Administrative Issues
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Transcript of Administrative Issues
Administrative Issues
Response to Feedback
More cases Cases coming up
GE vs. Westinghouse Bitter Competition African Communications Group Raytheon
Lead time for ordering HBS cases such that we can’t add HBS cases at this point.
Will try to add some “mini-cases.” Also some philosophy here about value of deductive vs.
inductive learning for business. Will post questions about HBS & other cases (as did with
GE vs. Westinghouse).
Feedback continued … More student participation
Okay, but two-way street – you have to talk up, ask questions, point out connections, etc.
Give more explanation and guidance about CSG Will talk about in a moment
Give some guidance about the final exam Final will consist of
Short problems to test understanding of theoretical ideas (1/3 roughly)
Short answer questions about aspects of strategic situations (1/3 roughly)
A case analysis (1/3 roughly) I have posted some examples of the type of questions I’ve asked
previously on the course web site (“Exam questions from old exam …”).
Some Things that are Tricky
Be more clear when assignments are due … but best laid plans:
Confusion over when case reader would be ready Technical problem with CSG Stochastic elements in pacing of course
Switch to Catalyst Never used it Will look into it this weekend … but no promises.
One Thing I Won’t Do Distribute printed handouts & lecture notes
Not clear there’s sufficient demand and not clear demand for what.
Expensive (even at 6 slides/page, double sided, talking 720 pages per lecture on average).
Logistically a pain: Dear Haas Community,
Unfortunately, BOTH Xerox digital copier / printers (rooms F-580 & S-545) are presently DOWN. Please do not send print jobs to either machine until further notice. Service is pending. I apologize for the inconvenience.
Yours truly,Kurt, the Copy Guy
Fails the market test
CSG
Grading Dependent on how you do given your situation. Based on your strategy memorandum
It’s intended to be experiential learning I “want” mistakes to happen because through their
analysis we learn Remember Carter Racing – you don’t learn a lot
looking at just your successes Clarification
You produce to order
Avoiding the Bertrand Trap II: Cooperation
How do Coke & Pepsi Make Money? Coke and Pepsi sell essentially
undifferentiated products Prices are widely known, often advertised There are no consumer switching costs No evidence of serious limits on capacity No evidence of cost advantages
Coke and Pepsi Recognize Repeated Interaction Suppose Coke forbears cutting price today
because it knows Pepsi will follow suit tomorrow.
Suppose Pepsi forbears cutting price today because it knows Coke will follow suit tomorrow.
Tradeoff for Coke or Pepsi is forgoing a larger market share today in order to avoid the Bertrand trap tomorrow.
Method 6: Exploit Repeated Play If firms play repeatedly, then can use
repeated play to sustain a form of cooperation on price known as tacit collusion
No firm cheats (undercuts rivals) because this will trigger a price war in the future (e.g., reversion to Bertrand competition).
To Cheat or Not to Cheat:That is the Question
PDV of profits PDV of profits
time time1
Cheat(undercut)
Cooperate(tacitly collude)
Looking Looking justjust at today: at today:
Profits from just undercutting rivals
and capturing entire market.
Profits from matching rivals at
monopoly price but sharing market.
To Cheat or Not to Cheat:That is the Question
PDV of profits PDV of profits
time time1
Cheat(undercut)
Cooperate(tacitly collude)
Now take into account Now take into account the the future!future!
To Cheat or Not to Cheat:That is the Question
PDV of profits PDV of profits
time time1
Cheat(undercut)
Cooperate(tacitly collude)
Benefit today But Bertrand
trap forever after.
Smaller benefits today (because split market). But positive benefits in future.
To Cheat or Not to Cheat:More Firms
PDV of profits PDV of profits
time time1
Cheat(undercut)
Cooperate(tacitly collude)
To Cheat or Not to Cheat:Higher Interest Rate
PDV of profits PDV of profits
time time1
Cheat(undercut)
Cooperate(tacitly collude)
Tacit Collusion
Tacit collusion is easier to sustain when fewer firms (four or fewer if excess capacity) interest rate low
To Cheat or Not to Cheat:Dying Industry
Expected PDV of profits Expected PDV of profits
time time1
Cheat(undercut)
Cooperate(tacitly collude)
Dying Industries
In fact, if “death date” known with certainty, then cooperation generally not sustainable at all.
Backwards induction: In last period there is no future period, so no
punishment to deter cheating in last period. Hence cheating (Bertrand) in last period
But then same is true of penultimate period and so on back to first period.
General Phenomenon
Firm going bankrupt not paid by other firms that owe it money.
Management problems when boss announces she’s leaving.
Basically don’t let others know the end is coming.
The Issue with Detection
PDV of profits PDV of profits
time time1
Cheat(undercut)
Cooperate(tacitly collude)
2
Detectionoccurs
The Issue with Detection:Stochastic Discovery (Demand Fluctuation)
PDV of profits PDV of profits
time time1
Cheat(undercut)
Cooperate(tacitly collude)
Detectionoccurs
Possibly lost tomistaken price
war
When Demand Fluctuates
Play trigger strategies Sometimes to avoid temptation, firms don’t charge
maximum price during high-demand periods Evidence that gasoline refiners don’t charge maximum
price during summer, the high-demand season. If too much (unpredictable) variability in demand,
then would have price wars too often. Hence, value of tacitly colluding is reduced. Relative cost of cheating today is reduced. So difficult or impossible to sustain tacit collusion.
Making Tacit Collusion Work
Incentive to cut price?
Tacit collusion not an issue
no
yes
Easy to detect price
cuts? Tacit collusion will fail & the firms risk finding them-selves in the Bertrand trap
no
no
no
Firms willing to punish?
Can serious punishments be
inflicted?
yes
yes
yes
Tacit collusion is sustainable in equilibrium
Electronic Components Distribution Industry How do we assess the potential for tacit
collusion in the electronic components distribution industry?
Making Tacit Collusion WorkElectronic Components Distribution Industry
Incentive to cut price?
Tacit collusion not an issue
no
yes
Easy to detect price
cuts? Tacit collusion will fail & the firms risk finding them-selves in the Bertrand trap
no
no
no
Firms willing to punish?
Can serious punishments be
inflicted?
yes
yes
yes
Tacit collusion is sustainable in equilibrium
Making Tacit Collusion WorkAirline Industry
Incentive to cut price?
Tacit collusion not an issue
no
yes
Easy to detect price
cuts? Tacit collusion will fail & the firms risk finding them-selves in the Bertrand trap
no
no
no
Firms willing to punish?
Can serious punishments be
inflicted?
yes
yes
yes
Tacit collusion is sustainable in equilibrium
VSVS..
Exiting a Price War
Need to signal that price war at end without engaging in illegal explicit collusion. American Airlines and the NYT Price leaders
Traditional leaders are GM in automobiles American Airlines in airline industry Tesco is a price leader with respect to Asda and Sainsbury
Public adoption of means for facilitating tacit collusion
Facilitating Tacit Collusion:Improving Detection Firms want to make sure that
cheating is detected promptly cheating is detected accurately
Numerous devices to make this work public posting of prices simplified pricing
e.g., GE and Westinghouse airlines & per-mile pricing
collection & dissemination of prices (some antitrust issues—Maple Flooring Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. United States)
Making Punishments Severe
PDV of profits PDV of profits
time time1
Cheat(undercut)
Cooperate(tacitly collude)
Making Punishments Severe
PDV of profits PDV of profits
time time1
Cheat(undercut)
Cooperate(tacitly collude)
Increase the severity Increase the severity of the punishmentof the punishment
How to Make Severe
Most Favored Nation Clauses MFN: If cut price today, give refund to past
customers. Note: the other guy better adopt this too!
Also contemporaneous MFN: All customers get same price today (makes detection of price cutting easier)
How to Make Willing
Build in “doomsday devices” Dr. Strangelove
Meeting the Competition Clauses (MCC) state that will meet lowest price available
just advertised policy or put into contracts (some antitrust issues)
if rival cuts price, either honor clause (a reputational or contractual obligation) or suffer consequences.
We miss you Stanley
Tacit Collusion on Non-Price Dimensions to Lessen Price Competition When tacit collusion on price would be
difficult, firms can tacitly collude to maintain conditions that lessen price competition
Generally, these are conditions that make one of the assumptions of the Bertrand model fail.
Concept of market discipline.
Tacit Collusion on Non-Price Competition Raising search costs
tacit agreements not to price advertise not locating outlets near each other
Raising switching costs making products incompatible with rivals’ signing customers to long-term contracts Note: As we will see, these can also serve to
deter entry.
Tacit Collusion on Non-price Competition Restrict capacity
Firms can tacitly agree not to expand capacity Note: can be difficult to coordinate
Think about GE vs. Westinghouse Industrial capacitor industry In reverse: lead additive industry
Product Differentiation
Tacitly agree to split market on non-price dimensions location: non-overlapping territories (usually
invites antitrust scrutiny) product space: e.g., split market between high-
end and low-end
Other Dimensions of Tacit Collusion
R&D (Non-price) advertising No poaching
Take-aways GE vs. Westinghouse Price fixing is illegal – you can go to jail for it. Tacit collusion requires
An ability to detect deviation Sufficient punishments
Sometimes need to facilitate tacit collusion By improving ability to detect (e.g., multiplier,
audits) By increasing punishments, including use
“doomsday devices” (e.g., MFN) By serving as a price leader
Conclusions
Recognizing repeated play can allow firms to avoid the Bertrand trap via tacit collusion. Tacit collusion is distinct from explicit collusion or
pricing fixing, which is illegal. Tacit collusion works best when
The number of firms is relatively small. The future is sufficiently important. Detection of undercutting is easy and not too
subject to error.
Conclusions (continued …)
Firms can take steps to facilitate tacit collusion Making prices public Using MFN and MCC clauses to increase
punishment Signal to each other through the press and other
means But be careful: Devices intended to facilitate
tacit collusion can run afoul of the antitrust authorities.
Conclusions (continued …)
The logic of repeated games has many applications in business. Among them … Payments to bankrupt firms Treatment of a leaving supervisor Quality assurance (see reading) Entry deterrence (upcoming)
List of some of the firms and industries mentioned American Airlines Asda Coca-Cola GE Pepsi Sainsbury Tesco Westinghouse
Airline industry Electronic components
distribution industry Industrial capacitor
industry Lead additive industry Maple flooring industry