Administrative Law Cases Part 1

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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXTThe Lawphil Project - Arellano Law FoundationG.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATIONCO., INC., ET AL.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,vs.PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.

Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.

Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay Transportation Co.

P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez. A. M. Zarate for respondent RaymundoTransportation Co.

Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.

MALCOLM,J.:

The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the ManilaElectric Company, requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as aboard of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportationcompanies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila ElectricCompany and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company bysuch transportation companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No.1446 and to the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as aboard of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is

entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain,and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electriclight, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterlydirection to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Actprovides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other personor corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracksof the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shalluse such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by


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such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members ofthe Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority ofwhom shall be final."

When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it

was ordered that the petitioner be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and the transportation companies affected by the petition. Thereafter, theAttorney-General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings, and opposition wasentered to the petition by a number of public utility operators. On the submissionof memoranda after an oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution.

Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted thatpower is attempted to be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting asa board of arbitrators and to the Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen thatthe decision of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court is made final. Andit is finally observed that the franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by

the Government of the Philippine Islands, although only a contract between theparties to it, is now made to effect the rights of persons not signatories to thecovenant.

The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' ownchoice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitrationagreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted toarbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821of the Civil Code. Citation of authority is hardly necessary, except that it should berecalled that in the Philippines, and in the United States for that matter, it hasbeen held that a clause in a contract, providing that all matters in dispute between

the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to publicpolicy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction (Wahl and Wahl vs. Donaldson,Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301; Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69;Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of Columbia vs. Bailey[1897], 171 U. S., 161.)

We would not be understood as extending the principles governingarbitration and award too far. Unless the arbitration agreement is such asabsolutely to close the doors of the courts against the parties, the courts shouldlook with favor upon such amicable arrangements. We can also perceive adistinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration andagreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a statute enacted for suchpurpose and affecting others than the parties to a particular franchise. Here,however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true that thedecision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced wouldleave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446,without recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of the question indispute.


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Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case ofTallassee Falls Mfg.Co. vs. Commissioner's Court[1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of astate legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county toregulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is notunconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is not the

question before us. Here the question is not one of whether or not there has beena delegation of legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concernsthe legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board ofarbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity.

We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court,sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of theSupreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasijudicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdictiongranted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose theright to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction

would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But ifthis be the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision bythe members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, takentherefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, wherethe Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting asarbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed by the members ofthe Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered asadministrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance ofduties which the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it uponthemselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an apt illustration ofanother anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if

the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not acourt at all.lawphil.net

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the threedivisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power onlywhich is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as theguardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any otherdepartment of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere ofinfluence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the OrganicAct. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required toexercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertainingto or connected with the administering of judicial functions.

The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islandsshall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additionaljurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the OrganicAct speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not onlymean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and


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could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the SupremeCourt, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction betweenthe Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board ofarbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none ofthe jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the

Supreme Court.lawph!l.net

In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:

The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannotbe required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction andpowers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, andbeing all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court toexercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . . Theaward of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgmentpassed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal

sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment wouldbe inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without aremedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter,and without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congressshould at some future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the courtto carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided tothis court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the wholepower that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . .And while it executes firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, thecourt will carefully abstain from exercising any power that is not strictlyjudicial in its character, and which is not clearly confided to it by the

Constitution. . . . (Gordon vs. United States [1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S.,697 Appendix.)

Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Courtholds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide theoperation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that itwould be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as aboard of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on thepetition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the SupremeCourt decline to proceed further in the matter.

Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers,

Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXTThe Lawphil Project - Arellano Law FoundationG.R. No. L-28790 April 29, 1968ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, ET AL.


EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28790 April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner,vs.CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, asExecutive Secretary, respondents.

Leandro Sevilla, Ramon C. Aquino and Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.

Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REYES, J.B.L.,Actg. C.J.:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain theSecretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the Commissionerof Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the ExecutiveSecretary pending investigation.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed,confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created byRepublic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the saidCommissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments andprivileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The appropriationlaws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of saidofficer, use the following expression:

1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges ofdistrict judge P19,000.00.

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner aletter requiring him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why nodisciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving orrecommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the


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original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as heenjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of theCourt of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the samemanner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papersrelative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon

conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule140 of the Rules of Court.

On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by theExecutive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "findingthat aprima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conductprejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipthereof, pending investigation of the above charges."

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentionsadvanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and

abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondentsadmit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner,exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge ofFirst Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers isadministrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge thejudiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidentalto the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle ofthe separation of powers.

Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land

Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of theconferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 andAppropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of FirstInstance.

First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of theJudiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges,specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed fromoffice by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in thejudgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown,that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a memberof the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge ofFirst Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by theSupreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, wouldnecessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executiveofficials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same


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privileges. These favoured officers include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of theDepartment of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General,seven in number (Rep. Act No. 4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No.4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the Securities andExchange Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory,

therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigatingand disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and theconsequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of thePresident's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who arepresidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed under thePresident's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).

Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the SolicitorGeneral, another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter,since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank andprivileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only

removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act,sec. 24, par. 2).

In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by theLegislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges ofJudges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when account is taken ofthe fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations and thoseof the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that they areto be removedfrom office for the same causes and in the same mannerprovided bylaw forJudges of First Instance", or "members of the judiciaryof appellate rank".

The same is true of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103)and of the Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is therebyshown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removalprocedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers,provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, ifthe Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges"or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to beinvestigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only uponrecommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would beunconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation ofpowers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisorycontrol over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the controlof the Chief Executive over such officials.

Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y.401, 160 N. E. 655), saying:


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There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge thejudiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidentalto the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General

Electric Co., et al., 281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972,

But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character,whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into being bythe judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power onlyand can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies fallingwithin the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisionswhich are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exerciseof functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v.Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct.Rep. 445) and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co.

supra (272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); LibertyWarehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct.Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed.880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal Radio Commission v. GeneralElectric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)

In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and itsmembers should notand cannotbe required to exercise any power or to performany trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with theadministration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to

arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila ElectricCo. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600).1wph1.t

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executiveofficials by claiming that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowedwith judicial functions. The section invoked runs as follows:

Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step tobe taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage,or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any partyin interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to anysuch matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of LandRegistration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, statingthe question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writingby the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, afterconsideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and incase of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter


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an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. Hisdecision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers ofDeeds: Provided, further, That, when a party in interest disagrees with theruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a questionof law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty

days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.

Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consultaby a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrativeprocess. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision ofthe Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon allRegisters of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation1 in effectidentifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of anyother bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone.That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they arenot administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the

corresponding department head.

But even granting that the resolution ofconsultas by the Register of Deeds shouldconstitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of thepowers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No.1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution ofconsultas are but aminimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merelyincidental to the latter.

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutesshould be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict

with the Constitution,2 We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those ofa Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended toinclude, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to besuspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise,the said grant of privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null andvoid. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the aforenamedCommissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260)are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, andthe petition is ordered dismissed. No costs.

Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,

concur.

1wph1.t Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes


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1That did not exist when formerly consultas were resolved by the fourthbranch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. (Cf. Adm. Code. sec. 200).

2Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634; People vs. Zeta, 98 Phil. 147; Alba vs.Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683.


PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXTThe Lawphil Project - Arellano Law FoundationA.M. No. 198-J May 31, 1971PAZ M. GARCIA vs. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.


EN BANC

A.M. No. 198-J May 31, 1971

PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant,vs.HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

BARREDO,J.:

Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable CatalinoMacaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, nowUndersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violationof his oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or theJudiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed(allegedly) as follows:


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2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, as suchincumbent Judge, respondent herein, has not submitted his monthly reportscontaining the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or resolved,the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to overthree months, together with the title, number, number of hours of court

session held a day, etc., as evidenced by the certificate issued by Hon. EulalioD. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice, copy of which is heretoattached as Annex "A", Item No. 1, in violation of Circular No. 10 of the Dept.of Justice dated February 6, 1952, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex"B";

3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form No.86, Revised 1966) from July to December, 1970 and from January toFebruary, 1971 inclusive as evidenced by the certificate issued by JudgePichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex "A", Item No. 2thereof;

4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Lagunaand San Pablo and knowing fully well that he has never performed his officialduties or discharged the duties appertaining to his office, he has collectedand was paid his salaries from July to December, 1970 and from January toFebruary 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the cashier Mrs.Santos of the Department of Justice hereto attached as Annex "C" and thecertificate of Mr. Pichay Annex "A", last paragraph thereof, aggravated by hisrepeated failure to submit the certificate of service in flagrant violation ofaction 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which provides as follows:

... District judges, judges of City Courts, and municipal Judgesshall certify on their application for leave, and upon salaryvouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the payrollsupon which their salaries are paid, that all special proceedings,applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal caseswhich have been under submission for decision ordetermination for a period of ninety days or more have beendetermined and decided on or before the date of making thecertificate and ... no salary shall be paid without such certificate'(Emphasis supplied).

5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports from July toDecember, 1970 and from January, 1971 to February, 1971 stating thereinthe number of hours of session that the Court holds daily, theaccomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a District Judge ofthe Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo, Branch VI he has


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manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness to perform ordischarge official duties in the administration of justice.

7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the Honorable Secretaryof Justice informing him that he was entering upon the performance of his

duties, which letter of his reads in full:

'I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon theperformance of the duties of the office of Judge of the Court ofFirst Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City (Branch VI) today,June 29, 1970.'

That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate falsehood aggravateshis moral bankruptcy incompatible to the requirements of the highest degreeof honesty, integrity and good moral character appertaining to holding theposition of Judge in the administration of justice.

Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer alleging pertinently that:

THE FACTS

Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Lagunaand San Pablo City with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, beingone of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch.After consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna, themunicipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice, respondent decidedto accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space

for the courtroom and offices of the court; to utilize the financial assistancepromised by the Laguna provincial government for the purchase of thenecessary supplies and materials; and to rely on the national government forthe equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, all these items must be furnished by the provincialgovernment. The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed therespondent that the province was not in a position to do so).

As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calambaassured the respondent that the court could be accommodated in the westwing of the Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of the municipal

treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location. When theprojected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office was about to beeffected, the treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. Themunicipal mayor then requested the respondent to look over some of theoffice spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment that the municipalgovernment will shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's firstchoice was the second floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but thenegotiations failed when the owner of the building refused to reduce the rent


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to P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by respondent was thesecond floor of the Laguna Development Bank. After a month's negotiations,the municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the owner on October26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal government couldrelease the amount necessary for the improvements to convert the space that

was rented, which was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom andoffices for the personnel of the court and for the assistant provincial fiscal.Thereafter, upon respondent's representations, the provincial governmentappropriated the amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies andmaterials needed by the court. Early in December, 1970 respondent alsoplaced his order for the necessary equipment with the Property Officer of theDepartment of Justice but, unfortunately, the appropriation for theequipment of courts of first instance was released only on December 23,1970 and the procurement of the equipment chargeable against thisallotment is still under way (please see enclosed certification of the FinancialOfficer of the Department of Justice marked Annex "A").

"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually presideover his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in theDepartment of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extendedleave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximumten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed uponrespondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formaldetail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

"Charges Have No Basis -- .

"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, graveincompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act.

"It is respectfully submitted that -- .

"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstancesmentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was like every lawyerwho gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and ridhimself of the stigma of being 'a judge without a sala', but forces and circumstances beyondhis control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.

"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty becauseaside from the time, effort and money he spent in organizing the CFI at Calamba, he workedin the Department of Justice (please see enclosed certification of Undersecretary of JusticeGuillermo S. Santos marked Annex 'B'). Indeed, even if respondent did no more than exertefforts to organize his court, he could, as other judges have done, have collected his salariesas judge without being guilty of dishonesty.


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"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position then carried asalary of P19,000 per annum, he automatically ceased to be Chief of the Technical Staff ofthe Department of Justice and Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, positions fromwhich he was receiving P16,200 and P8,000 per annum, respectively. Also, in anticipationof the judicial duties which he was about to assume, respondent took a leave of absence

from his professorial lecturer's duties in the U.P. College of Law where he was receivingapproximately P600 a month.

"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 ofthe Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicialduties.

"The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not actually started, toperform their judicial duties to comply with the abovementioned statutory-provisions andcircular (please see enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, JudicialSuperintendent, marked Annex 'C').

"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the folly of requiring ajudge who has not entered into the Performance of his judicial duties to comply with them.Taking Section 5, how could a judge who has not started to discharge his judicial dutiescertify that 'all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil andcriminal cases, which have been under submission for decision or determination for aperiod of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date ofmaking the certificate.' And bow could such a judge hold court in his place of permanentstation as required by Section 55; observe the hours of daily sessions of the court asprescribed by Section 58; and render the reports required by Circular No. 10 when hiscourt is not yet in physical existence Clearly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the

Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge." .

In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in their respectivecomplaint and answer and considering, in the light thereof, that the material facts are moreor less undisputed, the Court feels that this case can be disposed of without any furtherproceeding.

After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must bedismissed. To begin with, We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations forthe respondent complained of. As We see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant hasattempted to portray it. Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received

salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he took his oath upto the filing of the complaint. In the sense that respondent has not yet performed anyjudicial function, it may be admitted that respondent has not really performed the duties ofjudge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming thisposition as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in theextreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, whilepreparing himself for his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he hadplanned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the


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idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way possible which would not, it mustbe presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, thegovernment officials or officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place andfacilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide himtherewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to personally

work for early action on the part of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in hisspare time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary,what with his vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen years, is, far from beingdishonesty, to his credit. In the circumstances, it was certainly not improper that herendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, whilebeing unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on, his part. As towhether or not in doing so he, placed in jeopardy the independence of the judiciary andfailed to act according to the correct norm of conduct which a judge should observe vis-a-vis service to the other departments of the government will be discussed a non. At thisjuncture, the only point We settle is that complainant's theory of dishonesty cannot holdwater.

Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports ofaccomplishments and status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges underexisting laws as well as the corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice. Thereason is simple. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of thoselaws and circulars apply to him for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holdingtrials and hearings and making decisions and others. On the other hand, respondent Couldnot be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid confirmed appointment in hisfavor. In other words, he simply made himself available for the purpose for which he wasappointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointedwas not of his making. The other officials in charge of providing him therewith seem to

have been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to have it read. Conceivably,under the law, with the permission of this Court, respondent could have been assigned toanother court pending all these preparations, but that is something within the initiativecontrol of the Secretary of Justice and nor of the respondent.

Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at thepractice of long standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice toassist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercisingadministrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and whathe may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the othergreat departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed,

least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate ofthe people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivatedby good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages andthe necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited onlyby the specific constitutional precepts a check and balance between and among them, havelong been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passinggovernmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciaryunder our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge or even the lowest


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court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matterssubmitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approvaland, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than theCourt of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feelsvery strongly that, it is best that this practice is discontinued.

WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed. Let a copy of thisresolution be furnished the Secretary of Justice.

Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Castro and Teekankee, JJ., took no part.

Fernando, J., concurs fully and in addition submits a brief separate opinion. Makasiar, J.,concurs with the opinion Mr. Justice Fernando.

FERNANDO, J., concurring: .

I join the rest of my brethren in yielding concurrence to the ably-written opinion of JusticeBarredo. Respondent Judge clearly should be exculpated of the charge filed against him.What is more the opinion of the Court possesses the merit of setting forth in forthright andunequivocal language the disapproval of the practice hitherto followed of having membersof the judiciary perform non-judicial functions. There is no doubt to my mind of itsrepugnancy to the fundamental concept of separation of power. It is to that aspect of thequestion as well as what, to my mind, is the doubtful constitutionality of allowing theSecretary of Justice to exercise supervisory authority over lower court judges that this briefconcurring opinion addresses itself.

1. The doctrine of separation of powers, a basic concept under our Constitution, 1 embodiesthe principle of a tripartite division of governmental authority entrusted to Congress, thePresident, and the Supreme Court as well as such inferior courts as may be created by law.Three departments of government are thus provided for, the legislative vested with thelawmaking function, the executive with the enforcement of what has been thus enacted,and the judiciary with the administration of justice, deciding cases according to law. 2 Thereason for such a doctrine is to assure liberty, no one branch being enabled to arrogateunto itself the whole power to govern and thus in a position to impose its unfettered will. Ifit were so, the rights of the individual could with impunity be disregarded; he could beplaced at its mercy. The three departments are coordinate and co-equal, each having

exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and supreme in its own sphere. Thatis to guarantee independence, no interference being allowed on matters left to theexclusive concern of each. Much less is control by only one of the three departments of anyor both of the others permissible. 3 .

It is to be admitted that the realities of government preclude the independence of each ofthe departments from the other being absolute. This is so especially as between thelegislative and executive departments. What the former enacts, the latter implements. To


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paraphrase Roosevelt, the letter of the Constitution requires a separation, but the impulseof a common purpose compels cooperation. It could be carried to the extent of such powersbeing blended, without undue danger to liberty as proved by countries having theparliamentary forms of government. This is especially so in England and in Switzerland,where the tradition of freedom possesses strength and durability. It does not admit of

doubt, however, that of the three branches, the judiciary is entrusted with a function themost sensitive and delicate. It passes upon controversies and disputes not only betweencitizens but between citizens and government, the limits of whose authority must berespected. In a system like ours, every exercise of governmental competence, whethercoming from the President or from the lowest official, may be challenged in court in anappropriate legal proceeding. This is an aspect of the theory of cheeks and balance likewiseprovided for in the Constitution. 4 It is thus indispensable that judicial independenceshould, by all means, be made secure. Not only that. The feeling that judges are not in anyway subject to the influence of the executive and legislative branches must be pervasive;otherwise, there would be loss of confidence in the administration of justice. With thatgone, the rule of law is placed in dire peril.

Nor is the force, to my mind, of the preceeding observation blunted by the recognition thatthere could be no precise delineation of the respective competence alloted the legislative,the executive and the judicial departments under the Constitution. Necessarily, overlappingand interlacing of functions could not entirely be avoided. For as observed by JusticeHolmes in his famous dissent in a case of Philippine origin, "The great ordinances of theConstitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific ofthem are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to theother... When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that theymust be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on." 6 Further on,he added: "It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by

veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative andexecutive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertightcompartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, orthat the Constitution requires." 7 .

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced withpedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrine application, itcannot justify a member of the judiciary being requited to assume a position or perform aduty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plaindeparture from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only ahigher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a

subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable thatthere be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined tothe task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance ofrespect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

It is opposite to quote from an opinion of Justice Cardozo, as Chief Judge of "the New YorkCourt of Appeals," when that Court nullified a section of a New York statute that would vestin a justice of its Supreme Court the power to investigate at the instance of its governor. His


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opinion explained why: "He is made the delegate Of the Governor in aid of an executive act,the removal of a public officer... At the word of command he is give over the work ofjudging, and set himself to other work, the work of probing and advising. His findings whenmade will have none of the authority of a judgment. To borrow Bacon's phrase, they willnot 'give the rule or sentence.' They will not be preliminary or ancillary to any rule or

sentence to be pronounced by the judiciary in any of its branches. They will be mere adviceto the Governor, who may adopt them, or modify them, or reject them altogether. From thebeginnings of our history, the Principle has been enforced that there is no inherent powerin Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions exceptwhen reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties... The exigencies ofgovernment have made it necessary to relax as merely doctrinaire adherence to a principleso flexible and practical, so largely a matter of sensible approximation, as that of theseparation of powers. Elasticity has not meant that what is of the essence of the judicialfunction may be destroyed by turning the power to decide into a pallid opportunity toconsult and recommend ..." 9.

Our holding today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee," 10 a 1968 decision,Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who penned the opinion, first referred to the above Richardson decisionas well as to Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co.",. It went on to state: "In thisspirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members shouldnot and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume anyduty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a lawrequiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronouncedvoid in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600)." 12 It is clear fromthe above Noblejas decision that even prior to the motion there was a commitment to theprinciple that a member of the judiciary cannot be asked non-judicial functions. For inManila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 13 mentioned therein, Justice Malcolm ,

speaking for this Court, was quite explicit. Thus Supreme Court and its members cannot berequired to exercise any power any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to orconnected with the administering of judicial functions." 14 .

3. Nonetheless, as now decided, respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any wiseaccountable. No taint of bad faith can be attached to his conduct. What he was required todo was in accordance with the practice herefore followed by the Department of Justice. Heis, under the statute in force, under the administrative supervision of its head. Nor can thegood faith of Secretary of Justice Abad Santos be impugned. What was done by him waslikewise in accordance with what previous secretaries of justice were accustomed to do.The root of the evil then is the statutory authority of the Department of Justice over Court

of first instance and other inferior courts.15 While a distinction could be made between theperformance of judicial functions which in no way could be interfered with by theDepartment and the task of administration which is executive in character, still theconferment of such competence to a department head, an alter ego of the President, is, tomy mind, only unwise but of doubtful constitutionality. For in issuing administrative rulesand regulations over matters deemed non-judicial, they may trench upon the discretion ofjudges which should be exercised according to their conscience alone. What is more, theinfluence that the Secretary has over them, is magnified. It is already unavoidable under


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our scheme of government that they court his goodwill; their promotion may at timesdepend on it. With this grant of authority, the assertion of independence becomes evenmore difficult. It is thus objectionable in principle and pernicious in operation. Thatcertainly is not the way to reduce to the minimum any participation of the executive injudicial affairs arising from the power to appoint. As it is, even when the government as the

adverse party in criminal cases, tax suits, and other litigations is in the right, a favorabledecision from the lower courts could be looked upon with suspicion. The judiciary must notonly be independent; it must appear to be so.

The presence in the statute books of such power of administrative oversight then, is, to mymind, anomalous. More specifically, were it not for such power granted the departmenthead, respondent Judge in this case could not have been called upon to assist the Secretaryof Justice. Considering that the Constitutional Convention is about to meet, it is to be hopedthat it be made clear that the judiciary is to be totally freed from any supervisory authorityof an executive department.

1 Cf. "The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government."Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936) per Laurel, J.

2 Law covers not only statutes but likewise, treaties, executive orders to implementstatutes, and ordinances, municipal corporations being delegated with the competence oflegislating over local affairs.

3 Cf. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Social Security Commission, L-26175, July 31, 1970, 34SCRA 178.

4 As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the previously cited Angara decision, the President

may approve or disapprove legislation, his veto however being subject to be overriden; hemay convene the legislative body in special sessions. Congress may confirm or rejectPresidential appointments; it may apportion the jurisdiction of the courts and determinewhat funds to appropriate for their support; it may impeach certain officials; and lastly asfar as the judiciary is concerned, it has the power of judicial review enabling it to annulexecutive or legislative acts.

5 Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 US 189 (1928).

6 Ibid., pp. 209-210..

7 Ibid., p. 211.

8 In re Richardson, 160 NE 655 (1928).

9 Cf. Hayburns Case, 2 Dall 409 (1792); United States v. Ferreira 13 How. 40 (1851);Gordon v. United States, 117 US 697 (1865); Matter of Sanborn 148 US 222b (1893);Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 US 447 (1894); Muskrat v. United states,


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219 US 346 (1911); Tutun v. United States, 270 US 738 (1926); Liberty Warehouse Co. v.Grannis 273 US 70 (1927).

10 L-28790, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 405.

11 281 US 469 (1930).

12 Noblejas v. Teehankee, L-28790, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 405, 409-410.

13 57 Phil. 600 (1932).

14 Ibid., p. 605.

15 Section 83, Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, reads as follows: Bureaus andoffices under the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice shall have executivesupervision over the Office of the Solicitor General, the Courts of First Instance and the

Inferior Courts, the Public Service Commission, the Bureau of Prisons, the General LandRegistration Office, the Court of Industrial Relations, the National Bureau of Investigation,the Bureau of Immigration, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the Deportation Board andthe Code Commission. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel shall be mergedwith the Office of the SolicitorGeneral..."________________________________________________________________________________


PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXTThe Lawphil Project - Arellano Law FoundationA.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988RODOLFO U. MANZANO


EN BANC

A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOSNORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.


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PADILLA,J.:

On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte,Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:

Hon. Marcelo FernanChief Justice of the Supreme Courtof the PhilippinesManila

Thru channels: Hon. Leo MedialdeaCourt AdministratorSupreme Court of the Philippines

Sir:

By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the HonorableProvincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designatedas a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice createdpursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, asamended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance withExecutive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norteissued my appointment as a member of the Committee. For your readyreference, I am enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.

Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the

powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) ProvincialCommittee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by theHonorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:

(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to asassume and discharge the powers and duties attached to thesaid position;

(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neitherviolative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation ofSection 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section

.7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in anyway amount to an abandonment of my present position asExecutive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, FirstJudicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and

(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part ofthe primary functions of an Executive Judge.


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May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.

Very respectfully yours,

(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO

Judge

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/CityCommittees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion andimproving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final orjudge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of hisduties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believedprejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrativefunctions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control overthe conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rulesand regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolvedupon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit IntegratedArrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978,Blacks Law Dictionary).

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it isprovided that

Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall beunder the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishmentreports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established bylaw shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrativefunctions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committeeon Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of theConstitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs.Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:


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2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to beenforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of governmentprecluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of thejudiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicialin character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain

departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is todecide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can passon his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official,however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to therigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task ofadjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than themaintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monasticinsensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. Asincumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and

performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. Aspublic officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members ofProvincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to saidCommittees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only whensuch assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,

concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J., dissenting:

The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agencyperforming quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII,Constitution.).

Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judgescan confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency whichadjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its


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jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar asadministrative functions are concerned.

"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery ofgovernment and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the

management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administerthe laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, ofsupervision or control.

Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and controlover the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and thepromulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of thelegislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by theorganic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring

Services Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black's LawDictionary. )

we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice wouldnot involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neitherwill the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a memberof the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justiceas long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition ofcases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools theexpertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may

be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer theparticular function involved in their implementation.

We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. Theadministration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges,Fiscals, Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriersagainst one another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessaryand impractical barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution forsuch a quixotic and unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we shouldnot be monastically insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating onpossible solutions to our common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding their

findings to the people, public or private, where these findings would do the most good.

The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of theCommittees on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers?Advisers? Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by theConstitution or is it participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot becomemembers, why should they be allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees Theline drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.


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The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activitieswhich may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problemsinvolving the administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions donot in any way involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislativefunctions or into matters which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of

the other departments into judicial affairs.

As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge shouldnot shy away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and properperformance of his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannotstop mingling in civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committeeson Justice will also be immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups.The work of the Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges theofficials most concerned with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertakingbecause of a strained interpretation of their functions.

It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when itinterprets provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit theexercise of our jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basicprinciples of constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define orcircumscribe our powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the otherdependents of government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction whichimpairs its own efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing timesand conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this caseconstitutionalprovisions are interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.

I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA,J., dissenting:

I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIIIof the 1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.

What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, forexample, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR.Those are full-time positions involving running the affairs of government, which will

interfere with the discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from theperformance of his regular functions.

The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency ofgovernment. It is a study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership bymembers of the Bench in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions oftheir position.


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The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326amending E.O. No. 856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined toCommittee work and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functionsperse.

Manzano to become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J., dissenting:

The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agencyperforming quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Article VIII,Constitution.).

Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judgescan confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency whichadjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within itsjurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar asadministrative functions are concerned.

"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery ofgovernment and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to themanagement actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administerthe laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of

supervision or control.

Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and controlover the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and thepromulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of thelegislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by theorganic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and StevedoringServices Inc. v. Tapucar, S.P-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black's LawDictionary. )

we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice wouldnot involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neitherwill the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a memberof the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justiceas long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition ofcases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the


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expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which maybe adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer theparticular function involved in their implementation.

We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The

administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges,Fiscals, Police, Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting water-tight barriersagainst one another and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessaryand impractical barriers into one another's work, all the while blaming the Constitution forsuch a quixotic and unreal interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we shouldnot be monastically insensible or indifferent to projects or movements cogitating onpossible solutions to our common problems of justice and afterwards forwarding theirfindings to the people, public or private, where these findings would do the most good.

The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of theCommittees on Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers?

Advisers? Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by theConstitution or is it participation in the prohibited functions? If judges cannot becomemembers, why should they be allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees Theline drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.

The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activitieswhich may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problemsinvolving the administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions donot in any way involve the encroachment of. the judiciary into executive or legislativefunctions or into matters which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment ofthe other departments into judicial affairs.

As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge shouldnot shy away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and properperformance of his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannotstop mingling in civic intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committeeson Justice will also be immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups.The work of the Committees is quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges theofficials most concerned with justice have hesitated to join in such a worthy undertakingbecause of a strained interpretation of their functions.

It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it

interprets provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimit theexercise of our jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basicprinciples of constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define orcircumscribe our powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the otherdependents of government. The Court should not adopt a strained construction whichimpairs its own efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing timesand conditions of society. The familiar quotation is apt in this caseconstitutionalprovisions are interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.


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I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzanoto become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa and Grio-Aquino, JJ., join in Gutierrez dissent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA,J., dissenting:

I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIIIof the 1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.

What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, forexample, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR.Those are full-time positions involving running the affairs of government, which willinterfere with the discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from theperformance of his regular functions.

The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency ofgovernment. It is a study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership bymembers of the Bench in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions oftheir position.

The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under E.O. No. 326amending E.O. No. 856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined toCommittee work and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functionsperse.


PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXTThe Lawphil Project - Arellano Law FoundationG.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982EUGENIO J. PUYAT vs. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982


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EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT,JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,vs.HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities &Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO,

MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.FERNANDEZ, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:

This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against theOrder of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No.1747.

A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and allegationsare being given and made:

a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe IndustriesCorporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the followingwere elected as Directors:

Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. AceroErwin L. Chiongbian R. G. VildziusEdgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo

Antonio G. Puyat Servillano DolinaJaime R. Blanco Juanito MercadoRafael R. Recto

Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the AceroGroup. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management ofIPI.

b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) quo warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioningthe election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were

not properly counted.

c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties withrespondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a memberof the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondentAcero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII,of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear ascounsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body.


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Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The citedConstitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue hisappearance for respondent Acero.

d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:

(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchasedfrom Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 uponrequest of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.

(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and wassought to be registered on said date.

(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of AssemblymanFernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Interventionin the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in

the matter in litigation.

e)July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez'ownership of the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitatedthe instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.

f)July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal(Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior De Maas andrespondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in theIPI to respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared ascounsel for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could

not appear as counsel in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in suchsituation the Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."

On September 4, 1979, the Courten banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoiningrespondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor,of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand ofthe latter in allowing intervention. The Courten banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved toconsider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.

The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a thenstockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII ofthe Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:

SEC. 11.

No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before anycourt without appellate jurisdiction.


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before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or anysubdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,

or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government isaccused of an offense committed in relation to his office,

or before any administrative body.

Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in anycontract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by theGovernment, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, includingany government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office.

He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where hemay be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case,Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before anadministrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.

Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot besaid to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another,although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance couldtheoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect ofthe matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents whohave their respective capable and respected counsel.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of AssemblymanFernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI,representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after thefact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979,after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day beforethe scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more,before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel forrespondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing,perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground oflegal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed beforethe Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior,

co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.

Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been anindirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, thatis a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was anafterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. Tobelieve the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as


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Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. Hewould still appear as counsel indirectly.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective.All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a

minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings.That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by ageneral legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedlyprohibited. 3

In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 fallswithin the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of theconstitutional prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, orany number of stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy before the

SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary inthis case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandezleave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporaryRestraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, DeCastro, Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Barredo, J., I reserve my vote.

Footnotes

1 p. 23, Rollo.

2 p. 6, Ibid.

3 Am. Digest, 2d Dicennial Ed., Vol. 5, citing Atkinson vs. Board, etc., 108 P.1046.


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EN BANC

G.R. No. 109113 January 25, 1995

CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE

SYSTEM (MWSS), petitioners,vs.HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINELARGE DIAMETER PRESSURE PIPE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (PLDPPMA),respondents.

VITUG,J.:

The Ombudsman, in its 19th October 1992 Order, 1directed the Board of Trustees ofMetropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System ("MWSS") (a) to set aside therecommendation of its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee for ConstructionServices and Technical Equipment ("PBAC-CSTE") that Contract No. APM-01 be given to acontractor offering fiberglass pipes and (b) to instead award the contract to a complyingand responsive bidder pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1594. 2Thesubsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman in its Order 01March 1993.

These two Orders are now sought to be annulled in this petition for certiorari, with prayerfor preliminary injunction

Administrative Law Cases Part 1

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