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Adventures in Transcendental Materialism_ Dialogues With Contemporary Thinkers __ Reviews __ Notre...
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College of Arts and Letters Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.12.04 Author Adrian Johnston Adventures in Transcendental Materialism: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers Published: December 02, 2014 Adrian Johnston, Adventures in Transcendental Materialism: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers, Edinburgh University Press, 2014, 358pp., $39.95 (pbk), ISBN 9780748673292. Reviewed by John Protevi, Louisiana State University Adrian Johnston's work in this new volume of essays is challenging, erudite, and very important. He seeks to bring Hegel, Marx, Freud, and Lacan into contact with certain nonreductionist, nondeterminist programs in the life sciences and neurosciences (the pair "epigenetics and neuroplasticity" appears at several points) in order to distinguish his work from that of his closest, though friendly rivals. These are Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, Catherine Malabou, Quentin Meillassoux, Markus Gabriel and Martin Hägglund. He also has a rather more oppositional, and indeed sometimes polemical, relation with those he deems neoSpinozist, here represented by Iain Hamilton Grant, Jane Bennett, and William Connolly. This review will have two parts. In the first section I will place Johnston in relation to his friendly rivals; in the second I will pose some critical remarks regarding Johnston's enlisting of various scientific and philosophical practices under his rubric of "strong emergence" of a "morethannatural" subjectivity. I In the first part then, I will indicate the singular points of Johnston's portrayal, in this book, of his system of "transcendental materialism." [1] In the interests of space (and as a result of the limits of my training), I will pass by, with regret, the many detailed passages in which Johnston distinguishes his psychoanalytic readings from those of Žižek, Badiou, Malabou, and Hägglund. Instead I will concentrate on the singular points of the ontological position Johnston stakes out. That is, I will identify the points on the near side of which one is in Johnston's system, and on the far side of which one leaves it. This is a topology of a conceptual space: you can twist and pull on Johnston's concepts to a certain extent, but there are points beyond which things change too much for it to be considered still his system. So the first part of the review is not really about correspondence: does Johnston get it right relative to the way the world works? Or coherence: who agrees with Johnston? Or pragmatics: what can you do with Johnston? But, about a sort of philosophical mapping: where does Johnston's system force a choice on you? I will concentrate on the singular points of Johnston's ontological system. As I read this book, Johnston's primary concern is the relation of substance and subject, or that of matter and mind. An early gloss on the key term, "transcendental materialism," sees it as an "account of the emergence of selfdetermining, autoreflexive transcendental subjectivity out of asubjective substance, [which] also fairly could be depicted as a genetic, temporally elongated (meta)transcendentalism" (18). As we can see, Johnston affirms the Hegelian imperative of "grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance but equally as Subject " (27; see also 173 and 308; emphasis in original; citing the Phenomenology of Spirit ). In working with "substance" and "subject" as basic terms, Johnston also uses "mind and matter," stressing their irreducibility once the mental emerges from the material. This gives us one of our first singular points, distinguishing transcendental materialism from dialectical materialism: whereas certain versions of HegelianMarxist dialectical materialism tend to emphasize possible unifying syntheses of such apparent splits as that between mind and matter, transcendental materialism treats these splits as real and irreducible (while nevertheless depicting them as internally generated out of a single, sole plane of material being). (13)
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Adventures in Transcendental Materialism_ Dialogues With Contemporary Thinkers __ Reviews __ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews __ University of Notre Dame
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2014.12.04AuthorAdrianJohnston
AdventuresinTranscendentalMaterialism:DialogueswithContemporaryThinkersPublished:December02,2014
AdrianJohnston,AdventuresinTranscendentalMaterialism:DialogueswithContemporaryThinkers,EdinburghUniversityPress,2014,358pp.,$39.95(pbk),ISBN9780748673292.
ReviewedbyJohnProtevi,LouisianaStateUniversityAdrianJohnston'sworkinthisnewvolumeofessaysischallenging,erudite,andveryimportant.HeseekstobringHegel,Marx,Freud,andLacanintocontactwithcertainnonreductionist,nondeterministprogramsinthelifesciencesandneurosciences(thepair"epigeneticsandneuroplasticity"appearsatseveralpoints)inordertodistinguishhisworkfromthatofhisclosest,thoughfriendlyrivals.TheseareSlavojiek,AlainBadiou,CatherineMalabou,QuentinMeillassoux,MarkusGabrielandMartinHgglund.Healsohasarathermoreoppositional,andindeedsometimespolemical,relationwiththosehedeemsneoSpinozist,hererepresentedbyIainHamiltonGrant,JaneBennett,andWilliamConnolly.
Thisreviewwillhavetwoparts.InthefirstsectionIwillplaceJohnstoninrelationtohisfriendlyrivalsinthesecondIwillposesomecriticalremarksregardingJohnston'senlistingofvariousscientificandphilosophicalpracticesunderhisrubricof"strongemergence"ofa"morethannatural"subjectivity.
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Inthefirstpartthen,IwillindicatethesingularpointsofJohnston'sportrayal,inthisbook,ofhissystemof"transcendental
materialism."[1]Intheinterestsofspace(andasaresultofthelimitsofmytraining),Iwillpassby,withregret,themanydetailedpassagesinwhichJohnstondistinguisheshispsychoanalyticreadingsfromthoseofiek,Badiou,Malabou,andHgglund.InsteadIwillconcentrateonthesingularpointsoftheontologicalpositionJohnstonstakesout.Thatis,IwillidentifythepointsonthenearsideofwhichoneisinJohnston'ssystem,andonthefarsideofwhichoneleavesit.Thisisatopologyofaconceptualspace:youcantwistandpullonJohnston'sconceptstoacertainextent,buttherearepointsbeyondwhichthingschangetoomuchforittobeconsideredstillhissystem.Sothefirstpartofthereviewisnotreallyaboutcorrespondence:doesJohnstongetitrightrelativetothewaytheworldworks?Orcoherence:whoagreeswithJohnston?Orpragmatics:whatcanyoudowithJohnston?But,aboutasortofphilosophicalmapping:wheredoesJohnston'ssystemforceachoiceonyou?
IwillconcentrateonthesingularpointsofJohnston'sontologicalsystem.AsIreadthisbook,Johnston'sprimaryconcernistherelationofsubstanceandsubject,orthatofmatterandmind.Anearlyglossonthekeyterm,"transcendentalmaterialism,"seesitasan"accountoftheemergenceofselfdetermining,autoreflexivetranscendentalsubjectivityoutofasubjectivesubstance,[which]alsofairlycouldbedepictedasagenetic,temporallyelongated(meta)transcendentalism"(18).Aswecansee,JohnstonaffirmstheHegelianimperativeof"graspingandexpressingtheTrue,notonlyasSubstancebutequallyasSubject"(27seealso173and308emphasisinoriginalcitingthePhenomenologyofSpirit).Inworkingwith"substance"and"subject"asbasicterms,Johnstonalsouses"mindandmatter,"stressingtheirirreducibilityoncethementalemergesfromthematerial.Thisgivesusoneofourfirstsingularpoints,distinguishingtranscendentalmaterialismfromdialecticalmaterialism:
whereascertainversionsofHegelianMarxistdialecticalmaterialismtendtoemphasizepossibleunifyingsynthesesofsuchapparentsplitsasthatbetweenmindandmatter,transcendentalmaterialismtreatsthesesplitsasrealandirreducible(whileneverthelessdepictingthemasinternallygeneratedoutofasingle,soleplaneofmaterialbeing).(13)
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Therealityandirreducibilityofmindorsubjectivityistermed"strongemergence"byJohnston,whichhewilldistinguishfrombothweakemergenceandepiphenomenalism,aswellasfrompanpsychism.Weakemergencewouldpositarealbutdependent,notreallyfreeorautonomoussubjectivity,whereasepiphenomenalismdeniestherealityandcausalefficacyofsubjectivity.Panpsychism,whichJohnstondescribesinextremeterms,goestoofartheotherwayfromepiphenomenalism,seeingfullblownsubjectivityeverywhere.HenceJohnstonmustdistinguishHegel's"panlogism"from"panpsychism."Hegelisapanlogistinthesensethat"Tobeknowableinandthroughsubjects'thoughts,asubjectivethingsmustnotbewhollyalienandcompletelyforeigntotheformsandcontentsofthoughts"(42).Butheisnopanpsychist:"Hegel'spanlogismisfarfromhypothesizinganythingpanpsychical,sinceascribingknowabilitytosomethingbynomeansentailsattributingknowledgeofitself(throughreflective/reflexiveselfawareness/consciousness)tothissamesomething"(43).Thisverystrongnotionofpanpsychismisanothersingularpointmostpanpsychismsallowagradient,withonlysomesortofveryfaintglimmerofsentienceatthelowestlevels.
Inanycase,withthissubstance/subjectorientation,Johnstonaffirmsan"axiomaticpositing"ofreal,autonomoussubjectivitythatleadstothe"reverseengineering"ofanaturecapableofproducingsuchsubjectivity:
Transcendentalmaterialismstartswithadecisiontocommittoanaxiomaticpositingoftherealexistenceofsubjectsastranscendental,autonomous,andirreduciblefreeagentsofnegativitynonethelessimmanent/internaltothephysicalrealitiesconstitutedbymaterialbodies(inthisrespect,itcanbeviewedasamaterialistrecastingofthemethodologyandstartingpointofFichteanism).Itsontologyofobjectivefirstnatureisthenreverseengineeredoutofthiscommitmenttotherebeinganineliminablefacticityofsubjective(aswellasobjective)secondnature.(18)
ThisbringsustoJohnston'sverycloserelationwithiek.Twosingularpointsappearhere,dividingJohnstonfromiek:theproperscienceforgroundingtranscendentalmaterialism,andtherelationofpositivitytonegativity.
Withregardtoscience,thekeydivisionhereisthatJohnstonthinksbiologyratherthanquantumphysics,aswithiek,offersthebestscientificgroundingfortranscendentalmaterialism(16).(TherelationtoscienceisalsoamongthepointsthatdivideJohnstonfromBadiouandMalabou.WhileJohnston'spreferenceforthelifesciencesdistinguisheshimfromthemathematicallyorientedBadiou,heagreeswithMalabouthatneuroscienceisthekeyscience.However,Malabouthinksthefindingsofneuroscienceoutstriptheabilityofpsychoanalysistodealwithrealneuronal/subjectivedestruction,whileJohnston
thinksaproperlyreformattedpsychoanalysisretainssomeutilityeventhere.[2])
ToreturntoJohnstonandiek,andshiftingfromascientificfocustoontology,Johnstonwantstolookforthe"genesisofnegativityoutofpositivity"(theemergenceofsubjectfromsubstance,tousetheHegelianterms),whileiek'sfocusisonthe"explosionofpositivityoutofnegativity"(17).Exceptfortheserelativelysubtledifferences,Johnstonthinkstheirpositionsarecloserthaniekrecognizes:
iek'stetheringofsocalleddialecticalmaterialismtoanontologyofaselfsunderingsubstanceinternallygeneratingparallaxstyleantinomiesandoppositionsseemsmorelikeasortofgenetictranscendentalism,atheorycenteredonthemodelofatrajectoryinvolvingtheimmanentgenesisofthethereaftertranscendent(i.e.,anemergentistsupplementtoKantiantranscendentalidealism).Onecouldcallthis,asIhavedone,"transcendentalmaterialism,"definedasadoctrinebasedonthethesisthatmaterialitymanufacturesoutofitselfthatwhichcomestodetachfromandachieveindependenceinrelationtoit.(118)
Thisnotionofimmanentmateriality'smanufacturingofathereaftertranscendentsubjectivitybringsusbacktoJohnston'sprogrammaticstatementoftranscendentalmaterialismas"agenetic,temporallyelongated(meta)transcendentalism"(18).SeveralsingularpointsappearherewithJohnston'slineartemporalityofemergence(firsttherewasmatter,thenitscompositionallowedformind),whichdistinguishhispositionfromaclassicexplicationofthespiritualaspectsofnature.Inthosesystems,historyismerelyafiniteperspective,eithertheexplicationofanaprioriimplicationortheprogressivematerializationoremanationofapurespirit.ForthematerialistJohnston,however,historyisnotanexplication,muchlessanemanation.Rather,itisallthereisataparticularpointinlineartimesubjectivityemerges,aneweventintheworld.(JohnstonhasaverycomplexnotionofpsychoanalytictemporalitythatherehearsesinthechaptersonHgglund.)
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WeseethenthewayJohnston'sontologicalfocusprovidessingularpointsdividinghisworkfromthatoftworecentlyappearingEuropeanphilosophers,MeillassouxandGabriel.ContratheepistemologicalquestionposedbyMeillassouxwhowantstoknow"howthesubjectivemindtranscendsitselfsoastomakedirectknowingcontactobjectiveworld"Johnstonwantstoknow"howthisidealistcorrelationistcircuitofsubjectivityirruptsoutof(andthereafterperturbsfromwithin)theasubjectiveRealansichofbeingquabeing(l'treentantqu'tre)"(15).Johnston'sdivisionfromGabrielremainsontologicalhowever,withtheturningpointbeing(partial)naturalism:
TheontologyofGabriel'stranscendentalontology,itselfresultingmainlyfromthegestureofontologizingKantianandpostKantiantranscendentalsubjectivity,isavisionofbeingasanonhierarchized,detotalizedpluralityof'fieldsofsense'defyinggroundingcapturebyanytypeofnaturalismand/orsciencealliedmaterialism.(26)
ButforJohnston,his"materialistleaningsinclinemetosee'fieldsofsense'asarisingfromembodiedmindedbeingsinwaysatleastpartiallyexplicableinnaturalscientific(especiallybiological)terms"(26).
II
Inthissecondpartofthereview,Icontinuewiththemapping,butconcentrateonthesingularpointofdivergencebetweenstrongandweakemergence.Let'sturntotheschoolofenactivism,whichcanberepresentedherebyEvanThompson,andanachronisticallyextendedbackwardstoHumbertoMaturanaandFranciscoVarela.Withsomestrain,itcanalsobeextendedhorizontallytoAntonioDamasioandTerrenceDeacon,whomJohnstoncites.Enactivismshould,Ithink,beseenasweaklyemergentitacknowledgesthatfullblownselfconsciousnessisadiachronicallyemergentphenomenon,butitisnotsomethingradicallyorontologicallydifferentfromsimplerformsofcognitionandsentience.Johnston'sclaimof"morethannatural"statusforfullselfconsciouswoulddisruptwhattheemergentistscallthecontinuityofmindinlife(Thompson2007).
Johnston'sontologicalconcernwithstrongemergencealongthelinesofsubstance/subjectormatter/mindprovidesthemostimportantsingularpointdividinghisconceptionfromthatoftheenactivists.ForThompson's"mindinlife"perspective,cognitionisthedirectionofanorganisminitscoconstitutedworld.Herethequestionisnotemergenceofmindfrommatter,but,sincecognitionandlifearecoextensive,theoriginoflife(Thompson2007:214218).Andthatbringsasingularpointontheothersideofenactivism's"biologicalpanpsychism,"thatofvariousformsofstrongpanpsychismorbetter,pansentiencewithoutthe"biological"modifier(Protevi2011).
ForThompsonthevocabularyofmindandmatterbringsoutabadlyposedproblem.Forhim,it'snotmindand(mindless)body,butthe"twobodyproblem"ofthelivingandlivedbody:
Theredoesnotseemtobeanyexplanatorygapinthetransitionfromseeingthebodyasaphysicalobjecttoseeingitinitsstructuralmorphologyasalivingbody.Buttheredoesseemtobeagapordiscontinuityinthemovementfromseeingthebodyasalivingbodytoseeingitasalivedbody,asalocusoffeelingandintentionalactivityinshortassentient....WehavehadtojettisonthetraditionalCartesianvocabularyofmentalversusphysicalentitiesandproperties.Thelivedbodyisthelivingbodyitisadynamicconditionofthelivingbody.Wecouldsaythatourlivedbodyisaperformanceofourlivingbody,somethingourbodyenactsinliving.(Thompson2007:23637emphasisinoriginal)
Andwiththe"twobodyproblem"wecanreturnagaintothesingularpointbetweenstrongandweakemergence(andnotthatbetweenstrongemergenceandepiphenomenalism).Johnstonacknowledgesthatthescientistsheenliststhroughout(e.g.,MaturanaandVarelaat30607seealsoDeaconandDamasioat5661)arenonreductive,nondeterministnaturalists(30001),butheneverdrawstheconclusionthatthisiscompatiblewithnay,morecongruentwithweakemergenceratherthanstrongemergence.Johnstonwritesofthe"EarliestSystemProgramofGermanIdealism"thatitsauthoris,withregardtomoralbeings,
raisingthequestionofhowtoreconceptualizeontologicalsubstantialitysoastoincorporate,as(still)fullyimmanenttosuchsubstantiality,themorethansubstantialfreesubjects(assentientandsapientautorelatingselfdeterminantnotdirectlydeterminedbyironcladmetaphysicallawsofexternallydictatedefficientcausality,whetherphysicalorbiological)backwithinthisgroundofbeingwhichgaverisetosuchsubjectstobeginwith.(310)
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Thispositionofstrongemergenceisalsocharacterizedasneedinganaturethatis"tornorshatteredtopiecesbycreatingwithinitselftheweirdcognitiveemotionalmotivationalbeingsthatcananddoturnbackuponit(withthesebeingsachievinganautoreflexiveselfdetermination"(307).
Itis,however,difficulttoacceptJohnston'scategorizationofMaturanaandVarela(1980,1987),orofVarela,ThompsonandRosch(1991),asstrongemergentistsat307.Withoutbeingabletofullyprovethepointhere(IhaveamorefulldevelopmentofthefollowingnotionsinProtevi2009),itdoesseemtomethatthenotionofautonomyspringingfromthatoforganizationalclosure(thegenerictermwithinwhichautopoiesisisaphysicalinstantiationatleastforVarela)wouldneverbetakenbythemtomeanJohnstonian"selfdeterminingsubjects,"asorganismandworldarealwayscoconstituted.ItistruethatanautonomoussystemintheVareleansenseisonlyperturbedbytheworldwhenconditionsrelativetothesurvivalvaluesofthesystemchange,thusunleashingcharacteristicbehaviorsthatthenbringitbacktohomeostasis,butitcannotactexceptinconditionsof"coupling"withtheworld.Vareleansubjectsareautonomousinhissense,yes,buttheyareneverfullyselfdeterminingtheywouldseemtometobemuchmoreinlinewithatleastsomeofthemarkersofweakemergence(exceptingthe"vital"):"immanentnaturalistvitalmaterialismofaflat,even,anddemocraticfirstnatureofweaklyemergingnotquitesubjects"(314).
Theproblemwithcallingtheenactivistsstrongemergentistsisthatyoucanavoidepiphenomenalistreductionbyweakemergenceaswellasstrong.Therecoursetodynamicsystemstheorybycontemporaryscientists(seetheprcisinThompson2007,41741)allowsareconceptualizationoffinaland/or"downward"causality(Juarrero1999seeDeLanda2002foraDeleuzeanuptake)beyondthatof"ironcladlawsofexternallydictatedefficientcausality"(theepiphenomenalistposition)withoutneedingorevendesiringtogoallthewaytostrongemergenceandits"axiomaticpositingoftherealexistenceoftranscendental,autonomous,andirreduciblefreeagentsofnegativity"(18).Thusafinalsingularpoint:avoidingepiphenomenalismstillleavesaseconddivisionbetweenweakandstrongemergence.
Thesearedifficultandchallengingconcepts,andperhapsthesingularpointofdivergencebetweenstrongandweakemergenceadmitsoffurtherinternaldistinctions(perhapsit'safractalzoneorstrangeattractor,tocontinuewiththemappingmetaphoronelasttime).Butwhateveronemakesoftheimportanceoftheencounterwithenactivism,Johnston'sworkshouldbereadanddiscussedwidely.Icouldnotagreemorewithhimontheneedforcontinentalphilosophytoengagewiththeneurosciencesandlifesciencesattheintersectionofmetaphysics,psychology,andpolitics.Irecommendgrapplingwiththisbook,evenifIhaveindicatedwithsomebriefremarksonenactivismplacesofperhapsmisplacedemphasisoroverlystronginterpretation.
REFERENCES
DeLanda,Manuel.2002.IntensiveScienceandVirtualPhilosophy,London:Continuum.
Juarrero,Alicia.1999.DynamicsinAction:IntentionalBehaviorasaComplexSystem.CambridgeMA:MITPress.
Maturana,Humberto,andVarela,Francisco.1980.AutopoiesisandCognition:TheRealizationoftheLiving.Dordrecht:Riedel.
Maturana,Humberto,andVarela,Francisco.1987.TheTreeofKnowledge:TheBiologicalRootsofHumanUnderstanding.Boston:NewScienceLibrary.
Protevi,John.2009.BeyondAutopoiesis:InflectionsofEmergenceandPoliticsinFranciscoVarela.InEmergenceandEmbodiment:NewEssaysonSecondOrderSystemsTheory,ed.BruceClarkandMarkHansen.DurhamNC:DukeUniversityPress:94112.
Protevi,John.2011.MindinLife,MindinProcess:TowardaNewTranscendentalAestheticandaNewQuestionofPanpsychism.JournalofConsciousnessStudies18,nos56:94116.
Thompson,Evan.2007.MindinLife:Biology,Phenomenology,andtheSciencesoftheMind.CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress.
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Varela,Francisco,Thompson,Evan,andRosch,Eleanor.1991.TheEmbodiedMind:CognitiveScienceandHumanExperience.CambridgeMA:MITPress.
[1]SeetheNDPRreviewofhisearlierProlegomenatoAnyFutureMaterialism,Volume1.
[2]SeethisNDPRreviewoftheircoauthoredbookSelfandEmotionalLifefordetails.
Copyright2015ISSN:15381617CollegeofArtsandLettersNotreDame,IN46556
