet4 d h m a & n t Iaovlding for the strictegt inteanaîioml conml lm- lbedhteiy. Althou@ tbat wuuid b the boat mathori cd cmauring pence. agreement cmùd d s o b mached on Cenain partial maamms which would halp memwhiïe to reduce Inîernationsl tension sndîncmasr mnfldence m n g States. Accordingiy. them couidb w doubt that &e hw draB maoiuslm noar Wore the Commit.- W d help ta atmngmm paaceontheAiircanamttnent M to i m p m the international sibuon. 0..

13. As.far an dmit molrrtion A/C.Ut29.?andAdd.l cwe c<mwrnsd the & ~ U O l l it embodbd wdd .ct ui a mdtnbie baoin f o r s o l d n g t à e ~ d pnhîblb Ing the use af mriclm an-. Ths sudet ulllon belleved, M it alwaya ha& -the m e m ol the amrld must be mved frOm tbe thmat d llllclaa~ au. It i1Bd of* pmpossd O the WesternPmmm tbnt ümm .hould bs an q?wment to b.n d e a r mmpotm, a but for theit ranistance that pmùiem wdd ha? ban iettled long ago. The Soviet , t W a -rpb

dum (A/4892) made the point that r dedamib bp the &aar States thu tbey W d n o t ~ i m d o a r ~ amad help O aapaia the pmed for r g e n e r e . i d m m p l e h ~ ~ < r t . U a h o i l t d b s r + d e d fn tbât ûûmexh thrt cha aenaa R O t O d pmhmitiollthe UEe d p o i s o n ~ a n d ~ g l a l mapone if h d Qmwd d e c t i m in lam&c% in a0 Second Worid War. In aontrast O the F h t , auab weapona h d not b e n ueed, .Itùon@ ümy hrd Thue ulehere was na rensonwtiplt&not bs plmanle tomohthittheUEedmiclear.nd&asapana wu& wem mon more mmatrow. fn the muam-lny: HLa delemtion muldtàereiam rnmaortddtraa1luCi8n Is/c.l/L292 and Addl Both dr& zceolutinnn bd& the Cornmitka d e c t e d the amcern d the pwplea, ai the arorld attheüueatalanuciearau.andümlr idoption would bs a d6p townnia enanl snd comphb diaarmamsnt.

la. a. WINIEWlcz (Pom M . - 18. Draft rsaolutloa A/C.lh292 and Addl con^- tuted a d@Jmns app0.I a-t the une ai d e a r weapons. 'and had the rupport d hia delègst:on. R should be pofnted out. however. that only gaienû and complete disarmiunent could flnôIly d h h a t e tàe danwr of nuclear W.

Y p d i m ~ a i m ~ i t d ~ ~ g . ~ ~ oQar G u a . d -WC.I MUUS d W- apnd* dg~mnuCeamaa17Jw 1 9 U ~ d N ~ ~ m n S d ~ ni. m. lm. No. mQ.

United Nations FiRST COMMiTKE, 1190th 1E MEETING GENERAL

ASSEMBLY SIXTEENTH SESSION

OBicial Recordr

Thursday, 9 November 1961. a t Il a.m.

N E W Y O R K

C O N T E N T S Page

Agenda items 73 and 72: Continuation of suspension of nuclear and

thenno-nuclear tests and oblleations of

whatever degree of force was necess?rJ' in order to repel a w s a i o n .

8. Ais delegation wouid vote againat the &aft res* lution. since it felt that the course of action proposed in it wouid serve no usefui purpose.

States to refrain from tbeir renëwal (con- &!@).' .......................

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weap6ns tests under effeciive international contml (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

-

Chafman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentinal.

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72 Continuation of suspension of nuclwr and them-nuclwr

tests and obligations al States io refrain l m their r c newd (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/849, A/Ç1/84), A/C. l / L . l / R i v . l and Rev.l/Add.l. A/C.l/L.292 md Add.1-2) (continued)

rile urgent nied For a tmaty to ban nuclear weapons tests undn effective iniernatianol wntml (A/4799, A/C. l / 849, A/C.1/850, A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2) (cmtinued)

3. Sii Michael WRIGHT (United W o m ) - - - i . --~urning to arait resolution A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2. he said that an uncontmlled ban on the use of nuclear weapons would be no more effectiw than the previoua uncontmlled moratorium on nuclear testlng. which had been cynically disregarded by the Soviet Union. A s recently as 5 September. the Chair- man of the Councfl of Minieters of the USSR. MT. Khrushchev, had said In an interview in Moscow that a pledge to refrain fmm the use of nuclear weapons would be meaningiess since a nuclear Power which felt It was losing a war would unquestionably malte use of such wespons: he had gone on to aay that onïy disarmament couid enaure worldpeace. The objectives sought by the sponsors of the draft resolution couid be achieved onïy within the framework oi general and complete disarmament carrfed out in balanced stages and under effective international contml. a s provided In the joint statement of principles for diaarmament negotiationa agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879). He was gratified that the President of Senegal had supported that approach to the pmblem in his statement to the General Assembly on 31 October (1045th plenary meeting).

7. With regard to the statement in ohra t ive paragraph 1 of M t resolution A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2 that the use of nuclear weapons would constitute a d i rec t violation of the United Nations Charter. hs wished to point out that the Charter recognized the right of individual and collective self-defence, wbich, in the vlew of hi6 delegation. lmplied the right to use

9. MT. MEZINCESCU (Romanis) said thathisdelega- tion wouid vote Ln faaiur cd boib draft resoluttons before the Cornmittee. He a p e d with the United Kingdom representatiw U t the danger of W couid be elimlnated onïy withln +e conte* of general and complate disarmament. That. however, m a no argii- ment against adopting measures calcuiatedto i m p m the political cllmate and facflitate the resimiption of negotiations on general and complete diSaZmament: indeed. in view of the deterioration of the international situation and the increased rlak of nuclear mr. suct measures were essential. Altho- the goalofpPohlbiG ing nuclear weapona and eliminating them f m m the arsenal8 of States-a goal tO which ail nations should shive-could be attained only through the implementation of a treaty on genenil and complete diaannament under strict i n t e r n a t i d contml. draft reSoluti0n ~/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2. whicb was essentially a condemnatlon of nuclear aggmssion. Fould help to pmmote fuhue negotiationa with a vlsw tO a c h i e h g it. The Romantan delegation muid not agree with the United Kingdom representatiw that the draft resolution couid serve no usefui purpose-th- Sir Michael Wrlght was douùüess reilectingtbe general NATOview whsn he aseimied a position whicb BrnWIItedb rejeCt- h g all me-s by the e n e n i l Assembly l W l y to reduce international tension and to aug~eeting U t the Assembly should take no steps to impmrs the luter- aational .StInOsphere. but ahould memly eeek to e n - cerbate the cold war. The Rominlia dele@tiondidnot regsrd the tw d d t resoluüona a s a panama for al1 the wrld ' s flls: it was conrlnced. bmewr . chat they could easrt a poaitiw Lnfluence on the hswlopment of intemational relations. 0 .- 12. Mr. KURKA (C~Echo~lovalda) said that us GO~, e-nt h-l alwaya supported pmposals forpractical measures aimed at lesseaing international tension, hp-g mlatirm between States and cnating famurable conditions for general and complete disarmament. The sociaiist coimtrles, desiring as they did to aChiew poaitiw results in disarmament n e p tk t iom and reduce the danger of nuclear n r , constantly atresaed thelr willinuness tocanyout such measurea lmmediately: the &%et ~ove&ent. for elrample. had mt forward constructive umwsaïs Ln its - - -~~~ -

memorandum-of 26 September 1961 (~14892).

13. There could be no doubt chat adoption of the taro irait resolutions before the Commlttee would belp to achieve the aime he had mentioned. To pmhlbit the use of nuclear weapona would be a s t tp towarda pmhibiting their manufacture and towardatheir final eliminatlon from the arsenala of Stataa. whlch shouid be carried out wi th t . the framework of general and complete disarmament. The fact that the United Klng-

dom representative had spoken agalnst dTUt resolution A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2 showed that there was stfll a contradiction between the words and the deeds of the Westem Powers in matters of disarmament. The argument that the draft resolution in question would be of no practical value because i t made no pmvision for control could not be accepted. Although general and complete disarmament under effective international control was undoubtedly the most reliable means of elimlnating the danger of nuclear war. a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons wouid certainly help to avert that danger. A comparable agreement. the Protocol pmhibiting the Use in Warof Asphyxiating, Poisonous o r other Cases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. openedfor signature at Geneva on 17 June 1925.u hadproved effective in the Second World War. In any case, a convention of the ldnd envisaged would not ohlige countries t0 undertake any specific measures. so that the question of control was irrelevant. His deleption would support that draft resolution. . - - 15. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) said that the comprehensive plan of generai and complete disarmament placed before the Generai Assembly early in the session (1013th plenary meeting) by the President of the United States. W. Kennedy, provided that disarmament should be carried out in stages containing balanced. phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be completed in an agreed period of time. That plan provided. in the first stage-in other words. at an earlier stage than in any other plan so far submitted-that States whichhad not acceded to an effective test-ban treaty should do 80, that the production of fissionablematerialsforuse in weapons should be stopped and that agreed initial quantities of fissionable materiale fmm p s t production should be transferred to non-weapons purposes. The plan further pmvided that when armaments reached prescribed levels. the arrnaments in depots should be destmyed o r converted to peaceful uses. That was the basic position of the United States Covemment with respect to nuclear and thermo- nuclear arma and to the eventual elimination. pursuant to the United States plan of generai and complete disarmament, of al1 nuclear and thermo-miclear weapons. Moreover. the United States a twd ready to sign immediately an effective treaty banning nuclear weapons tests not only inAfricahutallwer the world. . .. 18. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistanl . .- 19. With regard to draft resolution A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2. the aim of which was to ellminate the use of nuclear weapons in case of war. his delegation considered that it could more appropriately be discussed against the background of the question of general and complete disarmament. However. if the Committee should decide tlmt it was relevant to the two items on nuclear tests and should vote on it, Pakistan would support operativè pragraph 1. althougb the drafting of sub-paragraph (al of that paragraph could be improved on. Hia delegation found greater difficulty in supporting operative paragraph 2. The paragrapb related to one aspect of general and complete disarmament. which should be discussed in i ts proper context. Yet several representativeblncluding the

representative of the Soviet Union. who had only recently declared that his country would discuss the question of nuclear weapons tests only in the context of general and complete disarmament-wereprepared to support the proposal to convene a conference for the purpose of signlng a convention pmhibitingthe use of nuclear weapons in case of war. The best course would be to defer the draft resolutionfor consideration under the general headingofdisarmamenr: the position might then be clarified. If that course was not followed. ~ a k i s t a n Would ahstain on operative paragraph 2. . .- 27. Mr. SULAIMAN (Iraq)

i8: 'Hls delegation wouid alsosupport draft resolution A/C. 1/L.292 and Add. 1-2. The mliddraftinecritlcism of operative paragraph 1 (5) made by the riPresenta- tive of Paldstan might be met by removing the word 'letter" o r by adding the word "Charter" alter the words "UnitedNationsW. Thedeterioration in the international situation was clearly reflected in the resumption of the arms race, and particularly inthe renewed competition in nuclear weapons. Yetboth sides already possessed enougb nuclear weapons to destmy notonly each other but most of the rest of the world. The target of such weapons was not armies, but peoples themselves. who were now hos taps at the mercy of any potential enemy. The prospect that faced the world was self-annihilation: little pmgress had been made towards averting that catastrophe since the first atomic bombs had been dmpped in 1945. The least that the Assembly could do, therefore. was to adopt a declaration stating that any country which used nuclear weapons was committing a crime against manldnd and civilization.

30. MT. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba) said that to de-nuclearize Africa would be to decolonize it. Once colonialism disappeared f m m Africa. no African State would consent to the testingor storingof nuclear weapons on i ts territory. The colonial Powers had taken to using their colonies for teating in preference to their own territory: his dele tion would therefore support dtaft resolution A E . i / ~ . z g i ~ v . i and Rev.l/Add.l. It was not enough to put an end to tests. however, since the nuclear Powers already b p t vast gtockpfles of weapms a t their various militarybases. many of which were maintained in foreign countries against the wlshes of their peoples and Oovemments. Ris delegation would accorâingly also support draft resolution A/C. 1/L.292 and Add.1-2.

31. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) .- - 32. His delegation had voted in favour of the suspension' of nuclear tests: but i t also belleved that the use of nuclear weapons should be pmhibited. since that would certainly do much more harm than tests alone. It would therefore vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-2. He was @ad tonotethat the proposal had the support of many delegations..and in particular that of the socialist countries. since at one time it had seemed f m m the statements made by the Powers most concerned that the Committee's labours would be in vain. Operative paragraph 2 was particularly important: if a convention prohibiting theuseof nuclear weapons was signed. tests of such weapons would automatically be rendered unnecessary. Thus the draft resolution pmvided a solution to theproblem of tests without linldng i t to general and complete disarmament. It only remained for the Western Powers to support it.

I/ L e i p of Niumr. T r e i < y VOL Z N . 1929. Ne. 2118.

Nstr.

G E N E R A I LP~TB)

A/C.l/L.295 9 November 1961

ORIGINAL : ENGLLSH

. - 5ixt.eer.th session rm'i COI.II.IIT?ZE h;erSa items 73 and 72

C~~?I'IMJATIGN OF ÇL'SPINSION OF W C ~ R AND m - m c m 'IEÇ'IÇ AND ORLIGATIOIE OF S T A W 'IO REFRAIN FROM m m RENEVAL

'l'HE ~ ~ ~ m ' l ' NEED FOR A m m 'Io PAN N C C M ~ ~ P I ç m m EFFECTIVE INPERNATIONAL C O ~ L

Italv: amendments to draft reçolution A/C 1 1 ~ 292 and ~ d d - G a G ' < " .

ia. Sudâa_Toao, . . ia,

"1. In the fiith preambular paragraph. reading as i o l l o~~s :

. " 'Bc! i lz ing that the use oi meapons oi mass destruction, such as nudear and thermo-nuclear weapons. is a direct negation of the high ideais and ohjectires tvhich the United Nations has been established to achieve through the proteciion oi succeeding generations from the scourge of war and through the prescrvation and promotion oi their cultures.' "insert the words 'conuary to the Chaner' oi the u'nited Xations' aiter the words 'such as nuciear and thermo-nuclear weapons'.

"2. I n operative paragraph 1 (a), insert at the beginning the words 'The threat or use of a m e d force. including' ; and i n s m the words 'in any manner contrary to the Charter of the United Nations' after the xvords 'thenno-nudear w a p n s ' .

"3. in operative paragraph 1 (b ) , ' insert at the begtiining the word '.\ccordingly'; and insert the lvords 'contrary to the Charter of the United Nations' aiter the words 'thermo-nuclear weapons'.

"4. In operative paragraph 1 ( c i , insert at the Ixginning the tvorcl 'Accordingly'; and insen the irorcià 'contrary to the Chaner of the United Nario~is' aiter the words 'the-nuclear weapons'.

"5 . In opcrative paragraph 1 (d), insen the words 'contrary to the Chaner of the United Satians' aiter the words 'themo-nudear weapons' ; and delete the 1,vords 'as viokting the Charter oi the Cnited Sations.'.

"6. In operative paragraph 2. suhstitute the worrls '!O consider the means of prohibiting' ior the words 'for signing a convention on the prohibition of': and insert the words 'contrary to the Ckarter of the United Sarions' aiter the words 'for ivar purposes'."

:r United Nations

i GENERAL ASSEMBLY SIXTEENTH SESSION

RRST QMMillEE, llgl~f 20 .-. . . . . MEETING <

Friday, 10 November 1961. at 11 am.

. . O f i i d Recordc ' N E W Y O R K

CONTENTS Page


thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States ID refrain from their renewal (con- -[z51 k e d ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The urgent need for a treaiy to tmn nuclear weapons tes k under effective international contml (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chainnmi: Mr. Mario A M A D E O (Argentinal.

A G E N D A ITEMS 73 A N D 72 Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thenno-nuclear

tests and obligations of Stata ta refrain fmm chair rr newal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.l/L291/Rev.l and Rev.l/Add.l-2, A/C.l/L292 and Add.1-3) (continuedl

ihe uqmt need for a tmaty ta ban nuclear weapons tests under *ffeaive international contml (A/4799, A/C.l/ L292 md Add.1-3) (continuedl

1. MI. b¶ARTïNO (Itaiy). explaining his delegation's amendmenta (A/C.l/L.295) to dr3A resolution A/C.li L292 and Add.1-3. said the Soviet representative had etated at the 1189th meetingthatsincetheunco~olled and umrerified ban on chernical and bacteriologlcal warfare embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 had been observed, there was no reason to believe that a simflar ban on miclear weapons waild not ai80 be effective. Kowever, the anaiogy was a p w r one. The beliigerents in the Second Worid W a r hsd Imown that the use of chemical and b~rfologlcalweapone would not have prwed decisive and would merely have provoked immediate retaliation: the ban had been observed out of self-interest rather than humanitarianiam. Nuclear weapons. on the other hsnd, appeared to offer the o p p o m t y of t a t a victory w e r an enemy. Furthennore. the use dnucbarweapons by one Power would compel other Powem to use them, and as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Mr. Khnishchev, had et& in an interviewinbfoscow on 5 Sentember. a miclear Power whichbelieveditseif to be I;>sing a bar would unquestlon~ly make use of Lts miclear weapons. Hence, the baaniag of nuclear weapons could be accomphhed oniy wübîntheframe- work of a disarmament programme based on the principles agreed upon by, the United States and the Soviet Union in September 1961 (A/4879).

2. The amendmenta proposed by his &leganonwould atrengthen the dra f t resoiution's condenmation of the U e of nuclear weapons by proclaiming tbat theh use vas contrary to the United Nations Charter.Bowever. it was to be hoped that the consukations referred to in operatbe paragraph 2 would help to bring about early agreement on general and complete disarmament.

3. U its amendments were adopted. his delegatlon would support the draft resolution.

4. Mr. SANCIIEZ Y SANCHEZ (Dominican RepubLic) . .. 7. The Dominican Republic would vote in favour of draft resolution .4/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3.

8. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that the effect of the amendments proposed by Italy would be to autborize tbe use of nuciear weapons on the pretaxr of seif-defence: they w r e thus io direct conflictwithtbe draft resolution. nie Italian represenktlve had con- tended that the United Nattons Charter permitted miclear war under certain circumstances. That was not so: the Charter did not permit war, l eas af a l l uuclear war. % r&ht of self-defence couid not be cited aa fustIficatim for the use of weapons whicb could wipe ait whole areas of the world. Natwith- standing the r e m a h of the Italian represenktlve. the Geneva Protocol of 1925, na d s o the d e r instniments refemed to h the third preambular paragraph of draft reeohtlonA/C.1/L*292 andAdd.1-3 and the Convention oq the Prevention and nrnfshment of the Crlme of Cenocide,Y had been lnspired by humanitarian rather than purely practlcal considerationa and had containad specffic prohfblttons oftbeuse of weapons d mas8 destruction. in 1946, bath the United States. in the Baruch planfor uuclear c ~ o l , l / and the Soviet Union. in the &ait convention wbich it had propwed. II had called for the baiining of nuciear weapons because of their indiacrimfnaîe nature.

U S ~ C ~ ~ d y n . o L 1 m ~ l l i ~ 0 . - 2 SeeOniclai R e c o n b of~eAmmlcEncmCommlsnm.Flm Year.

No.. ln masamg. m 4-14. I/ Ibld.. No. 2, a d m e . pp S l h

9. -much as the M a n amendmenta would completely sitar the m~ankig d the &ait resoiuüon sponsored by bis and eleven ather delegatlona (A/C.l/i.292 and f i l + ) , he wauid vote w t them. aud if they were adopted wnild vote ~ g a l ~ t the draft resolutioa

10. Mr. MARTINO W Y ) , r n p l ~ h ~ the Ethiopian representative. s d d that fa? eLatlng that the United Nations Charter permitLed the uAe of nuclear wespons, hg had condemned the ose ai mch WeapOM precisely because It ana ConPsrg to the le-r and spirit of the Charter. . - - 12. Kr. BUDO (Albani@ Said Lhat hb dekgation welcomed both the draft ntsoiutiolrs M o r e the Com- mittee and considerd that their rdoptlonwouldhelpto r a c e lnternatimal tenûion d increase conïidence between States, whlch in 8u-n would faciiitate the conclusion of an agreerne& on ganerd and complete disannament, the crucial pmblem af the present day. Bls Oavernment had dwaga ~llpPorted simiLu constructive proposala. Not only was it oppoaed tonuclear tests and the maintenance d a t o d c bases on foreign te r r i ton , but it waa In fmour af the destructfon of edating ntmkpfles and the prohibition ai michar weapm production. it would be rscalled in that con- nexfon that two years ap Albaoia. together WU the Soviet Union, had propoaed that the Balkaas and the Adriatic should be declared a zone free from atomic weapona and rockets.U His delegation was also in favour of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe. the Pacific and Africa.

13. if hi8 delegation had not aupported the two draft resolutions alrendy adopteci by the Committee it was because the negative attitude ah- by the United States in the Geneva negotintions lndicated @at the problem of nuclear tests could be solved only d,thin the framework of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. The purpose of the United States and the United Klngdom in submitting draft resolution A/C.l/L.280 had been to distract attention from the problem of disarmament. Tbey wiabed to have a free hand to continue the arma race and war preparationa, as could be seen from recent statementa by United States statesmen that their countryintendedtoachleve nuclear mperiority in ail fielde. Aa long as they pursued that poIicy, the threat of a nuclear war would continue. if the Western P w e r s reaiiywantednuclear testa to be prohlbited. they should respond to the Soviet Union's propmals for an agreement on general and complete disannament. 14. Rb delegation wouLd vote for both draft resolu- tiens n w before the Cornmittee. . r. 20: m. TSEVECMi? (IlboWpJua) . .* 21. Slnce the itm ai fts fore- poiicy was to strengthen pe=e througimut tbaworld, Mongollawould also 8uppo-t draft reaolirtion A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3.

22. Mr. BOU= W i n ) -. . 27. The draft resolution aponsored by twelve African and Aais. (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) was intended as a moral condemnation of nuclear war. It reflected the feelings of peoples all mer the world. U s approach tothequestionwas amora1,not a political one. The imperfections in &a drdrafting could easily be remedied. and ahouid not deter delegatlons from joining in what was basically 8a appeal to the General Assembly to declare the use of nuclear weapons to be moraiiy reprehensible. While t could of course be argued that the declaration should be considered under the heading of disarmament. It deait wlth a pressing question and. Ilke the resolutions calling for a moratorium on nuclear testa and a test ban trearp, warranted separate discussion: in atense international situation in wàich threats were being uîtered by each side in response to the aiieged war preparationa of the other. the adoption of a declaration ndlawlng the use of miclear weapons became a m W r of urgency. Tunisia regretted that the Itailan delegation had seen fit to submlt amendmenta to the draft resohtionwhich hsd the effect of dtstorthg ita essential senne. By injecting the question of the right ai seif-defence. an attempt was belng made to mwe the declaration from the mord to the poiitical leveL The Uaiian amendments sribatantially weakened the W , and he appealed to the Uallan dekgation to wlthdraw them.

28. Kr. MARTINO (Italy) asked the Tunisian repreaentative ln what w q theItallanamendmentsdisto-d the 8e-e of &aftresolutionA/C.l/L292 andAdd-1-3. The I W a n delegrdfon felt that the amendmenta would on the contrarg atrengthen the resolution.

29. Mr. BOUZIRI (Tuuiaia) said that the Ethiopian representative had effectively set fortb the Tunisian dekgatiou's abjectiolrs to the amendments, which were eo muneroue and tended to make the taxt of the draft resolution so imarieldy that their purpose could only be to distort its meanlng.

30. He wished to state that it 4 proper. under certain circumstaaces. to exercise the right of seif- dafence; in tact, the African continent ahould be

. encwaged to axercise that right at the present t h e . Hwever, there was no med to d e r tn the rigbt oi seIfdefence in draft resolution A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3, which waa deaigned to condemn the use of mtclear weapons under di circumstancea.

31. Mr. MARTINO (Itaiy) obeerved that hts delegation'a. amendmenta (A/C.l/L.295) coatained no reference to the rlght of seIf4efence.

32. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Etbiopia) said that, since the . Itallan representative now disclaimed any intention of

invoking the issue of seif-defence and had thua in effect accepted the theeis that nriclear war ras not permfssible under any circlimstaacen, the Itaiian amendmente no Iloager served any purpose.

9 S e Officiai Records of r n ~ c ~ m l Asicmbly, Fouriroirnsesri~n. PlmirvMeennq. 81fnh mrrunr. prns . 12Sl27.

34. Mr. PUMSOLL (Australla) obeerved thai the two draft resolutions before the Co-ittee brought into focus the grest problem of the United Nationa: how to go beyond mers expressions of aspirations and prin- CiPles and b t i t u t e concrete and affective m e m u e s for abolishfng not merely nuclear war, but war in general. . .. 37. Draft resolution A/C.l/L292 and Add.1-3sought to outlaw nuclear weapons; but there were other weapons of masa destruction-for example, bacteriological weapons-which might be e q u d y horrible in effect and scale. and the destmctiveness even of conventional weapona îended to be underestlmated. Moreover, the draft reaolution was not prsctical. Nuclear weapons existeci; the defence poiicy of several great Powers was based on the nuclear &terrent. and even if the draft resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority, none of the nuclear Poarers would destroy its nuclear weapons, hait production cd them o r cease to baae ite defeuce poiicy on the posaibility of e i n g them or of their being uaed by other great Powers. The Sovlet Unionhadthreatened.for example. that tta nuclear weapona could wipe out whole cities or whole countries; but it aùio no douht took into account the capacity of d e r cnintries to devastate its own national territory. The prospect waa ahorrible : one; however, its hormr was created not merely by the existence af nuclear wespons but by the very possibillty of war. Conaequently, the dr& mohition. by disregarding great Power poiicies as they were Ukely to exist for some tirne, was unreallstic and might ,even stand in the way ai endeavcurs to mach agreement on disarmament.

38. Australla would support the W a n amendments (A/C.l/L.295) because they took the declfcation embcdied in draft resohtion A/C.l/L292 andAdd.1-3 as far as s declaration caild go. But the Aesembly ahould be aiming at other forma of action: hinding agreements and detailed understandings. to be worked out in the vurious disannament bodies. It should be considering the prioritiee to be given to nuclear weapona and detailed messures to prwent their use, includlng the desirabflity oi demiïitarlzed o r * nuclearized' zones in msny parts of the world. The primary aim d all States, however, should be to do everything possible in their national and international poiicies to prevent the outbreak of war anywhere: for in the event of war eacb'side wouid be tempted t0 use whatever weapona it had at its disposal. including nuclear weapona.

FlRST COMMITTEE, 1192nd 21 M E E T I M G

ASSEMBLY SIXTEENTH SESSlON

Ofiial Records

Friday, I O November 1961. a t 4.30p.m.

N E W Y O R K



thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States ta refrain from their renewal (con- W d ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The urgent need for a treaty ta ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Arsentina).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 A N D 72

Continuation of surpension of nuclwr m d theno-nucleor tests and obligations of Stoter tu refrain fmm their r c newol (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.l/L.29l/Rev.l and Rev.l/Add.l-3, A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) (continved)

The urgent need for O treoty to bon nuclear weopons tests under effective intemotionol contml (A/4799, A/C. l / L.292 m d Add.1-3) (continued)

1. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) said that he wished first to emphasize that hi8 delegation appreciated and respected the motives of the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3).

2. He noted. however, that the draft resolution negiected to mention the elementary right of self- defence reserved to al1 States under the Charter of the United Nations. ïn that connexion, it yas relevant to recall the reply given on 5 Augwit 1961 by the Chairman of the Council of Miniatera of the USSR. Mr. Khrushchev. to a correspondent of The New York Times. who had asked him whether the Soviet Union was prepared to declare that it would never be the first nation-to employ nuclear weapons in a war. Mr. Khrushchev had replied that anyone who made such a statement, even in al1 aincerity. might find his words belied by events. for should there be a war and one side felt that it was losing. it would undoubtedly use its nuclear bombs.

3. Mr. Khrushchev had gone on to Say that world peace should be a s s v e d not by undertaldngs to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons. but by a radical Solution of the cardinal issues. the best guarantee of Peace being the destruction of armamenta and the elimination of amies-in other words. disamament. On that fundamental question. the UnitedStates agreed With the Soviet Union. a s had been demonstrated by the President of the United States. Mr. Kennedy. when he had submitted to the General Assembly (1013th Plenary meeting) a .programme fo r general and complete disarmament. The ultimaîe atm of the United States was to bnng about a free. secure and peaceful

world of independent States adhering to common standards of justice and international conduet and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law. a world in which complete disarmament would be achieved under effective international control. In order tofulfil that objective. the United States was advocating a series of specific measures, including the disbanding of al1 national armed forces. the elimination of al1 armaments. including weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. the institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements and the settlement of disputes. and the establishment. within the framework of the United Nations. of an international disarmament organization to ensure effective compliance with disarmament measures.

4. In the first stage oftheplanproposedby the United States, al1 States would adhere to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testlng of nuclear weapons. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons would be stopped and the reconversion of existing stocks would be undertaken. States owning nuclear weapons would be called upon not to relinquish control of such weapons to any nation which did not possess them and the latter would undertake not to attempt to obtain such weapons. A commission of experts would be established from the outset to report on the feasibility of the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

5. In the second stage. there would be further substantial reductions in the armed forces and armaments of States. including strategic nuclear weapons and countering weapons. ln the thirdstage.States would retain oniy those forces and non-nuclear armaments required to maintain internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force. The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited. except fo r those to be used by the United Nations peace force and those required to maintain internal order. Al1 other armaments wouldbe destroyed o r converted to peaceful purposes.

6. Nevertheless, pending the achievement of general and complete disarmament-and the United States pledged itself to exert every effort towards that end- that 1s. until a peaceful world was established with appropriate machinery for settling al1 disputes by peaceful means, within the framework of the United Nations Charter. no State could abrogate its rigtit of self-defence. recognized in Article 51 of the Charter. There was nothing in that Article which limited the right of individual or collective self-defence orstated what type of forces o r armaments might be used in repelling an individual o r collective armed attack. ïndeed, it wouldbe suicida1 to impose sucha limitation. fo r an aggressor might a m itself with weapons which the intended victim might not have. 7. Conversely, any use of armed force in a manner contrary to the United Nations Charter shouid not be

sanctioned. directly o r indirectiy. by a declaration referring exclusively to a particular weapon. More- over. the United States was against the use of al1 force when it was contrary to the United Nations Charter. In the twelve-Power draft resolution. it was proposed to outlaw only the use of nuclear and thermo- nuclear weapons. which would appear to indicate that the use of other types of force. even in violation of the Charter. might be deemed acceptable. For those reasons, the United States would be compelled to vote against the draft resolution in its unamended form.

8. The amendments submittedby the Italiandelegation (A/C.l/L.295) introduced new elements which the United States Government deemed appropriate.. As amended. the draft resolution would condemn not only the use of nuclear weapons. but the use of any armed force contrary Io the Charter. Accordingly. theUnited States delegation supported the Italian amendments. If they were adopted-and he sincerely hoped they would be-it would vote in favour of the draft resolution as amended.

S. The declaration under consideration was not afinal o r complete solution of the problem of the illegal use of force. The problem could be solved oniy by a general disarmament agreement which would secure the replacement of the use of armedforceby adequate peace-keeping machinery under the rule of law. Thus it was oniy by adoptingaplanfor generai and Wmplete disarmament. such a s that proposed by the United States. that it would be possible to bring about the abolition of al1 illegal use of force, not only in Africa but throughout the world. h t h e f i r s t stageof that plan. Statee would reaffjrm their obligations under the United Nations Charter to refrain fmm the threat o r use of any type of armed force contrary to the principles of the Charter.

. . . 1 . Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics). exercising his right of reply. pointedout that the question asked by the correspondent of The New York Times to which the United States representative had referred had called for a unflateral pledge by the Soviet Union that it would not be the firat nation to use nuclear weapons. The twelve-Pcnver draft resol lc tion. howewr. called for an international convention binding al1 States to refrain f m m the uae of nuclear weapone. Hence. the statement quoted by the United States representative had no relation to the question before the Cornmittee;

13. Mr. ROSSIDES (CyPmS) ... 14. Referring Io the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3). he stated that Cyprus was firmly opposed to war. in particular to nuclear war. and appreciated the motives of the sponsors. The draft resolution. however. dealt only with the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in war and made no reference Io the outlawing of nuclear weapons tests in peacetime. The sponsors could have either included a reference to tests in their draft resolution o r reserved the latter for discussion in connexion with the disarmament item. Nevertheless, despite that procedural aspect. the Cyprio! delegation would support the draft resolution.

15. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India)

a 0 0

16. With regard to the twelve-Power draft resolution. his delegation did not see how it was contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter and. specifically. Io Article 51. The sponsors were not seeldng 10 impair the natural right of States to self-defence: they simply considered. for the reasons given in the preamble to the &aft resolution, that nuclearweapons should never be used, even in self-defence. The ltalian amendments would therefore a m a r to go against the very spirit of the draft resolution. The hdian delegation would not, therefore. be able t0 support them. but would vote in favour of the &afl resolution a s it stood.

.. United Nations

GENERAL ASSEMBLY SIXTEENTH SESSION

Monday. 13 November 1961. a t II a.m.

. .

OfiiBl Records N E W Y O R K



thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (continued). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 -

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international contml (con tinued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~hainn&: Mr. Mario A M A D E O (Argentinal.

A G E N D A ITEMS 73 A N D 72

Continuotion of suspension of nucleor ond cherno-nucleor tests und obliootionr of States to nfroin fmm chair r c

5. Mr. LORINC (Hungary) . . . 6. If the twelve-Power draft resolution was adopted and implemented. it would he an important advance towards the f ina l abolition of nuclear weapons. The Hungarian delegation wouid therefore vote for it. On the other hand. it wouid vote against the Italian amendments. for the reasons already explained by the representative of Ethiopla.

7. Mr. OKAZAKf (Japan) satd that he would vote for the twelve-Power drait resolution because the disaster of nuclear warfare must be prevented by al1 means and the adoption of a resolution dong those lines m!ght have a stlmulating effect on the efforts k i n g made to achieve nuclear disarmament. However, Japan was not abandonhg its basic position on dis-

......

newol (A/&:- and ~ d d . 1 , A/C.l/ L.291/ Rev.1 and armament in general. It continued to maintain that

Rev.l/Add.l-3, A/C. l /L.292 ond Add.1-3) (c-d) every disarmament measure should he accompanied by effective international controi and inspection. The

The urgent need for O treotl to bun nuclmr weoponr tests adoption of the declaration would not in any way

under effective intemotionol contml (A/47W, A/C.l/ d u c e the necessity of tackllng the prohlem oi

L.292 nnd Add.1-3) (continued) nuclear disarmament. and should he followed by

. -. sincere efforts to reach agreement on more complete - - - 2. The CHAIRMAN sald that there were no more speakers in the debate on the two drait resolutions before the C o m d n e e , and tbat he wouid cal1 upon ' reDresentatives who had asked to explain their votes. ... 4. Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom) wished to explain the United Ktngdom's voteon the twelve-Power draft resolutlon (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3). His delegation welcomed the amendments suhmitted hy Italy (AE.UL.295) because they brought thedeclara- tion into conformity with the United Nations Charter. If thoae amendments were adopted, his delegation wouid support the draft re~0lutiOn as amended. If. on the other hand. the amendments were not adopted, it wouid regretfuïïy have to vote against the draft resolution. By voting against it. the United Kingdom delegation wouid not be voting against the elimination of al1 stockpiles of nuclear weapons or against the cessation of the production of such weapons. Those measures were an essential part of the programme for general and completa disarmament subrnitted by the United States, which the United Klngdom 'was eager to see adopted. . .

measures in the field of nÜclear disarmament.

8. The Japanese delegationunderstood theconsiders- tions which had prompted the Italian delegation to &mit ita amendments (A/C.l/L.295). However. it belleved that special importance ahouid be attached to measures designed to avert the threat of a nuclear war. It would therefore abstain in the vote on the amendmenta. In t b t corneldon. he requested a separate vote on the flrst part oi the s k î h amendment. reading "Suhstihite the worda 'to consider the means of pro- hihiUr@ for the worda 'for slgning aconventionon the prohibition cd>'. If a eeparste vote was rsken, the Japanese delepiion wouid vote in favou of thit part of the amendment.

9. Mr. LEGENDRE (France) said he reoognized that the principles underlying the declarationin the hvelve- Power draft resolution were genemus ones. but questioned whether such a dec@ration represented an appropriate and effective approach to the basic pmblems facingtheCommlttee: to reduce international tension and to make gradua1 progress towarùs real disarmament. In the present-iay world, a world in which undertaklngs made one day were suddenly withdrawn the next. to try to begin with measures involving purely moral obligations. without controls o r sanctÏons. Aght well have the effect of intensiiying mistrust and increaslng tension. The Frenchdeleeation therefore hoped that the Committee would retÜrn to real disarmament measures accompanied byeffective international contml and would not allow itself to be diverted f m m ihat course. Moreover. the references that had heen made to The Hague Convention of 29 July 1899 and to the Geneva Protocol of 27 June 1925 prohibithg the use of chemical and hacterio- logical weapons had been misjudged: those weapons were t w dtfferent fmm p r e s e n t d y nuclear weapons to bear comparison with them. In the view of the French Gwernment. as it had been stated by the representative of .France at the fourteenth session (1030th meeting), solemn but unverifiable moral prohibitions left distrust in existence. and such declarations should be included in an over-ail plan only when other measures, themselves contmllable and controlled, had contributed to re-establishhg a minimum of international confidence.'/ For thosfi reasons. the French deleaation would vote against the declarailon. which, whllebell intentioned, was actually oointless and illusom. if. however. thedraft resolution = ~ - ~ ~ .- was amended so a s to b rkg thepkblemback into Une with the United Nations Charter and the right of seif- defence. o r K it was supplemented so a s to provide for international contml within the framework of a disarmament plan. the F renchdelegation rnight be able to support it a s amended. S..

12. U ON SEIN (Burma) said that Burma had always opposed tests of nuclear andthermo-nuclearweapons. wherever they might be carried out. He therefore appreciated the anxiety which had pmmpted the African States to urge that their continent should be regarded as a denuclearized zone. Consequently. his delegation would vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution. For similar reasons. it would vote for the twehe-Power draft resolution. However. it would be unable to support the Itallan amendments tothe laner.

13. M t . DE MELO FRANCO (Brazil) said that he would vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution. since his delegation felt thatthenuclearneutralization of a continent iike Airioa could only serve to pmmote the cause of peace and to eliminate at least one source of internaticrial friction. On the other hand, it would be obliged to ahstain fmm the vote on the hvelve- Power draft resolution, for it believed that the question dealt with in ihat draft resolution could more properly be consideredwithin the framework of general and complete disarmament. The I t U amendments did not alter that aspect of the maiter.

U s c o Offlcial Records a theCeneri1 Assemblv. FourrconthScaiion. a s . agenda item 70. document A/C.1/821. piri. 2 2

14. Mr . DELGADO (Philippines) said that he would Vote for the two draft resolutions despite their defi- ciencles of form and. to some extent, sutstance. His delegation pariicularly supported operative paragraph 1 (2) of the hvelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3). for a nuclear war would clearly be directed against mankind in general. in view of the volume of fall-out that would result and the genetic effects of radlation.

15. The convening of a special conference to sign a convention prohiblting the use of nuclear and thermo- nuclear weapons for war purposes mlght provide 3 solution to the problem. Such a prohibition would. of course, have to be subject to effective international ~ 0 n t m l and inspection, in accordance with the Wo resolutions on that subject already adopted by the General Assembly.

. p .

17. Mr. CISSE (Senegal) It would also vote for the twelve-Power draft resolution sinCe it was opposed to war and therefore, a fortiori. to the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes. For similar reasons. his delegation would vote against the Itallan amendments.

18. Mr. RONAN (Ireland)

i9: -~l though the hvelve-Power draft resolution (A/ C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) contained some elements which were acceptable, his delegation seriously doubted the value of a declaration of that kind. Since the leaders of the major Powers had indicated that they would not hesitate to urie their moat powerN weapoas if their vitai interests were seriously threatened. the pmposed declaration would be d linle practical value and might create a false senseof securtty. Hia delegation would therefore be obliged to vote against sub-paragraphs (a. @ and (p) of operative paragraph 1 and. if they were adopted, a g a h t the draft resolution a s a whole. It would ahstain from the vote on certain other parts of the draft resolution.

20. The Italian amendments (A/C .1/L.295) dld no! greatly alter the fundamental vlew cd hisdelegationa~ to the value oi a declaration of the kind pmposed. Although the amendments were unexceptionable in themselves, they would detract fmm the value of the declaration and, in rnany instances, result intautology. For example. they would cause operative paragraph 1 (5) to state that action contrary to the United Nations Charter was a violation of the Charter. H i s delegation wouid therefore abstain in the vote ontheamendments and ii they were adopted would also be obliged to abstain In the vote on the twelve-Power draft resolution as a whole.

21. Mr. PAZHWAK (Afghanistan) said that he would Vote against the Italian amendments (A/C.l/L.295) while bearlng in minci the tradltionalfriendly relations e.-dsting between Aighanistan and Italy. He viewed the amendments as an attack on the form and substance Of the twelve-Power draft resoluiîon and said that their adoption would make the pmposal meaningless and useless.

22. The insertion ai the phrase "oontrary to the United NaUons Charter" in the draft resolutlon left open the possibility of interpretlng the Charter a s aliowing war, even nuclear war, in certain cinXm- stances; since the Charter did not allow war but. on the contrary. pmhibited it, the amendments atîacked not oniy the basls ai the draft resolution but the Charter itseif.

23. The vote of ~f~hantstana~ainsttheitdanamend- ments was intended tn pmtect the purpose ofthe dmft resoluuon and defend the purposes of the United Nations Charter.

24. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan), discussingthe Itaiian arnendments a s one of the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution, said that they were intended to in- corporate in the declaration the arguments concerning the principle of self-defence whtch had been advanced in particuiar by the United Kingdom and United States delegatlons. Those arguments were unquestionably valid in their pmper context. but what was involved in the present instance was a waragalnst al1 manklnd.

25. The Italian delegation pmposed, in particular. that the words "to violate the Charter of the United Natlons" in operative paragraph 1 (d) sbould be deleted. Thw altered, that vital portion of the declaration would lose its present pmfound signLficanoe; if the amendment was adopted, his delegation wauid be obiiged to vote against the draft resolutionas a whole. The fact that the United States representative had stated (1192nd meeting) that N s delegation would vote in favour ai the draft resolution only If the ItaUan amendments were adopted conflrmed thevalidlty of the apprehensions amused by the Italian amendmenta.

26. Mr. NINCIC (Yugoslavia) said that he would vote for the two d r d t resolutions. However. if the Italian amendments were adopted. he would be obllgedtovote against the twelve-Power draft declaration as a whole, slnce the declaration was designed to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons as contrary to the spirit, letter and alma of the Charter of the United Nations, whereaa the changes pmposed by Italy would have the effect of sanctioning the use of those weapons.

27. Mr. ZOPPI (Italy) said he was convinced that tt was essential to act within the framework of the Charter; it was therefore dangemw to isolate the problem of nuclear weapons from the principles of the Charter relating to the use of force in any form. Although the sponsors of the draft declaration (A/C .l/ L.292 and Add.1-3) were acting out of praiseworthy motives. a ban on the use ai nuclear weapons would have more likeiihood of being eüective if it was closely linked with a programme of general and complete disarmament embodying adequate safe- guarfis. Hls delegation therefore felt that thedeclara- tion should he considered within the framework of disarmament; if, however. that was not possible. it would prefer to see its amendments adopted so that it could vote for the dechration a s a whole.

28. Mr. SUCAlR (Saudi Arabia) observed that the right of non-alignment was now recognlzed by ail countries and that it was perfectly pmper. inasmuch as the nuclear Powers had been unable to reach agreement on puttlng an end to nuclear testing. that the African countries should address a solemn appeal toallstates for the denuclearization of their continent. His delegation would therefore vote for the twodraft resolutions before the Committee (A/C.l/L.291/Rer.l andRev.l/ Add.1-3, and ~/C.l /L.292 and Add.1-3) and for the Libyan amendment (A/C .i/L.296). It would not be able to support the Itaiian amendments (A/C.l/L.295). which, in its view. were at variance with the imme- dlate purposes of the twelve-Power draft declaration.

29. M r . BOUZIRI (Tunisia) regretted the Italian representative's. view that the question dealt with in the twelve-Power draft resolution coud be considered within the framework of disarmament. for his delegation regarded the rnatter a s an urgent one. in addition. the Itaiian amendments had the effect of sbiftlng the centre of gravity of the draft resolution and of givlng the im~ress lon that the Charter perrnitted the use of nuclear weapons. He wished to repeat his reWeStthat the Itaiian delegation should withdraw Its amendments.

30. Mr. TSARAPKIN (union ai Soviet sociaiist Re- pubilcs) said timt the Itaiian amendments seemed to him an attempt to justify the use of nuclear and thermo- nuclear weapns agstnet man. Those amendments would completely faisiiy the meaning of the twelve- Power draft resolution and distort the spirit of the Charter itseii. Iîaly's afm was to secure acceptance of the principle that the use d nuclear weapons for war purposes was not a violation ai the Charter. a s stated in the draft resolution. but a measure specifically sanctioned by the Charter. That interpretauon of the Charter was endorsed by the members of West- ern military blocs, wNch were preparing to unleash a nuclear m k e t war and oonsequently seelring to justify the use of nuclear weapons. It wasobvlous that U nuclear weapons had been known when the Charter had been drawn up, a refereace would have been in- oluded to those lnstnunents of rnass destruction and their barbaric nature. Those considerationa sufficed to show why hls delegation would vote against the Itallan amendments. ..- 32. The twelve-Power drsft resolution was also perfectly clear. The conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo- nuclear weapons for war purposee would certainly make for the prevention of miclear war and would be a first step towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons which. of course, was possible orily against a background of general and cornpiete disarmament. His delegation would accordtngly vote in favour of that draft resolution.

33. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) a .

34. The twelve-Power drait resolution expressed the universai feeling about nuclear war in unequtvocal terms: If the various principles statedinthat proposai were out to the vote senaratelv. his delenation wouid cer ta iJy endorse them, &en th&ghthey wiuid be more sultablv Lncluded ln the oreamble of the drait resolution on-disarmament whkh the Cornmittee was to adopt later. The Generai Assembly had already expressed disapprovai of the use ofnuclearweapons. andthe n e d step was to initiate negotiations on d l aspects of disarmament. including ita eîfective oontrol. The proposa1 for the signing of aconventiononthe prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons reflected a pessi- mistfc attitude to such negotiations. For thosevartous reasons. his delegation wouid abstain on the draft resolution as a whole. 35. Mr. FERNANDEZ (Argentina) . .. 36. His delegation was not sure that the twehe- Power draft resolution, which wouid declare a ban on the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes. was within the scope of agenda items 73 and 72; it had ais0 some faults to find with the drait- hg . Tbe ltalian amendments impmved the proposal considerably and had the effect of stating the problem more correctly in terms of the Charter. His delegatton wouid therefore vote in favour of those amendments and. if they were adopted, in favour of the draft resolution as amended. It wlshed to make it clear. however, that i ts votes wouid be cast onthe understanding that those provisions couid not be construed a s authorizing, either explicitly o r implicitiy, the use of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons in cases not specifically contempiated in the dechration.

37. Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uniguay) .*

38. H i s delegation wouid lîke to sucport the welve- Power draft resolution. for it was in keeping with Uruguay's humanltarian and pacfflst tradition. HOw- ever, the proposal should have been examlned at the same Ume as the other questions relating to general and complete disarmament. Although the pmp~sed dechration was on a high moral plane and exp=ssed a universal aspiration. hi8 delegaten couid not vote for it in isolation, aad for the aame reasons would have to abstain an the IIallan amendments.

39. M r . BURNS (Canada) sald that he fully appreciated the motives which had prompted the sponsors cb the twelve-Power drait resolution and respected thelr concem a t the threat to the peoples of the world which the use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction represented. In the llght of pst experience and present circumstances. hourmer, the methad proposed did not appear effective. Al1 the declarstions and agreements referred to in the thid preambular pragraph had been violated. and recent events had s h m the insecurity al unilaterai declarations on the suspension of nuclear tests.

40. ~ h e only way to be sure that nuclear weapons wouid not be used in war was to eliminate them f m m the arsenals of the nations. Such elidnation was proposed in the United States programme for generai and complete disarmament and also lnthe plan put forward by the Soviet Union. Dechrations of good intent had always falled when nations had been faced with the alternative of using what weapons they had o r faclng defeat. The General Assembly shouid therefore con- centrate its moral force on helping to bring about the speedy resumption of negotiations on generai and complete disarmament.

41. Hls delegation would vote in favour of the Italian amendments. for they wouid bring the draft resolution more closely into Iine with the Charter. If those amendments were adopted, hb delegation wouid vote in favour of the draft resolution an amended: otherwise. It would have to abataia.

42. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) ..r -'

43. With regard to thetwelve-Powerdraft resolution, the Spanish delegation considered that it exceeded the ecopa of the items under discussion in the Com- mittee and, indeed, dealt with an entirely different question. Such a resolutionseemedunnecessa~, since recourse to war a s a means of seniing international disputes was already pmscribed in more specific terma ia the Charter. Moreover. it would be unjust to deprive countries of the right oi seif-defence.

44. The Itallan améndments to the twelve-Power draft resolution represented a aubstantial impmve- ment am1 dld not go beyond the Charter. Article 51 of which expressiy stated that nothlng in the Charter fmpalred the iDherent right of individual o r collective selfdefence.

45. Mr. MEKKERUP (Denmark) ... 46. Where the twelw-Power draft resolution was Concemed. aithough the Danlsh delegation broadly W e d with the gsaeral oidllne of that proposal and respected the motives behind It. it disagreed in certain respects with the prssent wordkig. which. in its dm. R m not entirely coneistent with the letter and spirit

the Charter. The adoption oftheItallanamendments WOuid aubstantially improPe the text, whichtheDanish delegation would then be able to support. On the other. band, iî the Itallan amendmenta' were not adopted. the Danish delegation wouid be obïiged to abstain in the voting. bacause it ConsideRd that the question of BUminatiag nuclear weapons was part d the bmader Westion of general and complete disannament uader Mectlve inieraational control.

47. Mr. WEI (Cbina) ;a'.' The proposal in tic lwelve-~ower drait res01ution (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) had been aubmitted to the . Atomic Energy Commission by the Soviet Unionasfar back as 1946.y and had been rejected a s affordlng no assurance that such weapons would not be uaed. The Generai Assembly had since rejected al1 s i d a r proposala.

49. The Briand-Kellogg PactS/ had not averted the outbreak of war. The moratorium on nucleartestshad not prevented the Soviet Union fmrn setting off a series of powerfui eXpi~sionS, andon 5 Nwember 1961. Mr. Khwhchev had told a correspondent of The New York Tlmes that If either side inawar felt t h , losing. it wouid undoubtedly use its nuclear bombs.

50. The Chinesedelegation hadconsistently advocated the ellmination of duclear weapons and al1 otherweapons of mass destruction, but had always voted against pmposals pmvlding for pmhibition without control. Its attltude remained unchanged. Finally. it welcomed the amendments submitted by Italy. which werealrned at bringing the draft resolution into llne with the Charter of the United Nations.

'51. Slr Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakisîanl .. -.. . . 52. - H i s delegation still had certaindoubtsconcerning the hvelve-Power draft resolution, whlch dealt witb a single aspect of disarmament in isolation fmm other aspects of the subject. However, it wouid vote for operative paragraph 1. since the general princiole stated In that $rigraph was in accordance with'its own attitude.

53. On the other band, it considered that the Italian amendments were unnecessary. A resolution could not have the eüect of amending the Charter. Also, both the draft resolution and the amendments seemed to have been s o hastfly drawn up that l t would be d m - cuit to assess the effect of the pmposal. especially if the Italian amendments were Incowrated. Some great Powers which opposed any ban on nuclear testlng had declared themselves in support of thedraft resolution. They. therefore, seerned to believe that lt would not prevent them fmrn continuing to test nuclear weapons with a view to their possible defensive use.

54. The delegation d Paklstan wouid ahstaln fmrn voting on the I t a W amendrnents, but would support operative pragrsph 1 d the M t reaolution. even li the. ItaiIan amendmenta were adopted. Operative paragraph 2 related to a question which was part of the general pmblem cd diaarmament. As his delegation did not know what would emerge h m the debates in the Commlttee and in the ~ s s e m b l ~ on that subject. it wouldte oblined toabatainfromvotin~on that paragraph. Should the proposai prove tc be k e s s a r j ' at a iater stage, it wouid be happy to SUppOrt It.

5 5 .Mr. SOSA RODRIGUE2 Neneruela). 56. With regard to the I t a h amendments (A/C.l/ L.295) to the twelve-Power d r d î resolution (A/C.l/ L.292 and Addl-3). lt was hardly possible, Without deviattng fmrn the spirit d the Charter. to draw a distinction between the use d weapons ai mass destntction in c o n f o d t y with the Charter aod the use oï such weapons contrary to the Charter. The use of such weapons couid never be in keeping with the Charter.

57. As to the hvelve-Power drait resolution, his delegation considered that the uae d nuclear weapons ahouid be pmhiblted. but did not agree with the wording d the proposal, because the pmhibition ai such weapons could not be dealt wlth in isolation. but m u t ,be considered withtn the general iramework af disarmament. Moreover, Lt was necessarg to prohibit not oniy the use d auch weapons, but aiso their manufacture and stcc!qiling. and also to oall for the destruction d di mdsting stocks. Furthermore, a draft resolution which pmhibltd the usednuclearweapons oniy wouid a contrario sensu authollze the use of conventionai weapons which. although lesa ciangemus. could neverthelesa algo wipe out entire populations. Conaequently his delegatlon wouid abstain fmrn voting on the Itallan amendments and would aiso abstain from voting on the draft resolution. regdldless of the result d the pote on the arnendments.

58. Mr. ZOPPI (IWy). replying to the Soviet representative's oriticisms d the Itaiian amendments, pointed out that the Chairman d the Councll of Minlsters d the USSR had repeatedly stated that he wouid not hesitate to use nuelearweaponsifnecessary and had even mentioued h y many missiles would be sent agatast Italy.

US- Officiai Rccordr oi the Ammlc E n e r g Commtsslm. Ffrst Ycir, No. 2. 2nd meedng. pp 2628.

YGrneral Trury for the R-linon d W i r i r an lnrmmirnc of N i ~ I o n i l PoUcy. slmed .c Pans on 27 Ainrurc 1928 (Leime of N.aair. Trean, Scrlss. ML ~ C N . 1929. No. 213h

i

United Nations

-GENERAL ASSEMBLY SIXTEENTH SESSION

J si 1 i

flRST COMMITEE, 1194th M E E T I N G

Tuesday, 14 Novemixr 1961. a t IO:20 a m .

. .

O f i d Record> N E W Y O R K .-

8. Sir Michnel WRIGHT (United Kingdom). speaking C O N T E N T S in exercise of his right of reply. said that the NATO

page countries. by the very tenns of the treaty between Agenda items 73 and 72: them, could take oniy defensive measures. It was

Continuation af suspension of nuclear and absurd to maintain, as the USSR representative had tbenno-nuclear tests and obligations oi done at the 11931-d meeting, that the United Kingdom States io refrain fmm tbefr r eneml (2 and the other memhers of NATO were preparing to ............ . . . . . . .-..-.. launch a nuclear and rocket war against the Soviet

The urgent need for a &aW ban nuclear Union. weasns tests under effective International contml (concluded) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chaimet: Mr. Marlo AMADEO (Argentinal.

AGENDA ITEMS 73 A N D 72 Continuation of suspension of nuclear and ihermo-nuclaot

tests and obligations of States io mfmin from iheir newol (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.l/L.291/Rev.l and Rev.l/Add.l-3, A/Cl /L .292 and Add.l-3) (concludd

The urgent need for a tiwty io ban nuclmir weopons tests under effective international onml (A/47W, A/C.l/ 1 2 9 2 ond Add.1-3) (conclvded)

1. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- Ucs). speaking in exerciee of hle ri& of reply, recalled that at the 1193rd meeting the representative of Italy had implled that thesoviet Unionwas prepared to dellver amortalmiclear blow against any aggreasor. It was obviaus that at the present t h e any war migbt develop M o a nuclear war. and since Italy w u a member of NATO and had allowed the United States to eatabllsh b u e s in ita territory. it w c d d inimF- diately he & a n intosuchawar.w%haii the inevitable Consequences. For the Itallan people. as for all the Peoplea of the world, aafety lay. notin aliiances and miUtary bases, but in general and complete diaarmament. That was the solution which UPiy shouldsupport in the United Na t im. instead of irying to justify the use of nuclear weapona. . .. 6. Mr. IFEAGWU' (Nigeria). referring to the Itaiian amendments (A/C.l/L395). atressed that the twelve- Power draft resolution (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) would in no way wesken the right of selfdefeuce a s defined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations; it was designed solely to forbid the use of atomic devices for milit- purposes, because of the fearful consequences which such use would have for mankind. . . .

9. The representative of the USSR had also impUed that, in his Government's opinion, it was contrary t0

' the Charter to use nuclear weapons in self-defence. In that case. one might ask why. in 1946. the Soviet Cioverament had not accepted the United States pro- posalu that aii countries ahould glve up maldng and possessing nuclear weapons and why in the preceding two montha it had exploded more than thfrfy nuclear devices with a total yield of over 120 megatons. Only recently, the Chairman of the Council of blbiaters of the USSR. Mr. Khrushchev, had achowledged that. in a war. U one of the sides coneidered tts position hopeless, it would use nuclear weapons. The repre- eentative of the USSR had himself saidthat his country would use such weapons to defend Ltself. which was the very position he had stLacked the day hefore.

10. The Soviet Union ahould abandonauchpropaganda d join in conatmdive negotiation on the ending of nuclear tests and on diaarmament. Meanwbile it was important not to undermine the Charter by misinter- pretatiom or to create a false sense of safety by pretending that declarations uneupported by a aystem of fnteraational verificatim could give security.

il. Mr. MENEMENCIOGLU (Turkey)

i i 'The Turkish delegation further considered that legal arrangements. such as those envisaged in the twelve-Power draft resolutlon (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3) should form part &d parcel of a general. balanced and progressive programme of diaannament. Nuclear dissrmament was no doubt essential for the aurvival of mankiad. but was no: enougù in iteelf to ensure survival in particular of the amaller countries which did notpossess nuclear anns d w h o s e sraenals of conventionalweapons were ineignificant comparedto those of other Powers. The only hop8 of achieving concrete results &us Lay in a balanced, general arrangement to be carried mt in progressive stages

I that would give no advantage to any one side at any t h e . For those reasom, the Turkish delegationcnild not vote for the draft resolution. It would vota for the Itaiian amendmente. which were directly inspired by the Chsrter of the United Nations. although the draft resolution. even Bs smended, did not really come within the scope of agenda items 73 and 72.

15. Mr. TSAFLAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics). speaking in reply to the United Kingdom representative. said that NATO was unquestionably aggressive in character. The CENT0 documents to which the Soviet delegation had already referred (A/C.1/853 and Corr.2) were adequate proof of the true nature of the Western alliances.

16. As to the Baruch ~ 1 a n . U the Sovietdelegation had already pointed out that It was notdesignedto prohibit nuclear weapons, but to perpetuate the nuclear mono- poly of the United States and to glve that countrv control over the sources of raw materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and over the atomic industries which were beginning to develop in other countries. The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, had taken a completely negative attitude towards the proposals made by the Soviet Union in 19462 to bring about a genuine prohibition of nuclear weapons. ... 21. Mr. ZOPPI (Italy). replying to the commente made by the Soviet representative at the beginning of the meeting, said that the Soviet Union had made the question &Y issue of the cold war between East and West. He wondered why the Soviet Union was s o interested in the twelve-Power draft resolution when it would not besitate to use nuclear weapons ii necessary. aa Mr. Khrushchev htmseü had stated only recently. Did members of the Cornmittee believe that the Soviet Union. in voting for the draft resolution. did not intend to use nuclear weapons in caae of war? And did they believe that the United States andother West- ern countries. in voting againet the proposal. lntended to use them? The difierence in attitude towards the draft resolution waa easily explained. Thesoviet Union waa ready to vote in favour ofadrafî resolution which it dld notintend to respect if it sbouM prove contrary to tts own Interests. When the democratic countries. on the other band, supported a draft resolution it was with the intention of abidinp: bv it. The uuruose of the Itallan amendmenta ( ~ / ~ ; 1 / - ~ 2 9 5 ) & the twelve- Power draft resolution waa to avoid placing those countries which honestly belleved in the importance of United Nations resolutiom in a diffinilt position.

22. Mr. GUIRMA (üpper Volta) .. . .. . 25. The United Nations would probably bedoingmore effective work if t had before it draft resolutions resulting from agreements already concluded and 'Wiring inîernational guarantee, Lnstead of &ah resolutions which bad hardiy b e n etudied at d. in that connexion, the delegation of the Upper Volta Wel~omed the twelve-Power draft resolution. since it W U broad in scope and weil constnicted and would Prepare the ground for diacyssion betweenthe African Reade of State on the objectives ofthefmeen-Power

resolution. The delegation of the Upper Volta wWld vote for that draft resolution and against the h l i a n amendments to it, which dlstorted its meaning

bearing.

U S e Oiiietsl R c c d s oi bic AmmrC E n m ~ Commlsilon. Flrsr Ycar. No. 1. 1st muIlW. pp 4-14.

26. M ~ . TURBAY AYALA (Colombia) .. . . . . . r-•

27. The Colornbian delegation appreciatedthe sincere motives of the sponsors of the hvelve-Power draft resolution aa alsoof the Itaiiandelegation in submitting its amendments. The question. however. waa one which related to general disarmament rather than to the suspension of nuclear tests, audit could only be settled by agreement between the parties. if the draft resolution were to be adopted without the ltallan amendments, it would put countries which complied with its recommendations in an unfavourable position. On the other hnnd, if it were to be adopted with the Itallan amendments, It would appear to authorize the use of nuclear weapons in certain cases. The Colombian delegation was morally unable tosupport aresolution which would permit the possible use of aiomic weapons. even for purposes of seiï-defence. For those reasons, it wouid vote against the Italian amendments and wouldabstain from voting on the twelve-Power draft resolution.

28. Mr. SANCHEZ Y SANCHEZ (DominicanRepublic) . . .. . . . . . .- 29. His delegation had intended tovote for the twelve- Power draft resolution, in view of the eminently moral considerations by whicb it had been insplred. But a more carehil study of the text. in addition to the lack of unitv amonn the African countries. had led his dele- -. --- gation-to recgnsider its position. In.point oi fact, the draft resolution had no connexion with aendaitems 73 -. -. . . - . - and 72; It related rather to agenda item 19. in other words the question of disarmament. Accordingly U s delegation would have to abstain from the vote on it.

30. Mr. ROSSDES (Cyprus) . .. - . .. . . 31. Xis delegation would also vote for the lwelve- Power &ah resolution. It considered that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. which recognized the right of self-defence. could not be cited =.a pretext for limiting the prohibition on the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. If the use of the weaDons in question for purposes of defence were to be pennitted. the declaration wauld become meaningless. On the other hand. the declaration should have prohibited not only the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. but also nuclear test-.

32. Mr. HAMID IBRAHIM (Ethiopia) said that he would vote against the Itallan amendmenta, since their purpoee was contrary to that of the hvelve-Power draft resolution. They would have the effect of sanctionlng the use of weapons of maas destruction where such uae waa not at variance with the United Nations Charter, whereaa the purpose of the &ait declaration was precisely to outlaw the use of such weapons finally and categorically. The danger they represented would be the same whether or not they were employed in conformity witt the Charter.

1/ IMd. No. 2. 2nd meedng. &-p. 26-28.

39. The CHALRMAN invited the Committee to voteon the Italian amendments (A/C.l/L.295) to the twelve- Power draft resolution (A/C.l/L.292 andAdd.1-3). He reminded the Committee that the representative of Japan had asked for aseparatevoteonthe f b s t part of the sixth amendment. reading "Substitutethewords '!O

consider the means of prohibiting' for the words 'for signing a convention on the prohibition of'". He would therefore put that part of the sentence to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Yugoslavia, having k e n drawn by lot by the Chair- man. was called upon to vote firs t.

In fawur: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Haiti, Iceland, :taly, Japan. Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Norway, Pana- ma, Paraguay. South Mrica, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthernIreland, United States of America.

Against: Yugoslavia, Afghanistan. Aibania, Bulgaria. Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cam- bodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad. Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopold- ville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Gabon. Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, h o r y Coaet. Laos, Liberia, Lihya, Mali, Mauritania, Mon- golia. Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Ro- mania', Saudi Arabia, Senegai. Sierra leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Unlon of Soviet Sociaiist Repubiica, United Arab Repubiic, Upper Voita, Yemen.

Abstaining: Austria, Boiivia, Brazil, Cbile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras. Iran. Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru. Philippines. Por- tugal, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay. Venezuela.

Tbe f irs t pari ai t h SM amendment was rejected by 50 potes to 25, witb 25 a b ten tions.

40. The CHAIRMAN put to the votetheItaiianamend- ments as a whole (A/C.l/L.295), wtth the exception of the part of the sFxlb amendment which had been voted on separately and rejected.

A vote was taken by mu-call.

n i e Federation ai Malaya. having &en drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to wte first.

In favour: France, Greece, Haiti. Honduras, Iceland, Israel. Italy. Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zeaiand, Nicaragua. Norway. Panama. Paraguay, South Africa, Spain. Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UnitedStates of America. Argentina, Austraiia, Belgium. Canada, China, Costa Rica, Den- mark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador.

Against: Gabon, Chana. ûuinea, Hungary, India. Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria. Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone. Sudan, Syria, Togo. Tunisia, ükrainian Soviet Socialist Repuhlic. Union of Soviet Sociallst Republics. United Arab Repubiic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania. Bulgaria. Burma, Byelorussian Swiet Sociaiist Repubiic, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Colombia. Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cypms, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia.

Abstaining: Federation of Malaya, Finland. Guate- mala, Iran, Ireland, Japan. Jordan, Lehanon, Mexico, Pakistan. Peru, Phiiippines, Portugal, Somaiia. Swe- den, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Austria, Boiivia, Brazil, Chile.

n i e amendments were rejected by 50 votes to 28, with 22 aabstentlons.

41. The CHALRMAN put to the vote thehvelve-Power dran resolution (A/C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3).

A vote was taken by mil-cdl.

Panama, having k e n drawn by lot by the Chairman. was called upon to vote firot.

In favour: Philippines, Poland, Romania. Saudi Arahia. Senegal. Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,Syria. Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic. Upper Volta, Yemen. Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Aibania. Bulgaria, Burma. Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia. Cameroun. Cen- tral .Urican Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazza- ville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czech* slovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary. India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon. Liberia, Lihya, Mali, Mauritania. Mexico. Mongolia, Morocco. Nepal. Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan.

Against: South .Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United States of America, Austraiia, Belgium, China. France. Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua.

Abstaining: Panama, Paraguay, P e n , Porhigai, Spain. Sweden, Uruguay.Venezuela, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil. Canada, Chile, Colombia, CostaRica, Denmark, Dominican Republic. El Salvador. Finland, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland. Israel, Norway.

The draft resolution was adopted by 60 votes to 16, with 25 abstentions.

Document A/4942/Add.3

Report of the First Committee (pan N)

[Original text: English] (16 Novembpr 1961

1. Pans 1, II and III of the report of the First Committee (A/4942 and Add.1 and 2) dealing with itenis 73 and 72 of the agenda of the General Assemhly recommended to the General Assembly the adoption oi three draft resolutions. Thc present foiirth part briii$s to a conclusion the report of the Committee's ,:onsideration of items 73 and 72.

1. The following documents were available to the Comniittee in connexioti with its consideration of ;%enda items 73 and 72: dociiments A/4772 and Add.1. '\/4778, A/4787. A/4797 and Corr.1, A/4819, A/4853. .\/1869, A/4871. A/4893. A/C.1/849, h/C.1/850. :\/c. 1/852, A/C. 1/853 and Corr.2, and A/C.1/85 j.

3. At the 1188th meeting, on 7 Novenilier. El Salvador moved, under rule 118 of the rules of procedure

the General Assembly, that the Committee should close the general debate on agenda items 73 and 77 and Proceed to discuss the two d n f t resolutions remaining heiore it. The Salvadorian motion was adopted by 49 rotes to none, with 35 abstentions.

4. Discussion on the two remaining draft resoliitions jook place at the 1189th to 1194th meetings. held Detween 8 and 14 November 1 x 1 . . .. 7. The second draft resdution. submitted by Ceylon,

Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia. Liberia, Libya. Nigeria. Somalia, the Sudan, Togo and Tunisia (A/ C.l/L.292 and Add.1-3). was in the f o m of a declaration. The opentive part. read as follows :

"Tlte Genmd Assembly, " ... " 1. Declares tbat : "(a) The use of nudear and thenno-nudez

weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations:

"(b) The use of nitdear and thermo-nudear weapons would exceed even the xope of war and cause indiscriminate s e n g and destruction to mankind and civiiiition and, as such, is con- to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity ;

" (c) The use of nuclear and t h e r m ~ + ~ u d a r weapons is a war directed not against a, many or enemies done but a h against mankind general, since the people of the world not involved in such a war will be subjectal to aU the mils g-td by the use of such weapons;

"(d) Any State using nudear and thenno-nudear weapons is to be msiderui 'as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as d g mntrary to the laws of humanity and a s ~ommitting a uime againsr mankind and civilkation;

"2. Requests the Seaetary-General to consult the Governments of Manber States to axertain their views on the possibility of convming a speeial conference for signing a convention on the prohibitioii of the use of nuclear and them-nuclear weapons for war purposes and to report on the results of such consultation to the Gaieral Assembly at its seventeenth session." S. On 9 Novernber 1961, Italy submitted amend-

ments (A/C,l/L295) to the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C. l /U92 and Adbl-3). as follows:

"1. In the fifth preambuiar paragraph, reading as follows :

" 'Belieuing that the use of weapons of m a s destruction, such as nudrar and thermo-nuclear weapons, is a direct iaegdtion of the high ideals and objectives which the United Nations has betn

established to achieve through the protection of succeeding generations from the scourge of war and through the p resmt ion and promotion of their cultures,' "insert the words 'contrary to the Charter of the United Nations' after the words 'such as nuclear and thermo-nuclear w e a p ' .

"2. In operative paragraph 1 (a), insert at the beginning the words 'The threat or use of amed force, including' ; and insert the words 'in any mamer contrary to the Charter of the United Nations' aiter the words 'thermo-nudear weapons'.

"3. In operative paragraph 1 (b), insert at the beginning the word 'Accordingly'; and insert the words 'contrary to the Charter of the United Nations' after the words 'thermo-nuclear weapons'.

"4. In oprative paragraph 1 (c), insert at the beginning the word 'Accordingly'; and insert the words 'contrary to the Charter of the United Nations' after the words 'th-nudear weapons'.

"5. In opuative paragraph 1 (d), insen the words 'contrary to the Charter of the United Nations' after the words 'theho-nudear weapons'; and delae the words 'as violating the Charter of the United Nations.'.

"6. In operative paragraph 2, substiture the words 'to consider the rneans of prohibiting' for the words 'for signing a convention on the prohibition of'; and insert the words 'contrary to the Charter. of the United Nations' after the words 'for war purposes'." 9. At its 1194th meeting, on 14 November, the

Committee proceeded to the vote on the drait resolutions and the related amendments. .-.

( 6 ) The twdve-Power d n f t resolution (A/C.I/ L.?-? and Add.1-3) and the amendments thereto were ~ t e d iipon as follows:

The Italian am&dments (A/C.l/L.BS) were put ro the vote in the following manner.

r\t the rquest of the representative of Japan, the {rst part of the sixth Italian amendment. which woiild iiibstitute the words "to consider the means of pro- ~iibiting" for the words "for signing a convention on ihc prohibition of" in operative paragraph 2 of the [,celve-Power draft resolution, was voted upon sepa- ntely. It was rejected by a roll-cal1 vote of 50 to 25, 5vith 75 abstentions. The voting \vas as follows:

111 javoilr: Argentina, Austnlia, Belgium, Canada. China, Denmark. Federation of Malaya. France, Greece. Haiti. Iceland. Italy, Japan. Luxembourg. Netherlands. Sew Zealand, Nicaragua. Xorway, P-, Paraguay. South .4friu. Spain. Turkey, United Kingdom of Great [?ritain and Northern Ireland, United States of Ameriu.

.4gainst: Afghanistan. Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Cambodia, Canieroun. Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville) , Ciilia. Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Giiinea. Hungary, India. Indonaia. Iraq, Ivory Coast, o s . Liberia, Libya, Mali. MaUritania, Mongolia, \lorocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria. Potand, R o m i a , Saiicli Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone. Somalia. Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cilion of Soviet Sociaiist Republics, United Arab Re- piil~lic. Upper Volta, Yemen. Yugoslavia.

.-ibstoining: Austria, Bolivia. Brazil. Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic. El Salvador, Finland. Guate- mala. Honduras. Iran. Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon. Ilexico. Pakistan. Peru. Philippines, Portugal. Sweden. ?;!ria. Thailand. Uruguay, Venezuela.

The remaining Italian amendments were r e j a e d by 1 rollal l vote of 50 to 28, with 2 abstentions. The roting was as follows:

In favowr: Argentina, Australia, Belginm, Canada China. Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France. Grecce, Haiti, Honduras. Iceland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 'licaragua, N o m y , Panama, Paraguay, s u t h Africa, Spain. Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Sorthern Ireland. United States of America. . . ~

..lgainst: Afghanistan. Albania. Buleria. B u m . Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Cambodia. Cameroun, Centrai African Republic. Ceylon. Chad. Colombia. Congo (Bmzaville), Congo (Leopoldville) . Cuba. Cvprus. Crshoslovakia, Ethiopia. Gabon, Ghana. Giiinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Itaq, Ivory Coast, L;r9s, Liberia. Libya. Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, hlorocco, Nepai, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegai, Sierra Leone, Sudan. Syria. Togo. Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socidist Republic. Union of Soviet Sociaiist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yemcn, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Federa- tion of a Finland, Guatemala, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Pem. Philippines, Portugal, Somalia. Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela.

The M t resolution was adopted by a r u I l 4 vote of 60 to 16, with 25 abstentions. The voting as follows :

In fmour: Afghanista Albania, Buleria, Buma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, cambodia, Cameroun, C d Africart Republic, Ceylan, Chad, Congo (B-ville), Congo (Leopoldville) , Cuba, Cypnis. CtediosloMkia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federation of Xalaya, Gabon, Ghana Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Im, hq, Ivory Coast, Japan, JO*, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mo-, Nepal. Niger. Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabi, Scnegal, Sierra Leone, Som& Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia. Ukrainian Soviet Çoadist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. United Arab Republic. Upper Volta, Yemm, Yugoskvia

Agoinst: Austratia, Belgium. C h i , France, Greece. Guatemala, Ireland, Itaiy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, South Africa. Twkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of M c a

Abstoining: Agavina. Austria, Bolivia, B r d l , Canada. Chile. C o l d i a , Costa Rica, lknmdc, Danini- on Republic, El WMdor, F I & Haiti. Honduras, Iceland, Isracl, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, PeN, Portugal, Spain, Swedm, Unig~ay, Venuuek

Recommendotbn of the F l r ~ r ComMuae

10. The First Gmmittee thereforc rmmmends to the General Assanbly the adoption of the following draft resolutiom:

DIoft wso lu t i a I CONSIDERATION OP AFBIcA AS A DWUC~EABPED ZONE

[Te.rt adopfed by the C e n d Assembly Mthout change. See "Artion taken by the Ceneral Assemblf below.]

Dmfr rrsoluiion II DECL.+RATION ON TEE PBOHIBIITON OF THE USE OF

NUCLEAP A N ù THPBMO-NUCLEAR WEAPONS

[Text adapfrd by t h C n v m l Assembly Mthout change. See "Artion takm by the Genrral Assembly"

'belm. 1

United Nations

G E N E R A L ASSEMBLY SIXTEENTH SESSION

O&inl Records



thermo-nuclear tests and obli@ations of States to refrain from their renewal (CA- c m d )

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weakns tests under effecnve international control (concluded) Report of the Fi rs t Committee (part IV) . . . 797

President: Mr. Monsi SLlM (Tunisia).

A G E N D A ITEMS 73 A N D 72 Continuation of suspmsion of nucleai and themo-nuclear

tests and obligations of States to refrain from thair nnaw- al (concluded)'

The urgent need foi a treoty to bon nucleai weapons tests undei effective international control (concluded).

REPORT OF THE FlRST COMWTTEE (PART iVl (A/4942/ADD.3)

Pursuant to mle 68 of the Rules of Procedure. i t was decided not to discuss tbe report of the ~ i r s t Committee.

Mr. Encke11 (Flnland), Rapporteur ofthe Flrs t Com- mlttee, presented the report of the Committee and then spoke a s follows:

1. Mr. ENCKELL (Flnland). Rapporteur of the Firat Conmittee: The consideration of the two Itema under discussion in the First Committee was concluded on 14 November by the adoption of the two draft reeolu- vons r e p d u c e d in the prreent report. [A/4942/ Add.31. During the debate on these draft resolutiona the view was expressed by some speakers that their ecope. and especiaily the scope of draft resolution II. was wider than the i t e m under discussion a s included in the agenda. The opinion was ai80 voiced that i t would have been desirable that draft resolution 1 be regionally discussed before comlng to thecommittee. It was. however. very widely felt that the Committee could consider and decide upon these proposa18 at that atage of its pmceedings. Both draft resolutions weie adopted. the first one. without opposition; the second one. in lts original wording by 60 votes to 16. with 25 abstentions.

Tuesday. 24 iVovem&r, 1961, a t 10.30 a.m.

N E W Y O R K

3. The PRESIDENT (translated from French) Ishall now cal1 on the representatives who wish to explain their vote.

4. Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation would I k e to explain its vote on drnft resolution il presented in the report of the First Committee [A/4942/Add.3] that is, on the drnft resolution concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

5. Since this draft resolution was adopted in the First Committee, two significant developments have taken place, both of which affect the attitude of my delegation to it. In the f i rs t place. we have received the encowaging news that the negotiations on a nuclear test ban agreement will be resumed in Geneva next Tuesday. Second. we have reason to be hopefui that an agreement will soon be reached concerning the resumption of general disarmament negotiations in an appropriate negotiating forum. My delegstion feels that it i s of great importance that Us Assembly should take no action which might in any way hamper the succesa of these resumed negotiations.

6. 1 should like to remind Memhers that in the First Committee my delegation expreaaed the sympthy which we felt, and which we continue to feel, for the motives of the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution.

7. However, we made it very clear that we had serious reserwtions about the effectiveness of this sort of dechration. We recalled in the First Com- mittee that aii dechrationa prohtbiting the use of specific types d weapona had. without exception. been vioiated in the p s t in wartime: and it was on this ground that Canada abstained on the draft resolution in the Firat Committee.

8. Now, in the light of m e n t devalopmenta to which 1 referred, our doubte about the wisdom of adopting this draft resolution have been relnforced. For example, it appears tn my delegation that the convening of a special conference, a s envisaged in operative pragraph 2 af the draft resolution. would be ill- advised in preaent cimumstances. Action to assemble a world conference to sign a convention of doubthrl utillty might very well detract fmm the efiort tn negotiate binding disarmament agreements which a r e the only flnally efiective means of dealing with the îhreat of nuclear weapons.

9. Accordingly, my delegation bas come to the conclusion that we muet oppose draft resolution II. on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapona, on which the Assembly bas been Called upon to vote.

2. 1 have -the honour to recommend for adoption by 10. Mr. DEAN (United StatesofAmerica):IwouldlIke the General Assembly the draft resolutions contained to speak firat mdraftresoiutionIIcmtainedin the re- in the report. port of the Flrat Committee [A/4942/Add.l]. 1 have a

number of the tbings to Say about this draft resolution.

11 The United States fuily rec50gnizes that most of the delegations which voted for Us draft resolution

in the First Committee did so in the sincere belief w t they were acting from noble motlves and effectively. in an attempt to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in war. With this view everyone can be in sympathy. It i s necessary to say frankly and bluntly that in the opinion of the United States delegatlon- these votes were wasted. 1 regret to say it but this draft resolutlon cannot fulfil the wishes of its pro- ponents who. we luiow. supported it out 06 their abhorrence of nuclear w a r . ~ l l peoples.genuinely interested in peace share that abhorrence.

12. But, a s in al1 these matters. there i s a correct way and an incorrect way to make a wish o r a desire come true and be carried out. So 1 am sorry to say that this draft resolution. in the opinion of the United States delegation. will not achieve its objective.

13. I say this carefully because the Soviet Union. a s It has indicated in this Assembly. hasnot the slightest Intention of paying any attention to this draft resolution. despite the enthusiastic support which the Soviet Union gave to it in theCommittee.Howdo I know thls? We know it f rom. the Soviet representative's own statements in the Committee that the Soviets openly intend to use nuclearweapons a t the sole discretion of the Soviet Union, ii that country considers their use necessary. The delegatlon of t he United States and other delegations quoted Mr. KhniShCheV's statement to this ëffect. so there can be no doubt of the Soviet intentions in this matter. So. just a s in the case of the uninspected. uncontmlled moratorium resolutions on the subject of nuclear testing. the Soviet Union votes for this draft resolution with every intention of violating it, if for its sole purposes i t suits it to do so.

14. No. 1 regret to Say that the Soviet Union wlll not observe this draft resolution. It will continue to rat- tle i ts rockets and to threaten other countries with thermo-nuclear destnictlon.

15. A t the same time. the Soviet Union will attack the United States when it votes, a s a na t te r of sln- cere principie. against this d d t resolution. It was the Soviet Union and no one eise which bmke off the nuclear test ban negotiations a t Geneva so the Soviet Union could conduct its own series of testsweek after week. The Soviet Union will Say that our vote here Cast a s a na t t e r of aincere princlule. pmves that the - ~. United States desires to w& nuclear war. Now the United States desires no such thina. and the Members of this Assembly imow that this charge of the Soviet Union i s pure hokum. and nothing but holnun. But the point 1s. that the Soviet Union has already begun to use this draïi resolution a s an Inetrument of propa- guida in the cold war. wblle the Soviet Union continues to prepare to disregard it. Surelythis isnot the reauit the aincere supporters of this d d t resolution hsd in mind when they cast their favourable votes.

16. The second reason for the ineffectlveness of this .&aft resolution is. with aU respect. that itgoes ab& the task of ridding the world of atomic war in the wmng way. Wlth the end lt seeka we can all agree. However. this draft resolutlon deciares that theuseof atomlc weapons is a crime. But it sets up no sate- W r d s whatsoever to pmtect anv nation awlnst the - ~~

assaults of the Soviet union.

17. States which seek security fmm w a ~ which do not wlsh to wage war-that is the positionof the United States-annot, I submit. trust their safety to such 81nsuDported declarations: or othenvise we, too. might

receive invitations to visit Mr. Khnishchev onhis own territorv. Nuclear war will be effectively outlawed when nuclear weapons a r e reduced and abollshed thmwh a disarmament Droeramme carefully formu- lated; with effective inie&tional contmli, a s the United States has pmposed in this Assembly. [See A/4891.) With such effective safeguards. the United States and other countries could destroy their own nuclear weapons without impairing their own security. There i s no other effective way to go about this task with assurance and with success.

18. The third basic defect in the draft resolution arises from its own terms. It 1s sirnply Untnie to Say that the use of nuclear weapons 1s ~0ntrar)' to the Charter and to international iaw or to assert that the Charter itself can be emended-for thiS there a r e ample provisions-by declaratlons in the Assembly. That being the case. this draft resolution, 1 submit, sets a very dangemus precedent. If it i s an attempt to try to amend the Charter by resolution. 1 would like to point out that surely it 1s ineffective. since this Ceneral Assembly has no such power.

19. This Assembiy cannot rewrite the Charter in a manner totally forelgn to the precise provisions for its amendaient. If people wish to amend the Charter, 1 submit that they should follow the orderly pmcedure iaid down in that regard. But this Assemhly is a body of re~resentatlvea of States. It is essentiai that they shoulh respect legal processes and procedures. and not nout them. It 1s essential that the United Nations be preserved a s an effective Instrument for the ~reserva t ion of -ce. But this Assembly's reputation is bound to s&er if du- waves of emotion it caats the Charter pr&isiona to one side and acts capriciously.

20. Indeed. the verv pmvisiona of the Charter ap- pmve, and demand. -the exercise of self-defence aeainst armed attack. It is verv clearthat the Charter a iys nothing whatwer about -any p r t i cu l a r weapon o r method which n a y be used for self-defence. Those who wrote the charter expected victims of aggression to react a s neceaaary to pmtect their territorial integrity and political independence. and they were verv careful not to say ùow seif-defencecouldbe car- ri4 out. The unforgivable crime under the Charter ts not self-defence but aggression. direct o r indirect; in other words, the iUegal uae of force. The General Assembly has recognized that fact many limes. 1 cal1 the attention of representatives in particular to the resolution 1380 (V)] on "Peace through deedsn adopted a s far back a s the fifîh session of the Assembly, and 1 can cite many other -ples.

21. The amendmenta which the Itatallan delegation introduced and so ably and courazeously defended In the Firat Committee -&resentedWan atiempt to re- conclle the Assembly's desire to prevent the use of nuclear weapona with the clear anddedinite pmvisiona of the Charter. Rad these amendrnents pmpoaed by Italy been adopted. the United States wodd &en havé been giad to vute for the draft resolution, a s so amended, for then i t WOuld have heen a renection of a humanitarian desire s h a d hy al1 men of good will. Instead, in l ts present form, the draft resolutlon can only mislead dang8mualy those who put thelr iaith in the acts of this Assexnbly.

22. Mv delenation b s that al1 those who wish this ~ s s e m b l y to h e a &al contribution to theoutiawing of nuclear weapons. to the attamment of general and

complete disarmament under effective international controls, and to the support and strengthening of the United Nations Charter, will vote against this draft resolution.

34. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated f m m Russian): After careful discussion the First Committee has by anovenvhelm- ing majority of votes approved hvo important draft resolutions contained in its report [A/4942/Add.3], which a r e an important contribution to the cause of peace and to the preparation of conditions whichwould free humanity from the threat of nuclear warand help p solve the problem of generai and complete disarmament. These resolutions have now been submitted for the approval of the General Assembly.

35. The Soviet delegation was very happy to support both the draft resolution of the African States declaring Africa a denuclearized zone and the draft resolution of the African and Asian States concerning adoption of a declaration pmclaiming that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons i s contrary to the spirit, the letter and the aims of the United Nations and ia. accordingly. a direct violation of the United Nations Charter.

36. In advocating an immediate solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. the most burning and urgent problem of our time. the Soviet Union at the same time warmiy supports any constructive pmposals aimed atdimiriishinginternational tension. strengîhening trust between States andthere- by facilitaîing the realization of general and complete disarmament. One such measure whichwould impmve ihe international atmosphere and lessen the danger of war would be the creation of denuclearized zones and, more especiaiiy, a denuclearized zone on the African Continent.

37. The idea of creating in varioua partsof the world zones free of atomic nuclear weapons i s a sound and constructive ides and one which meets the wishes of the peoples. It is. therefore. making headway. As we ail how. in recent years Governments of varioua countries have put fornard plana for the creation of denuclearized zones for düierent aress. There ie a proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe-the most sensitive area of theworld. where the armed forces of the Lw0 mllitary gmups ai States a re in direct contact with one another.This proposal is usually called the RapacM ~ l a n ? l after the name of the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland. the State which put fonvard the plan for creating a denuclearized zone in Centrai Eumpe. There a r e also proposais for creating denuclearized zones in Northern Eumpe. in the Balkan

!/ Sce 0- Plcnarv \leerinqr. 697th meeting.

Peninsula. in the Near and Middle East, Ln Asia and the Pacifie Ocean. This last pmposal was putfonvard hy the Government of the People's Republic of China.

40. It iS dlfficuit to over-estimate the great positive significance of the second resolution a lso-a declaration proclaiming that the uae of nuclear and thermo- nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit. letter and aims of the United Nations and a s such 1s a violation of the United Nations Charter-a declaraîlon which proposes that a multilateral international convention should be concluded on this question.

41. The Soviet Union has always favoured and, naturally, continues to favour a ban on nuclear and hydrogen weapons. Of course, the best decision would be a cornplete ban on nuclear weapons, together with the liquidation of al1 the stock piles of these deadly weapons. We trust tbat it wiL1 4 fact be possible in this way to solve this problem within the framework ai a treaty on generai and complete disarmament and thus to eradicate the threat of nuclear war.

42. At the snme time. the Soviet Union ha8 for many years past been emphasizing ü@, even before ihe conclusion of an agreement on generai and complete disarmament, which would put an end to the very existence of nuclear and hydrogen bombs and the means of delivering them to the target. the States manufachiring nuclear weapons might. a s m o r d preparation for such an agreement, declare their resolve not to use nuclear wepons.

43. The Soviet Union ha8 more than once invited the United States and the other Western Powers tounder- take a solemn and unconditional obligation to renounce the uae of nuclear weapons and otherweapons of masa destruction. And were it not for the obetlnate objections of our Western partners, this question would have been settled long ago.

44. We are. therefore, happy that. on the proposai of Ethiopla and a number of other Afrioan and Asian States. the Flrst Committee hae adopted adeclaration on banning the use of nuclear weapons and we voice the hope that the General Assembly will coniirm this

important decision, which i s the f i r s t steptowards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

45. The Soviet delegation will, of course. vote for bath draft resolutions-for declaring Africa a denuclearized zone and for pmhibiting the use of nu- c lea r weapons. Only those who do not want peace o r who want the United Nations to legalize the incon- ceivable horrors of thermonuclear warfare can fail to support these resolutions o r can vote against them.

46. In this connexion, 1 cannot refrain from sayingat least a few words about the statements made f rom this platform at the beginning of our discussiontoday.

47. 1 would like to Say, Literally, a couple of words about the speech made by the representative of Canada, who today propounded a rather strange and unintelligible argument in support of his alteredposi- tion on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In the Firs t Committee the Canadian delegation did not display a very great degree of baldness and did not vote for this resolution. As a member of NATO. Canada did not go nll the way on this question, but sti l l i t abstained and did not vote against.

48. Today General Burns indicated that the Canadian delegation would now vote against this resolution.Ap- parently. NATO discipline has prevailed. At the same time. we cannot but point to the completely unfounded assertion that the better the atmosphere gets a s favourable symptoms of progress towards disarmament appear. the more strongly one should oppose the very measure which favour the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament. This however. was the very argument put fonvard by the representative of Canada today. 1 am sorry, but i t i s one I cannot nccept, and I feel sure that the Assembly will not agree with it.

49. Mr. Dean. the representative of the UnitedStates. made a speech here in which. possibly for the f i r s t Ume in United Nations history. he tried to speak, a s i t were, on behaiF of the Soviet Union. This i s a rather unusual situation-to find the United States representative speaking fo r the Soviet Union, speaking from this mstnun-and with complete assurance- about what the Soviet Union will do and what i t will not do.

50. With al1 due respect to Mr. Dean. the Soviet Government has instmcted the Soviet delegation to speak f m m this rostnun and explain the position of the Soviet Union-it gave no instmctions to the United States delegation.

51. 1 leave aside the question of diplomatic tact which. a s we think. has not been entirely ohserved by the United States delegation in trying to speak here for the Soviet Union. But why worry about the diplomatic tact of United States representatives when their country. the country of Abraham Lincoln. isnow supporting a proposal that African Negroes should remain for another ten years the slaves of white masters; when their country, the country of Franklin Roosevelt, is now the mainstay of facist regimes in different parts of the world. including the Dominican Repubiic: when their country, the country of Jefferson and Paine, irr now preparing a terrible nuclear catastrophe for the peoples in reply to the Soviet proposai to conclude a German peace treaty.

52. Still. we shall leave the question of diplomatic tact on the side. We oniy want to Say that speeches. such a s that made today by Mr. Dean. do not in any

way help & create a favourable atmosphere for the negotiations on disarmament which the Soviet Umon is approaching with an open rnind. with a definite position and with a crystal-lear programme. We would llke the United States to help in every way, and not obstmct. the creation of a favourable atmosphere for achieving agreement on the resumption of disarmament negotiations. and for these negotiations themselves.

53. Mr. Dean attempted £rom this rostrum to cast doubfs on the good will of the Soviet Union a s regards complying with the General Assembly resolutions on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. May 1. not through the mouth of Mr. Dean but through that of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. reply to that question.

54. Nikita Sergeevich Khmshchev, the Head of the Government of the Soviet Union, in reply to a letter f rom Cannon Collins, Chairman of the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament. said:

"The question of not being the f i rs t to use nuclear weapons which you touch upon in your proposa1 is certainiy of paramount importance. A good solution to that problem would play an important role in the elimination of the threat of war and the solution of the whole pmblem of disarmament. A simultaneous undertaking by al1 States possessing nuclear weapons not to be the f i rs t to use them would be an Important step towards the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war. The position of the Soviet Union i s quite olear. We a r e in favour of an undertaking by ail States renouncing the use of nu- c lea r weapons and we a r e prepared to sign an agreement not to be the f i r s t State to use nuclear weapons."

55. Yes, we. the Soviet Union, a r e prepared to sign such an unde-g. We a r e prepared to sign and implement an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. That is the position of the Soviet Union.

56. Unfortunately, to our great regret, the position of the United States 1s. apparantly, the opposite. The United States representative tried to j u s t e this opposite position by referring here to the discussion in the F i r s t Committee. where the Iîalian amendmenta [~/C.l/L.295] to the Afm-Asian resolution of banning the use of nuclear weapons. were rejected by an ovenvhelming rnajoriîy. The United States delegation, you see, cannot, he said, vote f o r thisdraft resolution because the Itaiian amendments were defeated. Yes, there was actually such an incident in the First Committee. one of which it might be better not to remind the Western Powers-the Incident of the submission of the Italian amendments, the whole point of which boiled down tn the terr ible thought that the united Nations Charter sanctions the use of nuclear weapons.

57. No. the United Nations Char te r is not adocument which can be constmed to suit those who want war. The United Nations Charter. of course. does not ~ e r m i t , and cannot per-mit. theuseof nuclearweapons. and the resolution of the African States, which we a r e now coneiderlng. is in full confarmity with the United Nations Charter. 58. It 1s no mere accident that, when the Italian amendments were put to the vote, fewer thana quarter of the United Nations memhers supported those

amendments. SO it was a rather unhappy incident in the Flrst Committee for the Western Powers and it would be better not to remind them of It.

59. Finally, one remark about the position of the United States. and apparently, of the other Western Powers. members of the North Atlantic military bloc. a remark about their position on the ffrst resolution proclaiming the African continent a denuclearized zone.

60. The United States representative expended much energy and many words on tryinn to Iustifv from this mstnim the unwiiiingness of the tn i t id States tosup- p r t this noble resolution.

61. He tried to explain this position from various angles but he failed and was unahle, to explain one thing: Why after all. is the United States against pmclaiming Africa a denuclearized zone?Or does it want. again thmugh France's intermedlary, to hegin testing nuclear weapons there? Or does it want to transform Africa into a nuclear, not a denuclearized zone. to saturate African States with lta nuclear weapons? 1s than how the United States understands helping Africa? 1s that how the'united States understands giving support to the young AfricanStates?lsthat how the United States understands aupportlng the lnitlative of the African States, for it was the initiative of the States of Africa. Mt. Dean said here that the African States must themselves take the initiative in ensuring their aecurity. They did so. They are aaking everyone. includlng the Soviet Union. the United States. the United Klngdom and France, not to tranaform Africa into a nuclear zone. The Soviet Union sigufles Its agreement. The United States d w s not give i t s a g m - ment to this pmposal. It does not support it.

70. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): 1 should iike to make quite a brief intervention here thia mornlng on the vote of my delegation on the second oi the taro resolutions which we are considering hem. aamely draft resolution II contalned in the repart of the First Cornmittee (A/4942/Add.3].

71. Now this la a caee in which the sponsors of the draft resolution and those who. as in our mm cane. have serious healtations abait the windom of it in lta present form, none the lesa. 1 think. both have the eame aima. We both want to M the world of the potential disaster of nuclear and thermonucleararar. We both want the whole of the world tobe a denuclearized area. fmm which the fear of aoy fonn af war. Loclud- ing nuclear and thermomlear war. in banished. That. 1 think, la common gmund. We düfer only aa to the best methods of achieving o u common end.

' 72. The sponsors oi this d d t resolution bellme- - and 1 am quite sure they are absolutely sinceTe in this-that the aim can he artained by a noble declaration which. in its present form, we beileve-1 a m bnind to say-is dwmed to be ineffectuai. Now. we. for our part, a r e Convinced lbat the same goal mUSt be sought. but it must be sought through genenil and complete disamlament with effective international verification: and 1 emphasize those laat words.

73. We very much regret that it was not possible in the First Committee to achieve a meeting of minds on the best way to secure whatwebothwant. what indeed. 1 hope that we ail want. This regret does not temper our SYmpathY With the sponsors and with their objective.

74. SinCe the discussion of this draft resolution in the First Committee. we have. of course. resumed consideration there of the subject of disarmament: and my own delegatlon and that of the United States have reafffrmed the urgent need for general and complete disarmament. carried out in balance stages andunder effective international control. The joint statement of agreed principles [A/4879], submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union, provides for the ellmlna- tion of stockplles of nuclear weapons and the cessation of the production of such weapons. carried out in such a wny that at no stage of the pmcess could any State o r gmup of States gain military advantage.

75. Under the United States disarmament programme [A/48911. which we supporS, ail nuclear weapons would cease ta adat . There would ba no nuclear o r thermonuclear weapona to use. Wben al1 existing nuclear weapons are destmyed, when no more are being made. and when this can be verifled internatlonally, the pmblem oi preventing their use wiil have solved IteeU. The aim of this draït resolutlon and of many other partial proposala will have been achieved. That le what we ourselves favour. For tbat we are working, and WU work. with al1 our power.

76. But the hard fact remalas that so long as States possess nuclear weapons. they will use them in self- defence. Mr. Wnishchev has shoam himseU a reallst on this point. in a recent statement toMr. Sulzberger. which ha8 alresdy been the a+bject of discussion in Us Aasembly. Mr. Wnishchev dealt speciffcaiiy with the question of undertnkings to refrain fmm the use ai nuclear weapons. The Soviet representative in the First Committee sought to show that the point which Mt. Wrushchev wae maklng le, in some way, tnap- pilcahle to the reaolution which Is nav before us. 1 Would Uke the Assembly to judge on this. What Mr. Khrushchev said when aaked whether the Soviet Union would be the finit to employ nuclear weapons in a war was. and 1 quotnhlsacbial words aa reported in The New York Times of 8 September 1961:

"Evm if aither side abould i n such a war feel lt waa loaing. would It not use nuclear weapons to apold defeat? IL would doubtediy use Ita nuclear tmmbs . . . . "AU thia goes to shoslw-and I am still quoting

Mr. Wnishche~-~that if atomic weapons are pre- se&. and if war Is unleaahed. ltwilïbe a thenno- nuclear war. Therefore. world peaca muet be assured wt by d e r t a l d n g to &nain h m the use of nuclear weapons but by radical solution of the cardinal issues. And the best parantee to peace is

the destruction of armaments and the elimination of armies, in other words, disarmament."

77. N m those are the words of Mr. Kh~shchev. You will notice that in this there i s no reference whatever to unilateral declarations, no suggestion that this view. so forthrightly and-if 1 may Say so- . so effectively. stated. depended upun the number of States which might declare that they would not use nuclear weapuns. 78. The arguments which have been advanced by Soviet representatives in the FirstCommittee seeking to justify their vote in favour of such vague declarations as that envisaged In the draft resolution before us, are specious. The point quite clearly made by Mr. Khrushchev hirnself-and on this, at least. we are bound to agree with him-isthat mereunverifiable undertakines not to use nuclear weawns-in the ab- - ~~~~

sence of general and complete disirmament under effective international control-are. in those circumstances, entiGly valieless. He ha; clearly said that the Soviet Union wouid use nuclear weapons in seif- defence if it found itseif at a disadvantage in any war, includim what i s ususllv called a conventional war. 1 find it ïmpossible to understand how any representative of Mr. Khrushchev or his Government oan then justify casting a vote in favour of a drait resolution which says among other things that " . .. any State using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons 1s to be considered to violate the Charter of the United Na- tions . . . ." This must surely he taken as a declaration by the Soviet Government of their readiness to violate the Charter. It can mean nothing else.

79. 1 listened with great care to what the representative of the Soviet Union said to us thia morning. He is well aware that 1 raised this matter on a previous occasion with himin the First Committee [1197th meeting); indeed. on that occasion, 1 think he thought the worda 1 used were unnecessarily harsh, but a s 1 reminded him on that occasion. 1 cannot cal1 other than hypocrisy actions which are, in fact,hypocritical in this way. When we a r e told that the Soviet Union 1s supporting this drnft resolution, in the light of these remarks of Mr. Wrushchev. then 1 cannot see any other expianation for that action.

80. 1 listened careiuily this mornlngto see ifwe were to receive a hirther explanation of these words of Mr. Khruehchev; 1 should have been very interested indeed to hear it. But 1 do understand that it w d d be ciifficuit, if not embarrassing. for the repreaentative of the Soviet Union here pubUcly to disagree with what Mr. Khrushchev said in ~ o s c i w . ~cerlainlv do not wish the representative aqy harm and so 1 do not want to oress the point and to embarraas him further on it, k t it is a matter in Which 1 think we oan al1 draw our own conclusions: and for myself. men with the greatest respect for the words of-the representative here, 1 prefer the WOrdS of Mr. Khrushchev on this occasion as showing What the real intentions of the Soviet Union are.

81. For Our own pafi, sinCe we do agree with Mr. KhNshCheVs logic in this matter, we see no alternative. if international honesty and good faith are to be preserved, but to vote againat this draft resolution. At the same t h e . we again pl-e ourselves to bend our every effort in the cause of ConcludIng an auree- - ment on general and complete disarmakent, with proper pmvision for effective international contml under which there can no longer be any question of using nuclear weapons..This is the way to remove the threal; and it is for this reason that we feel bound to vote against this particular drait resolution.

82. 1 think it was significant this morning when the representative of Canada here announced that hi3 delegation wouid n m vote against this draft resolution. and 1 hope that may encourage others, too, to feel that this is really the correct action to Lake in regard to this particuiar draft resolution because of the implications which 1 have tried to spell out. We al1 want to achieve real and lasting disarmament, in which nuclear weapons will disappear altogether. But in the light of the arguments 1 have presented. 1 believe that it i s no help to thls Organization for us to blind ourselves to the issues invofied here merely bv m s s h resolutions which appear to have the right hkention and to thtnk that by so doing we are solving these vital pmblems.

83. 1 hope very much that other delegations willthink carefully about this. For the reasons stated. my delegation wiii vote against this draft resolution.

84. Mr. IQBAL (paldstan): When draft resolution II. contained in the report of the First Committee [A/4942/Add.3) and couched in the form of a declaration, was voted upon in the Committee, we pointed out that it in fact related to the item on disarmament. rather than to that on the banning of nuclear weapons tests. There has been a development since the draft resolution was adopted in the First Committee, because the USSR has deciared its intention to resume negotiations on the banning of nuclear weapons tests. As we al1 hope that this may lead speedily to a treaty on the banning of nuclear weapons tests, we feel that draft resolution II has becomeunnecessary. Wethere- fore W that. in order to give the fullest chance for these negotiationa to result in a treaty banning nu- olear weapons tests, we should not pmceed with this draft resolution. In any case, if this draft resolution is put to the vote, we shall abstain. . .. 90. Mr. BLUSZTATN IPoland): 1 would U e brieflv to explain the vote of my d e l b t i o n on the hvo d& resolutfons contained in the report of the First Com- mittee [A/4942/Add.3] nm before us.

0 . -

96. The PoIish delegation wii i also support draft resolution R, a dechration banning the use of nuclear weapons. We beiieve tùat the adoption of this draft resolution w d d be a VeIy iUWrtant contribution of this Assembly to the solution of the genenl pmblem of disarmament.

97. The representative of the United iUngdom, who spoke a while ago, tried to enlarge the scope of our debate. It seems to him that the pmblem, which the authors of thia draft resolution are trying to solve,

can best be solved by a treaty on general and complete disarmament. 1 am in full agreement with him 3n this point, with only one reservation. I cannot see .low this declaration can be opposed to Our efforts to conclude an agreement on general and complete disarmament. It i s certainly not Our intention to sub- stitute this declaration for a determined effort to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. We are looking fomard to the resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament and we hope that these negotiations will lead to an early conclusion of a comprehensive treaty.

98. We are also in favour of partial measures leading towards generai and complete disarmament and we see many merits in the adoption by this Assembly of a declaration which would state in clear terms that the international community i s against the use of nuclear weapons. 99. The representative of the United Kingdom has quoted here a statement by Mr. Khwhchev. This has been the subject of debate in the First Committee and has been, 1 U, clearly and definitely refuted by the representative of the Soviet Union. 1 wonder why we have here reverted to the custom of some representatives taking the f l w r to explain their w n vote and trying also to explain the votes of other representatives. The representative of the United Kingdom has used rather harsh language.

100. It seems to me that it is not hypocritical to favour disarmament and to vote for adeclaration such as this. But one can easily cal1 it hypocrisy when one sees somehody vote against the declaration and pre- tend. at the same time, to be in favour of general and complete disarmament.

O . The PRESIDENT (translated fmm French): Be- fore calling on the succeedtng speakers and in order to facilitate our work somewhat, I intend, before the vote, to cal1 on three speakers who have asked to explain their vote. 1 shall grant any other requests for an explanation of vote, under Rule 90, after the voting. 1 call on the first of these three persons. the representatlve of Thailand.

102. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thalland): In the First Committee, the delegation of Thailand voted in favour of draft resolution II contained in the Com- mittee's report [A/4942/Add.3]. The reas0.n for its action aras that it has full aympathy with the noble desire and motives of the sponsors of this draft resolution.

103. The genuine desire of my country and my people to see the baniehment of all nuclear weapons. a s well a s to see al1 areas of the world denuclearized, is well known. That is why my delegation ha8 mpported al1 previoua resolutions on nuclear matters adopted by this Assembly.

104. However. now that thehvo great nuclear Powers, the United States of American and the Swiet Union. have agreed to return to the conference table at Genew in order to nesume negotiations on a nuclear test ban. my delegation is of thevfewthat no duplicat- ing action shouid be taken by this Assembly which mlght prejudice the resumption of these negotiationa. A apecial conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons for war purposes, as envisaged by this draft resolution will, in the view of my delegation. not serve any useful purpose at the present'time, for it will certainly clash with the conference at Geneva.

Its work wiU not only duplicate. but also complicate. the work of the Geneva conference.

105. In the light of these reasons-changeof situation and the conviction that al1 peace-loving people everywhere should welcome the resumed negotiations and should give their wholehearted support to achieving their success-my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution II.

106. Mr . DE LEQUERICA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): The Spanish delegation has no comment to make on the first of the draft resolutions on which we are to vote-that concerning atomic explosions on the African continent. We shall cast Our vote and pursue our policy on this pmposal as we did in the First Committee. On the other hand. ourdelegationisamong those which are changlng their votes on the other draft resolution-that concerning the use of nuclear weapons. The hvo draft resolutions appear in part N of the report of the First Committee (A/4942/Add.3].

107. Strictly speaking. however. we are not changing our vote; above all. we are not changing our ideas, which we expressed with the utmost firmness in the First Conmittee. 1 venture to read what 1 said there:

"Furthermore, the proposal unlntentionally serves to bind band and foot. in the face of acts of aggression by the country of constant atomic explosions. those countries which obey international law. Tode- prive those countries of the right to take adequate military counter-measures in the face of theSoviet's untrammelled preprations would be an injustice. These bonds would aot be mer-stmng, for they would lack tme moral force, which is what we are in a position to give; K 1 remember my Swift correctly. they would be rather Uke GuiIlver's bonds. which were of soft aiik, and whichhe threw of i with a single movement when he awoke.

"At d l events. we must be mindful of the moral consideration we owe to the opinions of the United Nations, and muat not be wer-hasty in giving expression to them . . . ..Y

108. Our view. then, was wholly unfavourab1e to the draft resolution. When the vote was taken. we expressed that unfavourable view in the courteousform, increasingly adopted hem, of abstention: first, out of respect, friendship and consideration for the aponsor- ing countries, of whose good intentions and alms we had no doubt. and secondiy out of a kind of instinctive respect for the wording; for it is dlfficult to aay "no" to noble and genemua words. even if in practice they may serve dangerou ends. This is the strength of drafts which are couched in aubllme language but whose nitcorne may be less sublime and even, perhaps, prejudiciaï to the amooth progress of international order and extemai dedence. Moreover. we were then unaware of the forhinate agreement to continue negotiations. reached between the countries represent- ing the taro main contending schwls of thought on this matter of armamenta-an agreement which clarifies -y pmblema and calls for clear and well-defined positions on our part also.

109. The Spanieh delegation. then renising to be tempted by genemua words and good intentions. was opposed to the draft resolution, as 1 have just said; but when the time came to vote. it took the courteous

?/ This sratcmeni v n s mide nt th. 1193rd m e d q of the Firsi Cam- m i n e . rhe offlcial record d vhich arc pbllrhed only in aummiry form.

course of abstaining. as the correct and civillzed thing to do. At the present grave juncture, faced with new circumstances. and wishing to assume its full responsibilities and avoid the snare of mere words, it announces that it will vote against the draft resolu- Uon in question.

110. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Thedraftresolu- tions contained in the report of the First Committee [A/4942/Add.3] and upon which we are about to vote, are historic. We have given birth to both of them- that i s to Say, we. the Ethiopiandelegation. Of course. being the father of two historic children, if 1 may pu: it so. we have no preference whatsoever. Yet, since one of them comes before the other-that ia. the draft resolution containlng Ihe declararion. draft ;esolution II-Uie first child should have a linle bit of meference. although not very much.

111. The ldea of this drafî resolution was brought Up by my delegation-indeed, by my Minister of State for Foreign Affairs-three years ago. We bmught it here during the fourteenth session, but we did not submit a draft resolution. We consulted a number of delegations and. as history now shows. the great majority of the Members were completely in favour of it.

112. During the fifteenth session we presented the draft resolutiong and, for reasons which a r e now weiI known, it was not voted upon. So it was that this year again twelve African-Asian countries brought the draft resolution to the First Committee. Now the Ethiopean Government and delegation have already explained in detail the reasons for submittiq the draft resolution. We have replied to al1 criticisma and 1 am most happy to note that the Committee adopted our resolution not simply by a majority vote. not slmply by a ho-thirds vote, but by avote appmaching unanimity. A glance at the voUng record shows that the amendments which were submitted against our &ait resolution-amendments which would have authorized something which the Charter itself never h e w and would not dare, even K it did knw, to authorize-were rejected by 50 votes to 28, with 22 abstentions. Once that was done, the draft resolution was adopted by a mU-call vote of 60 to 16 with 25 abstentions.

113. 1 Wnk the conclusion is clear that the entire human race le for the draft resolution. A s a matter oi fact, even those who voted againat it accepted it- they could not Say they wanted to useatomic weapons. They simply said that they wanted toachieve the same end by other menus. ao that. to my delegation. the occasion is very historic. The world hasnow accepted that which we bmught to ita attention. thatwhich grew out of our experience. The world now respects our experience in this maner and 1s ready to vote on this draft resolution, and thereby take a position on it.

114. 1 have heard a nurnber of delegations say that there are some developments which must be bmught to the attention of the ~ s s e m b i ~ . What are these developments? One 1s. that the hvo great Powera have agreed to further negotiations regarding a nuclear test ban treaty. and so it i s argued thnt this &afî resolution now ties our hands. It is said that for this reason it should be defeated.

115. I submit that nothing in ourdraft resolutionpre- vents anybody fmm doing anything-in fact, it welcomes negotiations to prepare and define a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Nowhere does the draft resolution say that it ia against the conclusion of a treaty baming nuclear weapons: it does not Say that. In al1 humility. 1 amboundto Say that those who invoke this fact are not giving a pmper interpretaticn to the situation. The draft resolution in fact. in operative paragrapb 2. envisages such a convention. but that is to come in due course.

116. Supposlng, however, that there i s agreement on nuclear weapons. Tbere is no conflict, because operative paragraph 2 does not Say that this cannot be done; it simply requests the SecretaryGeneral to consult the Governments of Member States on the possibility of convening a conference for drawing up a convention. There i s no conflict whatsoever. If the countries now engaged in negotiations on a nuclear test ban succeed before the replies come fmm the various Governments, well and good; we shall be the the first to applaud them. If they do not succeed, 1 submit that they should notprevent otherGovernments, including themaelves a s a matter of fact. fmm makuig another attempt. 117. Second, the draft resolution in substance is not againat the nuclear Powers concluding an agreement on nuclûir weapons. Nowhere does it say that it is in fact against it. If they agree, by contml and other means, to conclude auch an agreement. again, our declaration would be implemented, just as i s envisaged in its operative pragraph 2.

118. 1 also heard an argument to the effect that negotintions on dlssrmament a r e being advanced and that therefore thia drafî resolution 1s unnecessary. This is reaiiy a repetition of the previous argument and 1 need not deal with it a t le@. If there is an advance. weiI and good. K an agreement on disarmament is concluded. this would constitute a prt oi that historic document. 1 see no contradiction whatsoever in that. 119. 1 heard one more argument, which aeema to deserve my attention. and that wae. tbat D~Clear weapons camot be done away witb by ban- them. Well. that is a dmlaration of the human rsce and it m u t be respectad. 1 do not know why it must be concluded: "Do not do thia because 1 am not going to fouow it or othera are not going to follow it". If we take that üne of action then we shall aot do any- W. 1f I am told: "Do not do thb because 1 am going to do something against it". thm îhat iîne of action, 1 submit. can pievent action everywhere, not only hem. but everywhere. 120. 1 am therefore compeiled ta begthose delegations that have spoken a- the draft resolution to we* the consequences of their position and at least. ii they cnnnot vate for 11. to abat*. 121. 7he PRESIDENT Vanslated from French): We shall naw vote on the draft resolutions.

Y Orriciai Records of rhe Cemril As9embly. F l l i e n t h Session. -. agcnd* iims 67. Sb. 69 and 73. documcirir AjC.lIL.2SI and

122. The President (translated fmm French): We shall now vote on drait resolution II contained in the report (A/4942/Add.3] of the First Committee. A vote in parts has been requested. as well as a roll- Cali vote on the operative paragraphs and on the drait resolution a s a whole. In accordancewith this request, we shall first vote on the preamble, paragraph by parngraph.

The first paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 62 votes to none. with 28 abstentions.

The second paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 63 votes to none. with 29 abstentions.

The third paragraph of the preamble was adopted '

by 63 votes to 1. with 31 abstentions.

The fourth paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 62 votes to none. with 28 abstentions.

The fiftb paragraph of the preamble was adopted hy 61 votes to 6. with 25 abstentions.

123. The PRESIDENT (translated f m m French): We shall now vote on the operative part of draft resolution II. A vote in parts has been requested for each of the sub-paragraphs of operative paragraph 1; a roll-cal1 vote has been requested on sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1, on paragraph 1 a s a whole. on paragraph 2 and on the draft resolution as a whole.

The vote was taken by mil-c@I on subparagraph (a) of operative paragraph 1.

Turkey, baving been drawn by lot by the President. was called upon to vote f irs t.

in favour: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republlc, Union of Soviet Sociaiist Republics, United Arab Re- public, Upper Volta, Yemen. Yunoslavia. Afnhanistan. Àlbania, ~ u l ~ a r i a , ~ u r m a . oruss us si& Soviet socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroun.CentralAfrican Republic; Ceylon. Chad. congo (~razzaville), Congo (Leopoldvillei. Cuba. Cyprus. Cz6shoslovakia, Da- homey, Ethiopia. Federation of Malaya, Gabon. chana. Guinea. Hungary, India. Indonesia, ~ r a q , Ivory Coast, Japan. Jordan. Lebanon. Liberia. Libya, ~ad'agascar, Mali, Mauritania. Mexico, Mangolia, ~ o r o c c o , Nepal, Niger. Nigeria, Poland. Romania. Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Sierra Leone, Soouilia, Sudan. Syria, Togo, Tunisia.

Against: Turkey, United Klngdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United States of America. Australia. Belgium, Canada, China, France, Greece. Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg. Netherlands, New Zealand. Nicaragua. Porhigsl. South Africa, Spain.

Abstaining: Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentins, Aus- tria. Bolhia, Brazil, Chile, Colombla, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Halti, Hon- duras, Iceland, Iran, Israel. Nomay, Pakistan, Pana- pia. Paraguay, Pem. Philippines. Sweden, Thailand.

Sub-paragraph (aJ vas adopted by 56 votes to 19, with 26 abstentions

Subparagraph (bJ was adopted by 59 votes to 17, witb 19 abstentions.

Su&paragrap.h.(c) was adopted by 63 votes to 12. with 24 abstentions.

Sut-paragraph (üJ was adopted by 52 votes to 20. with 23 abstentions.

124. The PRESLDENT (translate0 iiv,ii French): 1 shall now put the whale of operative paragraph 1 to the vote.

A vote was taken by mll-call.

Cuinea, Iiaving &en drawn by lot by the President. was called upon to vote first.

Zn favour: Guinea, Hungary, India. Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan. Jordan. Lebanon, Liberia, Llbya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Poland. Romania, Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Sierra Leone. Somalia, Sudan. Syria, Togo. Tunisia, Wain ian Soviet Socialist Re- public. Union of Sodet Socialist Republfcs. United Arab Repuhlic, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavla. Afghanistan, A M , Bulgaria. Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Cambodia, Cameroun. Cen- tral African Republic, Ceylon, Chad. Congo (Brazza- ville). Congo (Leopoldviiie). Cuba, C y p m , Czecho- slovakia. Dahomey, Ethiopia. Federation of Malaya. Gabon, Ghana.

Against: Ireland. Italy, Luxembourg. Netherlands. New Zealand, Nicaragua, Portugal, South Africa, Spain. Turkey, Unlted Klngdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United States of America, Australla, Beigium. Canada, China. France, Greece, Guatemak.

Abstaining: Halti, Honduras. Iceland. Iran, Israel. Norway. Paldstan, Panama. Paraguay, Penq Philip- pines, Sweden, Thailand. Uruguay, Venezuela, Argen- tins, Austria, Bolivla, Brazfl, Cbile, Colombia. Costa Rica. Denmark. Eouador. El Salwdor. Finland.

Operative psragraph 1 a s a wbole was adopted by 56 votes to 19, witb 26 ehstentions.

125. The PRESIDENT ( tms la t ed fmm French): We shall now vote on operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution U set fourth in the report [A/4942/Add.3] of the First Committee.

A vote was taken by mll-cdl.

The United Kingdom. baving &en drawn by lo t by ihe President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Upper Volta, Yemen. Yugoslavis. Af- ghanistan. Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian

Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia. Cameroun. Cen- tral African Republlc, Ceylon. Chad. Congo (Brazza- ville). Congo (Leopoldvilie), Cuba. Cyprus. Czecho- slovakia. Dahomey, Ethiopia. Gabon, Ghana, Guinea. Hungary, India, Indonesia. Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan. Lebanon, Liberia, Libya. Madagascar, Mali, Mauri- tania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nlger, Nigeria, P o b d . Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone. Somalia, Sudan, Syria. Togo, TunIsia, UkraMan Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. United Arab Republic.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United States of America, Australla, Belgium, Canada, China. Costa Rica, France.Greece, Guatemala, Italy. Luxembourg. Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Portugal. South Africa. Spain. Turkey.

Abstaining: Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina. us- tria, Bolivia, Brazil. Chile, Colombia. Denmark, Ecuador. El Salvador, Federation of Malaya. Finland. Haiti. Honduras. Iceland, Iran. Ireland, Israel. Japan, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan. Panama, Paraguay. Pem. Philippines, Sweden. Thailand.

Operative paragaph 2 was adopted by 53 mites to 19, with 29 abstentions.

126. The PRESIDENT (translated fmm French): We shall now vote on draft resolution U a s a whoie.

A mite was taüen by roll-call.

Yemen. hahaPing k e n d r a m by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In famiur: Yemen. Yugoslavia. Afgùanistan. Al- bania, Bulgaria. Burma, Byelorussian SovietSociaiist Republic. Camboila. Camemun, Centrai Airican Re- public, Ceylon. Chad. Congo (Brazzaville). Congo (Leopold~le) . Cuba. Cyprus, Czechoslovakfa. Da- homey, Ethiopia, Gabon. Ghana, Guinea, Eungaiy, India. Indonesis, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan. Lebanon. Liberia. Libya, Madagascar. Mali. Mauri- tanla. Mexico. Mongoiia. Momcco. Nepai. Niger, Nigeria. Poland, RomanIa, Saudi Arabia, Senegai. Sierra Leone. Somalia, Sudan, Syria. Togo. %sia. U k M a n Soviet Socialist Republic. Union af Soviet Socialist Republic. United Arab Repubiic, Upper Volta.

Against: AustIalia, Belgium. Canada, Chlna. Costa Rica. France, Greece. Guatemala. h i a n d . Italy. Luxembourg. Netherlands. New Zeaiand, Nicaragua. Portugal, South Africa. Spain. Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem ireland. United States of America.

A b M i n g : Argentina. Austria. Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colomhia. Denmark. Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya. F W , Haiti. Honduras, Ice- land, Iran, Iarael, Nomay, Palristao, Panama, Para- guay, P e n , Phlllppines, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay. Venezuela.

Draft resolution II as a wbole was adopted by 55 mtes to 20, with 26 abstentions.

127. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): There a r e SUU two speakers on my Ust who wish to exercise their right oi teply. one who wishes to explain hie vote after the -te. I caü upon the representative of the United States of America, who desires to exercise Ms right of reply.

128. Mr. DEAN (United States of America): lt was not quite clear to our delegation what the representa-

rive of the Soviet Union q s complaining about this morning.

129. 1 used Soviet sources and nothing else to de- scribe the Soviet position. The representative d the United Kingdom bas already quoted Mr. Khrushchev's statement in which he said that

" . . . it would be untimely at present to say that Ln the event of w u atomic weapons would not be empioyed. Anyone who made such a statement could turn out to be untruthful even though. when making such a pledge. he would he sincere and not be lying . . . if either side should In such a war feel it was losing, would it not use nuclear weapons to avoid defeat?Y It wouldundouhtedly use its nuclearbombs."

130. Nevertheless. the Soviet Union bas suppoaed a statement that the use of nuclear wapons, even in self- defence, was a violation of the Charter. In the First Committee. in the meeting of 13 Novemher 1961. the representative d the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin. said:

.It i s quite clear to us-and 1 think lt 1s just a s clear to the representative of Italy-because the draft resolution of the eleven African couutries atates that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is a dlrect violation of the Charter of the United Nations."u

131. 1 stated that the Soviet Union enthusiastically aupported this draft resolution. The next day, in the meeting of 14 Nwember. Mr. Tsarapkin of the Soviet Union sald:

.Yesterday, in reply to OUI criticism oftheItalian amendments [A/C.l/U95]. the representative of Italy. being unable to refute that criticism. statedthat the Soviet Union wae ureuared todeal acrushing nuclear hlw*-1 repeat~cr;ehlrignuclear blow-"6 any aggressor. Every'body wili understand that that wiU happen. It La exactly what will happen ii war beglns. War ie war. and it has ite own logical sequence of events. in our day any war can immediately become a nuclear war. and since Itab ie a memher of NATO, and has allwedthe United States to establish miUtary bases on its territory. It is clear that. In,view of its undertakings under the NATO agreements, it will, whether it wiehes or not. he drawn into any such war in the most active manner- and. cd course. with aii due consequences.

*The ltalian representative has no doubta concerning the objective af these NATO hases in hia country. We have no doubîs on that score either. That i s why it i s within the logic of events that. la the event of war, those hases will he immediately dealt a cnsbing and devastating blwm-and here i s Soviet irony-"but the reaponsihillty for these consequences wlU. af course. rest with those who created NATO, who have dravm Italy into NATO and who have estabushed military bases on ItaUan soi1 and bave thus made that country ninerable to such hlws."Y

132. 1 suhmit that what 1 said in entirely justifled by what MI. Wnishchev bas said and what the repre-

sentative of the Soviet Union has said in this hall. namely. that aithough they have voted for a resolution which would outlaw nuclear weapons even in theexer- cise of self-defence. nevertheless, the Soviet Union does not intend to iive up to that resolution.

133. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I cal1 upon the representative of the Union of Soviet Sociaiist Repubiics. who wishes to exercise bis right of reply.

134. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Sociaiist Republics) (translated from Russian): At this hour 1 have no intention of detaining the General Assembly for long. and want to make only two short remarks. The fondness which the United Kingdom and United States delegations have iately shown for quoting from Soviet sources should, in our view. be hacked up ais0 by correctness of quotation. since what i s the point of quoting, if the quotation is incorrect7

135. As regards the declarations by the Head of the Soviet Govemment which were quoted by the representatives of Western delegations speaking from this rostrum, 1 cannot do other than Say that they were quoted incorrectiy. 1 rend out today a clear and absolutely definite statement by the Head of the Soviet Government about that Government's readiness to sign an undertaking by States to renounce the use of nuclear weapons the very same day that other States also do so.

136. As regards the declarations made by Mr. N. S. Khrushchev in reply to questions put by the United States fournalist, Mr. Suizberger, the Soviet delegation is obliged. for the third Ume, to draw the attention of the delegations of Western Powers m the fact that the United States observer, Mr. Suizberger. asked: "Wouid the Soviet Union agree to declare that it wouid never be the first to employ nuclear weapons in the event of war?" Mr. Suizberger went on to say: "It seems to me that, U just onecountry were to make such a statement. then perhaps the other nuclear Powers also wouid make similar statementan.g And N. S. Khrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government. replied: "We shall never he the tiret to start a war against any country. That is our position: we shall never be the first to start a waragainst any countryg. huther. in reply to Mr. Suizberger's question about the unilateral assumption by the Soviet Union ofa com- mitment not to employ nuclear weapons, Mr. Khrush- chev explained why such a cornmitment couid not be accepted unilateraiiy. And we. today. continue to hope that, after the General Assembly has. by an over- wbelmlng majority of votes. adopted the resolution in favour of concluding a muitilateral convention pmhibiting the use of nuclear weapons, it will pmve possible to conclude such a convention and that the Governments of the United States and theUnitedKlng- dom wiii not oppose this. On ita part. the Soviet Union is prepared to conclude such a convention.

137. Secondly, with reference to Mr. Dean's last speech. the Soviet delegation wouid llke once again

tO draw attention tn the vitnlly important necessity of ensuring a healthy and favourable atmosphere for the forthcoming disarmament negotiations. We consider this to he a most important task and we appeal to al1 delegations, including the United States delegation, to help in creating such an atmosphere.

138. The PRESIDENT (translated fmm French): 1 caii upon the representative of the Upper Volta. for an explanation of vote.

139. Mr. GUIRMA (Upper Volta) (translated fmm French): It may seem strange and contradictory that certain African countries shouid have abstained in the vote on the resolution [1652 (XVI)] which asks for the denuclearization of Africa, and yet have voted in favour of the resolution [1653 (XVI)] which declares that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit. letter and aima of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

140. Nevertheless. our position ia clear. 1 shouid iike to repeat briefiy here the explanations we have already given in the First Cornmittee. During the Cornmittee's disoussion on denuclearization and various nuclear pmblems. we found ourselves witnessing what was virtually a duel between the United States of American and the Soviet Union. This brought it home to us that disarmament was an extremely pressing pmi>lem: that the problems bad to be placed in order of importance andurgency; that the disarmament pmblem was. into the bargain Indivisible; and that it was necessaxy to think in terms of general disarmament rather tban disarmament by continents. Even Uacon- tinent was declared a denuclearized zone. it wouid not, in the event of nuclearwar. necessarlly be spared by the atomic bomba, much les8 by the radio-actlve faii-t that the nuclear explosions might pmduce. This pmmpted us to feel that we shouid strive for a more general and more comprehensive form of disarmament thmughout the world. because it would be idle to think that Africa's destiny couid be kept apart f m m that of the rest ai the world.

141. We also felt that this move sbouidcomefmm the various African Heads of State. Faced with the con- troversy amused by the wrious pmblema of disarmament and denuclearizaUon, tbe African Heads of State muat reach a thomugh and unanimous agreement on the steps to be taken to keep Airica safe. It ia not our iunction. here in the United Nationa, take up positions and ask our Heads of State to sanction them; we are bere rather in order to secure international sanction for the decisiona taken by the supreme authorities of OUI States. That is wby we abatainsi on the resolution concerning the denuclearization of Airica, yet votad in iavour of the resolution submined by Ethiopia and ita friends.

142. 1 say this in order ta dispel any conhision regarding our intentions and ta make it clear that there has never been any quesuon Of O u r wishing to proteet anyone, or any intention in connexion with the initiai testing or stnrago of atomic weapons in Africa.

lEe meeting m e at 1.45 p . a

33/71. Renew of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at itn tenth speeial session

B

NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR


Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining Eystem posed by nuclear weapons and by their use inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling the statement contained in the Fmai Docu- ment. of the Tenth Special Session of the GeneraI As- sembly that al1 States should activcly participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful wnduct of nations in international &airs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapon~,'~

1 . Declares that:

( a ) The use of nuclcar weapons will be a nolation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity;

( b ) The use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pendingnudear disarmament;

2. Requests ail States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to submit to the SeentaryGeneral, beforc the thirty-founh session of the General Assembly, proposais concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and rclated maners, in order that the question of an international convention or some other agreement on the subject may be discussed at that session.

84th plenary meeting 14 December 1978

' 8 Rcsolution SIO/Z para. 58.

( ' .

~ f l I T E D N A T I O N S - '. ,, ... D i s t r . LIMITE3

A/C.1/33/L.2 20 October 1978

ORIGIPIAL: ENGLISH

/ a j r t y - t h i r c ? sess ion - -z - - . . CO!.CIITTEE

,:genia item 125

REVIEi OF THE IPJ~PLEIENTATION OF THE RECOMI.BNDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOFTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT

ITS TEHTH SPECIAL SESSION

Aigeria. A r ~ e n t i n a , Cyprus, Ethiovia, India, Indonesia. blalaysia, Nigeria and Yugoslavia: d r a f t r e so lu t ion

Non-use of nuclear weauons and prevention of nuclear v a r

The Ceneral Assenbly,

Alarmed by t h e t h r e a t t o t h e s u r v i v a l of mankind and te t h e l i f e - s u s t a i n i n g sfsten posed by nuclear weapons and by t h e i r use inherent i n concepts of ieterrence,

Convinced t h a t nuclear disarmament i s e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e prevention of nuclear var and fo r t h e strengthening of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y ,

Reca l l inq t h e Declaration of t h e Ceneral Assembly contained i n t h e F ina l h c m e n t adopted a t i t s t e n t h s p e c i a l sess ion t h a t "al1 S t a t e s should a c t i v e l y ;ort icipate i n e f f o r t s t o b r ing about condit ions i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s among Ztates i n which a code of peaceful conduct of nat ions in i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s %uld be agreed and which would preclude t h e use o r t h r e a t of use o f nuclear .~eapons", i/

1. Declares t h a t :

( a ) The use of nuclear weapons w i l l be a v io la t ion o f t h e Char ter of the Ynited Nations and a crime agains t humanity;

( b ) The use o f nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibi ted , pending :.ï:iear d isarzeaent ;

2. Requests al1 Sta tes . p a r t i c u l a r l y nuclear-weapon S t a t e s , t o submit t o t h e Ceneral Assezbly a t its th i r ty - four th sess ion propcsals concerning t h e non-use of n u c l e u veapons. avoidance of nuclear va r and r e l a t e d mat ters in Order t h a t t h e ques t ion of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l convention o r some other agreement on the subJect may be discussed a t t h e th i r ty - four th sess ion .

United Natiotu

G E N E R A L A S S E M B L Y THIRTY-THIRD SESSION O&k1 Records '

FIRST COMMITTEE 18th meeting

held on Friday, 27 October 1978

at 10.30 a.m. New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 18TH MEETING

Chaiman: Mr. PASTINEN ( Finland)

CONTENTS

AGENDA ITEM 125: RFVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMMDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

Thihir record is subkct 10 conection. C~mct ionr should bc incurporrted in a copy a l the rcccid u d houid bc unt wrnm ont w e k of the &te ofpvbllcown io the Chicl. 0ffi;iri Records Editing Section. r w m *-su.

Camctionr vill be issued sharily alter the end of the uxion . in a xpui i c faSCi~lc roi erch Cornmittee.

Distr. GENERAL A/C.1/33/W.18 30 October 1978

The CIIP.PE141T: In the few minutes t ha t a r e l e f t t o us, 1 ca l1 on

.he ... r ep rec~n ta t ive of India foma l ly t o introduce t o t he Comittee the draf t

.,.olution~ .-- in document A/C.1/33/L.Z and P . / C . 1/33/L. 3.

:Ir. GIL4REm4Ji ( Ind ia ) : Permit me t o introduce the tvo d ra f t

resoliitions which have been before t h i s Committee for the past week and, i n

aaaûner of s ~ e a k i n g , before the d e l e ~ a t i o n s assembled here for the past

four to f ive months. The draf t resolutions per ta in t o important questions

rhich were not adequately ref lected i n t he Final Document adoited a t t he

special session devoted t o disarmament.

Representatives vil1 r e c a l l t h a t India did not press i t s draf t resolut ions

to a vote during t h e speciai session i n the i n t e r e s t s of achieving a consensus,

but we reserved the r i gh t t o introduce those d ra f t resolutions, su i tab ly

mended, during t h i s session.

On behalf of t he delegations of Aigeria, Angola, .Argentka, Shutan,

Cyprus, E m t , Ethiopia, Cuinea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Figer ia ,

h a n i a , t h e S-nian Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Zaire and my ovn, 1 have t h e

privilege t o introduce t h e draf't resolution contained i n document A/C.1/33/L.2

on the non-use of nuclear veapons and the prevention of nuclear var.

The General Assembly a t i ts special session unambipus ly and unanimously . .

reiterated the f ac t t ha t nuclear weapons y s e d t h e greates t danger t o mankind

and t o t he survival of c iv i l i za t ion .

T!ie 'ips.l )cc-xent of t h e s p e c i a l ses s ion a l s o reccmized t h a t t h e

zcz+ effectix-e guarantee aga ins t t h e danger of nuclear war and t h e use

of ?.uclear ' Iequns i s nuclear disarmament and t h e complete e l iminat ion of

nuclezr veapons. In f a c t t h e General Assembly had, a t i t s ver:.? f i r s t s ? s s & ,

h e l à 32 j-ears ago, callecl f o r t h e adoption of measures preventing t h e use

of atomic energy f o r m i l i t a r y purFoses and f o r t h e e l iminat ion of nuclear

i.?eapor.s. S ince t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n whatsoever of an e a r l y h a l t t o t h e

nuclear a r i s r ace , l e t a lone t h e commencement of a process of nuclear

d i s a r m ~ e n t l ead ing t o t h e f i n a l e l iminat ion of nuclear weapons, t h e r e i s no

reason rrhy mankind should not be given c r e d i b l e and binding assurance againct

the use of nuclear weapons.

Both aur ing t h e s p e c i a l s e s s i o n and i n the cenera l debat? here in the

F i r s t Cormittee arguments have been put forward by some nuclear weapons States,

3.S :.~€ll a s ?r s c r e of t h e i r a l l i e s , t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e y were obliged t o

r e t a i n nuc lea r a r sena i s i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r s e c u r i t y . Eut su re ly these

Powers have an equal o b l i g a t i o n no t t o endanger t h e rest of mankind by

t h e use o r t h e e t of nuclear weapons.

This d r a f t r e so lu t ion r e i t e r a t e s t h e provisions of t h e dec la ra t ion

conta ined i n General Assembly r e s o l u t i o n 1653 (XVI) of November 1961. It

a l s o r e i t e r a t e s t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e non-aligned coun t r i e s adopted s ince t h e

f irst non-a l igned S i i a m i t meeting h e l d i n Belgrade i n 1961. Most r ecen t ly

t h e Belgrade Declarat ion of t h e Foreign Hin i s t e r s of non-dignod

c o u n t r i e s expressed r e g r e t t h a t t h e negat ive a t t i t u d e o f some nuclear-weapon

S t a t e s had prevented t h e s p e c i a l s e s s i o n from adopting measures necessarr

t o p r o h i b i t t h e use o f n u c l e a r weapons and t o have a ~ o r a t o r i m cn t h e i r

t e s t i n g .

1 should l i k e t o point o u t t h a t i n t h i s draft r e s o l u t i o n t h e sponsors

. a r e net asking f o r an i aned ia te ~ o n c l u s l û n of a convention on non-use of

nuc lec r veapons. We a r e merely c a l l i n g upon al1 S t a t e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e

nuc lea r veapon S t a t e q t o submit proposais on t h e arrangements f o r t h e conclusion

of 2. Ccn-rention o r any o t h e r agreement on t h e non-use c f nuclear weapons

so t h a t t h e subjec t could be s t u d i e d at t h e th i r ty- four th sess ion of t h e

G e n e r d Assembly.

surelY, no delegation should f ind any d i f f i cu l ty in supporting such a

and non-controversial resolution. ji:pi* I

1 have just been asked t o announce tha t t he United Republic of Cameroon

has also beccme a CO-srorsor of à r a f t resolution ~/~.1/33/L.2. The respective

Co-sponsors of both these à r a f i resolutions which 1 have jus t formaily

introduced sincerely hope t h a t both w i l l receive the general appr0v.d of c l 1

tembers and v i l 1 be adopted by consensus.

united Nationr

c E N E R A L 29

FIRST CO-

A S S E M B L Y 19th meeting

held on

THIRTY-THIRD SESSION Pridsy, 27 October 1978 at 3 p.m.

0p.d Razor& * New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 19TH MEZTIHC

Chairman: Mr. PASTINm (Finland)

AGENDA ITR4 125: REVIEW OF THE IMPLPIEHTATIOH OF THE RECOMMEBDATIOBS AND DECISIOHS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TZHTH SPECIAL SESSIOB: REWRT OP THE SECRETARY-GEWERAL (continued)

Ethiopia is firmly committed t o strenqthenin,? in te rna t iona l peace and secur i ty ,

building confidence among S ta t e s , ccnsolidating détente and prcmoting respect

for t h e purposes and pr inciples of the Charter of t h e United Nations. AS t he

v i c t i n of successive vars of aggression, the people and Govenunent of

Ethiopia a r e a l r~ays ready t o join i n al1 e f fo r t s aMed at avoiding the horrors

of w a r . The nuclear Pcvers and non-nuclear-wea~on S ta t e s must r ea l i ze tha t time

i s of t he essence, because war i n t he present-day world is a war of t o t a l

destruction. For these reasons Ethiopia has been par t ic ipa t ing act ively i n

e f fo r t s t o strengthen t h e effectiveness of t h e pr inc ip le of t he non-use of force,

and pa r t i cu l a r ly t h e prohibit ion of the use of nuclear weapons. This a l s0

explains vhy we have joined i n sponsoring the d r a f t resolut ion, i n i t i a t e d by

India, on non-use of nuclerr wea-ons and the oreventicn of nuclear war

(A/C.1/33/L.2).

Ethiopia 's ult imate object ive is general and complete disannament under

e f fec t ive in te rna t iona l cont ro l on the basis of equal secur i ty f o r fi. This

process can begin only a f t e r t h e cessation of t he arms race i n t he nuclear

f i e ld . Since t h e r e is no indication tha t t h i s will be a t ta ined in t h e near

future , Ethiopia supports a l 1 e f fo r t s t ha t contr ibute towards thc achievement of

t ha t object ive.

.. United Nations

G E N E R A L A S S E M B L Y THIRTY-THIRD SESSION O8;iai Records

FIRST COMMITPEE 51st meeting

held on Monday, 27 November 1978


VEREATIii RECORD OF THE 51ST MEETING

Chaiman: M r . PASTINEN F in land)

AGENDA ITEM 125: REYIEW OF THE IMPLPlENTATION OF THE RECOMM&I7ûATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPPED BY TüE CENERAC ASSEMBLY AT il's TENTH SPECIAL SESSIOif: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ( continued )

P..e CCBAI- As no oti!er d e l e g ~ t i o n has asked t o sp&, t h e Cornmitter: hzs thus conclwJod its considt.rntion of tli? *rift rc.solution

i n document A/C.1/33/L.l. It w i l l now consider the draft reso lu t ion i n

document A/C.1/33/1.2, e n t i t l e d "~ev iew of the implementation of t h e eeconmendations

ar.3 àecis ions adopted ùy the General Asseibly a t i t s ten th spec ia l session". The

d r a f t concerns the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war.

It has 36 sponsors, end 1 7 ~ s introduced by the representat ive of India a t

the eiehteenth meeting of the F i r s t Comnittee, on 27 October 1978. The sponsors

have expressefi the wish t h a t the draft resolut ion be adopted by cons.msus.

Mr. --- G H A R W ( Ind ia ) : !Then the F i r s t Cornittee adjourned on Friday

evening, Kr . Chairman, you were good enough t o annouilce t h a t t h e sponsors of

&aft resolutions ~/C.1/33/L.2 and L.3 would be me et in^ t h i s morning a t 9.30.

~ ~ f ~ ~ t u n a t e l y today's Journal i.0ntfl.ini.d ;in miforturiate i :rror It liinounccd t h a t

the sponsors of d r a f t resolut ions A/C.1/33/L.l anC L.2 were t o r,iêet t h i s morninz

fo r informal consultations. As a r e s u l t of t h i s mistalie i n t h e -- Journal n+ny of

the sponsors did not etterid t h e morning consultations. 1 would tlierefore

ffiii, M. Ch~irnnn a t least as far as d ra f t reso lu t ion A/C.1/33/1.3 is

concerned, i f you could possibly give us snrle tsme f o r i n fom? . l consultations.

As f a r as drnf t resolut ion A/C.1/33/L.2 is concerned, perhaps we c o d d

dispense with t h e need f o r consul ta t ions among the sponsors.

1 should l i k e t o r eac out a smaU drnfting chaii~e' t o opera t ive paragraph

? of the draf t . That paragraph should be reworded t o read a s follows:

"Requests al1 S ta t e s , pa r t i cu l a r ly niiele;i~.weapon S t z t e s , t o submit

t o t he Secretary-Generai, before t h e th i r ty - four th sess ion of t h e General ..

P.sai.mSl.y, proposais concerning t h e non-use of nuclear wecpons . . . " the r e s t of t h a t parapaph remeining unchanged.

That i s a very small change, and it does not a t al1 a f f c c t t h e substance

of the d ra f t resolution.

The CHAIRÿA?: 1 thank t h e representat ive of I n d i e f o r h i s

clarification. I f 1 understood him cor rec t ly , t h e snonsors of d r a f t reaolution

A/C.1/33/~.2 have nothing q a i n s t t h e Committee proce3Ckg ta consider t h r t

&ft resolution 8s nmended by thr- r e n r e s a t a t i v e of SnQia. Fnr tte of claî i ty 1 s h a l l now read out his anendment. Tbo parzgraph r;hould.read:

"Requests ail S ta t e s , per t icu lnr ly nuc lear - ïe5~0n S t a t e s , t o submit

t o t h e Secretary-General, before t he thir ty-fotrr th s e s s ion of t h e General

assekibly, proposals . . . '' and so on. That i s t h e only change.

1 Vould ask the representat ive of India whether = k t is cor rec t .

W. G H A R E ~ 4 1 1 ( Ind ia ) : Yes, Mr. Chai-, it i s c s r r e c t .

i Would take t h i s oyportunity t o c t a t e t h a t i f the t i r a f t resol i i t ic? is not t 0

be ado~ tcd by cons,.risus my d e l e ~ a t i o n would a ~ p r e c i e t e 8 recs rded vote.

The CIiAIPiW?: 1 s h a l l now c a l 1 upon those representat ives wishing ta

srea:: i n exclanation of vote before the vote.

. ISSRA-LYKT (Union of Soviet S o c i d i s t ~ e p u b l i c s ) ( i n t e r p r e t a t i o ~ frai

Russian) : Tne Soviet Union cogci<?rc tha t t he question of t h e prohibition of th ,

use of ni!c\ear veaoons s u s t be considerea and decicied upon in c0nnc::ion v i th the

n~n-üse of force i n interna-tional r e l a t i o n s and t h e stren,-th en in^ of inteniatiocal

l e e a l guarantee of t h e s e c - k i t y of States . Such aa a p ~ r o a c h is i n t o t a l accord

with the decis ions of the Wi ted Nations, and i n picrticular t r i t h GsnCal Jsserkl7

reso iu t ion 2936 iX)NII) on t ~ o o n - ü s e o f force in in t e rna t iona l re la t ions and pennsnen+. prohib i t ion of t h e usa of nuclear wcapo~s whick 57:~s .sBo~tcd.

a s r r i l l De r e c d l e d , a t z h e erenty ~ ~ e r . f ! l session of thc & n a a l Asseably.

m a t principie was reflectea as v e l l i n a nurber of .ravisions of the Final

iocment of the spec ia l session devoted t o disarmsrient. On the basis af those

Drovision~ and decisions, the Soviet Lhion, as is known, intrcduced f o r consideration

in the United llations R draf t un iversd t r ea ty on the ncn-use of force

international re la t ions , a r t i c l e 1 of vtiich provides that s a r t i e s t o the

treaty s h & L ref ra in from the use of armeci force invo1vi.q the use of any

types of weapons, including nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

me conclusion of such a t rea ty in accordance with United nations decisions

muid, i n our opinion, be a major step towards the solution of the question of

:he prohibition of the use of nucleer weapons.

ünfortunatelp, i n the draf t resolution bef ore us, dociment A/C.l/33/L. 2,

the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is a r t i f i c i a l l y

divorced f i a m the question of the adoption of internationaï po l i t i ca l and

legal measures t o strengthen security fo r all States and fram the question of

the non-use of force by States in international relations.

In view of t h i s , the Soviet delegation w i ï i a s t a i n in the vote on t h i s . .

draft resolution.

Mr. FISHER ( ~ n i t e d States of America) : The llnited States would

like t o explain the vote that it vil1 cast epainst the draft resolution

in dccmeat A/C.1/33/L.2. This vote is based, in 1-e part, on

oprative paragraph 1 of th i s draft resolution .=hich ~ u r n o r t s t o outlair the use

of nüclear weapons, under any circumstances, as a violation Of t he Charter.

lhe United States cannot find the basis f o r t h i s draft resolution i n the

a m e r . 5 e Clarter provides tha t ail States nust not use 02' threaten t o

u e force in t h e i r re ïa t ions vi th other Sta tes except ia self defence o r in Other s i tuat ions pennitted under the Charter. The ünited Rations Charter &es

ad outlaw nucleer means for deterrence or defence against an a t tack ae;&st

United S ta tes or i ts a l l i es .

The b i t e d States has peviouçly referred t o t h e facts of nucleer deterrence.

are not pleasant f a d s but we cannot overlooii the Zact that i n many areas

Of the world nuclear weapons are pprt of t t e securit:. arranqements t ka t have

k e ~ t the peace. mis fac t exis ts , as does i t s frightening corollarY t h e

'mer of nuclesr 7,eanons and aeapon systems deplove6 on h t h s ices . The:?

'sot be ra:, t o disaupear by the passage of r resolution by the United mations.

ILqainst : Aust ra l ia , Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany , Federal Republic o f , Greece, I reland, I t a l y , Luxembourg,

Netherlands, New Zealand, Noway, Portugal, United Kingdom

of Great Br i ta in and Northern I re land , United States of

America

.4bstainin&: Austria, Bulgaria, Byelomssian Soviet Socia l i s t Republic,

Czechoslovakia, Finland, Germen Democratic Republic,

Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, I s r a e l , Japan,

Mongolia, Poland, Spain, Sweden , Ukrainian Soviet

Soc ia l i s t Republic, Union of Soviet Soc ia l i s t Republics

Draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2 was adouted by 8k votes t o 16, with

18 abstentions.

The CRAIRMAN: 1 s h a l l now c a l l on those representat ives who wish

t o explain t h e i r vote a f t e r t he vote.

Mr. HSü (China) ( in te rpre ta t ion from Chinese) : The Chinese delegation

i s of t h e view t h a t t he d e s i r e of many countries fo r the non-use of nuclear

weapons is just . China has consis tent ly stood f o r the complete prohibition

and thorough destnict ion of nuclear weapons and has repeatedly declared tha t

China w i U a t no t h e and under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against

non-nuclear States. It is k n o ~ t o a l l t ha t the most e f f ec t ive way t o eliminate

the danger of a nuclear var is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction

of nuclear weapons. Before t h i s objective is rea l ized , t h e two super-Powers

possessing the l a rges t nuclear arsenal3 should be the f i r s t t o undertake

unccnditionaily t h a t n t no time and under no circumstances vil1 they use nuclear

veapons against non-nuclear S ta t e s o r nuclear-free zones, and should proceed

forthwith t o reduce subs tan t i a l ly t h e i r nuclear weapons.

As no reference i s made i n &ait resolution A/C.1/33/L.2 t o t h i s

fundamental question, t h e Chinese delegation did not pa r t i c ipa te i n the vote

on t h i s & a f t resolut ion and requests t h a t t h i s statement of t h e Chinese

delegation be r e f l ec t ed i n the records.

ilr. OC120 ( Y a p n ) : LThe question of non-use of nuclear weapons - ---- h a ~ been ùiscusseci a nmber of %i>:~es i n Unite6 nlations fo- : and TIY

c o u l t r j hm cons is ten t ly talcen tlie positioii t ha t a comitmexit t o the non-use

of i ~ u c l e a r ireapons r r i l l never ùe ~ e n u i n e k r e f fec t ive imless it i s backed up

by the ~ ~ l ~ a c n t 2 + i o n of coficrete aeasures af nuclear disamament and

e f f ec t ive i i i t e r n a t i o n d control.

Fur t l i snore , it i s rie11 uncierstood by al1 "ie~bers present :lere

t h a t t he C1.arter o f t he Chiteci !rations :las a l e ~ a l l y binclinq provision i n

Ar t ic le 2 , uaragr-h 11, t ha t

1 e b e r s s h a l l re f ra in i n t i i e i r i n t e rna t iona l r e l a t i ons f m n

:;!le -tlires.t o r use o f force ~ 2 i n s t t h e t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o r oo l i t i ce l

indepeildence of any S t a t e , o r i n nny o tùe r muiner inconsis tent with the

gurposes of t he h i t e d Zations. II

m e Governnent of Jepan therefore believes t h a t t he question of non-use

of nuclear 7reapOiïS s:iould be considered b'j t h e United :?utions only after

procress lias beeil xa2.e on concrete uieasiires of disarmament and an!!! control,

such as SALT II and III-, a comnre:lensive test-ban, p rohib i t ion of chernical

veapons, a cut-off of f i s s iona5le n a t e r i a l s , and so for th .

For t h i s reason, ny delecation abstnined fron v o t i n l on d r a f t

resolut ion A/C.1/33/L.2.

S i r Dere!: ASEX (United ItinzGm) : The v i em of Covement ori the -- i s sues r a i s ed in t h i s d r z f t resolut icn are too r re l l hown f o r me t o need t o make

Fore thzn the S r i e f e s t explanation of vr:~y qy d ~ l e g a t i o n hes voted a ~ a i n s t it. - ..

VJe of course Wree on the supreme i q o r t a n c e of ensurinr: t n a t nuc l ee r - 1

?:eapoz!s cever need t o be used, but a ban on use is not a p r e c t i c a l measuire

f o r !Jestem countries i n an aree. rrhere nuclear veapons e - e s t i n larg= nuabers

and vrhere t l icre i s a 'neevy conventional imbalance, so thet s e c u r i t y f o r the

present r e s t s & nuclear deterrcnce. Deterrence of aggression i s e s s e n t i d

t o i n t e rna t ione l s ecu r i t y u n t i l nuclect disamment has been achieved.

h y non-use pleùge vould weaken the c r e d i b i l i t y of ùeterrence and inc re i se

t he chances o f a ~ ~ r e s s i o n .

? ~ . RAJE::OZCI (Finland): The Finnish dele,-;ation abstained i n t h e vote - th: draft resolut ion i n document ~ / ~ . 1 / 3 3 / ~ . 2 . Ye Cid because of

qerat ive paragra'h 1 ( a ) , and more spec i î i ca l ly becîuse of the mention t h a t

The s e of nuclear weapons will be a violatiori of t he Charter". !!e thinL

:bat th i s iuention does not rccur2t.ely r e f l ec t r e a l i t y .

Havins said t h a t , ï shouid l i k e t o add tha t my delegation arodd have Seen

ja??y t o vote in favour of it could the aforementioned inconsistency rrith the

charter have been avoided. The main puqose of t he draf t resolut ion i s , i n our viev,

certainly qui te pos i t ive enù thus meets the concerns of the Finnish C-ovement

as far as t he dancer of nuclear w a r i s concerned.

P.*. LIDGARD (Swecien): It i s i n the i n t e r e s t o f t he sukval of -li:;ir>d -- that nuc1e.u r.reapons not be used. Tliere i s a l so a ce r t a in l o e i c a l l i nk betrreen

non-use and non-proliferation rrhich must be Ise- i n mind. Thus the issue o f

:On-use ~ e r i t s t h e hinhest attention. The l a t e s t occasion ~rhen it was discussed

i n depth ? r a ç during the del ibers t ions of the s ~ e c i a l session of t he Generd

bsserlbly on d i samment .

1 tnsh t o r e c a l l trhat is sa id i n paragrzph 58 of the Final Docuen.: on

that issue. Those del iberat ions have harever a ï s0 reninded us of a l 1 the

?Tactical d i f f i c d t i e s involved. It is al1 too evident t h a t the probleus inherent

in the nuclear arsenal= and t h e i r r e l a t eù militsry doctrines cannot be solved.

'hply by a declzration of non-use. It i s i n fac t necessary t o p ~ . p p l e with the

COncrete r e a l i t y of deployed nuclear forces md of the doctrines f û r t h e i r

"ssible use x.rhich GO deeply i n t o the gcneral z ~ i l i t a r y d iSp0~i t ionS of the

ieading s i l i t a r y Powers and concern conventional forces :.S wcll.

JUS^ as in the case of secur i ty guarantees, a declaration of co:?-use

L.tich could gain ~ e n e r d acceotance c m under no cir~umstances Serve 3s a

':bstitute for m e a s a s on nuclear disamament. Unfortunately, i n th= absence

"substaritial r e su l t s i n t h e e f for t s underteken so f a r t o r e s t r e in the nuclear

'% r2Cee, and il vie11 of t h e differences i n force postures and doctrines aireacbr

"''entioned, t h e issue of a non-use declaration tends too e c s i l y t o become l e s s ' w a y t o mep.ter s ecu r i ty f o r a l1 than a d iv is ive i s sue between the

"'lear-weapon Ytat es.

That nust be avoided, a d f o r those various reesons my delecation zbstGned in tlie vote.

1 visii t o concl!ide by r eca l l i n s once tain the Final Document of the

s?ec ia l sessior?. nie auertlon of non-use is too inportant t o be l e f t aside,

am1 th? non-nucleir-iiea~on States have a l e g i t i a z t e r igh t t o e e e C t COnstruct ivg

act ions i i i o r k r t o h a l t the nucleé~r anus rece.

Fr. NGUYEN V.@N Lx (Yiet Fan) ( in te rpre ta t ion fron French) : The deleneii

of the S o c i a l i s t Republic of Viet ?Tm voted i n favour of d r e f t resolut ion

A/C.1/33/L.2, it 'Jeinq ~ x . d e r s t o o tha t uncier i ts t e m recourse t o nuclear weapans

i n cme of eggression i s a violat ion of t he C h u t e r and a crime aaainst humanity,

The CHAIRKW: !le have noIr !lep.rd d l d.e le~a t ions -rishing t o e.qlain -- t h e i r votes a f t e r t he vote. .

united Nations Agenda item 125 $1.. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

ANNEXES

THIRTY-THIRD SESSION

fic ci al Recordr NEW YORK. I9781le7P

G n d i item 125:' Rcvicw of rhe implementation o f h e r-commeadationi uid deciaioru adopted by ihe Gnerd Aucmbly i l ils ken& v c i d uuion: (a) Repori of ihe Di.um.meni Cornminion: ( b ) Rep.,* of he Secretuy-Gnerd

C

COYTEYTS W I U o I<#U rd.,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A133146 1 Repon of rlr Fini C o m m i ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *mkmby<br IAmcdArmbh 13

'-bdLbiddaumQo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I>

DOCUMENT A1331461

[Original: Enqlishl Il2 Drcrmber 19781

1. INTRODUC~ON 1. ïhc ium entitlcd "Revicw of the implementaùon of the

~mmenda t ions and decisions aQpad by the Gmral As- m b l y aï ics unth special session: (a) R e m of the Diwnn- ment Commission: (b) Repaa of che Seact~yCimwl" m includcd in the p r o v i s i d agead. of the duny-thid mion in accordancc with pampph I 15 of the Finil DOEU- mcnt of the Tmth Spfiai Susion of the G e d i b a n b l y ~uolution S- 1012). doprcd on 30 Junc 1978.

2. At iu 4th and 5th plenary d n p . oa 22 Seplmibcr '1978.theGmralkumibly.ontherrcommmditionofche G c d Commirrcc. dccided to includc the imn in i n agcda md ai1ouu~ it to the Fm1 CommiücC.

3. At iu 3rd meeting. on 6 Onobs. the Furt CommitUe dccided to consider vpuucly i m 1îS and 128 and dm IO boM a combincd gmnl dcbuc on che other imnr diocad oit rrlatuig w bssmiPmmt. nuncly. im 35 to 49. 'Ihc p n a s l â e b a u o n i u m I U & p L r a u t h e 4 t h m I % h mcerings. h m 16 to 27 Octoba.

6. On 20 Onobcr. Algma. Argentina. Cypnrr. Miopia. India. Inâonesia. Maiaysia. Nigeria and Yugmhvu submined a drpn nsolution (AIC. 11331L.2). sukqumfly a h s nrorrd by Angola. B a h d o s . Bhuun. Bolivu. Burundi. &ombia. the Congo. Cuba. Ecudor. Egypt. Gui-. Jordan. Liberia. Mdqucsr. M. Mauritiw. Maoceo. RIU. Romania. Senegai. Sri W. Ibe Syfian Anb Rc-

blic. the Unitai Repiblic of Camemon. Uruguay and L, which . wir inuuiucoi by üae rrpracntaùve of udi. u the 18th d n g . on 27 Ocmba. ïk uxt rrsd u foUows:

[ S a m feu ru dm# resoiwio~~ B in para8rapA 33 kkw. with rhe uccurion of orrat ive w r a ~ n w h 2 which r d ru - . . - . follows:

"2. R q u e ~ dl Stata. phni lady nuclur-wqmn S<ntcr.u>~ubmit<ocheûmnlkunnbly~i~thirty- fourrh sasion nomulr ancanin= the non-use of nuclar we~ponr. avo& of n u t e p wY and rr~g(cd orda rboi the qunWn of M iaPmnDohll convamai a

III. VOTINC . *. 20 Ai the rame meeting. bcfm Ihe Fmt Comrnina

procccdcd io voie on drafi asnlution A/C 1133IL ?. lndm announccd a drafunn change IO oarauve paramph 2. the . - . paragraph r d in as fGllows:'

"Requests ail Siarcs. panicularty nuclcar-weapon States. to rubmii IO the S e c r r u r y G e d . beforr the thiny-fouith session of the Gcned Asrernbly. propa;rls conceming the non-use of nuclear weaponr . . . ".

the mc of the pangraph rcmaining unchangcd. Thercupon. the draft moluoon. as rcviud. vas doprsd by a recordrd voie of 8.4 to 16. with 18 absunuonr (ibid.. draft moluuon - ~ - ~ ~

8). The voting &as as follows: In ~<IYOUI: Afghanisran. Algeria. Angola. Argentina.

Bahamas. Bnhnin. Bangladnh. B a h ~ h . Benin. Bhuw. Botswana. Bruil. Buma. Bumndi. Chad, Chile. Colombia. Congo. Cortl Rica. Cuba, Demacmic Yemcn. Dominicm Rcpublic, Ecusdor. Egypt, Uhiopia. Fiji. Ghana. Guinep. Guyana. Haiti. india, indonesia. Iran, Irq. IV- Cout. Jamaica. Jordan. Kenya, Kuwait. Lzo Pcople's DemocrdIic Republic. Lebanm. L i h a . Libyan Ardb Jamahiiya. Md- agarcar. Malaysia, Maldiva. Mali. Malia, Mauriuinia. Mauritius. Mexico. Morocco. Mozambique. Nepal. Niger. Nigeria. Oman. Pakistan, Panma. Papa New Guinep. Paraguay. Pmi. Philippines. Qatar. Romania. Smcd. Sierra Leone. Sri Lanka. Sudan. SHan Arab Repiblic. Thailand. Togo. Trinidad uid Toùago, Tunisia. UgMdo. Uniicd Rcpublicof Camemon. United ~~~~~~~~~~~~ia. Uppcr Volta. Uruguay. Venezuela. Vie: Nam. Yugalavia. Zairc. Zambia.

Againrr: Ausnalia. Belgiurn. Cm&. Denmark. Fnnce. Gennany. F d e d Republic of. GM. belud. Italy. Lux- embourg. Nethcrlands. New W a n d . Nonway. PnaigJ. United Kingdom of Greu Britain ud Nonhcrn beland. United Sram of Arnerica.

Absraining: Ausma. Bulguia. Byelonwian Soviei Socialist Republic. Czshoslovakia. Finland. G e r w Dem- ocratic Rcpublic. Guatemala. Hondurac, Hungary. Icelud. Israel. Japan. Mongolia. Poland. Spain. Swcdcn. Ilkrainh Soviet Socialist Rcpublic. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

33. The Fm1 Cornminet ncommends IO the G n c d As- rcrnbly rhe adopuon of LIK following drafi moluiions:

Rcv~ew of the implementarion of the recomme~ionr and decirions ridopted by the Generaî ~ssemb(v oi us renrh special session . ., B

NON-USE OF NUCLEAR W E A ~ N S AND pREVENTlON OF NUCLEAR WAR

The Generai Assembly. Alarmed by the thrcai IO the ~urvival of mankind and to the

life-rustaining systcm poscd by nuclear wcapons and by theu u x inhercnt in concepts of detcrrcnce.

Convinced thu nuclear disamwunt is csvnual for the prcveniion of nuclear war and for the smnglhening of Inter- national peace and rccurity.

- -

Recdling Ihe rmcmenr conuined in the W d Document of the Tenth Specid %ion of che Gcncnl Arrembly thu "al1 States rhould actively participate in e f f m IO bring about conditions in intcmatiod relations amonn SIDUS in which i code of p a ~ c f u l conduci of nauoiu in i h m a o o d affam could be and which would prrclude the iuc a thrcat of use of nÜcluir wapons".'

.

1 . Declares rhot: (a) ïhe use of nuclcar weapons will bc a vialaion of the

Charter of the Unitai Nations d a crime againri humanity; (b) The ure of nuclcar wuponr sharld rhacfm be

hibired. pnding nuclcar disannament:

ml& -. in ihu the quuticn of an minnitim convention or somc ocher agrmncnt on Ihc subjst m y be dirusscd a 1 . h session.

united Nations

Agenda i t m 125: Rcriew of the lmplementation O( the r ceommcn~t imr

and deciions ndopled by the G e n e n l Aüeiiibly al itr tenth spccial semion:

(4) Repart of the Disarmament Commission: /bl Reports of the SceretaryCcned

RcpQrI of the Fùrt Committee . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51.. Mr. M~HAJLOVIC (Yligodavia), Rapporteur of the ES conmittee: 1 have the konour t o prexnt CO the anal A ~ ~ m b l y the reports of the Fint Committee on its wtk miating to %enda i t e m 35 Io 50, 125 and 128. T b p i Cornmitte considercd t h e v 18 i t e m during the piiod fmm 16 Odober t o 8 Deamber 1978. As a result of ai delibentions, the Cornmittee adopted 45 draft nrolu- inu and one remmmcndation, which are containcd in the fdbwing EpO~ts.

70. Document Al331461 mntairu the n p a t of the Fint Commiitec on item 125. Under t h item. th Co&tre adopted 14 dnf î molutions wfiich are t o be found in p n g n p h 33.

- 0

'13. This yair-u a reailt of the decison of the tenth rpcial session. devoted to d i m i m e n t - t h e F i Com- mittee dealt exclusively with the problem of d h n l l m m t and n h t e d international seeurity questions. The un- peccdcnted nwnber of proponlr adoptcd by ths Corn- mittee-41 drafî rcnilutiom mnarning dirvnnmcnt and four mnarning intemational scurity, and one tecorn- mendation on diumwnent-and the record number of statements made during the gcnerol debatc d in the m u n e of mmideration of the dorementioncd w n & items, arc. in my opinion. an exDresdon of th i n d interest, puticukrly of 4 coumriu, in the m l v i ~ of questions of d inmamem and international recurity anthin the fnmework of the United Nstionr and in the rtrrng<h- ening of the role of the worid Otganization in thic &Id.

74. On behalf of the Fini Committce it ia my planirc t o mmmend to the G e n e d A ~ c m b l y for ilr adoption the dratt nsolutions and the decison to which 1 hi= jurt refened.

N E W Y O R K

S I . The PRESIDENT (inrerprrarion /mm Sprnish): I now put to the vote draft remlution B. A ~ c o r d e d vote has bren rcqucrted.

A nmrdcd vote nus taken

In fovourt Afghanutan. Algeria, Angola. Argentina. BPbms. Bahnui. Bangladesh. Barbador. Benin. Bhutan. BolMa. Botswana, Brarjl, Burma. Burundi. C a p Verde, Ctmnl African Empin. Chd . Chile. Colombia, Congo, Co- Ria . Cuba, Democratic Yemen. Djibouti, Domnian &public, Ecuador, E ~ p t , Equatorial Guinea. Ethiopia. Fiji. Gambh, Ghana. Guatemala, Guinea. Guinea-Bissau, C u ~ m , Haiti, Honduras. Indu, Indoneria, Iran. Iraq. Ivory C a . himica, Jordan. Kenya, Kuwait. Lao People's h o c f a t i c Republic, Lebanon. Lesotho, Liïr ia, Liayan Anb hrnahiriya. Madagascar, Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives. Mau, Malta. Miutirania, Mexico, Morocco. Mozambique. NeW. Niger, Nigeria, Oman. Pakisian. Panama. Papua New C u h l , Paraguay. P ~ N . Philippines. Qatar. Romania. Rmdr. Samoa, 90 Tome and Princip. Saudi Arabia.

S icm Leone. Somalh. Sri Lanka, Sudan. Swi- mm, Srnuland. Syrian Arab Republic, Thailuid, Togo. T%d and Tobago. Tunisia. Ugand.. United A n b Ernir-

h i t e d RepubEc of C m r o o n , United Repiblic of T W a . U p p r Volta, Uruguay. Venezuela. Vict NG, Yenun, YuprLni . Zambù

Aminsr: Aur tnb , Bel6um. C m & . Dcnmuk, F n n a , Gemany, Fedenl RepubIic of, Gmcc, lacland. Ireluid. Itrly, Luxembourg. Nethcrhds, New Zcrland, N o m y . Portugal Turf<ey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northnn Ireland, United S h t a of Amcria

Abs~hing.. Autria. Buleria, Byelonutian Soviet Social& Republic, C r c c h o d w , El Snlvador, Fmhnd. Gabon. G e m h o c n i i c Republic. Hungary, I n c l , h a n . Mongol*, N i c l n g u ~ Poland, S p r k Swcden, lkminian Sonet Social& Republic, Union of Soviet Soaaüsf Republia

Dmfi molution 8 ws odopted by IO3 votes to 18. wirh 18 abstentions (moùuion 33/71 8). 11

22 The delsgdon of Mauritiw rubrquentlr mformcd the Sc- urbi thai it wuhcd Io h n e i u v o ~ e recadul a l hanW bccn in hvour of the d n f t inolution.

34/83. Review of the implementation of the m m - mendations and decisiom adopted by the General Assembly al its tenth spedal sesion

NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENnON OF NUCLEAR WAR

The General Assernbly, Recalling its resolution 33/71 B of 14 Davmber

1978, in whicb, inter d ia . it caUed for prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear dismament,

Taking into occount proposais submitted by States conceming the non-use of nuclear weapons; prevention of nuclear war and related matîer~, '~

1. Decides to transmit to the Cornmince on Dis- armament the views of States concenùng the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and relatcd matters:

2 . Requests the Comminee on Diarmament ta take those views iato appropriate consideration and to report thereon to the Generai Assembly at its thirty-ûftb session.

97th plenary meeting I I Decernber 1979

'8 Sec A/34/456 and Add.1.

General AsmUB RA R y ~ i ~ t ~ . GFNERAL

OCT - Q I Q J ~ ~ / 3 4 / 4 5 6

UN/& COLLECTION 2 8 s e p t e d e r 1 9 7 9

ORIGINAL: WGLISH/FRENM/ SPANISH

, . .. i r t y - f o u r t h s e s s i o n q n d a item 4 2 I d )

RNIEW OP THE IMPLMENTATION OP THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GFNERAL ASS-LY AT ITS m H SPECIAL SESSION

Non-use o f n u c l e a r u e a w n s a n d p r e v e n t i o n of n u c l e a r war

R e p o r t o f t h e S e c r e t a r v - G e n e r a l

CONTMTS

&=

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

1 . REPLIES RECEIVED FROEl G O V E R M T S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

B a r b a d o s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

C h i l e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

C u b a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

P i n l a n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

German D e m c r a tic R e p u b l i c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

I n d i a . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0

Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

P e r u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

m g o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2

U n i t e d Kingdom of G r e a t B r i t a i n a n d N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d . . . . . . . . . 1 2

A/34/456 Engli 'sh Pasge 2

1. INTRODUCTION

1. On 14 December 1978, t h e General ~ s s e m b l y adopted, under t h e i tem e n t i t l e d - .Review o f t h e implementation o f t h e r ecomenda t ions and d e c i s i o n s adopted by *e General Assembly a t i ts t en th s p e c i a l s e s s i o n g , r e S 0 i ~ t i o n 33/71 8, the opera t ive p a r t o f which reads as fo l l ous :

"The General Assembly,

"1. Dec la res t h a t :

(a) The use o f nuc l ea r ueapons w i l l be a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e Cha r t e r o f United Nations and a crime a g a i n s t humanity)

(d) The use o f nuc l ea r weapons should t h e r e f o r e be p r o h i b i t e d . Pending nuc l ea r disarmament;

"2. r e u u e s t s a l 1 S t a t e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y nuclear-weapon S t a t e s , t o submit t o t h e Secretary-General , be fo re t h e t h i r t y - f o u r t h s e s s ion o f t h e General Assembly, p roposa l s concerning t h e non-use o f nuc lear weapons, avoidance of nuc l ea r war and r e l a t e d m a t t e r s , in o rder t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l mnven t ion or some o t h e r agreement on the s u b j e c t may be

, d i scus sed a t t h a t sess ion. .

2. Pu r suan t to paragraph 2 o f t h e resolution, t h e Secre ta ry-Genera l submits he r ewi th the r e p o r t on the p roposa l s r ece ived f r m Hember S t a t e s concerning t h e non-use o f nuc l ea r weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and r e l a t e d mat ters . ,

A/34/456 m g l i s h Page 3

II. REPLIES RECEIVPD PROn COVERWMTS

BARBAWS

112 J u l y 19791

1, Barbados has s e t as its goal genera l and canp le t e disarmament and has @roached t h e quest ion of disarmament with t h i s goal .

1 Barbadœ is deeply opposed to the t h r e a t which the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f nuclear ,d other weapons poses to i n t e r n a t i o n a l pesa and s e c u r i t y and to t h e very Grvival o f mank ind.

3 Barbados suppor ts a l 1 e f f o r t s which seek to reduce o r e l iminate t h e t h r e a t o f 3~ arms race .

$ Barbados cuns iders t h a t nuclear veapons pose t h e g r e a t e s t danger to the ,,tvival o f mankind and hence the re is a r e a l need to proh ib i t the use o f these *apons not on ly by renuving them £rom t h e drawing board and the l i n e s of *oduction b u t a l s o by b a ~ i n g them f r an combat.

5 Barbados g i v e s its f u l l e s t support to measures vhich seek to achieve nuclear !,sarmamemt uhether by the establ ishment o f nuclear-weapon-free zones o r by ,*erence to the nuclear non-prol iferat ion t r e a t y .

q Barbados w i l l lend its support to the d r a f t i n g o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l convention n agreement i f by its very ex i s t ence such a wnvent ion o r agreement w i l l enhance the e f f e c t i v e n e s s OP the i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h r u s t f o r t h e e l iminat ion o f the t h r e a t o f ruclear warfare and its d e s t r u c t i v e wnsequenœs and fo r t h e achievement of jeneral md ccmplete disarmament.

[Original : Spanishl

127 June 19791

1. T r a d i t i o n a l l y the Government o f Ch t l e has a f f irmed its pos i t i rm a g a i n s t t h e f r m t i c a r w race i n t o which mnkind has been dragged desp i t e t h e v a l i a n t e f f o r t s of a l 1 S t a t e s Hembers of the United Nations t o a v o i d i t . It accordingly supports l a the u l t ima te goal general and complete disarmament under s t r i c t and e f f e c t i v e international con t ro l and supports a l 1 proposais fo r achieving ind iv idua l dlsarmament goals .

2. I t recognizes t h a t the way i n which t h i s v i l 1 be achieved is through gradua1 $karmament a c t i o n , i so l a t ed or s imultaneous, and to this end it has suppotted t h e Xder o f p r i o r i t i e s l a i d &ni in paragraph 45 o f t h e p ina l Document of the Tenth SPecial Session o f the General Assembly. /. . .

A/34/456 Eng l i sh Pasge 4

3. It is d i s m u r a g e d to no t e t h a t enormous inves tments in a rmamnts a r e r e t a r d i n g t he development o f peoples , e s p e c i a l l y t hose o f t he developing c o u n t r i e s , which a r e w m p e l l e d to i n v e s t d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e sums i n armaments, sinO war t e n s i o n s a r e r e a c h i n g r e g i o n s which u n t i l ncu seemed to be f r e e f r m the s w u r g e o f war.

4. We have r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d t h a t a l 1 a t t emp t s a t disarmament would i a i l a s long a s r i v a l r y and m i s t r u a t e x i s t e d between the major Powers, which a r e t h r ea t en ing b unleash a g e n e r a l w n f l i c t i n which it would be ve ry d i f f i c u l t f o r any country remain n e u t r a l and uncommitted. Accordingly there is an urgen t need:

( a ) T b d e v i s e e f f e c t i v e v e r i f i c a t i o n procedures i n o r d e r to m n i t o r disarmament measures;

( b ) lb make the d e t e r r e n œ procedures worked o u t i n Europe u n i v e r s a l and t,, e n s u r e t h a t p o l i t i c a l . d e t e r r e n e is camplemented by m i l i t a r y de t e r r ence ;

(c) 'Ib p r even t t h e fo rmat ion of m i l i t a r y b loc s ;

(d) To s e c u r e reai achievements i n h a l t i n g the arms race!

(e) lb ensu re respect f o r t h e purposes and p r i n c i p l e s of t h e Cha r t e r o f the Uni ted Nat ions , e s p e c i a l l y t he peacefu l s e t t l e m e n t o f d i s p u t e s , non-use o f fo rce , n o n - i n t e r f e r e n œ i n t h e i n t e r n a 1 a f f a i r a o f o t h e r S t a t e s , etc.

5. At p r e s e n t t he g r e a t e s t t h r e a t is t h a t the nuc l ea r weapai may be used. A g e n e r a l n u c l e a r s t r i k e would have u i t a s t r o p h i c wnsequences fo r mankind and t he use o f t h a t weapcm in l o c a l wars could l e a d us i r r e v o c a b l y i n t o a g l o b a l w n f l i c t . Prom t h i s it can be deduced t h a t nuc lea r disarmament t akes p r i o r i t y ove r any o t h e r t ype o f disarmament.

6. Neve r the l e s s , w e r e a l i z e t h a t e x i s t i n g t r e a t i e s do n o t f u l f i l and have no t f u l f i l l e d t h e i r purpose o f l i m i t i n g , reducing and e l i m i n a t i n g those weapons.

(a) m d a y v e r t i c a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n is i n c r e a s i n g and. more s e r i o u s l y , is i n c r e a s i n g i n q u a l i t y r a t h e r than i n q u a n t i t y . Tha t means t h a t wi th l e s s weaponry and s m a l l e r bu t more s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons g r e a t e r d e s t r u c t i v e fo rce can be a t t a i n e d .

(b) Hor izon ta l p r o l i f e r a t i o n is inc r ea s ing a l a rming ly , inasmuch a s i n a few y e a r s f r m n a , over 30 countries w i l l be a b l e to j o i n the nuc lear t e r r o r c lub . Year a f t e r Year aie nure Member S t a t e a c q u i r e s nuc l ea r c apac i t y . And t h i s cannot be s topped .

(c) The SALT t a l k s a r e slow and a r e merely he lp ing to l i m i t and c o n t r o l nuc lea r weapons a t l e v e l s c a p a b l e o f de s t roy ing mankind.

7. U n a u b t e d l y t h e g r e a t e s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l ies a t t h e rroment w i t h t h e nuc lea r P w e r s , b u t a s S t a t e s Members o f the United Nat ions w e have a du ty t o h e l p i n s eek ing a s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem and to know c l e a r l y where we s t and .

A/34/456 h g u s h Page 5

8. uuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n is a consequence o f a number o f f a c t o r s which ue must s t r e s s w i t h a view to ensu r ing speedy adopt ion o f l e g s 1 documents r e g u l a t i n g t h a t

pn C-SS and sa preven t ing its exace rba t i ng the problem.

( a ) M i l i t a r y s c i e n t i f i c r e s ea r ch l e ads to t h e & v e l o p n t Of i n c r e a s i n g l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons, the reby r a i s i n 9 the cost of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and improving its c f f i c a c y .

( b ) The t r e a t y on t h e genera l and t o t a l p r o h i b i t i o n o f nuclear-weapon tests must be cunple ted w i t h a i t de lay , f o r wi thout it nothing cm be done to prevent

nuc!ear p r o l i f e r a t i o n .

Vis w s t make it c l e a r t h a t t h i s s t e p does no t imply banning t h e use of nuc lea r energy. f o r peace fu l purposes , which is an i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t o f a l 1 peoples. Such

u se is guaranteed by t h e s a f egua rds accepted by U E A , which aha i l d become iricreasingly e f f e c t i v e and r igorous .

9 , m r e o v e r , we b e l i e v e t h a t we have t he necessa ry m a t e r i a l a v a i l a b l e to Consider an .in t e rna t iona l conven t im cover ing a l 1 sub jectsg which would p rov ide g ï ea t e r assurance o f t h e non-use o f t h e nuc lea r weapon.

(a ) L a t i n America ha s set m example in the ma t t e r o f a t r e a t y p r o h i b i t i n q nuclear wapons . What is r equ i r ed n a r is to enmurage t he e s t ab l i shmen t o f nuclear-weapon-free zones i n Afr ica , the n i d d l e Bast , M e South P a c i f i c and clsewhere.

lb) Al1 nuc l ea r Pawers o r those t h a t a r e in a p o s i t i o n to manufacture wclear m i l i t a r y dev i ce s should conclude a t r e a t y cm t h e non-use o f weapons o f rsis type a g a i n s t non-nuclear-weapon S t a t e s . The t r e e t y On t h e non-use o f forCa in i n ter n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s should cover these mat te r S.

10. P ina l l y , we welwme any proposa1 aimcd a t banning va r , a t s e t t l i n g by pacc fu l means any d i s p u t e s t h a t may a r i s e betwean peoples , a t avoiding the use o f force in i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and a t devo t i ng al1 a i r e f f o r t s to w n q u e r i n g t h e 1cr ious problems o f deve lopmnt .

CUBA

[Original : Spaniah]

1. The Government o f t he &publ ic o f Cuba c o n s i d e r s t h a t preSent level.9 o f Yuclear weapons a r s e n a l s r ep r e sen t a s e r i o u s danger to a l 1 mankind.

2. I t t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r s it v i t a l l y important to reach agreements which c f f e c t i v e l y gua ran t ee t h a t nuc lea r weapons w i l l never be uscd again. This puarantee v i l 1 o n l y k f u l l y in a f f e c t when t h e nuc lea r arma race i n h d t e d and rcversed and when, a t t h e f i n a l s t a g e , t h i s type o f veapon ia' mmple te ly el iminated . /...

A/34/456 E n g l i s h Pasge 6

3. The a t t a i n m e n t o f t he se o b j e c t i v e s w i l l c a l 1 f o r t h e n e g o t i a t i o n of agreements a t a p p r o p r i a t e s t a g e s , w i th the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a l 1 nuclear-weapon S t a t e s and o t h e r S t a t e s wi th a l a r g e m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l , i n a f a v a i r a b l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l atmosphere, a f t e r a l 1 a t t emp t s to ob t a in U n i l a t e r a i advan tages have cea sed .

4. The r enunc i a t i on of t h e use or t h r e a t o f f o r ce i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s ehould m a s t s p e c i f i c a l l y cover nuc l ea r f o r ce . In the present-day world, t he use or t h r e a t o f nuc lea r f o r c e by a S t a t e or g r c u p o f S t a t e s a g a i n s t ano the r S t a t e or o t h e r S t a t e s would cause a crisis t h a t would ex tend beyond the con f ine s o f t h e S t a t e s invo lved i n t he m n f l i c t and become a s e r i o u s t h r e a t to t h e ve ry s u r v i v a l

.o f c i v i l i z a t i o n .

5 . The' Qnge r s inheren t i n such a s i t u a t i o n w u l d i nc r ea se in p ropo r t i on to th. i n c r e a s e i n t h e l e v e l s o f nuclear a r senaLs t h r a i g h a i t t he world. Aence t h e urgent need to start n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th a view to b r i n g i n g about the c e s s a t i o n of p roduc t ion of a l 1 types o f nuc lea r weapons and the gradua1 r educ t i on o f nuc lea r a r s e n a l s m t i l they have been w m p l e t e l y ùes t royed .

6. These n e g o t i a t i o n s could be conducted i n d i f f e r e n t phases , by degrees , and in a m n n e r m i t u a l l y accep tab le to and ag reed upon by t h e s e S t a t e s i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s . The Cormaittee on Disarmament might be the most s u i t a b l e forum f o r t h e t a l k s , which should a l s o ensure the s t e a d y l ove r ing of l e v e l s o f nuc l ea r s t r e n g t h , w h i l e keeping the e x i s t i n g ba l ance i n t h a t a r e a unchanged and g u a r a n t e e i n g t h e s e c u r i t y o f a l 1 S t a t e s .

7. L a s t l y , t h e Goverrurent o f t h e Republ ic o f Cuba m n s i d e r s t h a t the i n i t i a t i o n o f these n e g o t i a t i o n s should i n no way a f f e c t the conduct o f o t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t a r e in p rog re s s and designed to a c h i e v e t h e s a m o b j e c t i v e o f nuclear-arma l i m i t a t i o n .

PINIAND [Or ig ina l : Engliah]

1. E f f e c t i v e measures o f nuc lea r disarmament and the p r e v e n t i a i o f nuc l ea r wat have been i d e n t i f i e d as a p r i o r i t y t a s k t o v a r d s t he u l t imate goa l o f g e n e r a l ~d canp l e te disarmament under e f f e c i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l con t ro l . Withcut p r e jud ice to o t h e r u r g e n t t a s k s , t h i s p r i o r i t y was r ea f f i rmed by t h e General Assembly a t its s p e c i a l s e s s i o n devoted to disarmament.

2. E f f o r t s to e l im ina t e t h e dangers posed by nuc lear weapons and to h a l t and r e v e r s e t h e nuc lea r arms r a c e should i n c l u d e a v a r i e t y o f approaches. The ongoing e f f o r t s to this e f f e c t should be i n t e n s i f i e d and f u r t h e r a s p e c t s o f nuc lea r arms bu i ld -up should be brcught w i th in t h e scope o f nego t i a t i ons .

3. While n o t being d i s a r m m e n t measures per se, arrangements f o r l i m i t a t i o n s m t h e development, product ion, deployment and use or t h r e a t o f use o f nuc l ea r weapons can c o n s t i t u t e important m a s u r e s to reduce t he dangers i n h e r e n t i n t he ve ry e x i s t e n c e o f these weapons.

A/34/456 Eng l i sh Page 7

Amonq such measures , the es tab l i shment o f nuclear-weapon-free zones has ,lready proved i ts v i a b i l i t y . Based on arrangements f r e e l y a r r i v e d a t amng t he *dtes o f t he r e q i o n concerned and involving commitments by nuclear-weapon S t a t e s , h;iclear-weapon-free zones a r e a con t r i bu t i on to n u c l e a r arms c o n t r o l and the Ign -p ro l i f e r a t i on o f nuc l ea r weapons and thereby to t h e s e c u r i t y o f the region and

'

@ i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n genera l . The c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e es tab l i shment o f *ch zones should con t i nue to b e n e f i t f r a n the c m p r e h e n s i v e s t u d y o f the q u e s t i o n ,,f nuclear-weapon-free zones i n a l 1 i ts a s p e c t s under taken by t h e United Nations ,q 1975 . y

g. The p reven t ion of t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuc l ea r weapons and o t h e r nuclear ,,plosive dev i ce s is a c e n t r a l element i n t he e f f o r t s to c o n t a i n the dangers o f an wtbreak Of n u c l e a r var . I n this regard, t h e n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n t r e a t y remains the b s t ins t rument . As the a c q u i s i t i o n o f nuclear weapons by more S t a t e s is a g a i n s t the s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s o f a l 1 S t a t e s , nuc lea r and non-nuclear a l i k e , f u r t h e r ,!forts should be made to s t r enq then t he n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n régime i n the i n t e r e s t of t he i n t e r n a t i o n a l wmmunity as a whole.

6. Fran the p o i n t o f v i e v o f the c o u n t r i e s t h a t have renounced nuclear weapons - Ze it i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e non-pro l i fe ra t ion t r e a t y o r r e g i o n a l arrangements such a~ nuclear-weapon-free zones - it is reasonable t h a t nuclear-weapon S t a t e s g i v e ~ m i t m e n t s not to use or t h r e a t e n to use nuc l ea r weapons a g a i n s t such S t a t e s .

7. The Government o f P in land ha s noted with s a t i s f a c t i o n the s e c u r i t y assurances tlready u n i l a t e r a l l y g iven by t h e f i v e nuclear-weapon S t a t e s . While these a r e cteps forward, such u n i l a t e r a l d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l nuclear-weapon S t a t e s :m n e i t h e r by t h e i r c o n t e n t nor by t h e i r form a m p l e t e l y s a t i s f y t h e o b j e c t i v e rcight by t h e non-nuclear-weapon S t a t e s . In paragraph 59 o f t h e P i n a l mcument of :he Tenth S p e c i a l Se s s ion o f t h e General Assembly, t h e nuclear-weapon S t a t e s u e r e xqed .to pursue e f f o r t s to conclude, as a p p r o p r i a t e , e f f e c t i v e arrangements t o assure non-nuclear-weapon S t a t e s a g a i n s t . t h e use or t h r e a t o f use o f nuclear weapons" . . It is b be hoped t h a t t h e cons ide r a t i on o f s e c u r i t y gua ran t ee s undertaken by the General Assembly a t its t h i r t y - t h i r d s e s s i o n and, subsequent ly , by the : m i t t e e on Disarmament, v i l 1 l ead to arrangemencs f o r t h e p rov i s i on of such quarantees as c a l l e d f o r by t he Assembly.

9. In t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e b i l a t e r a l agreements concluded f o r t h e prevention of wclear war between a number o f nuclear-weapon S t a t e s a r e a l s o a con t r i bu t i on to :he s e c u r i t y o f a l 1 S t a t e s and t he i n t e r n a t i o n a l community a s a whole.

!O. While the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the prevent ion o f nuc l ea r var l ies p r ima r i l y i i t h t h e nuclear-weapon S t a t e s , t h e i s sue is of c r u c i a l w n c e r n f o r a l 1 S t a t e s . 'ie P i n a l Document o f t h e Tenth S p e c i a l Sess ion c a l l e d upon a l 1 S t a t e s , in ' a r t i cu la r nuclear-weapon S t a t e s , t o cons ide r , a s soon as p o s s i b l e , var ious ?roposals designed to s e c u r e t he avoidance of t h e use o f nuc l ea r weapons. lb t h i s

I/ O f f i c i a 1 Records o f t h e General Assemblv, T h i r t i e t h Se s s ion , Suvplement (A/10027/Add.l), annex 1. /. . .

A/34/456 Eng l i sh Pasge 8

e f f e c t , t h e F i n a l Document env i s ages t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreement, , goa l vh ich h a s the suppo r t o f the P i n n i s h Government.

[ o r i g i n a l : EnglliL:

I l 0 AUgUSt 19791

1. TO h a l t t h e arms r a c e and proceed to disarmament have become key i s s u e s hcrr t h e s a f egua rd ing o f peace is wnce rned . Cnly th rcugh e f f e c t i v e measures of disarmament i n both t h e nuc lea r and conven t i ona l f i e l d s w i l l it be p o s s i b l e & c r e a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s to mke s e c u r i t y l a s t i n g and s t a b l e . S t e p s towards nuclear disarmament have p r i o r i t y s i n c e t h e nuc l ea r arms r a c e is bound to he igh t en t he r i s k o f a nuc l ea r war. Such a va r w u l d t h r e a t e n t h e s u r v i v a l o f a l 1 mankind. xt is t h e c e f o r e nece s sa ry to counte r t h i s danger wi th the utmost de t e rmina t i on .

2. It v a s f u l l y i n l i n e wi th the F i n a l Document adopted a t t h e United Nations s p e c i a l s e s s i o n devoted to disarmament when t h e German D e m c r a t i c Repulbic , j o i n t l y wi th t h e o t h e r s t a t e s p a r t i e s to t h e Warsaw Trea ty , proposed w n c r e t e and e f f e c t i v e measures designed to h a l t the arms r a c e and ach ieve disarmament i n the n u c l e a r f i e l d i n the Moscow Dec l a r a t i on o f 23 November 1978 and a t the Meeting of t h e Conmit tee o f Foreign n i n i s t e r s on 14 and 15 May 1979.

3. The G e r m n D e m c r a t i c Republ ic welcomes t h e s i g n i n g o f SALT II as a s i g n i f i c a n t s t e p touard l a s t i n g l y ensur ing peace and s e c u r i t y f o r the peoples and l e s s e n i n g t h e danger o f a nuc l ea r war. The T r e a t y w n s t i t u t e s the b a s i s f o r the p r e p a r a t i o n o f f u r t h e r accords . Its r a t i f i c a t i o n is a mat te r of g r e a t urgency.

4. Ta w u n t e r a c t t h e danger of t h e ou tbreak o f a nuc lear war and o f t h e use of nuc lea r weapons, t h e German D e m c r a t i c Republ ic b e l i e v e s t h a t S t a t e s should c o n c e n t r a t e their e f f o r t s ai t h e f o l l o u i n g s t e p s :

5. The most e f f e c t i v e way o f e l i rn ina t ing the r i s k o f nuclear va r is the canple t r l i q u i d a t i o n o f nuc l ea r weapons. Th is o b j e c t i v e w u l d be reached by way o f partial s t e p s o f the wides t p o s s i b l e scope. I n this connexion the inmediate i n i t a t i a of n e g o t i a t i o n s w n g a l 1 nuclear-weapon Powers wi th t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a number of non-nuclear-weapon S t a t e s cm the c e s s a t i o n o f t he product ion o f a l 1 t ypes o f n u c l e a r weapons and on t he gradua1 r educ t i on o f t h e i r s t o c k p i l e s and e v e n t u a l l y t h e i r comple te l i q u i d a t i o n is of pr imary importance.

6. Th i s o b j e c t i v e w u l d be reached i f t h e q u a l i t a t i v e improvement and f u r t h e r development o f nuc lea r weapons were h a l t e d , i f t he product ion of a l 1 t ypes o f n u c l e a r arms, t h e i r means of d e l i v e r y a s w e l l as t h e product ion of f i s s i o n a b l e m a t e r i a l f o r armament purposes were d i s con t i nued , and i f nuclear weapons stocks and t h e means o f t h e i r d e l i v e r y were reduced s t e p by s t e p and f i n a l l y e l im ina t ed c m p l e t e l y .

/..a

A c a n p l e t e and g e n e r a l ban on nuclear-weapon tests would b e a s i g n i f i c a n t

?ep 8 . toward d i s e o n t i n u i n g t h e q u a l i t a t i v e improvement o f n u c l e a r weapons and

&ld, a t t h e same tirne, c o u n t e r a c t the development o f new such weapons. The M , t i c i p a t i o n o f a l 1 nuclear-weapon S t a t e s i n such a m v e is a s i n e sua non.

8. The n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n régime concern ing n u c l e a r weapons s h o u l d be f u r t h e r .,engthened. The emergence o f new nuclear-weapon S t a t e s m u l d w n s i d e r a b l y I -

.,ighten . . the danger o f n u c l e a r war. T h e r e f o r e , t h e u n i v e r s a i l i t y o f t h e T r e a t y on L,e on-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons s h o u l d be regarded a s an u r g e n t ,Nuirement. T h i s would a t t h e same time f a c i l i t a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s among t h e ' .,clear-weapon Povers.

q. T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f nuclear-weapon-free zones ms t e f f e c t i v e l y b e n e f i t the , ,n-prol i fera t icm o f nuc lea r weapons and enhance t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e S t a t e s ,,volved.

10. MeasUres o f n u c l e a r disarmament shou ld b e accanpan ied by a c t i v i t i e s t o , trengthen p o l i t i c a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l s e c u r i t y g u a r a n t e e s f o r S t a t e s .

i l . The German D e m c r a t i c Republ ic h o l d s t h e view t h a t it is e s s e n t i a l , p a r a l l e l .J t h e e f f o r t s f o r n u c l e a r disarmament, to c r e a t e p o l i t i c a l i n s t r u m e n t s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h a t w i l l g i v e S t a t e s s t r o n g e r s a f e g u a r d s a g a i n s t t h e outbreak of a n u c l e a r war and t h e use o f n u c l e a r weapons. It m n s i d e r s it n e c e s s a r y f o r me nuclear-weapon S t a t e s to shape t h e i r r e l a t i o n s on t h e b a s i s o f p e a c e f u l a>existence i n a way t h a t a v o i d s dangerous a g g r a v a t i o n and w n f l i c t s . T h i s is ,160 an e f f e c t i v e iwthod o f g u a r d i n g a g a i n s t n u c l e a r c o n f l i c t b e i n g unleashed arough the f a i l u r e o f t e c h n i c a l systems. I n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y would a l s o aenef i t f r m a ban on t h e use o f nuc lea r weapons. T h i s problem s h o u l d be t a c k l e d , p a r a l l e l to n e g o t i a t i o n s on n u c l e a r disarmament, i n t h e framwork o f a world treaty cm t h e non-use o f ' f o r c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Such a t r e a t y shou ld w m i t a l 1 S t a t e s to renounce t h e use o r t h r e a t o f f o r c e i n a l 1 forms and ~ m i f e s t a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the use o f n u c l e a r weapons.

12. The G e r m n Demcratic Republ ic f u r t h e r b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e s e c u r i t y g u a r a n t e e s for non-nuclear-weapon S t a t e s ought to be improved w i t h o u t de lay . T h i s should be bsne through the w n c l u s i o n o f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l convent ion on t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n o f the use o f n u c l e a r weapons a g a i n s t S t a t e s t h a t fo rgo the p r o d u c t i o n and acqu is i t ion o f such weapons and & n o t have n u c l e a r weapons deployed i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s .

13. Another i m p o r t a n t s t e p i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n m u l d be taken i f t h e nuclear-weapon Parers were to renounce the deployment o f n u c l e a r weapons i n the t e r r i t o r i e s o f States where t h e r e a r e no s u c h weapons a t p r e s e n t .

14. The l e s s e n i n g o f m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i m i n Europe is a t a s k o f i n c r e a s i n g Argency. I n view o f t h e importance which s t a b i l i t y i n Europe h a s f o r t h e P o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e a l 1 over t h e world , the c o n c l u s i o n o f an a c c o r d among the S t a t e s of t h e Conference on S e c u r i t y and c o - o p e r a t i o n i n Europe on t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n of /...

A/34 /456 Eng l i sh Pasqe 10

t h e f i r s t use o f bo th nuc ï ea r and w n v e n t i o n a i weapons c a r r i e s p a r t i c u i a r l y gr& weiqht. Such a t r e a t y would be a form of p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f the p r i n c i p h . agreed i n H e l s i n k i a s wel l a s a l o g i c a l and e f f e c t i v e s t e p i n t h e m n t i n u e d p u r s u i t o f p o l i t i c a l d é t e n t e and in cmplement inq it by c o n c r e t e measures i n m i l i t a r y f i e l d .

III

15. The German Democratic Republ ic is convinced t h a t j o i n t a c t i o n by the nuclear-weapon S t a t e s is of d e c i s i v e importance f o r p r o g r e s s in t h e f i e l d o f nuc l ea r disarmament. T h e i r s is a s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and t he p a r t i c i p a t i o n a l 1 nuclear-weapon S t a t e s in the n e g o t i a t i o n s is a b s o l u t e l y necessary.

16. I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s can be meaningful ly s t a b i l i z e d o n l y through the r educ t i on of armaments a, t h e b a s i s o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f equa l , undiminished s e c u r i t y . The p o l i c y o f d e t e r r e n c e , on which t he s tepped-up arms race t h r i v e s , must be abandoned once and f o r a l l . What is r e q u i r e d is r e s o l u t e a c t i o n of Governments to h a l t the arms r ace , l i m i t armaments and ach i eve disarmament and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , to ban t h e w e a p n s o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n .

17. A world disarmament confe rence i n which a l 1 S t a t e s . possess inq nuc l ea r w e a p n s o r no t , p a r t i c i p a t e , would be a p t to b r i n g a b o u t genuine p rogress i n t he f i e l d o f nuc l ea r disarmament as it would e l a b o r a t e and conclude corresponding agreements.

18 . The German D e m c r a t i c Republic welwmes the j o i n t s t a t e m e n t made on a world disarmament confe rence by Leonid 1. Brezhnev, Genera l S e c r e t a r y o f t he C e n t r a l C m i t t e e o f t h e C o m n i s t P a r t y o f t h e Sovie t Union and Chairman of t h e Supreme S o v i e t o f t he USSR, and James E. C a r t e r , P r e s iden t of the United S t a t e s o f America, a t t h e i r meeting i n Vienna (see A/34/414).

19. The German Democratic Republ ic wishes to e x p r e s s t h e expec t a t i on t h a t t h a t confe rence v i l 1 t a k e p l ace a t t h e e a r l i e s t s u i t a b l e d a t e .

INDIA

[ o r i g i n a l : h g l i s h ]

130 J u l y 19791

1. Nuclear weapons a r e weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n . The i n t e r n a t i ona l community ha s unequivoca l ly and r e p e a t e d l y expressed its sense o f concern and a larm a t t h e grave t h r e a t posed by t he e x i s t e n c e o f nuc lea r weapons to the very s u r v i v a l o f mank ind .

A/34/456 h g l i s h Page 11

ço long a s any nuc l ea r weapons remain i n the possess ion o f any r - t i o n , Eyvhere in t h e world, t h e danger o f a nuc lea r war with a l1 i ts awesom j p l i c a t i o n s , i nc lud ing a world ho locaus t , w i l l con t inue to e x i s t . I t is, a e r e f o r e t impera t ive t h a t no e f f o r t should be spared to ach i eve nuc l ea r disarmament, whereby nuc l ea r weapons would have been c a n p l e t e l y e l im ina t ed from

face o f t h i s e a r t h .

3. Pending nuc l ea r disariaament, t h e r e should be a t o t a l p r o h i b i t i o n o f a l 1 use .[ nuc lea ï weapons, p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e any use o f nuc lea r weapons has a l r e a d y been

by t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l oommunity as a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e Uni ted Nat ions -9.rter and a crime a g a i n s t humanity.

4 S e c u r i t y a g a i n s t t h e u s e or t h r e a t o f use o f nuc l ea r weapons, l i k e peace i n t i i s nuc lear age, is i n d i v i s i b l e . E f f o r t s Co seek s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t the use o f ,,,clcar ueapons can o n l y be f r u i t f u l i f a l 1 S t a t e s , w i t h a i t any excep t i on , a r e svered, i nc lud ing t hose S t a t e s which posseas such weapons, sa they too a r e insecure a g a i n s t such weapons and need to be p ro t ec t ed a g a i n s t them, pending ,gclear disarmament. Iio be e f f e c t i v e , a convent ion ai the p r o h i b i t i o n o f the use or t h r e a t o f use o f nuc l ea r weapons muid r e q u i r e t h e a c t i v e suppo r t o f a l 1 j t a t e s , pa r t i c u l a r l y o f S t a t e s pos se s s ing such weapons.

KENYA

[Or ig ina l : Eng l i sh l

123 A p r i l 19791

The Government o f Kenya does n o t have any nuc lear weapons and welcomes and supports the n a t i o n s t h a t a r e p r e s s i n g f o r e a s ing o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t en s ion through promotion o f dé t en t e . Concer ted e f f o r t s i n the s e a r c h f o r more l a s t i n g and e f f e c t i v e m a n s o f avo id ing nuc l ea r war have the f u l l suppo r t of t h e Government o f Kenya.

PERU

[Or ig ina l : Span ish l

121 June 19791

1. Awace o f the t h r e a t posed by t he con t inu ing and i nc r ea s ing manufacture and refinement o f nuc l ea r weapons and o f t h e nega t i ve wnsequences which t h e i r use would have fo r the forms o f l i f e on this p l a n e t , Peru r e i t e r a t e s its suppor t f o r General Assembly r e s o l u t i o n 33/71 B by r e a f f i r m i n g t h a t the u s e o f such weapons would be a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e United Nat ions Cha r t e r , i n t h a t it would d e t r a c t from the Organ i za t i on ' s aim and o b j e c t i v e o f p i n t a i n i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s ecu r i t y .

A/34/456 Engl i sh Pasge 12

2. ~o t h a t end, Peru endo r se s t h e idea o f suppor t ing any i n i t i a t i v e &signed b,

s t r e n g t h e n the p r i n c i p l e o f t h e non-use o f nuclear weapons and advoca t ing the d r a f t i n g o f a w n v e n t i o n o r agreement, t h e main w n t r a c t u a l e lement o f which W b be t h a t t h e nuclear-weapon S t a t e s e x p r e s s l y renounced t h e use o f nuc lea r w e a p m i n any form o r i n any c i r cu ms t ance , t he r eby r u l i n g wt the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a nuc lea r war, w i t h un fo r e seeab l e consequences For t he whole o f mankind.

3 . &ce a g a i n , we mst emphasize t h a t the nuclear-wapon S t a t e s have a very s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t they a lone can f u l f il, namely, a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ta reach t h e agreements needed ta avo id t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f n u c l e a r uar.

TOGO

[Or ig ina l : PrenQ) . .

(12 J u l y 19791

1. P i r s t o f a l l , the Togolese Army h a s no nuclear weapons a t t he p r e sen t time.

2. Secondly, t h e m g o i e s e Army has no i n t e n t i o n of a c q u i r i n g nuc l ea r weapons.

3. Consequent ly , t h e Togolese Government endorses the p r i n c i p l e o f the non-use o f nuc l ea r weapons as s e t o u t i n Genera l Assembly r e s o l u t i o n 33/71 B.

CINITID KINGDaM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

[Or ig ina l : h g l i a

[ 5 September 19791

1. The Government o f t h e Uni ted Kingdom voted a g a i n s t Genera l Assembly r e s o l u t i o n 33/71 B because the vo rd ing d i d no t , i n a i r view, r e f l e c t t h e r e a l i t i e s of the modern world, and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between d e t e r r e n c e Of agg re s s ion and the maintenance o f peace. ûrr vo te d i d n o t s i g n i f y any d i sagreement wi th t he fundamental ' importance o f e n s u r i n g t h a t a c o n f l i c t never a r i s e s i n which t he use o f nuc l ea r weapons needs ta be wn temp la t ed . But,, i n the B r i t i s h view, such avoidahce o f c o n f l i c t can o n l y be ach ieved thrcugh t he c r e a t i o n o f c o n d i t i o n s i i n which t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t a m f i d e n c e between S t a t e s to r e m v e a l 1 f e a r s o f agg re s s ion . The Government o f t h e United Kingdom w i l l CO-Operate in a l 1 measures which w i l l l e a d ta an i n c r e a s e in such conf idence , b u t it ha s to be recognized t h a t t he achievement o f our u l t i m a t e g o a l w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be a long-term process . I n the aieantime our inunediate aims a r e twofold: on t h e one hand, t o pursue e f f o r t s to check and to r e v e r s e t he arms r ace , bo th nuc lea r and conven t i ona l ; and on t h e o t h e r , to p r even t the spread o f nuc l ea r weapons to a reas uhe re such weapons a r e n o t an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f c u r r e n t s e c u r i t y arrangements.

~ / 3 4 ? 4 5 6 Engl i sh Page 13

2. In t h i s p roce s s , r ecogni t ion must be given to t h e d i f f e r i n g b a s i s which the: s ecu r i t y of regioiia is founded. I n t he ~u ' ropean t h e a t r e , t h e e x i s t i n g compsition Of fo r ce s and the s t r a t e g i e s o f the m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s mean t h a t s t e p s towads nuc lear d i sa rmment cannot b e m n s i d e r e d in i s o l a t i o n . It is neCeSSarY t o mintain a s t a b l e equi l ibcium b o t h i n nuc lea r and c o n v e n t i o n d terms. Otherwise the i n s t a b i l i t y c r ea t ed would s e r i o u s l y i nc r ea se t he r i s k o f m i ~ ~ a l c u l a t i ~ n and c o n f l i c t , which could have grave consequences fo r mankind. We t h e r e foce seek be:.snced and v e r i f i a b l e measures o f arms m n t r o l and d i s a r m m e n t which. through a

s tec-bY-Step approach, r e d u œ t h e numbers o f both nuc lea r and convent iona l arms whce m i n t a i n i n q t h e s e c u r i t y o f a i l S t a t e s a t each s t a g e , thcogh with p r&ress ive ly lower l e v e l s o f armaments. The w i l l i n g n e s s o f a l 1 S t a t e s to

co.-.uperate in f u l l m a s u r e s o f v e r i f i c a t i o n is e s s e n t i a l f o r p rog re s s in this Equa l ly , i t is important to d e v i s e measures which a r e s u s c e p t i b l e t o such

.Je,jfication.

The North A t l a n t i c T rea ty Organ i s a t i on , to which B r i t i s h nuc l ea r d e t e r r e n t forces a re c o m i t t e d , i s a d e f e n s i v e a l l i a n c e and ri11 nOt contemplate the use o f n u ~ l e a r ireapons except where nece s sa ry i n s e l f d e f e n a . I f one of its nembers wer- a t t a cked , NATO would respcmd a t the most a p p r d p r i a t e l e v e l bo th to h a l t t h e attdck and to w n v i n œ the agg re s so r t h a t cont inucd agg re s s ion u w l d involve r i s k s out of a11 propor t ion to the g a i n s he might have hoped to ach ieve . To s u s t a i n t he c,-+iibility o f t h i s & t e r r e n t a b i l i t y , N A M needs to possess a f u l l range of nu:lear and convent iona l weapons, b o t h to & t e r t h e use o f s i m i l a r weapons by those h o dep loy them i n Europe and to d e m n a t r a t e M a t the A l l i a n c e w u l d be w:'.lling, i f a t t a c k e d , to defend i t s e l f to whatever l e v e l might be necessary. Plcdqes o f 'non-use. o r 'no f i r s t une. o f nuc lea r wsapons, or a t t emp t s to a i t l a w t h e use o f such weapons, would remove NATO's a b i l i t y to &ter a l 1 f o r m o f a g g e s s i o n , and thereby l e ad to i n s t a b i l i t y wi th al1 t h e g r a v e r i s k s which t h i s enta ils.

4. Undertakings by nuclear-weapon S t a t e s not to use or t h r e a t e n to use nuclear rcdpons a q a i n s t non-nuclear-weapon S r a t e s are a d i f f e r e n t caatter. The Covernment af the United Kingdom nude such an under taking a t the t e n t h a p c i a l sess ion o f t h e ;cneral Assembly on DiSarinawrnt, i n June 1978, when it gave an assurance to m-nuclear-weapon S t a t e s uh ich are p a r t i e s to the non -p ro l i f e r a t i on t r e a t y , or >cher i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y b ind ing coamPitments n o t to manufacture or a c q u i r e nuc lea r explosive dev ices , no t br, u s e n u c l e a r wsapons a g a i n s t them 'except i n t he case o f m a t t a ck on the United K i n g d e , i t n &pendent t e r r i t o r i e s , its armed fo r ce s or i t s a l l i e s by such a state in a s s o c i a t i o n or a l l i a n a with a nuclear-weapon S t a t e g . me United Kingdan b e i i e v e s that su& assurances should i nc r ea6e the donfidence o f nm-nuclear-veapon S t a t e s in t h e i r am s e c u r i t y f r m nuc lear a t t a c k .

S. The Covernment o f t h e Uni ted Kingdan p laced emphaais a t the s p c i a l s e s s i o n m disarmament on t h e o b j e c t i v e o f h a l t i n g and r eve r s ing t h e nuc l ea r arma r ace in its q u a n t i t a t i v e m d q u a l i t a t i v e dimensions. The tw SALT agreements ~d t he ABn :reaty have a l r e a d y been s u c c e s s f u l l y achieved i n t h i a f i e l d . The F i n a l Cecumcnt of the Tenth Special Sess ion recommended khat SALT II should k f o l l w e d promptly by f u r t h e r s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n n e g o t i a t i o n s between t h e hm p a r t i e s , l e ad ing

agreed s i g n i f icmt r educ t i ona of and q u a l i t a t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s on s t r a t e g i c a r a s . The Uni ted Kingdom is i t s e l f engaged i n i n t e n s i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s with t he

A/34 /456 Eng l i sh Pasge 1 4

Uni ted S t a t e s and t h e Sovie t Union ar a wmprehensive test ban t r e a t y . These agreements should c o n s t i t u t e an impor tan t s t e p i n the d i r e c t i m o f nuc l ea r disarmament and u l t i m a t e l y o f e s t a b l i h s i n g a world f r e e o f n u c l e a r veapons.

6. So long a s nuc lea r weapons e x i s t , and bea r i ng i n mind t h e p o t e n t i a l l y d e v a s t a t i n g r e s u l t s which nuc l ea r war vould have on b e l l i g e r e n t s and non -be l l i ge r en t s a l i k e , t he nuclear-weapon S t a t e s have s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b do eve ry th ing pos s ib l e to avoid t h e r i s k o f t h e ou tbreak of such a war. I t is incumbent u p m them i n p a r t i c u l a r to main ta in and, where nece s sa ry , to improve t h e i r e x i s t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and t e c h n i c a l arrangements f o r guard ing a g a i n s t the a c c i d e n t a l o r unauthor ized use o f nuc l ea r weapons under t h e i r c o n t r o l . The Government o f t h e United Kingdom n o t e t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e b i l a t e r a l arrangements ai the p r even t i on o f a c c i d e n t a l nuc l ea r war e x i s t between France, t h e United Kingdoip and t h e Uni ted S t a t e s ai t h e one. hand, and t he Sovie t Union on t h e o t h e r . They b e l i e v e t h a t t he se agreements have been h e l p f u l i n b u i l d i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l conf idence .

UN LIBRARY

OCT 2 4 1979

UFI ITED f i A r i O P I S UNISA COLLECTDN, Distr.

~ / 3 b / b 5 6 / ~ d d . l 16 October 1979 LIiGLISH ORIGIiJAL : EUSSIbiI

%:Y/-fourth s e s s i o n o g d a item 42 ( d )

REVIEW OF THE IbPm.IENTATION OF THE RFCOE,iTicNDATIONS AND DECISIOMS AWFTED BY THE CEliERAL ASSEIBLY AT 1'15 Tï3ITH SPECIAL SESSION

Non-use o f n u c l e a r weaoons and wrevention of n u c l e a r v a r

R e r o r t of t h e Secre ta ry -Cenera l

CONTENTS

Pace - P L I E S RECEIVED FROM GOVERNbIENTS

Bye lo russ ian S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t Republ ic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ukra in ian S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t Repub l ic 3

Union of Sov ie t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

BYELORU33IAi4 SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

/ c r i c i n a l : Russian - /ï6 October 19797 - -

The c o u n t r i e s of t h e s o c i a l i s t comiiiii ty, inc luding t h e Byelorussian SSR, c o n s i s t e n t l y advocate t h e l i m i t a t i o n and e l iminat ion of nuc iea r Veapons, the per:.ienont p r o n i b i t i o n of t h e use o f such weapons and, a t t h e sane time, the . renuncie t ion o f t h e use of force i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The Treaty Bannin-

I i iuclear Weapon Tes t s i n the Atmosphere, i n Outer Space and Under Mater, the Trearies ~ r o h i b i t i n g t h e placern ne nt of nuclear weapons and o t h e r weapons of mass destruction i n o u t e r space and on the sea-bed. and t h e Treaty on t h e Ilon-Proliferation of iIir-lear Weapons, concluded during the 1:.LOs and 1970s, played an important ro le i n C U r b i n g

t h e nuclear a rns r ace .

h outs tanding event i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i f e I r a s t h e s i g n i n g i n Vienna i n June 1979 of t h e Soviet-United S t a t e s Treaty on t h e Limi ta t ion o f S t r a t e â i c Offensive Arms (SALT-II). which represented a r e a l con t r ibu t ion t o t h e l imi ta t i rn of the arms r a c e b ~ t h q u a n t i t a t i v e l y end q u a l i t a t i v e l y and wi th regard t o the mcst d e s t r u c t i v e rneans of w a ~ i n g war, namely s t r a t e g i c nuclear m i s s i l e s . The conc lus i~n cf c t e SCLT-II Treaty makes poss ib le Ljrogress i n o the r d i r e c t i o n s , t o o , in the l i w i t a t i o n of t h e n u c l e a r a m s r a c e and i n disarmament.

The l a t e s t i n i t i a t i v e o f t h e USSR and o t h e r coun t r i e s of t h e s o c i a l i s t comuni ty i n in t roducing i n t h e Committee on Disarmament a proposai f o r negotiatirn on ending t h e production o f dl types of nuclear weapons and gradual ly reducing t h e i r s t o c k p i l e s u n t i l they havebeen completely destroyed and t h e par t ic ipa t ion in such nego t i a t ions of al1 nuclear-weapon S t a t e s and some non-nuclear S ta tes d e s e r v e f u l l support .

There i s no doubt t h a t t h ? implementation o f p r a c t i c a l measures i n t h i s f ie lc should be considered i n c l o s e conjnnction with t h e renuncia t ion of t h e use of force i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and t h e s t rengthening of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l guarantees of t h e s e c u r i t y of S t a t e s . In t h i s connexion, t h e conclusion o f a world t r e a t y on the non-use of fo rce i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s wouïd be o f enormous çignificance.'

A number o f b i l a t e r a l agreements on measures t o reduce t h e danger of an outbrwk o f nuclear v a r and t o prevent t h e acc iden ta l o r unauthorized use of nuclear ireapons concluded during the 1970s by t h e . S o v i e t Union with t h e United S t a t e s , France and the United Kingdom a r e aimed a t p r e v e n t i n ~ t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an outbreak of nuclear war. iieasures o f t h i s kind, designed t o reduce the danger of nuclear va r , nust be expanded and improved.

The solenn dec la ra t ion by t h e Sov ie t Union t h a t it would never use nuclear weapons aga ins t those coun t r i e s which renounce t h e production and acquis i t ion of nuclear weapons and have no nuclear iieapons on t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s w a s of fundaienti l s i g ~ i f i c a n c e f o r the z e c u r i t y of t h e non-nuclear S t a t e s . The USSR has a l s o declared i t s readiness t o conclude 2ppropr ia te agreements v i t h such c o u n t r i e s .

Gn t he i n i t i a t i v e of rhe Sovie t Union, the Cecei-21 Assenbly a t it; t h i r t y - t h i r e s e s ~ ; o n a a c ~ t e d a resc lu t ion on t h e p r e ~ a r s t i o n of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l convention on

the :.in-iise of nuc le i r ïea-ons a z a i n s t those S t a t e s vhich r e n o m c e the grciductign and 2sss1s i t i3n ?f nuclear vearo-2 snd nnvc no nuclear 2eacons on t h e i r t e r r i t o r l e s . A : ;?"d:r 3re7ara:ion 2nd conclusion of the conventicn ?ro;osed Sy the USS? : i o d 3 considerab:y reeuco :te t o s ; i c i l i t y O f :lie o u t b r e a of ~ u c l e a r va r . p.e strengthening i c every ~ o s z i o l e iray of the ré:ir.:e f o r the non-crol iferat ion of nu=learYelFonS. the c ree t ion of nuclear - f ree zones i n various r e ~ i o n s o f the wor ld , anà t n e non-stat ionica o f nuc lea r ::eapons on the t e r r i t o r i e s of S t a t e s ..rhere t h e r e a r e no Suc.1 weepons a t PreSent uould con t r ibu te tovards the sace enàs.

:!le nuclear a rzs race r r p r e s e n t s the major danger t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l pecce and secuf i ty t sday . The 3yelorussian SSR i s convinced t h a t the e f f o r t s of a l 1 peace- LovingStates stiould be d i r ec ted towards l i e i t i n ~ and ending the nuclear a m s race .Adaverting the t h r e a t of an outbreak of nuclear war.

U:<?AI:!IfiI SOVIET SOCIALIST FIEPLISLIC

/Or ig ina l : ~ u s s i e ~ 7 - /il October 19727 -

i h e nuclear ans rece represents t h e s a i n danger t o peace and i n t e r n a t i o n a l secur i ty .The e f f o r t s o f S t a t e s should the re fo re focus on measures d i r e c t e à towards elirninacinqhe t h r e a t of nuclear v a r and excluding nuclear weapons i n al1 t h e i r

-differentforms from the a r sena l s of S t a t e s . Since t h e f i r s t appearance of t h i s m g t d e ~ a s t a t i n g veapon o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n , t h e s o c i a l i s t coun t r i e s , i n p a r t i c x l a r thesov ie t Union. have repeatedly put forward i n t h e United Nations concrete p r o p o s a l s ~ a l l i n g f o r an end t o t h e nuclear arms race , t h e p roh ib i t ion of t h e use :.fnuclear veapons and t h e i r complete e l iminat ion , and, a t t he same time, t h e renunc'iatlonof the use o f force as a means o f s e t t l j n g d isputes between S t a t e s . TheUkrainian SSR has c o n s i s t e n t l y supported al1 these i n i t i a t i v e s .

I n recent yez r s , a nimiber o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements have been concluded whichha~e t o some extent l imi t ed t h e nuclear arms race. Of p a r t i c u i a r s igni f icance inthe curbing of the nuclear arms race vas the s igning i n Vienna i n June 1979 by theleaders o f t h e USSR and t h e United S t a t e s o f the Treaty on t h e Limitation of strategicOffensive Aras and o t h e r Soviet-United S t a t e s documents. The pre.ctica1 implementatlorbf those documents would g ive a considerable impetus t o fu r the r

p r ~ r e s s t o w a r d s the l i a i t a t i o n and reduction of a r sena l s of nuclear miss i l e s and towardsiuclear d i s a m m e n t i n genera l .

A t t he s p e c i a l session of t h e General Asselibly. t he Soviet Union put fonrard nn inportant proposal i n t h e f i e l d o f nuclear disamament - a proposal f o r ending the-roduction of a l 1 types o f nuclear weapons and g r a d u d l ~ reducing t h e i r ~ t o c k p i l m u n t i l they have been completely destroyed. A d e t a i l e d descr ip t ion of that-roposal vas given i n spr ing 1973 by the s o c i a l i s t S t a t e s which are merbers of theCoimittee on Disamairent a t t h e m e e t i n ~ s o f t h a t organ, which is a for- fo r nul t - : la terolnegot ia t ions on mstters r e l a t i n g t o d i sa rna ren t .

The Ukrainian SSF! cons iders t h a t an e a r l y s t a r t t o prepara tory cOnsultat i ot regardinn nece t i a t ions on e n d i 2 ~ the production of a l 1 types o f nuclear veamaoa$ ~ r a d u a l l y roducinp t h e i r s t o c k p i l e s u n t i l they have been c o r p l e t e l y destroyèd, t o the n e g o t i a t i ~ n s the-selves, i n vhich a i l t he nuclear-weapon Povers and go-,

non-nuclear S t a t e s vould par t ic i ' e te , wculd in 3 p r a c t i c a l riay i rp ie ren t the decis ions adopte* by t h e General Asserbly a t i ts s p e c i a l sess ion devoted t o d i s ~ r r a c e n t and vould rep resen t a s i g n i f i c a n t s t ep forvard towards the preventi- -- üf nuclear v a r .

The Llkrainian SSR b e l i e v e s t h a t the vorking out and i ap le ren ta t ion of a ized a t ending t h e production o f nuclear veapons and' a t destroyin: such veapoo, should be c l o s e l y l inked t o t h e s t r e n e h e n i n ~ of ~ o l i t i c a i and in te rna t iona l lecal guarantees o f t h e s e c u r i t y of S t a t e s . The Generaï A-sserbly has already adopted, nurber of i r p o r t a n t r e s o l u t i o n s t h e i cp le ren ta t ion o f vhich could contr ibute in a s i g n i f i c a n t vay t o t h e e l i n i n a t i o n of t h e t h r e a t o f nuclear v a r and t h e s t r e n s h e n i n g o f peace and t h e s e c u r i t y of peoples.

In 1972, t h e General Assembly. i n resolu t ion 2936 (XX'fII). solemniy declarcd, on behalf o f t h e S t a t e s Merbers o f the United Nations, t h e i r renunciat ion of the use o r t h r e a t of fo rce i n al1 i t s f o n s and c a n i f e s t a t i o n s ' in in te rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s , i n accordance v i t h t h e Charter o f the United !ations, and the per-ane~: p rah ib i t ion o f t h e use o f nuclear veaFons. Unfortunately, because of the positicr. taken by a n w b e r of S t a t e s , t h a t i rpor t an t d e c h r a t i o n could not be given bindic; force. Pronpted by a d e s i r e t o s trengthen t h e e x i s t i n g s y s t e a f o r safeguarding peace and s e c u r i t y and t o e s t a b l i s h a r o r e r e l i a b l e legal b a s i s f o r i rpor t an t advances i n t h e f i e l d o f disarnair.ent, i n p a r t i c u l a r nuc lea r d i s m e n t , the Sovie t Union, a t t h e t h i r t y - i i r s t sess ion o f t h e General Assembly i n 1976, propo& t h e conclusion of a vor ld t r e a t y on t h e non-use o f force i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l relatiow, vhich m u l d inpose an o b l i ~ t i o n on al1 S t a t e s to renounce t h e use o r t h r e a t of fo rce i n al1 its fo rns and manifes ta t ions and t o p r o h i b i t t h e use of nuclear veapons. iiovever, t h i s p r o p s a ï , t oo , has so f a r not been implenented. f o r reas- which a r e v e l l knovn.

The s t rengthening o f t h e régine f o r t h e non-prol i fera t ion o f nuclear veaponl, t h e establishment on a l 1 con t inen t s o f nuclear-weapon-free zones and t h e preparatim of i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements on quest ions r e l a t i n ~ t o t h e strengthening of guarantee: o f t h e s e c u r i t y of non-nuclear-veapon S t a t e s and t h e non-stationing of nuclear veaFons on t h e t e r r i t o r i e s of S t a t e s vhere t h e r e a r e no such weapons a t present vouid be a s i e n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n tovards e l i n i n a t i n g t h e t h r e a t of a nuclear ca tas t rophe.

In v iev o f t h e above, t h e Ukrainian SSR considers t h a t t h e e f f o r t s of the United Nations t o so lve t h e ques t ion of the non-use o f nuclear veapcns and t o prevent nuclear v a r should focus on the adoption o f e f f e c t i v e rneasures i n the field o f nuclear d i s a m e n t and t h e sioultaneous s t r e n g t h e n i n ~ o f p o l i t i c a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l guarantees of t h e s e c u r i t y of S t a t e s , as v e l l as ceasures t o reduce t h e danger o f t h e u s e of nuclear weapons. .

A/3b/k56/Add.l Enql i s h Page 5 .

A s a resal: of the ac t ive e f f o r t s of the count r ies of the s o c i a l i s t cozzunicy and of a l 1 sesce-loving S t a t e s i n recent years i t has 'been possible t o aver t the threat of a f u r t n e r world var ; de tente has become t h e dominant t rend in j-rernational r e l a t i o n s . The main task now cons i s t s i n supplementing p o l i t i c a l .;tente w i t h mi l i t a ry dé tente . b-

Since the main danger t o in t e rna t iona l peace and s e c u r i t y a r i se s f r o c the c.;clear arms race, t he e f f o r t s of S ta t e s . Should focus on neasures directed tovares trie ha l t ing and reversa1 of t h e nuclear arms race , t he permanent prohibi t ion of the <se of nuclear veapons, and, a t t he same time, the renunciation of the cse of force i n i n t e rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s .

With t h i s aim i n view, the Soviet Union, s ince t h e f i r s t appearance of nuclear jelpons, has cons i s t en t ly advocated and continues t o advocate the implementaticn oi ?rac t ica l s t eps i n the f i e l d of the l i m i t a t i o n and e l h i n a t i o n of nuclear weacons ànd the adootion of p a r a l l e l measures t o s trengthen in t e rna t iona l peace and a e c l ~ ~ f t y .

As a r e s u l t of these e f f o r t s , a nuinber of b i l a t e r a l and mul t i l a t e ra l ~ r e e m e n t s were concluded during t h e 1960s and 1970s which have had a cer ta in res t ra in ing influence on the nuclear a m race. These include t h e important internat ional Trea t i e s banning nuclear-weapon t e s t s i n the atmosphere, i n outer $Face and under water, and prohib i t ing t h e emplacement of nuclear weapons and o ther +eapons of mass des t ruc t ion i n ou te r space and on t h e sea-bed, the Treaty on the bn-Pro l i f e ra t ion of Nuclear Weapons. and o thers .

An event of h i s t o r i c importance i n t h e curbing o f the nuclear arms race vas :he signing on 18 June 1979 i n Vienna by t h e leaders o f t h e USSR and the United States of t h e Treaty on t h e Limitat ion of S t r a t e g i c Offensive Arms and re l a t ed iocuments. The essence of t h i s Treaty cons i s t s i n the quan t i t a t ive l imi ta t ion of ieapons and cont ro ls on t h e i r q u a l i t a t i v e improvement. The f u l l implementation of rhe documents signed i n Vienna vould open up nev p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r hal t ing the increase i n the a r sena l s of nuclear ~ i s s i l e s and ensuring the f u r t h e r quant i ta t ive and q u a l i t a t i v e l i m i t a t i o n and t h e s ign i f i can t reduction of such weapons.

A t t h e present time, on t h e i n i t i a t i v e of t h e USSR, t h e question of ending the ~ roduc t ion of a l1 types of nuclear weapons and g r a d u d l y reducing t h e i r s tockpi les -1ti1 they have been completely destroyed i s on t h e agenda of in terna t ional r.egotiations. A t t h e beginning of February 1979. t h e USSR. together with other zocia l i s t countr ies . introduced i n t h e Conmittee on ~ i s a r m a n e n t a concrete proposa1 rhat negotiat ions should be held on t h a t question with t h e pa r t i c ipa t ion of ail r.zclear-wea-on S t a t e s and soce non-nuclear S ta t e s . The a i m now i s t o begin lonsultat ions without delay v i t h a v iev t o preparing f o r p r a c t i c a l negotiations on th is question.

In i t s er.<?avcrrr: -.;. ~ c h i c v e cenuine r e s u l t s i n t h e b l t i n ~ of the nuclou s m r zc r , t he Zo-:i-r Uzi-ri j t l i + v e j t b a t the wcrkicg cu t and izclementation of cewures in tha t f i e l d si.;uii ee c lose ly l inked t o t h e srre2~r.i.enin.g of p o l i t i c a l and inter:.ltiinâ!. 1=.::i g.;z=-r..-ces of t"e s e c ~ ~ r i t y of 3 c r t e i . The cocclusior. cf a . .,r:i .- t r e e r y CE the :.r,--,q;e of force in i n t e r n z t i o n a l r e l a s i o n s would be a cajor s:o; in t h i s l i r e c r i c n . The P a r t i e s t o such a t r e a t y , including, of course, thc r.xclerx ?c.iorz, . ~ o L i 2 a ; ~ z e an obl iga t ion t o r e f r a i n f r c n the use o r threa t or force er.;icjir..: en- z y ~ e c f weapons, includine nuclear wes-ons and o ther t m e s veapons of sa:; desir-c- ion. The advantace of so lv ing the question of the nonLse cf nuciear wez-ons ir. ti.e context of the ; r o h i t i t i o n c f the use of any type of veepons l i e s i n the fsc: chat a l 1 S ta t e s - both nuclear and non-nuchar - vould be placed i n t k e 5arr.e zosi?ion.

Such an a'-rgac.*. i s a l s o f u l l y i n keepinc with the dec is ions of t h e Unitcd iiations. I n ; & r t i c u l a r , i n resolu t ion 2936 (XXVII) on t h e non-use of force in i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e i a t i o n s and pemanent p roh ib i t ion of t h e use of nuclear weaFom, the General Acsect ly, on oenalf of the S t a t e s Members of the Organization a s c i a r e a t n e i r renunciat ion of t h e use o f fo rce i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t ions ;errenent p rch ib i t ion of t h e use o f nuclear weapons. The Final Cucument of t t o sp -c ia l s e s s i c n of the General Assemoly devoted t o aiâar::ment, notes the ce& the adoption of meaâ-ses a i zed a t preventing t h e outbreel. of nuclear var an6 the use cf force i n i n t e r r a r i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , i n acccrdacce v i t h t h e oi-avisions 31 tte Charter o f t h e United listions, including t h e use o f nuclear weapons.

I n condi t ions vhere ncc lear veapons a r e r e t a i n e d i n t h e a r sena l s of States the nuc lea r arns race continues, t h e Soviet Union i s doing everything in i ts p&& t o exclude t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e outbreak of nuclear v a r and t o a v e r t t he threat o f t h e use of nuclear veapons. With t h i s aim i n mind, t h e USSR has concluded a number o f agreements v i t h o the r nuclear S t a t e s v i t h a v iev t o preventing t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e outbreak of c o n f l i c t s involv ing t h e use of nuclear veapons. These inc lude such important documents as t h e agreement between the USSR and tbe United S t a t e s on the prevention o f a r u c l e a r v a r (1973). t he agreement v i t h the United S t a t e s on measures t o reduce t h e daager o f t h e outbreak o f nuclear v a . M? on measures t o improve d i r e c t communications l i n e s (1971). t h e exchange of l e t t e r s between t h e i l i n i s t e r s f o r Foreign Af fa i r s o f t h e USSR and R a n c e on t h e prevention of t h e a c c i d e n t a l o r unauthorized use of nuclear weapons (19761, t h e agreement between t h e Goverments of t h e UÇSR and t h e United Kingdom on t h e prevention of acc iden ta l outbreak of nuclear va r (1977). From t h e s tandpoint of t h e USSR. dl nuclear-weapon S t a t e s which have not ye t done so should conclude v i t h o the r nuclear S t a t e s agreements concerning measures t o reduce and ave r t t he danger of nuclear va r and t o prevent t h e acc iden ta l o r unauthorized use o f nuclear weapons. ana those nuc lea r S t a t e s between vhich such ag ree ren t s a l ready e x i s t should i m m v e and expa.nd such measures.

i k e USS? has decle-ed t h a t it i s opposed t o t h e .Ise s f nuclecr weapoes: 0?i?? extraordinar,- c i r c m t a c c e s - aggression agains t t h e US3À or i t s a l l i e s by another nuclear Pover - couid c o q e l it t o r e s o r t t o t h a t extreme means of s e l f - d e f e n e - The USSR has so leml j r dec lared t k s t it w i i i never use nuclear veacons against those couu t r i e s which renounce t h e production and a c q u i s i t i o n of nuclear veapons a d have

nuc lear ;rezpor.j t,eir territcrii.s. 7" s o v i e t Union h a s a l s o exyres ted i t s r e ao ine s s t o c cnc l s fo jFeciel aGrierents oc :tij r a t t e r v i t h an7 S U C Ç c ~ u n t r i e s . t h e USSR~ZS sppezled -2 t h e s t h e r nuclear ?o.iers t o f0llc.d t h e s u e course of c c t i o n ar.3 t o ZS;(LT~ t h e s a c ~ t l i ~ a t i o n s .

. - . t . , ---. cCnorol . $ ~ ~ ~ - ~ l y , on a : ro iosa l o f t k~e Zcvie:

Union .z<c? te i a reso l . J t i c2 cn t h e conclysicn gf an i n t e r n a t i o n a l con'lention Zn :Le non-use f n ï c l e a r tre=por.; a,sin-t :nose s t a t e s vhich renounce t h e product icn ana

a c q u . i ~ ; t ' o n c f nuc lea r veaFons and have no nac lea r i,ea;ons on t h e i r t e r r i t c r i e s . The speedyp re r a r a t i on and conc lus ion of such a c-invention irould ~0nSiàerab1 . i i nduce the ~ O s s i b i l i t y of t h e outbreak of nuc lea r c m f l i c t and would s t r ene then t h e secuf i tyOf non -nuc l ea r . c cun t r i e s a ~ a i n s t t he t h r e a t o f t h e >se of n u c l o u ;;ezpor.; a g a i n s t t h e = .

The i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of United Nations e f f o r t s v i t h r ega rd t o t h e n o n - r r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuc l ea r weapons, t h e expansion of t h e number o f p a r t i e s t o t h e p e a t y on t h e Flon-Proliferation of Nuclear \.Ieapons and t h e e s t ab l i shmen t of nuc?ei.:--fTee zones i n va r i ous r eg ions of t h e vor ld . and t h e inp lementa t ion of t h e resolution adopted by t h e Ceneral Asseably a t i t s t h i r t y - t h i r d s e s s i o n , on t h e j n ; - t i s t i ve of t h e USSR, on t h e ques t i on of t h e non-s ta t ion inq of nuc l ea r wez:ons or. :ke t e r r i t o r i e s o f S t a t e s v h e r e t h e r e a r e no such veapons at p r e s e n t would undoob t@~ c o n t r i b u t e to:rar?s t h e g o a l of ~ r e v e n t i n g nuc l ea r v a r .

-. .nus, t h e Sov i e t Union cons ide r s t h a t a s o l u t i o n t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e non-use o f r.,;clear veapons and t h e p r even t i on o f nuc lea r v a r can t e ach ieved , first and foremost, through h a l t i n g t h e n u c l e a r anus r a c e and ending t h e p roduc t ion of nuclear weaponsand reducing a7d d e s t m y i n g s t o c k p i l e s of such weapons; secondly. p a r a l l e l w i th such measures. th rough t h e s t r eng then ing o f p o l i t i c a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a i q u a r a n t e e s o f t h e s e c u r i t y of S t a t e s p rov id ing f o r t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of t h e use o f ù o t h n u c l e a r and o t h e r types of weapons and o f f o r c e i n g e n e r a l i n i n t e m a t i o n a i .-clations; and, t h i r d , t h r o y h t h e adopt ion of measures d i r e c t e d towards :-rengthening t h e régime f o r t h e n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f n u c l e a r veapons and a v e r t i n e :.:e danger of t h e ou tb r eak of c o n f l i c t s invo lv ing t h e use o f n u c l e a r veapons.

. . ~ J N I T E D N A T I O N S

NOV 1 !7 1979 Distr. LIMITED G E N E R A I A/C.l/ib/L.26

A S S E . M B L Y 1 5 ?!ovenber 1979

ORICICrAL: DICLISH

T!?irty.-fourth sess ion FIRIT CO~"~~ITTEE hgrnda i t e r . 42

P.FirIFr OF THE IE~PL~.E~PTATIO~l OF TII? R.FCOI.D.T.F!DATIO!IS AFD DCCISIONS ADOPTED BY T m CEIrFRAL ASSITqBLY AT ITS TEPTH SPECIAL SFSSIOI!

A r ~ e n t i n a , C y ~ r u s , Wt, ï t h i o p i a , Ind ia , Indonesia, Iran, - I!ieeria, S r i Lanka and Yqos lav ia : d r a f t r e so lu t ion


Recal l inz i t s r e s o l u t i o n 33/71 B , i n t e r dia, c a l l i n g f o r p roh ib i t ion of 5 ie Ge of nuclear weapons, pendinp nuclear disarmament,

Takinrz i n t o account proposais submitted by S t a t e s concernine t h e non-use of nucleer weapons, avoidance of nuclear w a r and relat.ed ma t t e r s (A/34/&56 and Aci.d.11,

1. Decides -- t o t ransmi t t h e views o f S ta t e s concerning the non-use of ncclear wea-on~, avoidance of nuclear var and r e l a t e d ma t t e r s , t o t h e Corni t tee cn Disarmament i

2. Eeauests the Corn i t t ee on Disrrmament t o t a k e those views i n t o considerat ion along with o t h e r r e l a t e d items on i ts agenda and t o r epor t thereon tc t he General Assembly a t i t s t h i r t y - f i f t h sess ion .

United Naions

G E N E R A L FIIW COWiïïTEZ 36

36th meeting A S S E M B L Y hela on

THIRTY-FOURTH SESSION Riàay. 16 tfovemùer 1979

et 10.j0 a.m.

DISrnrnrENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continuedl

Thci C H A I R t r n :

* * * 1 now ca l1 on the representative of ïndia, who wishes t o introduce draf t

resolution A/C.1/34/L.26.

M r . GHAREKHAn (India) : On behalf of the delegations of Argentina,

Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, ïndonesia, Iran, Nigeria, S r i Lanka and Yugoslavia, as

well as my OM. 1 introduce t h e draît resolution contained in document

A/C.1/34/L.26. T h i s &ait resolution is re la ted to agenda item b2, vhich deals

with the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted

by the General Assembly a t i t s t en th spec ia l session. The C o d t t e e w i l l r e c a l l

t h a t a t the session last year, the Assembly adopted, by an overvhelming mnjority,

resolut ion33/71 B, which ca l led for the prohibition of t h e use of nuclear weapons

pending nuclear disarmament and which fur ther ca l led upan Member States to

transmit t h e i r views regarding t h e non-use of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of

a nuclear var.

My delegation was happy t h a t sewral Members responded t o the Secretary-

General's l e t t e r inv i t ing t h e i r views and those views are avai lable i n document

A/34/456 and Add.1. The d r a i t resolution in A/C.1/3b/L.26 is of a procedural

nature. It is a very simple t e x t , in accordance with t h e custom of Indian

A / C . ~ / ~ ~ / P V . 36 32-35

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

delegations of d r a f t i n g resolut ions i n very simple language, and we t r u s t tho t the

d ra f t w i l l be acce?table t o al1 delegations. The f i r s t preambiilar paragraph merely

r e c a l l s resolut ion 33/71 B. wnich, as 1 s t a t e d e a r l i e r , was adopted by a very la rge

majori ty last year. The second preambular paragraph would take i n t o account the

proposals submitted by tat tes concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, the

avoidance of nuclear w a r and other r e l a t ed matters. In operative paragrapn 1 the

Assembly would decide t o transmit those views t o the Comrnictee on Disarmament fo r

consideration and i n operative paragraph 2 it would request the Committee t o take

chose views i n t o consideration when it considers o ther items on i ts agenda and t o

repor t on i ts considerations t o the Assembly a t i t s next session.

1 would no t l i k e t o take any more of t h e Committee's time s ince the d r a f t

reso lu t ion is r e a l l y very simple and self-explanatory, and on behalf of the

sponsors 1 muid request and express the hope t h a t the resolut ion be adopted

without a vote when it is taken up.

United Nations

:*' ., G E N E R A L A S S E M B L Y THIRTY-FOURTH SESSION 0di;ciai Records

FIRST CONMITTEE 42nd meeting

held on !.ionday, 26 November 1979

a t 10.30 a.m. New York

DISAWW~ENT I T ~ ~ S

AGETDA ITEMS Y , 32, 35, 39 ND 42 TO 45 (continued)

A statement vas made by:

!&. Garcia Robles (Mexico)

Thu nmrd u rub- IO comcuoo. Comcwnis Jiould b. vicomntcd tu r cow of th. mord uid should bc ml wlhm m m k of lhe &le of p b i a m n IO thc ml. O I T 4 RMds Ebun~ k u > o . room A.=

Comctims viU k i-d shady dur the end of thc mpn. in r apuitd IiPclo for e u h C o m ~ i m .

73-74249

Distr. GENERAL ~ / ~ . 1 / 3 4 / ~ . 4 2 27 Elovember 1979

ENGLISH

The CHAIRHAN: The Ccmi t t ee kas concluded i t s consideration of

~ l c . i / 3 h / ~ . 2 3 .

It is my intent ion t o turn now t o d ra f t reso lu t io ~ / ~ . 1 / 3 4 / ~ . 2 6 , under

agenda item 42, en t i t l ed "Review of the Implenentation of the Recommendations

and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly a t its Tenth Special Session".

This d ra f t resolution b s 12 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of

India a t the 36th meeting of the F i r s t . Committee on 16 November.

Mr. GHARI-ICFAN ( India) : 1 should l i k e t o inforn the Coimittee of a

s l i gh t amendment t o this d r a f t resolution. The phrase i n t h e second l i n e of

operative paramaph 2, "along with other .related items on i ts agenda" should be

deleted, and the word "appropriate" should be inserted between the words "into"

and "consideration" so t h a t the paragraph now reads:

"Requests t h e C d t t e e on Disarmment t o take those views

i n t o appropriate consideration and t o report thereon t o the General

Assenbly a t i ts t h i r t y - f i f t h session1'..

This saal1 amendment is i n response t o s u g ~ e s t i o n s made t o us by some

delegations, and 1 hope t h a t it v i l 1 f a c i l i t a e t h e t ssk of those delegations.

The CHAIRMAN: The sponsors of riraft resolut ion A/~.1/34/L. 26 a re :

Argentina , Cyorus , Pgyot , Ethiopia , India, Indonesia, I ran , Nigeria, Qatar,

S r i Lanlui, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The &ra f t resolut ion a s jus t amended

by the representative of India , vil1 nom be put t o t h e vote.

-. - ... , '

Mr. FISHER ( ~ n i t e d S ta t e s of America): 1 wish t o request a recorded

vote.

The CiU.IRMAï?: A recorded vote has been requested.


In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria. Angola, Argentina, Bahamas,

Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bol ivia , Braz i l ,

Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cliile , China, Colombia,

Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen,

Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egfpt , Ethiopia, Fiji,

Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Qlana, Guatemala, Guinea,

Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Ind ia , Indonesia, I r an ,

I r a q , I re land , Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,

Kuwait , Lao People's Democratic Republic , Lebanon,

Lesotho, Liber ia , Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, lkdagascar,

Malaysia, Mali , Mslt a , Plauritani a, Mauritius , k x i CO,

florocco, bbzambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,

Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,

Phi l ippines , Qatar , Romania, Sa0 Tome and Principe,

Saudi Arabia, Sene@, S i e r r a Leone, Singapore,

Somalia, S r i Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden,

Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and

Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United

Republic of Cammon, United Republic of Tanzania,

Upper Volta, Uruguq, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yenien, Yugoslavia,

Za i re , Zambia

Agains t : Belgium, Canada, Denmaris, f i ance , Gennany , Federai

Republic o f , Greece, Iceland, I t a l y , Luxembourg,

~ e t h e r l a n d s , Nel? Zesland, Noiway, Portugal, Turkey , United Kingdom of Great Br i ta in and Northern I re laad ,

United S ta t e s of America

Abstaining: Austral ia , Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet

S o c i a i i s t Republic, Czechoslovakia, Ge- Democratic

Republic, Hungary , I s r a e l , Japan, Mngolia, Poland,

Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Soc ia l i s t Republic, Union o f

sov ie t Soc ia i i s t Repuhlics

Draft resolut ion 4/C.1/34/~.26, a s amended, was adopted by 100 votes t o 16,

with 1 4 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: 1 s h a l l nar cal1 on those representatives who wish

t o explain t h e i r votes.

M r , PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Soc ia l i s t Republics) ( in te rpre ta t ion

from Russian) : With respect to the vote just taiser. on d r a f t , resolution

A/C.1/34/L.26 on the review of ' the implementation of the recomiendations and

decisions of the ten th soec ia l . sess icn , we should l i k e t o s t a t e the following.

2 r 0 ~ the t h e vrhen nuclear weauons bad just emerged, the Soviet-Union has

cons is ten t ly advocated and s t i l l advocates the imulementation of

p rac t i ca l s teps t o reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons together with

p a r a l l e i mesures t o strengthen internat ional peace and security. We

recogiize t h a t the main danger fo r internat ional peace and securi ty stems

from the nuclear arms race and the Soviet Union considers t h a t the' cen t r a l

place i n t h e e f fo r t s of S t a t e s should be taken by mesures dmed a t the ha l t ing

and then t h e reversal of the arms race, t o ban forever the use of nuclear

weapons and a t the same time t o r e f r a in from using force i n internat ional

re la t ions .

TO a t t a i n r ea l r e s u l t s , t h e Soviet Union b e l i w e s t h a t the elaboration and

kp lenen t s t ion of measures in t h i s f i e l d should be par t of the oreanic

process of strengthening l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l guarantees of t h e secur i ty of

States . An important s t ep i n t h i s direct ion would be t h e conclusion of a

world t r e a t y on the nm-use of force i n internat ional re la t ions. The par t ies

t o such a t r e a t y , natural ly including the nuclear Parers , would undertake t o

r e f r a in from the use o f force and the th rea t of t h e use of force from the

use of any types of weapons , including nuclear weapms and other types of

weapons of mass destruction.

The advantage of resolving the question of nuclear weapons i n t h e context

of banning al1 types of weapons is tha t a l l States - both nuclear and

non-nuclear States - wouïd be put on an equal footing. That approach is

îU3.y i n l i n e with the decisions taken by t h e United Nations, i n par t icu lar

resolution 2936 (XXVII) adopted at the twenty-seventh session of the General

Assembly on the Non-Use of Force i n Internat ional Relations and t h e Permament

Prohibit ion of the Use of Nuclear tleapons. That resolution contains

an apoee-1 by the General P.ssembly t o States t o renounce t h e use of

A/c.1/34/pv.42 39-40

( ~ r . Petmvsigr, =SR)

such weapons snd t o pmhib i t permanently the use of such weapons. I n the

Final Document of the spec ia l session of the General Assembly devoted t o

disarmament, the need is noted t o take measures Il .. . t o eliminate the danger o f war, i n pa r t i cu la r nuclear w a r , t o

ensure tha t w a r is no longer an instrument fo r s e t t l i n g internat ional

disputes and t h a t the use and the th rea t of force are eliminated from

in terna t ional l i f e , as provided f o r i n the Charter of the United

Nations". ( resolu t ion S-10/2, para. 19)

AS nuclear weapons are stiU maintained i n the arsenals o f States and

t h e n u d e a r armç race continues unabated, the Soviet Union is doina its utmost

t o exclude the possibiLity o f the outbreak of a nuclear va r and t o prevent

the th rea t of such a var. On these l i n e s , we have concluded a number of

agreements with other nuclear S ta t e s to prevent the poss ib i l i ty of the use

of nuclear weapons i n c i n f l i c t s widch might arise.

I n order to prevent a nuclear w a r , fur ther e f f o r t s should be made by

S ta te s Merabers of t h e United Nations so as t o h a l t the p m l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear

weapons and to expand the nuaber of pa r t i e s t o the Non-Proliferation Treaty,

t o cre8te nuclear-wespon-fiee zones thm@out the world and a l so t o implement,

at t h e i n i t i a t i v e of the Soviet M o n , the resolut ion on the non-stationing

of nuclear vespons on the t e r r i t o r i e s of S ta tes where there are no such weapons

at present.

The Soviet ünion thus sees t h e solut ion to t h e non-use of nuclear weaponç

i n var fint and f o r e m s t i n the ha l t ing of the nuclear-arms race. the cessation of

t h e production of euch weapone and the cut t ing d m of araenals of them. Secondly, and p a r a i l e l w i t h th is , w e would strengthen in terna t ional lega l

guaraatees f o r t h e secur i ty of States, envisaging the prohibi t ion of the use of

nuclear and other types of weapons and i n f a c t of force i n general i n internat ional

re la t ions . Thirdly, we would aâvocate adopting measures to strengthen the

régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and t o prevent t h e danger of

conf l ic t s ar is ing which would use nuclear weapons.

h f o r t u n a t e l y , the dralt resalut ion tha t we have just a m e d refeX3 t o

resolut ian 33/71 B which c s l l s f o r the of the use o f nuclear

WespOns but a r t i f i c i a u separates it JIU t he other measures which should be taken,

namely, t h e provision of in terna t ional l e g a l guarantees and t h e renunciation b~ all Sta tes of the uae of force i n in t emat iona i relat ions. For t h a t reason the Soviet W o n abstained i n the vute on t h i s draft resolution.

Mr. MULLOY (I re land) : I reland regards draft resolut ion ~ / ~ . 1 / 3 4 / ~ . 2 6

introduced by India, e n t i t l e d "Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations

and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly a t its t en th special session", a s

a procedural resolut ion; f i r s t , deciding t o transmit proposàls concerning t h e

non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear w a r and re la ted matters t o the

Committee on Disarmament; secondly, requesting the C d t t e e on Disannament t 0

take those views i n t o appropriate consideration and t o report thereon t o the

General Assembly a t i t s th i r ty - f i f th session.

I reland, i n voting f o r the procedural draf t resolut ion, believes it necessary

t o say t h a t we regard it as important tha t al1 views formally not i f ied on th5

issue should be Ailly taken i n t o account i n the discussions i n the Committee on

Disamament.

O u r views on the substantive i ssue a r i s ing were expressed i n the posit ion

we took on l a s t year 's resolution 33/71 B, which Ireltind voted against.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Sweden has voted i n favour of d ra f t resolution

~/C.1/34/~.26. This pos i t ive vote does not imply t h a t we a re not avare of the

r o l e of nuclear weapons i n the current mi l i ta ry doctrines of cer ta in S ta tes and

military a l l iances , o r the in te r re la t ionship between nuclear weapons and

conventional forces and t h e r e l a t i v e s i zes of such forces. Unfortunately, ve do

not think t h a t there is su f f i c i en t ground t o imply t h a t t h e use of such weapons

is prohibited by present in te rna t ional law. Deficiencies i n last year's resolution

i n these respects l e d us t o abstain i n the vote which then took place.

But our pos i t ive vote today should be seen as an expression of our deep

conviction t h a t t he u s e of nuclear veapons, i n al1 circunstances, should be

prohibited, taking i n t o accouat t h e i r u t t e r l y inhumane e f fec t s and t h e i r t h rea t

t o the very survival of c iv i l i zed Society. This object ive must remain our cen t ra l

concern.

It i a o u . f inn be l ie f t h a t a more reso lu te e f f o r t t o achieve t h a t objective

i s urgent. This should take place through gradua1 and balanced reductions of

nuclear-weapon s tockpi les with t h e aim of t h e i r t o t a l abolit ion. Such an e f f o r t

holds grea ter prospects for ' increas ing werybody's s ecur i ty than t h e present

seemingly never-ending build-up and the modernization beyond any reasonable Mt

of nuclear weapons, s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l , within nat ions and both major all iances.

DOCUMENT A1341

Repori of the Fïnt Committw on

1. The item cntitled: "Review of the implementation of the rceommendations and decisions adopted by the Gcneral As~unbly at its tenth specid session: (a) Re o n of the Committee on Diamiment; (6) Re- port O ! the Disarmament Commission; (c) United Na- tiens studiu on disannament: report of the Secrctary- General; (4 Non-use of nucicar weapons and prwention of nuclear war report of the Secretary-General; (e) Disarmament Week: reports of the Secretary-General; (B United Nations programme of feuowships on disarmment: report of the SecretaryGeneral; (g) Implemen- tation of the rewmmendations and deasions of the tenth spsial session: report of the Sccrc t~Gcncra l ; (h) Dissemination of information on the amis race and disamment: (i) Reports of the SaretaryGeneral; (ii) Report of the Director-Guieral of the United Na- tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; (O Monitoring of disarmament agreements and suength- ening of international smirity: reports of the S e c e taryeeneral; 03 Programme of rsearch and studiu on disarmament: report of the SecretaryGeneral; (k) Study on the relationship bctween disamament and development: report of the SecretaryGenenl; (0 New philosophy on disarmament: report of the Secretary- General" was included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-fourth session in accordance with General Asxm- bly molutions 33/71 B. D. E, F, G. H. J, K. M and N of 14 December 1978.

2. At iu 4th plenary meeting, on 21 Sc tember 1979, the General Assembly. on the m m m e n tton of the Genenl Committee, dccided to include the item in iis agenda and to allocate it to the Fint Committee.

3. At its 3rd meeting, on 1 October, the Fint Com- mittce dended to hold a combined pneral debate on the items allocated to it relating to disarmament. namely, items 30 to 45, 120 and 121. The gcneral debate t w k place at the 4th. 6th. 8th to 13th and 15th to 30th meet- mg. fmm 6 October to 5 Novemkr. . .. . . .

H. Draft ruolution A/C.1/34/L.26

22. On 15 ~ o v ~ m b m . Argmtina, WN. E ~ p t . Ethiopia India, Indonnin Inn, Nigena, Sn h k a and Yugoslavia submitted a draft molution (A/C.I/3?/ L.26) conceming the non-me of nudear we?pons. which was i n t r o d h by the rcpracntative of India at the 36th meetinpl on 16 November. The draft was Subquentiy sponsoÏed a h by Qatar and ~niguay. 23. At the 42nd meeting on 26 November. k f o r e

che Fmt Conunittee proccakd to vote on the draft rcsolution the representative of India o d l y r e v t e operative p a r a p p h 2 by deleting the ph- "dong ~11th other rclated i tem on in agenda" aftcr the w0rd "consideration" and inserting the word "appmpnaten k- tween the words "into" and "consideration" (for the tCXt. we pan. 38 below, draft rcsolution G). The drafi rs~lution, as orally rcvised. wat adopted by a ~ ~ r d e d vote of 100 10 16. with 14 abstentions. The voting was

agenda item 42 [Origind: Engüshl

[8 Decembcr 19791 ' In javow: Afghaakran, Algeria, Angola Argentin& Bahamas. Bahmin, Bangiadah, Barbados, Bhutan. B~livia, Buma. Burundi. Cape Verde, Chile. China, Colombia, ~ o n g o 3 o s t a Rica, Cuba, Cypnir, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, qnland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemaia, Guinea. Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, h d i a Indonesia, I n k a Ireland, Ivory Coat, Jamaica. Jordan, Kenya Kuwait, Lao People's Demo- cratic Republic, Lebanon. Lesotho. Liberia, Lib~an Arab lamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico. Momeco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigr, Nigeria. Oman, Pakistan. Panama, Pa ua New Guinea. Paraguay, Pem. Philippines. Qatar. [O- mania. Sao Tome and Principe, Saudt Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Lmne, Singaporc. Somalia, Sri Lanka. Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland. Sweden, Synan Anb Republic, Thailand Top , f in idad and Tobago. Tunisia, Uganda. United Arab Emintn, United Republic of Carnemon, United Republic of Tanuinia. Upper Volta Umeuay, Venezuela, Viet Nam. Yemen, Yugoslavia, &m. Zambia.

Againrt: Belgium. Canada, Denmark, France, Ger- many. Federal Republic of. Grecce. Iceland, Italy, Lm- embourg, Netherlands. New Laland. Nonvay, Portugal. Turkey. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhem Ireland. United Statu of Amcriea.

Abnaining: Australia. Austna. Bulgaria, Byelomssian Soviet Socialit Republic. aedioslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, hrael, Japm, Mon- golia. Poland, Spain. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repub- lic. Union of Soviet Socidkt Republia. ..O

Re- of the Fini Commitîes

38. Tbe W m Committee rccommcnds to the Gen- eral Auembly the adoption of the hllowing draft m- olutions: Review of the imphentarion of l e ravmmendalionr

and &Nions adopid by the Gened Auembly ai irr renth speciai session . m . a NON-USE OP NUCLEAR WEAWNS AND PREVEHTION

OF NUCLEAR WAR

The Grnerd Assembly, Recaflin'g iis molution 33/71 B of 1 4 Daxmber

1978, in which, inter ah, it callcd for pmhibition of the w of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament.

Taking inro amount proposais submitted by Statu conceming the non-use of nudear weapons, avoidance of nuclcar war and related manen (A/34/456 and Add. I),

1. Decidu to Iransmit to the Committee on Dis- armament the views of S e t ~ concming tbe non- of nuclear weapons, avordana of nuciex and da t ed matten;

2 Reqvurs the Cornmittee on Disarmament to &e those views into appmpnate cormderation and to v n thermn to the General A m b l y at its th@-nfth session.

!? United Norions G E N E R A L A S S E M B L Y ïWàïï-FOURTH SESSION U

PLENARY MEEiiNG Tursday. I I Drcernbrr 1979.

or I I u.m.

O f G d Record N E W I O I K

Agenda ilem 42: Rerlev uithe implementat;on ,,l the rccommenduian, and

deci?iuns adopted by the ticiicrul Aswmbly ai ils lenih spectal session:

ta) Repon of the Committcc itn iliwfrnuncnl:

( b ) Kepon 01 the u~-ameni t:ommission: (CI Unilcd Nations studie, on tlirumiament: mpon of the

Sccrrwçenenl: (4 Nonusc of nuclcar weapon* iind pmven'ion of nuclear

var: mpon of the Secrcinrv4icne~: le) Disamument wcck: mponq of the SccFtaryClencd: V) United Nations pm-me 181 f e l l ~ i h W on d i m -

ment: mpon of the SecmtwGenenl: (O) lmpiementation ihc mtimmcndalionr Md decirions

of h c ienih 5-id s~ i s iun : repon of the Secreiary- Gcnerdi: .

th) Disscmtmion of infomatiiin un lhc arms race and

( i~Repons of the ~ecmmrvlicncd. t i i i Repon ofthc ~imtor-<;cnc+p(th e United Nations

~duca t iom~. Scienitfic nnd culiura Ornuauon . (11 Monitonnp ofdimeni uyieemcnu and smnaihcn.

crnslional ~ ~ ~ u ~ t y . iepons of ihe SecceW. ina of ins ~ -

Gëncnl: (I) Rognmme of ms-h *tudies on diwmiuneni:

rcpon of the ~ e c ~ u r y ~ e n c n l : IL) Study on thc mlnuonship b~ iwcen dirnnwnent and de-

velopmeni: mpon the ~ e c r e ~ û e ~ e r d i : tl) New phiiosophy on diurmmenl: Won of ihc

S c c m ~ G c n e d Repon of the Fint Commiiirs:. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 1. The PRESIDENT: 1 regret that through no fault of oum. and panicularly no l'nul1 of the delegations, we have had to s w our meeting rather late. That was not because representatives were not herc punctuaîiy-aJl of them were-but because the documents were not =ad)'. In ordcr to give lime Io d l , delegations to go t h o u g h the documents. I thought 11 more prudent 10 w a t until ail memben had the documents before start- lng the meeting.

2. Mr. SUCHARIPA (Austria). Rapporteur of the First Committee: 1 have the honourof presenting to the General Assembly the repens pf the First Committee on its work conceming agenda items 30 1045 and items 120 -and 121. which üII relate to questions of disarmament.

3. The Fint ~ o m m i t t e c ,ibis year,held a combined general debate on these items having regard to the review of the impiementaiion of the *commcndations and decisions adopted by th? Genet-al Assembly at its tenth special session [resolutlon S-lOa] as wellasothcr disarmament items. f h e y e n c d debate on these items look place at the 4th to 30th meetings of the First Cornmittee from 16 Octoher 10 5 November. Subse- quently. the Fin t Committee devoted t5 meetings. from 6 to 27 November. and again Pan of one meeting on 30 November. to an in-depth consideration of and action on the draft resolutions that had been pmsented. As a result of ils delibentions. the Cornmittee adopted 38 Jraft resolutions and one drafi decision.

4. Before introducing the individual repons on the various agenda items. L wish to,apologize todelcgations for the fact that it was not possible for the Secretariat 10 publish al1 the repons in lime for distribution 10 the permanent missions. 1 have been assured. howcver. thai al1 the reports are now available al the documents booth. ... 17. The Cornmittee's rcpon on item 42. entitled "Re- view of the implementation of the rccommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session". appears in document A13417St. Under this item the Committee adopted 13 drafi resolu- lions entitled. respcctively: "Disarmament and internationai security": "Repon of the Committee on Dis- annament"; "lmplementation ofthe recommendations and decisions of the tenth spetial session"; "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament"; "Monitoring of disarmament agreements and strengthening of international xcurity": "Freezing and reduction of military budgets": "Nonuse of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war": "Re- on ofthe Disarmament Commission"; "Disarmament

beek": '.Nuclear weapons in ail aspects"; "Study on the rclationship benveen disarmament and development": "Committee on Disarmament"; and ..Pro- gramme of research and studies on disarmament". These draft rcsolutions appear in paragraph 38 of the report.

18. Funhermore. under the same item. the Commit- tee adopred also a dralt deciston concern~nga &udy on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The relevant rccommendations of the Commitree am cinÏGned in panyraph 39 of ils report [A/341752l. 1 wish to point out a minor ermr in this repon. The las1 paragraph should be numbered 39. instead of ? 1. . .-

23. The large number of p m p o d s adopted by the Committee and the fact chat no less than 105 smements were made in the general debate on disannament ituns are again a clear expression of the intensificd interest of al1 delegations in these pressing issues as well as a i-cflection of the serious effons made by the General Assembly to solve questions of d i s a m e n t withii the framework of the United Nations which. in rhe words of the Final Document of the tenth spccial session, which was devoted to disamament. h a . in accordance with the Charter, a cenirai role and primary rcsponsibility in the sphere of disarmament [ser rrsuluriun S-1012. srci. II. pora. 271. Most. if not all. of these proposais arc designed to ensure the carliest implementation of the i-ccommendations and decisions adopted by the Gen- eral Assembly a t its tendi spccial session.

24. On behaifof the Fint Committee. i r is my pleasure IO recommend to the General Assembly for adoption the draft resolutions and the drafl decision to whtch I have . - just referred.

60. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now consider the repon of the Fint Committee on agenda item42 [A/34/752]. The Assembly will now take a decision on the 13 draft resolutions rccommended b the Fint Committee in pamgmph 38 of iu rcpon. whic l appear together under the tiUe "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopred by the General Assembly at ils tenth special session".

69. The PRESiDENT: Dr& resolution G is entitled "Non-use of nuclcar weapons and prcvention of nuclear war". A rccorded vote bas been rcquested.

A recorded Vore was takon.

In favour: Afghanistan. Algeria. Angola. ArgenCna. nahamas. B a h n . Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin. "--~ Bhutan. Bolivia, ~o<swaia . Brazil, Burma. Burundi. Cape Verde, Cenual African Re ublic, Chad, Chüe, China. Cqmoms. Congo, Costa Lca, cuba, c y p m Democdic ,Kampuchea Dcmocratic Y-n. ~ $ 1 bouti. Dom+ca? Republic, Ecuador, Egypt. El ~alvador. E h o p i a Fip. Fuiland, Gabon, Gambii Ghana. GE*. Guatemala Guinea. Guinea-Bissau. GU ana. Hain. Honduras. .hdia, Indonesia. h. Iraq, Ire r and. Ivow.Coast, Jarnac?, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait. Lao People s Democmc Republic, &banon, Lesotho. Liberia. Libyan &ab Jmahhiya. Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia, Maldiva, Md. Maita. Mauntania Mauritius, Mexico. Mo-, Mozambique. Nepal. Niger. Nigeria. Oman. Palristan. panama. Paraguay. Pcni. Philippines. Qw. Romania. Rwanda. Samoa. Sao Tome and Ruici~c, Saudi - - Amhia. Senesai. Sierra Lconc. Sinnaoorc. .&da. Sri . .. - -~ ~ ~~. - ~ -

- - -Lanka. SU*. SU*~. Swaziiand, Swcdcn, Syrian Arab Repubhc. lhd?nd. Top . Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Uganda Un i l e A d Emiratcs. United Re- oublic of camemon. Umtcd Republic ofTanzania U p 'er Volta. Uruguay, Venezuela. Viet Nam. Ycmcn, $ugoslavia, Zak. Zambii

Apainst: Beleium. Canada. DenmarL. France. ~ e r k a n y , Federal Republic of. Grcece, Iceland. Italy. Luxembourg. Netherlands, New Zealand, Noway. Ponugal. TUrkey. Uniud Kingdom of Gmat Britain and Nonhern Ireland, Umtcd States of America.

Abstoining: Australia, Austria, Bul 'a B elorus- P " . r . sian Soviet Socialist Republic. zcchos ovakta. German Democratic Republic, Hungary. Isracl. Japan. Mon olia. Poland. Spain, Uk++ Sovi. Socialisr ~epu!lic, Union of Soviet Socraiist Republics.

Drafi resolution G was adopted by 112 votes to 16. with 14 ubstenriom (resolution 34\83 G).

35/152. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAWNS AND PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

The-General Assembly. Alarmed by the threat to the survival of rnankind and

to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inhercnt in concepts of deterrena.

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its declaration, contained in the Final Docu- ment of the Tentb Special Seision of the General Assembly. that al1 States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of pcaceful conduct of nations in intemational affairs could be agrctd upon and which would precfude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,"

Recalling its rcsolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961. 33/71 B of 14 Dcccmber 1978 and 34/83 G of II December 1979.

Experts, Wcapons, prepared

1. Declares once again that: ( O ) The use of nuclcar weapons would be a violation

of the Charter of ihe United Nations and a crime against humanity;

(b) The use or thrcat ,of iuc of nuclear weapons should thereforc be prohibitcd, pending nuclcar disarmament;

2. Requests ail States that have so far not submitted their proposals conœming the non-use of nuclcar wca 8 ons, avoidanœ of nuclcar war and rclated matten, to O so, in order that the question of an international convention or some other agreement on the subjcct may be funher considercd at the thiny-sixth m i o n of the General Ascmbly;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item cntitled "Non-ux of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclcar war".


" The rcport was laicr brucd with the titlc C o m p n h m i r Siudy MI Nuclcar Weapnr(Uni1ed Nations publication. Sala No. E.81. I. I 1).

l j N I l E D D A R I O N S UNISA c~XLECT]DN Distr . LI!.IIT.ZD

6 E N E R A L A/C.1/35/L.22

"Ek/ iB! ' f 1 4 Hovember 1960 A 3 J

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thi r ty - f i f th sess ion EEST CONTiITTEE &enda i cen 44 (.g)

REVILI! OF THE Ii.!PLEI~IENTATIOï'l OF THE RECOP~!MEilDATIOI~IS MID DECISIONS AEOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSE'BLY AT ITS TENTH

SPECIAL SESSION

NOiI-USE OF NUCLCAR WEAPONS AND PREVEPITIOW OF NüCLEAR \!AR

Alger ia , Angola, Argentins, Congo, Ethiopia, Ind ia , Indonesia, ;,

Yugoslavia and Zai re : d r a f t r e so lu t ion

The G e n e r d Assembly,

Alarmed by t h e th rea t t o t h e s u r v i v a l o f mankind and t o t h e l i f e - sus ta in ing system posed by nuclear weapons and by t h e i r use inherent i n concepts o f deterrence,

Convinced t h a t nuclear disarmament i s e s s e n t i a ï f o r t h e prevention o f nuclear var and f o r t h e s trengthening of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y ,

Recal l ing i t s declara t ion , contained i n t h e Fina l Document o f t h e Tenth Çpecial Sess ion , t h a t " A l 1 S t a t e s should a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n e f f o r t s t o br ing about condi t ions i n in t e rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s amone S t a t e s i n which a code o f ~ e a c e f u i conduct o f Nations i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s could be agreed and which .muid preclude t h e use o r t h r e a t o f use o f nuclear weapons::,

Recal l ing i t s resolu t ions 1653 (XVI) o f 24 Novenber 1961, 33/71 B o f 1 4 Decenber 1978 and 34/63 C of 11 December 1979,

N o t i n ~ t h e comprehensive study o f nuc lea r weapons prepared by t h e Secretary- &nera ï wi th t h e ass is tance o f a group o f exper t s ( ~ / 3 5 / 3 9 2 ) ,

1. Oeclares once again t h a t :

( a ) The use o f nuclear weapons v i l 1 be a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e Charter of t h e United Nations and a crime agains t humanity:

( b ) T k e use o r t k r e a t of use of nuclear ueapons Shoulil t h ~ r e f o r e be proi l ibi te*, pending nuclear disarmerient;

2. !?e?iie;tç a l 1 S t e t e s w h i c h have so fa* not subn i t t ed t l i e i r proposals concerniiig the no:;-use of cuc iez r rreacons, avoidance of nuclear va r and. r e l a t e d r a t t e x , t o do so , hl o rdz r .tlir.t t h e 2urstio;i of a? i ~ t e r n a ~ i o n a l conventiori o r some o t h s r agreemriit on t h e sub jec t ;na.{ be f u n h e r considered at t h e th i r ty-s ixrh s e s s i c n of t'ne Ceneral Asst.mbl7;

3. Decides t o inc lude i n the - , rovisional Menda o f i t s t h i r t y - s i x t h session m i tem e n t i t l e ù "llon-use o f nuclear i.reapons s72 preiention of nuclear var".

c.7 United Notions

C E N E R A L A S S E M B L Y THIRTY-FIFTH SESSION O&id Records*

FlRST COMMITTEE 35th meeting

held on Wednesday, 19 Hovember 1980


VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 35TH MEETING

Chaiman: M r . NAIK (Pakistan)

DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA 1'i'R.E 31 M b9 AlJD 121 (continued)

Dr& resolutions were introduced by:

Mr. Bdasubramsniam (sri Lanka) - A/C.1/35/~.24 Mr . Komives ( ~ungary) - A/C.1/35/L.27 Mr. Mittd (India) - A/C.1/35/L.22 Mr. Adeniji (Higeria) - A/C.1/35/L.30 and L.3

PROGRAMME OF WORK

*This record n subject ta correction. Concctiona mould be unt under thc rignaturc of a membn of the delegalion concerned virhin one monrh of rhe &re of publicarmn to the Chief of the O m d Recorda Eiiitiq Section. room A-3SS0. 866 United Nations Plara (Alma Building). a d incorporatcd in 1 mPY of thc record.

Comctioni will be Usucd aftcr the end of the xrrion. in s rcpurte faacide for =ch Committec.

80-63707

Dlstr. CENERAL A/C.1/35/W.35 20 Eovember 1980

The CHAIRMAN: 1 c a l 1 on the representative of India t o introduce

the & a i t reso lu t ion contained i n document A/C.1/35/L.22.

M r . Mï'ïTAL ( India) : On behalf of i t s sponsors, includirq my am

delegation, 1 have t h e honour of introducing the &aft resolut ion contained

i n document A/C.l'/35/L.22 on t h e non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention

of nuclear war.

It w i l l be r e c d e d that t h e Final Document of the speciaï session

of the General Assembly dwoted t o disarmament unequivocally States:

"iiuclear weapons pose the grea tes t danger t o mankind and t o the

survivaï of c iv i l i za t ion . It is essent ia ï t o h a l t and reverse the

nuclear anns race i n a i l i t s aspects in order t o ave r t t he danger

of rar involving nuclear weapons. The u l t h t e goal i n t h i s context

is t h e complete elimination of nuclear weapons." ( resolut ion s-1012,

para. 47)

( M r . Mittal . 1ndia)

The Final Document a l so s t a t ed t h a t the most effect ive guarantee against

the danger of nuclear war and t h e use of nuclear weapons is nuclear

disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weaFons.

The several statements t h a t we have heard during our debate i n the past

f e ~ r weeks i n t h i s Committee have underscored the f ac t t h a t the nuclear arms

race has continued unchecked and t h a t the danger of a nuclear var breaking

out has s igni f icant ly escalated. This is due not onïy t o the continued increase

i n the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon Sta tes , but a l so t o the espousal

of such dangerous s t r a t eg ic doctrines as nuclear deterrence, l imited nuclear

strilses and so on. Given t h i s s i tua t ion , the question of providing mankind

w i t h a credible and binding assurance against the use o r t h rea t of use of

nuclear weapons has become more urgent than ever before.

The d ra f t resolut ion before us is basical ly a r e i t e r a t ion of the pkovisions

of the Declaration contained i n General Assembly resolut ion 1653 (XVI ) of

November 1961. That Declaration had c l ea r ly s t a t ed t h a t the use of nuclear

weapons would be a v io la t ion of t h e United Nations Charter and a crime against

humanity. The e f f ec t s of any nuclear war , a s should be apparent t o dl, would

not be l imited merely t o the t e r r i t o r i e s of those who may wage it. A l l S ta tes ,

including non-nuclear-weapon countries, would su f fe r from the radioactive

fall-out and t h e contamination tha t muid inevi tably ensue. This is amply

c lear from the study on nuclear veapons prepared by the Secretary-Ceneral with

the assis tance of a gmup of experts, contained i n document A/35/392. It is

f o r t h i s pressing reason t h a t we continue t o hold t h a t the sovereignty and

irell-being of el1 Sta t e s , i nc lud iw those not involved i n t h e conf l ic t , would

be endangered in the event of a nuclear var. Such a develoment, then, would

c lear ly be a v io la t ion of the United Nations Charter and a crime against t h e

whole of mankind. In addition, given the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear

war, it may well mean t h e end of Our species and human c iv i l i za t ion as we

know it .

(fi. Mittal . 1ndlk)

The present d ra f t resolut:r,n re fe rs i n a d à i t i o ~ i t o t i r 0 o ther resolutions

on the subject . The f i r s t , General Assembly resolution 33/71 B. was aponsored

by as ncny as 34 delegations and was adopted by an overirhelming majority of

t he in te rna t iona l ccnliunity. Tne present d ra f t resolution is on s imilar l i ne s .

The reason rihy it i s f e l t necessary t o focus a t ten t ion once again on t h i s

extremely important issue r e s t s on the increasingly elusive prospect of rnzking

meaningful progress i n regard t o nuclear disarmament. The d r a f t resolut ion

fur ther tal,es note of the study on nuclear weapons prepared by the Secretary-

Ceneral t o which 1 have aiready made reference.

The other resolution re fe r red t o i s General Assembly resolut ion 34/83 G ,

which was meinly procedural i n nature and had asked for the views of States

concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons and avoidance of nuclear rrar t o be

transmitted t o the Cornmittee on Disarmament for i t s consideration.

The sponsors of the d ra f t resolut ion which i s now before us a r e not asking

for t he immediate conclusion of a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons,

since t h i s would obviously take considerable time. But they do consider it

necessary t h a t a t l e a s t a beginning must be made without delay i n t h a t

d i rec t ion t o prevent the p o s s i b i l i t y of a nuclear conf l ic t . In response t o

the e a r l i e r resolution 33/71 B, some S ta t e s had communicated t h e i r proposais

i n t h i s regard t o the United NatLons. These are avai lable ;n documents

~ /34 /456 of 28 Sep tabe r 1979 and A/34/456/Add.l of 16 October 1979. The

current d ra f t resolution c a l l s upon those States t ha t have not already done

so s imi la r ly t o submit t h e i r suggestions i n t h i s regard so t h a t t he poss ib i l i ty

of concluding an in te rna t iona l convention o r other su i tab le agreement on the

subject may be seriously considered a t the th i r ty -s ix th session of t h e General

Assembly. It i s the opinion of t h e sFonsors t ha t once a cross-section of

views, rrhich shouïd be as broad as possible, has been obtained, t he objective

of negot ia t ing a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons, o r some other

in te rna t iona l ly binding agreement t o t h a t e f f ec t , could be taken up i n a more

p r a c t i c a l and concrete manner.

The sFonsors of the draf t resolution which 1 have just introduccd

earnestly hope t h a t it w i l l receive the widest support of ail membcri .>f the

F i r s t Committee and t h a t t h i s w i l l i n turn move the rrorld comunity closer

towards the goal of eli i i inating once and f o r a l l the danger of a nuclear

var, thereby rnsu r ing tha t Our generation a s well as future generations

a re f ree frcm the ever.-present and groinng th rea t t o t h e i r s w i v a l

from such a war.

lir. PETmE (United States of ~ m e r i c a ) : For the f i r s t t i r e i n i t s

his tory, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean has been able t o fornulate

a draf t resolut ion which, we believe, should be able t o command unanimous

support in t h i s body. A l 1 countries who par t ic ipated i n the lengthy Ad Xoc

Cornittee discussions of the past year share the c red i t for t h i s achievenent,

but praise is most especial ly due t o Chai- Balasubramaniam and h i s grou-

of friends, whose t i r e l e s s e f fo r t s plnyed u key ro l e i n negotiating the presmt

consensus d r a f t resolut ion.

It is well recognised that t h i s draf t resolut ion may not be en t i r e ly

sa t i s fac tory t o al1 members of the Ad Hoc Committee. Indeed, t he lengthy

substantive discussions undertaken i n the Committee and st the meetings of

t he "Friends of t h e Chairman" have c l ea r ly demonstrated tha t a vide diversence

of views on a number of fundamental issues remains.

As t h i s Committee i s avare, t he United S ta tes i t s e l f over t h e years has

voiced i ts concerns on fundamental issues r e l a t ing t o the vork of t he Ad Hoc

Committee. Indeed, Our d i f f i c u l t i e s with aspects of the mandate of t he Ad Hoc

Committee precluded our par t ic ipat ion in i ts vork u n t i l t h i s year when,

a f t e r lengthy consultations, the United S ta tes accepted the invi ta t ion extended

t o it t o Join the Ad Hoc Committee.

United Nations

G E N E R A L FIRST cornumm 39th meeting

43 A S S E M B L Y held on

Fridw, 21 November 1980 THIRTY-FIFTH SESSION a t 3 p.m. O f i d Records ~ e w l ' o r k

VERBATLY RECORD OF THE 39TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. NAIK ( ~ a k i s t a n )

CONTENTS

DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITDG 31, 32, 34 TO 37, 39 M 42 AND 44 M 49 (continued)

A draft resolution was introduced by:

Mr. Rose (German Democratic ~ e p u b l i c ) - A/C.l/35/L. 36

.mir record u rvbjcct to correction. Corrcctianr shauld bc u n t under the anaturc of a rncrnber of the delcgation concerncd wirhin one monrh of the I r e of publicorion IO the Chicf of the Official Records Editing Section.roorn A-3550. 866 United Nations Plaza (Alcoa Building). and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issucd alter the end of the session, in a separate fascicie for each Cornmittoel

Dlstr. GENERAL A/C.1/35/W.39 22 bvember 1980

The CIiAIF'i ml: \Je noir t u r n t o d r a f t r eso lu t ion A/C.1/35/L.22.

It is sponsored by 24 delegat ions and iras introduced by the representa t ive of

India a t the Comi.Sitteets 35th meeting on 19 Pioveriber 1980.

1 s h a l l nov c a l 1 on those representa t ives ~ i s h i n g t o expla in t h e i r votes

before the voting.

i i r . i,ULLOY ( I r e l a n d ) : 1 should l i k e t o expla in I re land ' s vote on

t h e non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear rrar as s e t out i n

d r a f t r eso lu t ion A/C.1/35/L.22, which was introduced by Ind ia , c a l l i ng once again

on the General Assembly t o declare t h e use of nuclear ireapons t o be a v io la t ion

of t h e Charter of t h e United Nations and a crime agains t humanity.

We a re opposed t o t h e use of nuclear weapons: we consider t h a t t h e i r use

would indeed be d i s a s t rous . 1 wish t o quote the statement made by the I r i s h

delegation e a r l i e r , i n t h e generai debate:

"#e do not ever uant t o see such weapons used. We be l i eve t h a t it wouid be

madness, t h e u l t imate madness.. . Be want t o s ee an end t o t h e fu r the r

development of t h e s e weapons; a reduction i n t h e stoclrpiles: and the

complete e l iminat ion of nuclear weapons as soon a s poss ible ."

(A/C.1/35/PV.28, p. 5 )

Vre deeply r e g r e t , t h e r e fo r e , t h a t ve should be ob l iged t o vote acains t

a d r a f t r eso lu t ion under t h e t i t l e "Bon-use of nuclear weapons and prevention

of nuclear rai-" and, t o avoid any misunderstandine o f Our pos i t ion on t h i s very

i s sue , we rrant t o put it q u i t e c l e a r l y on record.

Already i n 1961 I r e l and voted agains t r eso lu t ion 1653 (XVI) on

24 November 1961, rthich declared

"the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons Lto be/ contrary t o the

s p i r i t , l e t t e r and aims of t h e United Nations and, as such, a d i r ec t

v io l a t i on of t h e Charter of t h e United Mations."

The 1961 reso lu t ion f u r t h e r declared t ha t t h e use o f such weapons vas

"contrary t o t h e ru l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l lavr and t o t h e lairs of humanity."

In explaining O u r pos i t ion on t h a t i s sue t h e I r i s h l i i n i s t e r fo r Foreign

Affa i r s , tir. Frank AiIren, i n a l e t t e r t o t h e Secretary-General dated 29 June 1962

ind ica ted t h a t I r e l and w a s not convinced t h a t a simple dec la ra t ion ~rouid be an

effect ive method of preventing the use of nuclear weapons o r t ha t such a

àeclaration arould add anything t o the c lear terms of t he Charter, by which

a l 1 I!embers are obliged t o "refrain i n t h e i r internat ional re la t ions from

the threa t o r use of force against . . .any State: ' .

( I k . Mulloy, I re land)

In I r e l and ' s v i e ~ r , s a id Llr. Aiken, t he declarat ion might even be

pos i t i ve ly dangerous, i n so f a r as it wculd tend t o encourage a f a l s e sense

of s ecu r i t y and lead S ta t e s t o reduce t h e i r endeavours t o prevent t h e fur ther

spread of these t e r r i b l e neapons and t o e s t ab l i sh a world s ecu r i t y system

~rhicii would be e f f ec t ive i n preventing war and would ensure t h e gradua1

elimination of nuclear weapons i n t h e handc of individual Powers.

That was t h e pos i t ion i n 1962, t h ree years a f t e r I re land ' s f i r s t

in t roduct ion t o t h i s Assembly of a d ra f t resolut ion t o prevent t h e spread

of nuclear weapons and s i x years before t he culmination of t he e f f o r t s

i n i t i a t e d by Ire land i n 1958 which resu l ted i n t h e conclusion of t h e

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) . While 1 wouid not wish a t t h i s point t o en t e r in to t h e merits of t h e

system of controls and safeyuards es tabl ished a s t he r e s u l t o f t h e NPT,

i s it r e a l i s t i c t o imply t h a t a s ing le declarat ion is an adequate .

s i ibs t i tu te f o r pa t ien t negot ia t ions involving t h e nuclear Powers t o r e s t r i c t

t he production, t r a n s f e r and s tockp i l i rg of nuclear weapons and f i s s ionable

mater ia is f o r weapcns purposes. However, t h e d ra f t reso lu t ion on which we

a r e t o vote is not simply a general statement with which all can agree.

It declares s p e c i f i c a i l y t h a t t h e use of nuclear weapons muld be a v io la t ion of

t he Charter and a crime against humanity and t h a t t he use o r t h r e a t of use

of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited pending nuclear d i s a m e n t .

1 regre t t o have t o Say t h a t we do not agree tha t t h i s pa r t i cu l a r approach

is a good one. The nuclear Parers which claim t o hold nuclear weapons as a

de te r ren t have developed those weapons over many years a s a n a t t e r o f mi l i t a ry

policy and they always emphasize t h a t they a r e ready t o r e t a l i a t e i f attacked.

Granted t h a t posi t ion, we see l i t t l e prospect t h a t t he nuclear Powers w i l l

now put i n t o prac t ice a declarat ion here t h a t t h e use of nuclear weapons wodd

be a v io l a t i on of t h e Charter, especial ly s ince the Charter i t s e l f makes no

mention of any weapons and does provide for t he r i gh t of self-defence.

(Mr . Nulloy , Ireland )

Nor w i l l the nuclear Powers accept a declaration by t h e Assembly tha t

the use of nuclear weapons i s a crime against humanity. They may agree, as we

do, t ha t it would be the supreme fo l ly . But they a t tach a ~ a r t i c u l a r l ega l

significance t o the term "crime against humanity", which was given a specif ic

def in i t ion by the in te rna t iona l community fo l lo~i ing t h e Second Vorld Var,

and they w i l l not concede i n response t o a simple declaration by the Assembly

tha t t he mi l i ta ry pol ic ies of deterrence t o which they a re a t present cormitted

a re i n e f fec t crimes i n in te rna t iona l law which merit internat ional punishment.

Furthermore, we consider it unrea l i s t ic and indeed dangerously m i s l e s d i n ~

t o the world a t l a rge t o suggest t h a t pending nuclear disarmament t h e nuclear

Powers couid be wil l ing t o accept a prohibit ion on t h e th rea t of use of

nuclear weapons iihen t h a t is cent ra l t o t he log ic of t h e i r s t r a t eg ic doctrines,

however much we regre t those doctrines.

Given the huge a rsena ls t h a t e x i s t , it is , r a the r , only throush nuclear

disarmament tha t t he immense r i s k t o mankind can be reduced and eventually

rernoved. We question ser ious ly t h e value of sweeping declarat ions of t h i s

kind because we fear t h a t they may d i s t r ac t a t t en t ion from t h e very Serious

need t o negotiate t h e reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons,

t o which we a r e strongly committed, and devalue the currency of United

Nations resolutionn and t h e i r authority.

\Je know t h a t a simple declaration by the Assembly vil1 change nothing

i n pract ice , however emotionally sat isfying it may sem. b e n i f t h e nuclear

Powers were t o accept such a declarat ion now, they w u l d , we believe, s t i l l

r e t a in t h e i r weapons, and we see no prospect t ha t they would r ea l ly abide by

t h e declaration i n t h e o f w a r .

A s evidence of t h e ineffectiveness of such declarations i n achieving

r e a l nuclear disarmament, I wouid point t o t h e f a c t t h a t t he 1961 resolution

declared the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons a v io la t ion of the Charter

and a crime against humanity. That was 19 years ago, and the only change

s ince then has been a grea t increase i n the arsenals of nuclear weapons held

by the nuclear Powers.

~/C.1/35/W.39 63-65

(1 Ir. Ilulloy , Ireland )

I n vot ing against the d r a f t reso lu t ion already i n 1961, I re land ' s

delegation explained i t s posi t ion as follows:

"Each nuclear Power may declare ncw t h a t t o use i t s nuclear weapons would be

contrary t o in te rna t iona l law, but i f i t s very survival were a t stalce, it

would not h e s i t a t e t o use t h e most potent weapons avai lable t o it , regardless

of what dec la ra t ions it subscribed t o ... ?ly delegation yields t o none i n our

horror a t t he prospect of the use of nuclear weapons ... but we strongly f e e l

t h a t t h i s declarat ion ' ' - t he 1961 d r a f t declarat ion - "although well intended,

would be of very l i t t l e r e a l value. Indeed, i n so f a r a s a convention of t he

kind proposed would give a f a l s e sense of secur i ty , it may even be pos i t ive ly

dangerous - a s it would lead S ta t e s t o reduce t h e i r search for t he

construct ion of a world secur i ty system which would be e f fec t ive i n preventing

war and wouïd permit t h e gradua1 elimination of nuclear weapons i n t he hands

of ind iv idua l Powers." (A/C.l/W.1193. P. 38)

Those were t h e views of my delegation i n 1961, a s expressed i n t h i s Cornmittee

on a somewhat simi'lar resolution. 1 bel ieve t h a t those views have been f u l l y borne

out i n t h e 19 years which have passed s ince then and i t is e s sen t i a l l y for s imilar

reasons t h a t t o Our regre t we must vote against t h e present d r a f t resolution.

M r . NONOYAMA (Japan): Against t h e baclqround of increased in te rna t iona l

tension i n var ious regions, notably i n Afghanistan, my Goverment considers a

s t ab i l i zed system of nuclear deterrence t o be of ever-increasing importance as a

f ac to r t o contain t he fur ther spreading of such tension. That is the reason why

t h i s year my delegat ion has been ins t ruc ted t o vote against t h e d r a f t reso lu t ion

contained i n document A/C.1/35/L.22.

The CHAIRMAN: 1 s h a l l now put t o t h e vote d r a f t resolut ion A/C.1/35/L.22.

Draft r e so lu t ion A/C.J./35/L.?2 was adoptedby 101 votes t o 19 , with

15 abstent ions .

The CHAlXbRnI: 1 s h a l l now c a l 1 on those representat ives who wish t o

explain t h e i r votes. -

n/c.1/35/pv.39 66

k i r . ZILUKOV ( Union of Soviet S o c i e l i s t Republics) ( i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . . from Russian): Flitk respect t o t h e vo te t h a t has j u s t been taken on t h e d r a f t

r e so lu t ion contained i n document ~ / C . 1 / 3 5 / ~ . 2 2 , on t h e non-use of nuclear

weapons and t h e ixevent ion of nuclear war, t h e delegat ion of t h e USSR brould

l i l i e t o s t a t e t h e follorring.

The Sovie t Union considers t h a t a s o l u t i o n t o t h e quest ion of t h e non--use

of nuclear rreapons and t h e prevention o f nuclear war can be achieved by

a cessa t ion of t h e nuclear-arns race end t h e cessa t ion o f t h e production of

those WeaPons, t h e reduction and e l iminat ion o f s t o c k p i l e s of nuclear weapons

and, p a r a l l e l wi th t h a t , by al1 S t a t e s r e f r a i n i n g from t h e use o f force i n

i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The pos i t ion of t h e USSR on t h i s ma t te r has been

repeatedly s t a t e d i n t h e United i~lat ions, inc lud ing i n a l e t t e r s e n t by t h e

Permanent Mission of t h e USSR t o t h e United Nations addressed t o t h e

Secre tau-Genera l o f t h e United Nations on t h e ques t ion o f t h e non-use o f

nuclear weapons and t h e prevention of nuclear war, da ted 2 October 1979, which

was c i r c u l a t e d as document A/34/456 Add.1. The Sovie t Union sees t h e so lu t ion

of t h i s matter f i r s t and foremost through a c e s s a t i o n of t h e nuclear-arms r a c e ;

secondiy,and i n p a r a l l e l with t h a t , through s t r e n ~ t h e n i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l and

i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l guarantees f o r t h e s e c u r i t y o f S t a t e s , inc luding a ban on t h e

use of nuclear and o t h e r types of ireapons and banning t h e use o f force i n g e n e r d i n

i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s ; and t h i r d l y , through t h e adoption o f measures aimed a t

s trengthening t h e non- .prol i fera t ion regime and prevent ine t h e danger of c o n f l i c t s

a r i s i n g where nuc lea r ireapons might be used.

We b e l i e v e t h a t it is inadmissible a r t i f i c i a l l y t o d ivorce t h e p roh ib i t ion

of t h e use o f nuc lea r weapons from t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f t h e use of fo rce i n

i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . TTe a r e convinced t h a t t h e advantage of resolving

t h e ques t ion o f t h e non-use of nuclear weapons i n t h e context of t h e p roh ib i t ion

of t h e use o f al1 types of rreapons l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t al1 S t a t e s , nuclear

and non-nuclear, w o d d be placed on an equal foot ing. Unfortunately, i n t h e

àraft r e s o l u t i o n contained i n document ~ / ~ . 1 / 3 5 / L . 2 2 , t h e ques t ion of t h e

p roh ib i t ion o f t h e use of nuclear weapons i s once more a r t i f i c i a l l y divorced

from t h e ques t ion of t h e adoption o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l and l e g a l measures

t o s t rengthen t h e s e c u r i t y of a l1 S t a t e s and from t h e ques t ion o f t h e

renunciat ion by S t a t e s of t h e use of fo rce i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Because

Of t h a t t h e Sovie t M i o n w a s compelled t o a b s t a i n i n t h e vo te on t h a t d r a f t

resolut ion.

bk. LIDGARD (Sweden): The Svedish Goverment a t taches t he greates t

importance t o measures aimed a t preventing the use of nuclear rieapons. It i s

i n fac t a matter of t he very survival of mankind tha t such weapons

shouid not be used. There i s a lso a log ica l linl; betlreen non-use and

non-proliferation which must be kept i n nind.

1 wish t o r e c a l l what was said i n paragraph 58 of t he Final Document of

t he f i r s t spec ia l session of t he General Assembly devoted t o disarmament on the

question of t he non-use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on t h e na t t e r during

t h a t session reminded us of a i 1 t he p rac t i ca l d i f f i c u l t i e s involved. It is al1

too evident t h a t e f fec t ive measures i n t he f i e l d of non-use cannot b e .

achieved without f u l l y taking in to account t he problems inherent i n t he

nuclear arsenals and t h e i r r e l a t ed mi l i t a ry doctrines. It i s i n fac t necessary

t o grapple with t he concrete r e a l i t y of nuclear forces and of t he doctrines

for t h e i r possible use which go deeply in to t he ~ e n e r a l mi l i t a ry disposit ions of

t h e leading mi l i t a ry Powers and concern t h e i r conventional forces as well.

It i s our f irm be l ie f t h a t more reso lu te e f fo r t s t o achieve nuclear

disarmament a r e urgently needed. That should take place through gradua1 and

balanced reductions of nuclear-weapons stockpiles with t h e aim of t h e i r t o t a l

abol i t ion. Measures of non-use have t h e i r natural place i n such a process,

although unfortunately it does not seem r e a l i s t i c t o expect t h a t a prohibition

of nuclear weapons can s t a r t such a process.

Sweden en t i r e ly shares, however, t h e objectives of t h i s draft resolution.

We a l so share t h e opinion of t h e representat ive of India i n h i s introductory

statement t h a t a nuclear var most probably m u l d have such e f f e c t s t h a t it

would cons t i tu te a crime against hmani ty .

A s operative paragraph 1 i s worded, naking a precise in te rpre ta t ion

of t he Charter of t h e United ifations, we think it has t o be carefd ly scrut inized

from a l e g a l standpoint as w e l l . In t h a t l i g h t we have, much t o our r eg re t , not

found it possible t o vote i n favour of t h i s d ra f t resolut ion, s i n c e we do not

think t h a t a declarat ion of t h i s kind w i l l f u l f i l i t s purpose.

. . th. 8AJA:COSIlI (Finiancl) : ?ke Finnisii deleiration .rotcd I n C'a-ruci of ::le

d r a f t resol l r t ion conzained i n docunent ~ / ~ . 1 / 3 5 / L . 2 2 t h a t has j u s t been

ado'ted. !le b e l i e v e t h a t e f f o r t s t o o l i i i ~ i n a t e t h e dmgers pose.; by n u c l e x

rieapons and to h a l t and reve r se t h e a n s r ace siioulfi inc lude a v a r i e t ÿ o f . .

approaches, inc lud ing neasures a ined a t t h e >re7rention o f n u c l e l r v a r . i!e

consider t h ~ t t o be t h e over r id ing goa l of t h a t d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n .

However, i n ti ie vie:.^ o f my d e l e z a t i o n , opera t ive paragrapn 1 i s not i n

conformity t r i th t h e Char ter o f t h e United S s t i o n s . That i s a s e r i o u s

snortcoming i n t h e d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n j u s t adooted. Taking i n t o account . iior;e.r?r,

clle u i t i s i a t e o b j e c t i v e exoresseci i n t h e d r a f t r e so lu t ion , nazely t h e p r e v e n t - i n

o f nuclear v a r , my de ieqa t ion c a s t a p o s i t i v e vote..

[Oriximl: English] [ 9 December 19801

1. The f i s t pan of the report dealt only with drafi resolution A/C.1/35/L.7 on the preparationr for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disannament; the present part deals with ail other proposais submitted under agenda item 44. . , ./

E. Drafr resolurion A/C.1/3S/L.22

10. On 14 November, Ngeria, Angola, Argentina. the Congo, Ethiopia. India, Indonesia, lamaica, Mada- gascar. Nigeria. Pem. Romania. Sri Lanka. U ~ g u a y . Yugoslavia and Zaire submitted a draft resolution (A/ C.1/35iL.22) entitled "Nan-use of nuclear WaponS and prevention of nuclear war" (for the tcxt, set pan. 27 below, draft resolution D); This draft rcrolution, which was subsequently also sponsorcd by Bhutan, Costa Rica. Cypnis, Ecuador. Egypt. Malaysia. Qatar and Yemen. was introduced by the representltive of India at the 35th meeting, on 19 November.

I l . At its 39th meeting, on 21 November, the Com- mittee adopted the draft resolution by 101 votu t0 19, with 15 abstentions. # .-

Recommendatinnr of fhe Firat Commiiîee 27. n i e F i t Committce recommends to the Gen-

eral Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

REVIEW OF nie IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOM- MENDAT~ONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTW BY THE GEN- ERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTB SPEClAL SESSION

..O

D Non-use of nuclear weaponr and prevenrion

of nuclear war The Grnerd Assembly, Alarmrd by the threat to the survival of mankind

and to the Me-sustaining system posed by nuclcar weapons and by their use, inbcrent in wncepts of deterrence,

Convinced that nucleat disarmament is esxntial for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengrhcning of international pcace and security,

Recdling i ü deelaracion, containcd in the Final Docu- ment of the Teoth Spetial Session of the General As- sembly, that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in intemational relations among States in which a code of peacehil wnduct d nations in international affain could k agreed upon and which would preelude the use or tiueat of use of nuclear weapon,.*

Recalling i b rnoluuons 1653 (XVI) of 24 Novem- ber 1961,33/71 Bof 14 Deceinber 1978 and 34/83 Cl of 11 Dccernkr 1979.

Taking mre of the repon of the SecrctaryGeneral. Io which i .~ annexcd the Comprehensive Sfudy on Nuclear Weaper, preparcd with the assistance of a Group of Experts (A/35/392).

1. Declares once again that: (a) The use of nuclear weapon, would be a nolation

of ihe Charter of the United Nations and a crime againrt humanity;

(b) The use or threat of use of nuclear weapns should therefore k prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament;

2. R ~ ~ U ~ S I J di States that have w far not submitted their proposah wncerning the non -w of nuclcar weapons, avoidancc of nuclear war and rclated manen. to do so, in order that the question of an international convention or wme other agreement on the subjut may be hirther considercd a t the thirty-sixth session of the Gencral Assembly;

3. Decides Io include in the provisional agenda d itc thiny-sixth sasion the item cntitled "Non-use of nuclcar weapona and prevention of nuclear &'.

* Resoludon SIOR. p u r 58.

,ynaed Nm'ons 94th 45 G E N E R A L PLENARY MEEllNG A S S E M B L Y Friday. 12 Dccember 1w. ai 3 p.m. THIRTY-FIFTH SESSION

offiitù Reco& NEW VORK

17. Pan II of the report of the First Committee on agenda item 44 appears in document ,413516651 Add.1. Under char item, the First Cornmittee adopted

Agenda ilcm U: 10 drafl rcsolutions deaiing with the United Nations h r i e w of the impiemenution of ihc momnnndniionr programme of fellowships on disarmament. nuclcar

and decirions dopicd by tbc ûcncrdi Arwmbly iu trnih ipceiai xsrion froncludrd): weapons in ail aspects, non-use of nuclear weapons

(a) Rcpon of the Cornmirtee on DùPmiamcnt: and the prevention of nuclear wax. the implementation (6 ) Repon of tk Disamument ~ommission: of the rccommendations and decirions of the tenth (c) & d o n a fot ihc serand apc ia i wuion of speciai session. the report of the Disannament Corn-

Gcncrnl ~ ~ w m b l y dcvoicd to duamwicnt: mission. paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the (d) RnprPph IL( of the F i d Document d i h c Tcnih

S p c d Scssioa: Tenth Special Session. the programme of rcsearch and studies on disannam (i) Rcpon of tbc Cornmittee m Diumilmcnt: ent. the wodd disarmamen,-

(ü) Repn of tbc Di~iwmvmcnl Cornminion; campaign and the iepod of the Cornmittee on Dis-. L<) ImpkmcalaIioa of Ihc rtsommendoiionr .M1 ment. ïhe relevant rccommendation under this item iS

decùionr of tbc tcnlb rpecd i e ~ i 0 n : V) Unilcd Nilions pm&nmm of fchmhipa on dir

t0 # * - O be found in pamgta~h T] of the rcaon. u m m n t : mpon of tbc SccrewOencnl.

(r) on-use of n u c l w weapons and prevenlion d 3. As ar prcvaus sessions. the work of the Fmt nuclepr uu: wpon oi tbc Cornmitte on Dis- Committee reflected the General Assembly's drep umamcnl: concem a< the pace of disamament and expresscd

(h) ~irnmisasm Wai: rcpon d tbc S a m w a definite desire for action, in panicukr for the impfe- Gencd:

(0 Nuclcar wuponr io nll IipcU: mpoK of l b ~ Corn mentation. dn the eve of the second spccial session

mit- on Duumimcnc on disannament. of the decuions and rccommenda-

umma- y) ~0~ d m.rarcb and anidicr ai d' tions of the tint spccial session. This year the F-t meni: mpon of tbc SesrctwyG~~~RL: Committee adopted 20 draft rcsoiuiions by consensus

ik) United Nitiona midia on dumnmcm: mpon of and a large numbcr by a substantial majority-indi- thcscmun-

Repon of tbc F i t Cornmincc .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cating, let us hope, a trend. however slow. towards the enlargement of amas of agreement in the field of disarmament. Highlighu of thic session werc the establishment of the Reparatory Committee for the

President: Mr. Rüdiger von WECHMAR Second Speciai Session of rhe General ~ssembly (Federal Republic of Germany). Devoted to Disannament and Ihc adoption of the

Declmtion of the 1980s as the Second Disannament Decade. Many other ddtrcsolutions laid stress on the

1. Mr. KENSMIL (Suriname), Rapporteur of the need for action in the field of disamament. Fint Cornmittee: 1 have the honour of prcsenting to * a - the General Assembly the reports of the F i t Corn- mittee on its work conceming agenda items 31 10 35. 27. On behdf of the First Cornmittee, 1 comme,.,d 37 to 46. 48 and 49 on the question of nt (0 the General Assembly the adoption of ibe dmt and item 50 on the impiementation of the Declaration resolutions that I have just outlined. on the Strcngthening of Intemational Security.. - - . *. 4. AS at prcvious sessions. this year the First Corn- mitte hcld a combined encra1 debate on the items 103- me PRESIDENT Now the Grnerd Asscmbly mlating 10 disarmament. A rotai of 47 draft rcsolutions will consider pan n of the report of the fint corn- werc submitted, out of which four werc withdnwn. mittee on agenda item 44 [A/35/66S/~dd.]]. ~n addition o . - the 10 d d rcsoiutions iCCommended by the

Committee. the Assembly has beforr it a draft decirion ~A/35IL.47/Rev.l]. 104. The Assembly will nüw take a decision on the 10 drafr rcsolutions mommended by the Fimt cornmittee in paragraph 27 of its report. - *

108. The PRESIDENT: Now we turn to dm? resolution D, entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapomj and prevention of nuclear war". A recorded vote bu been requested.


In favour: Afghanistan, Algena. Angola, Argentina. Bahamas, Bahrain. Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia. Brazil. Burma, Burundi. Cape Verde. Central African Republic, Chad. Chile, China, Colom- bia. Comoms. Congo. Costa Rica. Cuba, Cyph, Democratic Kampuchea, Dernocratic YemB. Djibouti. Dominiean Republic, Ecuador, Egypt. El Salvador, Ethiopin. Fiji. F i a n d , Gabon, Gambia, Ghana. Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea. Guyana. Haiti. Hondum. India. Indonesia. Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coaat, Jamaica. Jordan. Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Dem+ cratic Republic. Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyv Arab Jamahinya. Madagascar. Malaysia. Maldives, Maii. Malta, Msuritania. Mauritius. Mexico, Mon>sco. Mozambique, Ncpai, Nicaragua. Niger, N i & Oman. PaListan, Panama. Papua New Gui- Parai guay, Pem. Phiiippines. Qatar. Romania, Rwanda Saint Lucia; Samoa. Sao Tome and Principe. Saudi. Arabia, Senegal. Sierra Leone. Singapore..Somalia Sri Lanka, Sudaa. Suriname. Swariland. Syriaii Araù Republic, Thailand. Togo, Mnidad and Tobago, Tuni- sia, Uganda. United Arab Emirates. United Repubk of Camemon. United Republic of Tan2ani.a. Uppr Volta, Uruguay, Venemeia, Vit N m . Ycmen. Yugoslavia Zairc. Zambia. Zimbabwe.

Againsr: Ausüaüa. Belgium. Denmark. F&. Germany, Fedcral Republic of. Grecce, Icelmd. Ireland. Isracl. Italy, Japan, Luxembourg. N e w lands. New Zealand. Nonvay. Pomgai. TurLeY* United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nonhem Ife land, United States of America.

Abstaining: A u d a . Bulgaria, Byelonissian Sovic! Sociaiist Republic. Caa8da.' Ctechoslovakh, Ge- ~cmocratic Republic, Hungary. Malawi, hfongoli& poland, Spain. Sweden. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist ~epublic, Union of Soviet Sociaiist Republics.

Draft r~solution D was odopred by I l 2 vores to 19, wiih 14 abstentions (resolurion 331152 D).

' The delegsiation oi CMad. wrbsequedy i d o d iba - tariai ih it rvisbnl 17 have it vote recordcd a$ bniy bccd againsi the drift rcwlution.

36/92. Review of the implementation of the m m - mendations and detisions.adopted by <he Gen- eral Assemhly at its tenth special session

1 NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTlON OF

NUCLEAR WAR

The Grneral Assembly. Alarmed by the h a t to the survival of mankind and to

the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of dctemnce.

Convinced that nuclear dismament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the sucngthening of international peace and secuity,

Rccalling ils declaration. containcd in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, that al1 States should actively participate in effons to b ~ g about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of Rations in international &airs could bc agreed upon and which would prccludc the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,"

Rccalling irs resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 Novemk 1961. 33/71 B of 14 December 1978. 34/83 G of 11 Dc- cembcr 1979 and 351152 D of 12 December 1980.

Takng note of the Comprehcnsive SI& on Nyclear WeaponP prcparcd by the Secretary-Gcneral with tbc a?- sistance of a group of experts.

1. Dcclares once again hat: ( a ) The use of nuclcar weapons would be a violation

of the Chaner of the United Nations and a crime against humanity;

(b) The use or b a t of use of nuclear wcapons shouid thereforc be ~rohibited. œ n d i n ~ nuclear disamiamwit - ..

2 Urger the consideranon. at tbc second spccial session of the General Assembly dcvoted to diJarniamnit. of the question of an i n t e d o n a l convention on rhe mni-usc of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear wiu or somc other agreement on the subjecr. taking into e u n i the proposais and views of Sutes in this ngard;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of i u thiny-sevcnth session the item entitlcd "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war".

9 1 s ~ / C M ? meeting 9 Dccembcr 1981

' United Nations publicaion. Sala No. E.78.1X.Z. " Rcroluwn S-1012. para. 58. Y Uniicd Nations publication. Sales No. E.81.1.11.

General Assembly D i s t r . LIMITED

. .

16 November 1981 ! 1 i ,il,(]1 , . . . .. .

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

ll- t ir ty-sixth s e s s i o n FIRST COMMITTEE kgenda item 51 ( 9 )

REVIDY OF THE IMPLFXENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEXBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

A l q e r i a , Argen t ina . Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Eqypt, E t h i o p i a , I n d i a , Indones ia , Jamaica , Jo rdan , Madagascar, Malaysia , Niger ia , P e r u , Romania, Yemen and

. Yugoslavia: d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n


Alarmed by t h e t h r e a t to t h e s u r v i v a l o f mankind and to t h e l i f e - s u s t a i n i n g System posed by nuc lea r .weapons and by t h e i r use, i n h e r e n t i n c o n c e p t s o f ,de te r rence ,

Convinced t h a t n u c l e a r disarmament is e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e p r e v e n t i o n o f nuc lea r Var and f o r t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y .

R e c a l l i n q i ts d e c l a r a t i o n , c o n t a i n e d i n t h e F i n a l mcument o f . t h e Tenth s p e c i a l S e s s i o n o f t h e Genera l Assembly, t h a t a l 1 S t a t e s shou ld a c t i v e l y P a r t i c i p a t e i n e f f o r t s to b r i n g a b o u t c o n d i t i o n s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s among S t a t e s i n which a code o f p e a c e f u l conduc t o f n a t i o n s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s coula be a g r e e d upon and which would p r e c l u d e t h e u s e o r t h r e a t o f u s e o f n u c l e a r meapons,

R e c a l l i n q i t s r e s o l u t i o n s 1653 ( X V I ) o f 24 November 1961, 33/71 B o f 14 December 1978, 34/83 G o f 11 December 1979 and 35/152 D o f 12 December 1980,

M t i n q t h e comprehensive s t u a y o f n u c l e a r weapons prepared by t h e S e ~ r e t a r ~ - ~ n e r a l w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f a g roup o f e x p e r t s ,

A/C. 1/36/L. 29 English Page 2

1. Declares once again that:

(a) The use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanityr

ib) The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmamenti

2. Urges the secona special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament to consider the question of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war or some other agreement on the subject, taking into consiaeration the proposals and views of States in this regardr

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war".

united Nations

G E N E R A L -4s S.E M B L Y mIRTY-SIXTH SESSION ofiial Record( *

FIRST COMMITTEE 32nd meeting

held on Tuesday, 17 November 1981

a t 10.30 a.m. NP* York

-

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 32ND MEETING

Chairman: M r . GOLOB (Yugoslavia)

hît resolutions vere introduced by:

Mr. Ahmad (Pekistan) - A/C.1/36/L.17 Mr. EUio t t (Belgim) - A/C.l/36/L. 37 Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico) - ~/~ .1 /36/L.22 Mr. Krishna (India) - A/C.1/36/L.29 ür. Djokic (Yugoslavia) - ~ / ~ . 1 / 3 6 / ~ . 2 6 ür. Rostov (Bulgaria) - A/c.1/36/L.24

'Th& record b ~ ~ b k c t 10 c o n e c t l o n Conutlolii lhouid b. MI undr Ib. UIn*turr of. ,,,=,,,ber 01 th. d d c p t i o n coneeined >*iNn one r n k of ik di i r of P"bilcoIlon to the Chier of the Ofnciil Record. Edltln8 Seulon, room A4SSO. '66 Unitcd ~ a t i ~ ~ . niri ni coi Buildln8). and i n c m v o n t ~ d in I corn ai the 'tC0,d.

Dlstr. CENERAL A/C .1/36/W .32 19 November 1981

I s l r . S . M. ICRISIINA ( Ind ia ) : On behalf of the delegations of Algeria,

Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, .

Ethiopia, Indonesia, Janaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru,

Qatar, Romania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and India , 1 have the honour t o introduce

today d r a f t resolut ion ~ / ~ . 1 / 3 6 / ~ . 2 9 e n t i t l e d "l'on-Use of Nuclear Tleapons

and Prevention of Nuclear War".

It w i l l be reca i led tha t a s imilar reso lu t ion , 35/152 D , vas adopted

las t year by the Ceneral Assenibly by an overwhelming majority of l ï 2 votes

i n îavour, 19 against and 1 4 abstentions. An important feature of t he voting

las t year was the posi t ive vote cas t by one nuclear-weapon State . That and

the growing support that our i n i t i a t i v e has been able t o ~O!mmldhave encouraged

the CO-sponsors t o lceep t h i s item on the disarmament agenda.

During t h e general debate i n the F i r s t Conmittee t h i s year, t he re has

been an unprrcedented and universal expression of concern over t he growing

danger of a nuclear w a r . The nuclear arms race i n both i t s quant i ta t ive and i t s

quali tative aspects has acquired a new momentum and the internat ional

A / c . ~ / ~ ~ / P v . 32 37

( t i r . S . M. ICrishna, India)

s i t ua t ion has worsened t o t h e point t ha t t he in te rna t iona l c0mmunj.t~ has

grea te r apprehensions than ever before t ha t a nuclear war, with a l 1 i t s

catas t rophic consequences, may break out. In such circumstances, it i S

Our co l lec t ive respons ib i l i ty t o undertake al1 possible measures t o reduce

t h e t h rea t of a nuclear war. VJhat i s a t stake i s not t he secur i ty of a

handful of countries or mi l i t a ry a l l i ances , but the very survival of the

human species i t s e l f . It is .the conviction of the CO-sponsors of the

d ra f t resolut ion on the non--use of nuclear weapons and' prevention of

nuclear war t h a t , pending the conplete elimination of nuclear weapons,

sn 2-reenent on the prohi'dition of the ilse or th rea t of c se of nuclc?r :re:?OnS

would r eùuce the t h r e a t of a nuclear w a r .

The draf t resolut ion makes it c lear t h a t our ul t imate objective,

and indeed an objective which has been universally accepted, i s t he

achievement o f nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament alone can

provide the on ly 'e f fec t ive guarantee against the use o r t h r e a t of use of

nuclear weapons. IIuclear disamûnent i s , liurever , a c o ~ ? l e x i ssue ?nd 3:iy

not be achieved immediately. However, t he th rea t of t h e use of such

weapons creates insecur i ty for a l1 S ta tes , including t h e nuclear-weapon

S ta t e s themselves. Nuclear weapons cannot be oga rded a s ordinary weapons,

a s instruments of war. They a r e weapons of mass destruct ion, whose use v i l 1

have disastrous consequences for bel l igerents and non-belligerents alilte.

The e f f ec t s of t he use of nuclear weapons cannot, because of t he very

nature of such weapons, be confined t o national o r regional boundaries.

Their use w i l l mean t h e mass slaughter of millions of innocent c iv i l i ans ,

including those belonging t o S t a t e s which are non-belligerents. It i s for tha t

reason tha t the d r a f t reso lu t ion declares t h a t t he use of nuclear weapons

would be a violat ion of t h e United Iiations Charter and a crime against

humanity. It i s t r u e t h a t t h e United Nations Charter pennits individual

and co l lec t ive self-defence, but it would be making a nockery of t he Charter

t o suCCest t ha t i n t h e pursu i t of i t s individual secur i ty concerns, a State

way jeopardize t he co l l ec t ive survival of al1 the S ta t e s and peoples i n t he

world. A S t a t e ' s choice of weapons and the means of warfare, even i n the

exercise of individual end co l lec t ive self-defence, i s not unlimited.

The use of nuclear weapons w i l l not merely mean the mutual annihi la t ion

of S t a t e s usine them, but would r e su l t i n the death and permanent incapacitation

of mill ions of human beines a l 1 over t he world through the spread of radioactive

f a l l cu t and the snapping of the economic and soc ia l linliages which would

inevi tably follow a nuclear var. We l i v e today i n a world t h a t has, under

the pressure of technological progress, become increasingly interdependent

and inter l inked. The massive destruction which would r e su l t from the use

of nuclear weapons would destroy the de l ica te interl inkages which have been

bui l t up over t he years and which sus ta in the economic and soc i a l l i f e over

our e n t i r e planet . Those d i s ~ p t i v e e f f ec t s of a nuclear w a r a r e well

ùocumented i n t he comprehensive study on nuclear weapons, which the draf t

resolution has referred t o i n i t s preamble.

The t r a g i c experience of Hiroshima and iiagasaki indicates t ha t not

only would n i l l i o n s upon mil l ions d i e i n a nuclear va r , but t h a t succeeding

generations would suffer permanent impairment as a r e su l t of radiation-inrluced

genetic disorders. Taking al1 those fac tors i n to account, i s it not t rue

to Say tha t t he use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity?

The d r a f t resolution 1 have introduced today is s h i l a r t o t h e t e x t

of resolut ion 35/152 D adopted by the General Assembly l a s t year. However,

operative paragraph 2 i s di f ferent from l a s t year ' s . It urges t h e second

special session devoted t o disanaament scheduled t o be held next year t o

consider t h e question of an in te rna t iona l convention, or some other aame€~.ent,

on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear v a r , tal:in:-

into consideration the proposals and views of S ta tes i n t h i s regard. We

are convinced t h a t one of t he urgent questions t h a t t h e second spec ia l

session irould have t o address is the prevention of a nuclear w a r . It i s

Our earnest hope tha t t he prohibit ion of t he use or t h r e a t of use of nuclear

.&apons would be eiven the a t t en t ion it deserves i n t h a t context.

Final ly , t he sponsors of t h i s d r e f t rcsolut ion venture t o hope tha t

*hose S ta tes , which for one reason o r another have e a r l i e r opposed our i n i t i a t i v e

Or abstained on it, w i l l r i s e above t h e i r separate and individual secur i ty

C""cernS and join t h e mninstreani of in te rna t iona l opinion i n ensuring the

CO1lective survival and well-beinp of mankind as a whole.

,i - united Nations

' ~ E N E R A L FïRST CDMMITTEE

. 4 S S E M B L Y 40th meeting

held on

THIRTY -SIXTH SESSION Monday, 23 Bovember 1981 at 3 p.m.

O@i.,l Records New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF TEE ~ O T H MEETING

Chaiman: Mr. G O M B (Yugoslavia)

DISARMAMENT ITEMÇ

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 56, 128 AND 135 (continued)

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

- - ~p

'Th" record ir rubrct toconcctlor~ Conwllom houid b. ml unth# "ln~tuie of a mimber of the dclcptlon conccrnid wfthln M. wC.L Of t k dit8 01 PubIC~no~ to th. c h i d of the Omdd Records Edltins 5.nloq room A.JSSO. '66 Unilcd Nitioor Plie (Alcorn Building). and incorpontd Ln i MW d th* '-0rd.

Coriection~ vil1 b. iuucd ifter the end of the seulon. in i upiili f l u k l i lot '''h Comrni~tce.

-~ ~ -

Dlstr. CENERAL Uc .1/36/w .bo 29 December 1981

Tlle CHAIRtîAII: Tàa-2 concludes Our consideration of rirait resolutior!

A/C.1/36/L.24.

$e sha l l norr take up dra f t resolutioil A/C.1/36/~.29, r e l a t ing t o aqenc'a item

51 ( g ) , "Revie?.~ of Che ifi~plementation of the recomflendations and decisions

adogted by the General Assembly at i t s tenth special session; non--use of

nuclear rrealoilo and ~ r e v e n t i o n of nuclear var". This rirait resolution has 30

sponsors and vas introducea by tlie representative of India on 17 Novenber

a t the 32nd ~ e e t i n r : of the "irst Ca-~zittee. The ;O snonsors are: Alfieria,

A r ~ e n t i n a , sahanas, Sanpladesh, 3arbados, Bhutan, Colonbia, Congo, Q,'prus, Eciiador,

S y p t .. p h i o p i n , Ghana, Guinea, India, Inaonesia, Janaica, Jordan, Hda.gascar,

B a l a ~ s i a , 'Mali, Higer, Nigeria, Oeru, Qatar , nouania, mrancia, S r i Lanka, Yemen

and Yu$oslavia.

The ciiAIRI.!iU~I: Cie s h a l l now take a vote on the draf t resolution

contsined in document A/C.1/36/L.29. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote vas taken.

In falrour: Afghanistan, Alseria, Ancola, Argentins, ?ahanas,

Dahrain, Ban~ladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia,

r a i Buigaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet

Soc ia l i s t Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Regublic,

Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,

Denocrat i c Yemen, Djibouti , Ecuador . Egypt , Ethiopia,

F i j i , Gabon, German Deniocrat i c Republic , Ghana,

Guatemala: Guinea, Guyana, I Ia i t i , Honduras, Hungary,

India, Indonesia, Iran, I raq , Ivory Coast, Jamaica,

Jordan, ICenya, ICuirait, Lao People's Democratic Republic,

Lebulcn, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, lbdagascar, Malaysia.,

Maldives, I . i a l i , I:Ialta, Mauritania, EIexico, tJongolia,

biorocco, Mozambique, Nepal, ?Ticar.wua, Niger, Nigeria,

Oman, Paliistan, Peru, . ~ h i l i p p i n e s , Poland, Qatar ,

Romania, Ehmnda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia,

Senegal, S ie r ra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, S r i Lanka,

Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic , Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda,

Ukrainian Soviet Social is t Republic, Union of Soviet

Soc ia l i s t Republics, United Arab a i i r a t e s , United

Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,

Yu~os lav ia , Zaire and Zambia

A ~ a i n s t : Austral ia , Belgium, Canada, Denmaris, France, Germany,

Federal Republic o f , Iceland, I re land, I t a l y , Japan,

IJetherlands , Xew Zealand, IJoniay , Portugal., Spain,

Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Bri ta in and Eiorthern

Ireland, United States of America

Abs ta in in~ : Austria, Finland, Greece, I s r a e l , Sweden

Draft resolution A/~.1/36/L.29 was a d o ~ e d by 99 votes t o 18, with

abstentions.

Tne [email protected]?.: 1 notr c a l 1 upon those representat ives ~rho wish - t o exglain t h e i r vote a f t e r t he vote.

?!k. !2UTZSCH (Gernan Democrat i c Recublic ) : IlIy delegat ion

supported d r a f t r e s o l ~ t i o n A/C.l/:G/L.29, irhich was jus t adosted. We believe

tha t in t h e face of the current acute danyers of a nuclear ve r t h i s proposa1

i s a very timely one. We regard it a s especial ly importent th3.t ?.t the second

speciel session devoted t o d i s a m m e n t every e f f o r t be rizc1.e t o e::clude

the iise of nuclear veapons. Eut we have seen tha t ce r t a in S t a t e s have

opposed t h i s proSect. It i s even more incredible t h a t among those

which have czs t a negative vote a r e nucle'ar-weapon S ta t e s and t h e i r c losest

a l l i e s wiiose CO-operation i s e s s e n t i a l i n t h e endeavour t o exclude t h e danger.

of a nuclear war.

1.k. LIDG.4RIi ( Sueden) : & Government a t taches t h e grea tes t

importance t o nieirsures aimed a t preventing t h e use of nuclear weapons.

In f a c t , it i s v i t a l fo r the very s w i v a l of manl,inù t h a t such weapons

a re not used. There is also a l og i ca l l i n k between non-use and non-proliferation

of nuclear weapons t h a t nust be kept i n mind.

1 wish t o r e c a l l irhat vas s a id i n paragraph 53 of t h e Final Document

of the t e n t h special session of t h e Ceneral Assembly (A/s-10/2) on the question

of t he non-use of nuclear rreapons. Deliberations on t h e inztter during tha t

session well i l l u s t r a t e d the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s involved. I-t i s ail

too evident t l ia t e f fec t ive measures i n t h i s f i e l d must f u l l y trl;e i n t o

account t h e problems iniierent i n t h e e x i s t i n g mi l i t a ry doc t r ines . It is ,

i n f a c t , necessary t o ,:rapple witli t he concrete r e a l i t y of niclear forces

and of t h e doctr ines for t h e i r possible use, .rhich ?O Cee?lv in to t he :encrd

i i i l i t a r y preparations of t he leadinz m i l i t a r y Po~rers, and which concern

t h e i r conv.entiona1 forces a s well.

It i s iiy Governr~ent's firm b e l i e f t h a t I?ore r e so lu t e e f f o r t s t o

achieve nucle2.r disarmament a r e u r ~ e n t l y needea. This should be achieved

thi-ough a process of grac?ual and balanced reductions of nuclear l?eaPons

with t h e aim of t h e i r t o t a l el ininatior. . Mezsures on ncn.-use hrve t h e i r natuml

place i n t h i s context although, unfor tunatoly, it does not seem r e a l i s t i c

-,O exoect t h a t p roh ib i t ion o f t h e use o f nuclear iieapons can s t a r t such a

?rocesS.

Sweden e n t i r e l y shares t h e o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n . It a l s o

~ h a r e s t h e opinion t h a t nuclear war most probably v o d d have such e f f e c t s a s

t o c o n s t i t u t e a crime aga ins t h m a n i t y . A s ope ra t ive paracraph 1 i s worded it

!!!&es a p r e c i s e in te r - re t a t ion o f t h e Charter of t h e United Nations end thus does

n o t seem t o be e n t i r e l y c o r r e c t from a l e g a l s tandpoint . I n t h a t l i g h t ,

nuch t o Our r e g r e t we have not found it poss ib le t o vo te i n favour of t h i s

a rz f t r e so lu t ion , s ince rre do not thinlc t h a t a dec la ra t ion o f t h i s kind w i l l

f u l f i l i t S purpose. Although tlie Swedish delegat ion i s i n s t rong SYmpathy with

the oenera l aims of t h i s d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n , it has r e se rva t ions of a l e c a l na ture

û:.?Fnst it and it a l s o has some doubt a s t o uhether a dec la ra t ion of t h i s

kind ! . r i i l f u l f i l i t s purpose. There îore , t o i t s r e g r e t , ny dele&at ion

has not been i n a pos i t ion t o vo te i n favour o f t h ? d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n ,

but abs ta ined i n t h e v o t i n ~ .

Mr. O'CONPIOR i ~ r e l a n d ) : 1 do not t h i n k i t i s necessary f o r me

t c emahasize t h e opoosi t ion of my de lega t ion t o any use o f nuc lea r ireapons.

Our record on t h e quest ion i s c l e a r . Fle would consider t h a t any use of such

treapons woulc? be d i s a s t r o u s f o r t h e world. It i s , the re fo re , wi th deep

regret t h a t my delegat ion , i n l i n e wi th t h e pos i t ion it has taken i n t h e

psst , f e l t ob l iged t o vo te aga ins t t h e present t e x t . We have done so

because o f doubts regarding t h e approach adopted i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n , doubts

irllich Le have expreçsed i n t h i s forum a t previous sess ions going baclc a s

f a r a s 1961.

DOCUMENT A136R52

Report of the First Cornmiltee on agenda item 51 [Original: Englishl [7 Decembcr 19811

1. î h e item enuded: Dr@ resolwion AIC.1136lL.29

"Review of the implementation of the rccommenda- 22. On 16 November. Algeria. Argentina. die Baha- rions and daisions adoptcd by the Gcncrai Assembly at mas. Barbados. B h u a . Colombia. Cypm, Ecuador, is unth special session: Egypt. Eihiopia. India. Indonesia. lamaica, Jonian, Mad-

agascar. Malaysia. Nigeria, Pem. Romania. Yemcn "(a) Repon of the Disarmament Commission: Yugoslavia submitlcd a draft rcsolution (AIC.ICi6/L.29) .'(b) ~ e b n of the Cornmime on Disarmamcnt; . -(cj Rogramme of Rsearch and snidies on disam-

ament: npon of the SccreraryCeneial; "(d) Study on the rclationship between disarmameni

a d dcvelopmenr: repon of the Scmtary-Generai; "(e) United Nations programme of fellowships on

disarmament: report of the SecrctaryGenerai; -'V) Nuclcar weapons in al1 aspects: rcpon of the

Conunina on Disamament; "(6) Non-use of nuclcar weapons and prcvcntion of

nuclcar war. "(h) implementation of the recommendations and

dccisions of the unth special session: repon of the Com- minec on Disarmamcnt;

"(1') World Disarmament Campaign: report of the S ~ G u i c r a i : "(j~ D i i e n t Wek: rcpon of the .Scerary-

k n c n l " was includcd in the pmvisional agenda of the cbiny-sixth =ion of the hed ieralmbly in accordance with irs molutioiu 34/83 K of I l December 1979 and 351152 A. B. C, D. E. F, H, 1 and J of 12 December 1980.

2. At irs 41h pluiary meeting. on 18 Sqxunkr 1981. the Gaural Asscmbly. on Ihe mmmcndation of the Gen- en1 Cornmittee. decided Io include the item in its agenda md ta ailoute it to the Fust Conunina for consideration md rcanr.

mtitlcd "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prcvcntion of nuclcar wu". which was subsequently also sponsorcd by Bangladesh. the Congo. Ghana. Guinea. Mali. the Niger, Qatar, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. The draft ~ o l u t i o n war inIoduccd by the rcprcsentative of India ai the 32nd mec< ing, on 17 November. - 23. At its 40rh meeting, on 23 November. the Com-

mime adoptcd draft rcsolution A/C. 1136lL.29 by a r e c o r d vote of 99 to 18. with 5 abstentions (for the text. sec pan. 32 below. draft rcsolution D. The voting was as follows:

In foyow: Afghanisa. Algeria. Angola. Argentina. Ba- hamas. Bahrain. Bangladesh. Barbados. Bhutan. Bolivia. B w l . Bulgaria. B u m . Bumndi. Byelomssian Soviet So. cialist Republic. Cape Verde. Central African Republic, Chad. Chile, China. Congo, Cuba. Cypms. Czechoslova- Lia. Democratic Yemcn. Djibouti. Eeuador. Egypt. Ethio. pia. Fiji. Gabon. Gemian Dernoentic Rcpublic, Ghana. Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana. Haiti. Honduras. Hungary, india. Indonesia. Iran, Iraq. lvory Coast. lanuica. Jordan, Kenya. Kuwait. Lao People's DemocraUc Republic. Lcb anon. Libyan.Arab Jamahiriya. Madagascar. Malaysia. Maldives. Mali. Malta, Maurimia. Mexico. Mongolia. Morocco. Mozambique. Nepal.Nicaragua. Niger. Nigma, Oman. Pakistan. Pau. Philippines. Poland. Qatar. Ro. mania. Rwanda. Sao Tomc and Principe. Saudi Arabia, Senegal. Sierra Lmne. Singaporc. Somalia. Sri Lanka. Su- dan, Suriname, Swaziland. Syrian Arab Republic. lhailand. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia. Uganda. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Union of Soviet Socialici Re-

3. ' ~ t irt '& meeting, on 7 0 c t o k . bic mi Com- publics. United AI& Emirates. United Repubiic of Ca- m i n o decided to hold a eombincd grneral drbaîe on the meroon. Venezuela. Viet Nam. Yemen. Yugodavia. Zairc. km ailoutcd to it rclating to disamament. nimely. i t em Zambia. 39 ta 56, 128 aad 135. This g e d dcbatc mok place at Againsr: Australia. Belgium. Canada. Denmark. Fronce.

3rd to 26th marings, h m 19 Of tokr to 4 Novmber. Germany, Fcdenl Repubiic of. Iceland, Ireland, Itaiy, !a- , . .- pan. Netherfands. New Zealand. Norway, hmgal. Spm. Turkey. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nontien Ireland. United S w s of Amcrica.

Abstaining: Austria, Fmland. Grcece. Israel. Swedcn. . . .

RecommendnhBn of the FLsr Commütee

32. The Fint Commim momrnends to the Gcneral Assernbly the adoption of the following draft rcsoluiions:

REVIEW O F THE iMPLEMENTATlON OF THE RECOMMENDA- TIONS AND OECIS~ONS ADOPTEO BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT il5 n N T H SPECIAL SESSION

S . . 1

Non-me of ~ruclear weopom undprevenrion of nucleur war

The Gencrul Rrsrmbly. Alarmcd by the ducat Io the survival of mankind and to

the life-sustaining syslem poscd by nuclear wc;ipons and by their use. inhemnt in concepts of deterrcmc.

Convinred that nuclcar disarmament is essential for the prcveniion of nucicar war and for the smngthening of in- lemational pacc and x c d y .

Recullin# its dcclaration. contained in ihc Final Documcni of the Tenth Special Session of the ûeneral Asscmbly. chat al1 States should aciively participate in effom to bring about amditions in i n d o n a l relations among S î a m in which a code of pcaccful conduct of nations in inremational affairs wuld k ag& upon and which would prccludc the use or thrcat of use of auclear weawns." - - ~~ -~ r - ~ ~ ~ .

Recalfing io molutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 Novcmkr 1%1. 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of I I Dc- ccmber 1979 and 351152 D of 12 Decemkr 1980.

Taking note of the Comprehcmive Study on NUCICOI Weapom preparcd by the S a x c a r y G e d witb the assisi- aacc of a p u p of upau,"

1. Declarcs once again ihac: (a) The use of nuclcar weapons would k a violation

of the Chana of the Unitcd Nations and a crime against ùumanity;

(b) 'Ihc use or thrcaf of use of nuclear weapons should thercforc k prohibitcd. pcnding nuclcar disarmament;

2. Urges the wnsidaation. u the xcond spccial session of the Gtneral Asrcmbly devolcd m disamiament. of the question of an i n d o n a l convention on the non-use of auclcar wcaponr and prcvenùon of nuclcar war or some aher agreement on the subjcct, taking into account the proposais and vicw of States in mis regard;

3. Dccides m include in the provisional agenda of its th*-scventh session the item entitied "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prcvention of nuclcar war".

'' Rcrolui~on S-IOIL. pur. 58. * Uniud Niuonr publicuton. SJa No. E.81.1.11

T united Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIRTY.SIXTH SESSION

atïcial Records

Agcnda item JI: Revicv of ihc implcmcniaiion of the mommcndaiions ar.d

dsciiionr adoptcd by ihe Gcnrrrl Aswmbly u ils tenth s p i a l wrrion:

Io) Rcpon d ihc Diwmiunea Commission: ( b ) Repon of the Cornmina on Disartnamcnt: (cl RDmm d m h and ~rudier on d i m a m e n t : rc- pi of thc QcrcwyCencd:

(4 Sludy an lhe mluionrhip bc<-n diwmumcnt and dcvelopment: rcpm of lhc krctary-Gcncnl;

(r) United Naions pmgrammc d feilwships on d i m a - ment: rcpon d the. Secrcwy-ûcncral:

y) N u c l w wpon. in 111 irpccu: mpon d ihc Commit- tex on Diumumni:

(r) Non-iÿe of n u c h wuponi and pmcntion of nuclcu W.

(hl l m p l c ~ n u t i o n d the mmmcnduions and dsc!sionr d ihe lcnlh spechl session: rcpon cd ihe Commiece on Diwmumcni:

(O World Diurmimcni Cmpugn: mpnl cd ihe Qccrrcury- ûenenl:

(1) D i w m m c n ~ Wak: rrpon d the SeccrrctuyCenenl Rcpon of ihe Fini Cornminec . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

President: Mr. lsmat T. KITTANI (Iraq).

I n rhe abserice of lhe Prrsidenr. Mr. Nuik (PokisluiiJ. Vice-Prcsidenr, rook rhc Chuir.

1 . Mr. MAKONNEN (Ethiopia), Rapponeur of the First Comminee: 1 have the honour to pmcnt to the Gcned Assembly the rcpons of the First Commince on iu work. They contain its recommendations on the disannament and sccurity questions under agenda items 39 to 58, 128 and 135. Thox recommendations an IO be found in documents Al361740 to 761. With the exception of items 128 and 135. which arc nw, al1 the disannament iums hevc been included in the agenda of the thiny-sixth session in accordance with prcvious Gened Asxmbly molution% Thur. this year. discussion on these items in the Fm1 Comminee could be cons idcd as a continucd expression of concern over the complexitics of disarmament prob lems and of determinaiion IO continue exemng effow to make pmgnss towsrds the ultimate objective of gencd and complete disamament.

Wednesduy. 9 D e c c m b c r 1981. or 3.30 p . m .

N E W Y O R K

2. The First Comminee, as in prcvious yearr. hcld ai this sessici~'h combined gened debate on al1 dismament items. which took place at its 3rd to 26th meetings. k- ween 19 October and 4 November. The discussion on items 57 and 58 tmk place ar its 45th to 51st meetings. fmm 27 November to 3 Decemkr. The Comminee had bcfon it a total of 22 items and twk action on 52 draft rcsolutions. The= was wide ~anicipation in the general debatc, which rcflmed the gcineral feelings of sup$n by the international community for disannament. pcace and sccurity.

3. The fact that the discussion in the First Comminee look place on the cve of the xcond spcial session of the General Assembly d e v d to disarmament, scheduled to convene on 7 June 1982. gave an opponunity to a large number of participants Co aniculatc rhcir expectauons and to express their hopcs about future action in the field of dismament. . 6. Despite the complexities and difliculties of disannament problems, the discussion in the Fmt Conminec has shown both that thuc cocuinuer ta be a spirit of bope and optimism and the conviction that morc effons an needcd and that there is no alternative but to prcss on with the hard work, whcther in the delikrative or ncgotiating bodies. in order to make hvthcr pmgrcss. Rrhaps a sign of this h o p ir to te rcen in the continued adoption by consensus of a substaatial numkr of ciraft mlut ions. This year the Conunince adopted 48 ciraft rcsolutions on disannament items. of which 18 wac adoptcd without a vote. This is an indication that the international community still enccnainr the hope of widening the undustand- ing of the problems and enlarging the anas of agrrrmciit in the field of disamiament.

7. With these fnv remarks 1 have the honour to submit the draft rcsolutions of the Fmt Cornminec to the Genual Assembly for adoption.

45/59. RRfcr and Implcmcn(st1on of the Concludlqj Document or the ïkL l<h Sperial Sesslon of the

CONVENnON ON ME PROHIBITION OF M E USE OF NUCLEAR WEAWNS

ihe General Assernbly, Convinced that the existence and use of nuclear

weapons pose the greatest threat to the suMval of man- Lind,

Conrcious that the nuclcar-arms race incrcases the danger of the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced aivo that nuclcar d i m a m e n t is the only ultimate guarantee against the use of nuclear wcapons,

Convincedfruiher that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should strcngthen international rccurily and help to create the climatc for ncgotiations leadig to the wm- pletc elimination of nuclcar Wapons,

Conrcious a h that the -nt ste taken bilaterally k . by the U ~ o n of Soviet h d i t eptiblics and the United Statu of America towards a reduction of thcir nuclear weapons and the improvement in East-West PZ- lations and the international climate cau mntribute towards this goal,

Recaüing thai, in paragra h 58 of the final Docu- 8 . ment of the Tenth Spccial s ion of che General As- sembly," it is stated that aü S t a t ~ should actively participate in efforts to bring about mnditions in international relations among Statu in which a code of peaccful w n d u a of nations in international affairs wuld bc agrecd u n and that would prcdude the use P" or threat of use O nuclcar Wapong

Rcapning that the use of nuclearweapons would be a violation of the Cbancr of the Unitcd Nations and a aime against bumanity, as declared in its m lu t i ons 1653 (XVI) of 24 Novcmber 1961.33I11 B of 14 De- ambcr 1978, 34/83 G of 11 Dnxmbcr 1979,35/152 D of 12 Dcccmbcr 1980 and 36/92 1 of 9 Dccember 1981.

Nofing witn ngm that the Conferracc on Disar- mament, during ils 1990 sc~sion, wa9 no1 able <O undertake negotiations with a view to agreement on an international convention pmhiiüng the use or threat of use of nucicar ahapons under any circumstances, laking as a basW the texi annexcd to Gcneral Asscmbly resolution 441117 C of 15 Dcxmbcr 1989,

1. Rcùenuu iu nque.9 to the Conferencc on Disar- marnent 10 commence ncgotiationg as a matter of priority, in ordcr to rcaeh agreement on aa international convention pmbibiting the use or thrcat of use of nuclcar weapons undcr any cimumtanaq taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nucicar Weapons anncxcd to the p m n t raolution:

ANNEX

Dnn Cammu~ on a Roblbluom or& Uu d N i u d r u W u p o u

n c S I n l u P M Y I r o ~ ~ AhmvdbyIhcthrutU>thcvcysunmlofmra~dposcdbyibe

aistena of nuclur wpom C o n W Ihu m), us? of nuclw aeapon. mnaitutrr a violation

of ih m e r of thc Unid Nitionr a d a crime agaimi huminiry. C~r inccd h t Ihi. Comtion WOUd be i step t h the mm-

pktc ctimiollioo ofouc*lrruponr *Mïng m p ~ n l &ld mmplele diurmrmcnt undcr mia and eilectiv. inlemûonai motmi,

Rrrmrlud to mntinue œgotiatiolv for thc .mimmcot of ihy

eosL Hm a@ u f O h

AdkI

3. ThuCommtionih.uentcrin<oIoioconthcdcpaitofh- menu of nriuurioo by nmy-&s GDnmmrno indtwüog thc Ga- rmmmn Of tbc &s mdur+-3p SW4 & rrmdrare nia plngraph2dIhi.iriYlr

AmicL4 m c o r m o ~ ~ r b i m i b c A R M c . C b i o c y ~ F ~

RurniD d S p n i l l l iQi uc cqii.lhl i,uhct,tlc, rbiU be depaiw m I h t h ~ ~ o l i h U n i l c d N 8 r i a n i r b o r b i U r n d d v l y c c n i f i c d m p i e ~ t b a e a ~ t h c ~ t d i a ~ I O i > . ~ n - d n g suvs

IN - WEWX, ibc w i c d q d , king dvly iolhoNcd ianto by 1h9r rcrpemn Govcmmmt~ bm rigocd Ihi. Comcntion. o p c d for ugunuc u au ibc dir of one Wuarndnins h u n d d d - .

2. Ako rrqwu the Conferencc on Disarmament 10 rtpon to the Gencral A s m b l y at iU forry-llnh session on tbc mulis of those ncgotiatiom.

54th plnoiy meeting 4 December 1990

53

UNITED NATIONS

*,-. 1 --

A

Distr. LIMITE0

AIC.1/45/L.25 31 October 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

~orty-fifth session FIRST COMMITTEE Agenda item 57 (b)

REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSIOR OF THE GENERAL ASSEHBLY: COWENTION

ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

AEahanistan, Alaeria. Arwntina. Banaladesh. Bhutan. Ecuadoq, Esv~t. Ethiaoik India, Indoresia. Madawscar. Malavsia,

Viet Nam and Yussslavia: draft resolutioa

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Puclear WeaD0n.q

The General Assembh, l Convinced that the existence and use of nuclear weapons pose the greatest

threat to the survival of mankind, l C e s that the nuclear-arms race increases the danger of the use of

nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is the only ultimate guarantee against the use of nuclear veapons, I

Convinced also that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should strengthen international security and help to create the climate for negotiations leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Consciouq that the recent steps taken bilaterally by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the improvement in the East-West relations and international climate can contribute towards this goal,

A/C. 1/45/L.25 English Page 2

Recallinq that, in paraqraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, I/ it is stated that al1 States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in vhich a code of peaceful conduct of nations in internafional affairs could be agreed upon and that vould preclude the use or threat Of use of nuclear veapons.

Reaffirminq that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared i n i t s resolutions 1653 ( X V I ) of 24 November 1961. 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/1:2 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 1 of 9 December 1981, .

Notino with remet that the Conference on Disarmament, durinq its 1990 session vas not able to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution 44/177 C of 8 December 1989,

1. Reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority. in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;

2. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session on the results of those negotiations.

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Alarmed by the threat to the very'survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convince_d that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced that this Convention vould be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weaponsleading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

Have aareeè as follovs:

A/C.1/45/L.25 English Page 3 .;

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 1

1. This Convention shall be open to al1 States for signature.. Any State that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States. in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depository shall promptly inform al1 signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as uell as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depository in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

This Convention. of which the Arabic, Chinese. English. French. Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Goverment of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments. have signed this Convention. opened for signature at

on the day of one thousand nine hundred and

.. . . . :

UNITED NATIONS FIRST COhWITl'EE 29th meeting

held on ~eneral~@Assembl~ %.A.-& Viedneshay, November 1990 a t 10 a.m.

FORTY-FIFTH SESSION New York Officùù Records

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 29th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. RANA (Nepal )

CONTENTS

- Consideration of and act ion on a l 1 disannament agenda items (m)

- Staternent by the Chaiman

Rus -<d ir w i b ~ a i i a c o t m l m Comciionr 'harld br ml under dr ri-m of* m m h r d t s d c k p t m mnrrnrd

wthrn MI -rd olrhr &c ~ p h l ~ m ~ m m dr Chrfdlhr Ol%xul W Eduinl Sormn. Rmm W3.M 2 unid Nzrionr P l u . a d inraannd tn a cw ddr m d

Corrrciion. W,II b , u u d i h o w.4 d i h c seuton. in a wgn le rom~ndum for c r h Commana

Dis t r . GENERAL A/C.1/45/PV.29 8 November 1990 ENGLISB

The CHAIRMAN: 1 now cal1 on the representative of India to introduce

draft resolutions A/C.1/45/L.25 and A/C.1/45/L.24.

Mr. CHADHA (India): 1 have asked to speak to introduce two draft

resolutions. The first, entitled "Convention on the prohibition Of the use of

nuclear weapons", is contained in document A/C.1/45/L.25 and has been sponsored by

Afghanistan, Algeria, ~rgentina. Bangladesh. Bhutan, Bolivia. Ecuador, Egypt,

Ethiopia, Indonesia. Madagascar. Malaysia, Viet Nam. the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

Republic, Yugoslavia and India.

The rationale behind the draft resolution is simple and clearly stated in the

preamble. It is accepted that the existence and use of nuclear weapons pose a

threat to life on this planet. It is also accepted that the nuclear-anus race only

serves to increase the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. The "nuclear winter"

studies by R. Turco, O. Toon. T. Ackerman, J. Pollack and C. Sagan (the TTAPS

group), by the Scientific Conunittee on Problems of the Environment of the

International Council of Scientific Unions, and in 1988 by the Secretary-General's

Group of Experts have al1 concluded that the use of nuclear weapons. even on a

limited scale of 1 per cent of the existing meqatonnage, rould produce

"irreversible consequences" for life on this planet. 1 quote further from the

study by the Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Climatic and Other Global

Effects of Nuclear War:

"Scientific evidence is now conclusive that a major nuclear war rould

entai1 the high risk of a global environmental disruption. ... Three-dimensional atmospheric circulation modela with detailed representations

of physical processes indicate regional episodea of sub-freeaing temperatures.

even in summer. ...

A/C.1/45/PV.29 12

(Mr. Chadha. India)

"Beyond one month. agricultural production and the survival of natural

ecosystems would be threatened by a considerable reduction in sunlight,

temperature depressions of several degrees below normal and suppression of

precipitation and s m e r monsoons. In addition. these effects would be

aggravated by chernical pollutants. an increase in ultraviolet radiation

associated with depletion of ozone and the likely per,sistence of radioactive

'hotspots'.

"... The widespread impact of nuclear exchange on climate would constitute a severe threat to world food production. The prospect of

widespread starvation as a consequence of a nuclear var would confront both

targeted and non-targeted nations. ... The direct effects of a major nuclear

exchange could kill hundreds of millions: the indirect effect could Li11

billions.

"The socio-economic consequences in a world intimately intercomected

economically, socially and environmentally would be grave. The functions of

production, distribution and consumption in existing socio-economic systems

w u l d be completely disrupted." ( - /4 -25)

Those are only some of the irreversible consequences of a nuclear war.

The Conference on Disannament at Geneva, the single multilateral negotiating

forum in which al1 nuclear-weapon States are represented. has been repeatedly

requested by the General Assembly to undertake neqotiations with the objective of

concluding a convention that would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, we have submitted our draft convention to the Conference on

Disarmament for its consideration. It is therefore a matter of great regret that

the Conference on Disannament has not been able to register any progress on that

priority item.

W C . 1/45/PV. 2'9 13

At the same time, no logical reasons have been put forvard as to vhy such a

convention should not be negotiated. To relate the urgency of preventing nuclear

var with preventing al1 vars is to deny the special menace that nuclear veapons

pose to mankind. We must, of course, entirely rule out any kind of var as a

possible option. 1 reiterate. however, that while conventional vars may escalate

into nuclear var, and vhile that fateful transition can be prevented. a nuclear var

cannot de-escalate into a conventional var. We are resubmitting Our draft

resolution to underline the importance of that issue and in the hope that the Pirst

Connnittee will be able to bring the might of its moral authority to bear on the

Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on that item.

The draft convention is contained in the annex to the draft resolution. It is

based on the recognition by this forum that the use or threat of use of nuclear

veapons vould be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and contrary to

the lavs of humanity. That vas accepted almost three decades aqo in General

Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) in 1961.

The vorld conmunity has since xelcomed the statement by the United States and

the Soviet Union that "a Buclear war cannot be w n and must not be fought". Our

draft resolution seeks to transfonu that understanding into a legally binding

conmitment. Such a prohibition in the form of a legal agreement wuld help bring

about a qualitative change in security doctrines and policies and create the right

climate for negotiations leading to the complete elhination of nuclear weapons.

On behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Bolivia, the Bplorussian Soviet

Socialist Republic, Hungary, Indonesia. Peru, Sri Lanka. Venezuela and my o m

delegation, 1 should now like to introduce a draft resolution entitled "Scientific

and technological developments and their impact on international security".

contained in document A/C.1/45/L.24.

(Mr. Chadha. radié)

At the first special session of the ~eneral Assembly devoted to disarmament,

the threat posed to international peace and ~ecurity by the growing anns race was

acknovledged by the world community. It vas agreed that. along with quantitative

measures, qualitative measures in the field of disarmament also needed to be

negotiated if the arrns race was to be halted. More than a decade has passed since

the adoption of the Final Document, a decade in which qualitative aspects of the

arms race have not received the attention they deserved. That concern ras

reflected in Our initiative at the third special session of the General Assembly

devoted to disarmament and in the 1988 General Assembly resolution 43/17 A, in . which the Secretary-General was requested:

"to follow future scientific and technological developments, especially those

which have potential military applications, and to evaluate their impact on

international security".

A/C.1/45/PV.29 16

(Ur. Chadha. India)

In the report of the Secretary-General on this subject. it is made clear that

"in some respects modern technological advances may be hindering rather than

helping the pursuit of international security." (A/45/568. u. 3)

The report identifies five broad fields in which scientific and technological

developments should be followed: nuclear technology, space technology. materials

technology, information technology and biotechnology. The cumulative impact of

individual developments in these five fields could substantively transfonn the

security environment. Taking into account the illustrative set of criteria

elaborated in it. the report suggests that the international community needs to be

better equipped to follov the nature and direction of technological change and

that, in this regard. the United Nations can serve as a catalyst and a

clearing-house of ideas.

The Conference on the peace and security implications of new trends in science

and technology, which was held in April 1990 in Sendai, Japan, saw a convergence of

vievs favouring the goal of mare active and effective multilateral collaboration in

the area of technology assessment - in which the United Nations should play a leading role - the purpose of which would be to improve predictability and foster greater public awareness. It ras also recognized that it is necessary for the

scientific and policy communities ta work together in dealing from a truly global

perspective rith the complex implications of technological change. Tbe

Secretary-Ganeral has therefore been requested to continue to follow these

developments and to suggest to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session a

framework for their assessment.

It is interesting to speculate whether the security environment would not be

better and safer today if attempts by some scientists of the highest stature had

resulted in the creation of a shared awareness against the development of many of

the technologies, 4 t h their attendant military applications. with which we are

burdened today. Tomorrow's weapons will be more subtle. more threatening and less

verifiable, and will give us shorter response times. The impact of some of these

can already be seen in the areas dealt with in the report. and many others can be

perceived dimly at present. However. it is sobering to realize that al1 weapon

technologies and systems begin with the postulating of an idea: unrestrained hwnan

ingenuity does the rest.

Only watchfulness and collective action can restrain trends that undermine

global security. We have a common future and must demonstrate a common

determination to give science and tecbnology a human face. The challenges of

eradicating hunger. poverty and disease and of solving the problems of global

wanning. oaone depletion and environment management - al1 of which have acquired a global dimension - require inventiveness on Our part and international CO-operation on an unprecendented scale. Scientific and technological development must

continue. but should be oriented entirely in favour of peaceful uses, for the

benefit of mankind.

My delegation and the others on whose behalf re are introducing this draft

resolution hope that these proposals will receive the serious conaideration and

universal support of the Conunittee that thay deserve.

UNITED NATIONS FIRST COMMITTEE

55 ~ e n e r d ~ ~ A s s e r n b 1 ~ %-L-L

34th meeting held on

Monday, 12 November 1990 FORTY-FIFTH SESSION at 10.30 a.m.

officiai Reconis New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 34th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. RANA

CONTENTS

- Consideration of and action on draft resolutions (çontinued)

~ ~~~~-~~

Co-ions should b un< undcf ihc signinire of a mcmbr of the delepiion conccmcd r thm M. I,& oflht &. 0fpYbli~u80n 10 #h Chid of the Omcid RCCO& Edifinp Section. Rmm DCI.754

2 U n i d Niiionr FI-. and incorponud i n a c m of t h -rd.

Distr. GENERAL A/C.1/45/PV.34 3 December 1990 ENGLISH

Mr. GAJDA (Hungary): At this juncture the Hungariap deleqation wishes to

explain its position on three draft resolutions in cluster 5.

The Hungarian delegation has been carefully studying the draft resolution

contained in document L.25, concerning a convention on the prohibition of the use

of nuclear weapons.

It is common knowledge in this body, as it is beyond these walls. that Hungary

is totally opposed to nuclear weapons and, consequently. is a willing partner to

any effort that can lead to their complete and final elimination. We are not

convinced. however, that the convention promoted by this draft resolution is

realistic enough to be accorded priority by the Conference on Disannament. As long

as the parties involved continue the practice of engaging in m0n010g~e~. time and

energy will be taken away from other, more realistic subjects. For that reason the

Hungarian delegation will, with some reluctance, abstain in the Vote on this draft

resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: The Cornittee will now take a decision on draft resolution

A/C.1/45/L.25, entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of

the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly: convertion on the prohibition

(The C h a i m a )

of the use of nuclear weapons". The draft resolution vas introduced by the

representative of India at the 29th meeting of the Conunittee on 7 November 1990.

1 cal1 on the Secretary to read out the list of sponsors.

Mr. (secretary of the Conunittee): The sponsors of draft

,,solution A/C.1/45/L.25 are Afghanistan. Algeria, Argentina. Bangladesh, Bhutan,

Ecuador. EgYPt, Ethiopia, India. Indonesia. Madagascar, Malaysia. Viet Nam and

The CHAIRMAN: A recorded vote has been requested.


u-: Afghanistan. Albania. Algeria, Angola, Argentina. Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam. Burkina Faso. Burundi. Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon. Central Africân Republic. Chile, China. Colombia. Congo, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire. Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic. Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland. Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau. Guyana. Baiti. India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Rep-lic of), Iraq, Jamaica. Jordan. Kenya. Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho. Liberia. Libyh Arab Jamahiriya. Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali. Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger. Nigeria, Oman. Pakistan. Panama, Peru. Philippines, Qatar, Branda, Samoa. Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia. Sri Lanka. Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, ïhailand. Togo, Tunisia. Uganda, ULrainian Soviet Socialist Bepublic. Union of Soviet Socialist Bepublics. United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, taire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

m: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark. France, Germany. Iceland. Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands. New Zealand. Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdorn of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Wstaining: Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland. Israel. Japan. Liechtenstein, Polana. Romania

Draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25 was adouted bv 106 votes to 17. rith LQ -a.

Mr. PAWLAY (Poland): 1 should like to explain the vote of the Polish

delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25, "Convention on the prohibition of the

use of nuclear weapons".

Poland is in general in favour of the objectives set Forth in that draft

resolution. namely, reduction of the threat of nuclear war and prohibition of the

use of nuclear weapons. However, we have certain doubts as to whether the draft

convention annexed to draft resolution L.25, in its present form, can realisticallg

be acceptable to and considered by the Conference on Disarmament as a practical

disarmament measure. For that reason. Poland reluctantly abstained in the voting

on the draft resolution.

Mr. ELM (Sweden): The Swedish delegation would like to explain its vote

on draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25. "Convention on the prohibition of the use of

nuclear weapons".

Sweden voted in favour of draft resolution L.25, which ras introduced by the

representative of India. We have done so. as with similar draft resolutions in

A/C.1/45/PV.34 43

(-1

previous years. because Sweden supports the concept of the prohibition in an

international legal instrument of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. It

seems that such a prohibition corresponds to an emerging international norm

according to which the use of nuclear weapons contravenes the laws of humanity and

the dictates of public conscience. Already many rules of international law limit

or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances. Sweden considers

that the time is ripe for an investigation into the possibilities of

cornprehensively banning, in an appropriate, legally binding form, the use of

nuclear weapons.

Since the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons cannot be inferred frorn

the Charter Of the United Nations, Sweden has reservations concerning the seventh

preambular paragraph of the draft resolution and its interpretation of the Charter.

Mr. HU Xiaodi (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Chinese

deleqation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/45/L.25. entitled "Convention

on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" because we are in faveur of the

main purpose of the draft resolution. This is known to all. Since the first day

when nuclear weapons came into its possession, the chinese Government has solemnly

declared that China will at no time and in no circumstances be the first to use

nuclear weapons. China has also undertaken to refrain fr0m the use or threat of

use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free

ZOr~es.

( ~ r . Bu Xiaodi. China)

China has always maintained that, pending the achievement of the goal of a

complete ban on and total destruction of nuclear weapons. al1 the nuclear States

should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any

circumstances, and unconditionally promise to refrain £rom the use or threat of use

of nuclear veapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

On this basis, corresponding international agreements could be concluded. The

Chinese delegation believes that some of the wording in draft resolution

A/C.1/45/L.25 and the draft convention annexed thereto could be further discussed

and improved.

DOCUMENT N4m9

Reporl of the Flrst Comminee on anenda item 57 - ~ ~ [Origiml: English]

[21 November 19901

1. The item entitled .*Review and implementation of the Concluding Docu-

ment of the Twelfth Special Session of the General ~ssembiy:

..(O) World Disarmament Campaign:

..(b) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons;

"(c) Nuclear-amis freeze; ' * ( d ) United Nations disamament fellowship, train-

ing and advisory services programme;

( e ) United Nations ~ e ~ i o n a l ' c e n m for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. Unitcd Naions Regional Cenm for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and Unitcd Nations Regional Cenm for Peace. Disannament and Dcvelopment in Latin America and the Caribkan"

was included in the pvisional agenda of the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly in accordanec with its resolutions W117 A. C. D. E and F of 15 December 1989.

2. At its 3rd plenaty meeting. on 21 September 1990. ihe General Assembly. on the wommendation of thc Gen- eral Cornminec, decided to include the item in its agenda and to allocate it to ihe Fmt Comminee for c o m i ~ o 1 1 and report.

3. At its 2nd meeting. on 9 Octokr. the F i t Commit- tee decided to hold a combined general debatc on the disam- amcnt item aliocaud to it. namely , items 45 to 66. At its 4th meeting. on 16 Octokr, the Commiüe decida3 to m i d e r jointly wiih other disamiamcnt items item 155. which was allocavd to it upon a decision of the G c d Assembly at its Mth plenary meeting. on 15 October. ïùs delibaations on hose items took place h m the 3rd through î3rd meetings. from 15 to 30 ûctokr . Consideration of and action on draft resolutions on those iwms took place h m the 24th h u g h 3% meetings. frum 2 to 16 November.

Consideratlon of proposab **

Drofi resolurion AlC.Il45lL.25 7. On 31 October, Afghanistan, Algeria. Argentina.

Bangladesh. Bhutan. Ecuador. Egypt. Ethiopia. India. indo- ncsia, Madagascar. Malaysia. Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submincd a drafi rcsolution entirled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" (A/C.1/451 L.25). The draft nsolution was introduced by the repnsentative of india at the 29th meeting. on 7 November.

8. At iu 34th meting. on 12 Novemkr. the Comminec adopvd draft molution AIC. 1145L.25 by a mcorded voit of 106 to 17. with 10 abstentions (sa para. 15 klow. draft resolution B). n i e voting was as follows:

In fovow: Afghanistan, Albania. Algeria, Angola, Argentina. Ausuia. Bahamas. Bahtain, Bangladesh. Bar- bados. Benin. Bhutan, Bolivia. Botswana, Brazil. Bmnei D d a m . Burkina Faso. Burundi. Byelonisrian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cawroon. Cenual A f n w Republic. Chile, China, Colombia. Congo. Costa Rica. C8te d'Ivoire. Cuba. Cypnu. Djibwti. Dominican Republic. Efuador. Egypt. Ubiopia. Fiji. Finiand. Ghana, Guatemala. Guinea. Guinea-Bissau. Guyana. Haiti. India. indonesia. üan 0s- h i c Republi of), Laq, Jamaica. Jordan. Kenya. Kuwait. Lao People's Dcmrratic Republic. Lebanon. Lesotho. Liberia. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives. Mali. Malta. Mauntania. Mauritius, Mexico. Mongolia. Moroav. Mozambique. Myanmar. Nepal, Nicaragua. Niger. Nigaia. Oman, PaLisiaa. Panama, Pem. Philippines, Qatar. Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia. Senegal. Sierra Leone. Singaporr. Somalia. Sri La&, Sudan, Su- riname. Swaziland. Sweden, Syrian Amb Republic. Thai- land. Togo. Tunisia. Uganda. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Unitcd Arab Emùatcs. Unircd Rcpublic of Tanuuiia. Umguay. Vcn- m e l a . Viet Nam. Yemcn. Yugoslavia. Zak. Zambia. Zimbabwe.

Againif: Auswlia. Belgium. Canada. Dcomarlr. France. Gcminny, Iccland, Italy, Luxembourg. Nerhcrlands. New Zealand. Nomay. Ponugal. Spain. Turlrey. Unitcd King- dom of Gr ra Britain and Nonhern ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia. Grrecc. Hungary. ireland. Israel. Japan, Liahtenstein. Poland, Romania.

r 15. The Fint Cornmittee recommends to the General

Assembly the adoption of draft resolutions A 10 E klow:

R ~ v n w AND ~MPLEMEKTA~ON OF THE CONCLUDING DON- MEKT OF THE TWELFIW SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GEN- ERAi ASSEMBLY

B Convention on the Prohibition of the Use

of Nuclear Weapons The General Assembly: '.

Convinced that the existence and use of nuclear weapons pose the grcatest thrcat to the survival of mankind.

Conreiovr that the nuclear-amis race increaws the danger of the use of nuclear weapons.

Convinced aisa that nuclear disamament is the only ultimate guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons.

Convinced/unkr that a multilated agmment prohibiting the use or b a t of use of nuclear weapons should sorngthen inumational security and help to m a t e the cii- mate for negotiations leading to the complere elimination of nuclear weapons.

Corncioui aiso that the ment steps takcn bilatedly by the Union of Soviet Saialist Republics and the Uniied States of America mwards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the improvement in East-West relations and the international climatc can conmbute towards this goal.

Rccalling thai. in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the encra1 A s ~ m b l y . ~ ~ it is stated thai ail Srates should actively participate in effons to bnng about conditions in international relations among Slates in which a code of pcaceful conduct of d o n s in international &ais could k a g d upm and that would prcclude the use or b a f of usc of nuclcar weapons.

Reafinning ihat the use of nuclear weapm would bc a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity. as d e l a d in i u resolutions 1653 ( X m of 24 Novcmber 1%1.33171 Bof 14 December 1978,34183 G of 11 Deccmbcr 1979,351252 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 1 of 9 Decembcr 1981.

Noring wirh rcgrer that the Conference on Disannament. during its 1990 session, was notable to undendte negoriarions with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the u x or thrcat of use of nucicar wcaPons under any circumstances, taLing as a basis the '=XI annexed to Gencd A s ~ m b l y resolution 4411 17 C of 15 December 1989.

1. Reirerares ifs reqwsr to the Conference on Disanna- ment 10 commence negotiations. as a matter of pnority, in Order to mach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or b a t of use of nuciear weapons under anY circumstances. taking as a basis the d m Convention on , the Rohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapans annexed to

the present rcsolution: . 2. Also rrquesrs the Conference on Dismarnent to

report to the General Assembly at iu fony-sixth session on the results of those ncgotiations.

ANNEX Drin Coavuitioa on the Rohlbition ol tbc U x

d NudPr Wcipon. ïk Srarn Parties ro rhir Canvenrion. Aiwrud by thc hri 10 Q vvoy survivd of d i m i povd by the

rlislencc of nuclur weuerpom. Convim~d Ihu any use of nueles wapms cwstiMn a violation of Ue

Chvvr of Uie Uniied Nuiom snd a crime a d n u hwninin. - , . Convisrd Uur thir Conveniion would be a sep t o w h thc cornpletc

climiiilljon of n u e l a w u p n r l d n g to gcncnl rad cornplce di-. mnr undcr sùict m d effective invmariooll conmil.

Lkrcrmiiud to continue ncgaiuiolu for the ach ievmr of thir g d .

Have ogrcrd as followr: Micle I

The S W M u w this Canvmtion solcmnly tmkmkt na IO we or diruon w ure nwlcu vupons undcr any eimmuanm.

Mi ik 2 Tbir Convention duIl be of unlirniwd ddurarion.

M i r k 3 1. 'Ihir Convcnwn shdl be open io JI S u u s for sipanirr. Any Sute

dm doa nn rigi the Coaventioii bcfm iu rnw inw fncc in scordanec wiih p a n ~ ~ p h 3 of thil h c l c nuy ocçcde to it QJ anv rim. . ~~

2. Tbir Canrcniion rbiU bc sub* Io dficuioo by ridSurn. Insmimnu of ntifiution a rrruion &ail be depmiwd wiih thc S m m r y û + d of dr UniW Nbom.

3. ~~CainMonrhilImaintofora:mthcdtporitofimmunnm oi dficit ion by rrreniy-fivc Oowrmmo. iacluding Q Govmmmo of Q 6ve aucleu-vcapa SUcr. in ac+md.nct wiih png.ph 2 of this miclc.

5. Thc depmilrary shdl prompily infmm JI s i p n u q d &ing SutaofWducofucbii~.thedueofdeporitofocbinrrmmniof ~ ~ a r o c u n i d d r d r n o f t h e ~ i m o f m ~ c o f ~ r ~ v e a - ~ . u ( ~ ~ U ~ o f r b t b ~ i p ~ d O < h Q ~ .

6. This Convcntim .h.U bc ~gincrrd by Q dcporiwy in aEcadiiicc mth ~ r r i c l c IM of dr Qna al the Unitcd N h .

AnVIl4 Tb" Convention. d vhish Q Anbic. aiirese. Endi l . F W . R u - -

am mi p.n ni* -XII m ogua~y unhcnoc. SNI k-&iw *,th me SmmqOarnl of thc U m w NUION. who M l und duly -ficd mpa f k m f w ~ I C Oovemnrni of the r igmay d .cocduip sws

IN w m m r weaem. the uadarigmi. beinaduiy urthorùcdtkm by Qir rrrpctivc Oovcmmsno. han si@ thir Caavcntion. oprncd f a ii((ninuc u - on fhe &y of o<rtbauuidnkhvadrrdud-.

UNITED NATIONS

. . . . -. - . . - . . . 57 A. -

General Aasembly PROVISIONAL.

A/45/PV.54 18 December 1990

ENGLISH

president:

Porty-fifth session

GENERAL ASSPIBLY

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at Eeadquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 4 December 1990, at 10 a-m.

Mr. de W C 0

This record contains the original text of speeches Uelivered in English and interpretations of speeches in the other languages. The final text ri11 be printed in the Qgfacaal . . Records o f the eneral Assen@&.

Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, rithin one veek, to the Chief, Officia1 Records Editing Section. Department of Conference Services, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

The PRESIDENT: 1 request the Rapporteur of the Pirst Committee,

Mr. ~atévi Modem Lawson-Betum of Togo, to introduce the reports of the First

Committee in one intervention.

P . LAWSON-BETUM (Togo), Rapporteur of the First Comittee

(interpretation £rom French): Ur. President, since this is the first time 1 have

spoken in the General Assembly in my capacity as Rapporteur of the First Conunittee.

I am especially pleased to congratulate you on the competence, ski11 and

selflessness with which you have been guiding the proceedings of the forty-fifth

session. While these fine qualities confirm the wisdom of the choice made in

entrusting you with the presidency of the General Assembly, coupled vith your

constant readiness to serve, they have ensured the full success of our session.

(Mr. Lawson-Betum. Ra~Dorteur, Pirst Conmittee)

Reflecting the increasing improvement in the international political climate,

the Pirst Cornittee's work was carried out in an atmosphere marked by serenity,

constructive dialogue and CO-operation. Even if deep differences of opinion still

existed on some important issues, it must be acknowledged that considerable efforts

were made to make the legitimate concerns of Member States or groups of States

better known and to enlarge upon some points or areas of agreement.

In its consideration of the 27 agenda items, referred to it by the General

Assembly, the Pirst Committee followed its customary procedure. that is to Say, to

organize its work into three broad phases corresponding to the three groupi of

items - namely, questions relating to disarmament, items 45 to 66 and 155; the question of Antarctica, item 67; and questions relating to international security.

items 68 to 70. The Pirst Comittee also had on its agenda the relevant part of

agenda item 12, section D of chapter III of the report of the Economic and Social

Council, entitled "International CO-operation in eliminating the consequences of

the accident et the Chernobyl nuclear-power plant".

(Mr. Lawson-Betum. Ravoorteur, First Cornittee)

At this plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 1 have the honour to

introduce the First Cornmittee's reports on agenda items 45 to 60, 62 to 66, and 155

on disarmament. These reports are contained in documents W45/767 to 782, A/45/784

to 788, and A/45/794.

The first phase of the First Committee's work - consideration of the 23 agenda items on disarmament - vas carried out at 38 meetings, from 15 October to 16 November, and consisted in 106 statements and the adoption of 52 draft

resolutions and decisions, 25 of which were adopted without a vote. In all, 22

meetings were devoted to the general debate and an exchange of views on al1 items

relating ta disarmament, from 15 to 30 October. Moreover, the Cornittee held 16

meetings. from 2 to 16 November. to consider draft resolutions and decisions on

agenda items on disarmament. as well as to take decisions relating thereto.

At the same time, intensive informa1 consultations were held among delegations

as part of efforts to deepen dialogue and narrow differing views and positions on

various issues of cornon interest.

Both the positive assessment of the international political situation and the

ongoing challenges, as well as new ones, served as backdrop to the statements made

in the general debate and in the exchange of views on disarmament questions.

(M -, Cornittee)

The number of statements made vas undoubtedly due to an increased interest in

disannament issues in the light of the opportunities offered by the improvement in

the international political climate. In this connection particular emphasis vas

placed on the end of the cold war and the resulting movement from mistrust and

confrontation to dialogue, partnership and CO-operation as uell as on

American-Soviet efforts to limit arms and disarmament in the nuclear and chemical

fields, the initiatives taken in various parts of the world, particularly Europe,

to promote trust. security and CO-operation. and the importance of the forthcoming

international exchanges on the subject of disarmament.

Nevertheless, the Conunittee's attention was called to the fact that peace

remains fragile in the light of the persistence of military threats. in particular

tbe crisis in the Persian Gulf, and of non-military threats to international peace

and security.

The feeling emerged from the various statements that the disarmament proaess

should drav nev encouragement from the improvement of the international political

climate and should respond to the folloving requirements to ensure the reign of a

nev vorld order: reinforcement of the dynamic interaction of bilateral and

multilateral negotiations; continuance and intensification of bilateral

negotiations on nuclear disannament and multilateral negotiations on chemical

veapons; equitable distribution of the dividends of peace: rational use of the

collective security machinery provided for in the Charter, particularly to ensure

the rule of lav and to promote the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts:

strengthening of the role of the United Nitions in disarmament matters: improvement

of the verification machinery under disarmament agreements. transperency on

military questions and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mess

destruction: and. finally, harmonization of regional disarmament efforts.

(m. Lawson-Betum. ~aooorteui;, ' P i r s t Cornmittee)

A s i l l u s t r a t e d by the information received £rom the Pourth Review Conference

of the Pa r t i e s t o the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, increased

i n t e r e s t i n the quest ion of nuclear t e s t inq i n the Conference on Disarmament A d

prospects f o r the amendment Conference on the p a r t i a l nuclear-test-ban Treaty. as

well as the requirements of national. reqional and in te rna t iona l secur i ty , nuclear

disarmament occupied a pa r t i cu la r ly important place again t h i s year i n the concerns

expressed by deleqations.

Thus, of the 48 d r a f t resolut ions adopted by the Committee, 19 deal witb

various aspects of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Lawson-Betum. Rannorteu~, Pirst Conunittee)

The positive changes in international political relations have been reflected

in the consideration of disarmament questions. Also. within the framework of

efforts to rationalize Our work and to narrow the differences between views and

positions it has been possible to reduce the number of draft resolutions and

decisions submitted and adopted and to increase the number of draft resolutions and

decisions adopted without a vote. Indeed, 54 draft resolutions and decisions were

submitted during this session compared to 64 at the forty-fourth session, 14 at the

!-, First Conunittee)

forty-third session and 79 at the forty-second session. Furthemore, 52 draft

resolutions and decisions were adopted in the course of this session. as compared

to 59 at the forty-fourth session: while 26 draft resolutions and decisions. as

compared to 22 last year and 23 at the forty-third session, were adopted without a

vote. This constitutes considerable progress and it is an encouraging trend

tovards consensus.

The amalgamation of two draft resolutions on the conclusion of effective

international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or

threat of use of nuclear weapons should also be mentioned. while a single draft

resolution was submitted on the prevention of an anns race in outer space.

1 must also report that the Chairman of the Pirst Conunittee organized several

informal meetings of the Friends of the Chainnan, an open-ended group, to ascertain

the vievs of delegations on ways and means of rationalizing both the substantive

and the procedural aspects of the First Conunittee's work. As a result of those

consultations the Chairman submitted a working paper containing pcoposals for

rationalizing the procedural and substantive vork of the Pirst Committeee.

1 cannot conclude my submission of the reports of the Pirst Committee oa

disarmament agenda items 45 to 60, 62 to 66 and 155 without paying a vell-deserved

tribute to those who are responsible for the success of the vork of Our Conunittee.

It is only right and proper for me to make special mention of the Chairman of the

First Committee, Mr. Jai Pratap Rana. With his great intellectual and moral

probity. keen political sense and profound knowledge of what is at atake in

connection with questions of disarmament and international peace and security, he

wss able to give vise, responsible and effective leadership.

(W. Lawson-Betum. Ra~porteur, First Committee)

It is a pleasure for me to pay a tribute also to the two Vice-Chairmen,

Mr. Ronald Morris and Mr. Sergei Martynov who. with ski11 and perspicacity,

confirmed the excellent reputations that preceded their election to their posts.

1 wish also to express appreciation of the enlightening and valuable

contribution of the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs,

Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security

Council Affairs, Mr. Vasiliy Safronchuk, to the smooth accomplishment of our work.

It gives me great pleasure to thank most warmly the Secretary of the Committee,

Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, who, as usual, put al1 his ability and long experience at the

service of the Committee. with the wise and effective assistance of his colleagues,

including Mr. M o h m a d Sattar.. Mr. Timur Alasaniya, Mr. Jack Gerardi-Siebert,

Mr. Kuo-Chung Lin andMrs. Agnes Marcaillou. and al1 the other members of the

secretariat of the Committee.

The PRESIDENT: The Assembly has concluded it.9 consideration Of agenda

item 56.

We turn next to the report of the First Committee (A/45/779) on agenda

item 57, "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth

Special Session of the General Assembly".

The Assembly will now take decisions on the five draft resolutions, A to E,

recommended by the First Committee in paragraph 15 of its report.

Draft resolution A is entitled "United Nations disannament fellowship,

training and advisory services programme". It was adopted without a vote in the

First Committee. May 1 take it that the General Assembly adopts draft resolution A?

Praft resolution A was adooted (resolution 45/59 A).

-PR_ESIDENT: Draft resolution B is entitled "Convention on the

prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons".


recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania. Algeria. Angola. Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina. Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain. Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil. Brunei Darussalam. Burkina Faso, Burundi. Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China. Colombia, Cornoros, Congo. Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador. Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait. Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar. Malawi. Malaysia, Maldives. Mali. Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico. Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique. Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Oman. PakiStan. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar. Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis. Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia. senegal, Seychelles. Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands. Somalia, Sri Lanka. Sudan. Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden. Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand. Togo. Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Ernirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu. Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Aaainst: Australia, Belgium. Canada. Denmark. France. Germany. Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal. Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United States of America

Abstaininq: Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary. Ireland. Israel. Japan. Liechtenstein, Poland, Romania

Draf t resolu t i O n B w as adout e d bv 125 votes to 17. with 10 abst enti ana (resolution 45/59 8).

. . 46/37. Rcview and implementntioa of the Concluding Documcnt of the Twelfth Speeial Session of the Gencral .ltscmb~y 58

ïhe Generol Assembly. Convinced that the existence and use of nuclear wcap

ons pose the greacest threat to the d d of IMUkd. Convincrd also that nuclear disarmament is the only

ultimate g m e e againn the use of nuclear weapom, Convinced funher tbat a multilateral agrement prohib

iting the use or t h m of use of nuclear W W m shodd mengthen international security and anmbute to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate eiimiMti0n of nuclev weapom,

Welcoming the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republia on the Reduction and Limitation of Smtegic Offensive Amis, siçned on 31 July 1991.

R'elcoming &O the announcemenrs by the Govenunent of the Union of Soviet Sociaiiit Republia and the Cioveru- ment of the United States of America of significant measures. including unilateral seps. whicb could signal the R- versal of the nuclear-anm race. and expnssing the h o p chat these will be followed by agrectnenîs at an cariy daîc on funher cuts in s a e g i c nuclcar asenals.

Conscious that the ~ c c n t neps taken by the Union of Soviet Socialist Revublia and the Uaitcd Siaies of Amer- iw towards a rcdu&on of tbeir nuclcar wapom and the im- proveinent in the i n e m t i o d d i e can contribue io- w v d s the goal of cnmplne dimirdon of audear w a p ~ ~ &

Recalling chy in paqraph 58 of the F i Document of the T a t h Special Session of the Genusl APwmbly: it mted that III S ~ e s should advely panicipate in effom to bring about conditions in intctnatiod rrfarions among Sutes in which a code of peacenil mndua of nations in international affain could be a v a l upon and chat would preclude the use or threat of use of n u c h W n s .

Reaflrming chat the use of nudear wcapons would be a violation of the Chanu of the United Nations and a crime agjinn humanity, as d e c W in iîs rrrolutions 1653 @VI) of 24 Novmber 1961. 33/71 B of 14 Deccmba 1978. 34/83 G of II Decemba 1979.351152 D of 12 D e m b a 1980 and 36/92 1 of 9 Demnbcr 1981.

Noring with regm that the Confemce on D i s a m a t . durine iis 1991 session wa¶ Mi able to undUUke =oh- -- ~~~

~

tions with a view to &ming agreement cm âü intemational convention pmhibitiag the use or thrcat of use of nuclur wwpons undu any circumnanca. taking aï a bvis the t u t m x e d to Ocneral AcKmbly molution 45/59 B o f 4 Dccembcr 1990,

1. R e i i e r w its request to the Confe rna on Disanna- ment to commence negotiations. as a matter of pnority, in order to Racb agreement on an i n m i o n a l convention prohibiting the +e or <hrrît of use of nuclear weapoar under any circumstances. taking as a basis the draA Con- ' vention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclur Weaoom

2. AIso requeru the Conference on Disamament to n- port to the General Assembly on the resulu of these n e g e tiations.


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- 4

n i a Coovention. o l r b k b th A n b i r Chineu. Enrlirb Fnocb. ~- ~ -~

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annexed to the p ~ ~ ~ n t ~solutioa;

UNIT €0 NATIONS

C. A'

.O . 3-

\ @' General Assec@ly Foy*,., Distr.

y! dr LIMITED 4

A/C.1/46/L.20 31 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-sixth session FIRST COKYITTEE Agenda item 61 (c)

REVIEW )rND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OP THE TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: CONVENTION

ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Afahanistan. Alqeria. Banaladesh. Bhutan. Ecuador. Ewiit, Ethiopia, Indiè. Indonesia. Madauascar. Malavsia. Viet Nam

and Yuaoslavia: draft resolution

Convention on t h e o f the Use of Nuclear Wea~ong

The General Assembb.

ConvinceQ that the existence and use of nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to the survival of mankind,

Convinced a l s ~ that nuclear disarmament is the only ultimate guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced furth= that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should strengthen international security and contribute to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms signed on 31 July 1991,

Welcominu alsQ their announcements of significant measures including unilateral steps rhich could signal the reversa1 of the nuclear arms race, and expressing the hope that these vil1 be followed by agreements at an early date on further cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals, .

A/C.1/46/L.20 English Page 2

Conscioua that the recent steps taken by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the improvement in the international climate can contribute tovards the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. it is stated that al1 States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that vould preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear veapons,

Reaffirminq that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 1 of 9 December 1981,

Notins vith reafet that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1991 session, vas not able to undertake negotiations with a viev to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution 45/59 B of 4 December 1990,

1. to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations. as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibitiog the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution:

2. Also the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly on the results of these negotiations.

Draft Convention on the Prohibitio . . . n of the Use of Nuclear WeaDong

The States Parties ta this Convention,

by the threat to the very survival ofmankind posed by the existence of nuclear veapons.

Çonvinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

C- that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear veapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

A/C. 1/46/L. 20 English Page 3

Determined to continue neqotiations for the achievement of this goal.

Have aoreed as follovs:

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to al1 States for signature. Any Scate that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited vith the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments. including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States. in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depository shall promptly inform al1 signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as vell as of the receipt of other notices.

6 . This Convention shall be registered by the depository in accordance vith Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, vho shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Government of the signatory and acceding States.

AIC.lI46IL.20 English Page 4

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned. being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at on the daY of one thousand nine hundred and

U N I T E I ) YA' I ' IOSS . - FIRSTCOMMITTEE 60

~eneral@!&4ssernbl~ 31th meeting held on

Thursday, 7 November 1991 F O R T Y . S I S T H SESSION at 3 o.m.

Ofjicial Records ~.

New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 3lst MEETING

Chai rrnan : Mr. MROZIEWICZ (Poland)

CONTENTS

- Consideration of and action on draft resolutions under al1 disarmament agenda items (continued)

- Organizatio~ of work

- ~ h t r mci>rd ir wbjccr tu cnrin'iii>n. Distr. GENERAL

cilirrr.iiunr shuu~d bc w a under the \opnaam of r mcmbcr ofihc iIclcpniun conccrncd A/C.1/46/PV.31 .irhl,, ,,,,, ,,.,i ,i/,hr dur, o/publi<urion iu the Chlcl of r k 0flici.l Rccordr Editinp Seali>n. Rixm DC?75ii.

2 Unirnt Naii<inr Plua. and tncorpimtcd inacow i i t ihc reuwd 15 November 1991

Cilirrction, ~ i l l he ir,uïd rflrr #nçcnJ of the <..iiin. in r wpmte ri>rri:cndun> Ior c3ch Commtiim. ENGLISH 91-61712 7258V (E)

m e CAAIRMàN: 1 now cal1 upon the representative of India. who vil1

introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/46/L.19 and WC.1/46/L.20.

Mr. SHAH (India): Over the last couple of weeks we have heard many

statements welcoming the many positive changes that have occurred in the

politico-military and security situation in the world. The dramatically

changed scenario in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern

Europe, the end of cold war and East-West confrontation and its impact on

prospects for peace and disarmament, the unilateral announcements of decisions

to dismantle and destroy some portions of the awesome nuclear arsenals of some

nuclear-weapon countries. and the improved political climate for further cuts,

are al1 indeed very positive changes.

(Fr. Shah. Indiq)

We believe it is a welcome, though belated, change.in the approach to nuclear

disarmament. We listen carefully when the non-nuclear weapon coustries are

asked to respond to these changes in their approach to disarmament. but we

also believe that welcome as these changes are, they must not blind us to the

other reality. And that relates to changes that have not taken place.

There is no change in the thinking that nuclear weapons are necessary for

security. The existing nuclear arasenals can still destroy the wrld several

times over. Despite the end of East-West confrontation. there is no change in

approach as regards the doctrine of deterrence. There is no change in the

policy of reserving the right to conduct nuclear explosions for armements

purposes. The production of nuclear weapons, the qualitative enhancement of

nuclear weaponry through scientific and technological improvements. the

production of fissionable materials, the manufacture of delivery systems for

nuclear veapons. and nuclear weapon testing still continue. And there is no

change in the policies that do no want to renounce the right to use nuclear

weapons or to threaten to use them, despite the welcome assertion that a

nuclear war must not be fought and cannot be won. and despite the innumerable

expert opinions about the "nuclear winter" and end of al1 kinds of living

organism if nuclear weapons are used either by design or by accident.

The overwheiming majority of humanity wants a nuclear-weapon-free world.

They want complete nuclear disarmament. They want the elimination of al1

nuclear weapons from this Earth and from outer space. These are Our goals and

objectives. And they must remain humanity's immutable objectives, which ._ should not be changed or diluted regardless of improvements in the

international climate, which ve welcome.

(& Shah. Indig)

r My delegation believes that these are achievable objectives despite the

difference of perceptions on their realization. My delegation is optimistic

that just as the international comunity is now negotiating a total ban on the

use of chemical and toxic weapons in addition to a ban on their production and

stockpiling, we will one day negotiate a convention on banning the use of

nuclear weapons. on the cessation of al1 nuclear-weapons tests. on production

of nuclear weapons and on their complete elimination. But we believe that it

is necessary to reiterate these goals and to pursue proposals to achieve

them. These proposals do not become irrelevant or uaaecessary, as some might

think. just because the political climate has changed. In fact, the changed

political climate is conducive to implementation of the ideas contained in the

draft resolutions we are presenting.

The second is draft resolution WC.1/46/L.20, on a convention on the

Prohibition of the uae of nuclear weapons. This draft resolution is

(Mr. Shah. India)

sponsored by Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador. Egypt,

Ethiopia. Indonesia. Madagascar, Malaysia, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia as well as

by India. The draft resolution reiterates the conviction that the complete

elimination of nuclear weapons remains the goal and it calls upon the

Conference on Disannament to commence negotiations in order to reacb agreement

on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear

weapons under any circumstances.

My delegation is privileged to introduce the t w draft resolutions on

behalf of al1 the sponsors. to whom we extend Our thanks. We urge al1 Member

States to contribute positively to the changed international climate by

supporting these resolutions, and subsequently to taie action to implement

them.

held on Monday, 11 Novemher 1991

;TH SESSIOS . .. at 10 a.m. ~'

Officiol Records New York - VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 33rd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. MROZIEWICZ

CONTENTS

d - Consideration of an action on draft resolutions under al1 disarmament agenda items

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: ~lnntçd ~aiiain, P l n ~ . rtid iwiirpirrted in r O>F .*I 'hc rrcisrrl. Distr. GENERAL A/C.1/46/PV.33

C,~rri,~iiCin. .+,II h. I , W C ~ rticr inc <,i ~ h c w..iiin. ,t> .r.prari, i . irri$rhlrti i iiii CL~~CIIII~IIIIIIII.. 19 November 1991

ENGLISH 91-61730 7295V (E)

The CHAIRMAN: The Conunittee will now proceed to take a decision on

draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20, entitled "Review and irnplementation of the

concluding document of the twelfth sepcial session of the General Assembly:

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons".

1 cal1 on the Secretary of the Conunittee.

(Secretary of the Conmittee): Draft resolution

A/C.1/46/L.20 has 15 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of

India at the 31st meeting of the Pirst Conmittee. on 7 November 1991. The

list of sponsors reads as follows: Afghanistan, Algeria. Bangladesh. Bhutan,

Bolivia, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia. Lao People's Democratic

Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.

The CHAIRMAN: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote vas t a k a .

Subsequently, the deleqations of Benin, Gabon. Rwanda and Uganda advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

R C / ~ A/C.1/46/PV.33 13

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Barbados. Belarus. Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana. Brazil. Brunei Darussalam. Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile. China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba. Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti. Ecuador, Eqypt, Ethiopia. Ghana, Grenada. Guatemala. Guinea. Guyana, India, Indonesia. Iran (Islamic Republic of). Iraq, Jamaica. Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta. Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman. Pakistan. Panama, Peru, Philippines. Qatar, Saudi Arabia. Senegal. Singapore. Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan. Suriname. Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic. Thailand, Togo. Tunisia. Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay. Vanuatu. Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire. Zimbabwe

Asainst: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark. France. Iceland. Italy. Luxembourg. Marshall Islands, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United iiingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United States of America

Wstaininq: Albania, Argentina. Austria, Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Bungary, Ireland. Israel. Japan. Latvia, Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania. Sweden

Subsequently, the delegations of Benin, Gabon, Rwanda and Uganda advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in faveur: the deleqation of Germany advised that it had intended to vote against.

Mr. (Bulgaria): 1 wish to explain my deleqation's vote on

two draft resolutions just adopted by the First Conmittee: draft resolution

A/C.1/46/L.19, on a nuclear-arms freeze, and draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20,

On the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons.

In principle Bulgaria takes a positive view of the basic objective behind

the concept of a nuclear-arms freeze. intended to fix the existing situation

with a view to providing time to negotiate appropriate reductions of nuclear

arsenals in such a way that the negotiated agreements would not run too great

PKB/ASW A/C.1/46/PV.33 3 2

(Mr. Devanov. Bulaaria)

a risk of being overtaken by the Pace of the arms race. We believe that such

a freeze could have been a viable and valuable option indeed in the past. when

the nuclear-arms race vas going on unabated.

At present. however. the situation seems to have changed completely.

Nuclear disarmament has become part of our life. Significant progress in

reducing the nuclear arsenals of the two leading nuclear Powers has been made

during the past several years. It may suffice to mention only the Treaty on

the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the most recent unilateral steps

by the United States of America and the USSR to withdraw non-strategic nuclear

weapons on a global scale. These are elements of a completely new situation

in the nuclear field, when mankind has begun a long process aimed at the

elimination of al1 nuclear weapons everywhere.

In such circumstances. calling for a nuclear-arms freeze might, in

practice, be somewhat misleading or even imply a reversa1 of the existing

momentum in nuclear disarmament, which would be highly undesirable. It is

difficult for us to reconcile the conviction expressed in the draft resolution

on a nuclear-arms freeze that the current international situation is most

conducive to nuclear disarmament witb a cal1 to freeze the nuclear status quo.

For those reasons my delegation decided to change the vote it cast last

year on a similar draft resolution. We are glad to observe that a number of

other delegations acted in the same manner in the new situation.

On the draft resolution dealing with the Convention on the Prohibition of

the Use of Nuclear Weapons, the delegation of Bulgaria again abstained, as it

did on a similar draft resolution at last year's session. We believe that the

new situation offers new opportunites for change in long-held perceptions on

pKB/ ASW A/C.l/46/PV.33 3 3

(Mr. Deyanov. Bulaaria)

the use of nuclear weapons, but we are not quite sure that the draft

reeolution i n document A/C.1/46/L.20 adequately r e f l e c t s the most promising

avenues for progress i n t h i s area. That i s why rny delegation abstained on

that draft resolut ion.

PKBl ASW

Mr. LIU Jievi (China) (interpretation £rom Chinese): The Chinese

deleqation wishes to make a few remarks concerning its position of principle

on the issue of a nuclear-test ban.

China understands the urgent desire of a vast number of

non-nuclear-weapon States for the early attainment of a comprehensive

nuclear-test ban. Adopting a restrained and prudent attitude towards nuclear

testing, China has conducted a very limited number of nuclear tests, and

stopped nuclear testing in the atmosphere in 1981. China has also

constructively participated in the work of the Ad Eoc Conunittee on a Nuclear

Test Dan of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. From May to June this

year China participated in part of the second technical test relating to the

global exchange and analysis of seismic data organized by the Ad Hoc Group of

Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament.

We believe that the cessation of nuclear testing by al1 States should be

effected in the framework of an effective nuclear-disarmament process. On

such issues as the cessation of nuclear testing and nuclear disarmament,

countries with the largest nuclear arsenals have special responsibilities and

should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of

nuclear weapons and drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals so as to create

conditions for the realization of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. We have

taken note of the actions they have taken in the field of nuclear

disannament. However, they still have a long way to go in discharging their

special responsibilities and obligations. China is prepared to work with

other countries in exploring the ways to promote complete nuclear disarmament,

including a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

1 shall now make a few connnents on draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20.

~KB/ASW A/C.1/46/PV.33 3 5

(Mr. Liu Jievi. China)

The Chinese deleqation has just voted in favour of draft resolution

~/~.1/46/L.20, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear

Weapons". 1 am speaking now in order to reiterate the position of principle

the Chinese Goverment on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

The Chinese Goverment has al1 along stood for the complete prohibition and

thorough destruction of nuclear veapons and has, since the first day of its

possession of nuclear weapons, undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear

weapons at any time or under any circwnstances.

(Mr. Liu Jievi. China)

China has also undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons

against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or

under any circumstances. We hope that al1 the other nuclear-weapon States can

make the same cornitment unconditionally.

China has also called for the signing of a corresponding international

agreement on this basis which will provide a forceful impetus to the process

of nuclear disarmament. We hope that China's constructive initiative will

receive a positive response.

Based on the above-mentioned position of principle, the Chinese

deleqation is in favour of the main thrust of draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20

on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and at the same time wishes

to point out that certain elements of the draft resolution and 'the annexed

text of the draft convention need to be improved.

Pr. PULE (Czechoslovakia): On behalf of Bungary, Poland and

Czechoslovakia. let me explain Our voting on two draft resolutions which vere

adopted just a moment ago: A/C.1/46/L.19, "Nuclear-arms freeze", and

A/C.1/46/L.20, "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

The three countries - Bunqary, Poland and Czechoslovakia - strongly support a realistic and most effective approach in various fields of

disarmament. During recent months, they have witnessed an impressive

breakthrough in nuclear disannament as a result of the outstanding initiatives

taken by President Bush and President Gorbachev. Consequently. it is time for

real and verified nuclear disannament. Taking into account the fact that the

United States and the USSR are considerably reducing their nuclear arsenals,

the idea of a nuclear-arins freeze is simply outdated. That is vhy Bungary,

Poland and Czechoslovakia decided to vote against draft resolution

A/C.1/46/L.19, entitled "Nuclear-arms freeze".

(Mr. Fule. Czechoslovak&)

As for draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20, "Convention on the prohibition of

the use of nuclear weapons", the three would like to reiterate their

consistent support for and cornitment to the principle of the non-use of

nuclear weapons. They consider it an essential, important element, together

vith a strong non-proliferation regime, for global and regional security. At

the same time. they advocate pragmatic and realistic approaches and measures

in this field.

At this juncture, the necessary political and legal requirements are not

present for a possible codification of the principle of the non-use of nuclear

veapons. For this reason the delegations of Hungary, Poland and

Czechoslovakia abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20.

Mr. (Finland): 1 wish to explain Finland's abstention in

the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/46/L.20, entitled "Convention on the

Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". Finland continues to believe that

the use of nuclear weapons would pose a grave threat to international peace

and security. and that nuclear weapons therefore should not be used. At the

sanie tirne we realize that the dramatic changes in international relations over

the past few years have created new opportunities to ensure that they will

indeed not be used.

(Mr. Patokallio. Finland)

The disappearance of East-West confrontation has for al1 practical

purposes removed the one scenario that in a crisis could have involved the use

of nuclear weapons on a global scale. Intensified efforts to strengthen

international non-proliferation arrangements will also help create conditions

in which the emergence, and therefore the potential use, of nuclear weapons is

precluded. We also realize that the repeated calls in draft resolution

~/C.1/46/L.20 and its predecessors for the commencement of negotiations on a

legally binding instrument to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons have not

been answered, and there seems to be little prospect that they will be

answered in the future.

It is for al1 those reasons that Finland decided it could no longer

support this draft resolution.

DOCUMENT A/46/674

Report of the F i n t Cornmittee on agenda item 61

1. The item entitled: "Review and implemmtation of the Concluding Docu-

ment of the TwelRh Special Session of the General Assembly:

"(a) Regionai disamrament report of the San<ary- Gmeral;

"(b) United Nations disannament feIiowship, lraining and advisory services progamme:

'Tc) Convention on the Ruhibition of the Use of Nw dear Weapaos: "(4 WorId Disamament Campaign: "(e) Nudear-ams neeP;

"y) United Nations Regid Cenm for P e a a aod Disamiament in Aüia Unitai Natiom Regiaai C e r n f a Peaa and Disarmameni in Asia and the Pacific aod United Nations Regional Cma for Peaa, Disarmament and Dcvelopment in Latin Amcrica and the Carilhan"

was included in the provisiooal agenda of the fariy-sixth sesion of the GUIMi Asmnbly in acmrdance with its moiutions 44/317 Bof 15 Decunber 1989 and 45/59 A, B. C, D and E of 4 k m b a 1990.

2. At its 3ni pl- meeting, on20 S e p l a b u 1991. the Ciencrai Aaetnbly, on the recommendation of the Germai Committee, decided to include the item in its agenda and to ailocaîe it to the Fust Committee for mnsideraîion aod npon.

3. At its 2nd meeting, on 10 Octoba. the Fust Cmnmit- tee decided to hold a wmbined generai debate on the disarmament items aüocatcd to it, namely. itans 47 to 65. 'Ihe delibcntions on thœe items took place h m the 3rd through 24th meetings. 6um 14 to 30 Octoba. Considem tion of and action on draA molufioni on those items took pkce hom the 25th h u g h 37th meetings. h m 4 ta l5 Novanber.

DmJî molution lC.U46/L20

16. On 31 October. Afghanistan. Algeria, Bangladesh. Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt. Ethiopia, Ladia, Indonesia. Madagascar, Malaysia, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submined a draA rsolution entitled "Convention on the Pro- hibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapoas" (AIC.U46/ L.20). which was later aiso sponsored by Bolivia and the Laa People's Democratic Republic. The draA molution was inuoduced by the repnsentative of lndia at the 31st meeting. on 7 November.

17. At its 33rd meeting, on II Nwember, the Com- mittee adopted drafi nsolution A/C.V46/L-.20 by a rewrded vote of 96 to 17. with 20 abstentions 40 (sec para. 20 belav, draft nsolution E). The voting waî as foUows:

In/ovour: AfghaniFtan, Algeria, Angok Bahamas, Bah- raio. Bangladesh, Barbados, Belanis. Bhutan, Bolivia. Bo- twaoa, Br&. Bnmei Damsalam. Burkina Faro, Bunuidi. h-. Cape Vude. Cenoal African Republic. Chad Ch&, China Colombia. Congo. Costa Rica Côte d'Ivoire. Cuba Cyprus. Dvnocntic b p l e ' s Republic of f<orea. Dji- bouti, Eaiador. Egypt, Ethiopka Ghana, Grrnada. Guate- m a 4 Guinea. Guyana, India. Indonsia. Iran (Irlamic Re- public of). hq, Jamaica Jordan. Kenya. Kuwait, Lao People's D a n d c Republic. iebanoo. Lsotho, Libaia Libyan Arab Jamahiya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali. Malta, Matuitiu. Muim, Mongolia. Momcco, Mo- rambi,que. Mya~mar, Namibia. Nepai, Nicaraguq Niger, Nigeria. hkkW& Paoama, Pew Philippines, Qatar, Saudi MW Suicgal. Sigapon, Solomon Isbnds, Sri hh. Suda% Svmzihud, Syrian Arab Rcpublic. Thailand Togo. ?\misia. Uloaine, Union of Soviet Socialkt Republiu. Uniîui Arab Emintes. United Republic of Taarania Uroguay, Vaiiualu. Vmezuek Viet Nam. Yunea. YugosIavia, zaiie, Zimbabwe.

A g o d r : Au- Belgium. Canada, Denmark, France. Iceland, Italy, LUOnbourg, Marshall Isiands, Nerherlands, New Zealand Nw, hmgal, Spain, 'Iwley, United Kingdom of Grrat Britain and Northan Inland, United States of America.

Absiaùùng: Al- Agentiua, Autria, Bulgaria Czcchmlovalria. Estonka, F i Gwhany,@ Gmecz. Hungar~. Irela4 h'ael. Japan, Lhia, Liechtemein. Lithuania. Poland, Republic of KOM. Romauia, Sweden

Recommrnd&n of ihe Firsi Cornmittee

20. Tne Fust Comminee recomrnends to the Cienetal Asembly the adoption of &ail resolutions A to F below:

REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUDINO DOCUMENT OF THE TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Convention on the Prohibition ofthe Use of Nuclenr Wenpons

The G e w a i Assembly, Convinced tbat the existence and use of n u c l w weapons

pose the greatest threat to the survival of mankind Convinced a h o tbat nuclear disarmament is the only ul-

tunate guarantee againn the use of nuclear weapons. ConvincedjLrther that a multilateral agreement prohibit-

ing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should Smngthen international security and contribute to the climate for negotiations Ieading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Welcoming the Treaty beween the United States of America and the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. signed on 3 1 July 199 1.

Welcoming &O the announcements by the Govenunent of tbe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Govern- ment of the United States of Arnerica of significant measures. including unilateral steps. which could signal the reversal of the nuclear arms race, and expressing the hope that these will be followed by agreements at an early date on funher culs in strategic nuclev arsenals,

Conscious chat the recent steps caken by the Union of Swiet Socialist Republics and the United States of America towards a reduction of tbeir n u c l w weapons and the improvement in the international climate can contribute towards the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

RecaiIing tbat ia paragraph 58 of the F i Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.1 it is mted that al1 States should actively panicipate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affain wuld be agreed upon and chat would preclude the use o r threat o f use of nuclear weapons.

Reoflnning tbat the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in ils resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961. 33/71 B of 14 December 1978. 34/83 G of I I December 1979,351152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981.

Nohng wiih regret t h t the Conference on Disamament. dwmg ils 1991 session. waï not able to undertake negolia- tfons with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution 45/59 B of 4 December 1990.

1. Reitemter iu requert to the Conference on Disanna- ment 10 commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention Prohibithg the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Con- "enlion on the Prohibition of the Use of N u c l w Weapons a e x e d to the present resolution;

2. AIso requests the Conference on Disarmament 10 to the General Assembly on the results o f these

ne80tiations.

ANNEX Dr-ft Convrndon on tbc Prnhihition or the Use of

Nucicir Wcapons

Alomed by the ihrcat to the very swival of mankind poxd by thc existence of nuclcar wedponr.

Convinced that any use of nuclcar uhaponr conrtihitcr a violation of the Charter ofthe United Nations and a crime a~ainst humanim. " , .

Convinced that this Convention would bc a step towards the complete climination of nuclcarveapons leading to gcncml and complete disannament under strict and effective international conml.

Detennined to mntinue nqotiations for the achicvcment ofthis goal. Hnvc agreedas follows:

Article I The States Parties to this Convention wilcmnly undertale not to urc

or thrcaten to uw nuclcar wcapons under any circumstançcr. Article 2

Thir Convention shall k of unlimited duration Article J

1. This Convention shnll be open to al1 Stavs for s i g n m . Any Swte ha1 dou Mt slgn Ihc Gnvrntion bcforc iu caty inio fame in accordancc withparagkph 3 ofthk anicle mny affcdc 6 it ataw the.

2. This ~ o n ~ e n l ~ n ~ s h a l l k subject io ratification by signatory Staro. Instrumenta of ratification or accsuion shall k deporitcd with the Secrcrnryûenml of the United Nations.

3. Thir Convention shall enter into foice on the dcpositof instm- menu of ratification by lwenry-five Govemmenu. including the Gov- ernmenu of the five nuclcar-wcapon States. in accordanec with para- g n p h 2 afthir anicle.

4. For States whow inrbumenu of ratification or accession an deposited a k r the enuy into foice of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit oftheir instnimenu of ratification OI nccession. -. -~~

5. The dcposilnry shall pmmptly inform al1 signatory and assed- ing Srates of the date of cach signature. the &te ofdcposit of each insrnuncnt of mtification or accession and the date of thc cnrrv into force of this Convention, as wcll Y of the rcceipt of othcr notiks.

6. ïhis Convention shall be rcgistercd by the dcpositq in accordance with Anicle 102 of the Chancr of the United Nations.

Article 4

Thir Convention. of which the Arnbic. Chinew. Ennlish. French. Rwian and S~anish texu uc eauallv authentic. ;halÏk &asited with the ~ecre&-Genml of the 'UniGd Nitlons. uho shnll se;ld duly sertificd copaes themfto the Govemment of the sagnaioly andassed- h g Srates.

IN wmsswwreoP. the undenigned k i n g duly authorirrd therc- to by their rcrpcctive Gommenu. have rigncd this Convention. opencd for signa- ai' on the of one thournnd nine hundred and

&Y

GeneraI Assembiy PROVISIONAL

20 December 1991

ENGLI SE

President:

later:

Porty-sixth session

GENEBAL' ASSEMBLY

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OP THE 65th MEETING

Eeld at Eeadquarters. New York, on Priday, 6 December 1991. at 10 a.m.

Mr. SBIHABI

Mr. EL-KEUSSAIBY (Vice-President)

(Saudi Arabia)

î Oman)

This record contains the original text of speeches blivered in English and interpretations of speeches in the other languages. The final text xi11 be printed in the Records of the General Aum&J,g.

Corrections should be submitted to original SpeechéS only. They should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned. Qne veek, to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, Department of Conference Services, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza. and incorporated in a copy of the record.

91-61971 7852V (E)

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Arabic): 1 cal1 on the

Rapporteur of the First Conunittee. Mr. Pablo Emilio Sader of Uruguay to

introduce the reports of the First Conunittee in one intervention.

Mr. SADER (Uruguay), Rapporteur of the First Committee

(interpretation from Spanish): It is a particular pleasure and honour for me

to address the plenary meeting of the General Assemhly and to inform the

Assembly that the First Committee successfully concluded its vork in an

atmosphere free of confrontation, reflecting the changes that have taken place

on the international scene since the end of the cold var. The approach taken

by delegations vas constructive and cooperative, making it possible for a

spirit of compromise to prevail throughout the meetings of the First Conunittee

at the forty-sixth session. The members of the Committee focused mainly on

issues vhich vere ripe for consideration at the multilateral level and vhich

yielded fruitful results.

(Hr. Sader. Raouorteur, First Committee)

A few statistics may illustrate the spirit of cooperation and

concession. This year. 48 draft resolutions and decisions were submitted,

3 of which were later withdrawn, in comparison with the 54 that were submitted

during the forty-fifth session. This constitutes a notable decrease from the

forty-second session, when 79 drafts were submitted.

There ras also a major change in the voting patterns the voting patterns

and a groving willingness to accept differing positions. not pressing certain

issues to a vote, and making every effort to achieve a consensus.

Thus the 22 drafts adopted without a vote represent a percentaqe

increase. from 50 per cent last year to 60 per cent at this session.

In connection with disannament-related issues, this ras a year in which

new and important issues were considered that seem to be destined for future

development. This and other elements contributed to making this session

qualitatively different from past sessions.

The first fact we can note in the general debate of the First Connnittee

is that a spirit of widespread satisfaction vas observed at the unprecedented

progress achieved by the hro major nuclear Powers in reducing their nuclear

arsenals.

(-, First Committee)

As in previous years. nuclear disarmament issues had a prominent place on

the First Committee's agenda. One third of al1 the resolutions on disarmament

deal vith such nuclear-related issues as non-proliferation, a nuclear-test

ban. nuclear-veapon-free zones. security assurances for non-nuclear-veapon

States. on nuclear-acms freeze and a ban on the production of Eissionable

material for nuclear veapons.

Takinq into account the circumstances surroundinq the Gulf War and its

aftermath, many deleqations expressed concern about nuclear proliferation aiid

emphasized the need for universal accession to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, an instrument that has become even more

relevant since the accession to the Treaty, or the declaration of intent to

accede to it. by China. France, South Africa, Lithuania, the United Republic

of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Many deleqations also called for

strenqtheninq the safequards system of the International Atomic Enerqy Aqency.

It is appropriate to mention that this year, for the first t h e . the

draft resolution on implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization

of Africa vas adopted without a vote. Another agenda item that vas the focus

of special attention dealt with nuclear tests. After 20 years of submitting

tvo separate draft resolutions on this item, this year, for the first time, it

vas possible to achieve a single test on the cessation of al1 nuclear tests.

Likevise, particularly noticeable this year ras the increased emphasis on

conventional and regional disarmament, vhich vas reflected in the adoption of

a number of draft resolutions on these items. The favourable political

atmosphere for the speedy conclt~sion of a convention on the complete

proliibition of ch~mical veapons vas reflected in a draft resolution adopted

(MT. Sader. Rauportefif. First Committee)

without a vote, in which the Conference on Disarmament is urged to resolve

outstanding issues so as to achieve a final agreement at its 1992 session.

Judging €rom a process begun a few years ago, it can be said that the

First Committee made even further progress towards a more practical

decision-making procedure, geared towards achieving practical results in

specific matters. With the progressive consolidation of the new international

situation and the prevailing atmosphere of cooperation, it may be said that

there has been an automatic rationalization of the Cornittee's work. As was

pointed out by the Chairman of the Committee in his concluding statement.

pertinent suggestions have been submitted as to the procedure to be followcd

for the consideration of disarmament and international security issues in

order to rationalize the Committee's work even further (A/C.1/46/PV.45.

- 1 6 ) . In this regard. the Chairman announced that consultations would be

held in New York and in Geneva with a view to making progress in this area a t

the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

The last - and certainly not the least important - item that 1 should

like to highlight with regard to the disarmament agenda is the widespread

recognition of the broadened concept of security, which emerged during the

general debate and in the treatment of the item on the relationship between

disarmament and development. This concept is reflected in the words of the

Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi. in the

statement he made before the First Conmittee:

"Arms control and disarmament now constitute essential parts of the

complex process of consolidating peace. together with peace-keeping.

diplornatic mediation, judicial settlements and other efforts for

(k Sader. Rawaorteur, &st Comittee)

enhancinq international cooperation. What is needed is a sustained

well-coordinated and non-compartmentalized approach to new global issues.

"The international comunity bas to espouse a multidimensional

approach to peace and security in which the military aspect vil1 not

dominate but will be considered in relation to other priorities such as

development, welfare, environment and the protection of human rights."

(+/C.1/46/PV.4, PD.. 3 and 4)

The PRESIDENI: The Assembly has thus concluded this stage of its

consideration of agenda item 60.

We turn next to the report (A/46/674) of the Pirst Committee on agenda

item 61. entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the

Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly".

The Assembly has before it six draft resolutions, A to P, recomended by

the First Committee in paragraph 20 of its report. As 1 informed the Assembly

earlier, action on draft resolution C is postponed until Monday mornieg. The

Assembly, therefore, vil1 take action on the five draft resolutions A and B

and D to F. After al1 the votes have been taken, representatives ri11 again

be given an opportunity to explain their vote.

The PRESIDENT: Draft resolution E is entitled "Convention on the

Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons".



In favour: Afghanistan. Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda. Bahamas, Bahrain. Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus. Belize. Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia. Botswana, Brazil, ~runei Darussalam. Burkina Paso, Burundi. Cameroon, Cape Verde. Central African Republic. Chad. Chile, China, Colombia. Comoros. Congo, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic. Ecuador, Egypt. El Salvador, Ethiopia, Pederated States of Micronesia. Fiji. Gabon, Gambia. Ghana. Guinea. Guinea-Bissau. Guyana, Haiti, Honduras. India. Indonesia.

, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica. Jordan. Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lebanon, Lesotho. Liberia. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar. Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, blyanmar, Namibia. Nepal. Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria. Chnan, Pakistan, Panama. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia. Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone. Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalie, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic. Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago. Tunisia. Uganda, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania. Uruguay, Vanuatu. Venezuela. Viet Nam. Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia. Zimbabwe

Aaainst: Australia, Belgium. Canada. Denmark. France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand. Norway, Portugal. Spain, Turkey. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. United States of America

mstaininq: Albania, Argentina. Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia. Finland. Greece, Hungary. Iceland. Ireland, Israel, Japan. Latvia. Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Marshall Islands. Poland. Republic of Korea. Bomania. Samoa. Sweden

Draft resolution E was'adouted bv 122 to 16, with 22 abstentions (resolution 46/37 D) .

Part III

PART III

A. Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction

B. Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction

Document No.

6 4

No. 14860

MULTILATERAL

Convention on the prohibition of the developrnent, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972

Aurhenric rerts: English. Russian, French. Spanish utid Cliitiese.

Regisrered bv the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. rhe ti/ i i ted Kingdom of Great Brirain and ~Vonhern lreland and rhe ti/trted Srures ofAmerica on 15 July 1976.

Convention sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication et du stockage des armes bactériologiques (biologiques) ou à toxines et sur leur destruction. Ouverte à la signature à Londres, Moscou et Washing- ton le 10 avril 1972

Extes authentiques : anglais. russe. français. espagttol et chinois

Enregistrée par les États-unis d'Amérique. le Roaume-Uni de Gratide-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et l 'Union des Républiques sociulisres soi,iériques le 15 juillet 1976.

C O N V E N T I O N O N T H E PROHIBITION OF T H E DEVELOPMENT. PRO- D ü C T I O N A N D STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGIC- A L ) A N D TOXIN WEAPONS A N D O N THElR DESTRUCTION

The Siares Panies to this Convention. Dciermined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and

cornpletc disarmament. includinr! the ~rohibition and elimination of al1 tvws of weaDons 01 &,<, Je\imîiion. ana 'on\in&d ihat the pmhib:tion of ihe de\elopm;nt. produ~tion and .iockpilin~ u i chemical and bactenological tbiologicali ueapons anc iheir elimina-

[ion. through effective measures. will facilitate the achie\.emeni of feneral and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Recognising the imponant significance of the Protocol for the Pri,hibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating. Poisonous or Other Gases. and of Bacicriological h4eihod.i o f Warfare. signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.' and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made. and continues to make. to mitigating the horrors of war,

Rsafirming their adhemnce to the pnnciples and objectives of that Protocoi and calling upon al1 States to comply strictly wiih them.

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned al1 actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and ihe general improvemeni of rhe inrernational atmosphere.

Desiring also to contribute to the realisation of the purposes and principles of ihe Charter of the Uniied Nations,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States. ihroush effective measures. such dangerous weapons of mass destmction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents.

Recognising ihat an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological ibiological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effeciivc measures also for the prohibition of the development. production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. and determined to continue negotiations to that end.

Determined. for the sake of al1 mankind. to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins k i n g used as weapons.

Convinced thar such use would be repugnant to fhe conscience of mankind and that no effon should k spared to minimise this nsk.

Have agreed as follows:

A i r e 1 Each Siate Pany to this Convention undenakes never in any circumstances to develop. produce. stwkpile or othewise acquire or rctain: ( 1 ) microbial or other biological agents. or toxins wharever their origin or method of

production. of types and in quantifies that have no justification for prophylactic. protective or other peaceful purposes:

(2) weapons. equipment or means of delivery designcd !O use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in umed conflict.

Anicle I I . Each State Pany to this Convention undenakes to destroy. or to diven to peaceiul purposes. as soon as possible but nor later than nine monthr after the entry inro force of the Convention. a11 agents. toxins. weapons. equipment and means of delivery

Came i n t o f o r c e o n 26 March 1975 . T e x t of t h e C o n v e n t i o n is r e p r o d u c e d £rom 1015 WTS 1 6 4 .

1976 Unilcd Nalion< - T-ty Srria . Yatioru Unies - Recueil des Traiti. 161

specified in hnicle 1 o f rhe Convention. which are in i f s possession or under i l s jurisdiction or control. I n implementing the provisions of thi3 Anicle al1 necessa. safety precautions shall be obsemed to protect populaitons and the environment.

Anicle 111. Each State Pany to this Convention undenales no1 to transier to any recipient whatsover. direcrly or indirectly. and no1 in an!. way fo assisi. encourqe. or induce an). State. group of States or international organisations to rnanufsciure or othewise acquire any o f the agents. roxins. weapons. equipment or rneans o i deliven specified in Aniclc I o f the Convention.

Anicle IV Each Statc Pany to rhis Convention shall. in accordance wirh i f s constitutional processes. take any necessa. mexures to prohibir and prevent the development. production. stockpiling. acquisition or retention of the agents. iorins. weapons. equipment and means of delivery spccified in r\nicle I of the Convention. within the temrory o f such State. under ifs jurisdiction or under i f s conrrol anywhere.

Anicle i! The Siares Panies to rhis Convention undenake to consult one another and to CO-opcrate in solving an!. problems which rnay anse in relation to the objective of. or i n the application of the provisions of. the Convention. Consulration and CO-operation pursuanr to this Anicle ma). also be undenaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in nccordnnce with its Chaner.

Anicle V I . ( 1 ) An! State Pany ro this Convention which finds that an? other Statç Pany is acting in breach o f obligations deriving from the provisions o f the Convention rnay lodge a complaint with the Security Council o f the United Nations. Such a complaint should include al1 possible evidence confirming ifs validity. as well as a request for its consideration by the Securiv Council.

(2) Each Siate Pany to this Convention undeflakes to CO-operate in c-ing out an! invesiigation which the Security Council rnay initiale. in accordance with the provisions of the Chaner o f the United Nations. on the basis o f the cornplaint received by ihe Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Panies to the Convention o i the resulo of the investigation.

Anicle V I / . Each Statc Pany ro this Convention undenakes to provide or suppon assistance. in accordance u-ith the United Nations Chaner. to any Pany to the Convention which so requests. i f the Securiry Council decides ihai such P m y has been exposed to danger as a result o f violarion o f the Convention.

Arricle V I I I . Nothing i n this Convention shall be interpreted as in an? way lirniting or delracting fmm the obligations assumed by any State under rhc Protocol for thc Rohibiiion o f the Use in War of Asphyxiating. Poisonous or Other Gases. and o f Bacteriological Methods o f Warfare. signed at Geneva on 17 June 1915.

Article lx. Each Staie Party to ihis Convcntion a[firms rhe recognised objective of effec~ive prohibition o f chcmical weapons and. to this end. undenakcs to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition o f their development. production and stockpiling and for their destruction. and on appmpriatc measures concerning equipment and means of delivey specifically designed for the production or use o f chernical agents for wcapons purposcs.

Anicle X . ( 1 ) The States Panies to this Convention undenake to facilitate. and ~-~ ~- ~~~~- ~ ~

have the right to p&icipate in. the fullest possible excha"ge of equipment. materials and scientific and technolonical information for the use of bacterioloeical (bioloeicall aeenis and toxins for peaceful~urposes. Panies to the convention in a position to doko shalialso CO-opcraie in convibuting individually or togerhcr with orher States or internalional organisations to the funher developrnent and application of scientific discoveries in the

PI 1015. 1-14-

168 United Nation< - mity Seria Nation< ~ n l a - Recueil d a i r a i t 6 19l6

field of bactcriology (biology) for the prevenrion of disease. or for other peaceful OUIDOSCS. . .

1 2 , This Con\ention ,hall k implcrnented in a manner desiencd to avoid hampenng the ecunomic or technoloeicaI develo~rnenr o i States Pmies IO the Con\,eniion Jr inrernational co.operation the field o'f peaceful bacteriological (biological) acriviries. including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equiprnent for the processing. use or production of bactenological Ibiological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Aniclr XI. Any State Pany may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendmrnts shall enter into force for each State Pany accepting the arnendmenrs upon rheir acceptance by a majoriry of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by il.

Anicle X I I . Five years after the enrry into force of this Convention. or earlier if it is requested by 3 majority of Panies to the Convention by submirting a proposal ro this effect to the Depositary Governments. a conference of States Panies to the Convenrion shall be held ar Geneva. Switzerland. to review the operation of the Convention. wirh a view to assuring thnt the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convenrion. including the provisions concerning negoriarions on chemical weapons. are being realised. Such review ,hall take into accounr any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

Anicle X I I I . (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Pany to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignry

have the right to wiihdraw frorn the Convenrion if it decides that extraordinary events. related ro the subject matter of the Convention. have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country. I r shall give notice of such withdrawal to ail other States Panies to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three monrhs in advance. Such notice shall include a sratement of the exunordinary events it regards as having jeopardised its supreme intercsts.

Anicle XIV ( 1 ) This Convention shall be open to al1 States for signature. Any Stale which does nor sign the Convenrion k f o r e its entry into force in accordnnce with paragraph 3 of this Anicle may accede ro it at any tirne.

(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signaroy States. Instmments of ratification and instmrnents of accession shall be deposited with the Governmentsof the United Kingdorn of Gren Britain and Nonhem Ireland. the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. which are hereby dcsignated the Depositary Governments.

13) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instmrnenrs of ratification by rwenty-two Governmenis. inciuding rhc Governments designated as Depositaies of the Convention.

(4) For States whose instmrnents of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry inro force of rhis Convention. it shall enter inro force on the date of the deposit of their insrmments of ratification or accession.

( 5 ) The Deposirnry Governments shall promptly inform al1 signatory and acceding States of the date ofeach signature, the date of deposit of each instmment of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention. and of the receipr of orher notices.

(6) This Convention shall be registered by the D e p o s i q Governments punuant to Anicle 102 of rhe Chaner o i the United Nations.

lW6 United Yslions - Tmnty &ria . Sstianc Unies - Recueil des Trait& 169

n i r l e XI! This Convention. the English. Russian. French. Spanish and Chinese texrs o f which are equally authentic. shall be deposited in the archives o f the Deposiray Governrnents. Duly cenified copies of the Convenrion shall bc transmiited bu the Deposiray Governrnents IO the Governments o f the signatop and accedine States.

United Nations Centre for Disamament Affairs

DISARMMENT

The Chernical Weapons Conven.l:ion with Selective Index

United Nations, New York 1994

Editorial Note

The present publication comprises the text of the chemical weapons Convention and a selective index. The latter is intended to provide the reader with the main elements and key wordsand phrasesof the Convention; it is based on a fuller index prepared by A. Walter Dom and published by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Affairs (UNIDIR) asInder to the Chemical Weapons Convention (Sales No. GV.E.93.0.13), Research Paper No. 18. The text of the Convention in the present volume can also be used in conjunction with the UNIDIR Index, as both publications utilize the pagination of the certified true copy of the Convention.

UNiTED NAïlONS PUBLICATION

Sales No. E.95.iX.2

ISBN 92-1-142213-2

Copyright O United Nations 1994 Al1 rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

CO~VENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTION . STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND

ON THEIR D E S T R U ~ O N . . Preamble ............................................................

........... 1 . General obligations ................................... : II . Definitions and cntena ............................................. III . Declarations ......................................................

................................................. 1 V. Chemical weapons V. Chemical weapons production facilities ................................ VI . ActMties not prohibited under this convention ......................... VI1 . National implementation measures ................................... VI11 . The Organization .................................................. IX . Consultations. cooperation and fact-finding ............................ X . Assistance and protection against chernical weapons .................... XI . Economic and technological development ............................ XII . Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance.

including sanctions ............................................... XII1 . Relation to other international agreements ............................. XIV . Settlement of disputes .............................................. XV. Amendments .................................................... XVI . Duration and withdrawal ............................................ XVII . Status of the annexes ............................................... XVIII . Signature ......................................................... XIX . Ratification ....................................................... XX . Accession ...................................................... XXI . Entry into force .................................................... XXII . Reservations ...................................................... XXIII . Deposita ry ........................................................ XXI V. Authentic texts ................................................. : ..

Annex on chemicals (table of contents) ................................... Annex on implementation and verification (table of contents) ................ 54 Annex on the protection of wnfidential information (table of contents) ........ 167

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chernical Weapons and on Their Destruction

The States Parties to this Convention,

Detemined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of al1 types of weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned al1 actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (the Geneva Protocol of 1925),

Recognizing that this Convention reaffirms principles and objectives of and obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Bearing in mind the objective contained in Article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,

Detemined for the sake of al1 mankind, to exclude wmpletely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925,

Recognuing the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent agreements and relevant principles of international law, of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare,

Considering that achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind,

Desiring to promote fkee trade in chemicals as well as international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention in order to enhance the economic and technological development of al1 States Parties,

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Convinced that the cornulete and effective ~rohibition of the develoornent. production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, traisfer and use of chernical wéapons; and their destruction, represent a necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives,

Have agreed as follows:

Arücle 1

Article I

1. Each State Party t o this Convention undertakes never under any circurnstances:

(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chernical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;

(b) To use chernical weapons;

(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;

(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chernical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

3. Each State Party undeaakes to destroy al1 chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a rnethod of warfare.

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Article II DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. "Chemical Weapons" means the following, together or separately:

(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;

(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;

( c ) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b) .

2. "Toxic Chemical" means:

Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes al1 such chemicals, regardless of their origin o r of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.

(For the purpose of implementing this Convention, toxic chemicals which have been identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)

3. "Precursor" means:

Any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system.

(For the purpose of implementing this Convention, precursors which have been identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)

4. "Key Component of Binary or Multicomponent Chemical Systems" (hereinafter referred to as "key component") means:

The precursor which plays the most important role in determining the toxic pro~erties of the final product and reacts rapidly with other chemicals in the binary or multicomponent system.

Article II

5. "Old Chernical Weapons" rneans:

(a) Chemical weapons which were produced before 1925; or

(b) Chemical weapons produced in the period between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such extent that they can no longer be used as chemical weapons.

6. "Abandoned Chernical Weapons" means:

Chemical weapons, including old chemical weapons, abandoned by a State after 1 January 1925 on the territory of another State without the consent of the latter.

7. "Riot Control Agent" rneans:

Any chernical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following tennination of exposure.

8. "Chemical Weapons Production Facility":

(a) Means any equipment, as well as any building housing such equipment, that was designed, constructed or used at any lime since 1 J a n u q 1946:

(i) As part of the stage in the production of chernicals ("final technological stage") where the rnaterial flows would contain, when the equipment is in operation:

(1) Any chernical listed in Schedule 1 in the Annex on Chemicals; or

(2) Any other chemical that has no use, above 1 tonne pet year on the territory of a State Party or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, but can be used for chernical weapons purposes;

(ii) For filling chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the filling of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 into munitions, devices or bulk storage containers; the filling of chernicals into containers that form part of assembled binary munitions and devices o r into chemical submunitions that forrn part of assernbled unitary munitions and devices, and the loading of the containers and chernical submunitions into the respective munitions and devices;

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(b) Dws not mean:

(i) Any facility having a production capacity for synthesis of chemicals specified in subparagraph (a) (i) that is less than 1 tonne;

(ii) Any facility in which a chemical specified in subparagraph (a) (i) is or was produced as an unavoidable by-product of activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, provided that the chernical does not exceed 3 per cent of the total product and that the facility is subject to declaration and inspection under the Annex on Implementation and Verification (hereinafter referred to as "Venfication Annex"); or

(iii) The single small-scale facility for production of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 for purposes not prohibited under this Convention as referred to in Part VI of the Verification Annex.

9. "Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention" means:

(a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;

(b) Protective purposes, narnely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons;

(c) Military purposes not c o ~ e c t e d with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chernicals as a method of warfare;

(d) Law enforcement including domestic riot wntrol purposes.

10. "Production Capacity" means:

The annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific chemical based on the technological process actually used or, if the process is not yet operational, planned to be used at the relevant facility. It shall be deemed to be equal to the nameplate capacity or, if the nameplate capacity is not available, to the design capacity. The nameplate capacity is the product output under conditions optimized for maximum quantity for the production facility, as demonstrated by one or more test-runs. The design capacity is the corresponding theoretically calculated product output.

11. "Organization" means the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established pursuant to Article VI11 of this Convention.

Artide il

12. For the purposes of Article VI:

(a) "Production" of a chernical means its formation through chemical reaction;

(b) "Rocessing" of a chemical means a physical process, such as formulation, extraction and purification, in which a chernical is not converted into another chemical;

(c) "Consumption" of a chemical means its conversion into another chemical via a chemical reaction.

1. Each State Party shall subrnit to the Organization, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall:

(a) With respect to chemical weapons:

(i) Declare whether it owns or possesses any chernical weapons, or whether there are any chemical weapons located in any place under its jurisdiction or control;

(ii) Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of chernical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraphs 1 to 3, of the Verification Annex, except for those chemical weapons referred to in sub-subparagraph (iii);

(iii) Report any chernical weapons on its territory that are owned and possessed by another State and located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 4, of the Verification Annex;

(iv) Declare whether it bas transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 and specify the transfer or receipt of such weapons, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 5, of the Verification Annex;

(v) Provide its general plan for destruction of chemical weapons that it owns o r possesses, o r that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 6, of the Verification Annex;

(b) With respect to old chernical weapons and abandoned chernical weapons:

(i) Declare whether it has on its territory old chemical weapons and provide al1 available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 3, of the Verification Annex;

Article III

(ii) Declare whether there are abandoned chemical weapons on its territory and provide al1 available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 8, of the Verification Annex;

(iii) Declare whether it has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of other States and provide al1 available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 10, of the Verification Annex;

( c ) With rcspect to chemical weapons production facilities:

(i) Declare whether it has or has had any chemical weapons production facility under its ownership or possession, or that is or has been located in any place under its jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 January 1946;

(ii) Specify any chemical weapons production facility it has or has had under its ownership or possession or that is or has been located in any place under its jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 January 1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1, of the Verification Annex,,except for those facilities referred to in sub-subparagraph (iii);

(iii) Report any chemical weapons production facility on its territory that another State has or has had under its ownership and possession and that is or has been located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State a t any time since 1 January 1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 2, of the Verification Annex;

(iv) Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any equipment for the production of chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 and speciîj the transfer or receipt of such equipment, in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 3 to 5, of the Verification Annex;

(v) Provide its general plan for destruction of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 6, of the Verification Annex;

(vi) Specify actions to be taken for closure of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1 ( i ) , of the Verification Annex;

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(vü) Provide its general plan for any temporav conversion of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, into a chemical weapons destruction facility, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 7, of the Verification Annex;

(d) With respect to other facilities:

Specify the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility or establishment under its ownership or possession, or located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, and that has been designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946 primarily for development of chemical weapons. Such declaration shail include, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites;

( e ) With respect to riot control agents: Specify the chemicai name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number, if assigned, of each chemical it holds for riot control purposes. This declaration shail be updated not later than 30 days after any change becomes effective.

2. The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985.

Article IV

Article IV

1. The provisions of this Article and the detailed procedures for its implementation shall apply to al1 chemical weapons owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, except old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons to which Part IV (B) of the Verification Annex applies.

2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this Article are set forth in the Verification Annex.

3. Al1 locations at which chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 are stored or destroyed shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, in accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.

4. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under Article III, paragraph 1 (a), has been submitted, provide access to chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 for the purpose of systematic verification of the declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State Party shall not remove any of these chemical weapons, except to a chemical weapons destruction facility. It shall provide access to such chemical weapons, for the purpose of systematic on-site verification.

5. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical weapons destmction facilities and their storage areas, that it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, for the purpose of systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.

6. Each State Party shall destroy ail chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as "order of destmction"). Such destruction shall begin not later than two years after this Convention enters into force for it and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying such chemicai weapons at a faster rate.

7. Each State Party shall:

(a) Submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 not later than 60 days before each annual destruction period begins, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 29, of the Verification Annex; the detailed plans shall encompass al1 stocks to be destroyed during the next annual destmction period;

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(b) Submit declarations annually regarding the implementation of its plans for destruction of chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1, not later than 60 days after the end of each annual destruction period; and

( c ) Certifj, not later thah 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that al1 chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 have been destroyed.

8. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after the 10-year.period for destruction set forth in paragraph 6, it shall destroy chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 as soon as possible. The order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification for such a State Party shall be determined by the Executive Council.

9. Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after the initial declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, secured and destroyed in accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.

10. Each State Party, during transportation, sampling, storage and destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each State Party shall transport, sample, store and destroy chemical weapons in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions.

11. Any State Party which has on its territory chemical weapons that are owned or possessed by another State, or that are located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State, shall make the fullest efforts to ensure that these chemical weapons are removed from its territory not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it. If they are not removed within one year, the State Party may request the Organization and other States Parties to provide assistance in the destruction of these chemical weapons.

12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with other States Parties that request information or assistance on a bilateral basis or through the Technical Secretariat regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons.

13. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex, the Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of chemical weapons storage and their destruction among States Parties.

To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit verification to measures complementary to those undertaken pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it considers that:

Article N

(a ) Verification provisions of such an agreement are consistent with the verification provisions of this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex;

(b) Implementation of such an agreement provides for sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant provisions of this Convention; and

(c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement keep the Organization fully informed about their verification activities.

14. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to paragraph 13, the Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement.

15. Nothing in paragraphs 13 and 14 shall affect the obligation of a State Party to provide declarations pursuant to Article III, this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex.

16. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification of storage and destruction of these chemical weapons unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. If the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 13, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7.

17. The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985. .

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Article V

1. The provisions o i this Article and the detailed procedures for its implementation shall apply to any and al1 chernical weapons production facilities owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this Article are set forth in the Verification Annex.

3. Al1 chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex.

4. Each State Party shall cease immediately al1 activity at chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, except activity required for closure.

5. No State Party shall construct any new chemical weapons production facilities or modify any existing facilities for the purpose of chemical weapons production or for any other activity prohibited under this Convention.

6. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under Article III, paragraph 1 (c), has been subrnitted, provide access to chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, for the purpose of systematic verification of the declaration through on-site inspection.

>7. Each State Party shall:

(a) Close, not later than 90 days after this Convention enters into force for it, al1 chernical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, in accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex, and give notice thereof; and

(b ) Provide access to chernical weaoons oroduction facilities s~ecified in , r paragraph 1, subsequent to closure, for the purpose of systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in order to ensure that the faciiity rernains closed andis subsequently destroyed.

8. Each State Party shall destroy al1 chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 and related facilities and equipment, pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with an agreed rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as "order of destruction"). Such destruction shall begin not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it, and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying such facilities at a faster rate.

Article V

9. Each State Party shall:

(a) Submit detailed plans for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, not later than 180 days before the destmction of each facility begins;

(b) Submit declarations annually regarding the implementation of its plans for the destruction of al1 chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, not later than 90 days after the end of each annual destmction period; and

(c ) Certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that al1 chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 have been destroyed.

10. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after the 10-year period for destruction set forth in paragraph 8, it shail destroy chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 as soon as possible. The order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification for such a State Party shall be determined by the Executive Council.

11. Each State Party, during the destmction of chemical weapons production faciiities, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each State Party shall destroy chemical weapons production facilities in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions.

12. Chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 18 to 25, of the Verification Annex. Such a converted facility must be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons but, in any case, not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention.

13. A State Party may request, in exceptional cases of compelling need, permission to use a chemical weapons production facility specified in paragraph 1 for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. Upon the recommendation of the Executive Councii, the Conference of the States Parties shall decide whether or not to approve the request and shall establish the conditions upon which approval is contingent in accordance with Part V, Section D, of the Verification Annex.

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14. The chemical weapons production facility shall be converted in such a manner that the converted facility is not more capable of being reconverted into a chemical weapons production facility than any other facility used for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes not involving chemicals listed in Schedule 1.

15. Al1 converted facilities shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Part V, Section D, of the Verification Annex.

16. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex, the Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of chemical weapons production facilities and their destruction among States Parties.

To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit the verification to measures complementary to those undertaken pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it considers that:

(a ) Verification provisions of such an agreement are consistent with the verification provisions of this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex;

(b) Implementation of the agreement provides for sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant provisions of this Convention; and

(c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement keep the Organization fully informed about their verification activities.

17. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to paragraph 16, the Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement.

18. Nothing in paragraphs. 16 and 17 shall affect the obligation of a State Party to make declarations pursuant to Article III, this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex.

19. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification under this Article unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. If the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 16, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7.

Article VI

Article CiI A r n V ~ n ~ s NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION

1. Each State Party has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chernicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. To this end, and in order to ver@ that activities are in accordance with obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall subject toxic chernicals and their precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the Annex on Chemicals, facilities related to such chemicals, and other facilities as specified in the Verification Annex, that are located on its territoly or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control, to verification measures as provided in the Verification Annex.

3. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 1 (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule 1 chemicals") to the prohibitions on production, acquisition, retention, transfer and use as specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex. It shall subject Schedule 1 chemicals and facilities specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.

4. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 2 (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule 2 chemicals") and facilities specified in Part VI1 of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.

5. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 3 (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule 3 chemicals") and facilities specified in Part VI11 of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.

6. Each State Party shall subject facilities specified in Part IX of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and eventual on-site verification in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex unless decided otherwise by the Conference of the States Parties pursuant to Part IX, paragraph 22, of the Verification Annex.

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7. Not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, each State Party shall make an initial declaration on relevant chemicals and facilities in accordance with the Verification Annex.

8. Each State Party shall make annual declarations regarding the relevant chemicals and facilities in accordance with the Verification Annex.

9. For the purpose of on-site verification, each State Party shall grant to the inspectors access to facilities as required in the Verification Annex.

10. In conducting verification activities, the Technical Secretariat shall avoid undue intrusion into the State Party's chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention and, in particular, abide by the provisions set forth in the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information (hereinafter referred to as "Confidentiality Annex").

11. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties, and international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

Article W

Article YI1

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATiON MEASURES

General undertakings

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention. In particular, it shail:

(a) Prohibit naturai and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity;

(b) Not permit in any place under its wntrol any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention; and

(c) Extend its pend legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law.

2. Each State Party shail cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1.

3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this regard.

Relations between the State Party and the Organization

4. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. Each State Party shall notify the Organization of its National Authority at the time that this Convention enters into force for it.

5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and administrative measures taken to implement this Convention.

6. Each State Party shall treat as wnfidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in connection with the implementation of this Convention. It shall treat such

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information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Convention and in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Confi- dentiality Annex.

7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of al1 its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat.

Article WI

Article WII THE ORGANIZATION

A. GENERAL PROViSlONS

1. The States Parties to.this Convention hereby establish the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve the object and purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.

2. Al1 States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization.

3. The seat of the Headquarters of the Organization shall be The Hague, Kingdom of the Netherlands.

4. There are hereby established as the organs of the Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.

5. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this Convention in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Convention. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and militas, activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Convention and, in particular, shall abide by the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality Annex.

6 . In undertaking its verification activities the Organization shall consider measures to make use of advances in science and technology.

7. The wsts of the Organization's activities shall be paid by States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and this Organization, and subject to the provisions of Articles IV and V. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatos, Commission shail be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget. The budget of the Organization shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to administrative and other wsts, and one relating to verification costs.

8. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payrnent of its financial contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due

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from it for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the wntrol of the member.

B. THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES

Composition, procedures and deckion-making

9. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference") shall be composed of al1 members of this Organization. Each member shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.

10. The first session of the Conference shall be wnvened by the depositary not later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Convention.

11. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which shall be held annually unless it decides othenvise.

12. Special sessions of the Conference shall be convened:

(a) When decided by the Conference;

(b) When requested by the Executive Council;

(c) When requested by any member and supported by one third of the members; or

(d) In accordance with paragraph 22 to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention.

Except in the case of subparagraph (d), the special session shall be wnvened not later than 30 days after receipt of the request by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, unless specified otherwise in the request.

13. ~ h e Conference shall also be wnvened in the form of an Amendment Conference in accordance with Article XV, paragraph 2.

14. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise.

15. The Conference shall adopt its niles of procedure. At the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at the next regular session.

Article WI

16. A majority of the members of the Organization shall constitute a quorum for the Conference.

17. Each member of the Organization shall have one vote in the Conference.

18. The Conference shali take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue cornes up for decision, the Chairman shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Convention. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless othenvise decided by the Conference by the majority required for decisions on matten of substance.

19. The Conference shali be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Convention, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. It may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues related to this Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.

20. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this Convention, and act in order to promote its object and purpose. The Conference shall review compliance with this Convention. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines in accordance with this Convention to either of them in the exercise of their functions.

21. The Conference shall:

(a) Consider and adopt at its regular sessions the report, programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider other reports;

(b) Decide on the sa le of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 7;

(c ) Elect the members of the Executive Council;

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(d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as "the. Director-General");

(e) ~ ~ ~ r o v e 'the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter;

(f) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention;

(g) Foster international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities;

(h) Review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Convention and, in this context, direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts appointed in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference;

(i) Consider and approve at its first session any draft agreements, provisions and guidelines developed by the Preparatory Commission;

0) Establish at its first session the voluntary fund for assistance in accordance with Article X;

( k ) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention, in accordance with Article XII.

22. The Conference shall not later than one year after the expiry of the fifth and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention, and at such other times within that t h e period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. At intervals of five years thereafter, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the Conference shall be convened with the same objective.

Composition, procedure and decision-making

23. The Executive Council shall consist of 41 members. Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to serve on the Executive Council. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected

Article MI1

by the Conference for a term of two years. In order to ensure the effective functioning of this Convention, due regard being specially paid to equitable geographical distribution, to the importance of chemical industry, as well as to political and security interests, the Executive Council shall be composed as follows:

(a) Nine States Parties from Africa to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these nine States Parties, three'members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating these three members;

(b ) Nine States Parties from Asia to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these nine States Parties, four members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating these four members;

(c) Five States Parties from Eastern Europe to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these five States Parties, one member shall, as a rule, be the State Party with the most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating this one member;

(d) Seven States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these seven States Parties, three members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating these three members;

(e ) Ten States Parties from among Western European and other States to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these 10 States Parties, 5 members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating these five members;

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(f) One further State Party to be designated consecutively by States Parties located in the regions of Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. As a basis for this designation it is understood that this State Party shall be a rotating member from these regions.

24. For the first election of the Executive Council20 members shall be elected for a term of one year, due regard being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in paragraph 23.

25. After the full implementation of Articles IV and V the Conference may, upon the request of a majority of the members of the Executive Council, review the composition of the Executive Council taking into account developments related to the principles specified in paragraph 23 that are governing its composition.

26. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval.

27. The Executive Councii shall elect its Chairman from among its members.

28. The Executive Councii shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions it shall meet as often as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions.

29. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote. Unless otherwise specified in this Convention, the Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of al1 its members. The Executive Councii shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of al1 its members. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Executive Council by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

Powers and functions

30. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Organization. It shall be responsible to the Conference. The Executive Council shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it under this Convention, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and assure their proper and continuous implementation.

31. The Executive Council shall promote the effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Convention. It shall supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat, cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party and facilitate consultations and cooperation among States Parties at their request.

Article W I

32. The Executive Council shall:

(a) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft programme and budget of the Organization;

(b ) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Convention, the report on the performance of its own activities and such special reports as it deems necessary or which the Conference may request;

(c) Make arrangements for the sessirns of the Conference including the preparation of the draft agenda.

33. The Executive Council may request the convening of a special session of the Conference.

34. The Executive Council shall:

(a ) Conclude agreements or arrangements with States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization, subject to prior approval by the Conference;

(b) Conclude agreements with States Parties on behalf of the Organization in connection with Article X and supervise the voluntary fund referred to in Article X;

(c) Approve agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities, negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States Parties.

35. The Executive Council shall consider any issue or.matter within its cornpetence affecting this Convention and its irnplementation, including wncems regarding cornpliance, and cases of non-compliance, and, as appropriate, inform States Parties and bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference.

36. In its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding cornpliance and cases of non-compliance, including, inter alia, abuse of the rights provided for under this Convention, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request the State Party to take measures to redress the situation withii a specified time. To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures:

(a ) Inform al1 States Parties of the issue or matter;

(b ) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;

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(c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding mesures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance.

The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council. It shall at the same time inform al1 States Parties of this step.

37. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shall cany out the verification mesures provided for in this Convention. It shall carry out the other functions entrusted to it under this Convention as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference and the Executive Council.

38. The Technical Secretariat shall:

(a) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization;

(b) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Convention and such other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request;

(c) Provide administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive Council and subsidiary organs;

(d) Address and receive communications on behalf of the Organization to and from States Parties on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Convention;

(e) Provide technical assistance and technical evaluation to States Parties in the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, including evaluation of scheduled and unscheduled chemicals.

39. The Technical Secretariat shall:

(a) Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities with States Parties, subject to approval by the Executive Council;

(b) Not later than 180 days after entry into force of this Convention, coordinate the establishment and maintenance of permanent stockpiles of emergency and humanitarian assistance by States Parties in accordance with

Article W I

Article X, paragraphs 7 (b) and (c). The Technical Secretariat may inspect the items maintained for se~ceabiii îy. Lists of items to be stockpiled shall be considered and approved by the conferen& pursuant to paragraph 21 (ij above; '

. .. (c) Administer the voluntary fund referred to in ~ r t i c l e X, compile

declarations made by the States Parties and register, when requested, bilateral agreements concluded between States Parties or between a State. Party and the Organization for the purposes of Article X.

40. The Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council of any problem that has arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions, including doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with this Convention that have come to its notice in the performance of its verification activities and that it has been unable to resolve or clariij through its consultations with the State Party concemed.

41. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, inspectors and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required.

42. The Inspectorate shall be a unit of the Technical ~ecretariat and shall act under the supervision of the Director-General.

43. The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter.

44. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of seMce shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or as other members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.

45. The Director-General shall be responsible for the organization and functioning of the Scientific Advisory Board referred to in paragraph 21 (h). The Director-General shall, in consultation with States Parties, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve in their individual capacity. The members of the Board shall be appointed on the basis of their expertise in the particular

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scientific fields relevant to 'the implementation of this Convention. The Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues. In regard to the above, States Parties may submit lists of experts to the Director-General.

46. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff shali not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Conference and the Executive Council.

47. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectorsand the other members of the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

E. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

48. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.

49. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives appointed to the Executive Council together with their alternates and advisers, the Director-General and the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.

50. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the Organization and the States Parties as well as in an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the headquarters of the Organization is seated. These agreements shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to paragraph 21 (i).

51. Notwithstanding paragraphs 48 and 49, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Director-General and the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in Part II, Section B, of the Verification Annex.

Article IX

Article IX

1. States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly among themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which rnay be raised relating to the object and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Convention.

2. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request a challenge inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations among themselves, any matter which rnay cause doubt about wmpliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which rnay be considered ambiguous. A State Party which receives a request from another State Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting State Party believes causes such a doubt or concern shall provide the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 10 days after the request, with information sufficient to answer the doubt or concern raised along with an explanation of how the information provided resolves the matter. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of any two or more States Parties to arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which rnay cause doubt about compliance or gives rise to a concern about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and obligations of any State Party under other provisions of this Convention.

Procedure for requesting clarification

3. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which rnay be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about the possible non-cornpliance of another State Party with this Convention. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate information in its possession relevant to such a concern.

4. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any situation which rnay be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about its possible non-wmpliance with this Convention. In such a case, the following shall apply:

(a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the State Party concerned through the Director-General not later than 24 hours after its receipt;

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(b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 10 days after the receipt of the request;

(c ) The ~xecytive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it to the requesting State Party not later than 24 hours after its receipt;

(d ) If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain from the requested State Party further clarification;

(e) For the purpose of obtaining further clarification requested under subparagraph (d ) , the Executive Council may cal1 on the Director-General to establish a group of experts from the Technical Secretariat, or if appropriate staff are not available in the Technical Secretariat, from elsewhere, to examine al1 available information and data ,relevant to the situation causing the concern. The group of experts shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council on its findings;

(f) If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obt~ined under subparagraphs (cf) and (e) to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a special session of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. In such a special session, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may rewmmend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the situation.

5. A State Party shall also have the right to request the Executive Council to clarify any situation which has been wnsidered ambiguous or has given rise to a concem about its possible non-compliance with this Convention. The Executive Council shall respond by providing such assistance as appropriate.

6. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties about any request for clarification provided in this Article.

7. If the doubt or concern of a State Party about a possible non-compliance has not been resolved within 60 days after the submission of the request for clarification to the Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent consideration, notwithstanding its right to request a challenge inspection, it may request a special session of the Conference in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 12 (c). At such a special session, the Conference shall consider the matter and may rewmmend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the situation.

Article IX

Procedures for challenge inspections

8. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or wntrol of any other State Party for the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention, and to have this inspection conducted anywhere without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the Verification Annex.

9. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection request within the scope of this Convention and to provide in the inspection request al1 appropriate information on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible non-wmpliance with this Convention as specified in the Verification Annex. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded inspection requests, care being taken to avoid abuse. The challenge inspection shall be carried out for the sole purpose of determining facts relating to the possible non-wmpliance.

10. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of this Convention, each State Party shall permit the Technical Secretariat to wnduct the on-site challenge inspection pursuant to paragraph 8.

11. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location, and in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Verification Annex, the inspected State Party shall have:

(a) T h e right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Convention and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfil its mandate;

(b) The obligation to provide access within the requested site for the sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-compliance; and

(c) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to this Convention.

12. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:

(a) The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, send a representative who may be a national either of the requesting State par& or of a third State Party, toobserve the conduct of the challenge inspection.

(b) The inspected State Party shall then grant access to the observer in accordance with the Verification Annex.

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(c ) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the final report.

13. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request for an on-site challenge inspection to the Executive Council and a t the same time to the Director-General for immediate processing.

14. The Director-General shall immediately ascertain that the inspection request meets the requirements specified in Part X, paragraph 4, of the Verification Annex, and, if necessary, assist the requesting State Party in filing the inspection request accordingly. When the inspection request fulfils the requirements, preparations for the challenge inspection shall begin.

15. The Director-General shall transmit the inspection request to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours before the planned arriva1 of the inspection team at the point of entry.

16. After having received the inspection request, the Executive Council shall take cognizance of the Director-General's actions on the request and shall keep the case under its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, its deliberations shall not delay the inspection process.

17. The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours after having received the inspection request, decide by a three-quarter majority of al1 its members against carrying out the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this Convention as described in paragraph 8. Neither the requesting nor the inspected State Party shall participate in such a decision. If the Executive Council decides against the challenge inspection, preparations shall be stopped, no further action on the inspection request shall be taken, and the States Parties concerned shall be informed accordingly.

18. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the challenge inspection. The inspection mandate shall be the inspection request referred to in paragraphs 8 and 9 put into operational terms, and shall conform with the inspection request.

19. The challenge inspection shall be conducted in accordance with Part X or, in the case of alleged use, in accordance with Part XI of the Verification Annex. The inspection team shall be guided by the principle of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of its mission.

20. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the challenge inspection and facilitate its task. If the inspected State Party proposes,

Article ïX

pursuant to Part X, Section C, of the Verification Annex, arrangements to demonstrate compliance with this Convention, alternative to full and comprehensive access, it shall make every reasonable effort, through consultation; with the inspection team, to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts with the aim of demonstrating its compliance.

21. The final report shall contain the factual findings as well as an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of accew and cooperation granted for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge inspection. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the final report of the inspection team to the requesting State Party, to the inspected State Party, to the Executive Council and to al1 other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and of the inspected States Parties, as well as the views of other States Parties which may be conveyed to the Director-General for that purpose, and then provide them to al1 States Parties.

22. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and functions, review the final report of the inspection team as soon as it is presented, and address any concerns as to:

(a) Whether any non-compliance has occurred;

(b) Whether the request had been within the scope of this Convention; and

(c) Whether the right to request a challenge inspection had been abused.

23. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 22, it shall take the appropriate measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance with this Convention, including specific recommendations to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the Executive Council shall examine whether the requesting State Party should bear any of the financial implications of the challenge inspection.

24. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party shall have the right to participate in the review process. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties and the next session of the Conference of the outcome of the process.

25. If the Executive Council has made specific recommcndations to the Conference, the Conference shall consider action in accordance with Article XII.

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Article X ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. For the purposes of this Article, 'Assistance" means the coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons, including, inter Ùlia, the following: detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment; dewntamination equipment and dewntarninants; medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures.

2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party to wnduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection against chemical weapons, for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right t o participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons.

4. For the purposes of increasing the transparency of national programmes related to protective purposes, each State Party shall provide annually to the Technical Secretariat information on its programme, in accordance with procedures to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

5 . The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later than 180 days after entry into force of this Convention and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data bank wntaining freely available information concerning various means of protection against chemical weapons as well as such information as may be provided by States Parties.

The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources available to it, and at the request of a State Party, provide expert advice and assist the State Party in identifying how its programmes for the development and improvement of a protective capacity against chernical weapons wuld be implemented.

6. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of States Parties to request and provide assistance bilaterally and to conclude individual agreements with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement of assistance.

7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance through the Organization and to this end to elect to take one or more of the following measures:

(a) To wntribute to the voluntary fund for assistance to be established by the Conference at its first session;

(b) To wnclude, if possible not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for it, agreements with the Organization concerning the procureme'nt, upon demand, of assistance;

(c ) To declare, not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the Organization. If, however, a State Party subsequently is unable t o provide the assistance envisaged in its declaration, it is still under the obligation to provide assistance in accordance with this paragraph.

8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedures set forth in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, to receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons if it considers that:

(a) Chemical weapons havc been used against it;

(b) Riot wntrol agents have been used against it as a method of warfare; or

(c) It is threatened by actions or activities of any State that are prohibited for States Parties by Article 1.

9. The request, substantiated by relevant information, shall be submitted to the Director-General, who shall transmit it immediately to the Ejrecutive Council and to al1 States Parties. The Director-General shall immediately forward the request to States Parties which have volunteered, in acwrdance with paragraphs 7 (b) and (c), to dispatch emergency assistance in case of use of chemical weapons or use of riot wntrol agents as a method of warfare, or humanitarian assistance in case of serious threat of use of chemical weapons or serious threat of use of riot control agents as a method of warfare to the State Party concerned not later than 12 hours after receipt of the request. The Director-Generai shall initiate, not later than 24 hours after receipt of the request, an investigation in order to provide foundation for furiher action. He shall wmplete the investigation within 72 hours and forward a report to the Executive Council. If additional time is required for wmpletion of the investigation, an interim report shall be submitted within the same time-frame. The additional tirne required for investigation shall not exceed 72 hours. It may, however, be further extended by similar periods. Reports at the end of each additional period shall be submitted to the Executive Council. The investigation shall, as appropriate and in conformity with the request and the information acwmpanying the request, establish relevant facts related to the request as well as the type and scope of supplementary assistance and protection needed.

10. The Ewecutive Council shall meet not later than 24 hours after receiving an investigation report to consider the situation and shall take a decision by simple

Convention

majority within the following 24 hours on whether to instruct the Technical Secretariat to provide supplementary assistance. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately transmit to al1 States Parties and relevant international organizations the investigation report and the decision taken by the Executive Council. When so decided by the Executive Council, the Director-General shall provide assistance immediately. For this purpose, the Director-General may cooperate with the requesting State Party, other States Parties and relevant international organizations. The States Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to provide assistance.

11. If the information available from the ongoing investigation or other reliable sources would give suftïcient proof that there are victims of use of chemical weapons and immediate action is indispensable, the Director-General shall notify al1 States Parties and shall take emergency measures of assistance, using the resources the Conference has placed at his disposa1 for such contingencies. The Director-General shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions undertaken pursuant to this paragraph.

Article XI

Article XI ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

1. The provisions of this Convention shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties, and international coooeration in the field of chemical .activities for Duruoses not . . prohibited under this Convention including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this convention.

2. Subject to the provisions of this Convention and without prejudice to the principles and applicable rules of international law, the States Parties shall:

(a) Have the right, individually or collectively, to conduct research with, to develop, produce, acquire, retain, transfer, and use chemicals;

(6) Undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this Convention;

(c) Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;

(d) Not use this Convention as grounds for applying any measures other than those provided for, or permitted, under this Convention nor use any other international agreement for pursuing an objective inconsistent with this Convention;

(e) Undertake to review their existing national regulations in the field of trade in chemicals in order to render them consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention.

Convention

Article XII MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE.

. . INCLUDING SANCTIONS

1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention. In considering action pursuant to this paragraph, the Conference shall take into account al1 information and recommendations on the issues submitted by the Executive Council.

2. . In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Executive Council to take measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and where the State Party fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, restrict or suspend the State Party's rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this Convention.

3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of this Convention may result from activities prohibited under this Convention, in particular by Article 1, the Conference may iecommend collective measures to States parties in^ Gnformity with international law.

4. The Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.

Article XiII RELATION TO OTHER INTERNAnONAL AGREEMENTS

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protowl for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 192.5, and under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.

Article XIV

Article XN

1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of this Convention shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the Organization, relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Convention and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. The States Parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being taken.

3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to start the settlement process of their choice and rewmmending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article VIII, paragraph 21 (f).

5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization. An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 34 (a).

6. This Article is without prejudice to Article IX or to the provisions on measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions.

Convention

Article XV

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any State Party may also propose changes, as specified in paragraph 4, to the Annexes of this Convention. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 and 3. Proposals for changes, as specified in paragraph 4, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 5.

2. T h e text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Director-General for circulation to al1 States Parties and. to the Depositaty. The proposed amendment shall be considered only by an Amendment Conference. Such an Amendment Conference shall be convened if one third or more of the States Parties notify the Director-General not later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further wnsideration of the proposal. The Amendment Conference shail be held immediately following a regular session of the Conference unless the requesting States Parties ask for an earlier meeting. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment.

3. Amendments shall enter into force for al1 States Parties 30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by al1 the States Parties referred to under subparagraph (b) below:

(a) When adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of al1 States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote; and

(b) Ratified or accepted by ail those States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.

4. In order to ensure the viabiliiy and the effectiveness of this Convention, provisions in the Annexes shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 5, if proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature. Al1 changes to the Annex on Chemicals shall be made in accordance with paragraph 5. Sections A and C of the Confidentiality Annex, Part X of the Verification Annex, and those definitions in Part 1 of the Verification Annex which relate exclusively to challenge inspections, shall not be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 5.

5. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the necessary information to the Director-General. Additional information for the

Article XV

evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly communicate any such proposals and information to al1 States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositaxy;

(b) Not later than 60 days after its receipt, the.Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to determine al1 its possible consequences for the provisions of this Convention and its implementation and shall communicate any such information to al1 States Parties and the Executive Council;

(c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of ail information available to it, including whether the proposa1 fulfils the requirements of paragraph 4. Not later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to al1 States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days;

(d) If the Executive Council recommends to al1 States Parties that the proposa1 be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation;

(e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance required under subparagraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 4, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session;

(f) The Director-General shall notify al1 States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph;

(g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for al1 States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by thè Conference.

Convention

Article XCiI DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal90 days in advance to al1 other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Article Xi41

STATUS OF THE ANNEXES

The Annexes form an integral part of this Convention. Any reference to this Convention includes the Annexes.

Article X M I I SIGNATURE

This Convention shall be open for signature for al1 States before its entry into force.

Article XZX RATTFICATION

This Convention shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to their respective constitutional processes.

Article XXII

Article X Y ACCESSION

Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

Article XXI ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Convention shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.

2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force 'of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.

Article X I I RESERVATIONS

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to rese~at ions incompatible with its object and purpose.

Convention

Article XXZZZ

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention and shall, inter alia:

(a) Promptly inform al1 signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices;

(b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Convention to the Govemments of al1 signatory and acceding States; and

(c) Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XXN

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Convention.

DONE at Paris on the thirteenth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-three.

Annex on Cbemicals

ANNEX ON CHEMICALS

CONTENTS

Page

A. GUIDEIJNE~ FOR SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS . .. .. .. . . . . .. .... .. . . .. . . .. ... .. .. .. .. . . .. .. . . . . . . 48

B. SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS ... ..... . . .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .... . .... .. . . . .. .. .... .... .. . . . . . . .. .... .. .... .. . . . . ... 50

Annex on Chernicals

k GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS

Guidelines for Schedule 1

1. The following criteria shall be taken into account in wnsidering whether a toxic chemical or precursor should be included in Schedule 1:

(a) It has been developed, produkd, stockpiled or used as a chemical weapon as defined in Article II;

(b) It poses otherwise a high risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of its high potential for use in activities prohibited under this Convention because one or more of the following conditions are met:

(i) It possesses a chemical structure closely related to that of other toxic chemicals listed in Schedule 1, and has, or can be expected to have, wmparable properties;

(ii) I t possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other properties that would enable it to be used as a chemical weapon;

(iii) It may be used as a precursor in the final single technological stage of production of a toxic chemical listed in Schedule 1, regardless of whether this stage takes place in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere;

(c) It has little or no use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.


2. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a toxic chemical not listed in Schedule 1 or a precursor to a Schedule 1 chemical or to a chemical listed in Schedule 2, part A, should be included in Schedule 2:

(a) It poses a significant risk to the object and purpose of this Convention because it possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other properties that wuld enable it to be used as a chemical weapon;

(b) It may be used as a precursor in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of formation of a chemical listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, part A;

(c) It poses a significant risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of a chemical listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, part A;

(d) I t is not produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.


3. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a toxic chemical or precursor, not listed in other Schedules, should be included in Schedule 3:

(a) It has been produced, stockpiled or used as a chernical weapon;

(b) It poses otherwise a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention because it possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other properties that might enable it to be used as a chemical weapon;

(c) It poses a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of one or more chemicals listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, part B;

(d) It rnay be produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

Annex on Chernicals

The following Schedules list toxic chemicals and their precursors. For the purpose of implementing this Convention, these Schedules identify chemicals for the application of verification measures according to the provisions of the Verification Annex. Pursuant to Article II, subparagraph 1 (a), these Schedules do not constitute a definition of chemical weapons.

(Whenever reference is made to groups of dialkylated chemicals, followed by a list of alkyl groups in parentheses, al1 chemicals possible by al1 possible combinations of alkyl groups listed in the parentheses are considered as listed in the respective Schedule as long as they are not explicitly exempted. A chemical marked "*" on Schedule 2, part A, is subject to special thresholds for declaration and verification, as specified in Part VI1 of the Verification Annex.)

Schedule 1

(CAS regisrry number)

A. Toxic chemicals:

(1) O-Alkyl ( sCio , incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates e.g. Sarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (107-44-8)

Soman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate (96-64-0)

(2) O-Alkyl ( s CIO, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidocyanidates

e.g. Tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl phosphoramidocyanidate

(3) O-Alkyl (H or =CIO, incl. cycloalbl) S-Zdialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts

e.g. VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl phosphonothiolate

(4) Sulfur mustards: 2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide Mustard gas: Bis(2-chloroethy1)sulfide Bis(2-chloroethy1thio)methane Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2-ch1oroethylthio)ethane 1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane 1,4-Bis(2-chloroethy1thio)-n-butane 1,5-Bis(2-chloroethy1thio)-n-pentane Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether O-Mustard: Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether

(5) Lewisites: Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chloroviny1)arsine

(6) Nitrogen mustards: HN1: Bis(2-ch1oroethyl)ethylamine HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine HN3: Tris(2-chloroethy1)amine

(7) Saxitoxin

(8) Ricin

B. Precursors:

(9) Aikyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldifluorides

e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride

(10) O-Aikyl (H or SCio, incl. cycloalkyl) O-Zdialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts

e.g. QL: O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite

(1 1) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate

(12) Chlorosoman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonochlondate

Annex on Chemicals

Schedule 2

A. Toxic chemicals:

(1) Amit0.n: 0,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] phosphorothiolate and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts

(2) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethy1)- 1-propene

(3) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (*)

B. Precursors:

(4) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1, containing a phosphoms atom to which is bonded one methyl, ethyl or propyl (normal or iso) group but not further carbon atoms,

e.g. Methylphosphonyl dichloride Dimethyl methylphosphonate

Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl ethylphosphonothiolothionate

(5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic dihalides

(6) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates

(7) Arsenic trichloride

(8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid

(9) Quinuclidin-3-01

(10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2- chlorides and corresponding protonated salts

(11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-01s and corresponding protonated salts

Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol and corresponding protonated salts

N,N-Diethylaminoethanol and corresponding protonated salts

N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2- thiols and corresponding protonated salts Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethy1)sulfide

(14) Pinawlyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-01

Schedule 3

A. Toxic chemicals:

(1) Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride

(2) Cyanogen chloride

(3) Hydrogen cyanide (4) Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane

B. Precursors:

Phosphorus oxychloride Phosphorus trichloride

Phosphorus pentachloride Trimethyl phosphite

Triethyl phosphite

Dimethyl phosphite Diethyl phosphite Sulfur monochloride

Sulfur dichloride Thionyl chloride

Ethyldiethanolamine

Methyldiethanolamine Triethanolamine

Verification Annex

ANNEX ON IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION

( " V E I U F I ~ O N ANNEX")

CONTENTS

Page

PART II: GENERAL RULES OF VERIFICATION

k DESIGNA~ON OF INSPECïûRS AND INSPECTION ASSISTANTS .. . . . .. .. .. .. .... ..

B. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES .. .. .. ...... .. . . .. . .. .;. . .. .. .. .... .. . . .. .. . . . .. . . .. .... .. .. .. .. .... .. .67

C. STANDING ARRANGEMENTS . . . ... .. .. .. . . .. . . .. .. . .. .. . . .. .... .. .. .. .... .. ... .... .. .... .. .... .. .... .. .69

Points of en 69 Arrangements for use of non-scheduled aircraft ................................. 70 Administrative arrangements 71 Approved equipment 71

D. PRE-INSPECTION ACTIVI~ES.. . . .. .. . . .. . ... ... . .. ... .... .. .... .... .. .... .. ... .. . ... .. . . .. .... .. ...... . 72

Notification 72 Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or Host State and transfer to the inspection site 73

. . Pre-inspection briefing ..... . .. .... .. .. .. .... .. . .. . ... .. . . .. . . .. .. . ................. .. .... .. .... ... 73

73

. . 74

Communications .................. .................... ......... ........................................ 74 Inspection team and inspected State Party rights 74 Collection, handling and analysis of samples ..................... .. .......... ..... 75 Extension of inspection duration 77 Debriefing 77

Page P m III: GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR VERINCATION MEASURES

PURSUAh'T M ARTICLES IV, V AND VI . PARAGRAPH 3 k ~NITIAL INSPECiïONS AND FACiLITY AGREEMENTS ....................................... 79 B . STANDING ARRANGEMENTS ........................................................................... 80

PART IV (A): DESTRUC~ON OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ITS VEIUFICAnON PURSUANT TO AI(T1CI.E IV

A . DECLARATIONS .............................................................................................. 82 Chemical weapons .................................................................................... 82 Declarations of chemical weapons pursuant to Article III. paragraph 1 (a) (iii) .......................................................... 84 Declarations of past transfers and receipts ......................................... 84 Submission of the general plan for destruction of

................................................................................... chemical weapons 85 B . MEASURES TO SECURE THE STORAGE FACILITY AND

STORAGE FACILITY PREPARATiON ...............................

Principles and methods for destruction of chemical weapons ..................................................................................... 86 Order of destruction ................................................................................ 86 Modification of intermediate destruction deadlines ........................... 88 Extension of the deadline for completion

........................................................................................... of destruction 89 Detailed annual plans for destruction ................................................ 90 Annual reports on destruction ............................................................... 92

D . VERIFICATION ................................................................................................. 92 Verificat'ion of declarations of chemical weapons through on-site inspection .................................................................... 92 Systematic verification of storage facilities ........................................... 92

. . Inspections and visits ............................................................................... 93 Systematic verification of the destruction of

............................................. chemical weapons Chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons destruction facilities ................................................................ 97 Systematic on-site verification measures at chemical weapons destruction facilities ................................................................ 97

Veriîication Annex

Page PART IV (B): OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. GENERAL: . . . . . .. .. .. . . .. .... .. ... .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .... .. .... ... .. . . .. ...... . ... .... .. ... .. .... .. .... .. .. .. .... .. .99

B. REGIME FOR OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS ..... .. . . .. .... .. . . .. . . .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. . . .. . 99

C. REGIME FOR ABANDONW CHEMICAL WEAPONS ......... ..... ..... 100

PART V: DESTR~&ON OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACI-ES

AND ITS VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE V

Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities .................. 103 Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii) ... 105 Declarations of past transfers and receipts ......................... ............... 105 Submission of general plans for destruction ...................................... 106 Subrnission of annual plans for destmction and annual reports on destmction 106

B. DESTRUC~ON . .. . . . .......... ............................. ..... ............................................ 107

General principles for destruction of chernical weapons . . . production facilities ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Principles and methods for closure of a chemical weapons production facility . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . .............. ................................................... 107 Technical maintenance of chernical weapons production faciiities prior to their destmction ....................................................... 108 Principles and methods for temporary conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into chemical weapons . . . destmction facilities ................... .......... ......... .......................................... 108 Principles and methods related to destmction of a chemical weapons production facility 110 Order of destruction 110 Detailed plans for destmction 111 Review of detailed plans 113

Verification of declarations of chemical weapons production facilities through on-site inspection .. . . . . . . 114

Contents

Page C. VERlFICATION (continued)

Systematic verification of chernical weapons production facilities and cessation of their activities ........................................... 115 Verification of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities ....... ...... .................................................... . . . ......... 116 Verification of temporary conversion of a chernical weapons production facility into a chernical weapons destruction facility .... 116

D. CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCnON FACILITIES

TO PURPOSES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER ms CONVENTION ............ . . . . ..... 117

Procedures for requesting conversion . . . . . .... .. . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . ... ... 117 Actions pending a decision 119 Conditions for conversion 120 Decisions by the Executive Council and the Conference ...... ....... . . . 120 Detailed plans for conversion 121 Review of detailed plans 122

P m VI: A c n m ~ s NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VI:

REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS AND FACILITIES

RELATED TO SUCH CHEMICALS

General principles for production Single srnall-scale facility Other facilities

D. DECLARATIONS . . . . . . .. ....................... ................................. ....................... .. . 126

Single small-scale facility .................... . . . ........ ............. . . ................... 126 Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11 ....................... 127

Single small-scale facility . . . .. .. .. . .. . . .. . .. .. ........ .. . . . . .. . . ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11 ....................... 129

Verification Annex

Page PART VII: A ~ T I E s NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION

IN ACCORDANCE w m ARTICLE VI:

REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS AND FAClLITIES RELATED TO SUCH CHEMICALS

A. DECLARATION 131 Declarations of aggregate national data 131 Declarations of plant sites producing, processing or consuming Schedule 2 chernicals 131 Declarations on past production of Schedule 2 chernicals for chernical weapons purposes ............. . 133 Information to States Parties 134

B. VERIFKATION 134 134 135

. . . Initial inspections .................................................................................... 135 Inspections 136 Inspection procedures 136 Notification of inspectio 137

C. TRANSFERS TO STATES NOT P m TO THIS CONVENTION ...................... 138 PART vin: A c n m ~ s NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION

IN ACCORDANCE w m ARTICLE VI:

REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS AND FACILiTIES RELATED TO SUCH CHEMICALS

A. DECLARATIONS 139 Declarations of aggregate national data ................. . . 139 Declarations of plant sites producing Schedule 3 chernicals .... .. ..... 139 Declarations on past production of Schedule 3 chernicals

141 Information to States Parties 141

141 141 142 142

Notification of inspectio 143

C. TRANsFERs TO STATES NOT PARTY TO THIS CONVENTION ..... . . .. .. . . .. .... ... 144

Contents

Page P m E: AC~NITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VI: REGIME FOR OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCïiON FACILiTIES

A. DECLARATIONS ... .. .. .. .. . . ............... ... . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. ........ . . . . . . .. .. ......... ........ . , .. . 145

List of other chemical production facilities ............. ................... . . . . 145 Assistance by the Technical Secretariat 146 Information to States Parties 146

B. VERIFICATIO 146

Gener 146 Inspection aims .......................... ........................................................... . 147 Inspection procedures 147 Notification of inspection 148

C. IMPLEMENTA~ON AND REVIEW OF SECTION B . . . . . .. . . ... . .. . . . .. . . .. .. . . .. . . .. .. . . .. . 148

Implementation ........... ......... . . . . ............... .............. ................... ............. 148 Review .... . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. ................... . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. . . . . . . . .... .. . . .. , , .. . 149

PART X: CHALLENGE INSPECïïONS PURSUANT ï0 ARTICLE IX

A. DESIGNAIION AND SELECTION OF I N S P E ~ O R S AND

INSPECTION ASSISTANTS . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. .. .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. . .

Notification .................... ............. .............................................. .........,..... 150 Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or the Host State ....................... ....................... ...... ...................... ......... 152 Alternative determination of final perimeter . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . ... .. . . .. . . . .. 1 5 3 Verification of location ............. ...... .................................................... ... 154 Securing the site, exit monitoring .............................. .......................... 154 Pre-inspection briefing and inspection plan ................ ....................... 155 . . . Perimeter activities ........ ............ ................... .......................................... 156

General rules .............................. ............................... . . . .......................... 156 158 159

Duration of inspection 160

Verfication Annex

Page ....................................... 160

Departure ................................................................................................. 160 Reports ..................................................................................................... 160

PART . XI. ~NVESTIGATIONS IN CASES OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Request for an investigation ........................................................... 162 162

Assignment of inspection team 163 Dispatch of inspection team 163

163

Extension of mspection site Extension of inspection duration ......................................................... 165 Interviews .............................................................................................. 165

Procedures ........................ ... ..................................................... 165 Contents .............................................................................................. 165 .

E . STATES NOT PARTY TO THIS CONVENTION .............................................. 166

, . . . . . Part 1

, , . . . . . 1. "Approved Equipment" means the devices and instruments necessary for

the performance of the inspection team's duties that have been'krtified by the Technical Secretariat in acwrdance with regulations prepared by the Technical Secretariat pursuant to Part II, paragraph 27 of this Annex. Such equipment may also refer to the administrative supplies or recording materials that would be used by the inspection team.

2. "Building" as referred to in the definition of chemical weapons production facility in Article II wmprises specialized buildings and standard buildings.

(a ) "Specialized Building" means:

(i) Any building, including underground structures, containing specialized equipment in a production or filling configuration;

(ii) Any building, including underground structures, which has distinctive features which distinguish it from buildings normally used for chemical production or filling activities not prohibited under this Convention.

(b) "Standard Building" means any building, including underground structures, wnstructed to prevailing industry standards for facilities not producing - any chemical specified in -&ticle G, parag&ph 8 (a ) (i), or wrrosive chemicais.

3. "Challenge Inspection" means the inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or wntrol of a State Party requested by another State Party pursuant to Article IX, paragraphs 8 to 25.

4. "Discrete Organic Chemical" means any chemical belonging to the class of chemical wmpounds consisting of al1 wmpounds of carbon except for its oxides, sulfides and rnetal carbonates, identifiable by chemical name, by structural formula, if known, and by Chemical Abstracts Service registxy number, if assigned.

5. "Equipment" as referred to in the definition of chemical weapons production facility in Article II comprises specialized equipment and standard equipment.

(a ) "Specialized Equipment" means:

(i) The main production train, including any reactor or equipment for product synthesis, separation or purification, any equipment used duectly for heat transfer in the final technologid stage, such as in reactors or in product separation, as well as any other equipment which has been in contact with any chemical specified in Article II, paragraph 8 (a) (i), or would be in contact with such a chemical if the facility were operated;

(ii) Any chemical weapon filling machines;

(iii) Any other equipment specially designed, built or installed for the operation of the facility as a chemical weapons production facility, as distinct from a facility constructed according t o pr.evailing commercial industry standards for facilities not producing any chemical specified in Article II, paragraph 8 (a) (i), or corrosive chemicals, such as: equipment made of high-nickel alloys or other special corrosion-resistant material; special equipment for waste control, waste treatment, air filtering, or solvent recovery; special containment enclosures and safety shields; non-standard laborato~y equipment used to analyse toxic chemicals for chemical weapons purposes; custom-designed process control panels; or dedicated spares for specialized equipment.

(b) "Standard Equipment" means:

(i) Production equipment which is generally used in the chemical industry and is not included in the types of specialized equipment;

(ii) Other equipment commonly used in the chemid industry, such as: fire-fighting equipment; guard and security/safety surveillance equipment; medical facilities, laboratory facilities; or communications equipment.

6. "Facility" in the context of Article VI means any of the industrial sites as defined below ("plant site","plantn and "unit").

(a) "Plant Site" (Works, Factory) means the local integration of one or more plants, with any intermediate administrative levels, which are under one operational control, and includes common infrastructure, such as:

Part 1

(i) Administration and other offices;

(ii) Repair and maintenance shops;

(iii) Medical centre;

(N) Utilities;

(v) Central analytical laboratoq;

(vi) Research and development laboratories;

(vii) Central effluent and waste treatment area; and

(viii) Warehouse storage.

(b) "Plant" (Production facility, Workshop) means a relatively self-contained area, structure or building containing one or more units with auxiliary and associated infrastructure, such as:

(i) Small administrative section;

(ii) Storagehandling areas for feedstock and products;

(iii) Effluenttwaste handlingltreatment area;

(iv) Control/analytical laboratoq;

(v) First aid servicelrelated medical section; and

(vi) Records associated with the movement into, around and from the site, of declared chemicals and their feedstock or product chemicals formed from them, as appropriate.

(c) "Unit" (Production unit, Process unit) means the combination of those items of equipment, including vessels and vesse1 set up, necessary for the production, processing or consumption of a chernical.

7. "Facility Agreement" means an agreement or arrangement between a State Party and the Organization relating to a specific facility subject to on-site verification pursuant to Articles IV, V and VI.

8. "Host State" means the State on whose territory lie facilities or areas of another State, Party to this Convention, which are subject to inspection under this Convention.

9. "In-Countq Escort" means individuals specified by the inspected State Party and, if appropriate, by the Host State, if they so wish, to accompany and assist the inspection team during the in-country period.

Verification Annex

10. "In-Country Period" means the period from the arriva1 of the inspection team at a point of entry until its departure from the State at a point of entry.

11. "Initial Inspection" means the first on-site inspection of facilities to verify declarations submitted pursuant to Articles III, IV, V and VI and this Annex.

12. "Inspected State Party" means the State Party on whose territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control an inspection pursuant t o this Convention takes place, or the State Party whose facility or area on the territory of a Host State is subject to such an inspection; it does not, however, include the State Party specified in Part II, paragraph 21 of this Annex.

13. "Inspection Assistant" means an individual designated by the Technical Secretariat as set forth in Part II, Section A, of this Annex to assist inspectors in an inspection or visit, such as medical, security and administrative personnel and interpreters.

14. "Inspection Mandate" means the instructions issued by the Director-General to the inspection team for the conduct of a particular inspection.

15. "Inspection Manuai" means the compilation of additional procedures for the conduct of inspections developed by the Technical Secretariat.

16. "Inspection Site" means any facility or area at which an inspection is carried out and which is specifically defined in the respective facility agreement or inspection request or mandate or inspection request as expanded by the alternative or final perimeter.

17. "Inspection Team" means the group of inspectors and inspection assistants assigned by the Director-General to conduct a particular inspection.

18. "Inspector" means an individual designated by the Technical Secretariat according to the procedures as set forth in Part II, Section A, of this Annex, to cany out an inspection or visit in accordance with this Convention.

19. "Mode1 Agreement" means a document specifying the general fonn and content for an agreement concluded between a State Party and the Organization for fulfilling the verification provisions specified in this Annex.

20. "Observer" means a representative of a requesting State Party or a third State Party to observe a challenge inspection.

Part 1

21. "Perimeter" in case of challenge inspection means the extemai boundary of the inspection site, defined by either geographic coordinates or description on a map.

(a) "Requested Perimeter" means the inspection site perimeter as specified in conformity with Part X, paragraph 8, of this Annex;

(b) "Alternative Perimeter" means the inspection site perimeter as specified, alternatively to the requested perimeter, by the inspected State Party; it shall conform to the requirements specified in Part X, paragraph 17, of this Annex;

(c) "Final Perimeter" means the final inspection site perimeter as agreed in negotiations between the inspection team and the inspected State Party, in accordance with Part X, paragraphs 16 to 21, of this Annex;

(d) "Declared Perimeter" means the external houndary of the facility declared pursuant to Articles III, IV, V and VI.

22. "Period of Inspection", for the purposes of Article IX, means the period of time from provision of access to the inspection team to the inspection site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on briefings before and after the verification activities.

23. "Period of Inspection", for the purposes of Articles IV, V and VI, means the period of time from arriva1 of the inspection team at the inspection site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on briefings before and after the verification activities.

24. "Point of Entry"/"Point of Exit" means a location designated for the in-country arrivai of inspection teams for inspections pursuant to this Convention or for their departure after completion of their mission.

25. "Requesting State Party" means a State Party which has requested a challenge inspection pursuant to Article IX.

26. "Tome" means metric ton, i.e. 1,000 kg.

Venfication Annex

A. DESIGNATION OF INSPECïORS AND INSPECI'iON ASSISTANTS

1. Not later than 30 days after entry into force of this Convention the Technical Secretariat shall communicate, in writing, to al1 States Parties the names, nationalities and ranks of the inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation, as well as a description of their qualifications and professional experiences.

2. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, proposed for designation communicated to it. The State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat in writing of its acceptance of each inspector and inspection assistant, not later than 30 days after acknowledgement of receipt of the list. Any inspector and inspection assistant included in this list shall be regarded as designated unless a State Party, not later than 30 days after acknowledgement of receipt of the list, declares its non-acceptance in writing. The State Party may include the reason for the objection.

In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed inspector or inspection assistant shdl not undertake or participate in verification activities on the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party which has declared its non-acceptance. The Technical Secretariat shall, as necessary, submit further proposais in addition to the original list.

3. Verification activities under this Convention shall only be performed by designated inspectors and inspection assistants.

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5, a State Party has the right at any time to object to an inspector o r inspection assistant who has already been designated. It shall notify the Technical Secretariat of its objection in writing and may include the reason for the objection. Such objection shall come into effect 30 days after receipt by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately inform the State Party concerned of the withdrawal of the designation of the inspector or inspection assistant.

5. A State Party that has been notified of an inspection shail not seek to have removed from the inspection team for that inspection any of the designated inspectors or inspection assistants named in the inspection tearn list.

6. The number of inspectors o r inspection assistants accepted by and designated to a State Party must be suEcient to allow for availability and rotation of appropriate numbers of inspectors and inspection assistants.

7. If, in the opinion of the Director-General, the non-acceptance of proposed inspectors or inspection assistants impedes the designation of a sufficient number of inspectors or inspection assistants or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the tasks of the Technical Secretariat, the Director-General shall refer the issue to the Executive Council.

8. Whenever amendments to the above-mentioned lists of inspectors and inspection assistants are necessary or requested, replacement inspectors and inspection assistants shall be designated in the same manner as set forth with respect - to ihe initial list.

9. The members of the inspection team carrying out an inspection of a facility of a State Party located on the territory of another State Party shall be designated in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Annex as applied both to the inspected State Party and the Host State Party.

B. PRMLEGES AND IMMUNITIES

10. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after acknowledgement of receipt of the list of inspectors and inspection assistants or of changes thereto, provide multiple entrylexit andior transit visas and other such documents to enable each inspector or inspection assistant to enter and to remain on the territory of that State Party for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities. These documents shall be valid for at least two years after their provision to the Technical Secretariat.

11. To exercise their functions effectively, inspectors and inspection assistants shall be accorded privileges and immunities as set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (i). Privileges and immunities shall be granted to members of the inspection team for the sake of this Convention and not for the persona1 benefit of the individuals themselves. Such privileges and immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire period between arrivai on and departure from the territory of the inspected State Party or Host State, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions.

(a) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Conventionon Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.

(b) The living quarters and office premises occupied by the inspection team carrying out inspection activities pursuant to this Convention shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Verüïcation Annex

(c) The papers and correspondence, including records, of the inspection team shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to al1 papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The inspection team shall have the right to use codes for their communications with the Technical Secretariat.

(d) Samples and approved equipment carried by members of the inspection team shall be inviolable subject to provisions contained in this Convention and exempt from al1 customs duties. Hazardous samples shall be transported in accordance with relevant regulations.

(e) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the immunities accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(B The members of the inspection team carrying out prescribed activities pursuant to this Convention shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(g) The members of the inspection team shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the inspected State Party or Host State Party, without payrnent of any customs duties or related charges, articles for personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

(h) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the same currency and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign Govemments on temporary official missions.

(i) The members of the inspection team shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected State Party or the Host State.

12. When transiting the territory of non-inspected States Parties, the members of the inspection team shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Papers and correspondence, including records, and samples and approved equipment, carried by them, shall be accorded the privileges and immunities set forth in paragraph 11 (c) and (d).

13. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the members of the inspection team shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected State Party or Host State and, to the extent that is consistent with the inspection mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the interna1 affairs of that State. If the inspected State Party or Host State Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Annex, consultations shall

be held between the State Party and the Director-General to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

14. The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the inspection team may be waived by the Director-General in those cases when the Director-General is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Convention. Waiver must always be express.

15. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities accorded to inspectors pursuant to this section, except for those accorded pursuant to pqagraph I l (d).

C. STANDING ARRANGEMENTS

Points of enhy

16. Each State Party shall designate the points of entry and shall supply the required information to the Technical Secretariat not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it. These points of entry shall be such that the inspection team can reach any inspection site from at least one point of entry within 12 hours. Locations of points of entry shall be provided to al1 States Parties by the Technical Secretariat.

17. Each State Party may change the points of entry by giving notice of such change to the Technical Secretariat. Changes shall become effective 30 days after the Technical Secretariat receives such notification to allow appropriate notification to al1 States Parties.

18. If the Technical Secretariat wnsiders that there are insufficient points of entry for the timely conduct of inspections or that changes to the points of entry proposed by a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of inspections, it shall enter into consultations with the State Party concerned to resoive the problem.

19. In cases where facilities or areas of an inspected State Party are located on the territory of a Host State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the facilities or areas subject to inspection requires transit through the territory of another State Party, the inspected State Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such inspections in accordance with this Annex. The Host State Party shall facilitate the inspection of those facilities or areas and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the inspection team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is required to inspect facilities or areas of an inspected State Party shall facilitate such transit.

Verificaüon Annex

20. ' In cases where facilities or areas of an inspected State Party are located . on the territory of a State not Party to this Convention, the inspected State Party

shall take al1 necessary measures to ensure that inspections of those facilities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Annex. A State Party that has one or more faciiities or areas on the territory of a State not Party to this Convention shall take al1 necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the Host State of inspectors and inspection assistants designated to that State Party. If an inspected State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.

21. In cases where the facilities or areas sought to be inspected are located on the territory of a State Party, but in a place under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this Convention, the State Party shall take al1 necessary measures as would be required of an inspected State Party and a Host State Party to ensure that inspections of such faciiities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Annex. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to those facilities or areas, it shall demonstrate that it took al1 necessary measures to ensure access. This paragraph shall not apply where the facilities or areas sought to be inspected are those of the State Party.

Arrangements for use of non-scheduled aircrafl

22. For inspections pursuant to Article IX and for other inspections where timely travel is not feasible using scheduled commercial transport, an inspection team may need to utilize aircraft owned or chartered by the Technical Secretariat. Not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, each State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft transporting inspection teams and equipment necessary for inspection into and out of the territory in which an inspection site is located. Aircraft routings to and from the designated point of entry shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon between the States Parties and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for such diplomatic clearance.

23. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall provide the inspected State Party with a flight plan, through the National Authority, for the aircraft's flight from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the State in which the inspection site is located to the point of entry, not less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. For its owned or chartered flights, the Technical Secretariat shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the appropriate notation identifying the aircraft as an inspection aircraft.

24. Not less than three hours before the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the State in which the inspection is to take place, the inspected State Party or Host State Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph 23 is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arriva1 time.

25. The inspected State Party shall provide parking, security protection, s e ~ c i n g and fuel as requued by the Technical Secretanat for the aircraft of the inspection team at the point of entry when such aircrafi is owned or chartered by the Technical Secretariat. Such aircraft shall not be liable for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges. The Technical Secretariat shall bear the cost of such fuel, security protection and s e ~ c i n g .

Administrative arrangements

26. The inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the inspection team. such as communication means, interpretation seMces to the extent necessary for the performance of inte~iewing and other tasks, transportation, working space, lodging, meals and medical care. In this regard, the inspected State Party shall be reimbursed by the Organization for such costs incurred by the inspection team.

Approved equipment

27. Subject to paragraph 29, there shall be no restriction by the inspected State Party on the inspection team bringing ont0 the inspection site such equipment, approved in accordance with paragraph 28, which the Technical Secretariat has determined to be necessary to fulfil the inspection requirements. The Technical Secretariat shall prepare and, as appropriate, update a list of approved equipment, which may be needed for the purposes described above, and regulations governing such equipment which shall be in accordance with this Annex. In establishing the list of approved equipment and these regulations, the Technical Secretariat shail ensure that safety considerations for al1 the types of facilities at which such equipment is likely to be used, are taken fully into account. A list of approved equipment shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

28. The equipment shall be in the custody of the Technical Secretariat and be designated, calibrated and approved by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall, to the extent possible, select that equipment which is specifically designed for the specific kind of inspection required. Designated and approved equipment shall be specifically protected against unauthorized alteration.

Verifcation Annex

29. The inspected State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the prescribed time-frames, to inspect the equipment in the presence of inspection team members at the point of entry, Le., to check the identity of the equipment brought in or removed from the territory of the inspected State Party or the Host State. To facilitate such identification, the Technical Secretariat shall attach documents and devices to authenticate its designation and approval of the equipment. The inspection of the equipment shall also ascertain to the satisfaction of the inspected State Party that the equipment meets the description of the approved equipment for the particular type of inspection. The inspected State Party may exclude equipment not meeting that description or equipment without the above-mentioned authentication documents and devices. Procedures for the inspection of equipment shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 ( i ) .

30. In cases where the inspection team finds it necessary to use equipment available on site not belonging to the Technical Secretariat and requests.the inspected State Party to enable the team to use such equipment, the inspected State Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can.

Notification

31. The Director-General shall notifi the State Party before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and within the prescribed tirne-bames, where specified, of its intention to carry out an inspection.

32. Notifications made by the Director-General shall include the following information:

(a) The type of inspection;

(b) The point of entry;

(c ) The date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;

(d) The means of arrival at the point of entry;

(e ) The site to be inspected;

(f) The names of inspectors and inspection assistants;

(g) If appropriate, aircraft clearance for special flights.

33. The inspected State Party shail acknowledge the receipt of a notification by the Technical Secretariat of an intention to conduct an inspection, not later than one hour after receipt of such notification.

34. In the case of an inspection of a facility of a State Party located on the territory of another State Party, both States Parties shall be simultaneously notified in accordance with paragraphs 31 and 32.

Enhy into the temtory of the ins ected State Party or Host State and transfer to t i' e znspection . site

35. The inspected State Party or Host State Party which has been notified of the arrivai of an inspection team, shall ensure its immediate entry into the territory and shall through an in-country escort or by other means do everything in its power to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team and its equipment and supplies, from its point of entry to the inspection site(s) and to a point of exit.

36. The inspected State Party or Host State Party shall, as necessary, assist the inspection team in reaching the inspection site not later than 12 hours after the arrival at the point of entry.

37. Upon arrival at the inspection site and before the commencement of the inspection, the inspection team shall be briefed by facility representatives, with the aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate, on the facility, the a c t ~ t i e s carried out there, safety measures and administrative and logistic arrangements necessary for the inspection. The time spent for the briefing shall be limited to the minimum necessary and in any event not exceed three hours.

E. CONDUCI' OF INSPECTIONS

General rules 38. The members of the inspection team shall discharge their functions in

accordance with the provisions of this Convention, as well as rules established by the Director-General and faciiity agreements concluded between States Parties and the Organization.

39. The inspection team shall strictly observe the inspection mandate issued by the Director-General. It shall refrain from activities going beyond this mandate.

40. The activities of the inspection team shall be so arranged as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible inwnvenience to the inspected State Party or Host State and disturbance to the facility or area inspected. The inspection team shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility and avoid affecting its safety.

Venficaüon Annex

In particular, the inspection team shall not operate any facility. If inspectors consider that, to fulfil their mandate, particular operations should be carried out in a facility, they shall request the designated representative of the inspected facility to have them performed. The representative shall carry out the request to the extent possible.

41. In the performance of their duties on the territory of an inspected State Party or Host State, the members of the inspection team shall, if the inspected State Party so requests, be accompanied by representatives of the inspected State Party, but the inspection team must not thereby be delayed or othenvise hindered in the exercise of its functions.

42. Detailed procedures for the conduct of inspections shall be developed for inclusion in the inspection manual by the Technical Secretariat, taking into account guidelines to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

43. In carrying out their activities, inspectors and inspection assistants shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, including those for the protection of wntrolled environments within a facility and for personal safety. In order to implement these requirements, appropriate detailed procedures shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

Communications

44. Inspectors shall have the right throughout the in-country period to communicate with the Headquarters of the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own, duly certified, approved equipment and may request that the inspected State Party or Host State Party provide them with access to other telecommunications. The inspection team shall have the right to use its own two-way system of radio communications between personnel patrolling the perimeter and other members of the inspection team.

Zmpection team and inspected State Party rights

45. The inspection team shall, in accordance with the relevant Articles and Annexes of this Convention as well as with facility agreements and procedures set forth in the inspection manual, have the right to unimpeded access to the inspection site. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the inspectors.

46. Inspectors shall have the right t o interview any facility personnel in the presence of representatives of the inspected State Party with the

Part II

purpose of establishing relevant facts. Inspectors shall only request information and data which are necessary for the conduct of the inspection, and the inspected State Party shall furnish such information upon request. Thc inspected State Party shall have the right to object to questions posed to the facility personnel if those questions are deemed not relevant to the inspection. If the head of the inspection team objects and States their relevance, the questions shall be provided in writing to the inspected State Party for reply. The inspection team may note any refusal to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered and any explanations given, in that part of the inspection report that deals with the cooperation of the inspected State Party.

47. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect documentation and records they deem relevant to the conduct of their mission.

48. Inspectors shall have the right to have' photographs taken at their request by representatives of the inspected State Party or of the inspected facility. The capability to take instant development photographie prints shall be available. The inspection team shall determine whether photographs conform to those requested and, if not, repeat photographs shall be taken. The inspection team and the inspected State Party shall each retain one copy of every photograph.

49. The representatives of the inspected State Party shall have the right to observe al1 verification activities carried out by the inspection team.

50. The inspected State Party shall receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its facility(ies) by the Technical Secretariat.

51. Inspectors shall have the right to request clarifications in wnnection with ambiguities that arise during an inspection. Such requests shall be made promptly through the representative of the inspected State Party. The representative of the inspected State Party shall provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarification as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. If questions relating to an object or a building located within the inspection site are not resolved, the object or building shall, if requested, be photographed for the purpose of clarifying its nature and function. If the ambiguity cannot be removed during the inspection, the inspectors shall notie the Technical Secretariat immediately. The inspectors shall include in the inspection report any such unresolved question, relevant clarifications, and a copy of any photographs taken.

Collection, handling and anabsis of samples

52. Representatives of the inspected State Party or of the inspected facility shall take samples at the request of the inspection team in the presence of inspectors. If so agreed in advance with the representatives of the inspected State Party or of the inspected facility, the inspection team may take samples itself.

Verification Annex

53. Where possible, the analysis of samples shall be performed on-site. The inspection team shall have the right to perform on-site analysis of samples using approved equipment brought by it. At the request of the inspection team, the inspected State Party shail, in accordance with agreed procedures, provide assistance for the anaiysis of samples on-site. Altematively, the inspection team may request that appropriate analysis on-site be performed in its presence.

54. The inspected State Party has the right to retain portions of al1 samples taken or take duplicate samples and be present when samples are analysed on-site.

55. The inspection team shall, if it deems it necessary, transfer samples for analysis off-site at laboratories designated by the Organization.

56. The Director-General shall have the primary responsibility for the security, integrity and preservation of samples and for ensuring that the wnfidentiality of samples transferred for analysis off-site is protected. The Director-General shall do so in accordance with procedures, to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 ( i ) , for inclusion in the inspection manual. He shall:

(a) Establish a stringent regime goveming the collection, handling, transport and analysis of samples;

(b) Certify the laboratories designated to perform different types of analysis;

(c ) Oversee the standardization of equipment and procedures at these designated laboratories, mobile anaiytical equipment and procedures, and monitor quality control and overall standards in relation to the certification of these laboratories, mobile equipment and procedures; and

(d) Select from among the designated laboratories those which shall perform analytical or other functions in relation to specific investigations.

57. When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples shall be analysed in at least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious processing of the analysis. The samples shall be acwunted for by the Technical Secretariat and any unused samples or portions thereof shall be retumed to the Technical Secretariat.

58. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analysis of samples relevant to wmpliance with this Convention and include them in the finai inspection report. The Technicai Secretariat shall include in the report

Verification Annex

64. Should the report contain uncertainties, or should cooperation between the National Authority and the inspectors not measure up to the standards required, the Director-General shall approach the State Party for clarification.

65. If the uncertainties cannot be removed or the facts established are of a nature to suggest that obligations undertaken under this Convention have not been met, the Director-General shall inform the Executive Council without delay.

H. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PROVISIONS

66. The provisions of this Part shall apply to al1 inspections conducted pursuant to this Convention, except where the provisions of this Part differ from the provisions set forth for specific types of inspections in Parts III to XI of this Annex, in which case the latter provisions shall take precedence.

Part III

PART III GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION MEASURES PURSUANT TO

ARTICLES IV, V AND VI, PARAGRAPH 3 A. INITIAL INSPECTIONS AND FACILITY AGREEMENTS

1. Each declared facility subject to on-site inspection pursuant to Articles IV, V, and VI, paragraph 3, shall receive an initial inspection promptly after the facility is declared. The purpose of this inspection of the facility shall be to verify information provided and to obtain any additional information needed for planning future verification activities at the facility, including on-site inspections and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, and to work on the facility agreements.

2. States Parties shall ensure that the verification of declarations and the initiation of the systematic verification measures can be accomplished by the Technical Secretariat at al1 facilities within the established time-frames after this Convention enters into force for them.

3. Each State Party shall conclude a facility agreement with the Organization for each facility declared and subject to on-site inspection pursuant to Articles IV, V, and VI, paragraph 3.

4. Facility agreements shall be completed not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party or after the facility has been declared for the first time, except for a chemical weapons destruction facility to which paragraphs 5 to 7 shall apply.

5. In the case of a chemical weapons destruction facility that begins operations more than one year after this Convention enters into force for the State Party, the facility agreement shall be completed not less than 180 days before the facility begins operation.

6. In the case of a chemical weapons destruction facility that is in operation when this Convention enters into force for the State Party, or begins operation not later than one year thereafter, the facility agreement shall be completed not later than 210 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party, except that the Executive Council may decide that transitional verification arrangements, approved in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 51, of this Annex and including a transitional facility agreement, provisions for verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for application of the arrangements, are sufficient.

7. In the case of a facility, referred to in paragraph 6, that will cease operations not later than two years after this Convention enters into force for the

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State Party, the Executive Council may decide that transitional verification arrangements, approved in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 51, of this Annex and including a transitional facility agreement, provisions for verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for application of the arrangements, are sufîïcient.

8. Facility agreements shall be based on models for such agreements and provide for detailed arrangements which shall govem inspections at each facility. The mode1 agreements shallinclude provisions to take into account future technological developments and shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

9. The Technical Secretariat may retain at each site a sealed container for photographs, plans and other information that it may wish to refer to in the course of subsequent inspections.

10. Where applicable, the Technical Secretariat shall have the right to have continuous monitoring instruments and systems and seals installed and to use them, in conformity with the relevant provisions in this Convention and the facility agreements between States Parties and the Organization.

11. The inspected State Party shall, in accordance with agreed procedures, have the right to inspect any instrument used or installed by the inspection team and to have it tested in the presence of representatives of the inspected State Party. The inspection team shall have the right to use the instmments that were installed by the inspected State Party for its own monitoring of the technological process of the destruction of chemical weapons. To this end, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect those instruments that it intends to use for purposes of verification of the destruction of chemical weapons and to have them tested in its presence.

12. The inspected State Party shall provide the necessary preparation and support for the establishment of continuous monitoring instmments and systems.

13. In order to irnplement paragraphs 1 1 and 12, appropriate detailed procedures shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

14. The inspected State Party shall immediately notify the Technical Secretariat if an event occurs or may occur at a facility where monitoring instruments are installed, which may have an impact on the monitoring system. The inspected State Party shall coordinate subsequent actions with the Technical Secretariat with

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a view to restoring the operation of the monitoring system and establishing interim measures, if necessary, as soon as possible.

15. The inspection team shall veriij during each inspection that the monitoring system functions correctly and that emplaced seals have not been tampered with. In addition, visits to senrice the monitoring system may be required to perform any necessary maintenance or replacement of equipment, or to adjust the coverage of the monitoring system as required.

16. If the monitoring system indicates any anomaly, the Technical Secretariat shall immediately take action to determine whether this resulted from equipment malfunction or activities at the facility. If, after this examination, the broblem remains unresolved, the Technical Secretariat shall immediately ascertain the actual situation, including through immediate on-site inspection of, or visit to, the facility if necessary. The Technical Secretariat shall report any such problem immediately after its detection to the inspected State Party which shall assist in its resolution.

17. The inspected State Party shall, except as specified in paragraph 18, be notified of inspections not less than 24 hours in advance of the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.

18. The inspected State Party shall be notified of initial inspections not less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.

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PART IV (A)

DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ITS VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE IV

Chemical weapons

1. The declaration of chemical weapons by a State Party pursuant t o Article III, paragraph 1 (a ) (ii), shall include the following:

(a) The aggregate quantity of each chemical declared;

(b) The precise location of each chemical weapons storage facility, expressed by:

(i) Name;

(ii) Geographical coordinates; and

(iii) A detailed site diagram, including a boundary map and the location of bunkerslstorage areas within the facility.

(c) The detailed inventory for each chemical weapons storage facility including:

(i) Chemicals defined as chemical weapons in accordance with Article II;

(ii) Unfilled munitions, sub-munitions, devices and equipment defined as chemical weapons;

(iü) Equipment specially designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment specified in sub-subparagraph (ii);

(iv) Chemicais specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment - - - . specified in sub-subparagraph (ii).

2. For the declaration of chemicals referred to in paragraph 1 (c) (i) the following shall apply:

(a) Chemicals shall be declared in accordance with the Schedules specified in the Annex on Chemicals;

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(b) For a chemical not listed in the Schedules in the Annex on Chemicals the information required for possible assignment of the chemical to the appropriate Schedule shall be provided, including the toxicity of the pure compound. For a precursor, the toxicity and identity of the principal final reaction product(s) shall be provided;

(c) Chemicals shall be identified by chemical name in accordance with current International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) nomenclature, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned. For a precursor, the toxicity and identity of the principal final reaction product(s) shall be provided;

(d) In cases involving mixtures of two or more chemicals, each chemical shall be identified and the percentage of each shall be provided, and the mixture shall be declared under the category of the most toxic chemical. If a component of a binary chemical weapon consists of a mixture of two or more chemicals, each chemical shall be identified and the percentage of each provided;

(e) Binaq chemical weapons shall be declared under the relevant end product within the framework of the categories of chemical weapons referred to in paragraph 16. The following supplementary information shall be provided for each type of binary chemical munitionidevice:

(i) The chemical name of the toxic end-product;

(ii) The chemical composition and quantity of each component;

(iii) The actual weight ratio between the components;

(iv) Which component is considered the key component;

(v) The projected quantity of the toxic end-product calculated on a stoichiometric basis from the key component, assuming 100 per cent yield. A declared quantity (in tonnes) of the key component intended for a specific toxic end-product shall be considered equivalent to the quantity (in tonnes) of this toxic end-product calculated on a stoichiometric basis assuming 100 per cent yield.

(f) For multicomponent chemical weapons, the declaration shall be analogous to that envisaged for binary chemical weapons;

(g) For each chemical the form of storage, i.e. munitions, submunitions, devices, equipment or bulk containers and other containers shall be declared. For each form of storage the following shall be listed:

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(il Type; (ii) Size or calibre;

(iii) Number of items; and

(iv) Nominal weight of chemical fil1 per item.

(h) For each chemical the total weight present at the storage facility shall be declared;

(i) In addition, for chemicals stored in bulk, the percentage purity shall be declared, if known.

3. For each type of unfilled munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment, referred to in paragraph 1 (c) (ii), the information shall include:

(a) The number of items;

(b) The nominal fill volume per item;

(c) The intended chemical fill.

Declarations of chernical weapons pursuant to Article III, paragraph I (a) (iii)

4. The declaration of chemical weapons pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (iii), shall wntain al1 information specified in paragraphs 1 to 3 above. It is the responsibility of the State Party on whose territory the chemical weapons are located to make appropriate arrangements with the other State to ensure that the declarations are made. If the State Party on whose territory the chemical weapons are located is not able to fulfil its obligations under this paragraph, it shall state the reasons therefor.

Declarations of past transfers and receipts

5. A State Party that has transferred or received chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 shall declare these transfers or receipts pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (iv), provided the amount transferred or received ex-eded 1 tonne per chemical per year in bulk and/or munition form. This declaration shall be made according to the inventory format specified in paragraphs 1 and 2. This declaration shall also indicate the supplier and recipient countries, the dates of the transfers or receipts and, as precisely as possible, the current location of the transferred items. When not al1 the specified information is available for transfers or receipts of chemical weapons for the penod between 1 January 1946 and 1 January 1970, the State Party shall declare whatever information is still available to it and provide an explanation as to why it cannot submit a full declaration.

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Submission of the general pian for destruction of chemical weapons

6. The general plan for destmction of chemical weapons submitted pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (v), shall provide an overview of the entire national chemical weapons destruction programme of the State Party and information on the efforts of the State Party to fulfil the destruction requirements contained in this Convention. The plan shall specify:

(a) A general schedule for destruction, giving types and approximate quantities of chemical weapons planned to be destroyed in each annual destruction period for each existing chemical weapons destruction facility and, if possible, for each planned chemical weapons destruction facility;

(b) The number of chemical weapons destruction facilities existing or planned to be operated over the destruction period;

(c ) For each existing or planned chemical weapons destruction facility:

(i) Name and location; and

(ii) The types and approximate quantities of chemical weapons, and the type (for example, nerve agent or blister agent) and approximate quantity of chemical fill, to he destroyed;

(d) The plans and programmes for training personnel for the operation of destmction facilities;

(e) The national standards for safety and emissions that the destruction facilities must satisfy;

@ Information on the development of new methods for destruction of chemical weapons and on the improvement of existing methods;

(g) The cost estimates for destroying the chemical weapons; and

(h) Any issues which could adversely impact on the national destruction programme.

B. MEA~URES TO SECURE THE STORAGE FACIUïï AND STORAGE FACILITY PREPARATION

7. Not later than when submitting its declaration of chemical weapons, a State Party shall take such measures as it considers appropriate to secure its storage facilities and shall prevent any movement of its chemical weapons out of the facilities, except their removal for destmction.

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8. A State Party shall ensure that chemical weapons at its storage facilities are configuredto allow ready access for verification in accordance with paragraphs 37 to 49.

9. While a storage facility remains closed for any movement of chemical weapons out of the facility other than their removal for destruction, a State Party may continue at the facility standard maintenance activities, including standard maintenance of chemical weapons; safety monitoring and physical security activities; and preparation of chemical weapons for destruction.

10. Maintenance activities of chemical weapons shall not include:

(a ) Replacement of agent or of munition bodies;

(b) Modification of the original characteristics of munitions, or parts or components thereof.

11. Al1 maintenance activities shall be subject to monitoring by the Technical Secretariat.

Principles and methodî for destruction of chemical weapons

12. "Destruction of chemical weapons" means a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other devices unusable as such.

13. Each State Party shall determine how it shall destroy chemical weapons, except that the following processes may not be used: dumping in any body of water, land burial or open-pit burning. It shall destroy chemical weapons only at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facilities.

14. Each State Party shall ensure that its chemical weapons destruction facilities are constructed and operated in a manner to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons; and that the destruction process can be verified under the provisions of this Convention.

Order of destruction

15. The order of destruction of chemical weapons is based on the obligations specified in Article 1 and the other Articles, including obligations regarding systematic on-site verification. It takes into account interests of States Parties for undiminished security during the destruction period; confidence-building in the early part of the destmction stage; gradua1 acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons; and applicability irrespective of the actual composition

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of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons. The order of destruction is based on the principle of levelling out.

16. For the purpose of destruction, chernical weapons declared by each State Party shall be divided into three categories:

Category 1: Chemicai weapons on the basis of Schedule 1 chemicals and their parts and components;

Category 2: Chernical weapons on the basis of al1 other chemicals and their parts and components;

Category 3: Unîilled munitions and devices, and equiprnent specifically designed for use directly in connection with ernployment of chemical weapons.

17. A State Party shall start:

(a) The destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons not later than two years after this Convention enters into force for it, and shail complete the destruction not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party shall destroy chemical weapons in accordance with the following destruction deadlines:

(i) Phase 1: Not later than two years after entry into force of this Convention, testing of its first destruction facility shall be completed. Not less than 1 per cent of the Category 1 chemical weapons shail be destroyed not later than three years after the entry into force of this Convention;

(ü) Phase 2: Not less than 20 percent of the Category 1 chernical weapons shail be destroyed not later than five years after the entry into force of this Convention;

(iü) Phase 3: Not less than 45 percent of the Category 1 chemical weapons shall be destroyed not later than seven years after the entry into force of this Convention;

(iv) Phase 4: Al1 Category 1 chemical weapons shall be destroyed not later than 10 years after the entry into force of this Convention.

(b) The destruction of Category 2 chemical weapons not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it and shall complete the destruction not later than five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Category 2 chemical weapons shall be destroyed in equal annual increments throughout the destruction period. The cornparison factor for such weapons is the weight of the chemicals within Category 2; and

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(c) The destruction of Category 3 chemical weapons not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it, and shall complete the destruction not later thm five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Category 3 chemical weapons shall be destroyed in equal annual increments throughout the destruction period. The comparison factor for unfilled munitions and devices is expressed in nominal fil1 volume (m3) and for equipment in number of items.

18. For the destruction of binary chemical weapons the following shall apply:

(a) For the purposes of the order of destruction, a declared quantity (in tonnes) of the key component intended for a specific toxic end-product shall be considered equivalent to the quantity (in tonnes) of this toxic end-product calculated on a stoichiometric basis assuming 100 per cent yield.

(b) A requirement to destroy a given quantity of the key component shall entai1 a requirement to destroy a corresponding quantity of the other component, calculated from the actual weight ratio of the components in the relevant type of binary chemical munitionldevice.

(c) If more of the other component is declared than is needed, based on the actual weight ratio between components, the excess shall be destroyed over the first two years after destruction operations begin.

(d) At the end of each subsequent operational year a State Party may retain an amount of the other declared component that is determined on the basis of the actual weight ratio of the components in the relevant type of binary chemical munition/device.

19. For multicomponent chemical weapons the order of destruction shall be analogous to that envisaged for binary chemical weapons.

Modification of intermediate destruction deadlines

20. The Executive Council shall review the general plans for destruction of chemical weapons, submitted pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (v), and in accordance with paragraph 6, inter dia, to assess their conformity with the order of destruction set forth in paragraphs 15 to 19. The Executive Council shall consult with any State Party whose plan does not conform, with the objective of bringing the plan into conformity.

21. If a State Party, due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control, believes that it cannot achieve the level of destruction specified for Phase 1, Phase 2 o r Phase 3 of the order of destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons, it may propose changes in those levels. Such a proposal must be made not later than 120 days after the entry into force of this Convention and shall contain a detailed explmation of the reasons for the proposal.

22. Each State Party shall take al1 necessary measures to ensure destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons in accordance with the destruction deadlines set forth in paragraph 17 (a) as changed pursuant to paragraph 21. However, if a State Party believes that it will be unable to ensure the destruction of the percentage of Category 1 chemical weapons required by an intermediate destruction deadline, it may request the Executive Council to recommend to the Conference to grant an extension of its obligation to meet that deadline. Such a request must be made not less than 180 days before the intermediate destruction deadline and shall contain a detailed explanation of the reasons for the request and the plans of the State Party for ensuring that it will be able to fulfil its obligation to meet the next intermediate destruction deadline.

23. If an extension is granted, the State Party shall still be under the obligation to meet the cumulative destruction requirements set forth for the next destruction deadline. Extensions granted pursuant to this Section shall not, in any way, modify the obligation of the State Party to destroy al1 Category 1 chemical weapons not later than 10 years after the entry into force of this Convention.

Extension of the deadline for completion of desmtction

24. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to ensure the destruction of dl Category 1 chemical weapons not later than 10 years after the entry into force of this Convention, it may submit a request to the Executive Council for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such chemical weapons. .Such a request must be made not later than nine years after the entry into force of this Convention.

25. The request shall contain:

(a) The duration of the proposed extension;

(b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension; and

(c) A detailed plan for destruction during the proposed extension and the remaining portion of the original 10-year period for destruction.

26. A decision on the request shall be taken by the Conference at its next session, on the recommendation of the Executive Council. Any extension shall be the minimum necessary, but in no case shall the deadline for a State Party to complete its destruction of al1 chemical weapons be extended beyond 15 years after the entry into force of this Convention. The Executive Council shall set conditions for the granting of the extension, including the specific verification measures deemed necessary as well as specific actions to be taken by the State Party to overcome problems in its destruction programme. Costs of verification during the extension period shall be allocated in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 16.

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27. If an extension is granted, the State Party shall take appropriate measures to meet al1 subsequent deadlines.

28. The State Party shall continue to submit detailed annual plans for destruction in accordance with paragraph 29 and annual reports on the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons in accordance with paragraph 36, until al1 Category 1 chemical weapons are destroyed. In addition, not later than at the end of each 90 days of the extension period, the State Party shall report to the Evecutive Council on its destruction activity. The Executive Council shall review progress towards completion of destruction and take the necessary measures to document this progress. Al1 information concerning the destruction activities during the extension period shall be provided by the Executive Council to States Parties, upon request.

Detailed, annual plans for destruction

29. The detailed annual plans for destruction shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat not less than 60 days before each annual destruction period begins pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 7 (a), and shall specify:

(a) The quantity of each specific type of chemical weapon to be destroyed at each destruction facility and the inclusive dates when the destruction of each specific type of chemical weapon will be accomplished;

(b) The detailed site diagram for each chemical weapons destruction facility and any changes to previously submitted diagrams; and

(c) The detailed schedule of activities for each chemical weapons destmction facility for the upcoming year, identifying time required for design, construction or modification of the facility, installation of equipment, equipment check-out and operator training, destruction operations for each specific type of chemical weapon, and scheduled periods of inactivity.

30. A State Party shall provide, for each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities, detailed facility information to assist the Technical Secretariat in developing preliminary inspection procedures for use at the facility.

31. The detailed facility information for each destruction facility shall include the following information:

(a) Name, address and location;

(b) Detailed, annotated facility drawings;

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(c) Facility design drawings, process drawings, and piping and instrumen- tation design drawings;

(d) Detailed technical descriptions, including design drawings and instmment specifications, for the equipment required for: removing the chemical fil1 from the munitions, devices, and containers; temporarily storing the drained chemical fill; destroying the chemical agent; and destroying the munitions, devices, and containers;

(e) Detailed technical descriptions of the destruction process, including material flow rates, temperatures and pressures, and designed destruction efficiency;

Cf) Design capacity for each specific type of chemical weapon;

(g) A detailed description of the products of destruction and the method of their ultimate disposal;

(h) A detailed technical description of measures to facilitate inspections in accordance with this Convention;

( i ) A detailed description of any temporary holding area at the destruction facility that will be used to provide chemical weapons directly to the destruction facility, including site and facility drawings and information on the storage capacity for each specific type of chemical weapon to be destroyed at the facility;

(j) A detailed description of the safety and medical measures in force at the facility;

(k) A detailed description of the living quarters and working premises for the inspectors; and

(1) Suggested measures for international verification.

32. A State Party shall provide, for each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities, the plant operations manuals, the safety and medical plans, the laboratory operations and quality assurance and control manuals, and the environmental permits that have been obtained, except that this shall not include material previously provided.

33. A State Party shall promptly notify the Technical Secretariat of any developments that wuld affect inspection activities at its destruction facilities.

34. Deadlines for submission of the information specified in paragraphs 30 to 32 shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

35. After a review of the detailed facility information for each destruction facility, the ~echnical Secretariat, if the need arises, shall enter into consultation with the State Party concerned in order to ensure that its chernical weapons destruction facilities are designed to assure the destruction of chemical weapons, to d o w advanced planning on how verification measures may be applied and to ensure that the application of verification measures is consistent with proper facility operation, and that the facility operation allows appropriate verification.

Annual reports on destruction

36. Information regarding the implementation of plans for destruction of chemical weapons shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 7 (b), not later than 60 days after the end of each annual destruction period and shall specify the actual amounts of chernical weapons which were destroyed during the previous year at each destruction facility. If appropriate, reasons for not meeting destruction goals should be stated.

Verification O declarations of chemical weapons t t rough on-site inspection

37. The purpose of the verification of declarations of chemical weapons shall be to wnfirm through on-site inspection the accuracy of the relevant declarations made pursuant to Article III.

38. The inspectors shall wnduct this verification promptly after a declaration is submitted. They shall, inter alia, verify the quantity and identity of chemicals, types and number of munitions, devices and other equipment.

39. The inspectors shall employ, as appropriate; agreed seals, rnarkers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons at each storage facility.

40. As the inventory progresses, inspectors shall install such agreed seals as may be necessary to clearly indicate if any stocks are removed, and to ensure the

' securing of the storage facility during the inventory. After completion of the inventory, such seals will be removed unless otherwise agreed.

Systematic verificarion of storage facilities

41. The purpose of the systematic verification of storage facilities shall be to ensure that no undetected removal of chernical weapons frorn such facilities takes place.

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42. The systematic verification shall be initiated as soon as possible after the declaration of chemical weapons is submitted and shail continueuntil .al1 chemical weapons have been removed from the storage facility. It sha1l.G accordance with the facility agreement, combine on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.

. . . . 43. When al1 chemical weapons have been removed from the storage facility,

the Technical Secretariat shall confirm the declaration of the ~ ta ' t e Party to that effect. After this confirmation, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the systematic verification of the storage facility and shall promptly remove any monitoring instruments instailed by the inspectors.

Inspections and visits

44. The particular storage facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected. The guidelines for determining the frequency of systematic on-site inspections shall be elaborated by the Technical Secretariat, taking into account the recommendations to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

45. The Technical Secretariat shall notifj the inspected State Party of its decision to inspect or visit the storage facility 48 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. In cases of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened. The Technical Secretariat shall specdy the purpose of the inspection or visit.

46. The inspected State Party shall make any necessary preparations for the amval of the inspectors and shall ensure their expeditious transportation from their point of entry t o the storage facility. The facility agreement will specify administrative arrangements for inspectors.

47. The inspected State Party shall provide the inspection team upon its arrival at the chemical weapons storage facility to carry out an inspection, with the following data on the facility:

(a) The number of storage buildings and storage locations;

(b) For each storage building and storage location, the type and the identification number or designation, shown on the site diagram; and

(c) For each storage building and storage location at the facility, the number of items of each specific type of chemical weapon, and, for containers that are not part of binary munitions, the actual quantity of chemical fil1 in each container.

48. In canying out an inventory, within the time available, inspectors shall have the right:

(a) To use any of the following inspection techniques:

(i) inventory al1 the chemical weapons stored at the facility;

(ii) inventory al1 the chemical weapons stored in specific buildings or locations at the facility, as chosen by the inspectors; or

(iii) inventory al1 the chemical weapons of one or more specific types stored at the facility, as chosen by the inspectors; and

(b) To check al1 items inventoried against agreed records.

49. Inspectors shall, in accordance with facility agreements:

(a) Have unimpeded access to al1 parts of the storage facilities including any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers therein. While conducting their activity, inspectors shall comply with the safety regulations at the facility. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the inspectors; and

(b) Have the right, during the first and any subsequent inspection of each chemical weapons storage facility, to designate munitions, devices, and containers from which samples are to be taken, and to a f f i to such munitions, devices, and containers a unique tag that will indicate an attempt to remove or alter the tag. A sample shall be taken from a tagged item at a chemical weapons storage facility or a chemical weapons destruction facility as soon as it is practically possible in accordance with the corresponding destruction programmes, and, in any case, not later than by the end of the destruction operations.

Systematic ver$cation of the destruction of chemical weapons

50. The purpose of verification of destruction of chemical weapons shall be:

(a) To confirm the identity and quantity of the chemical weapons stocks to be destroyed; and

(b) To confirm that these stocks have been destroyed.

51. Chemical weapons destruction operations during the first 390 days after the entry into force of this Convention shall be govemed by transitional verification arrangements. Such arrangements, including a transitional facility agreement, provisions for verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for application of the arrangements, shall be agreed

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between the Organization and the inspected State Party. These arrangements shall be approved by the Executive Council not later than 60 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party, taking into account the recommendations of the Technical Secretariat, which shall be based on an evaluation of the detailed facility information provided in accordance with paragraph 31 and a visit to the facility. The Executive Council shall, at its first session, establish the guidelines for such transitional verification arrangements, based on recommendations to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). The transitional verification arrangements shall be designed to verify, throughout the entire transitional period, the destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with the purposes set forth in paragraph 50, and to avoid hampering ongoing destruction operations.

52. The provisions of paragraphs 53 to 61 shall apply to chemical weapons destruction operations that are to begin not earlier than 390 days after the entry into force of this Convention.

53. On the basis of this Convention and the detailed destruction facility information, and as the case may be, on experience from previous inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall prepare a draft plan for inspecting the destruction of chemical weapons at each destruction facility. The plan shall be completed and provided to the inspected State Party for comment not less than 270 days before the facility begins destruction operations pursuant to this Convention. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and the inspected State Party should be resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matter shall be foiwarded to the Executive Council for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full implementation of this Convention.

54. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial visit to each chemical weapons destruction facility of the inspected State Party not less than 240 days before each facility begins destruction operations pursuant to this Convention, to allow it to familiarize itself with the facility and assess the adequacy of the inspection plan.

55. In the case of an existing facility where chemical weapons destruction operations have already been initiated, the inspected State Party shall not be required to decontaminate the facility before the Technical Secretariat conducts an initial visit. The duration of the visit shall not exceed five days and the number of visiting personnel shall not exceed 15.

56. T h e agreed detailed plans for verification, with an appropriate recommendation by the Technical Secretariat, shall be forwarded to the Executive Council for review. The Executive Council shall review the plans with a view to approving them, consistent with verification objectives and obligations under this

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Convention. It should also confirm that verification schemes for destruction are consistent with verification aims and are efficient and practical. This review should be completed not less than 180 days before the destmction period begins.

57. Each member of the Evecutive Council may wnsult with the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy of the plan for verification. If there are no objections by any member of the Executive Council, the plan shall be put into action.

58. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council shall enter into consultations with the State Party to reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they shall be referred to the Conference.

59. The detailed facility agreements for chemical weapons destruction facilities shall specify, taking into account the specific characteristics of the destruction facility and its mode of operation:

(a ) Detailed on-site inspection procedures; and

(b) Provisions for verification through continuous monitoring with on-site instmments and physical presence of inspectors.

60. Inspectors shall be granted access to each chemical weapons destruction facility not less than 60 days before the commencement of the destruction, pursuant to this Convention, at the facility. Such access shall be for the purpose of supervising the installation of the inspection equipment, inspecting this equipment and testing its operation, as well as for the purpose of canying out a final engineering review of the facility. In the case of an existing facility where chemical weapons destruction operations have already been initiated, destruction operations shall be stopped for the minimum amount of time required, not to exceed 60 days, for installation and testing of the inspection equipment. Depending on the results of the testing and review, the State Party and the Technical Secretariat may agree on additions or changes to the detailed facility agreement for the facility.

61. The inspected State Party shall notify, in writing, the inspection team leader at a chemical weapons destruction facility not less than four hours before the departure of each shipment of chemical weapons from a chemical weapons storage facility to that destruction facility. This notification shall specify the name of the storage facility, the estimated times of departure and arriva], the specific types and quantities of chemical weapons being transported, whether any tagged items are being moved, and the method of transportation. This notification may include notification of more than one shipment. The inspection team leader shall be promptly notified, in writing, of any changes in this information.

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Chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons destruction facilities

62. The inspectors shall verify the arriva1 of the chemical weapons at the destruction facility and the storing of these chemical weapons. The inspectors shall verify the inventory of each shipment, using agreed procedures consistent with facility safety regulations, prior to the destmction of the chemical weapons. They shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons prior to destruction.

63. As soon and as long as chemical weapons are stored at chemical weapons storage facilities located at chemical weapons destruction facilities, these storage facilities shall be subject to systematic verification ui conformity with the relevant facility agreements.

64. At the end of an active destruction phase, inspectors shall make an inventory of the chemical weapons, that have been removed from the storage facility, to be destroyed. They shall verify the accuracy of the inventory of the chemical weapons remaining, employing inventory control procedures as referred to in paragraph 62.

Systematic on-site verification measures at chemical weapons destruction facilities

65. The inspectors shall be granted access to conduct their activities at the chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons storage facilities located at such facilities during the entire active phase of destruction.

66. At each chemical weapons destruction facility, to provide assurance that no chemical weapons are diverted and that the destruction process has been completed, inspectors shall have the right to verify through their physical presence and monitoring with on-site instruments:

(a) The receipt of chemical weapons at the facility;

(b) The temporary holding area for chemical weapons and the specific type and quantity of chemical weapons stored in that area;

(c) The specific type and quantity of chemical weapons being destroyed;

(d) The process of destruction;

(e) The end-product of destruction;

(f) The mutilation of metal parts; and

Verification Annex

(g) The integrity of the destruction process and of the facility as a whole.

67. Inspectors shall have the right to tag, for sampling, munitions, devices, or containers located in the temporary holding areas at the chemical weapons destmction facilities.

68. To the extent that it meets inspection requirements, information from routine faciiity operations, with appropriate data authentication, shall be used for inspection purposes.

69. After the c o m ~ l e t i o n of each ~ e r i o d of destruction. the Technical Secretariat shall confinn the declaration of the State Party, reporting the completion of destruction of the designated quantity of chemical weapons.

70. Inspectors shall, in accordance with facility agreements:

(a) Have unimpeded access to al1 parts of the chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons storage facilities located at such facilities, including any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers, therein. The items to be inspected shall be chosen by the inspectors in accordance with the verification plan that has been agreed to by the inspectd State Party and approved by the Executive Council;

(b) Monitor the systematic on-site analysis of samples during the destruction process; and

(c ) Receive, if necessary, samples taken at their request from any devices, bulk containers and other containers at the destruction facility or the storage facility thereat.

Part IV (B)

PART IV (B)

1. Old chemicai weapons shall be destroyed as provided for in Section B.

2. Abandoned chemical weapons, including those which also meet the definition of Article II, paragraph 5 (b), shall be destroyed as provided for in Section C.

B. REGIME FOR OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS

3. A State Party which has on its territory old chemical weapons as defined in Article II, paragaph 5 (a), shail, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit to the Technical Secretariat al1 available relevant information, including, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity and the present condition of these old chemical weapons.

In the case of old chemical weapons as defined in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the State Party shall submit to the Technicai Secretariat a declaration pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (b) (i), including, to the extent possible, the information specified in Part IV (A), paragraphs 1 to 3, of this Annex.

4. A State P a m which discovers old chemical weapons after this Convention enters into force for it shall submit to the Technical Secretariat the information specified in paragraph 3 not later than 180 days after the discovery of the old chemical weapons.

5. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial inspection, and any hirther inspections as may be necessary, in order to verify the information submitted pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 and in particular to determine whether the chemical weapons meet the definition of old chemical weapons as specified in Article II, paragraph 5. Guidelines to determine the usability of chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

6. A State Party shall treat old chemical weapons that have heen confirmed by the Technical Secretariat as meeting the definition in Article II, paragraph 5 (a), as toxic waste. It shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the steps being taken to destroy or othenvise dispose of such old chemical weapons as toxic waste in accordance with its national legislation.

Verüïcation Annex

7. Subject to paragraphs 3 to 5, a State Party shall destroy old chemical weapons that have been confirmed by the Technical Secretariat as meeting the definition in Article II, paragraph 5 (b ) , in accordance with Article IV and Part IV (A) of this Annex. Upon request of a State Party, the Executive Council may, however, modify the provisions on tirne-limit and order of destruction of these old chemical weapons, if it determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. The request shall contain specific proposals for modification of the provisions and a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed modification.

C. REGIME FOR ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS

8. A State Party on whose territory there are abandoned chemical weapons (hereinafter referred to as the "Territorial State Party") shall, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit to the Technical Secretariat al1 available relevant information conceming the abandoned chemical weapons. This information shall include, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity and the present condition of the abandoned chemical weapons as well as information on the abandonment.

9. A State Party which discovers abandoned chemical weapons after this Convention enters into force for it shall, not later than 180 days after the discovery, submit to the Technical Secretariat al1 available relevant information concerning the discovered abandoned chemical weapons. This information shall include, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity and the present condition of the abandoned chemical weapons as well as information on the abandonment.

10. A State Party which has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of another State Party (hereinafter referred to as the "Abandoning State Party") shall, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit to the Technical Secretariat ail available relevant information conceming the abandoned chemical weapons. This information shall include, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity as well as information on the abandonment, and the condition of the abandoned chemical weapons.

11. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial inspection, and any further inspections as may be necessary, in order to verify al1 available relevant information submitted pursuant to paragraphs 8 to 10 and determine whether systematic verification in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraphs 41 to 43, of this Annex is required. It shall, if necessary, verify the origin of the abandoned chemical weapons and establish evidence conceming the abandonment and the identity of the Abandoning State.

Part IV (B)

12. The report of the Technical Secretariat shall be submitted to the Executive Council, the Territorial State Party, and to the Abandoning State Party or the State Party declared by the Territorial State Party or identified by the Technical Secretariat as having abandoned the chemical weapons. If one of the States Parties directly wncemed is not satisfied with the report it shall have the right to settle the matter in accordance with provisions of this Convention or bring the issue to the Executive Council with a view to settling the matter expeditiously.

13. Pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 3, the Territorial State Party shall have the right to request the State Party which has been established as the Abandoning State Party pursuant toparagraphs 8 to 12 to enter into consultations for the purpose of destroying the abandoned chemical weapons in cooperation with the Territorial State Party. It shall immediately inform the Technical Secretariat of this request.

14. Consultations between the Territorial State Party and the Abandoning State Party with a view to establishing a mutually agreed plan for destruction shall begin not later than 30 days after the Technical Secretariat has been informed of the request referred to in paragraph 13. The mutually agreed plan for destruction shall be transmitted to the Technical Secretariat not later than 180 days after the Technical Secretariat has been informed of the request referred to in paragraph 13. Upon the request of the Abandoning State Party and the Territorial State Party, the Executive Council may extend the time-limit for transmission of the mutually agreed plan for destmction.

15. For the purpose of destroying abandoned chemical weapons, the Abandoning State Party shall provide al1 necessary financial, technical, expert, facility as well as other resources. The Territorial State Party shall provide appropriate cooperation.

16. If the Abandoning State cannot be identified or is not a State Party, the Territorial State Party, in order to ensure the destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons, may request the Organization and other States Parties to provide assistance in the destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons.

17. Subject to paragraphs 8 to 16, Article IV and Part IV (A) of this Annex shall also apply to the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons. In the case of abandoned chemical weapons which also meet the definition of old chemical weapons in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the Executive Council, upon the request of the Territorial State Party, individually or together with the Abandoning State Party, may modify or in exceptional cases suspend the application of provisions on destruction, if it determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. In the case of abandoned chemical weapons which do not meet the definition of old chemical weapons in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the Executive Council, upon the request of the Territorial State Party, individually or

Verifcation Annex

together with the Abandoning State Party, may in exceptional circumstances modify the provisions on the time-limit and the order of destruction, if it determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. Any request as referred t o in this paragraph shall contain specific proposals for modification of the provisions and a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed modification.

18. States Parties may conclude between thernselves agreements o r arrangements concerning the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons. The Executive Council may, upon request of the Territorial State Party, individually or together with the Abandoning State Party, decide that selected provisions of such agreements or arrangements take precedence over provisions of this Section, if it determines that the agreement or arrangement ensures the destruction of the abandoned chemical weapons in accordance with paragraph 17.

PART V

DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND ITS VERiFïCATiON PURSUANT TO ARTICLE V

Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities

1. The declaration of chemical weapons production facilities by a State Party pusuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (ii), shall contain for each facility:

(a) The name of the facility, the names of the owners, and the names of the companies or enterprises operating the facility since 1 January 1946;

(b) The precise location of the facility, including the address, location of the complex, location of the facility within the complex including the specific building and structure number, if any;

(c) A statement whether it is a facility for the manufacture of chemicals that are defined as chemical weapons or whether it is a facility for the filling of chemical weapons, or both;

(d) The date when the construction of the facility was completed and the periods during which any modifications to the facility were made, including the installation of new or modified equipment, that significantly changed the production process characteristics of the facility;

(e) Information on the chemicals defined as chemical weapons that were manufactured at the facility; the munitions, devices, and containers that were filled at the facility; and the dates of the beginning and cessation of such manufacture or filling:

(i) For chemicals defined as chemical weapons that were manufactured at the facility, such information shall be expressed in terms of the specific types of chemicals manufactured, indicating the chemical name in accordance with the current International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) nomenclature, structural formula, and the Chemical Abstracts SeMce registry number, if assigned, and in terms of the amount of each chemical expressed by weight of chemical in tonnes;

(ii) For munitions, devices and containers that were filled at the facility, such information shall be expressed in terms of the specific type of chemical weapons filled and the weight of the chemical fil1 per unit;

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<n The production capacity of the chemical weapons production facility:

(i) For a facility where chemical weapons were manufactured, production capacity shall be expressed in terms of the annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific substance on the b a i s of the technological process actually used or, in the case of processes not actually used, planned to be used at the facility;

(ü) For a facility where chemical weapons were filled, production capacity shall be expressed in terms of the quantity of chemical that the facility can fil1 into each specific type of chemical weapon a year;

(g) For each chemical weapons production facility that has not been desîroyed, a description of the faciiity including:

(i) A site diagram;

(ii) A process flow diagram of the facility; and

(iii) An inventory of buildings at the facility, and specialized equipment at the facility and of any spare parts for such equipment;

(h) The present status of the facility, stating:

(i) The date when chemical weapons were last produced at the facility;

(ii) Whether the facility has been destroyed, including the date and manner of its destruction; and

(iii) Whether the facility has been used or modified before entry into force of this Convention for an activity not related to the production of chemical weapons, and if so, infoimation on what moifications have been made, the date such non-chemical weapons related activity began and the nature of such activity, indicating, if applicable, the kind of product;

( i ) A specification of the measures that have been taken by the State Party for closure of, and a description of the measures that have been or will be taken by the State Party to inactivate the facility;

0) A description of the normal pattern of activity for safety and secunty at the inactivated facility; and

Part V

(k) A statement as to whether the facility will be converted for the destruction of chemical weapons and, if so, the dates for such conversions.

Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii)

2. The declaration of chemical weapons production facilities pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii), shall contain al1 information specified in paragraph 1 above. It is the responsibility of the State Party on whose territory the facility is or has been located to make appropriate arrangements with the other State to ensure that the declarations are made. If the State Party on whose territory the facility is or has been located is not able to fulfil this obligation, it shall state the reasons therefor.

Declarations of pad transfers and receipts

3. A State Party that has transferred or received chemical weapons production equipment since 1 January 1946 shall declare these transfers and receipts pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iv), and in accordance with paragraph 5 below. When not al1 the specified information is available for transfer and receipt of such equipment for the period between 1 January 1946 and 1 Janualy 1970, the State Party shall declare whatever information is still available to it and provide an explanation as to why it cannot submit a full declaration.

4. Chemical weapons production equipment referred to in paragraph 3 means:

(a) Specialized equipment;

(b) Equipment for the production of equipment specifically designed for use directly in wnnection with chemical weapons employment; and

(c) Equipment designed or used exclusively for producing non-chemical parts for chemical munitions.

5. The declaration concerning transfer and receipt of chemical weapons production equipment shall specify:

(a) Who reœivedltransferred the chemical weapons production equipment;

(b ) The identity of such equipment;

(c) The date of transfer or receipt;

(d) Whether the equipment was destroyed, if known; and

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(d) Installation of blind flanges and other devices to prevent the addition of chemicals to, or the removal of chemicals from, any speciaiized process equipment for synthesis, separation or purification of chemicals defined as a chemical weapon, any storage tank, or any machine for filling chemical weapons, the heating, cooling, or supply of electrical or other forms of power to such equipment, storage tanks, or machines; and

(e) Interruption of rail, road and other access routes for heavy transport to the chemical weapons production facility except those required for agreed activities.

14. While the chemical weapons production facility remains closed, a State Party may continue safety and physicai security activities at the facility.

Technical maintenance of chemical weapons production facilities prior to their destruction

15. A State Party may cany out standard maintenance activities at chemical weapons production facilities only for safety reasons, including visual inspection, preventive maintenance, and routine repairs.

16. Al1 planned maintenance activities shall be specified in the general and detailed plans for destruction. Maintenance activities shall not include:

(a ) Replacement of any process equipment;

(b) Modification of the characteristics of the chemical process equipment;

(c) Production of chemicals of any type.

17. Al1 maintenance activities shall be subject to monitoring by the Technical Secretariat.

Princi les and methodr for temporay conversion of R . c emrcal weapons production facilities into chemical weapons destruction facilities

18. Measures pertaining to the temporary conversion of chemical weapons production facilities into chemical weapons destruction facilities shall ensure that the regime for the temporarily converted facilities is at least as stringent as the regirne for chemical weapons production facilities that have not been converted.

19. Chemical weapons production facilities converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities before entry into force of this Convention shall be declared under the category of chemical weapons production facilities.

They shall be subject to an initial visit by inspectors, who shall wnfirm the correctness of the information about these facilities. Verification that the conversion of these facilities was performed in such a manner as to render them inoperable as chemical weapons production facilities shall also be required, and shall fall within the framework of measures provided for the facilities that are to be rendered inoperable not later than 90 days after ents, into force of this Convention.

20. A State Party that intends to carry out a conversion of chemical weapons production facilities shall submit to the Technical Secretariat, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, or not later than 30 days after a decision has been taken for temporary conversion, a general facility conversion' plan, and subsequently shall submit annual plans.

21. Should a State Party have the need to convert to a chemical weapons destruction facility an additional chemical weapons production facility that had been closed after this Convention entered into force for it, it shall inform the Technical Secretariat thereof not less than 150 days before conversion. The Technical Secretariat, in wnjunction with the State Party, shall make sure that the necessary measures are taken to render that facility, after its conversion, inoperable as a chemical weapons production facility.

22. A facility converted for the destruction of chemical weapons shall not be more fit for resuming chemical weapons production than a chemical weapons production facility which has been closed and is under maintenance. Its reactivation shall require no less time than that required for a chemical weapons production facility that has been closed and is under maintenance.

23. Converted chemical weapons production facilities shall be destroyed not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention.

24. Any measures for the conversion of any given chemical weapons production facility shall be facility-specific and shall depend upon its individual characteristics.

25. The set of measures carried out for the purpose of wnverting a chemical weapons production facility into a chemical weapons destruction facility shall not be less than that which is provided for the disabling of other chemical weapons production facilities to be carried out not later than 90 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party.

Verification Annex

Principles and methodî related to destruction of a chemical. weapons production facility

26. A State Party shall destroy equipment and buildings covered by the defimition of a chemical weapons production facility as follows:

(a) Al1 specialized equipment and standard equipment shall be physically destroyed;

(b) Al1 specialized buildings and standard buildings shall be physically destroyed.

27. A State Party shall destroy facilities for producing unfilled chemical munitions and equipment for chernical weapons employment as follows:

(a) Facilities used exclusively for production of non-chemical parts for chernical munitions or equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with chemical weapons employment, shall be declared and destroyed. The destruction process and its verification shall be conducted according to the provisions of Article V and this Part of this Annex that govern destruction of chemical weapons production facilities;

(b) Al1 equipment designed or used exclusively for producing non-chemical parts for chemical munitions shall be physically destroyed. Such equipment, which includes specially designed moulds and metal-forming dies, may be brought to a special location for destruction;

(c) Al1 buildings and standard equipment used for such production activities shall be destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, with confirmation, as necessary, through consultations and inspections as provided for under Article IX;

(d) Activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention may continue while destruction or conversion proceeds.

Order of destruction

28. The order of destmction of chemical weapons production facilities is based on the obligations specified in Article 1 and the other Articles of this Convention, including obligations regarding systematic on-site verification. It takes into account interests of States Parties for undiminished securiq during the destruction period; confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage; gradua1 acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons production facilities; and applicability irrespective of the actual characteristics of the facilities and the methods chosen for their destruction. The order of destruction is based on the principle of levelling out.

29. A State Party shall, for each destruction period, determine which chemical weapons production facilities are to be destroyed and carry out the destruction in such a way that not more than what is specified in paragraphs 30 and 31 remains at the end of each destruction period. A State Party is not precluded from destroying its facilities at a faster pace.

30. The following provisions shall apply to chemical weapons production facilities that produce Schedule 1 chernicals:

(a) A State Party shall start the destruction of such facilities not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it, and shall complete it not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. For a State which is a Party at the entry into force of this Convention, this overall period shall be divided into three separate destruction periods, namely, years 2-5, years 6-8, and years 9-10. For States which become a Party after entry into force of this Convention, the destruction periods shall be adapted, taking into account paragraphs 28 and 29;

(b) Production capacity shall be used as the cornparison factor for such facilities. It shall be expressed in agent tonnes, taking into account the mles specified for binary chemical weapons;

(c ) Appropriate agreed levels of production capacity shall be established for the end of the eighth year after entry into force of this Convention. Production capacity that exceeds the relevant level shall be destroyed in equal increments during the first two destruction periods;

(d) A requirement to destroy a given amount of capacity shall entai1 a requirement to destroy any other chemical weapons production facility that supplied the Schedule 1 facility or filled the Schedule 1 chemical produced there into munitions or devices;

(e ) Chemical weapons production facilities that have been converted temporarily for destruction of chernical weapons shall continue to be subject to the obligation to destroy capacity according to the provisions of this paragraph.

31. A State Party shall start the des t~c t ion of chemical weapons production facilities not covered in paragraph 30 not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it, and complete it not later than five years after entry into force of this Convention.

Detailed plans for destruction

32. Not less than 180 days before the destruction of a chemical weapons production facility starts, a State Party shall provide to the Technical Secretariat

Verification Annex

the detaiied plans for destruction of the facility, including proposed measures for verification of destruction referred to in paragraph 33 ÿ), with respect to, inrer alia:

(a ) Timing of the presence of the inspectors at the facility to be destroyed; and

(b) Procedures for verification of measures to be applied to each item on the declared inventory.

33. The detailed plans for destruction of each chemical weapons production facility shall wntain:

(a) Detailed time schedule of the destruction process;

(b) Layout of the facility;

(c) Process flow diagram;

(d) ~ e t a i l e d inventory of equipment, buildings and other items t o be destroyed;

(e) Measures to be applied to each item on the inventory;

ÿ) Proposed measures for verification;

(g) Security/safety measures to be observed during the destruction of the facility; and

(h) Working and living conditions to be provided for inspectors.

34. If a State Party intends t o convert temporarily a chemical weapons production facility into a chemical weapons destruction facility, it shall notify the Technical Secretariat not less than 150 days before undertaking any conversion activities. The notification shall:

(a) Specify the name, address, and location of the facility;

(b) Provide a site diagram indicating al1 structures and areas that will be involved in the destruction of chemical weapons and also identify al1 structures of the chemical weapons production facility that are to be temporarily wnverted;

(c ) Specify the types of chernical weapons, and the type and quantity of chemical fil1 to be destroyed;

(d) Specify the destruction method;

(e) Provide a process flow diagram, indicating which portions of the production process and specialized equipment will be wnverted for the destruction of chernical weapons;

(f) Specifi the seals and inspection equipment potentially affected by the conversion, if applicable; and

(g) Provide a schedule identifiing: The time allocated to design, temporary conversion of the facility, installation of equipment, equipment check-out, destruction operations, and closure.

35. In relation to the destruction of a facility that was temporarily wnverted for destruction of chemical weapons, information shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 32 and 33.

Review of detailed plans

36. On the basis of the detailed plan for destruction and proposed measures for verification submitted by the State Party, and on experience from previous inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall prepare a plan for verifying the destruction of the facility, consulting closely with the State Party. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and the State Party concerning appropriate measures should be resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be forwarded to the Executive Council for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full implementation of this Convention.

37. 'Io ensure that the provisions of Article V and this Part are fulfilled, the combined plans for destruction and verification shall be agreed upon between the Executive Council and the State Party. This agreement should be completed, not less than 60 days before the planned initiation of destruction.

38. Each member of the Executive Council may consult with the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy of the combined plan for destruction and verification. If there are no objections by any member of the hecutive Council, the plan shall be put into action.

39. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council shall enter into consultations with the State Party to reconcile. them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they shall be referred to the Conference. The resolution of any differences over methods of destruction shall not delay the execution of other parts of the destruction plan that are acceptable.

40. If agreement is not reached with the Executive Council on aspects of verification, o r if the approved verification plan cannot be put into action, verification of destruction shall proceed through continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and physical presence of inspectors.

41. Destruction and verification shall proceed according to the agreed plan. The verification shall not unduly interfere with the destruction process and shall be conducted through the presence of inspectors on-site to witness the destruction.

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42. If required verification or destruction actions are not taken as planned, al1 States Parties shall be so informed.

Vérification of declarations of chemical weapons production facilities through on-site inspection

43. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial inspection of each chemical weapons production facility in the period between 90 and 120 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party.

44. The purposes of the initial inspection shall be:

(a) To confirm that the production of chemical weapons has ceased and that the facility has been inactivated in accordance with this Convention;

(b) To permit the Technical Secretariat to familiarize itself with the measures that have been taken to cease production of chemical weapons at the facility;

(c ) To permit the inspectors to install temporary seals;

(d) To permit the inspectors to confirm the inventory of buildings and specialized equipment;

(e) To obtain information necessary for planning inspection activities at the facility, including use of tamper-indicating seals and other agreed equipment, which shall be installed pursuant to the detailed facility agreement for the facility; and

u> To conduct preliminary discussions regarding a detailed agreement on inspection procedures at the facility.

45. Inspectors shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the declared items at each chemical weapons production facility.

46. Inspectors shall install such agreed devices as may be necessary to indicate if any resumption of production of chemical weapons occurs or if any declared item is removed. They shall take the necessary precaution not to hinder closure activities by the inspected State Party. Inspectors may return to maintain and verify the integrity of the devices.

47. If, on the basis of the initial inspection, the Director-General believes that additional measures are necessary to inactivate the facility in accordance with this Convention, the Director-General may request, not later than 135 days after this Convention enters into force for a State Party, that such measures be

Part V

implemented by the inspected State Party not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for it. At its discretion, the inspected State Party may satisfy the request. If it does not satisfy the request, the inspected State Party and the Director-General shall consult to resolve the matter.

Systematic verification of chemical weapons production facilities and cessation of their activities

48. The purpose of the systematic verification of a chemical weapons production facility shall be to ensure that any resumption of production of chernical weapons or removal of declared items will be detected at this facility.

49. The detailed facility agreement for each chemical weapons production facility shall specify:

(a) Detailed on-site inspection procedures, which may include:

(i) Visual examinations;

(ü) Checking and sewicing of seals and other agreed devices; and

(iü) Obtaining and analysing samples;

(b) Procedures for using tamper-indicating seals and other agreed equipment to prevent the undetected reactivation of the facility, which shall specify:

(i) The type, placement, and arrangements for installation; and

(ii) The maintenance of such seals and equipment; and

(c) Other agreed rneasures.

50. The seals or other approved equipment provided for in a detailed agreement on inspection measures for that facility shall be placed not later than 240 days after this Convention enters into force for a State Party. Inspectors shall be permitted to visit each chemical weapons production facility for the installation of such seals or equipment.

51. During each calendar year, the Technical Secretariat shall be permitted to conduct up to four inspections of each chemical weapons production facility.

52. The Director-General shall n o t e the inspected State Party of his decision to inspect or visit a chemical weapons production facility 48 hours before the planned arriva1 of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits.

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In the case of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened. The Director-General shall specify the purpose of the inspection or visit.

53. Inspectors shall, in accordance with the facility agreements, have unimpeded access to al1 parts of the chemical weapons production facilities. The items on the declared inventory to be inspected shall be chosen by the inspectors.

54. The guidelines for determining the frequency of systematic on-site inspections shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 ( i ) . The particular production facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected.

Vén$cation of destruction of chernical weapons production facilities

55. The purpose of systematic verification of the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities shall be to confirm that the facility is destroyed in accordance with the obligations under this Convention and that each item on the declared inventory is destroyed. in accordance with the agreed detailed plan for destruction.

56. When al1 items on the declared inventory have been destroyed, the Technical Secretariat shall confirm the declaration of the State Party to that effect. After this confirmation, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the systematic verification of the chemical weapons production facility and shall promptly remove al1 devices and monitoring instruments installed by the inspectors.

57. After this confirmation, the State Party shall make the declaration that the facility has been destroyed.

Vmfication of ternporary conversion of a chernical wea ons production faciliy into a chernical weapons destruction f acility

58. Not later than 90 days after receiving the initial notification of the intent to convert temporarily a production facility, the inspectors shall have the right to visit the facility to familiarize themselves with the proposed temporary conversion and to study possible inspection measures that will be required during the conversion.

59. Not later than 60 days after such a visit, the Technical Secretariat and the inspected State Party shaii conclude a transition agreement containing additional inspection measures for the temporary conversion period. The transition agreement shall specify inspection procedures, including the use of seals, monitoring equipment, and inspections, that will provide confidence that no chemical weapons

production takes place during the conversion process. This agreement shail remain in force from the beginning of the temporaty conversion activity until the facility begins operation as a chemical weapons destruction facility.

60. The inspected State Party shall not remove or convert any portion of the facility, or remove or modify any seal or other agreed inspection equipment that may have been installed pursuant to this Convention until the transition agreement has been concluded.

61. Once the facility begins operation as a chemical weapons destruction facility, it shall be subject to the provisions of Part IV (A) of this Annex applicable to chemical weapons destruction facilities. Arrangements for the pre-operation period shall be govemed by the transition agreement.

62. During destruction operations the inspectors shall have access to al1 portions of the temporarily converted chemical weapons production facilities, including those that are not directly involved with the destruction of chemical weapons.

63. Before the commencement of work at the facility to convert it temporarily for chemical weapons destruction purposes and after the facility has ceased to function as a facility for chemical weapons destruction, the facility shall be subject to the provisions of this Part applicable to chemical weapons production facilities.

Procedures for requesting conversion

64. A request to use a chemical weapons production facility for purposes not prohibited under this Convention may be made for any facility that a State Party is already using for such purposes before this Convention enters into force for it, or that it plans to use for such purposes.

65. For a chemical weapons production facility that is being used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention when this Convention enters into force for the State Party, the request shall be submitted to the Director-General not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party. The request shail contain, in addition to data submitted in accordance with paragraph 1 (h) (iii), the following information:

(a) A detailed justification for the request;

(6) A general facility conversion plan that specifies:

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(i) The nature of the activity to be conducted at the facility;

(ii) If the planned activity involves production, processing, o r consumption of chemicals: the name of each of the chemicals, the flow diagram of the facility, and the quantities planned t o be produced, processed, or consumed annually;

(iii) Which buildings or structures are proposed to be used and what modifications are proposed, if any;

(iv) Which buildings or structures have been destroyed or are proposed to be destroyed and the plans for destruction;

(v) What equipment is to be used in the facility;

(vi) What equipment has been removed and destroyed and what equipment is proposed to be removed and destroyed and the plans for its destruction;

(vu) The proposed schedule for conversion, if applicable; and

(viü) The nature of the activity of each other facility operating at the site; and

(c) A detailed explanation of how measures set forth in subparagraph (b), as well as any other measures proposed by the State Party, will ensure the prevention of standby chemical weapons production capability at the facility.

66. For a chemical weapons production facility that is not being used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention when this Convention enters into force for the State Party, the request shall be submitted to the Director-General not later than 30 days after the decision to convert, but in no case later than four years after this Convention enters into force for the State Party. The request shall contain the following information:

(a) A detailed justification for the request, including its economic needs;

(b) A general facility conversion plan that specifies:

(i) The nature of the activity planned to be conducted at the facility;

(ii) If the planned activity involves production, processing, o r consumption of chemicals: the name of each of the chemicals, the flow diagram of the facility, and the quantities planned to be produced, processed, or consumed annually;

(iü) Which buildings or structures are proposed to be retained and what modifications are proposed, if any;

(iv) Which buildings or structures have been destroyed or are proposed to be destroyed and the plans for destruction;

(v) What equipment is proposed for use in the facility;

(vi) What equipment is proposed to be removed and destroyed and the plans for its destruction;

(vii) The proposed schedule for conversion; and

(viii) The nature of the activity of each other facility operating at the site; and

(c) A detailed explanation of how the measures set forth in subparagraph (b), as well as any other measures proposed by the State Party, will ensure the prevention of standby chemical weapons production capability at the facility.

67. The State Party may propose in its request any other measures it deems appropriate to build confidence.

Actions pending a decision

68. Pending a decision of the Conference, a State Party may continue to use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention a faciliiy that was being used for such purposes before this Convention enters into force for it, but only if the State Party certifies in its request that no specialized equipment and no specialized buildings are being used and that the specialized equipment and specialized buildings have been rendered inactive using the methods specified in paragraph 13.

69. If the facility, for which the request was made, was not being used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention before this Convention enters into force for the State Party, or if the certification required in paragraph 68 is not made, the State Party shall cease immediately al1 activity pursuant to Article V, paragraph 4. The State Party shall close the facility in accordance with paragraph 13 not later than 90 days afier this Convention enters into force for it.

Verification Annex

Conditions for conversion

70. As a wndition for conversion of a chemical weapons production facility for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, al1 specialized equipment at the facility must be destroyed and al1 special features of buildings and structures that distinguish them from buildings and structures normally used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention and not involving Schedule 1 chemicals must be eliminated.

71. A wnverted facility shail not be used:

(a) For any activity involving production, processing, or wnsumption of a Schedule 1 chemical or a Schedule 2 chemical; or

(b) For the production of any highly toxic chemical, including any highly toxic organophosphorus chemical, or for any other activity that would require special equipment for handling highly toxic or highly corrosive chemicals, unless the Executive Council decides that such production or activity would pose no risk to the object and purpose of this Convention, taking into account criteria for toxicity, corrosiveness and, if applicable, other technical factors, to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

72. Conversion of a chemical weapons production facility shall be wmpleted not later than six years after entry into force of this Convention.

Decisions by the Executive Council and the Conference

73. Not later than 90 days after receipt of the request by the Director-General, an initial inspection of the facility shall be wnducted by the Technical Secretariat. The purpose of this inspection shall be to determine the accuracy of the information provided in the request, to obtain information on the technical characteristics of the proposed wnverted facility, and to assess the conditions under which use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention may be permitted. The Director-General shall promptly submit a report to the Executive Council, the Conference, and ail States Parties wntaining his rewmmendations on the measures necessaxy to wnvert the facility to purposes not prohibited under this Convention and to provide assurance that the converted facility will be used only for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

74. If the facility has been used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention before this Convention enters into force for the State Party, and is wntinuing to be in operation, but the measures required to be certified under paragraph 68 have not been taken, the Director-General shall immediately inform the Executive Council, which may require implementation of measures it deems

appropriate, inter alia, shut-down of the facility and removal of specialized equipment and modification of buildings or structures. The Executive Council shall stipulate the deadline for implementation of these measures and shall suspend consideration of the request pending their satisfactoiy completion. The facility shall be inspected promptly after the expiration of the deadline to determine whether the measures have been implemented. If not, the State Party shall be required to shut down completely al1 facility operations.

75. As soon aspossible after receiving the report of the Director-General, the Conference, upon recommendation of the Executive Council, shall decide, taking into account the report and any views expressed by States Parties, whether to approve the request, and shall establish the conditions upon which approval is contingent. If any State Party objects to approval of the request and the associated conditions, consultations shall be undertaken among intefested States Parties for up to 90 days to seek a mutually acceptable solution. A decision on the request and associated conditions, dong with any proposed modifications thereto, shall be taken, as a matter of substance, as soon as possible after the end of the consultation period.

76. If the request is approved, a facility agreement shall be completed not later than 90 days after such a decision is taken. The facility agreement shall contain the conditions under which the conversion and use of the facility is permitted, including measures for verification. Conversion shall not begin before the facility agreement is concluded.

Detailed plans for conversion

77. Not less than 180 days before conversion of a chemical weapons production facility is planned to begin, the State Party shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the detailed plans for conversion of the facility, including proposed measures for verification of conversion, with respect to, inter alia:

(a) Timing of the presence of the inspectors at the facility to be wnverted; and

(b) Procedures for verification of measures to be applied to each item on the declared inventory.

78. The detailed plan for conversion of each chemical weapons production facility shdl contain:

(a) Detailed time schedule of the conversion process;

(b) Layout of the facility before and after conversion;

(c) Process flow diagram of the facility before, and as appropriate, after the conversion;

(d) Detailed inventory of equipment, buildings and structures and other items to be destroyed and of the buildings and structures to be modified;

(e) Measures to be applied to each item on the inventory, if any;

(B Proposed measures for verification;

(g) Securitylsafety measures to be obsewed during the conversion of the facility; and

(h) Working and living conditions to be provided for inspectors.

Review of iietailed plans

79. On the basis of the detailed plan for conversion and proposed measures for verification submitted by the State Party, and on experience from previous inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall prepare a plan for verifying the conversion of the facility, consulting closely with the State Party. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and the State Party concerning appropriate measures shall be resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be forwarded to the Executive Council for appropriate action with a view to facilitate the full implementation of this Convention.

80. To ensure that the provisions of Article V and this Part are fulfilled, the combined plans for conversion and verification shall be agreed upon between the Executive Council and the State Party. This agreement shall be completed not less than 60 days before conversion is planned to begin.

81. Each member of the Executive Council may consult with the Technical Secretariat on any issue regarding the adequacy of the combined plan for conversion and verification. If there are no objections by any member of the Executive Council, the plan shall be put into action.

82. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council should enter into consultations with the State Party to reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved, they should be referred to the Conference. The resolution of any differences over methods of conversion should not delay the execution of other parts of the conversion plan that are acceptable.

83. If agreement is not reached with the Executive Council on aspects of verification, o r if the approved verification plan cannot be put into action, verification of conversion shall proceed through continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and physical presence of inspectors.

Part V

84. Conversion and verification shall proceed according to the agreed plan. The verification shall not unduly interfere with the conversion process and shall be conducted through the presence of inspectors to confirm the conversion.

85. For the 10 years after the Director-General certifies that conversion is complete, the State Party shail provide to inspectors unimpeded access to the facility at any time. The inspectors shall have the right to observe al1 areas, al1 activities, and al1 items of equipment at the facility. The inspectors shall have the right to verify that the ac t~ i t ies at the facility are consistent with any conditions established under this Section, by the Executive Council and the Conference. The inspectors shall also have the right, in accordance with provisions of Part II, Section E, of this Annex to receive samples from any area of the facility and to analyse them to verify the absence of Schedule 1 chemicals, their stable by-products and decomposition products and of Schedule 2 chemicals and to verify that the activities at the facility are consistent with any other conditions on chemical activities established under this Section, by the Executive Council and the Conference. The inspectors shall also have the right to managed access, in accordance with Part X, Section C, of this Annex, to the plant site at which the facility is located. During the 10-year period, the State Party shall report annually on the activities at the wnverted facility. Upon completion of the 10-year period, the Executive Council, taking into account recommendations of the Technical Secretariat, shall decide on the nature of continued verification measures.

86. Costs of verification of the converted facility shall be allocated in accordance with Article V, paragraph 19.

Acnvm~s NOT PROHïBITED UNDER THIS CONVEN~ON - . IN ACCORDANCE WITH AKTXCLE VI

REGIME FOR 'SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS AND FA CI^ REUTED TO SUCH CHEMICALS

1. A State Party shall not produce, aquite, retain or use Schedule 1 chemicals outside the territories of States Parties and shall not transfer such chemicals outside its territory except to another State Party.

2. A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain, transfer or use Schedule 1 chemicals unless:

(a) The chemicals are applied to research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes; and

(b) The types and quantities of chemicals are strictly limited to those which can be justified for such purposes; and

(c) The aggregate amount of such chemicals at any given time for such purposes is equal to or less than 1 tonne; and

(d) The aggregate amount for such purposes aquired by a State Party in any year through production, withdrawal from chemical weapons stocks and transfer is equal to or less than 1 tonne.

3. A State Party may transfer Schedule 1 chemicals outside its territory only to another State Party and only for research, medical, pharmaceutid or protective purposes in accordance with paragraph 2.

4. Chemicals transferred shall not be retransferred to a third State.

5. Not less than 30 days before any transfer to another State Party both States Parties shall notify the Technical Secretariat of the transfer.

6 . Each State Party shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding transfers during the previous year. The declaration shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the end of that year and shall for each Schedule 1 chemical that has been transferred include the following information:

(a) The chemicai name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned;

(b) The quantity acquired from other States or transferred to other States Parties. For each transfer the quantity, recipient and purpose . . shall . be included.

General principles for production . ,

7. Each State Party, during production under paragraphs 8 to 12, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and t o protecting the environment. Each State Party shall wnduct such production in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions.

Single small-scale facility

8. Each State Party that produces Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medicai, pharmaceutical or protective purposes shall carry out the production at a single small-scale facility approved by the State Party, except as s e t forth in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12.

9. The production at a single small-scale facility shall be carried out in reaction vessels in production lines not wnfigurated for chntinuous operation. The volume of such a reaction vesse1 shall not exceed 100 litres, and the total volume of al1 reaction vessels with a volume exceeding 5 litres shall not be more than 500 litres.

Other facilities

10. Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year may be carried out for protective purposes at one facility outside a single small-scale facility. This facility shall be approved by the State Party.

11. Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in quantities of more than 100 g per year may be carried out for research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes outside a single small-scale facility in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year per facility. These facilities shall be approved by the State Party.

12. Synthesis of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes, but not for protective purposes, may be carried out at laboratories in aggregate quantities less than 100 g per year per facility. These facilities shall not be subject to any obligation relating to declaration and verification as specified in Sections D and E. -

Veriîication Annex

D. DECLARATIONS

Single small-scale facility

13. Each State Party that plans to operate a single small-scale facility shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the precise location and a detailed technical description of the facility, including .an inventory of equipment and detailed diagrams. For existing facilities, this initial declaration shall be provided not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party. Initial declarations on new facilities shall be provided not less than 180 days before operations are to begin.

14. Each State Party shall give advance notification to the Technical Secretariat of planned changes related to the initial declaration. The notification shall be submitted not less than 180 days before the changes are to take place.

15. A State Party producing Schedule 1 chemicals at a single small-sale facility shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding the activities of the facility for the previous year. The declaration shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the end of that year and shall include:

(a) Identification of the facility;

(b) For each Schedule 1 chemical produced, acquired, consumed or stored at the facility, the following information:

(i) The chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts SeMce registry number, if assigned;

(ii) The methods employed and quantity produced;

(iii) The name and quantity of precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2, or 3 used for production of Schedule 1 chemicals;

(N) The quantity consumed at the facility and the purpose(s) of the consumption;

(v) The quantity received from or shipped to other facilities in the State Party. For each shipment the quantity, recipient and purpose should be included;

(vi) The maximum quantity stored at any time during the year; and

(vii) The quantity stored at the end of the year; and

Part VI

(c) Information on any changes at the facility during the year cornpared to previously submitted detailed technical descriptions of the facility including inventories of equipment and detailed diagrams.

16. Each State Party producing Schedule 1 chemicals at a single small-scale facility shall make a detailed annual deciaration regarding the projected activities and the anticipated production at the facility for the coming year. The declaration shall be submitted not less than 90 days before the beginning of that year and shall include:


(b) For each Schedule 1 chemical anticipated to be produced, consumed or stored at the facility, the following information:

(i) The chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts SeMce registry number, if assigned;

(ii) The quantity anticipated to be produced and the purpose of the production; and

(c) Information on any anticipated changes at the facility during the year compared to previously submitted detailed technical descriptions of the facility including inventories of equipment and detailed diagrams.

Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and I l

17. For each facility, a State Party shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the name, location and a detailed technical description of the facility or its relevant part(s) as requested by the Technical Secretariat. Thefacility producing Schedule 1 chernicals for protective purposes shall be specifically identified. For existing facilities, this initial declaration shall be provided not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party. Initial declarations on new facilities shall be provided not less than 180 days before operations are to begin.

18. Each State Party shall give advance notification to the Technical Secretariat of planned changes related to the initial declaration. The notification shall be submitted not less than 180 days before the changes are to take place.

19. Each State Party shall, for each facility, make a detailed annual declaration regarding the activities of the facility for the previous year. The declaration shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the end of that year and shall include:


(b) For each Schedule 1 chemical the following information:

(i) The chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned;

(ii) The quantity produced and, in case of production for protective purposes, methods employed;

(iii) The name and quantity of precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2, or 3, used for production of Schedule 1 chemicals;

(iv) The quantity consumed at the facility and the purpose of the consumption;

(v) The quantity transferred to other facilities within the State Party. For each transfer the quantity, recipient and purpose should be included;

(vi) The maximum quantity stored at any time during the year; and

(vii) The quantity stored at the end of the year; and

(c) Information on any changes at the facility or its relevant parts during the year compared to previously submitted detailed technical description of the facility.

îû. Each State Party shall, for each facility, make a detailed annual declaration regarding the projected activities and the anticipated production at the facility for the coming year. The declaration shall be submitted not less than 90 days before the beginning of that year and shall include:


(b) For each Schedule 1 chemical the following information:

(i) The chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned; and

(ii) The quantity anticipated to be produced, the time periods when the production is anticipated to take place and the purposes of the production; and

(c) Information on any anticipated changes at the facility or its relevant parts, during the year compared to previously submitted detailed technical descriptions of the facility.

Part VI

E. VERIFICATION Single small-scale faciliq

21. The aim of verification activities at the single small-scale facility shall be to verify that the quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals produced are correctly declared and, in particular, that their aggregate amount does not exceed 1 tonne.

. . 22. The facility shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site

inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.

23. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections for a particular facility shall be based on the risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the facility and the nature of the activities carried out there. Appropriate guidelines shall be wnsidered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

. The purpose of the initial inspection shail be to verify information provided concerning the facility, including verification of the limits on reaction vessels set forth in paragraph 9.

25. Not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for a State Party, it shail conclude a facility agreement, based on a model agreement, with the Organization, wvering detailed inspection procedures for the facility.

26. Each State Party planning to establish a single smail-scale facility after this Convention enters into force for it shail wnclude a faciiity agreement, based on a model agreement, with the Organization, covering detailed inspection procedures for the facility before it begins operation or is used.

27. A model for agreements shall be considered and approvedby the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

Other facilities refeired to in paragraphs 10 and 11

28. The aim of verification activities at any facility referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11 shall be to verify that:

(a) The facility is not used to produce any Schedule 1 chemical, except for the declared chemicals;

(b) The quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals produced, processed or consumed are wrrectly declared and consistent with needs for the declared purpose; and

(c) The Schedule 1 chemical is not diverted or used for other purposes.

29. The facility shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.

30. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections for a particular facility shall be based on the risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the quantities of chemicals produced, the characteristics of the faciliiy and the nature of the act~ities carried out there. Appropriate guidelines shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

31. Not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for a State Party, it shall conclude facility agreements with the Organization, based on a model agreement covering detailed inspection procedures for each facility.

32. Each State Party planning to establish such a faciliiy after entry into force of this Convention shall conclude a facility agreement with the Organization before the facility begins operation or is used.

Wrl VII

Acrrvm~s NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VI

REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS AND FACILITIES RELATED TO SUCH CHEMICALS

Dechrations of aggregate national data

1. The initial and annual declarations to be provided by each State Party pursuant to Article M, paragraphs 7 and 8, shall include aggregate national data for the previous calendar year on the quantities produced, processed, consumed, imported and exported of each Schedule 2 chemical, as well as a quantitative specification of import and export for each country involved.

2. Each State Party shall submit:

(a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 1 not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it; and, starting in the following calendar year,

(b) Annual declarations not later than 90 days after the end of the previous calendar year.

Dechrations of plant sites roducing, processing or consuming Sche f ule 2 chemicak

3. Initial and annual declarations are required for al1 plant sites that comprise one or more plant(s) which produced, processed or consumed during any of the previous three calendar years or is anticipated to produce, process or consume in the next calendar year more than:

(a) 1 kg of a chemicai designated "*" in Schedule 2, part A;

(b) 100 kg of any other chemical listed in Schedule 2, part A; or

(c) 1 tonne of a chemical listed in Schedule 2, part B.


(a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it; and, starting in the following calendar year;

(6) Annual declarations on past activities not later than 90 days after the end of the previous calendar year;

VeriTication Annex

(c) Annual declarations on anticipated activities not later than 60 days before the beginning of the following calendar year. Any such activity additionally planned after the annual declaration has been submitted shall be declared not later than five days before this activity begins.

5. Declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 are generally not required for mixtures containing a lowconcentration of a Schedule 2 chemical. They are only required, in accordance with guidelines, in cases where the ease of recovery from the mixture of the Schedule 2 chemical and its total weight are deemed to pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. These guidelines shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

6. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 shall include:

(a) The name of the plant site and the name of the owner, company, or enterprise operating it;

(b) Its precise location including the address; and

(c) The number of plants within the plant site which are declared pursuant to Part VI11 of this Annex.

7. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 shall also include, for each plant which is located within the plant site and which falls under the specifications set forth in paragraph 3, the following information:

(a) .The name of the plant and the name of the owner, company, or enterprise operating it;

(b) Its precise location within the plant site including the specific building or structure number, if any;

(c) Its main activities;

(d) Whether the plant:

(i) Produces, processes, o r consumes the declared Schedule 2 chemical(s);

(ii) 1s dedicated to such activities or multi-purpose; and

(iii) Performs other activities with regard to the declared Schedule 2 chemical(s), including a specification of that other a c t ~ i t y (e.g. storage); and

(e) The production capacity of the plant for each declared Schedule 2 chemical.

8. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 shall also include the following information on each Schedule 2 chemical above the declaration threshold:

(a) The chemical narne, wmmon or trade name used by the facility, structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned;

(b) In the case of the initial declaration: the total amount produced, processed, consumed, imported and exported by the plant site in each of the three previous calendar years;

(c) In the case of the annual declaration on past activities: the total amount produced, processed, consumed, imported and exported by the plant site in the previous calendar year;

(d) In the case of the annual declaration on anticipated activities: the total amount anticipated to be producmi, processed or consumed by the plant site in the following calendar year, including the anticipated time periods for production,, processing or consumption; and

(e) The purposes for which the chemical was or will be produced, processed or consumed:

(i) Processing and consumption on site with a specification of the product types;

(ii) Sale or transfer within the territory or to any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party, with a specification whether to other industry, trader or other destination and, if possible, of linal product types;

(iii) Direct export, with a specification of the States involved; or

(i) Other, including a specification of these other purposes.

Dechrations on past produ~tion of Schedule 2 chernicals for chernical weapons purposes

9. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, declare ail plant sites comprising plants that produced at any time since 1 January 1946 a Schedule 2 chemical for chemical weapons purposes.


(a) The name of the plant site and the name of the owner, Company, or enterprise operating it;

Verification Annex

(b) Its precise location including the address;

(c) For each plant which is located within the plant site, and which falls under the specifications set forth in paragraph 9, the same information as required under paragraph 7, subparagraphs (a) to (e); and

(d) For each Schedule 2 chemical produced for chemical weapons purposes:

(i) The chemical name, common or trade name used hy the plant site, for chemical weapons production purposes, structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service registxy number, if assigned;

(ii) The dates when the chemical was produced and the quantity produced; and

(iii) The location to which the chemical was delivered and the final product produced there, if known.

Information to States Parties

11. A list of plant sites declared under this Section together with the information provided under paragraphs 6, 7 (a), 7 (c), 7 (d) (i), 7 (d) (iü), 8 (a) and 10 shall be transmitted by the Technical Secretariat to States Parties upon request.

General

12. Verification provided for in Article VI, paragraph 4, shall be carried out through on-site inspection at those of the declared plant sites that comprise one or more plants which produced, processed or consumed during any of the previous three calendar years or are anticipated to produce, process or consume in the next calendar year more than:

(a) 10 kg of a chemical designated "*" in Schedule 2, part A,

(b) 1 tonne of any other chemical listed in Schedule 2, part A; or

(c) 10 tonnes of a chemical listed in Schedule 2, part B.

13. The programme and budget of the Organization to be adopted by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (a) shall contain, as a separate item, a programme and budget for verification under this Section. In the allocation of resources made availahle for verification under Article VI, the Technical Secretariat shall, during the first three years after the entry into force of this

Part VI1

Convention, give priority to the initial inspections of plant sites declared under Section A. The allocation shall thereafter be reviewed on the basis of the experience gained.

14. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct initial inspections and subsequent inspections in accordance with paragraphs 15 to 22.

Inspection aims

15. The general aim of inspections shall be to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this Convention and consistent with the information to be provided in declarations. Particular aims of inspections at plant sites declared under Section A shall include verification oE

(a) The absence of any Schedule 1 chemical, especially its production, except if in accordance with Part VI of this Annex;

(b) Consistency with declarations of levels of production, processing or consumption of Schedule 2 chemicals; and

(c) Non-diversion of Schedule 2 chemicals for activities prohibited under this Convention.

Initial inspections

16. Each plant site to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 shall receive an initial inspection as soon as possible but preferably not later than three years after entry into force of this Convention. Plant sites declared after this period shall receive an initial inspection not later than one year after production, processing or consumption is first declared. Selection of plant sites for initial inspections shall be made by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to preclude the prediction of precisely when the plant site is to be inspected.

17. During the initial inspection, a draft facility agreement for the plant site shall be prepared unless the inspected State Party and the Technical Secretariat agree that it is not needed.

18. With regard to frequency and intensity of subsequent inspections, inspectors shall during the initial inspection assess the risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the plant site and the nature of the activities carried out there, taking into account, inter alia, the following criteria:

(a) The toxicity of the scheduled chemicals and of the end-products produced with it, if any;

(b) The quantity of the scheduled chemicals typically stored at the inspected site;

Verification Annex

(c) The quantity of feedstock chemicals for the scheduled chemicals typically stored at the inspected site;

(d) The production capacity of the Schedule 2 plants; and

(e) . The capability and convertibility for initiating production, storage and filling of toxic chemicals at the inspected site.

Inspections

19. Having received the initial inspection, each plant site to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 shall be subject to subsequent inspections.

20. In selecting particular plant sites for inspection and in deciding on the frequency and intensity of inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall give due consideration t'o the risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant site and the nature of the activities carried out there, taking into account the respective facility agreement as weU as the results of the initial inspections and subsequent inspections.

21. The Technical Secretariat shall choose a particular plant site to be inspected in such a way as to preclude the prediction of exactly when it will be inspected.

22. No plant site shall receive more than'two inspections per calendar year under the provisions of this Section. This, however, shall not limit inspections pursuant to Article IX.

Inspection procedures

23. In addition to agreed guidelines, other relevant provisions of this Annex and the Confidentiality Annex, paragraphs 24 to 30 below shall apply.

24. A facility agreement for the declared plant site shall be conciuded not later than 90 days after completion of the initial inspection between the inspected State Party and the Organization unless the inspected State Party and the Technical Secretariat agree that it is not needed. It shall be based on a mode1 agreement and govern the conduct of inspections at the declared plant site. The agreement shall specify the frequency and intensity of inspections as well as detailed inspection procedures, consistent with paragraphs 25 to 29.

25. The focus of the inspection shall be the declared Schedule 2 plant(s) within the declared plant site. If the inspection team requests access to other parts of the plant site, access to these areas shall be granted in accordance with the obligation to provide clarification pursuant to Part II, paragraph 51, of this Annex and in

accordance with the facility agreement, or, in the absence of a facility agreement, in accordance with the rules of managed access as specified in Part X, Section C, of this Annex.

26. Access to records shall be provided, as appropriate, to provide assurance that there has been no diversion of the declared chemical and that production has been consistent with declarations.

27. Sampling and analysis shall be undertaken to check for the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals.

28. Areas to be inspected may include:

(a) Areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are delivered or stored;

(b) Areas where manipulative processes are performed upon the reactants pnor to addition to the reaction vessels;

(c) Feed lines as appropriate from the areas referred to in subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) to the reaction vessels together with any associated valves, flow meters, etc.;

(d) ' The extemal aspect of the reaction vessels and ancillary equipment;

(e) Lines from the reaction vessels leading to long- or short-term storage or to equipment further processing the declared Schedule 2 chemicals;

u> Control equipment associated with any of the items under subparagraphs (a) to (el;

(g) Equipment and areas for waste and effluent handling;

(h) Equipment and areas for disposition of chemicals not up to specification.

29. The period of inspection shall not last more than 96 hours; however, extensions may be agreed between the inspection team and the inspected State Party.

Notification of inspection

30. A State Party shall be notified by the Technical Secretariat of the inspection not less than 48 hours before the arriva1 of the inspection team at the plant site to be inspected.

Verificaüon Annex

31. Schedule 2 chemicals shall only be transferred to or received from States Parties. This obligation shall take effect three years after entry into force of this Convention.

32. During this interim three-year period, each State Party shall require an end-use certificate, as specified below, for transfers of Schedule 2 chemicals to States not Party to this Convention. For such transfers, each State Party shall adopt the necessasr measures to ensure that the transferred chemicals shall only be used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. Inter d ia , the State Party shall require from the recipient State a certificate stating, in relation to the transferred chemicals:

(a) That they will only be used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention;

(b) That they will not be re-transferred;

(c) Their types and quantities;

(d) Their end-use(s); and

(e) The name(s) and address(es) of the end-user@).

Part W I

PART VI11

ACI~VITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VI

REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS AND FACILITIES RELATED TO SUCH CHEMICALS

k DECLARA~ONS

Declarations of aggregate national data

1. The initial and annual declarations to be provided by a State Party pursuant to Article VI, paragraphs 7 and 8, shall include aggregate national data for the previous calendar year on the quantities produced, imported and exported of each Schedule 3 chemical, as well as a quantitative specification of import and export for each country involved.


(a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 1 not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it; and, starting in the following calendar year,

(b) Annual declarations not later than 90 days after the end of the previous calendar year.

Declarations of plant sites producing Schedule 3 chernicals

3. Initial and annual declarations are required for al1 plant sites that comprise one or more plants which produced during the previous calendar year or are anticipated to produce in the next calendar year more than 30 tonnes of a Schedule 3 chemical.


(a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it; and, starting in the following calendar year;

(b) Annual declarations on past activities not later than 90 days after the end of the previous calendar year;

( c ) Annual declarations on anticipated activities not later than 60 days before the beginning of the following calendar year. Any such activity additionally planned after the annual declaration has been submitted shall be declared not later than five days before this activity begins.

Verification Annex

5. Declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 are generally not required for mixtures containing a low concentration of a Schedule 3 chemid. They are only required, in accordance with guidelines, in such cases where the ease of recovery from the mixture of the Schedule 3 chemical and its total weight are deemed to pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. These guidelines shall be wnsidered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).


(a) The name of the plant site and the name of the owner, company, or enterprise operating it;

(b) Its precise location including the address; and

(c) The number of plants within the plant site which are declared pursuant to Part VI1 of this Annex.

7. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 shall also include, for each plant which is located within the plant site and which falls under the specifications set forth in paragraph 3, the following information:

(a) The name of the plant and the name of the owner, company, or enterprise operating it;

(b) Its precise location within the plant site, including the specific building or structure number, if any;

(c) Its main activities.

8. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 shall also include the following information on each Schedule 3 chemical above the declaration threshold:

(a) The chemical name, comrnon or trade name used by the facility, structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts SeMce registry number, if assigned;

(b) The approximate amount of production of the chemid in the previous calendar year, or, in case of declarations on anticipated activities, anticipated for the next calendar year, expressed in the ranges: 30 to 200 tonnes, 200 to 1,000 tonnes, 1,000 to 10,000 tonnes, 10,000 to 100,000 tonnes, and above 100,000 tonnes; and

(c ) The purposes for which the chemical was or wiil be produced.

Part W I

Declarations on part production of Schedule 3 chemicah for chemical weapons puposes

9. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, declare al1 plant sites comprising plants that produced at any tirne since 1 January 1946 a Schedule 3 chemical for chemical weapons purposes.

10. Declarations of a plant site punuant to paragraph 9 shall include:


(b) Its precise location including the address;

(c) For each plant which is located within the plant site, and which falls under the specifications set forth in paragraph 9, the same information as required under paragraph 7, subparagraphs (a) to (c); and

(d) For each Schedule 3 chemical produced for chemical weapons purposes:

(i) The chemical name, common or trade name used by the plant site for chemical weapons production purposes, stmctural formula, and Chernical Abstracts Service registry nurnber, if qssigned;

(ii) The dates when the chemical was produced and the quantity produced; and

(iii) The location to which the chernical was delivered and the final product produced there, if known.


11. A list of la nt sites declared under this Section toeether with the information proviged under paragraphs 6, 7 (a), 7 (c), 8 (a)and 10 shall be transrnitted by the Technical Secretariat to States Parties upon request.

General

12. Verification provided for in paragraph 5 of Article VI shall be carried out through on-site inspections at those declared plant sites which produced during the previous calendar year or are anticipated to produce in the next calendar year in excess of 200 tonnes aggregate of any Schedule 3 chernical above the declaration threshold of 30 tonnes.

Verification Annex

13. The programme and budget of the Organization to be adopted by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (a), shall contain, as a separate item, a programme and budget for verification under this Section taking into account Part VII, paragraph 13, of this Annex.

14. Under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall randomly select plant sites for inspection through appropriate mechanisms, such as the use of specially designed computer software, on the basis of the following weighting factors:

(a) Equitable geographical distribution of inspections; and

(b) The information on the declared plant sites available to the Technical Secretariat, related to the relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant site and the nature of the activities carried out there.

15. No plant site shall receive more than two inspections per year under the provisions of this Section. This, however, shall not limit inspections pursuant to Article IX.

16. In selecting plant sites for inspection under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall observe the following limitation for the combined number of inspections to be received by a State Party per calendar year under this Part and Part IX of this Annex: the combined number of inspections shall not exceed three plus 5 per cent of the total number of plant sites declared by a State Party under both this Part and Part IX of this Annex, or 20 inspections, whichever of these two figures is lower.

Inspection aims

17. At plant sites declared under Section A, the general aim of inspections shall be to verify that activities are consistent with the information to be provided in declarations. The particular airn of inspections shall be the verification of the absence of any Schedule 1 chemical, especially its production, except if in accordance with Part VI of this Annex.



19. There shall be no facility agreement, unless requested by the inspected State Party.

20. The focus of the inspections shall be the declared Schedule 3 plant(s) within the declared plant site. If the inspection team, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 51, of this Annex, requests access to other parts of the plant site for

Part W I

clarification of ambiguities, the extent of such access shall be agreed between the inspection team and the inspected State Party.

21. The inspection team may have access to records in situations in which the inspection team and the inspected State Party agree that such access will assist in achieving the objectives of the inspection.

22. Sampling and on-site analysis may be undertaken to check for the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals. In case of unresoived ambiguities, samples may be analysed in a designated off-site laboratory, subject to the inipected taie ~ a + agreement.

23. Areas to be inspected may include:

(a) Areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are delivered or stored;

(b) Areas where manipulative processes are performed upon the reactants prior to addition to the reaction vessel;

(c) Feed lines as appropriate from the areas referred to in subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) to the reaction vessel together with any associated valves, flow meters, etc.;

( d ) The extemal aspect of the reaction vessels and ancillary equipment;

(e) Lines from the reaction vesseis leading to long- or short-term storage or to equipment further processing the declared Schedule 3 chemicals;

(f) ControI equipment associated with any of the items under subparagraphs (a) to (4;

k) Equiprnent and areas for waste and effluent handling;

(h) Equipment and areas for disposition of chemicals not up to specification.

24. The period of inspection shall not last more than 24 hours; however, extensions may be agreed between the inspection team and the inspected State Party.


25. A State Party shall be notified by the Technical Secretariat of the inspection not less than 120 hours before the arrival of the inspection team at the plant site to be inspected.

C. TIUNSFERS TO STATES NOT PARTY TO THIS CONVENTION

26. When transferring Schedule 3 chernicals to States not Party to this Convention, each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the transferred chernicals shall only be used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. Inter alia, the State Party shall require frorn the recipient State a certificate stating, in relation to the transferred chemicals:

(a) That they will only be used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention;

(b) That they will not be re-transferred;

(c) Their types and quantities;

(d) Their end-use(s); and

(e) The narne(s) and address(es) of the end-user(s).

27. Five years after entry into force of this Convention, the Conferenœ shall consider the need to establish other rneasiires regarding transfers of Schedule 3 chernicals to States not Party to this Convention.

Wrtm

PART IX

ACTMTES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION IN. ACCORDANCE WlTH h X I C L E VI

REGIME FOR OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCTION FAC1LiTE.î

List of other chemical production facilities

1. The initial declaration to be provided by each State Party pursuant to Article VI, paragraph 7, shall include a list of al1 plant sites that:

(a) Produced by synthesis during the previous calendar year more than 200 tonnes of unscheduled discrete organic chemicals; or

(b) Comprise one or more plants which produced by synthesis during the previous calendar year more than 30 tonnes of an unscheduled discrete organic chemical containing the elements phosphorus, sulfur or fluorine (hereinafter referred to as "PSF-plants" and "PSF-chernical").

2. The list of other chemical production facilities to be submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not include plant sites that exclusively produced explosives or hydrocarbons.

3. Each State Party shall submit its list of other chemical production facilities pursuant to paragraph 1 as part of its initial declaration not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it. Each State Party shall, not later than 90 days after the beginning of each following calendar year, provide annually the information necessary to update the list.

4. The list of other chemical production facilities to be submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall include the following information on each plant site:


(b) The precise location of the plant site including its address;

(c) Its main activities; and

(d) The approximate number of plants producing the chemicals specified in paragraph 1 in the plant site.

5. With regard to plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (a), the list shall also include information on the approximate aggregate amount of production of

Verification Annex

the unscheduled discrete organic chemicals in the previous calendar year expressed in the ranges: under 1,000 tonnes, 1,000 to 10,000 tonnes and above 10,000 tonnes.

6. With regard to plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (b), the list shall also specify the number of PSF-plants within the plant site and include information on the approximate aggregate amount of production of PSF-chemicals produced by each PSF-plant in the previous calendar year expressed in the ranges: under 200 tonnes, 200 to 1,000 tonnes, 1,000 to 10,000 tonnes and above 10,000 tonnes.

Assistance by the Technical Secretanat

7. If a State Party, for administrative reasons, deems it necessary to ask for assistance in compiling its list of chemical production facilities pursuant to paragraph 1, it may request the Technical Secretariat to provide such assistance. Questions as to the completeness of the list shall then be resolved through consultations between the State Party and the Technical Secretariat.


8. The lists of other chemical production facilities submitted pursuant to paragraph 1, including the information provided under paragraph 4, shall be transmitted by the Technical Secretariat to States Parties upon request.

General

9. Subject to the provisions of Section C, verification as provided for in Article VI, paragraph 6, shall be carried out through on-site inspection at:

(a) Plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (a); and

(b) Plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (b) that comprise one or more PSF-plants which produced during the previous calendar year more than 200 tonnes of a PSF-chemical.

10. The programme and budget of the Organization to be adopted by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (a), shall contain, as a separate item, a programme and budget for verification under this Section after its implementation has started.

11. Under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall randomly select plant sites for inspection through appropriate mechanisms, such as the use of specially designed computer software, on the basis of the following weighting factors:

(a) Equitable geographical distribution of inspections;

(6) The information on the listed plant sites available t o the Technical Secretariat, related to the characteristics of the plant site and the activities carried out there; and

(c) Proposals by States Parties on a basis to be agreed upon in accordance with paragraph 25.

12. No plant site shall receive more than two inspections per year under the provisions of this Section. This, however, shall not limit inspections pursuant to Article IX.

13. In selecting plant sites for inspection under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall observe the following limitation for the combined number of inspections to be received by a State Party per calendar year under this Part and Part VI11 of this Annex: the combined number of inspections shall not exceed three plus 5 per cent of the total number of plant sites declared by a State Party under both this Part and Part VI11 of this Annex, or 20 inspections, whichever of these two figures is lower.

Inspection aims

14. At plant sites listed under Section A, the general aim of inspections shail be to ve;ify that activities are consistent with the information to be provided in declarations. The particular aim of inspections shall be the verification of the absence of any Schedule 1 chemical, especiaily its production, except if in accordance with Part VI of this Annex.



16. There shall be no facility agreement, unless requested by the inspected State Party.

17. The focus of inspection at a plant site selected for inspection shall be the plant(s) producihg the chemicals specified in paragraph 1, in particular the PSF-plants listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (6) . The inspected State Party shail have the right to manage access to these plants in accordance with the les of managed access as specified in Part X, Section C, of this Annex. If the inspection team, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 51, of this Annex, requests access to other parts of the plant site for clarification of ambiguities, the extent of such access shall be agreed between the inspection team and the inspected State Party.

Vedcation Annex

18. The inspection team may have access to records in situations in which the inspection team and the inspected State Party agree that such access will assist in achieving the objectives of the inspection.

19. Sampling and on-site analysis may be undertaken to check for the absence of undedared scheduled chemicals. In cases of unresolved ambiguities, samples may be analysed in a designated off-site laboratory, subject to the inipected taie ~ a & agreement.

2û. The period of inspection shall not last more than 24 hours; however, extensions may be agreed between the inspection team and the inspected State Party.


21. A State Party shall be notified by the Technical Secretariat of the inspection not l e s than 120 hours before the arrivai of the inspection team at the plant site to be inspected.

Implernentation

22. The implementation of Section B shall start at the beginning of the fourth year after entry into force of this Convention unless the Conference, at its regular session-in the third year after entry into force of this Convention, decides othenvise.

23. The Director-General shall, for the regular session of the Conference in the third year after entry into force of this Convention, prepare a report which outlines the experience of the Technical Secretariat in implementing the provisions of Parts VI1 and VI11 of this Annex as well as of Section A of this Part.

24. At its regular session in the third year after entry into force of this Convention, the Conference, on the basis of a report of the Director-General, may also decide on the distribution of resources available for verification under Section B behveen "PSF-plants" and other chemical production facilities. Othe~wise, this distribution shall be left to the expertise of the Technical Secretariat and be added to the weighting factors in paragraph 11.

25. At its regular session in the third year after entry into force of this Convention, the Conference, upon advice of the Executive Council, shall decide on which basis (e.g. regional) proposais by States Parties for inspections should be presented to be taken into account as a weighting factor in the selection process specified in paragraph 11.

26. At the first special session of the Conference convened pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 22, the provisions of this Part of the Verification Annex shall be reexamined in the light of a comprehensive review of the overall verification regime for the chemical industry (Article VI, Parts VI1 to IX of this Annex) on the basis of the experience gained. The Conference shall then make recommendations so as to improve the effectiveness of the verification regime.

Veriîicaüon Annex

CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS PURSUANT TO h l l C L E IX A. DESIGNA~ON AND SELECïION OF INSPECTORS

AND INSPECTION ASSISTANTS

1. Challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX shall only be performed by inspectors and inspection assistants especiaiiy designated for this function. In order to designate inspectors and inspection assistants for challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX, the Director-General shall, by selecting inspectors and inspection assistants from among the inspectors and inspection assistants for routine inspection activities, establish a list of proposed inspectors and inspection assistants. It shall comprise a suftïciently large number of inspectors and inspection assistants having the necessary qualification, experience, ski11 and training, to allow for flexibility in the selection of the inspectors, taking into account their availability, and the need for rotation. Due regard shall be paid also to the importance of selecting inspectors and inspection assistants on as wide a geographical bLis as possible. ~hedesignation of insaectors and insaection assistants shall follow the arocedures arovided for under Part i1, Section A, of this Annex.

2. The Director-General shall determine the size of the inspection team and select its members taking into account the circumstances of a particular request. The size of the inspection team shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper fuifilment of the inspection mandate. No national of the requesting State Party or the inspected State Party shall be a member of the inspection team.

3. Before submitting the inspection request for a challenge inspection, the State Party may seek confirmation from the Director-General that the Technical Secretariat is in a position to take immediate action on the request. If the Director-General cannot provide such confirmation immediately, he shall do so at the earliest opportunity, in keeping with the order of requests for confirmation. He shall also keep the State Party informed of when it is likely that immediate action can be taken. Should the Director-General reach the conclusion that timely action on requests can no longer be taken, he may ask the Executive Council to take appropriate action to improve the situation in the future.

Notification

4. The inspection request for a challenge inspection to be submitted to the Executive Council and the Director-General shall contain at least the following information:

Part X

(a) The State Party to be inspected and, if applicable, the Host State;

(b) The point of entry to be used;

(c ) The size and type of the inspection site;

(d) The concern regarding possible non-compliance with this Convention including a specification of the relevant provisions of this Convention about which the concern has arisen, and of the nature and circumstances of the possible non-compliance as well as al1 appropriate information on the basis of which the wncem has arisen; and

(e) The name of the observer of the requesting State Party.

The requesting State Party may submit any additional information it deems necessary.

5. The Director-General shall within one hour acknowledge to the requesting State Party receipt of its request.

6. The requesting State Party shall notify the Director-General of the location of the inspection site in due time for the Director-General to be able to provide this information to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours before the planned arriva1 of the inspection team at the point of entry.

7. The inspection site shall be designated by the requesting State Party as specifically as possible by providing a site diagram related to a reference point with geographic coordinates, specified to the nearest second if possible. If possible, the requesting State Party shall also provide a map with a general indication of the inspection site and a diagram specifying as precisely as possible the requested perimeter of the site to be inspected.

8. The requested perimeter shall:

(a) Run at least a 10 metre distance outside any buildings or other structures;

(b) Not cut through existing security enclosures; and

(c) Run at least a 10 metre distance outside any existing securiiy enclosures that the requesting State Party intends to include within the requested perimeter.

9. If the requested perimeter does not conform with the specifications of paragraph 8, it shall be redrawn by the inspection team so as to conform with that provision.

Ve.ri6cation Annex

10. The Director-General shall, not less than 12 hours before the planned arrivai of the inspection team at the point of entry, inform the Executive Council about the location of the' inspection site as specified in paragraph 7.

11. Contemporaneously with informing the Executive Council according to paragraph 10, the Director-General shall transmit the inspection request to the inspected State Party including the location of the inspection site as specified in paragraph 7. This notification shall aiso include the information specified in Part II, paragraph 32, of this Annex.

12. Upon airival of the inspection team at the point of entry, the inspected State Party shall be informed by the inspection team of the inspection mandate.

Enhy into the terriiory of the inspected State Party or the Host State

13. The Director-General shall, in accordance with Article IX, paragraphs 13 to 18, dispatch an inspection team as soon as possible after an inspection request has been received. The inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry specified in the request in the minimum time possible, consistent with the provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11.

14. If the requested perimeter is acceptable to the inspected State Party, it shail be designated as the final perimeter as early as possible, but in no case later than 24 hours after the arrivai of the inspection team at the point of entry. The inspected State Party shdl transport the inspection team to the final perimeter of the inspection site. If the inspected State Party deems it necessary, such transportation may begin up to 12 hours before the expiry of the time period specified in this paragraph for the designation of the final perimeter. Transportation shall, in any case, be completed not later than 36 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.

15. For ail declared facilities, the procedures in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shail apply. (For the purposes of this Part, "declared facility" means al1 facilities declared pursuant to Articles III, IV, and V. With regard to Article VI, "declared facility" means only facilities declared pursuant to Part VI of this Annex, as well as declared plants specified by declarations pursuant to Part VII, paragraphs 7 and 10 (c), and Part VIII, paragraphs 7 and 10 (c), of this Annex.)

(a) If the requested perimeter is contained within or conforms with the declared perimeter, the declared perimeter shail be considered the final perimeter. The final perirneter may, however, if agreed by the inspected State Party, be made smaller in order to conform with the perimeter requested by the requesting State Party.

(b) The inspected State Party shall transport the inspection team to the final perimeter as soon as practicable, but in any case shail ensure their arrival at the perimeter not later than 24 hours after the arrivai of the inspection team at the point of entry.

Alternative determination of @al pmimeter

16. At the point of entry, if the inspected State Party cannot accept the requested perimeter, it shall propose an alternative penmeter as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 24 hours after the mival of the inspection team at the point of entry. In case of differences of opinion, the inspected State Party and the inspection team shall engage in negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on a final perimeter.

17. The alternative perimeter should be designated as specificaliy as possible in accordance with paragraph 8. It shall include the whole of the requested perimeter and should, as a rule, bear a close relationship to the latter, taking into aCcount natural terrain features and man-made boundaries. It should normally run close to the surroundhg security barrier if such a barrier exists. The inspected State Party should seek to establish such a relationship between the per&eters by a combination of at least two of the following means:

(a) An alternative perimeter that does not extend to an area significantly greater than that of the requested perimeter;

(b) An alternative perimeter that is a short, uniform distance from the requested perimeter;

(c) At least part of the requested perimeter is visible from the alternative perimeter.

18. If the alternative perimeter is acceptable to the inspection team, it shall become the final perimeter and the inspection tearn shail be transported from the point of entry to that perimeter. If the inspected State Party deems it necessary, such transportation may begin up to 12 hours before the expiry of the time period specified in paragraph 16 for proposing an alternative perimeter. Transportation shall, in any case, be completed not later than 36 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.

19. If a final perimeter is not agreed, the perimeter negotiations shall be concluded as eariy as possible, but in no case shall they continue more than 24 houn after the arrivai of the inspection team at the point of entry. If no agreement is reached, the inspected State Party shall transport the inspection team to a location at the alternative perimeter. If the inspected State Party deems it necessary, such transportation may begin up to 12 hours before the expiry of the time period

Verification Annex

14. Before the commencement of the inspection the inspection team shall prepare an inspection plan to serve, inter alia, as a basis for logistic and safety arrangements. The inspection plan shall be updated as need arises.

Access

15. The inspection team shall have the right of access to any and al1 areas which could be affected by the alleged use of chemical weapons. It shall also have the right of access to hospitals, rehigee camps and other locations it deems relevant to the effective investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons. For such access, the inspection team shall consult with the inspected State Party.

Sampling

16. The inspection team shall have the right to collect samples of types, and in quantities it considers necessary. If the inspection team deems it necessary, and if so requested by it, the inspected State Party shall assist in the collection of samples under the supervision of inspectors or inspection assistants. The inspected State Party shall also permit and cooperate in the collection of appropriate control samples from areas neighbouring the site of the alleged use and from other areas as requested by the inspection team.

17. Samples of importance in the investigation of alleged use include toxic chemicals, munitions and devices, remnants of munitions and devices, environmental samples (air, soil, vegetation, water, snow, etc.) and biomedical samples from human or animal sources (blood, urine, excreta, tissue etc.).

18.. If duplicate samples cannot be taken and the analysis is performed at off-site laboratories, any remaining sample shall, if so requested, be returned to the inspected State Party after the completion of the analysis.

Extension of inspection site

19. If the inspection team during an inspection deems it necessary to extend the investigation into a neighbouring State Party, the Director-General shall notiQ that State Party about the need for access to its territory and request and confirm arrangements for the safe reception of the team.

Part XI

Extension of inspection duration

20. If the inspection team deems that safe access to a specific area relevant to the investigation is not possible, the requesting State Party shall be informed immediately. If necessary, the period of inspection shall be extended until safe access can be provided and the inspection team will have concluded its mission.

Interviews

21. The inspection team shall have the right to intemiew and examine persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of chemical weapons. It shall also have the right to interview eyewitnesses of the alleged use of chemical weapons and medical personnel, and other persons who have treated or have come into contact with persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of chemical weapons. The inspection tearn shail have access to medicai histories, if available, and be permitted to participate in autopsies, as appropriate, of persons who may have been affected by the aileged use of chemical weapons.

Procedures

22. The inspection team shall, not later than 24 hours after its arriva1 on the territory of the inspected State Party, send a situation report to the Diector-General. It shall further throughout the investigation send progress reports as necessary.

23. The inspection team shall, not later than 72 hours after its return to its primary work location, submit a preliminary report to the Director-General. The final report shall be submitted to the Director-General not later than 30 days after its return to its primary work location. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the preliminary and final reports to the Executive Council and to ail States Parties.

Contents

24. The situation report shall indicate any urgent need for assistance and any other relevant information. The progress reports shall indicate any further need for assistance that might be identified during the course of the investigation.

25. The final report shall summarize the factual findings of the inspection, particularly with regard to the alleged use cited in the request. In addition, a report of an investigation of an aileged use shall include a description of the investigation process, tracing its various stages, with special reference to:

Confidentialiîy Annex

(h) Access to confidential information shall be regulated in accordance with its classification. The dissemination of confidential information within the Organization shall be strictly on a need-to-know basis.

3. The Director-General shall report annually to the Conference on the implementation of the regime governing the handling of confidential information by the Technical Secretariat.

4. Each State Party shall treat information which it receives from the Organization in accordance with the level of confidentiality established for that information. Upon request, a State Party shall provide details on the handling of information provided to it by the Organization.

B. EMPLOYMENT AND CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL IN THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

5. Conditions of staff employment shall be such as to ensure that access to and handling of confidential information shall be in conformity with the procedures established by the Director-General in accordance with Section A.

6 . Each position in the Technical Secretariat shall be governed by a forma1 position description that specifies the scope of access to confidential information, if any, needed in that position.

7. The Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff shall not disclose even after termination of their functions to any unauthorized persons any confidential information coming to their knowledge in the performance of their official duties. They shall not comrnunicate to any State, organization or person outside the Technical Secretariat any information to which they have access in wnnection with their activities in relation to any State Party.

8. In the discharge of their functions inspectors shall only request the information and data which are necessary to fulfii their mandate. They shall not make any records of information collected incidentally and not related to verification of cornpliance with this Convention.

9. The staff shall enter into individual secrecy agreements with the Technical Secretariat covering their period of employment and a period of five years after it is terminated.

10. In order to avoid irnproper disclosures, inspectors and staff members shall be appropriately advised and reminded about security considerations and of the possible penalties that they would incur in the event of irnproper disclosure.

11. Not less than 30 days before an employee is given clearance for access to confidential information that refers to activities on the territory or in any other

place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, the State Party concerned shall be notified of the proposed clearance. For inspectors the notification of a proposed designation shall fulfil this requirement.

12. In evaluating the performance of inspectors and any other employees of the Technical Secretariat, specific attention shall be given to the employee's record regarding protection of confidential information.

C. MEASURES TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INSTWATIONS AND PREVENT DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA IN THE COURSE OF

ON-SITE VERIFICATION ACïNITIES

13. States Parties may take such measures as they deem necessary to protect ccnfidentiality, provided that they fulfil their obligations to demonstrate compliance in accordance with the relevant Articles and the Verification Annex. When receiving an inspection, the State Party may indicate to the inspection team the equipment, documentation or areas that it considers sensitive and not related to the purpose of the inspection.

14. Inspection teams shall be guided by the principle of conducting on-site inspections in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their mission. They shall take into consideration proposals which may be made by the State Party receiving the inspection, at whatever stage of the inspection, to ensure that sensitive equipment or information, not related to chemical weapons, is protected.

15. Inspection teams shall strictly abide by the provisions set forth in the relevant Articles and Annexes governing the conduct of inspections. They shall fully respect the procedures designed to protect sensitive installations and to prevent the disclosure of confidential data.

16. In the elaboration of arrangements and facility agreements, due regard shall be paid to the requirement of protecting confidential information. Agreements on inspection procedures for individual facilities shall also include specific and detailed arrangements with regard to the determination of those areas of the facility to which inspectors are granted access, the storage of confidential information on-site, the scope of the inspection effort in agreed areas, the taking of samples and their analysis, the access to records and the use of instruments and continuous monitoring equipment.

17. The report to be prepared after each inspection shall only contain facts relevant to compliance with this Convention. The report shall be handled in accordance with the regulations established by the Organization governing the handling of confidential information. If necessary, the information contained in the report shall be processed into less sensitive forms before it is transmitted outside the Technical Secretariat and the inspected State Party.

Confidentiality Annex

D. PROCEDURES IN CASE OF BREACHES OR ALLEGED BREACHES OF CONFiDENïïAiITY

18. The Director-General shall establish necessary procedures to be followed in case of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality, taking into account rewmmendations to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

19. The Director-General shall oversee the implementation of individual secrecy agreements. The Director-General shall promptly initiate an investigation if, in his judgement, there is sufficient indication that obligations concerning the protection of wnfidential information have been violated. The Director-General shall also promptly initiate an investigation if an allegation concerning a breach of wnfidentiality is made by a State Party.

20. The Director-General shall impose appropriate punitive and disciplinary measures on staff members who have violated their obligations to protect confidential information. In cases of serious breaches, the immunity from jurisdiction may be waived by the Director-General.

21. States Parties shall, to the extent possible, cooperate and support the Director-General in investigating any breach or alleged breach of confidentiality and in taking appropriate action in case a breach has been established.

22. The Organization shall not be held liable for any breach of confidentiality wmmitted by members of the Technical Secretariat.

23. For breaches involving both a State Party and the Organization, a "Commission for the settlement of disputes related to confidentiality", set up as a subsidiary organ of the Conference, shall consider the case. This Commission shall be appointed by the Conference. Rules governing its composition and operating procedures shall be adopted by the Conference at its first session.

Selective Index

SELECïiVE INDEX

The following sample enhies illustrate the way in which the various sections of the Convention are referred to in the Seteciive Index:

Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preamble 11.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Article II, paragraph 2 AC.A.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex on Chemicals, part A,

paragraph 2 VA.X.27,48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verification Annex, p8rt X,

paragraphs 27 and 48 CA.2(h) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gonfidentiality Annex,

subparagraph 2(h).

An underlined entry signifies the primary source of information on a subject:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The article deaiing with chemical weapons

The following acronyms appear in the Selective Index:

CSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conference of thc States Parties ICJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International Court of Justice

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ISP inspected State Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IUPAC International Union of Pure and

Applied Chemistry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PSF phosphorus, sulfur or fluorine

b e r VA.iX) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UN United Nations

The Selective Index does not contain any references to the "Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission".

Abaadoned cbemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Declarations III. 1 (b), VA.IV(B).8- 1 O

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defmition 11.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Destruction 1.3, VA.IV(B).Z, 13-18

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regime for VA.IV(B).2,8-18 (see also Chemical weqons, buried; Old chemicai weqons)

Access Aerial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.40 (see also TmspoHm'on,

wrrnft) Challenge inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.20-21, VA.X.38,41-42,59 (see

also Challenge inspection, mancged ciccess)

Confidentid infornation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.2(h), 5-7, 11, 16 Docurnentation/records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.Ii.47, VA.VII.26, VA.VIII.21,

VA.IX.18, VA.X.33, VA.XI.21, CA.16

Fulllless than full . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iX.20, VA.X.29, 42, 49, 52 Managed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Challenge inspection) Negotiation of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.5 1 Observer's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX. 12, VA.X.55 Other (e.g. neighbouring) States Parties . . . . . . . . VA.II.19-20, VA.XI.6, 19 Perimeter, within . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.20,37-39,43,47,51,55 Randornlrandorn selective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.27,48 (sec also Plantslplmt

sites, selection oj) Right of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.45, VA.N(A).49, VA.V.53,

85, VA.X.29, 41.55, VA.XI.15 State Paity to pmvide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.4-5, V.6-7, VI.9, IX.11-12, 20-

21, VA.II.20, VA.N(A).E, 60, 65, 70, VA.V.62, VA.VI1.25, VA.VIII.20-21, VA.X.20,34,37-52, 55, VA.XI.15, CA.1

(sec also Annex on Chemicais; Annex on Implementation and Yenfication; Annex on the Pmtection of Confidential Infornation; Inspectorslinspection temn; Obliga?ionslunde~cottngs; Requestfng Staie P w ; Storrqge)

Activitiealpuiporea aot pmhibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI, X.2, XI.1-2, AC.A.1, 3, VA.I.2,

. . VA.V.27 Defmition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.9 International cooperation andlor exchange . . . . . . Preamble, VI.11, XI.1 Regime for other chernical pmduction facilities . . . VA.D( ~ e i i m e for Schedule 1 chemicals and facilities . . . Regime for Schedule 2 chernicals and facilities . . . VA.VII ~ e i i m e for Schcdule 3 chernicals and facilities . . . EI Single small-scale facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IL8 (see also Medical puposes; Peciceful puposes; Proteciive purposes; Resemh)

Alternaiive perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (sec Penmeter) (sec also Director-Geneml of the Technical Secretmiai; Executive Council)

Aaaex on C&emicair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2-3,8, VL2, XV.4, a, VA.IV(A).2(a),(b)

Annex on Implementation and Venfication ('Verification Annex') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(see also Inspection; Verification) Annex on the Pmteciion of Confidentid

Lfomation ("Confidentiaiity Annex")

(see also Confidentid informafionlconj?dentidiiy) Amais in payment . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assistance

Clarification of ambiguities (by Executive Council) Definition (assistance against chemical weapons) ,

Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency andlor humanitarian . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Equipment problems, resolving lmplementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Protection against chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . .

V o l u n t q fund

VLIO, VII.6, VII1.5, XV.4, VA.VII.23, VA.VIII.18, VA.IX.15, VA.X.48, 60, a

IX.3,5 X.l IV.11-12, VA.IV(B).I6 VIIL39, X.6-7, 9, 11. VA.III.16 V11.2, VI11.38 X (see also Pmtection ogainst chemicai weqons) X.7

B . .

Binaty chemicai weapons Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3-4, VA.IV(A).2(d)-(B, 18 Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).2(d)-(e) Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA,IV(A).l8-19, VA.V.30 Production facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.8 , , (see Multicomponent chernicd weq~onslsyslems) . . ;

Biologicd weapons Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preamble, XII1

Capacily Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.10, VA.IV(A).3 l(B Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V.8-9,30 Nameplate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 10 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IL8, 10, VA.V.lV), 30, VA.V11.18 Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(B).3 l(i)

. . . . . . . . Ceitificaie, end-use (for cbemical hansfers) VA.V11.32, VA.VIII.26

Ce~tification/ceitify Conversion, completion of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V.85 Destruction of chernical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV.7 Destnictionluse of chemical weapons

production facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V.9, VA.V.68-69, 74 Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.1, VA.II.44,56 Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.56

Challenge inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iX.8-25, VA.X Abuse of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.9,22-23 Access during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Access, challenge inspections;

m anaged) Decide against (314 majority in Executive Council) IX.17 Declared facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.15, 37, 43, 51-52 . . Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.3, 20-21 Exit monitoring during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.23-32 Financial implications of abuse of . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.23 Managed access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V.85, VA.VII.25, VA.IX.17,

VA.X.29,38-52 Point of entrylexit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.15, VA.I.10, 24, VA.II.16-32,35-

36, VA.I11.17-18, VA.IV(A).46, VA.X.4-23, 39, 47, 53, 58, VA.XI.3

Procedure. for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iX.8-25, VA.X.I,35 Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iX.21, VA.X.59-61 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.2, 7-11, 13-14, 16-18,22, VA.I.3,

25, VA.X.2-4, 44, 59 (see also Inspection, requesl)

Right to request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.2, 7-8, 22 Time limits (during a challenge inspection) . . . . . iX.15, 17, VA.X

(see also Exenrtive Council; Facility agreements; Inspection; Observer, Verification, ruleslpmvisions, geneml)

Chaiter (of the United Nations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preamble, IX.1, XIV.1, XXIII . Chernicai.pmduction facilities (see Chemical weqons production facilities; Other.chemica1. .

production facilities) Chernical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E

Buried . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111.2, IV.17, VA.IV(A).13 Categories, three (for purpose of deshuction) . . . . VA.IV(A).16 Dumped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111.2, IV. 17, VA.IV(A).13 Nerve agent or blister agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).6(c) Removal/transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV.4, 10-1 1, VA.IV(A).7, 9,40-43,

61, 64, VA.V.13, 48 Stockpiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . Preamble, 1.1, AC.A.1, 3,

VA.IV(A). 15 Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preamble, 1.1, III.l(a),(c), X.2,

VA.N(A).5, VA.V.3, VA.VI.2 (see also Transfers)

. . Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(B).5 (see also A bmdoned chernical weqons; B i n q chemical weqons; Declarations;

Definitions and criteriq Destruction of chemical weqons; Equipment; Herbicides; Mixtures of chemicais; Multicomponent chemicai weqonslsystems; Old chemicai weqons; Schedule 1, 2 or 3 chemicaisifacilities; Storage; Toxic chemicais; Trcasporfm'on)

Cbemicd weapons destnietioa facilities Annual reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).6,36 Coastructionltesting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).14, 17,29 Conversion of chemical weapons production

facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Convenion) Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. l(c), VA.111.4, VA.V.1 (k ) Inspection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV.4-5, VA.III.6, VA.N(A).30, 49,

51, 53-55, 59-63, 65-70, VA.V.58- 63

Plan for destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).6, 29-35, VA.V.7-9 Removal of chemical weapons tolûom . . . . . . . . . N.4, VA.N(A).43,61 (see also Destruction of chemicai weqons; Stomge)

Cbemicd weapoas pmductioa facilities . . . . . . . . . . . V, VA.V Closedlclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IIl.l(c),V.4,7,VA.V.l(i),12-14,

21-22,46, 69 Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Conversion) Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.I(c), V.9, VA.V.l-IO, 45,

VA.IX.3 Defimition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IL8 Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I.4,Ill.l(c),V.7-12,16,19,VA.V.6-

9, 11-42, 55-57, 70 Order of destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V.28-3 1 Rendered inoperable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V. 19,21 Use of (in exceptional cases of

compellingneed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V.12-14,VA.V.64-66 (see also A ctivitieslpurposes not prohibited)

Cbemicds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . K Corrosive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.1.2,5, VA.V.71 Discrete organic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.1.4, VA.iX. 1 , 5 Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.iX.2 Hydmcarbons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IX.2 Identification of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).(c) Mixtures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).2(d), VA.V11.5, VA.VIII.5 Not listed in Scheduleslunscheduled . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7, V111.38(e), VA.N(A).Z(b),

VA.iX.1, 51 (see also Other chem icai production facilities)

Organophosphoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V.71 Production, processing or use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.12, VI.11, XI. 1-2 PSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see PSF chemicalslplmts)

Riot control agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Rio! contml agents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Schedules (see Schedules 1, 2, 3)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Synthesis 11.8, VA.I.5, VA.V.13, VA.VI.12, VA.IX.1

Toxic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1-4 ,9 ,VI.I -2 ,x ,VA.I .5 , VA.IV(A).2(d),(e), VA.IV(B).6, VA.V.71, VA.VII.18, VA.XI.3, 17

(see also Chemical weqons; Other chemicals; Schedules 1, 2, 3; Storage; Tmnsfers) Compliaacdnon-complisnee

Challenge inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Challenge inspection) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clarification of VIII.40, M.2-8, VA.II.51, 64,

VA.VII.25, VA.VIII.20, VA.IX.17, VA.X.39,42,44

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CSP, mle of VIII.20, 21(k), XII.1-4 (see also CSP)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . Doubts/ambiguities/uncertainties VIII.36, 40, E.2-5, 7, VA.II.5 1, 60, VA.VIII.20, 22, VA.IX.17

Executive Council, role of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.31,35-36, M.3-7, 22-23, XII.2 Inspected State Party obliged to demonstrate . . . . VA.X.42,49, 52

. . . . . Inspection report to contain facts relevant to VA.II.62, VA.X.59, CA.17 (see also Inspection, reports)

Inspection request to contain information regarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iX.9, VA.X.4

Inspection t e m to use only methods necessary to clariS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.44

Measures to ensure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.2 l(k), M.23, XJ Measures to redress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Memures to redress)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OPCW VIII.1, CA.17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sanctions XII, XIV.6 (see also Memures to

redress; Sanctions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State Party, mle of IX.2-5, 11, 20, VA.X.29,42,49, 52,

CA.13 Technical Secretariat, role of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.37,40

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confidence-building VA.IV(A).IS, VA.V.28,67 Confidentid infomaîiodconfiden6diiy

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Access to CA.Z(h), 5-7, 11, 16 Breaches or alleged breaches of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.18-23 Civil and military activities and facilities . . . . . . . VIII.5, CA.1 Classified/classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.Z(c),(d),(h)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dataldocument V11.6, VIII.5, E .11 , VA.X.48, 61, CA.1-2, 15

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disclosures, right to prevent E . l l , VA.X.48

Level of sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Liability of the Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Need-to-know basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Penalities, punitive measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Protection

Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rules/regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State Party's matment o f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Technical Secretariai to abide by provisions for . . Treatmentniandling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (se- also Conjidentiality A nnex)

Consultations. cooperatioa and fact-findiag . . . . . . . .

Director-General (with States Parties) . . . . . . . . . . Executive Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Inspection team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OPCW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Staîes Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technical Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Convention and Amexed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Accession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amendments Authentic tcxts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Depositary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Duraiion and withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Enûy into force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ratification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reservations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Signahire

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Siatus of annexes Convenion (of chernical weapons pmdudion

facilitien) Actions pending a decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

c ~ . 2 ( 4 CA.22 CA.2(h), 6, 8 CA.10, 20 . . .

VI.10, VIII.5, IX.11. VA:il.S6, VA.X.48, CA CA.2(c) CA. I(c),(h), 17 V11.6, CA.4 CA.Z(e)-0, 16 VI.10, CA.20 V11.6

IX (see also Dimctor-Geneml, - Executive Council; Settlement of disputes; Technical Secretariai; OPCW) VI11.45, VA.II.13, VA.V.47 V111.31, 36, XIV.2, VA.N(A).ZO, 57-58, VA.V.38-39, 81-82 1X.20, VA.XI.15 VIILI, XN.2 VIII.1, 31, 36, IX.1-2, XIV.2, VA.IV(B).13-14, VA.V.27, 75 VIIi.40, VA.11.18, VA.N(A).35, 53, 57, VA.IV(B).13-14, VA.V.36, 38, 75, 79, 81, VA.lX.7 XV-XXN X X -

Chemical weapons destruction. for purpose of

Conditions for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Costs of verification

. . . . . Decision by Executive Council andlor CSP Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Plans for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transition agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verification of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see also Chemical weqons

production facilities) Cosb

Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Executive Council decides on inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OPCW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preparatory Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scale of (financial) assessrnent

Technical Secretariat to bear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CSP. mle md funetions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... Agreements. procedures considered and

. . . . . . . . approved by (pursuant to VIII.21)

Chai m a n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chemical weapons production fscilities (permission

touse) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CornplianceInon-cornpliance

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confidential information Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Declarations. guidelines for . . . . Director-General of the Technical Secretariat

. . . . . . . . Emergency and humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Executive Council

. . . . . . . . . . . . . Extension of destruction deadline

V.13, VA.V.68 VII1.20, 21(k). 35-36. 1x.7, 23.25. XII.1-4, CA.23 VA.11.56, CA.Z(c)-(d), 3. 18. 23 VA.V.73.75, 82. 85 VA.VII.5, VA.VIII.5 v111.21(4,44,46 VIII.39, X.7, I I (see Executive CounciI) VA.N(A).22.26

Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Old chemical weapons, usability of . . . . . . . . . . . Programme and budget (of the OPCW) . . . . . . . .

Quorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Review of operation of Convention/verification

regune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Setîlement of disputes

Special session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Technical Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Aggregate national data

Annuel

Assistance and protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chemical weapons destruction facilities . . . . Chemical weapons production facilities . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confidentiality of Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Initial

Inventory format for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Old and abandoned chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . Other facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scheduled chemicals

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shipments

VIII.10, 21(i), X.7, VA.N(A).51, VA.IX.26, CA.23 (see Inspection) VA.N(B).S VIII.2l(a), 32, VA.VI1.13, . VA.VIII.13, VA.IX.10 VIII.I6

VIII.22, VA.IX.26 XN.4-5, CA.23 VIII.12, 22, 33, IX.4, 7,.VA.iX.26 (see Technicd Secretmiai) V111.8, 17-18

III, VA.VI.13-20, VA.VII.1-11, VA.VIII.I-II, VA.IX.1-8 III.l(a), VA.N(A).l, VA.VII.1-2, VA.VIII.l-2 N.7(b), V.9(b), V1.8, VA.VI.6, 15- 16, 19-20, VA.VII. 1-8, VA.VIIi.1-8, VA.IX.3, CA.2(b) X.7(c) III.l(e), VA.VI.14, 18 III.l(a), N.4, 9, 15, VA.IV(A).I-7, 16, 4243, 69, VA.N(B).3, VA.V.45, VA.VII.9, VA.VIII.9 III.l(c), VA,V. l(k) III.l(c), V.6, 9, 18, VA.V.1-IO, 19, 27 ,4347 CA.2(b) III.l(a),(c), N.7, V.9, VA.IV(A).I-6, 16, 18, 29-37, 69, VA.V.6-IO, 27, 32-35, 55-57 III, N.9, VI.7, VA.VI.13-14, 17-18, - VA.VII.1-II, VA.VIII.1-Il, VA.IX.1-6, CA.2(b) VA.N(A).S III. l(b), VA.IV(B).3 III.I(d), VI.7-8, VA.IX.1-8 (see Schedule 1, 2 or 3 chem icdslfiiIities) VA.IV(A).61-62, VA.VI.15

Single small-scale faciliîy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supplier and recipient countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Threshold Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unlisted chernicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see also A bmdoned chernical weqons; Obligations;

Definitions and cntena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abandoned chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chemical weapons Chernical weapons production facility . . . . . . . . . Key component of binary or multicomponent

chemical systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Old chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organization Precursor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Production capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Purposes not prohibited under this Convention . . . Riot control agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Toxic chernical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see also Definitions in Annexes)

Definitions in Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Delivey systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Desbuaion of chemicai weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Abandoned chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assistance

Conversion and verification. adequacy of plans for Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Defmition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Exceptional circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Levelling out principle (order of destruction) . . . . Methods pmhibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Modification and extension of deadlines . . . . . . . . Old chernical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Orderof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Period. annual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Period. IO-year . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phases

VA.VI.13-16 VA.IV(A).S, VA.VI.6, 15. 19. VA.VI1.32, VA.VIII.26 (see ThresholdF) III.l(a),(c), VA.IV(A).S, VA.V.3-5, VA.VI.6, VA.V11.7 (see also CeHificure. end-use) VA.N(A).2(b) (sec Venficdion)

Old chernical weqons)

AC.B, VA.I (see Muniiionsldevices) 1.2-3, N.3 , VA.N 1.3, VA.N(B).13-18 N.11-12, VA.N@).16 VA.V.81 N.16, V.19, VA.N(A).6(g), 26: VA.IV(B).lS VA.N(A).lZ VA.N(A).21, VA.IV(B). 17 VA.IV(A). 15 VA.N(A).13 VA.IV(A). 17. 20-28 VA.N(B).6-7, 17 N.6, 8. VA.N(A).15-21, VA.IV(B).7, 17 1v.7, V.9, VA.N(A).6(a), 17. 29. 36 1v.6, 8. V.lO, VA.IV(A).25, VA.V.30 VA.IV(A).I7, 21. 64

Plan for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.l(a)(v). N.7. VA.N(A).6. 20. 22. 25. 28.36. VA.N@).14

Plan for inspecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).50-60 Preparation for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).9 Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV.7. VA.IV(A).lZ. 31(e). 66. 70 Ratefpace and sequence of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV.6 Removal for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.4. VA.N(A).7.9. 15.4243, 64 Reports (annual) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).28.36. VA.V.9-IO Safeîy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV.IO.12.V.11.VA.N(A).6(e).

31(i). 32. 49. 62. VA.V.33 Samples. monitoring of analysis of . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).70 (see also

S m p l e s fsmpling) Temination of venfication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).43. VA.V.56 Transitional verification arrangements . . . . . . . . . VA.111. 6.7. VA.N(A).51 Undetected removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).4I (see also Assisimce; Chemicai weqons desituction facilities; Chemicai weqons

pmduciion facilifies; Conversion; Declumtions; Equipmenl; Schedule 1 chemicaislfailiiies; Yenfication)

Dest~ciion of chemical weapons pmdriction . . facil~bes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4. III.l(c). V.7-12. 16. 19. VA.V.l(g), 6-9. 11-42. 55-57. 70

(see also Conversion) Director-Gened of the Technical Seeretaiiaî,

mle and functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.ZI(d). 41.4 3.46 Amendments (to the Convention) . . . . . . . . . . . . . XV.2. 5 Assistance and protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.9-11 Challenge inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.8. 13-16, 18.21. VA.X.l.6.

10-1 1. 13. 60-61 Chemical weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . VA.V.47. 52.65.66. 73-74. 85 Clarification (of compliance) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.4. VA.II.64 Confidential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.2.3. 5. 7. 18-21 Executive Council informed by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.11.65. VA.V.74. VA.X.10.

VA.XI.5, 12 (see also Executive Council)

Inactivation of chemical weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V.47

Inspection mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.18. VA.I.14. VA.II.39 Inspection. notification of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.Il.31-32, VA.V.52. VA.X. II.

VA.XI.6, 19 Inspection report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.21. VA.II.62.65. VA.V.73.

VA.X.60-61, VA.XI.22-23 Inspection request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.13.16. 18. VA.V.73. VA.X.24.

11. 13. VA.XI.12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inspectorate supervised by VIII.42

Inspectors/inspection team designated by . . . . . . . K.8. VA.1.17. VA.II.7. VA.XI.8

Investigation of alleged chemicai weapons use . . . X.9. VA.XI.1. 3. 6.12. 19.2 2.23 Pnvileges and immunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.49. 51. VA.11.13.14. CA.20 Report on experience of Technical Secretariat . . . . VA.IX.23 Request for protection and assistance . . . . . . . . . . X.9 Samples. responsibility for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.56 (see also CSP; Executive Council; Scientific A dvisoty Bo&; Technical Secretaria)

Disputes. seüiement of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . m. CA.23

Eeonomic and technologid development . . . . . . . . . End-use cettificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Environmental proteciion

During destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dunng implementation of obligations . . . . . . . . . During inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . During production of Schedule 1 chemicals . . . . . Dunngtranspo rt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Equipment Approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Assistancelprotection (against chernical weapons) . Authentication documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Available on site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chemical weapons destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chemical weapons production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chemical weapons storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conversion . .

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Destruction of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Detectionldecontamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Installed

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Location-fmding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Monitoruig Non-prohibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Non-standard laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Product synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Preamble. VI.11, a VA.VII.32, VA.VIII.26

VA.I.1, VA.II.1 l(d). 12. 27.30. 44. 53. VA.V.50, VA.X.22 X.l, 3. VA.V.13 VA.11.29 VA.II.27, 30 VA,N(A).13,29,31(d), VA.V.34 11.8, IIl.l(c), V.8, VA.I.2, 5.6. VA.V.l(d),(g), 3-5. 7-9. 13. 26.27. 33.44. 65-66. 70. 78. VA.VI.13, 15.16. VA.V11.28, VA.VIII.23 VA.N(A).I(c),2(g),3;317VA.V.13 VA.V.27, 34. 65.66. 70. 78. 85 VA.I.5 V.8, VA.V.5, 7-9. 26.27. 65. 66(b). 70. 78 X.1 VA.I.5, VA.N(A).29, 60. VA.V.I(d), 13.44. 50. 60. VA.X.22 (see also Monitoring. instnrments) VA.X.22 (see Monitoring. instruments) VI.11, X.3, XI.1-2, VA.V.27 VA.I.5 VA.I.6, VA.V.l, 13. 16. 34 VA.1.5

Sample analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.53,56,58 . . Sensitive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.33,46,48, CA.13-14, 16 Specialized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.2,5, VA.V.l(g), 4, 13,26,34,

44, 68, 70, 74 Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.5, VA.II.56 Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. I(c), VA.V.3-5 (see also Inspection; Monitoring; Seals; Vessels. reaction)

Executive Couacil, mle end funetions . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.23-36 Amendments (to ihe Convention) . . . . . . . . . . . . . XV.5 Assistance and protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.9-Il Cha i m a n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.27 Challenge inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.13, 16-17,21-25, VA.X.34, IO-

11,60 Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIIL23-25 Confidentid information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.2(c),(e) Destruction of chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV.8, 13-14, 16, VA.I11.6-7,

VA.IV(A).20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 51, 53, 56-58, 70

Destruction of chemicd weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V.lO, 13, 16-17, 19, VA.V.36-40,

71, 73-75, 79-83, 85 Destruction of old and abandoned

chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(B).7,12, 14, 17-18 Investigation of dleged use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.XI.5, 12.23 Pnvileges and immunities of representatives to . . . VI11.49 Review composition of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V111.23, 25 Special session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.4 Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.29 (see also Assistmce; Complimcelnon-complimce; Conversion; CSP; Dimctor-Geneml;

Industry; Memures to redress; National Authority; RepoHs; Rights of States Pd ies ; Scientifc A h>isov Bo& Settlement of disputes; Technical Secretmiat; Voluntmy fun41

Exit monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Challenge inspection) Export

Scheduled chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VII. I ,8 , VA.VIII.1 (see also Impori; Schedule 1 , 2 or 3 chemicdslfacilifies; Tmsfers)

Extension Inspection duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.59, VA.V.20 Destruction period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Destruction of chemical

weqons, modiQ?carion and extension of deadlines)

Faciliiies Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.1.6 (see also B i n q chemicai weqons; Chemicai weqons destruction facilities; Chemicai

weqons production facilities; Conversion; Ofher chemicaipmduction facilities; Plmtsiplmt sites, Schedule 1. 2 or 3 chemicais~acilities; Single smail-scaie faciliry)

Faciliîy agieements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.7, VA.II.38, 45, VA.III.1-9 Challenge inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.5 1 Chernical weapons destruction facilities . . . . . . . . VA.III.4-7, VA.N(A).S 1, 59-60, 63,

70 Chemical weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . VA.V.44(e), 49-50, 53, 76 Confidentialiîy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.16 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.III.8, VA.Vl.25-27,31,

VA.VI1.24 Other chemical production facilities . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IX.16 Schedule 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VI.25-26,31-32 Schedule 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VII.I7,20, 24-25 Schedule3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VIII.19 Storage facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).42, 46, 49, 63 Transitional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.III.6-7, VA.IV(A).5 1 (see also A ccess)

Genwa Pmtocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preamble, XIII, XVI.3 Guidelines

Confidentialiîy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.2(a)-(h) (see also Confidentid information/ confidentiaiity)

Old chernical weapons, usabiliîy of . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(B).S Preparatory Commission develops . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.21(i) Schedules of chernicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC.A, VA.VII.5 (see also Schedule

1, 2 or 3 chemicais/focilities) (see also CSP; Executive Council; Inspection; Technicai Secretm'at)

Headquatîers agnxment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.50 . . Heibicides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preamble Host State (inspecîions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.8-9, 12, VA.II.9-44, 61,

VA.X.4, 13, 54, 56

Jmmunity fmm junsdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Inspectorslinspection team) h p o d

Scheduled chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VII. 1, 8, VA.VIII.1 hcapacitdion/incapacitding . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2, AC.A. hdusby

Purposes not pmhibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.9 (see also Activitieslpurposes no! pmhibited)

Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . u, VA.IX.26 (see also Other chemical production facilities; Schedule 2 or 3 chemicds~ïi l i t ies)

( s e also Other chemical production facilities; Plmtsiplant sires; Schedule 1, 2 or 3 chem icals/facilities)

Initial visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).54-55, VA.V.19 (see also Inspection)

hspecîed State Psi*. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.12 (see also Obligations; - Rights of Inspected State Pmfy)

hspeetioo Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VII.15, VA.VIII.17, VA.IX.14 Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Challenge inspection) . . Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.1 l(c), 26.44, VA.X.54 Conduct o f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.8,10, 12, 18-19, VA.I.14-15, 17,

VA.II.18, 33, 35, 38-60, 62, 66, VA.IV(B).S, 11, VA.V.44, 51, VA.VII.14, 24, VA.X.24, 33, 38-61, VA.XI.8, 15-21, CA.14-15

Debnefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.iI.60 Definitions (inspection: initial, assistant, mandate,

manual, site, team) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.ll-17 Documentation/~ecords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (seAccess) Durationlperiod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.1 O, 22-23, VA.11.44,

VA.IV(A).45, VA.V.52, VA.X.54 Extension o f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.59, VA.VII.29, VA.VIII.24,

VA.IX.20, VA.X.57, VA.XI.20 Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.1, VA.II.1 l(d), 12, 22, 27-30,

35, 44, 51, 58, VA.III.15-16, VA.IV(A).oO, VA.V.34,50, 60, VA.X.22, 24

Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.ZI(i), VA.II.42-43, 56, VA.III.13, VA.N(A).44, 51, VA.V.54, VA.VI.23, 27, 30, VA.VII.23, VA.VIII.18, VA.IX.15, VA.X.5 1

Intounby escort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.9, VA.Il.35

Initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.II,VA.III.I-9,18, VA.IV(A).49, 54, VA.IV(B).S, 11, VA.V.4347, 58, 73, VA.VI.24, VA.VII.13-20, 24, VA.X.34

Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.11.26.46, VA.X1.21,25 Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D(.ll,I8,VA.1.14,16,VA.I1.13,

3840, 62, VA.X.2, 12, 59 Manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.15, VA.II.42,45,56 Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Notificafion) Number, intensiîy, duration, timing and

mode of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VI.23,30 On-site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see On-site inspectionlvenficalion) Photographslphotographing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.Il.48, 51, VA.III.9, VA.X.24, 26,

CA.2(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Plan VA.N(A).53-54, VA.X.32-34,43,

46, VA.XI.14 Post-inspection procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.60-61, VA.X.58-61 Pm-inspection activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.31-37, VA.III.17-18, VA.X.3-

37, VA.XI.3-14 Pm-inspection bnefmg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.37, VA.X.32-34,43,46 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.4-5, V.6-7, IX.8-IO, VA.11.46,

VA.III.1, VA.N(A).37, 45, 68, VA.V.44,52,55,73, VA.Vi.24, VA.X.33, CA.13

Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.12, 21-22, VA.II.46, 51, 58,62- 65, VA.IV(B).12, VA.V.73, VA.X.59-61, VA.XI.22-26, CA.17 (see also Complimcelnon- complimce; Reports)

Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.9, 13-18, VA.I.16, VA.X.3-4, 11, 13, 29, 39, 44, 49, 52 (see also Chailenge inspection, request)

Routine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.1 Rules, general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.11.38-42 (see also venficalion) Selection of sites for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).44, VA.V.54, VA.VII.16,

20, VA.VIII.14, 16, VA.iX.11, 13 Storage areaslfacilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iV.5, VA.N(A).4 1-49, 61 Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).48 Visual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V. I5,49, VA.X.50 (see also A ccess; Confidentid infomalionlconfidentiality; Costs; Director-Geneml;

Equipment; Guidelines; Initiai visit; M q s ; Monitoring systems; Noti3cation; On-site inspectionlvenficarion; Post-inspection pmcedures; Pre-inspection activities; Reports; Safety; Yenficarion; Weightingfactom)

Iaspecîorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.42 (see also Technical Secretariui) laspeetoislinspeetion team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see partial listing of references in

Annex on Implementation m d Vetiflcation)

Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V1.9, IX.20-21, VA.1.22, VA.II.19- 20,4445, VA.N(A).49,60, 65, 70, VA.V.53, 62, 85, VA.VIi.25, VA.VIII.20-21, VA.M.18, VA.X.20, 29, 32,3740, 4749, 52, 55, 59, VA.XI.15, 19-21, CA.16

Arriva1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.15, VA.I.10,23, VA.IL24.31, 35-37, VA.III.17, VA.N(A).45-47, VA.V.52, VA.VII.30, VA.VIII.25, VA.M.21,VA.X.6, 10, 12-14, 16- 19,21,23,25,53,55, VA.XI.13

Assistant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . VA.L13,17,VA.II.I-8,10-11,20, 32, 43, VA.X.1-2, VA.XI.8, 16

Confidential infornation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.7-8, 10-13, 16 Consultations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iX.20, VA.XI. 15 . . Defïuiihon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.1.17-18 Depamire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.10,22-23, VA.II.61, VA:X.58

(see also Point of entty/exit) Designationlselectionlassignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.8, VA.I.13, 17, VA.II.l-9, 20,

VA.X.1-2, VA.XI.7-9, CA.11 Eswrt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.1.9, VA.11.35, VA.X.26 Independence of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI11.46-47 Listof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.2,5,8,10,VA.X.I,VA.Xi.8 Mandate/principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D<. 11, 19, VA.1.14 Objection to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.2,4,46 Physical presence of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).59,66, VA.V.4041,83-

84 Privileges andfor immunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.1I.B Rccniitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.44 Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Reports) Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Rights of inspection

teœnlinspeclors) Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.27,35,40,43, VA.N(A).49,

62, VA.X.32, VA.XI.14, 19-20 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.1 Transportationltransport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.22.26, VA.IV(A).46,

VA.X.14-15, 18-19, 22 Visas, transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.10 (see also Assistmce; Diector-Geneml, Inspection; Reports; Rights of inspection

teœnlinspeciors; Technicai Sectetariut; Transporiaiion) httuments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Equipment; Monitoring)

International Couit of Justice (ICI) Advisory opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XN.5 Referral to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XN.2

international Union of hite and Applied Cbemisûy (IUPAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).2(c), VA.V. 1 (e)

investigation Alleged breach of confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.19 Alleged use/use of chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . IX.19, X.9-Il, VA.XI (see also Chemicai weqons, usabilily)

Junsdiction o r contml . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2,4,11.8, 111,1(a)-(cf), N.1 , 5, I l , V.l, VI.2, VII.1, V111.48, IX.8, VA.1.3, 12, VA.II.2, 14, 21, VA.V11.8, VA.XI.27, CA.11, 20

K

Key componenb 11.3-4, .VA.N(A).Z(e), 18 (see also Pmnrrsors)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lebonitories VA.1.5-6, VA.IL55-58, VA.N(A).32, VA.XI.26

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Designated &y the OPCW) VA.II.55-58, VA.VIII.22, VA.IX.19 Off-site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.55, 57, VA.VIII.22, VA.IX.19,

VA.XI.18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Research andlor development IlI.l(d), VA.1.6, VA.VI.12

(see also Resemh) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Law enforcernent 11.9 (see A ctivitieslputposes not

pmhibited, Riot contml cppents) Liabilityniable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.11.25, CA.22

Maoaged afcess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Challenge inspection) Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.21, VA.11.37, VA.N(A).l,

VA.X.7, 22, 33

Maikeis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).39,62, VA.V.45, (see also Seais; Tags)

Meatuies to iediess (non-compliance) . . . . . . . . . . . . m, XN.6 CSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.2I(k),36,IX.23,XIl.l-4 Executive Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.36, iX.23, X11.1-3 Suspension of rights and privileges . . . . . . . . . . . XII.2 (see also Complimcelnon-complimce)

Medical arsistancdcare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X. 1, VA.II.26, VA.X.56 Medical cenWf~eiliiy1pemonaeVseetion . . . . . . . . . . VA.1.5-6, 13, VA.N(A).3 l(j),

VA.XI.21 Medical eraminatiouslmearuies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).3 l(j), VA.XI.25 Medical purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.9, V.14, X1.2, VA.VI.2-3, 8, 11-12

(see also Peaceful purposes) Mixtures of chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).2(d), VA.VII.5, VA.VIII.5 Monitoring

Bilaterallmultilateral agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV.14, V.17 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI.4-6, VA.X.24 Exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.23-31 instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.3, 5, V.3, 7, 15, V1.3-4, VA.II.56,

VA.III.l, 6-7, 10-12, 14, VA.N(A).42-43, 51, 59, 66, VA.V.40, 56, 83, VA.Vl.22, 29, VA.X.36, CA.16

Maintenance activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).I 1, VA.V.17 Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.27 Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.10-16 (see also Equipmeni; Schedule 1, 2 or 3 chemicaislfaciliiies; Verijication)

Multicompowut cbemical weapons/systems . . . . . . . 11.34, VA.IV(A).ZO), 19 (see also Binary chemicai weqons)

Munitionsldevices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1-2, 8, AC.A.1, VA.IV(A).I, 2(e),(g), 9-10, 12, 18, 31(d), 38, 47, 49, 67, 70, VA.V.l(e), 4, 27,30, VA.XI. 17

Filled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.8, VA.N(A).S, 31(d), 47, VA.V.I(e), 30

Unfilled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).I, 3, 16-17, VA.V.27

National Autboriiy Cooperation with inspectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.64 Designate or establish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI1.4 Executive Council to cooperate with . . . . . . . . . . VIIL3 1 Flight plan provided through . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.23

Storing data with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.2(e) National implernentaiion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a (see also National legislation) National legislation

Disposai of old chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(B).6 National safety standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see SMety) National secunty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Security, nationallStaies

Pmîiesl) Neive agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC.B.Schedule 1.1-3, VA.IV(A).6(c) Non-cornpliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Complimcelnon~omplimce) Notification

Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XV.2,5 Clearance (for access to confidential information) . CA.1 I Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V.34, 58 Declarations, changes to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VI.14, 18 Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.5, 31-34, VA.III.17-18,

VA.IV(A).45, 61, VA.V.52, 58, VA.Vi.2, VA.VII.30, VA.VIII.25, VA.IX.21, VA.X.4-12, VA.XI.5-6

Points of entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.17 Shipment of chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).61 (see Dimctor-General, Observer, Other chemical pmduction facilities; Schedules 2 or 3

chemicaisl/acilities; Verijîcation)

Object and purpose (of this Convention) . . . . . . . . . . Converted facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Risktothe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Obligationslunde~takings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Access, pmvide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Assistance against chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . Assistance in destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clarification, pmvide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Compliance, demonsirate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confidential information, protect . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deadline for destruction, meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VIII.1, 20, m.1, x1.2, XII.3, XXII VA.V.71 AC.A, VA.N(B).7, 17, VA.V.71, VA.VI.23.30, VA.VII.5, 18, 20, VA.VIII.5 AC.A, VA.V.23, 30, VA.VII.5, 18, 20, VA.VIII.5 Preamhle, VI11.5, 22, XI.2, VA.N(A).20, 56, VA.VIII.21, VA.IX.18 (see also Inspection, mms)

IX.11, VA.II.19, VA.VII.25, VA.X.41-42 X.7 N.12 VA.VII.25 1X.I 1, VA.X.42, CA.13 VII.6, CA.1, 19-20 VA.N(A).22-23

Destruction of chemical weapons/chemical weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Generai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geneva Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inspection. allow/enable/permit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inspection request kept within scope

ofconvention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Order of destruction based on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Probibited activities. not engaged in . . . . . . . . . . . Resûictions (on trade) incompatible with. not . .

mamtam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . StatT (of Technicai Secretariat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State Party to conform with its . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State Party to implemenVfulfil its . . . . . . . . . . . .

UnmeVunfufilled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verification plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see aiso Access. State Party to pmvide; Decladions

Observer Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defmition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Depamire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nameof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Privileges and immunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Refusal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rightsof Transporiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Old cbemical weapons Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definition Destruction or disposai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regime for ;

(see also A bmdoned chemicd weqons; Guidelines) On-site iaspedonlverification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(see Desinrction of chemicd weqonslchemical weqons pmduction facilities) Preamble. 1. CA .1 Preamble. XIII. xvi.3 IX.ll , VA.II.19

x12 CA.20 x112 VIl.1, 4. VA.II.19, VA.IV(A)A, 22. VA.V.2, 10. CA.13 VA.n.65, VA.Iv(A).4, VA.V.2, 10 VA.N(A).56

; Prohibitions; Rights)

III . 1 - 7 l(b). VA.IV(B). 11.5-6 VA.IV(B).6-7, 17 1v.1, VA.IV(B).I, 3-7. 17

IV.3-5, V.3, 6.7. 15. VI.3-6, 9. R.8, 10. 13. VA.I.7, II . VA.II.53-54, VA.III.l,3, 6-7. 16. VA.IV(A).I5, 37.70. VA.V.28, 40.41.49. 54. 83. VA.VI.22, 29. VA.VII.12, VA.VIII.12, 22. VA.IX.9, 19. CA . 13-1 7 (see also Inspection; Schedule 1 chemicalsl/aFilifies; Schedule 3 chemicdslfacilities; Monitoring; Venpcation)

OPCW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VlII Agreements with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XN.5. VA.1.7. 19. VA.II.38.

VA.111.3, 10. VA.IV(A).Sl, VA.VI.25-26, 3 1-32. VA.VII.24, CA.1 (sec also Fixility qgreements)

Alleged use of chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.XI.27 Assistance in desüuction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.11. VA.N(B).I6 (see also

Assisfmtce; Technicd Secmtmiat) Bilaterallmultilateral agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.13-17. V.16-17 Confidentialiiy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.5. CA.l.3(c).(e).(h). 4. 17. 22-

23 (see also Confidentid infom ation/confidentidi@)

CSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.9-22 Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111.1 ExecutiveCouncil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI11.23.36 General provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.1-8 Privileges and immunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V111.48-51 Programme and budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.16. V.19. VA.VI1.13. VA.IX.10

. . . . . . . . . . . . Relations between State Party and V11.4-7 Science and technology. making use of . . . . . . . . VII1.6 Settlement of disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XN.2 Technicalsecretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI11.37.47 (see also Confidenfial infom&onlconj)dentidi@; CSP; Director-Geneml; Executive

Council; Labomfones; Pnvileges md/or immunities; Technicd Secmfm.d) ûther chernical pmdudon faeilitiea . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI.6. VA.M

Data monitoring and evenhial on-site verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V1.6

Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IX.1-8. VA.XI.13-14 Notification time of iaspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IX.21 Review of verification regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IX.26 Selection of sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IX.13 Threshold for declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IX.1 Time limit for inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IX.20 Verscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI.6. VA.IX.9-26 (see also Chemicds; Weighting factors)

ûther chernicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.4.8. VA.IV(A).I6 ûther faeilities (Schedule 1 chemids pmduction) . . . (see Schedule 1 chemicdslfixilities)

Peaeeful purposes Indushial. agnculhiral. research. medical.

phmaceutical or other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.9. V.14. X1.2 International cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.2 1 Cg)

Not pmhibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.9 Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI.2 (see ais0 A ctivitieslputposes not pmhibited; Medicd putposes; Protective putposes;

Resewch) Penmeter . . .

Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.11.44, VA.X.35-37 Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.l6,21,VA.X.15-21,23,35,55 Declared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.1.21, VA.X. 15 Final . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.16, 21, VA.X.14-16, 18-25,35,

38,43,47,51, 55 Requested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.21, VA.X.7-9, 14-17,23, 38-

39.47 (sec aiso Access; Challenge inspection)

Pleats/plant sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.6, VA.IV(A).32, VA.V.85, VA.VII.3, 6-25, 30, VA.VIII.3, 6-20, 25, VA.IX.l-24, VA.X.15

Selection of (for inspection) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Inspections; Weighting factors) Point of enbylexit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Chdlenge inspection) Piecutsors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 1, VI.l-2, VA.N(A).2(b)-(c) . .

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1L3-4 Scheduled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI.2, AC.A, B, VA.VI.15, 19 (see also Key components)

Pmparatoiy Commission Draft agreements, provisions and

guidelines developed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.2 l(i) Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.7

Pnvilegw andlor immunitiea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.48-5 1, VA.II.10-15 Abuse hy inspectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.13 Abuse by State Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.36 Inspectors/ispection team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.10-15 Inviolability of samples andor papers

and correspondence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.1 l(c)-(d), 12 OPCW's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI11.48-5 1 Suspension of State Party's . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . XII.2 Viema Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.11-12 Waiver of stafïlinspection team member's . . . . . . . VA.11.14, CA.20

Produdion capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.10, VA.V.IV),30, VA.VII.7,18 Production facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Chemicd weqons production

facilities; Other chem icd production facilities)

Prohibitions/prohibited . . . Activit~es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1, V.5, VII.1, X.8, X11.3, AC.A.1,

VA.VII. 15, VA.X.41 (See aiso A ctivitieslputposes not pmhibited)

Chemical weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . V.5 Schedule 1 chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI.3 Weapons of mass destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preamble (see k s o A ctivitieslpurposes not pmhibited; Geneva Pmtocol; ObligcltionslundeHdings;

OPCW) . Protection against e b e m i d weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . X

Assistance and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.l, 8-1 1 Data bank of information on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.5 Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.1.3, VA.V.13 Request for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.5, 8-9, VA.XI.3 Voluntary fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.7, VIII.2l(i), 34, 39 (see also Chemical weqons, usability)

Pmtective purposes National pmgrammes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.4 Purpose not pmhibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IL9 Schedule 1 chemicals used for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VI.2-3, 8. 10, 12, 17, 19 Voluntary fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Voluntaty fund) (see also A ctivitieslpurposes not pmhibited, Medical putposes; Peaceful putposes)

Pmtocol for the Pmhibiiion of îbe Use in War of Aspbyxiating, Poisooous o r m e r *es, and of Bacteriological Meîhodc of W m f m . . . . . . (see Geneva Pmtocol)

PSF-chemicalslplants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IX.I,6,9, 17,24

Recoids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reports

Annual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Another State's chemical weapons or chemicai weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix (to final inspection report) . . . . . . . . Challenge inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Director-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Executive Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(see A ccess, documentationlrecorris)

Group of experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.4(e) Inspection. including preliminary . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see specific items) Investigation (of alleged use) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.9.10. VA.Xl.22.26 National programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.4 OPCW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.2l(a), 32. 38 Safeguards (to protect sensitive information) . . . . . VA.X.59 Situationlprogress report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X1.22,24 Technical Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VlIi.38. X.10. VA.II.58, VA.III.16.

VA.IV(A).69, VA.N(B). 12. VA.iX.23, CA.3

(see also Complimcelnon-complimce; Inspection) Requested Sîate P* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.4 Requwting State P* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.2.4. 12.14. 17. 21,23-24. X.5.

IO. VA.I.20, 25. VA.X.2, 4.8. 15. 22. 53-54. 56. 58. 60. VA.XI.5, 9. 20

Reaearch Laboratones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.6. VA.VI.12 Peaceful purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.9. V.14. XI.2 Protective purpoges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.2 Right to mnduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X.2. XI.2 Schedule 1 cbemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VI.2-3. 8. 11-12 (see also A ctivitieslpurposes no1 pmhibited; Peaceful purposes)

Rights Of OPCW to monitor bilateral or

multilateral agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.14. V.17 Of requesting State Party to participate

in review process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.24 Of Technical Secretariat to have monitoring

systems installed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.10 Of Territorial State Party to request

consultationslto settle maner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(B).12-13 (see also A ccess; Privileges md/or immunities)

Rights of iaspected Sîate Pmîy (LSP) Concerninginspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.11.19 To demonstrate compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iX.11 To identify data unrelated to chemical weapons . . VA.X.61 To inspect any instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.III.11 To inspect equipment of inspection team . . . . . . . VA.II.29 To manage access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IX.17 To object to questions not related to inspection . . . VA.II.46 To observe al1 verification activities . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.49 To participate in review pmcess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M.24 To protect national security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.X.41 To pmtect sensitive installations . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.11. VA.X.48

To retain portions of al1 samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rights of inspection team/inspecîors

To access any and al1 areas affected by alleged use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . .

To be briefed by representatives of the ISP . . . . . . To cany out an inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To collect samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To commence perimeter activities . . . . . . . . . . . . To communicate with Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . To demonstrate compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To go. under escort. to any part of the

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . perimeter To have monitoring instniments installed . . . . . . . To have photographs taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To have takenlreceive samples and affix tags . . . . To identify any informationldata not relevant . . . . To inspect documentation and records . . . . . . . . . To inspect vehicular traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To interview any facility personnel . . . . . . . . . . . To interview any persons affected or

eyewihess of alleged use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To managed access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To observe al1 areas. facilities and equipment . . . . To perform on-site analysis of samples . . . . . . . . To request clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Totag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To unimpeded access to inspection site . . . . . . . . To use approved location-finding equipment . . . . . To use certain inspection techniques . . . . . . . . . . To use codes for communications . . . . . . . . . . . . To uselinspect instniments installed by ISP . . . . . To use monitoring equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To verify that activities are consistent

with conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To veri S. that no chemical weapons are diverted

and that destruction has heen completed . . . . . To visit facility to be converted . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rights of States Paiîies Abuseof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confidential information îreated in

accordance with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Restriction or suspension of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To demonstrate compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To object to an inspecter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

To participate in exchange for protection against chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

To patticipate in fullest possible exchange of chemicals (etc.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

To protect sensitive installations and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . confidential information

. . . . . . . To protection of confidential information . . . . . . . . . . . . . To request a challenge inspection

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To request assistance To request Executive Council to assist

in clarifying situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To serve on the Executive Council

To settle matter concerning report on . . . . . . . . . . . . . abandoned chemical weapons

(see also A crivitfeslpuposes nor pmhibited) Riot contml agent9

Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definition

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Law enforcement Method of warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . Risk to the object and putpose of this Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ o u t i n e inspec'tion

Safety Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chemical weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Measures

. . Monitonng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National standards People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Physical security activities Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Standard maintenance activities (see also Desrrucrion of chemicai weqons)

III . 1 (e) 11.7 11.9 1.5, X.8-9, VA.XI.1 (see Object and purpose) (see Inspection. mutine)

VA.II.37, VA.X.32-34 VA.V.I(j), 13 (see Destruction of chemicai wecymns) VA.I.5, VA.11.27, VA.V.13 VA.IL37, VA.IV(A).3l(i), VA.V.33, 78 VA.N(A).9 IV.10, V.11, V1.7, VA.IV(A).6(e) IV.lO, V.11, VII.3, VA.II.43, VA.VI.7 VA.V.14 VA.IV(A).32 VA.Il.43, VA.IV(A).49, 62 VA.I.5. VA.V.15

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sampleslsmpling N.lO. VA.N(A).49. VA.X.27.47. VA.XI.16-18

. . . . . . . . . . . . Alleged use of chemical weapons VA.Xi.16-18. 26 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.53,55.58. VA.IV(A).70.

VA.V.49, VA.VII.27, VA.VIII.22, VA.IX.19, VA.X.27, 48. VA.XI.18, 25.26. CA.16

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Challenge inspections VA.X.27.36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Collection. handling and analysis VA.IL52.58

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confidentiality VA.II.56.CA.16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Duplicate VA.II.54

Facility agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V.49 Inspccted State Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.52-54. 60, VA.X.48.

VA.Xi.18 Investigation of aileged use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.Xi.16-18.26 lnviolability of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.1 l(d). 12 Off-Ion-site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.53.57. VA.VIII.22. VA.IX.19.

VA.XI.18, 25 (see also Laboraiones; Smples/sœnpling . malysis)

Right to designate and receive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).49. 70. VA.V.85. VA.X.36, VA.XI. 16

Right to retain portion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.54 Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N.10 Security. integrity and pmservation of . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.56. CA.16 Transferltransport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.II.1 l(d). 52. 55-56 Undeclared scheduled chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V11.27. VA.VIII.22. VA.IX.19 (see also Equipment; Laboraiones)

Sanetions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CSP may bring issue to attention of UN General

Assembly and Securiîy Council . . . . . . . . . . . X11.4 CSP may recommend collective measures . . . . . . XII.3 Settlement of disputes and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIV.6 (see also Mecsures to redmss; Rights ofStcde Patiies . abuse of)

Schedule 1 cbemicals/facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VI Absence. verification of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.V.85. VA.VII.15. VA.VI11.17.

VA.IX.14 Chemical weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . 11.8. V.14, VA.V.30. 70.71. 85 Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A).2(a), VA.Vi.6. 13-20 Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N(A). 16. VA.V.30 General provisions for . . . . . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . . . VA.VI.I.2 Guidelines for selection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC.A.1 List of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AC.B On-site inspection/monitoring with

on-site instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI.3. VA.VII1. 17. VA.IX. 14

Other facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prohibitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verfication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(see also Protective purposes) Schedule 2 chemicalsIfacilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chemical weapons production facilitieslsites . . . . . Data monitoring and on-site verification . . . . . . . . Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Guidelines for selection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notification time before inspection . . . . . . . . . . . Threshold for declarations of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Time limit for inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Schedule 3 chernicais/facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data monitoring and onsite verification . . . . . . . . Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Guidelines for selection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inspection period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notification time before inspection . . . . . . . . . . . Threshold for declarations of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Science and technology Avoid hampering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cooperationlexchange of information . . . . . . . . . . OPCW to maùe use of advances . . . . . . . . . . . . . Review of developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Use in verification activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see also Economic and technological development)

Scientific Advianiy Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Seais (andlor otber contml pmceduies)

v1.4, VA.V.85 VA,IV(A).2(a), VA.VII.1-II, 13.16. 26 AC.A.2 AC.B, VA.VII.11 VA.VII.30 VA.VII.3 VA.VII.29 VA.V11.8, 3 1-32 v1.2, 4. VA.V.85, VA.VII.12-30 (see also Venficafion) VA.VIII v1.5 VA.N(A).2(a), VA.VIII.1-II, 16 AC.A.3 VA.VI11.24 AC.B, VA.VIII.11 VA.V111.25 VA.VIII.3, 12 VA.VI11.26-27 V1.2, 5. VA.VIII.12-25 (see also VetiJîcaiion) (see Precumo IS, scheduled; Schedule 1 . 2 or 3 chernicals//acilities)

VI.11, XI.1-2 Preamble. N.12, VI.11, X.3, XI.1-2 VIIi.6 VIII.2l(h), 22 V111.6

V111.21(h), 45 VA.III.10, 15. VA.IV(A).39-40, 62. 64. VA.V.34, 44-45 . 49-50. 59-60 (see also Tops) CA.2, 19

Secmîary-Gened (of the UN) Alleged use of chemical weapons investigated by Depositary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . First session of CSP. convening of . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secunîy. nationailStates P h e s '

Seculity Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notice of withdrawal given to

Recourse to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Selection of plant sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sensitive information

Setîlement of disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Shmudlshmuding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Single small-scde faciliîy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Special session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . States not pmiy (to this Convention)

Alleged use of chemical weapons hy . . . . . . . . . . Facilities under jurisdiction or temtory of . . . . . . Inspection on temiory of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transfers to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Stoclcpiles (of chemicai weapons) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stomge (of chemicaislchemicai weapons)

Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bulk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inventory control procedures Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see also Equiprnent; Inspection)

xv1.2 VIII.36, x11.4 (see Inspection. selection of sites for, Plmtslplmt sites. selection) VA.X.46, 59. CA.2(e), 13.14. 17 (see also Confidenrial infonn aiionlconfidentiali@) m. VA.iV(B).12, CA.23 VA.X.48, 50 11.8, VA.VI.8-16 VA.VI.13-16 VA.VI.21-27 (see CSP)

VA.IX.27 VA.II.20-21 VA.Ii.20 VA.VII.31-32, VA.VIII.26-27 (see Chernical weqons)

Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(A).49.61.67 (see also Mmkers; Seals)

Technical Secmtanaî, mle and funeiion . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.4. 37-47 Agreements negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.34. VA.IV(A).SI. 60. VA.V.59.

VA.VII. 17. 24

Appointment/employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI11.44, CA.5 Conditions of service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.44, CA.5 Assistance bylthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. 12, X.5, 10, VA.IX.7

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assistance to V11.7, VA.III.16, VA.IV(A).30 Avoidance of intrusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI.] O

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Challenge inspection E .10 (references in Verification Annex are omiîted) (see also Inspection; Inspectorslinspection r e m )

. . Composttion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.41-42

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confidentiality VI.10, VA.X.61, CA.I,2(b), 0, 3, 5-12, 17, 22 (see also Confidentid informaiion1 conjidentialiiy)

Destruction of chemical weapons/chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . production facilities IV.12, VA.N(A).29, 35-36, 51, 69,

VA.IV(B).14, VA.V.32,34, 38 Equipment certified by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.I.1, VA.II.44 Group of experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX.4

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inspection/ispectors VIII.39,41,44, IX.10 (references in Verification Annex are omitted) (see also Inspection; Inspectorslinspeclion team)

lnspectorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.42 Penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CA.lO, 20 Privileges and immunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.48-5 1 Respect for international character . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII.46-47 (see also Compliancelnon-complimce; CSP; Direclor-Geneml; Exenilive Council;

Guidelines; Inspection; Inspectorslinspection l e m ) Tesbltesîing

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Destruction facilities VA,IV(A).17,60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lnspection equipment VA.III.1 1, VA.IV(A).6O

Production capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. 1 O Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III.I(d)

Thresbolds (for declaratioalvenfication) Other chemicai production facilities . . . . . . . . . . . VA.lX.1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Schedule 2 chemicals AC.B, VA.VII.3, 8, 12

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Schedule 3 chemicals VA.VI11.3, 8, 12 (see also Schedule 1, 2 or 3 chernicalsfiilifies)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Toxic chernicals (see Chemicals, toxic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Toxic waste VA.IV(B).6 (see also Warte) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Toricity AC.A., VA.N(A).2(b)-(e), VA.V.71,

VA.VII.18 T d e

Free hade in chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preamble, XI.2

National regulations (to be reviewed) . . . . . . . . . . ( s e also Tmsfem)

Tiaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Destruction

Inspecton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tmsfeis (of chemicais/chemicai weapons)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Declarations

Purposes not prohibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prohibitions

Restrictions

Right to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scheduled chernicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(sec also Cempctûe, end-use) Tiinsit thmugb the îemtoly of another Staîe . . . . . . Tnmspottation

Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chernical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Inspection team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IILl(a),(c), VA.IV(A).S, VA.V.3-5, VA.VI.6, VA.VII.7 V1.l-2, X.2, VA.VII.32, VA.VI11.26 Preamble, 1.1, VI.3, VA.VI.1-2 (see Schedule 1, 2 or 3 chem icaisifiiilities) VA.VI.1-6, VA.V11.3 1-32, VA.VIII.26-27 vl.l, X.2, XI.2 VA.VI.3-6, VA.VII.31-32, VA.VI11.26-27 (see also Schedule 1. 2 or 3 chemicaisifiiilities)

N.10, VA.11.22-25, 32 VA.N(A).oI, VA.V.13 (see also Chemicai weqons, removd/tr(p1spotî; Destruction of chemicai weqons, removal) VA.Ii.26, VA.N(A).46, VA.X.14- 15, 18-19, 22, 56 (see also Inspectors/inspection t e m ) N.10

Unitaiy munitions and deviees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.8 United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Chmie< SectelayGeneml,

Senrtily Councii)

Verifidon Activities not prohibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bilateral/multilateral agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . Challenge inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Defîitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Destruction of chemical weapons

Destruction of chemical weapons production facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Monltomg Oldlabandoned chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . On-site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other chernical production facilities . . . . . . . . . . .

Pre-inspection activities

Removal . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . .

Ruleslprovisions, general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Schcdule 1 chemicalslfacilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Schedule 2 chemicalslfacilities

Schedule 3 chemicalslfacilities

Standing arrangements

V1.2, 10, VA.VI. VA.VII, VA.VII1, VA.IX (see also Schedule 1, 2 or 3 chem icais//ocilities) N.13, V.16 (see Challenge inspection) (see Conjidential infomationlconfidentiaiity; On-site inspectionlveri~cdion) N.16, V.19, VI11.7, VA.II.25-26, VA.IV(A).26, VA.V.86, VA.VII. 13, VA.VIII.13, VA.iX.10, VA.X.56 N.4, V.6, VA.II1.2, VA.IV(A).37- 40, VA.V.43-47, VA.VI.21, 28, VA.VII.15, VA.VIII.17, VA.M.14 VA.I N . 8 , VA.N(A).37-70 (see also Destmction of chemicai weapons)

VA.V.43-63 (see also Chemicai wecpons production facilities) (see Equipm ent) VA.X.22 (see Monitoring) 111.1, N.l, VA.N(B) (see On-site inspectionlverijicdion) (see Other chemicd production facilities) VA.II.31-37, VA.III.17-18, VA.X.3- 37, VA.XI.3-14 (see Destruction of chemicai weqons) VA.11, VA.111 VA.Vi.21-32 (see also Schedule 1 chernicals1 f d i t i e s ) VA.VII.12-30 (see also Schedule 2 chem icalsl facilities) VA.VIII.12-25 (see also Schedule 3 chemicalsl facilities) VA.II.16-30, VA.III.10-16

Systematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV.3-5, V.3, 6-7, 15, VI.3, VA.IIi.2, VA.N(A).IS, 41-45, 50-70, VA.IV(B).I 1 , VA.V.28, 48-56, VA.VI.22, 29

(see also A ccess; Conversion; Inspection; Inspeclorslinspection team; Reports; Thresholds) Vessels, teaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.1.6, VA.VI.9, 24, VA.VII.28,

VA.VIII.23 Violaiions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (see Complimcelnon-complimce;

Smclions) Voluntary fund (for assistance against chemical

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . weapons use) VII1.2l(j), 34, 39, X.7

Warfm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . Preamble, I.5,11.9, X.8-9, XI.] (see also Geneva Pmtocoi)

Wmte Controlltreatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.1.5, VA.VII.28, VA.VI11.23 Old chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.IV(B).6 Toxic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VA.N@).6

Weapons of mms dest~ct ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preamble Weighting factors (for plant site seleetion) . . . . . . . . VA.VIII.14, VA.IX.11, 24-25

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Litho i n United Nations, New York 38988-October 1994-2.800

United Nations publication Sala No. E.95.IX2

PART IV

c of Nuclear Weawns. and Excemts from Statements made therein

1. The sixth preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 49/75 K' referred to "the concerns expressed in the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that insufficient progress has been made towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time".

2. This Part contains the text of the Final Document of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Oraanization and Work of the Conference (No. 66), which was convened on 20 August 1990 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

3. Also included are Excerpts from statements made at the Conference pertaining to the "concerns" mentioned above (No. 67). Al1 excerpts are copied from the Final Document of the Conference, Part III. Summarv Records, Geneva, 1992 (NPT/CONF.IV/45/III) in the order of the statements made. Before each excerpt, reference is given to the name of the speaker, nationality, meeting number, page number (in the Final Document), and paragraph number (in the Final Document). For ease of reference, an index is also attached.

FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATX ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

1. In the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under the section "Review of the Operation of the Treaty and Reconmendations". it is stated, with regard to article VI11 of the Treaty:

"The States Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a fourth Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1990.

"The Conference accordingly invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the forty-third session of the General Assembly:

'Implementation of the conclusions of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Conimittee for the Fourth Conference."'

2. At its forty-third session the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 43/82 noted that, following appropriate consultations. an open-ended preparatory conimittee had been formed of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serving on the Board of Govemors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or represented in the Conference on Disarmament as well as any Party to the Treaty which would express its interest in participating in the work of the Preparatory Comnittee.

3. Accordingly, the following 106 Parties participated in the work of one or more sessions of the Preparatory Conmittee: Afghanietan. Awtralia. Autria. Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh. Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia. Bulgaria. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt. Ethiopia, Fiji. Finland. Gabon, Ge- Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada. Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Honduras, Eungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland. Italy. Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kwait. Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lebanon. Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar. Malaysia. Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nauru, Nepal. Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua. Nigeria, Norway. Panama. Papua New Guinea. Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino. Saudi Arabia, Senegal. Sierra Leone. Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland. Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. Venezuela. Viet Nam. Yemen Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

4. The Committee held three sessions: the first took place in New York from 1 to 5 May 1989. the second in Geneva from 11 to 15 September 1989 and the third in Geneva from 23 April to 2 May 1990. Progress reports on the first two sessions of the Committee were issued as documents NPT/CONF.IV/PC.I/* and NPT1C0NF.1V1PC.111181Rev.1.

5. At its first session, the Preparatory Cornittee unanimously elected Ambafisador Bariyu Adeyemi (Nigeria). Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak (Poland) and Ambassador Chusei Yamada (Sapan) to serve together as membere of the Bureau for the three sessions that the Conmittee intended to hold and decided that Ambassador Yamada would be the Chairman of the firet session. Ambassador Strulak the Chairman of the second session and Ambassador Adeyemi the Chairman of the third session. When one member of the Bureau was serving as Chairman of a given session, the two other members would serve as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee. The Committee authorized ita Bureau to handle technical and other matters in the period before the Review Conference. Furthermore. the Cornittee decided that the Chairman of the third session should open the Review Conference.

6. Pursuant to the request of the Preparatory Cornittee, the Secretariat of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (DEA), the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) and the South Pacific Forum prepared a number of background papers which were submitted to the Conference as background document* as follows:

(a) by the Secretariat of the United Nations:

- Working Paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of the tenth paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPTlCONF.IVl2)

- Working Paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the implementation of articles 1 and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPTICONF. IV131

- Working Paper on basic facta within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of articles IVand V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPTlCONF.IVl4)

- Working Paper on basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPTICONF. IV/5)

- Working Paper on the dynamics and consequences of the nuclear-anus race. including its quantitative. qualitative and vertical aspects (NPTlCONF.IVl6)

- Working Paper on the dynamics and consequences of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (NPTICONF.IVf7)

- Studies relevant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF. IV/8)

- Report on the present status of negotiations of the Conference on Disamament on "Nuclear Test Ban" (NPT/CONF.IV/g)

- Report on the present status of negotiations o f the Conference on Disarmament on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete d i s a m e n t under strict and effective international control (NPT/CONF.IV/lO)

- Report on the present status of negotiations of the Conference on Disamament on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (NPT/CONF.IV/ll)

(b) by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):

- Activities of IAEA under article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/lZ)

- Activities of IAEA under article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/13)

- Activities of IAEA under article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/14)

(c) by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL):

- Memorandum from the General Secretariat of OPANAL prepared for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/15)

(d) by the South Pacific Forum:

- Memorandum from the Secretariat of the South Pacific Forum on the subject of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty prepared for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/lb)

7. In addition, to assist the Review Conference, the Preparatory Cornittee invited the nuclear-weapon States and other parties to the Treaty on the . Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to provide. sufficiently in advance of the Review Conference, information relevant to the implementation of various articles of the Treaty. including especially article VI. Pursuant to the Conmittee's invitation. the following documents were submitted to the Conference:

- Information on the implementation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/19)

- United States information pertaining to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear. Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/ZO)

- The United Kingdom's implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1985-90 (NPT/coNF.IV/~~)

8. The Final Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.IV/l) was also issued as a document of the Conference prior to its opening. The report included, interalia, the Provisional Agenda for the Conference, a proposed Allocation of Items to the Main Committees of the Conference, the Draft Rules of Procedure and a Schedule for the Diviaion of Costs of the Conference.

of the

9. In accordance with the decision of the Preparatory Conmittee, the Conference was convened on 20 August 1990 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. After the opening of the Conference by Ambasaador Bariyu Adeyemi of Nigeria, Chairman of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee. the Conference elected by acclamation as its President Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru. The Conference also unanimously confirmed the nomination of Mr. Arpad Prandler as Secretary-General of the Conference. The nomination had been made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following an invitation by the Preparatory Committee.

10. At the same meeting. Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affaira, United Nations. conveyed to the Conference a message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Dr. Hans Blix, , Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. addressed the Conf erence . 11. At the opening meeting, the Conference adopted its agenda and the Allocation of Items to the Main Cornmittees of the Conference as proposed by the Preparatory Coumittee (see Aimexes 1 and'II. respectively).

12. Aleo at the first meeting, the Conference adopted the rules of procedure reconmended by the Preparatory Cornmittee. The rules of procedure of the Conference are-contained in document NPT/CONP.IV/l.

13. The rules of procedure provided for the establishment of (a) three Main Committees; (b) a General Conmittee, to be presided over by the President of the Conference and composed of the Chairmen of the Conference's three Main Conmittees, its Drafting Committee and its Credentials Cornittee, as well as 26 Vice-Presidents of the Conference; (c) a Drafting Committee. composed of representatives of the 32 States Parties represented on the General Committee, but open to representatives of other delegations when matters of particular concern to them were under discussion; and (d) a Credentials Conmittee,

. composed of a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected by the Conference, and six other members appointed by the Conference on the proposa1 of the President.

14. The Conference unanimously elected the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the three Main Committees, the' Drafting Committee, and the Credentials Conmittee, as follows:

Main Conmittee 1 Chairman Ambassador Bariyu A. Adeyemi (Nigeria)

Vice-Chairman Ambaseador Todor Ditchev (Bulgaria)

Vice-Chairman Ambassador Oscar Vaerno (Norway)

Main Conunittee II Chaitman Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak (Poland)

Vice-Chairman Mr. Arend J. Meerburg (Netherlands)

Vice-Chairman Ambassador Hector K. Villarroel (Philippines)

Main Conmittee III Chairman Ambassador Chusei Yamada (Japan)

Vice-Chairman Dr. J h Chandoga (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)

Vice-Chairman Mrs. Fatma Hussein ( ~ g y ~ t )

Drafting Colnmittee Chairman Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius (Sweden)

Vice-Chairman Ambassador Peggy Hason (Canada)

Vice-Chairman Ambassador Tibor T6th (Hungary)

Credentials Comnittee Chairman Ambassador Jan Groop (Finland)

Vice-ChBi- Mr. Plamen Grozdanov (Bulgaria)

Vice-Chairman Ambassador Sawanit Kongsiri (Thailand)

The Conference also unanimouely elected 25 Vice-Presidente from the following States Parties:

Bangladesh Bulgaria Cameroon Canada Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

. EgYPt Ethiopia Ghana Eungary

Indonesia Iran (Islamic Republic of) Ireland Italy Mexico Morocco New Zealand Republic of Korea Romania

Spain Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

United States of America Venezuela Yemen Yugoslavia

NPT/CONF.IV/45/I page 6

15. The Conference al80 appointed, on the proposa1 of the President, representatives from the following six States Parties as members of the Credentials Cornnittee: Italy. Kenya, Nigeria. Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

16. At the first meeting of the General Debate, a message was addressed to the participants in the Conference by President George Bueh of the United States of America (NPTICONF.iVI25).

17. At the same meeting, a message was addressed to the Conference by President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (NPTICONF.IVI26).

18. At the same meeting a message was also addressed to the Conference by President Alberto Fujimori of Peru (NPTICONF.IVI27).

the CDnference

19. Eighty-four (84) States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons participated.in the Conference. as follows:

Australia Auetria Bahrain Bangladesh Belgium Bhutan Bolivia Brunei Darusaalam Bulgaria Cameroon Canada Colombia Costa Rica Côte d'Ivoire C Y P W Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Denmark Ecuador E ~ Y P ~ Ethiopia Finland Ge- Democratic Republic

Ge-y. Federal Republic of

Ghana Greece Holy See

Honduras Bungary Iceland Indoneaia Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Iraq Ireland Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya Kuwai t Libycur Arab Jamahiriya Liechtenstein Luxembourg Malaysia Malta Mexico Mongolia Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Nigeria Norway Peru Philippines Poland Portugal

Qatar . Republic of Korea Romania San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Singapore Somalia Spain Sri Lanka sudan Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Thailand Tunisia Turkey Uganda +

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ,

United States of America Uruguay Venezuela Viet Nam Yemen Yugoslavia

_.A A, .,"... ..., .< , page 7

20. In accordance with subparagraph 2 (a) of Rule 44. 15 States. not Parties to the Treaty. namely. Algeria. Argentina, Brazil, Byeloruesiao Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile. China, Cuba, France. Israel. Myanmar. Oman, Pakistan, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. United Republic of Tanzania and Zimbabwe, were granted observer statua.

21. In accordance with subparagraph 2 (b) of Rule 44, Palestine was granted observer statua.

22. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency participated in the Conference under paragraph 3 of Rule 44.

23. The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Commission of the European Conmnunities and the League of Arab States were granted Observer Agency status under paragraph 4 of Rule 44.

24. Forty-four (44) non-governmental organizations attended the Conference under paragraph 5 of Rule 44.

25. A list of al1 delegations to the Conference, incliiding States Parties, Obaervers, the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency, Observer Agencies and Reserach Institutes and non-governmental organizations, is contained in Annex IV to this report.

26. The Credentials Committee met on 12 September and adopted its report to the Conference on the credentials of States Parties (NPT/CONF.IV/CC/l and C o r r . At its 14th plenary meeting on 14 September, the Conference took note of the report.

27. At its 12th plenary meeting, the Conference decided to adopt the cost-sharing formula proposed by the Preparatory Committee in the Appendix to Rule 12 of the rules of procedure (NPT/CONF.IV/l). The final schedule ras based on the actual participation of States Parties in the Conference.

28. The Conference held 14 plenary meetings between 20 Auguat and 14 September 1990, when it concluded its work.

29. The general debate in plenary, in which 62 States Parties took part. was held from 20 to 28 August.

30. The General Committee, at its 1st meeting on 22 August, considered item 10 of the Agenda entitled "Progranmie of Work" and decided, inter, to make the following recommendations:

(1) the Conference should complete its work by 14 September;

(2) the three Main Conmittees should accordingly complete their work on 5 September and the Drafting Committee should convene hediately thereafter.

NPT/CONF.IV/45/1 page 8

31. A t i t e 8 t h meeting, on 24 ~ ~ ~ a t , the Conference adopted the above recommendations of the General C-ittee.

32. Main Committee 1 held seven meetings from 24 Augrnt t0 10 September. I t s report (NPTICONF.IV/MC.I/~) vas submitted t o the Conference a t i ts 13th meeting on 11 Sep tabe r . Main Cornnittee II held e ight meetings from 24 August t o 5 September. I t s repor t (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/l) waa submitted to the Conference at i ts 13th meeting on 11 September. Main Conmittee I I I held f i ve meetings from 27 A-ust t0 5 September. I t s report (NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I11/2) was submitted t o the Conference a t its 13th meeting on 11 September.

33. A t i ts 13th meeting on 11 September 1990, the Conference decided to take note of the three reports.

34. The Draf t i n g Cornit tee m e t f rom 10 t o 14 Sep tabe r . I t s report . (NPT/CONF.IV/DC/l) waa submitted t o the Conference a t i t e 14th meeting on 14 September 1990. A t tha t meeting, the Conference took note of the report .

35. A l i a t of the documents of t h e Conference is attached a s Annex I I I .

36. A t its last plenary meeting, on 14 September. the Conference. notwithstanding extensive consultations and considerable e f f o r t , xas d l e to adopt a f i n a l declarat ion.

Excerpts from Statements

made at the

Fourth Review Conference

of the Parties to the Treaty on the

on-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Index of the m c e r ~ t s (No. 67)

Acting President Mr. Collins, Ireland Mr. Sujka, Poland Mr. Lehman, United States of America Mr. Petrovsky, USSR Mr. Benhima, Uorocco Mr. Vaerno, Norway Mr. Vitalone, Italy Mr. Mackay, New Zealand Mr. Ogada, Kenya Mrs. von Grunigen, Switzerland Mr. Loeis, Indonesia Mr. Genscher, Germany Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands Mr. Pirek, Czech and Slovak Republic Mr. Ene, Romania Mr. Stephanou, Greece Mr. Tcheul, DPR of Korea Mr. Staikov, Bulgaria Mr. Houllez, Belgium Mr. Calderon, Peru Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka Mr. Somogyi, Hungary Mr. Kongsiri, Thailand Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea Mr. Evans, Australia Mr. Arteaga, Venezuela Mr. Duna, Turkey Mrs. Mason, Canada Mr. Barnett, Jamaica Mr. Mgbokwere, Nigeria Mr. Glessiner, Austria Mr. Nasseri, Iran Mr. Amoo-Gottfried, Ghana Mr. Rozental, Uexico Mr. Luong, Viet Nam Mr. Ngoubeyou, Cameroon Mr. Rivas, Colombia Mr. Rivadeneira, Ecuador Mr. Andersson, Sweden Mr. Villarroel, Philippines Mgr. Tauran, Holy See Mr. Sene, Senegal Mr: Katsigazi, Uganda Mr. Markides, Cyprus Mr. Guttierez, Peru Mr. Kralik, Czech and Slovak Mr. Reese, Australia Mr. Gordon, USA

paae Number in the Excer~t

Staternent of the Acting Resident (Fira Meeting) page 6, para I

1 . n e Actina P R E S I D C ~ , in his capacity as Chairman of the third session of

the Preparatory Cornittee, declared open the Fourth Reviev Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on eh0 Non-Prolitoration of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference had been convened in accordanco vith article VIII, paraqraph 3 . of

the Treaty. a proposal made durinq the Third Reviev Conference. and General Assembly resolution 43/82. Tho riqnificant increase in the number of States Parties Co the Treaty aince the Third Roviev Conference, in 1985, vas

convincinq evidence of the qreat importance atcached to the need to ensure' non-proliferation of nuclear veapons. Since 1985. actual reductions in nuclear

reapons had been achieved for the first rime al the result of a neqotiated aqreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. The international

community vas nov avaitinq the finalizatlon of an aqreement betveen the cwo major nuclear-weapon Povers concerninq the reduction of Strateqic nuclear veapons. Yec there continued to bo very serious concorn Chat not enouqh had been dooe, or seemed likely Co be dons. Co proceed tovards the complece elirnination £rom national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their

delivery pursuant to a troaty on genoral and complete disarmamenc under strict and effective internacional control. With thoso issues in mind. and takinq into account the rovibv of Cho Iroaty's future Chat ras to cake place in 1995. it ras of the u m o s t importance for th0 Conference to reaffirm its stronq commiment CO the purposes of the Treaty's preahble and provisions.

M R . COLLINS, IRELAND (2nd meeting) page 21, para 10

IO. The Treaty drev a fundamencal distinction becveen nuclcar-veapon and :on-nuclear-veapon States. Like al1 other non-nuclear-veapon States parties

ch* Yraaty, Ireland had forqone the right Co develop a nuclear weapons -vability and considered Chat the only acceptabla leveï of nuclear veapons '&' z*r0. His Govermont did believe that nuclear veapons couid >Crcnqthen the security of a stdte. Tho nuciear-veapon States musc neqotiace rr4ucci0n~ Of nuclear veapons and evencually their complete eiimination. The. '"" 'tep towards th. zero option vas to the development of 0uclear w*'poas, rhich required an end CO nuclear tescing.

MR. SUJKA, POLAND (2nd meeting) page 34, para 73

73. The first steps taken in the are. of nuclear disarmament vith the implementation of the Treaty eoncludad b.tvaen th. United States and the USSR on intermediate-rang. nucloar forces. togother vith Cho progress made in the START talks. demonstrated the desire of ch0 tvo super-Povars CO meet their obligations under articlo VI of the NPT and. gave rearon Co hope for substantial reductions in Choir strateqic nuclear-weapons arsenals. But the rorld expected more from the implementation of Chat crucial article for the viability of th. Troaty. Thoso siqns of progross should be only a beqinninq. and considerable efforts vere still neoded in order Co attain the desired tangible results. Cortain urgent problems still needed Co be resolved. id

particular in the ares Of a ban on nuclear testinq. testinq rhich could only be conducive to the qualitative and quantitacive dovelopment of nuclear arsenals in violation Of the spirit of the NPT. Althouqh the limited measurca adopted by the United States and the USSP Co reduce Choir testinq vere velcome. they still fell short of the long-standing expectation of the international cornunity that nuclear testinq should be brouqht CO a complete halt, rhich vas a fundamental measure aimed at endinq the nuclear arms race. It vas therefore Co be hoped that vith the improvement in thair relacionshipa. the tvo major nuclear Povers. folloved by other councries. vould soon take meaninqful steps towards Chat qoal. The Conterence on Disarmanent should b* called upon to play a role in chat undertakinq. vith additional constructive support from the conference currently beinq prepared on the reviev of Che l g b J Partial Test Ban Treaty.

MR. LEHMAN, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2nd meeting) page 25, para 33; page 26, paras 36 and 37

3 3 . pourthly, the United States had, over the previous five years, conducced intensive neqotiations on a broad range of arms-control issues. The list of

aqreements and neqotiations since the Third Review Conference made it clear that the United States vas successfully discharqinq its responsibilities under article VI of th. Treaty. Thus, in 1986. the United States had subscribed to the Final Document of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. In 1981. it had concluded an aqreement with the Soviet Union on establishinq nuclear-risk reduction centres and had signed the INF Treaty and an agreemeac on enhancinq the norms established by the Bioloqical Weapons Convention. In 1988. it had entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union on advance notification of ballistic-missile launches. In 1989. it had joined in the reaffirmatioo by the 140 participants in the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons of the need to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the usa of chemical

weapons and to achieve a universal ban on such weapons. In the same year. it had concluded an agreement vith the Soviet Union onprevention of danqerous military activities, an agreement on implementinq trial SIART verification and stability measures and an agreement on advance notification of major strategic exsrcises and an agreement with other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in CSCE ta open neqotiations on conventional forces in Europe. In 1990. it had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on the destruction of. chamical-weapon stockpiles. as well as new varification protocols-related to the 1 9 7 4 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Huclear Explosions Treaty.

36. h o n g notable achievements rince the Review Conference of 1985 vas the fact Chat the 23 States members of HAT0 and the Warsav Pact were now makinq proqress in their neqotiations - coverinq the aria from the Atlantic to the Urals - on conventional forces in Europe. At the Washinqton Sumnit. the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded a bilateral agreement to destroy the bulk of United States and Soviet chemical weapons by the year 2002. In December 1987, President Reagan and President Gorbachev had signed a historic aqreement - the IN? Treaty on the elimi,natinn of qround-launched intermediate-range nuclear delivery systems. The aqreement. vhich had entered into force in 1988. had already resulted in the elimination of 2.257 Soviet and United States missiles and almast 800 Soviet and United States launchers, and in the introduction of an elaborate system of verification. including innovative forms of on-site inspection.

37. At their meeting in June 1990, President Bush and President Gorbachev had indicated that an agrmement on strategic arms reduction miqht be sigoed by r?.e end of the year. For the first rime ever. both sides rould carry out siqnificant reductions - up to 50 per cent in certain categoiies - in the nwnbers of strateqic offensive arms. Ihose reductions would be designed Ca maite a first strike lesr plausible, providinq qreater stability and a louer risk of var. Uoreover. the far-reachinq reductions of the START Treaty uou!A

be accompanied by innovative provisions for effective verification and information exchange. thus increasing th. confidence essential for a round strategic relationship. When that goal vas attained. the United States and the -Soviet Union would continue their talks on nuclear and space weapons.

MR. PETROVSKY, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (2nd Meeting) page 28, para 46; page 29, paras 47 and 49; page 30, para 51

46. The profound changes which had taken place in the interotional situation had had a direct effect on arms control and disarmament; it would be no exaggeration to say that a reliable peaCe process. accompanied by a gradua1 reduction of military potential. had already taken shape. Ihat had been the object of the p r o g r m e of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mars destruction presented by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986. The most important step towards the implementation of that

had been achieved vith the OntKy into force of the INF Treaty betveen the Soviet Union and the United States. whose main political siqnificance consisted in reversing the absurd logic of nuclear confrontation and destroying the dangarous stereotype according to which the nuclear arms build-up ras unavoidable. For the firit time. the USSP and the United States had agreed on the elimination of two classes of nuclcar missiles and, accordinq to a joint assessment made at the highest level. the implementation of the agreement ras proceeding normally. The eliminarion of short-range missiles had been completed on both sides. As of 1 June 1990, the Soviet Union had. for its part, eliminated a total of more than 1.500 medium-range and rhorter-range missiles. or 90 par cent of the original number. The experience of the INP Treaty in other areas of disarmament, and above al1 nuclear disarmament. especially with regard to verification mechanism. would be extremely valuable to the START agreement at pr.esent being negotiated. which ras to mark the beqinninq of major reductions iqstrategic arsenals measured in hundreds of delivery vehicles and thousands of charges. As soon as possible after the conclusion of the Treaty, the two countries would hold ~0ns~ltati0ns on future negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and on the strenqthening of strategic stability.

47. There vas non a real opportunity for radical reductions of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union had already withdram 500 nuclear charges stationed in the territory of its allies in 1989 and had refrained from modernizing its tactical nuclear missiles in 1989 or 1990.

49. The Soviet Union favoured a ban on the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials. which should conrtitute a reliable barrier to both vertical and :.orizontal proliferation. It had ceascd, on a unilateral basis, the production of highly-enriched uranium and had begun to implement a programme of gradua1 diacontinuance of al1 its industrial reactors producinq weapons-grade plutonium by the year 2000. It had aïs0 proposed the elaboration of a USSP-United States agreement. as well as a multilateral agreement. on verifiable cessation of production of al1 weapons-grade fissionable materials. conpliance with which could be verified with the help of IAEA's experience. Lastly. the Soviet Union had proposed. at the United Nations. that agreement should be reached on the non-use for military purposes of nuclear material made available as a result of reductions in nuclear arsenals. together with a corresponding verification mechanism.

51. The signing at the Washington Suimit of protocols to the Threshold Treaties of 1974 and 1976 non made it possible ta ratify those treaties and pave the ray for setting further limits on nuclear tests with a viev eventually to stoppinq them altogether. The Soviet Union favoured the cont.inuance, without delay, of full-scale negotations in that field. in accordance wich the agreement reached in 1987. However. the nuclear-testinq issue called for multilateral efforts in parallel with bilateral efforts. and the Soviet Union therefore consistently advocated that practical work on a test ban should be started, vithin the framework of the Conference On Disarmament in Geneva. In 1987. toqether vith other States, it had submitted draft basic provisions of a treaty on the comprehensive and universal prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. One of the options in that respect would be to extend the 1963 Moscov Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests i n t?.e atmosphere, in outer space and under water to cover underground testinq. : te forthcoming conference on that question should make a positive contribution Co Che search for a solution to the nroblern o f a r:~c!onr t o a ? .=?.

MR. BENHIMA, MOROCCO (2nd meeting) page 38, pirr 90

90. Uith regard to article VI. hir dolegation welcolird the proqrers made in that aroa by th. cwo rupor-Povera and ch. continuocion of th0 negociations begun with O viow to roducing their rtratogic arsenals by 30-50 par cent. Nevertholorr, th0 now order of international socurity and poace would not be ushered in as long as the other throo nuclear Powers remained outside the d ~ s a r m m e n t process. Co-operation in ehat are. ras al1 the more necessary because the two military alliances conridorod themrolves no longer to be . antagonistr but partnerr in the aetting-up of a now security system based on CO-oporacion and dialogue. as proven by the progress made at the latest international conferences. In chat connection. hi9 deleqation 0arnest:y hoped chat the Cornittee on a Nuclear Test Ban. re-est€~blished vith the Conference on Diaarmmont. would benefit (rom th. United States-USSR bi?areral neqotiations.

MR. VAERNO, NORWAY (3rd meeting) page 45, p.ri 13 and page 46, para 19

13. ln no other field had the new era in Cart-Weat relations made more impact in arma control. Major progress - the IN1 Treaty M d the Stockholm

poc-nt - had already been made ~d more s i g n i f i c ~ t achievements were within reach. The prospects of an early STAR1 Treaty, providinp for aizeable reductions in strateqic nucleer weapoas were promiring and it ras to'be hoped

bilateral neqotiationr between the United States and the Soviet Union ,ould be succearfully concludod in the noar futur.. In Vionna, the end-game in the noqotiations on conventional forCOs ras about to begin and bis country ,as confident that. given the necessary political will. the major issues that ,,,ained outstanding could be sortrd out in t i w for the first CFE treaty to ba siqned at the CSCE summit in November 1990. Together with a meaningful

on confidence- and security-building meaaurea. such a CFE agreement could dramatically improve security M d atability in Europe by eliminatinq the cspability for surprise attack and large-scala offonsiva operations and would halp consolidate the recent political changes and serve as a barrier against a y attempt to re-establish the previous -. Such an agreement would .]so pave the way for significant reductionr in the nuclear arsenala in Europe and n0w.negotiation~ could be started on the reduction of Soviet and united States short-range nuclear forces.. In addition. at the July summit in London. the menbers of NATO's integrated military structure had made it clear chat they intended. in response to reciprocal action on the part of the soviet Union, to eliminste al1 the Alliance's nuclear artillery shells in Europe.

19. The objoetives of esdinq the nuclear arma race and implementinq effective measures for nuclear disarmament were a major and integral part of the Treaty. It ras gratifying Co note that considerable progress had taken place during the period under review and that the prospects for further advances were good. In that connection. ho referred in particular to the agreement on basic provisions of the STAR1 Tresty achieved at the United States-Soviet rununit in June 1990. He also noted wich satisfaction that the two parties were to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces specifically to achieve a mors stable strateqic balance after the Treaty vas completed. The riqning of verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty aad the Peaceful Nuclear Erplosions Treaty opened the way for the ratification of those instruments and thus represented a step towards a comprehensir.e ban o n ail nuclear testing.

r ,

U R . VJTALONE, ITALY (3rd meeting) page 48, para 27

27 . Against such a background. the overwhelming importance of the Treaty on the on-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ras self-evident. The Treaty's status as the principal multilateral instrument in the field of a m s control ras reflected by the fact that over 140 States had acceded to it in the desire not only to prevent a recurrence of the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. but also to contain the possibility of generalired conflict. Pecent developments in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe had radically transformed the international scene. so that the Second World War and the ensuinq cold war could be raid to have coma definitively to an end.

~

In that connection ha referred in particular to the London declaration of the NATO countries. as roll as to the conclusion of the IN? agreement and the agreements concerning the reduction by one-half of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two Great Powers. He also stressed the importance of the adoption of verification protocols to the Ihreshold Teat Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. a s well as the onqoing Vienna negotiations on the reduction of convencional forces in Europe and of the forthcoming Paris

s r n i t of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe. The Italian Goverment. in its capacity as current Prasident of the European Comunity, ras actively engaqed in al1 those endeavours.

MR. MACKAY. NEW ZEALAND (3rd meeting) page 54, para 50

50. In the five years since the previour Peview Conference. there had been unprecedented progress in nuclear disarmment as between the major Porers. The conclusion of the INF treaty had eliminated a whole category of weapons. aqreement on rignificant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons ras close and there were grounds for optimism with regard to short-range nuclear forces. Welcome developments in the conventional area had also had an impact upon the nuclear arms race. The chemical weapons agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the progress towards an agreement on conventional forces in Europe showed a new willingness to achieve concrete and major disarmment measures.

MR. OGADA, KENYA (3rd meeting) page 56, pua 61

61. the Ireaty souqht Co prohibit not only horizoota1 proliferacion but alio vertical proliferacion. Article VI O < Che Treacy Ici11 rernained Co be coca::? fulfilled. Two of the nuciear-weapon Staces Parties Co the NP1 concinued t~

be enqaqed in bilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament neqotiacioni t r a r had already culminated in the destruccion of a whole caceqory of nuclcar wcapona. Heverchelesa. choie reaponr cancinued to exist in the arienala s f a

fer Scacea. th* neqociaciona,co eliminate nuclear weapona ihould encompass al1 thoie States vhich porieiaed auch weapons. The world could not :e safe uncil al1 nuclear veapona, wherever they exiated. were effectively and verifiably destroyed. Th* banninq of a11 nuclear tests in al1 enviroumenti and for a11 cime vas long overdue. Under the prerenc favourable ioternaci=ca! circwnstancas, Cher* was 00 justification f3r the cootinuation of choie tescs.

MRS. VON GRUNIGEN, SWITZERLAND (4th meeting) page 60, pan 5

5 . Reqardinq the implementation of article V: of the Xresty. her deleqacloc welcomed the aubrtantial proqresr made in recenc years by the tmo Super-Powerr in the ares of arma reduction, especially in Europe. The siqnfng of the INF Treaty betreen the United scates aad the Soviet Uni00 in December 1987 rcpresented unprecedested proqresi in the area of armr control. iince the Treaty provided for qeouine reduccion of both States' potentidl nuclear i a p a ~ i l ~ c i e i , coqether with an encirely nev varification ayscem. which miqnt

serve as a precedent for tbe elimioatios of other military inbalanees. Houever. the IW? Treaty Should ba follorod by ocher aqreemancs on conventional and chernical wapooi. lt reeiud chat an aqreemaoc on con~eotional forces in Europe miqht be concluded before the next Cooference on Security and Co-operscion in Europe. Wer deloqacioo hoped ehat tbe oeqotiations oo a reductioo of strateqic nuclaar veapons rould produce a oer aqreenenc io 1990, and. like m i t States. it considered chat cha conclusion ol an aqreement on a compranensiv* nuclear test ban ras essencial for guaranteeinq conpliance with the c ~ ~ i ~ n t a made UDAer article VI of the Treaty.

MR. LOEIS, INDONESIA (4th meeting) page 66. para 29

29. Turning Co an evaluatiom Of the implementatioa of the Treaty, he raid

chat the three nuclear-weapon States parties had obserbd the provisions of article 1 but had noc been able fully to implement the provisions of the

~ ~

eighth to eleventh preambular paragrapbs and article VI. Since the Treaty's

entry into force, progresr towardr halting the nuclear arma race and vertical proliferation had been meagre. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to

the Treacy, for their part. had fully discharged chair obligations undar . article II. Indonesia believed Chat the factors Chat had led to the inabilicy of States parties fully to implement the Treaty's provilions should be reviewed regularly to enhance ics credibility. The United States and the Soviet Union had concluded agreements aimed at haltinq the arms race. buc thac vas insufficient. His delegation ras of the view that the most deciaive measure Co halt the nuclear arms race war a total ban on nuclear teacinq. Moreover. under the provisions of article VI. al1 parties had undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measurcs relacinq the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early dace and on nuclear disarmament. as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Thur the Treaty should noc bc considerad merely as an instrument Co encourage negotiations on nuclear and non-nuclear arms control. Indonesia war also worried by the fact thac the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons ras beinq accompanied by improvementr in the quality, dccuracy and reliability of nuclear weapon systems. With regard to nuclear dirarmanent. an assessment of the position also revealed a certain degree of dissatisfaction. It war true chat the INF Treaty had initiated a reduction in nuclear arseaals. However. even a 30 per cent reduction of the strategic nuclear weaponry of the United States and the Soviet Union would still leave them with arsenals far exceedinq thoar they had had in 1970, which ras con-rary Co the spirit of article VI of the T reatv.

MR GENSCHER, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (4th meeting) page 70. para 43

43. Further nuclear disarmanent waa neceasary and indeed possible. The changed security situation in Europe would permit less and less reliance on nuclear weaponr for the purpore of preventing war. In that connection, he mentioned the negotiationr betweeo the United Stater and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-raoge nuclear weapons. which would be started soon after the signing of ao agreement on conventional forces in Europe. The siqninq of the verification protocolr Co the threshold Treaties at the United States-Soviet srrnmit in Washington would constitute a further stage alonq the road Co a ban on nuclear tests.

MR. KOSIN, YUGOSLAVIA (4th meeting) page 78, para 85

8 5 . Although thay recognized the positive elemonts and affects brought about by recent agreements and onqoinq negotistions in the nuclear disarmament field. the countries he repreaented regretted that the modernization and qualitative improvemanc of nuclear weapons continued. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States continued contrary to the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty. Ar for horizontal proliferacion. the spread of nuclear weapons capability amonq certain Stater not parties to the NP1 posed a serious threat to the non-proliferation régime and underlincd the qravity of the problem.

MR. WAGENMAKERS, NETHERLANDS (5th meeting) page 84, para 13

. The NP1 had also been of Crucial importance as the major post-war

multilateral arms control agreement. It had strengthened the belief chat the spread of ouclear reepons could not be allored to go unchecked. The presmble

notsd the intention of the Parties "CO achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of Uie nuclear arms race" and article VI reflected that same

undertaking. Io the part five years considerable progress had been mide in

the field oC aras control and more tanqible resultr could be expected in the =car future. ~mportant agreements had been reached by the Uoited States and ,

the Soviet Union on major outstanding issues in that connection. There had

a;so been considerable advances in regional and rorld-ride disarmament over the past five years and the negotiations in Vienna on conventiooal scability in Europe could be expected Co lead to an agreement rithin a fer mooths. The

discussions on a treaty on chemical reapons had reached an advanced Stage. Geoeral and complete disarmament under strict and effective internetional cîctrol, one of the aims of the NPT. still seemad rather remote, but there ras some indication of movement in the right direction. After yearr of staqoacioo. some progrers had been achieved on the subject of nuclear-reapon restiog and discussion on chat item'had been resuined in the Conference 00 Disarmament. IC ras important that the nunber and yield of nuclear tests should be reduced to a minimum level. thereby offering the prospect of a comprehensive test ban at the appropriate moment.

U R . PIREK, CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC (5th meeting) page 93, paras. 50 and 5 1

50. As to the revier Of articles V, VI and VII. he rished to emphasire chat the gradua1 and consistent conscruction of a rorld free of nuclear reapons ras a priority in hi1 country's foreign policy. Like most other participants in the C00fere0~e. Czechoslovakia var oot fully satisfied rith the implementation of the provirionr of article VI. although it ras crue chat more had been donc in that field siece the 1985 Reviev Conference than in al1 previous years rakeo togecher. His country expecced chat process to continue and hoped to sec it advance to the stage of multilataral negotiations in the near future. Ir chat context. it greatly apprecisted the Soviet-United States :NF Agreement. in whose implementation it ras partly involved. The Agreement. "cich had launched a process of real disarmament in the nuclear field. should :e rupplemented in the foresecable future by a radical reduction in the tro p3uerV offensive rtratagic reaponr. someching his Goverment stroogly favoured. In vier of the London Declaracion of the NATO countries in :.L!Y 1990. the start of negotiations on the elimination of al1 tactical ~uc:ear reapons in Europe reemed pramising. The cino ras approaching rhen the iroceSS of nuclear disarmament should be jcined by the other nuclear Porers. :: "as to be hoped that their participation in the relevant nsgotiations rould = G r be linked to any preconditians. The first step towards that end miqht be :r.e adoption of so-cslled negative assurances.

i l . teneral and cornpletc prohibition of ouciear-reapoo tests vas the most e:fective way of haltinq the escalation of armaments and achieving nuclear :'"rmment. Unfortunately, the results expected had not been achieved: a:'hough the additional protocols to the Soviet-United States agreements = c nuclcar-weapoo tests of 1974 and 1976 had been siqned at the jo'~iet-United States s m i t in Washington earlier in 1990. they had Dot yer 'een Kasifiad. ~t ras CO be hoped thst resumed negotiations would result ic a slpnificant limitation by both Powers of the'oumber and enerqy yield Of their LUclear tests. At the Conference on Disarmament, the matter had remained in a "$te Of protracted stagnation. The Czechoslovak delegation ras am009 those

trying Co find ways of overcoming the impasse. Ic ras to be hoped that the recencly established Cornittee rould at long last produce tangible resulti. One possible solution miqht be found in the non-sliqned countries' proposal Chat the validity of the Partial Trrt-Ban Treaty rhould be extended to cover underground testing. t~echoslovakia, for its part. var makiog responrible and serious Preparatioor for th8 United Nations conference to be held in New York at the beginning of 1991.

MR. ENE, ROMANIA (5th meeting) page 95, p u a 59

59. ha poaitiva raaults achieved ?inca tka e'try into forca of th. Won-prolifaracion Traacy demonstrated the important Kola tâac cha NPT played in maintaining international peace and security and promoting davalopment, somethinq chat mure be borna in'mind in 1995 whan the Stataa Parties met to decide on the Traaty's further duration. In viaw of the recent positive ~developments in incarnational relations and the democrrtization and improved human riqhts situation in Europe. the coming five years offered a uniqua opportunity to prepare the qroundvark for Che abolition of nuclear weapods. The Conference souqht to give fresh impetus Co that goal by improvinq upon the ioadequacies of the non-proiiferation régime so as to make the spread of nuclear weapoos more difficult. The Conference muSc also attach priority to the early completion of the Soviet-United States neqotiations on a 50 par cent reduction in strateqic nuclear weapons. Che beqinning of a new series of ncqotiations on short-range nuclear missiles in Europe and a rs-evaluation of nuclear weapons strategy in the light of ner policical realitias. ~t ras ai30 important CO qive leqal force to the obligation of States not to resort to cbc Us* or threat of Use O C nuclear WeapOnS. The issue of sacurity assurances for non-nuclaar Scatas should no longer creace difficultiar. Tha stops taken to rrduce nuclaar weapons were mort qratifyinq. but such afforts musc also help achieve another objective of the Treaty - a ban on al1 nuclear tests. Romania *elcomed tha recent initiative by six non-aliqned States in that matter.

MR. STEPHANOU, GREECE (5th meeting) page 96. Para 65

65. Despite the continuinq risk chat yet more countries miqbt acquire nuclear weapons and the tact that a number of States continued Co romain outside the non-proliferation régime, important progress had been achieved in recent years: the INP Treaty, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe agreement. the verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. and the aqreement batween the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republicsto destroy chemical weapons rare al1 encouraging signs chat the tvo ruper-Porers were on the riqhc path cowards genuine nuclear disarmment and a reduction in vertical proliferation. Ais delegation looked forward to further proqresa towards the

~ o m p l e t i o ~ by the end of 1990 of a number of bilateral agreements hetveen the United States and the Soviet Union on strateqic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons.

MR. TCHEUL, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, (6th meeting) page 100, para 4

4. The NPT hed already played a significant role in that no new nuclear-weapon Stace had ernerged in recenc yaars. Since the Third Review Conference afforts had been made by the nuclear-weapon States to achievs nuclear diaarmment and progress had been made towards that goal. The 1987 Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of the11 Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Ranqe Missiles. the prospects for stracegic &rms reductions and the unilateral reduction of certain tactical nuclear weapons aroused hopes chat neqotiations on nuclear disarmament would extricate themselves from their three-decade-long stagnation. It ras for the Conference to see that those hopes vere fulfilled.

MR. STAIKOV, BULGARiA (6th meeting) page 105, pua 27

27. Bis Goverment vas convinced that continued nuclear disarmament efforts rould contribute siqnificantly to the strenqtheninq of the non-proliferation riqime. The elimination of thousands of intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union and the United States represented considerable proqress towards that end, and it ras to be hoped that the agreement concluded in June on a framework for reducinq strateqic nuclear . arsenals would lead to the rapid conclusion of a treaty on the subject and that neqotiations on future reductions would beqin immediately after the conclusion of the START-1 Treaty, which would be fully in keeping rith the States parties' commitments under article VI of the Treaty. The unilateral rithdrawal of hundreds of tactical nuclear charges by the USSR and the United States ras another encouraginq siqn of full cornpliance with the proviaions of article VI. R i s Goverment also welcomed the proqress in the negotiations on conventional arms reductions. confidence-building measures i n

Europe and the prohibition of chemical weapons. And it welcomed the recenc siqninq of the protocols on the control mchanism of the agreements concluded between the USSB and the United States in 1974 and 1976, and hoped that those agreements vould be ratified shortly.

UR. HOULLEZ, BELGIUM (6th meeting) page 106, para 30

30. In the area of disarmament. the IN? Aqreement. the first since the Second World Mar to be accompanied by effective varification measures. ras beinq implemented satisfactorily by al1 the parties. The signinq of the STAR1 Aqreement on the reduction of strateqic weapons. which would have a strooq impact on the capabilities of the two major nuclear Powers, appeared CO be imminent. and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. for ita part. had repeated its ri11 to beqin neqotiations on short-range weapons as soon as an agreement on Conventional forces in Europe ras siqned. Similarly, at their London sunmit. the aeada of State and G o v e r w n t of the Alliance countries had taken full account of the new relations between the countries of Europe. which aroused hopes that the new NATO strategy would be less dependent on nuclear weapons. The United States bad in turn announced its intention to refrain from modernirinq its LANCE miasiles and to withdraw its nuclear artillery from Europe. In the area of the cessation of nuclear testinq, too, a welcome siqn ras the inirainent ratification of the protocols to the 1914 and 1976 treaties on thresholda and peaceful nuclear explosions by the two nuclear super-Powers. In that CoMection. the re-establishment of the Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban proved that the final objective. to which Belqium ras stronqly comitted. nmely, a permanent and varifiable halt to nuclear testing, could finally be achieved.

MR. CALDERON. PERU (6th meeting) page 108, pur 40

O . nr. CALDLROIIPeru) raid chat it had probably been out o f fear of the conrequencei of a nuclear cooflict that Che ¶ u p * r - P O ~ ~ r r had bequn neqotiationr on a creaty Co check the proliferotion of ruch reaponr of mars destruction. The NPT had been an important initial rtaqa on the road CO reason. tt ras rimply one vay of creatinq condicionr that vould make it possible to eliminace nuclear weaponr from the face of the earth once and. for 111. Non-proliferacion did noc mean elinination or reduction. but non-reproduction. Thac var rhy the Ireaty ras dircriminatory, in cvo respects. lirrt. it var the firrt international inscrwnenc leqally C O recoqnize €ive States ar beinq the sole nucleer Porerr under article IX, paraqraph 3. tt var perhapr chac diacriminatory nature chat explained the existence of article VI. Indaed. rince ic war noC a nucleir disarmunent creaty. icr moral authority and universaliration depended on the cesration o f the nuclear armr race and on nuelear disarmament. Cvo procerrer leadinq ta qeneral and complete dirarmunenc. Secondly. the Treaty qave prelerential traaunant CO the non-nuclear-veapon States parties. Article IV provided :ha: non-nuclear-reapon States rhould benefit lion the devolopnunc of the many uses of nuclear enerqy for peaceful purporer.

MR. CALDERON, PERU (6th meeting) page 109, pan 43

4 3 . The successful implementation of the 1987 Washinqton Treaty, o n the elimination of intermediate-range and short-range mirailes, and the announcement that the super-Porers would be concludinq a treaty o n the elimination of certain categories of rtraceqic offenrive reaponr by the end of the year vere e x m p l e s of the mearures that musc be taken in order to lersen the disappoinement of the non-nuclear-reapon Statea parties at Che 'implementation of arcicle VI.

UR. RASAPUTRAM, SRI LANKA (6th meeting) page 1 13. pans 60 and 61

60. Regsrdiop article VI. ho note6 vith sacirfaction the proqrers in bilacerai neqotiationr rince 1985. The tvo nuclear super-Poverr had concluded the INl Treaty and conmitced themrelver Co concludinq the STAR1 Aqreement. However. his Government var dirappoinced chat there had been no aqreemeoc o n effective limitat~ons. and it Chus feared that the quert for a ner qeneration of nuclear veaponr vould continue.

51. Ihere had been reports of ner nucl*ar-weaPOn systemr. including submarize- bared missiles and cruise mirriles. noreover. even if 3 Co 4 par cent of :ze missiles ver. dertroyed under the IN? Treaty. thair rarheadr would be recainad. The STAR1 Aqreemenc enviraqed much leri than a 50 per cent reduction. but even after a 50 per cent reduction of the tvo super-Povers. scrategic arsenals. Chose tvo councries vould have 20 per cent more nuclcar rarheadr chan chey had had in the early 19701. Currenc neqotiationr had noc produced any proqresr Concerninp a possible agreement on prevencinq an arms race in outer rpace. Rerearch and davelopmenc vere continuinq in chat field. Sri Lanka var Chus leriourly concerned at Che porribility of an expensive and destabilirinq armr race in oucer rpace coupled rith the development of new nuclear reaponr.

--.. UU-IW I 1, ~ Y u B L I C OF HUNGARY (6tb meeting) page.ll4. nara 6R -- -

MR. D U N A , TURKEY (7tb meetiog) page 131. para 51

51. The progress achieved in nuclear disarmanent oves the past five years represented a major stop in the implen»ntation of article VI of the Treaty. In that connection, he referred to the IN? AqreeMnt of 1988, the impendinq \ conclusion of a STAR1 agreement. to be followed by turther talks o. ;trategic balance issues, and the neqotiations On the reduction Of short-range nuclear forces expected to take place sfter the conclusion of the agreement on conventional forces in Europe. Bis deleqation also weleomed the decision'of the Conference on Disarmainent tO discuss at informal meetings the topics of cessation of-the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmameat and prevention of nuclear war. includinq al1 related matterS. and hoped that the debate on those items rould be continued at the 1991 sessions of the Conference.

MRS. MASON, C A N A D A (8th meeting) page 137. para 7

1 . Maoy States Parties also participsted in bilateral nuclear CO-operation. and as a major exporter of nucleer items. Canada had played and would continue to play a significant sols in international nuclear CO-operation with a ride variety of countries, both developed and developing. It would be submittioq to the Conference a paper on its bilateral activities. which included uranium exports. provision of powar and research reactors. nuclear technoloqy transfer and training activities. Canada had bilateral agreements with 28 countries which, with the exception of France. a nuclear-weapon State, were parties to the NPT. It believed that adherence to the NP? or to NFT-type safeguards ras an essential condition of nuclear supply. bother important point war to clarify the list of nuclear materials and equipment. Some parties to the HP1 objected to the additional non-proliferation assurances often required by suppliers. Such requirements wera often a matter of national policy. responded to nuclear non-proliferation concerna and provided fallback safequards in the event that I U A ras unable to apply safeguards. They made it possible to take particular preeautions with hiqh enrichment and reprocessing and to have s o m control ovmr the retransfer of items to third parties. It ras within that more comprehensive non-proliferation régime that assurances of nuclear supply could continue to contribute to world prosperity. That did not eitend to the peacaful applications of nuclear explosions. as provided for in article V. for the benefits remained doubtful. As to the provisions of article VI, under which parties undertook to pursue neqotiations in good faith on effective Nasures relatinq to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. and on a treaty on qeneral and complote disarrnsnent. al1 the efforts undertaken in that direction had provoked the huild-up rather than the reduction of arms. in a climats of international tension. Howevsr, the international climate had chanqed considerably since the previous Review Conterence, particularly in the East-West context, and States were demonstrating a revitaliaed cornitment to resolve problems by peaceful means. Unprecedented proqrsrs had been made towards haltinq and reversing the nuclear arms race. The INP Treaty. concluded in 1987, ras a noteworthy achrevement. The United States.qnd the Soviet Union had reached agreement in principle on a S T m T treaty, which should be signed before the end of the year. They had also conmitted themselves to neqotiatinq a S T U Z II treaty and to pursuing a dialogue On

enhancinq rtrategic stability after the inplenentation of STMT 1. There rere also other indications tùat the super-Powrr had indemd embarked on thm path of nuclear dieamaumnt.

MR. B A R N E T , JAMAICA (8th meeting) page 139, 17-22

17. The last half of the 1980s bad beralded the nev direction in international relations, marked by improved relations betveen the super-Povers and the siqninq of the INP Treaty. Bowever. the elimioation of an entire class of missiles still loft the international comuoity militarily only marqioally better off. as there ver. still more Chan enouqb weapons to deatroy the vorld several times over. The siqnificance o f the recent turn in international relations portended more chan it actually meant. However. the - prospects for an early signature of a strateqic arms reduction treacy and of rubstantial proqress in the Vieona neqotiacions ver0 al1 the more encouraqinq.

20. Only a comprehensive nuclear-test ban vould prevent the developmenc of *ore aophisticatad nuclear weapons syatems. Continued testing, at whatever ievel, implied acceptaoce of the idea chat nuclear veapons vere usable and uould be used. thus indicacinq persistent adherence to a doctrine of certain autual destruction. If no proqresa ras made beyond ttiat stage, th00 tbe NPï had not yet provided a suitable framework for the maintenance of international peace and security in a chanqinq world.

2 2 . The principal concerns initially raised by the noo-aliqoed Countrier vere =till unmet. more particularly a comprehenrive test ban, a cut-off Of the production of fissile material for veaponr. a freeie and reduction 0: 'stocka Of nuclcar veapons and their delivery systems. prohibition of the use of

nuclear weapons, and iecurity assurances Co non-nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty, vhich ras essentially about States and not about veaponr, had led Co scant proqress in chose spheres.

MR. MGBOKWERE, NIGERIA (8th meeting) page 144, para 47

47. - 1 t had Co be remembered that. pursuanc to article VI of the Treaty. aii States Parties. nuclear and non-nuclear alike. had accepted a leqally-bindinq cornmiunent to purrue neqotiatioor in good faith on effective measures relatinc to cessation o f the nuclear arms race at an early date and CO nuclear disarmament. a d on a treaty an general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international coptrol. However. the adverse affect of Che military posture and defence doctrines of the nuclear-veapon States and other militarily siqoificant States Parties vere likely Co jeopardire actaiment of the qoals of the NPT. Accordinqly. Niqeria urqently called on the super-Povers and other nuclear-veapoo States. rhich vere primarily responsiblr for the implementation o f article VI. CO cake advancaqe of the conliderably improved relations betveen Cham Co redouble choir efforts tovardr fulfilliuq the'aims of that article. The statements they had already made durinq the Conference were encouraqinq and it vas Co be hoped that they vould actively parcicipare in tha 1991 Amendment Conference aimed at coovertinq the Partial Test Ban Treaty inta a comprehensive test ban creacy to enrure ici success.

MR. GLESSINER, AUSTRlA (8th meeting) page 147, para 59

59. Further to the conclusion of the INP Treaty by the United States and the ÜSSR. and Co other recent developmentr in the field of diaarmament. for the first time it seemed that the provisions of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty vere actually beinq applied. However, in view of the nlvnber of nuclear veapons to be destroyed, the INP Treaty could only be considercd as a first step tovards comprehensive nuclear disarmament. In the

rame concext. it ras co be hoped chat the S T U T 1 agreement on the reduction of Che strateqic arsensals of the tvo nuclear super-Poverr vould be concluded skortly and that a second agreement vould also be reached lacer.

MR. NASSERI, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (8th meeting) page 149, para 70

70 . The objective of article VI ras undoubtedly the mort important of the Treaty. althouqh it had to a large ertent long beeo iqnored by the super-Pouers. Durinq the cold war. the arms race had reached its peak, but a nunber of positive developments had since taken place. However, the policy of

maintalning nuclear supremacy and refusinq to disavar the nuclear option remained intact. Various States had adopted the doctrine of acquirinq security through the achievemeat of nuclear auperiority. Such trends had . unfortunately paved the way for a qualitative and quantitative reqional conventional arms race, thus boostinq Cho transfer of arms to such reqions. ~ecent developments in the Middle East and the Periiin Gulf were the

.3 consequence of that danqerous procesS.

MR. AMOO-GOTTFRIED, GHANA (8th meeting) page 151, p m 78

78. The ultimate objective of the NP1 ras complete nuclear disarmament. *hicE required an end to both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact that nuclear-weapon States conrinued to improve the quality of such weapons could only encouraqe non-nuclear-ueapon States with advanced nuclear technoloqy Co cross th0 nuclear threshold and develop nuclaar weapons. The first stop to halt that process ras an end to nuclear testinq throuqh a comprehenrive test ban treaty. The conclusion of ruch a treaty would be the mort concrete proof of the determination of the nuclearlweapon States to stop vertical proliferation and to work tovards complete nuclear disarmament. The prospects of iuch a treaty were not as bleak as seemed at first sight. The riqninq of the IN? Treaty. in 1987. had been followed by the conclusion of a number of bilateral aqreemeots between the United States and the Soviet Union. Aqain. the Comittee on a Nuclear Test Ban had b e m e - e s l i s h e d , a development rhich Ghana welcomed as a positive siqn of the cornitment of the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament.

MR. ROZENTAL, MEXICO (9th meeting) page 159, p m 18 18. He welcomed the reduction of 10 to 30 per cent in the rtratmqic arrenals. but noted with w i e t y thet the woapona thenselvos were not diaappearinq. but were beinq redeployod outside Curopo. to other reqionr. Thur. the nuclear threat had duindled in Europe. but it had mot dirappeared. Nuclear disarmament would not be achieved a8 long am nuclear weapon tertinq and the production of fissionable material for military purposer continue&. The necessary stops musr therefore be takeo to "suffocate" th. nuclear arms race.

UR. LUONG, VIETNAM (9tb meetkg) page '160. para 23

23. Since the Third Review Conference. international relations had undergone profound modifications. The w r l d had moved out of the cold war period inco ooe of dialogue and CO-operation. There were now real porsibilitier of prerervinq international poace and security and findinq equitable solutions to reqional conflicts. In that context. the procers ot bath qeneral and nuclear disarmanunt had made qreat proqress. With the entry into force of the INF Aqreement in 1988, qenuine nuclear disarmament measurer had been taken for the first time in history. Alro to be welcomed ras the signature of the verification protocolr to the "threshold" treaties of 1974 and 1976. as roll as the proqresr beinq made towards conclusion of the STIPT treaty. rhich provided for important reductions in the strateqic nuclear arrenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. There war rearon to bo ratisfied. but no: excessively so, rince ovin if the STAR?. treacy rare roll implemented. thouranc of nuclear warheadr would romain, enouqh co cause a nuclear holocaust whore consequences would brinq about the total destruction of civiliration.

MR. NGOUBEYOU, CAMEROON (10th meeting) pige 165, para 8

8 . ~t vas a natter of concern mat. despite some siqnificant developmagts iuch as the signing of the INI Treaty, the joint declaration on non-proliferation by the United States and the Soviet Union and the adoption of verification protocols at the recent Washington Sumnit. an roll as significant proqress achieved at the Vienna and Stockholm talks. the undertakings set out in article VI had not been fully discharqed during the period under review. The problem of the cessation of al1 test explosions of nuclear weapons, like Chat of the C O ~ C ~ U ¶ ~ O ~ of a treaty an general and camplete disarmament, remained unresolved. He continued to believe that the conc1usion of an agreement on the complete halting of nuclear testa vas an essential condition for complianca with article VI. and also supported the Nigerian proposa1 an neqative security assurances to non-nuclear-veapon States Parties to the Treaty (NPT/CONF.IV/17). It ras ais0 to be hoped that the

Cornittee on a Nuclear Test Ban re-established by the Conference on Disarmament would accelerate ita work with a viaw to arrivinq at an early agreement which. together vith measures prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons aqainst non-nuclear Stataa Parties. vould unquestionmiy contribute towards strengtheoing the NPT ia particular and th0 non-proïiferation rCqime in generai. encouraqinq States vhich had not yet donr a0 to acceds to the Treaty and rertorinq the confidence of non-nuclear-weapcn States Parties.

MR. RIVAS, COLOMBIA (10th meeting) page 168, para 20

20 . The Conference afforded an exceptional opportunity for nuclear phwers to strengthen their cornitment under article VI. Important. albeit partial, steps had beau taken on the road to nuclesr disarmament. or rather Co a lower rate of nuclesr armament. There ras no douht. however. chat international ,,pinion and the aspirations of al1 peoplaa contiaued to be in favour of bolder and more ~ i t i o u a measurer in that field. It ras not snouqh for the two ,~per-Pavera to aqree on certain limitations to their nuclear arsenals vhile leaving their destructive Capacity intact. if nuclear-ueapon States continued the race towards technical improvement of their wapons of masa destruction and a vertical praliferation which continued to threaten mankind. aomethinq that vas against the very spirit of the Treaty.

MR. RIVADENEIRA, ECUAWR (10th meeting) page 172, para 33

,-,. mile he welcomed the efforts mado by the nuclear-weapor States to ComPlY ,,ith article VI of the Treaty. it val important to make furtlier pro9re- in neqotiationa on effective measUres relating to cessation of Che nuclear race. The exceptionally ravouraol* international situation lnusf be used to

the partial lest BU rreaty into an instrument banoing al1 nuclear teseing. the 10.g-term goal beinq complot* disarmament.

M R . ANDERSSON, SWEDEN (1 ltb meeting) page 174, para 2 2 . Significant proqress had been made in the field of nuclear disarmameot. In January 1985, the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed to beqln negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Subiequent declarations by the tvo major nuclear Povers had demonstrated CO the world cornunity thst policy makers were non arking fundamental questions about the future role of nuclear weapons as a meana of detorrence. The firat real stop tovards nuclear disarmament had been the conclusi.on in 1987 of the bilateral IN? Treaty, vhich provided for the elimination of a whole category of nuclear veapons. The comprehensive study on nuclear veapona. in which both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-veapon States had participated, had also made a valuable contribution to the analysis of the matter. In the European context in particulsr, negotistions were under way on both disarmament and confidence- and security-buildinq measures. The States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) were expected to adopt regional measures in the near future; and although military negotiationr had so far been Concerned vitb conventional weapons, they rere also expected to addrass th* issue of nuclear voapons in the future.

MR. ANDERSSON. SWEDEN (I l th meeting) page 175, para 5

5 . The best way of achievinq universality adharonce lay in brinqinq about a situation in wbich al1 States Parties strictly obrerved the provisions of the Treaty, not only in pence-Cime but also in times Of crisis or war. It ras also hiqhly desirable to pursue comprehensive neqotiations on nuclear disarmament, includinq naval dirarmamenc. witb the objective of banninq nuclear weapons from al1 ships and sibnarines other than Chose placed in classes specially desiqnated by aqreement. Such a prohibition should covec al1 sen-lauched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. Moreover. in fulfilment of their obligations in m a t respect. States Parties should obviously conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty so as Co halt the qualitative improvement and horizontal proliferation of increasinqly sophisticated nuclear weapons. The Threrbold Test-Ban Traaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty concluded between tbe United States and the Soviet Union containad no bindinq provisions in that connection. The Swedish Goverment hoped that the Cornittee on a Huclear Test Ban would be reactivated at the begiminq of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. rince it had already been clearly damonrtrated that the international comunity had at its disposal the scientific and technical means of verifyinq observance of a colnprehensive nuclear test ban. and draft treaties on the subject were already on the table. In the iaeantime, the principal nuclear-weapon States should non declare nuclear test moratorium. In that connection. Sweden shared Finland's serious concern about nuclear tests in the Arctic. It also considered that al1 production of new nuclear

,materialwhich miqht ba used to build weapons should be halted. and that any aqreemenc reached in that connection should be verifiable. the prerequisite for any verification of that nature beinq saparation. in nuclear-reapon States. of nuclear activities for peaceful and for military purposas. In addition. nuclear warheads should be dismantled and destroyed. al1 resultanc transfers of fissionable material beinq mnicored under IAEA safequards.

MR. VILLARROEL, PHlLLIPlNNES (1 ltb meeting) page 182. para 37

3 7 . SO far a3 article VI was concerned, a comprehensive test ban would be c3.e most effective way to end the nuclear arms race. It would more0Ver ba

desirable for the Conference on DisarmCuMnt Co ceceive the nacessary support to achieve a comprehensive proqr-e 01 disarmment.

MGR. TAURAN, HOLY SEE (Iltb meeting) page 183, para 43

4 3 . It could be said that qenuine proqress had been made since the Third Review Conference. In 1987, the two super-Powers had signed the INP Agreement, which provided for the dismantlinq of al1 intermediate-range missiles and respective installations in the United States and the Soviet Union, and the START negotiations between the same two countries to achieve a 50 per cent reduction in strategic weapons raised the possibility of an even stricter limitation of nuclear weapons. Those factors. together with the currant neqotiations on conventional and chemical disarmament. represented a genuina peace dynamic. It ras increasinqly apparent that war was incapable of solvinq conflicts and that deterrenca ras merely an amergency solution. It ras but one staqe on the path towards diaarmament. and other means of quaranteeing peace should be actively souqht.

MR. SENE, SENEGAL (1 lth meeting) page 185, para 56

56. There were many lessons to be learned from an examination of the functioning of the NPI as far as article VI1 ras concerned, in the light of the new international environment. The first meeting between President Corbachev and President Reagan. at which they had agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought, had marked the beginninq of that process. The conclusion, in 1987. of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. which should be followed by new agreements and by consideration of a reduction in strategic weapons. had been the continuation of that meeting. In addition. there ras the iminent ratification by the two super-Powers of the protocols to the 1974 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The International Paris Conference on chemical weapons had, moreover. given a powerful impetus to negotiations aimed at the complete and universal elimination of chemical weapons in conjuction with a verification system. Lastly, mention should be made of the Stockholm Document on security and CO-operation in Europe and the forthcoming conclusion in Vienna oc an agreement on conventional forces in Europe and North America together with an agreement on confidence- and security-building measures, concluded in the spirit of the Final Act adopted in Helsinki in 1975. The Final Act, one of. the legal milestones of the present ara, had organized East-West CO-operation in spheres ranging from economics to disarmament, including science and technoloqy, environmental protection and respect for human rights, in order to usher in an era of détente in Europe capable of diminishing the risk of

MR. KATSIGAZI. UGANDA (1 lth meeting) page 189, para 74

74. Article VI of the Treaty, in which al1 partior undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on offectivo moaruros rolating to corration of the nuclear arrnr race and general and comploto disarmamont. had not boen respected and the nuclear-weapon Powors had done nothing in the part 20 yoars topromoce that objective. The quantitative reductioo in nuclear arrenalr war largely offset by the production of tochnologically advanced weaponr that would allow each super-Power evon if bilateral negotiationr on arma roduction succoedod. to.retain more than 9.000 nuclear weapoqr - throe timor more than thoy had had uhen the NP1 had been siqned in 1968.

MR. MARKIDES, CYPRUS (12th meeting) page 193. para 9. and page 194, para I I 1 9. Despite the conclusion of a nunber of armo Control treaties. includinq 7 'Orne important bilateral treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union, thora had. unfortunately, bean no significant and substantial Progress towards tha.aims set out in article VI of the NPT. Ia that CO'J'Jection, ho joined with othar speakers who had welcomed the agreement "cmen the United States and the Soviet Union for the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles in Europe - the IN? Treary. m a t 'qreem9nt vas a tirs: small. but positive, stop towards achieving soma of the objectives of the NPT. It ras to he k p a d that the recent favourable developments in international relations would make it possible for an agreemant to be reached preventinq an am. race in space and andinq it on Earth. Such an agraament ras essantial not only as a necsssary balancinq element for the self-restraint s h o m by the n ~ i - n ~ ~ l e a r - w e s p ~ n States Parties. ~ n d e r erticla II of the NPT but alao sa an ancouragenent to othar States, whether nuclear-weapon Statss or non-nuclear-wespon States, to join the non-proliferation régi- established by the Treaty.

11. A% recoqnizmd in tha preanibla to the RPf, tha conclusion of a comprabensivm taut ban traaty rai aasantial in order to achieve nuclear disamament. Negotiations in that diraction should be resunied as roon as porsibla and such a treaty could parhaps ba cofipleted within a fer years. The procesr could ba hastinad by a linkage batween the comprehensive test ban and the NFT. Tha daclaration adopte4 in Septmhar 1989 by the Non-Aliqned S m i t Conference atated; -, that a comprehaasive nuclear test-ban treaty ras absolutely essantial for tha preservatioa of the non-prolifsration reqim embodied in tha üF'T. Bis delegation ras in full agreement with tha proposals put forrard by othar non-aliqned coutrias witb a viaw to preserviq and strenqthening the W. Thoia proposala included: (1) tha daclaration of a moratorium on al1 nuclaar tasts axploaions till 1995: O ) a moratorium on the production of fiasionable matarialr (3) cb. promotion of full-scop. neqotiations on a coaprehensiva test ban in tha Comiittea established by tha Conferencm on Disamamant;. ( 4 ) a raadinasa to accapt multilatarally binding legal i n s t r w n t s to guarantea al1 non-nuclear-weapon Statea aqainst the use or throat of use of nucloar wapons; ( 5 ) support and racognition for, existing nuclear-weapon-Cree zonas and for thora to ba established in the furure: ( 6 ) improvad IAEA assistance to developinq couutries throuqh financinq institutions to promota the peaceful usas of nuclear energy.

MR. GUïTIEREZ, PERU (Committee 1, meeting 2) page 226, para 13

13. Despite a de moratorium on tha production of fissionable material on account of tha huge stockpiles in the hands of the nuclear-weapon States, none of those States had voiced a decision to suspena proauction. Therefore, neqotiations must be initiated on an agreement for international verificaion of a complete end to such production; such a masure would accord fully with bilateral understandings on the reduction of interaiediata-range and strategic nuclear waapons and therafore be consonant with srticla VI of the NPT.

MR. KRALIK, CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC (Committec 1, meeting 2) page 229, para 26 and page 230, para 28

2 6 . The review of article VI focused particularly on nuclear-reapon States. Although implementation of its provisions ras still not fully satisfactory, there had been more proqress Since the previous Review Conference than in al1 the prscedinq years; that dynamic atmosphore ras propitious for the stop-by-step solution ezemplified by the signinq of the INF Treaty in 1978', lomcthing rhich had r h o m that even highly COmplex problems could be iolved glven the political will, and by the tact that neqotiations for STAR1 II had already led to the elaboration of 12 verification methods. Such round

proqress augured roll for further strengthening of the TrObty.

2 8 . Nuclear disarmament ras inseparable from the disarmament process as a uhole. and the comprehensive banninq of auclear-weapon tests vas inseparable from the issue of non-proliferation. The connittee for Chat purpose in the Conference en Disarmment had been re-esfablished, and a Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference would be convened in Jsnuary 1991. A complete qlobal ban on nuclear tests ras a key factor for strengthening the NP? and achieving nuelear arma reduction and disarmament.

MR. REESE. AUSTRALlA (Cornmittee 1, meeting 2) page 232. paras 38 and 39

38. Article VI and preambular paraqraphs 8 to 12 related essentially to tne other half of the bargain struck in acceding to the NPT: the comnitrnent to nuclear disarmament. In Chat context, Australia welcomed the improved political climate and the resultant enhanced prospects for uuclaar and conventional disarmament. It supported the range of arma control neqotiations, especially START. betreen the United States and the Soviet Union and looked forward to the conclusion of an agreement rhich would drastically reduce their arsenals. Horever, as the Australiin Foreign Minister had pointed out during the general debate tha number of nuclear reapons in the rorld would still be unacceptsbly high. Bir deleqation therefore reiterated its conviction that nuclear disarmonunt murt ho pursued. aetively and in good Eaith. pursuant to article VI. rhile recognixing that the procesi would be slow and complex and that, aa noted at the previous Revier Conference. atability waa important.

39. A comprehensive nuclear teat-ban treaty remained an urgent priority, since the limita it would imposa on proliferation. vertical and horizontal, made it an integral part OC tBa nuclear d i s a m m e n t process and thus of full implementation of the NPT. Althouph the agreements signed. since the previous Revier Couference, by the United States and the Soviet Union on the Verification Protocol of the 1974 Zhreshold Test-Ban Trbaty and the 1976 Peaceful Huclear Explosions Treaty rare welcom and should be acknowledged in the Final Document, a comprehensive test ban ras some ray off. It ras gratifying CO ree Che recent re-establishment, in the Conference on Disarmment, of the hPljPC Conmittee on a Nuclear Test Ban. for it ras time for the international comunity to begin rork torards the eirly conclusion of a cornp~rehensiva test-ban treaty. Although Australia had doubts about the Partial Test-Ban Treaty Amendinant Conference, it rould participate in it constructively. Whatever the Conference'r findinga rith regard to tertinq. the NPT remained essential.

MR. GORDON, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Cornmith 1. meeting 2) page 233. para 45

45. Article VI appliad not just to nuclear-wespon States but to 811 countrier, and involvad non-nuclear as roll al nuclear atm8 control neqotiations. The United States had an i m p r ~ l ~ i v e record of atm8 coatrol negotiationr and activitier. nuclear and non-nucl*ar. which rpoke for itrelf and tercifiad to article vl'r viability. yet it var t i m for the international comunity to demand that al1 Parties rhould makm cornensurate efforts to achieve arma control mearurer chat could eare reqional tensions and abat. regional armr competition. The Conference 1hOuld rend a atronq merraqr Co al1 States Partier accordioqly. Tulfilment of article VI's objectiver rhould oot be judged aolely in termr of the aqreementr concluded. for the article dralt

1 with a procera which var, in and of itself. of the utmort importance. It ras alto ersencial Co recoqnire that chanqinq political relationrhips affectrd arms control and disarmament mearurer and vice verra. and that particular arms control mearurer themrelves. auch as deep cutr in arsenalr. required very careful attention in reqard to the type and reliability'of the veaponr remaininq. To avoid instability. reductionr must be dariqned to maintain balanced defanrive caprbility at every phare. *pain. at every staqe of reduction, the ability to test ras essential. It must be recoqnised that nuclear arsenal reductionr of the type rouqht in the S T M T neqotiations depended on avareners chat the remaininq weapons could be rtored. deployed or tranrported safely and would perforn al desiqned - which mesnt the ability Co test. Th* United States ras coaoitted to an eventu.1 conplet. ban. on on a rtep-by-rtap basis. The conditions it inpased rare base6 th. conviction that diaregard for the relationrhip b ~ t v ~ e n the types of reapons romainin9 at any t i m . or their reliability, w u l d b. l s.riourly dertabiliainq factor.

MR. HARUN-üR RASHID, BANGLADESH (Cornmittee 1. meeting 2) page 235, para 51

5 1 . The wrdinq O< article VI ai.& its purpose very elearr cessation of the nuclear arma race. as -11 as OuCli*r and comprehensive disam.ii.nt. In thac regard. bis deleqation n1coii.d the i u y recent positive staps such as the progrers in the variou8 .rus control noqotiations and masures undertaken by the Soviet Union and the U n i t d States. and eh. re-estrbllsbiwnt. in the Conference on D i s a m a t . ol th. Corittee on a lucliar Test Ban. A compreheosivm test ban ras crucial to lullilwnt ol the Treaty ohlipationr; it ris not in itrell a substantiw disa-nc r a s u r e but only a prelud.. In that connaetion. a11 aspocts O< disa-nt. partieularly nuelear d i s i m w n t purruaoc to the t e m a ol article VI. w r e contained in draLt rerolution NPT/COlT.IVIL.l.

UR. PALIHARKARA. SRI LANKA (Cornmi* 1. meeting 2) page 236. pua 58

5 8 . nr. (Sri Lanka). relmrrinq Co article VI, said chat he relcomed the recent proqrear in bilateral neqotietions. whicb contrasted with the overall lack of proqresa prior to the previous levier Conference. Neverthelers, it ras disappointinq that no etlective limitations hed been aqreed upoa in conneetion with the qualitative developœnt ol nuclear weaponi rybteaa, deapita swcific ealls voiced at the previous aevier. lt ras a

matter for concern chat, despite the deep cuts in stratoqic arsenals forrreen in the S T M T neqotiations, 20 por cent m r e nuclear napans rould be deployed chan bad been the case in 1~10. *. sboun in Ch. recenc coipreh.nsive rtudy by the United Mations Group ol Cxports, continued wderniratioo w u l d lead to the deploymnt of new typos of weapons rystna, cootrary to the purp.oses of article VI1 of the MPT.

MR. FLYNN, IRELAND (Main cornmittee 1, 5th meeting) page 258, Para 5 5 . The past five years had witnessed rom0 positive and encouraginq developments: the improvement in East-west relations had provided a frmework for significant proqress in soma areas of arma control; the INP Treaty had been signad and vas being implemented; and a strateqic arms reduction treaty (START) should soon be s i n e an event that would strenqthen the implementation of Article VI and result in reducing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

MR. BOLIATKO, UNION OF SOVIET SOClALlST REPUBLICS (Maio Cornmittee 1, 5th meeting) page 260, paras 14 and 19

1 4 . The Soviet-United States treaty on the elimination of intermediate and short-ranqe missiles had marked the beqinning of nuclear disarmment in Europe and throughout the world.

19. The unilateral reduction of anned forces. defence budgets and military proqramnes by the Soviet Union and other countries and the reduction in the manufacture for nuclear armament purposes of certain products such as fissile materials ras also contributinq to the implementation of thm eighth to trelfth preambular paragraphs and of Article VI of the NPT.

MR. GORDON. UNITED STATES OF AMERlCA (Main Cornmittee 1, 5th meeting) page 262. para 28 - 28. In the first place, he hoped that the Cornittee would not engage in academic or leqalistic debates about what measures should be considered in reviewinq Article VI and preambular paraqraphs 8 to 12 of the NPT. If the conclusion of a single treaty providing for general and complete disamament vas reqarded as the literal objective test. it ras clear that that objective had not been accomplished. However, that would not amount to a fair assessment of the progress made in the last rive years. Article VI should rather be considered in terms of al1 the accomplishments which had contributed to achievement of the long-term objective - INP. strategic anns reductions and other disarmament measures in both nuclear and non-nuclear areas.

i

MR. WEMBOU. CAMEROON (Cornmittee 1. meeting 5) page 266. pur 47

4 7 . He noted that in the pariod sinca the yaar 1985 vartical prolifaration had continued, ouclear wapona had continued to bo improvad in qualitative terms and proqreaa in the bilataral Ciald had not alraya hoan accompanied by similar progrers in multilateral noqotiationa. Daspita th* considerabla

proqress made. much still ramainad to ba doua. therefora. bafore general disarmment could ha achiaved. In ochar wrds, strict and comprehensive

implementation of th* proviaions of Article VI hava not yet beau accomplished.

MRS. MASON, CANADA (Main Committce 1,5tb meeting) prge 267. prri 52

52. w s , MASpL! (Canada) said that the Tinal Docuwnt ahould refar to the unp~cedented progress msde since 1985, particularly during th* past 18 aonths, involving d e v e l o p n t s al1 of which w r * consistent rith th. aima of Article VI of the NPT. D e v e l o p n t s of particular ipportanca w r a the Ill? Traaty and the proqress which had been made in negotiatinq a S T N ï traaty. Iba nogotiations on a comprebensive test ban wera w r a difficult, but proqrasr had naverthelers been made with the re-establishment of an Comittea on nuclaar taiting in the Conference on Disamamant and th* conclusion, i n Juna 1990, of the Protocols on verification of th* 1914 and 1916 bilataral Treaties.

MR. PALIHAItKARA, SRI LANKA (Cornmitte 1, meeting 5) page 267. para 56

5 6 . m i l e the conclurion of the 1NF Treaty and the proqress beinq made in the

neqotiation of a S T M T treaty were cause for satisfaction, he pointrd out that cothinq had been don. to limit the modernization of nuclear armamentr. It vas

necessary also to bear in mind thet. aven if the nuclear arsenalr were halved. :?.cy vould atill exceed by 20 pur cent their lave1 at the rtart of the 1970s. Re alto drew attention to the fact that rpace weapon p r o g r m e s had not been . abandonad and he joined the representative of New Lealand in rtreasinq the .lrgsnt need for a comprehenrive nuclear test ban. The cessation of tests ras i n essential measure to combat the proliferation of nuclear Weaponl. In that ~Onnection, he reqretted that the Conference on Disarmament hsd not been able ta q i v e a neqotiatinq mandate to the qroup on nuclear tests. The ~oaferenca rhould rtronqly encourage continuation of the comprehenrive nuclear test-ban procerr, particularly in vie- of the forchcominq conference to amend the Partial Test-Ean Treaty.

MRS. SOLESBY, UNITED KINGDOM (M8in Cornmittee. 5th meeting) page 268, para 58

5 8 . Since the 1985 Review Conference aubstaotial unexpected results had been achieved in the field of nuclear disamament. Examples rare the bilateral

aqreementr concluded between the United States and the USSR. the progress made towards conclusion of a START treaty and Che signinp of the IWO Trmty. Even

before the latter treaty had been concluded, NATO had unilaterally decided Co deatroy 2.400 of its nuclear warhsads daployed in Europe, so that, currently. NATO had fewer nuclear warheads in Europe than at the time of the conclurion of the NPT. Furthemore, NATO had proposed the initiation of negotiationr on eliminacion of short-range nuclaar forcea and of nuclear shells, once the treaty on conventional forcea in Europe had been concluded.

MR. HILALE, MOROCCO (Commiotee 1, meeting 5) page 269, para 65

65 . & R I L U (Morocco) raid chat whmn r+e NPT bad been riqaed in 1968. the prlmary objective had been that the nuclear Powera should undercake to neqotiate with a view Co 8ecurinq qeneral disarmuirnt under internationel control. Thst had been a counterpart. aa it rare. for the non-nuclear-weapon States, which had iovereiqmly renounced the nucle8r option by accedinq Co the Treaty. Unlike the 1985 Peview Conference. the Fourth Conference ras takinq Place in a mort favouraùle cliaate, as aubatancial d i a a r n w n t aqreemnta had been concluded and other aqreemontr ver* beinq neqotiated. Aa IN? Treaty had

been concluded, neqotiationr w r e in proqrerr with the aia of reducinq stracaqic arnwnnts by 30 to 50 per cent. and other neqotiation8 had been inatated betreen the t m alliances on the question of reduction of conventional woapons. Thoae new developunta w r e cercainly encouraqinp and rhould permit fulfilrunt of the derlre Of the international comunity for general and complet* dila-nt. The Conference. in ira ?inal Docuunt, rhould devote eonridereble attention to the proqr.88 iude towarde disam-nt. It ras necesaary to be realiatic, bowver, rithout b e i q neqative, and to point out that the reeulta achieved did m t fully moet the hoper arouaed by the undartakinq qiven in 1968 Dy the three nuclear-wapon Powers which were the Depoaitaries of th0 rreaty. The nuclear-wapon Powra rhould Cherelore further be urqed Co redouble their etfort8 in the interest of the entire world comuity.

Advisory Opinion - Leaglity of Nuclear Weapons

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