Administration in the First Decade of Bangladesh Some Observations on Developments and Trends

8/3/2019 Administration in the First Decade of Bangladesh Some Observations on Developments and Trends

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Public Administration in the First Decade of Bangladesh: Some Observations on Developmentsand TrendsAuthor(s): Habib Mohammad ZafarullahReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Apr., 1987), pp. 459-476Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644683 .

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PUBLICADMINISTRATIONNTHEFIRSTDECADEOF BANGLADESHSome Observationson Developmentsand Trends

HabibMohammadZafarullahIn 1981 Bangladesh completed its first decade as anindependent nation. It had been a turbulentperiod characterized by inter-mittent political tremors,recurringeconomic crises, and widespread social

changes. The ramificationsof these multifaceted phenomenahad deep im-pact upon the administrative dimensions of the state with consequent im-plications for the society and its people.The purpose of this article is to analyze the major developments andtrends in public administration that were perceptible during the first dec-ade of independent Bangladesh. First, it looks at developments that oc-curred during the first three years (1972-74) of the parliamentaryregime,and second, it identifies important trends during the remaining years(1975-81) of the decade that saw the operation of presidential systems ofgovernment.

Developments during1972-74The administrative establishment that Bangladesh inherited at indepen-dence exhibited all the cardinal features of colonial bureaucracies. It waselitist in composition, narrow in outlook, insulated from the people, andnonresponsive to the political leadership, as well as corrupt, antiquated,high-handed, and obsessed with the preservation of its status and privi-leges. Its structural-functional limitations precluded it from assumingroles that would best serve the objectivesof an independent polity. Critics

Habib Mohammad Zafarullah is Assistant Professor of PublicAdministration, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.( 1987 by The Regents of the University of California

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460 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 4, APRIL 1987

of the system that operated in Pakistan prior to 19711castigated the bu-reaucrats for ignoring the demands of the changing sociopolitical milieu,assigning perfunctory importance to their duties and responsibilities, andhobnobbing with power politics. Interstitialparticipation was conspicuousby its absence, the bureaucratsplaying the dominant role in the politicalprocess2 with the political institutions either disappearing, lying dormantor, at best, performing under the baton of oligarchs representing thelanded gentry, the military, and the bureaucracy.3 Whatever remnants ofpolitics were present could not exercise restraint over the bureaucracy,which continued to thrive andprosperdespite its many problemsand limi-tations. Institutional and structural rectification could not be facilitated.The bureaucrats,especially the members of the super-elite cadre, the CivilService of Pakistan (CSP), foiled any attempt that was considered a threatto their positions. Thus, all reform efforts in Pakistan between 1947-71failed, largely due to bureaucratic resistance.4

Alienation of the BureaucracyAfter Bangladesh achieved independence, the Awami League (AL) leader-ship made the bureaucracyone of the principal targets for its attacks, de-termined to reduce its powers and privilegesand make it subservientto theruling party's political will. The bureaucrats were frequently referred toby politicians, both government and opposition, in terms of reproach, irri-tation, even contempt. The government's condemnation of the inheritedbureaucracyfound eloquent manifestationin its frantic moves to tame thebureaucrats and bring them under total control. Critics of the bureau-cracy, who believed that public servants should be purely instrumental incarryingout the decisions of the political leadership, saw the commitmentof the Awami Leagueto subdue the bureaucracyas an importantstep. Buttheir initial enthusiasmfaded when it was discoveredthat the intents of theregimewere not honest and had overriding political motives. In the nameof wiping out bureaucratic malfeasance and ensuring responsibility in ads

1. Before 1971 Bangladesh was one of the five provinces of Pakistan. Each of the prov-inces had its own provincial civil services but the centraldepartments were under the supervi-sion of centrally recruited civil servants.2. E. Ahamed, "Dominant Bureaucratic Elites in Pakistan and Bangladesh," Journal ofSocial Studies, No.6, December 1969, pp. 93-119.3. E. Ahamed, "Exclusive Bureaucratic Elites in Pakistan: Their Socio-Economic andRegional Background,"Public Administration(Dhaka), 4:2, December 1979, pp. 57-84.4. For a detailed discussion on bureaucraticresistance to administrativereforms in Paki-stan, see M. M. Khan, Bureaucratic Self-Preservation (Dhaka: Dhaka University Press,1980).


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HABIB MOHAMMAD ZAFARULLAH 461ministration, promotions criteria were ignored, new appointments weremade on irrational bases and dismissals were decided capriciously.5Sympathizersand supportersof the ruling party, and particularlythosewho had fled the country during the 1971 war of liberation and soughtrefuge in India. became the beneficiaries of a peculiar "spoils system."People who had never previously held any public service position werequick to find themselves seated in a government office. Those refugeeswho had served in some capacity in the public service were rewarded withaccelerated promotions and increments whether they were qualifiedor not.Some of the AL adherents with little or no experience in administrationwere placed in responsible positions as important as secretaries of minis-tries, chairmen and directors of public corporations, and ambassadors. Allof these things were done to reward people for their "contribution" to thefreedom struggle. The result was a kind of panic among publicservants ofall ranks and status, particularlythose who had stayed in the country dur-ing the 1971 crisis and kept it together in the face of continuous militaryonslaughts and brutality.An early demonstration of the regime's move to alienate the bureau-cracy was the organizationof the Planning Commission, the foremost staffagency in the government, along lines sharply distinct from the systemthat had operated in Pakistan. There the top planning positions were al-ways reservedfor the CSPs, with the technical specialists occupying infer-ior ranks. In Bangladesh, immediately after independence, the status ofthe planning body was not only elevated, but its ranks were swelled bypeople who did not belong to the recognized cadres of the public service.The chief executive of the Commission, i.e., the deputy chairman, andother members were all reputableeconomists with in-depth understandingof the theories of economic planning, but without any previous experiencein administration.

Formally, the Planning Commission functioned within the Ministry ofPlanning, but in its actual operations it came close to the locus of politicalpower. This preeminent position enraged and humiliated the super-elites.As observed by its first deputy chairman,the Planning Commission "by itsown nature, composition and preferencewas seen as an ally of the politicalleadershipin the dilution of its pre-eminentrole."6 It not only dominatedeconomic planning for the country but also influencedthe political leader-

5. H. M. Zafarullah and M. M. Khan, "Staffingthe Higher Civil Services in Bangladesh:An Analysis of Recruitment and Selection Processes," Public Administration and Develop-ment, 3:2, 1983.

6. N. Islam, DevelopmentPlanning in Bangladesh (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977),p. 54.


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462 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL. XXVII, NO. 4, APRIL 1987ship in its attempt to reorganize the administrative system. It vehementlyopposed the monopoly of the generalist administratorsin the policy-mak-ing and implementing structures and it favoredthe appointment of special-ists in the administrative hierarchy. As might be expected, this embitteredrelations between the Planning Commission and the public service andprecipitated a new kind of infighting within the administration. However,this was not to last long as we shall see later.In the decision-making process, the political elites began to play a domi-neering role. Policies were formulated according to the dictates of SheikhMujibur Rahman (Mujib), the prime minister and leader of the nationalistmovement, who oftentimes did not adhere to the advice of his cabinet col-leagues, let alone the bureaucrats. Predictably, the outcome of these poli-cies churned out by people without past administrativeexperience or theability to comprehend the statics and dynamics of policy-making, provedto be disastrous for the country. Yet, the political leadership in its arro-gance could not respond to the realities and take the senior bureaucratsinto its confidence. These bureaucrats,for all their blemishes, did possessthe experience required to appreciate the complexities of administrationand its processes.

Emergence of BureaucraticFactionsThe "policy" of the government to favor one particular band of people atthe expense of others encouraged within the administrationthe formationof bureaucraticfactions whose objectiveshad nothing to do with adminis-trative performance but with interest articulation. Antagonism and in-trigues among these factions turned the administrative system into anarena of open competition for power and privilege.Three broad and significant groups emerged after independence. Theone that enjoyed the trust and "affection" of the political leadership con-sisted of those people who had served the government-in-exileduring theliberation war in 1971. As mentioned before, they were repaid by the re-gime for their "services"during the war, and they became the chief benefi-ciaries of political patronage. In the second and largest group were thosepublic servants who remained inside the country in 1971 and reluctantlyserved the Pakistani military junta amid continual harassment. The thirdgroup was composed of a large number of Bengali officers who were serv-ing in the western wing of Pakistan before 1971 but opted for Bangladeshwhen the war started, thereby losing their jobs. They remained strandedfor over a year before they were repatriated,and upon returning to theirhomeland they were shocked at the treatment meted out to them. To-gether with those in the second group, they were stigmatized as "collabo-


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HABIB MOHAMMAD ZAFARULLAH 463rators" and placed in positions that were not commensurate with theirbackgroundsand experience. In many cases, they found themselves undersuperiors who did not have even a rudimentary knowledge of administra-tion; many others were either dismissed or retired on one pretext or an-other.

Thus, the bureaucracy was a divided house and the government wasresponsible for creating the cleavages. Instead of integrating the adminis-tration for greater efficiency and effectiveness, the ruling party com-pounded its problems by favoringone group which, with support of strongsegments in the party, exercised enormous influenceon the political leader-ship and relentlessly dominated the other two groups.7

AdministrativeRearrangementsOne of the firstproblemsthat leaders of the new nation encounteredwas toorganize and rearrangethe chaotic administrativesystem. Three formalcategories of public servants were operating the various government de-partments when independence was achieved-the former all-Pakistanservices (the CSP and the Police Service), the formercentral superior serv-ices (Foreign, Audit and Accounts, Taxation, Customs, etc.), and the for-mer provincial services (both general and functional).8 The control andadministrationof the first two categories had been, up to 1971, the respon-sibility of the Establishment Division of the central government of Paki-stan. The Division acted as the central personnel agency of the nationalgovernment and operated directly under the authority of the president.The provincial services had been administeredby the Servicesand GeneralAdministration Department of the provincial government. Obviously, thepublic servants, particularly those in the non-provincial categories, werenow bewildered and without any direction as far as their career manage-ment was concerned. All their personal files were in the possession of theEstablishment Division of the government of Pakistan.Within months of independence the government amalgamated the cen-tral and provincial departments and created an Establishment Divisionwithin the Cabinet Secretariatto oversee the personnel administration ofall categories of public servants. The government also abolished the for-mer central and provincial public service commissions and created twoseparatebodies to oversee recruitment and selection of public servants,oneconcerned with higher rankingand the other with lower ranking positions.

7. M. M. Khan and H. M. Zafarullah, "Public Bureaucracy in Bangladesh," in K. K.Tummala, ed., Administrative Systems Abroad (Washington, D.C.: University Press ofAmerica, 1982), pp. 161-62.

8. Ibid, p. 161.


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464 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 4, APRIL 1987Interestingly, in spite of being accorded constitutionalstatus with the pres-tige and functions of autonomous bodies, the two Public Service Commis-sions were placed in a subordinate position as attached departments of theEstablishment Division, the latter acting "as the fountain-head of all laws,rules, regulations and instructions on personnel matters."9Another early step taken by the Mujib regime was to nationalize largeprivate undertakingsin the industrialand commercial sectors. This policystrove, at least on paper, to make optimum use of all available means ofproduction and to ensure distributive justice in society as far as profit orsurpluses were concerned. Consequently, there occurred many changes inthe structureand function of the existing system with government depart-ments either merged or bifurcated and some entirely new ones created.Public corporationswere establishedto oversee industrial and commercialunits.10

Centralizationof AuthorityThe Awami League, since its inception as a political party and throughoutits existence in Pakistan, had struggled hard to achieve parliamentary de-mocracy. Indeed, Mujib and his closest aides were continually persecutedand victimized for their political views that propounded, among otherthings and above all, unadulterateddemocracy of the Westminister type.11Thus, in Bangladeshthey wasted no time in declaring that the new countrywould adhere to the principles of the parliamentarysystem and adopt aconstitution that evinced the democratic aspirations of the people. Butwhat actually happenedwas a differentstory. The political leaders gradu-ally deviated from their long-cherished beliefs and intents and moved to-ward a system that was a clear perversionof democracy.12 With only thesuperficial appearanceof a parliamentarydemocracy, the political systemin reality was an autocracy with all powers concentrated in the person ofthe prime minister who maintained a strong secretariat to control the en-tire administrative structure. Draconian measures were promulgated

9. M. Ali, "Structure and Function of Central Personnel Agencies in Bangladesh," Paperprepared for APDAC Workshop on New Policies, Developments, and Trends in the CivilService of Asian Countries, Singapore, 1979, p. 23.

10. H. M. Zafarullah, "PublicCorporationsin Bangladesh: An Assessment of Their Ad-ministrative Aspects," Indian Journal of Public Administration, 24:4, October-December1978, p. 1168.11. Y. Bhatnagar,Mujib, the Architect of Bangladesh: A Political Biography (Delhi: In-dian School Supply Depot, 1971); see also A. G. Chowdhury, ed., Sheikh Mujib: A Com-

memorativeAnthology (London: Radical Books, 1977).12. R. Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues (Dhaka: University Press Ltd.,

1980), p. 95.


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HABIB MOHAMMAD ZAFARULLAH 465through executive orders that ignored all the norms of democratic process.Civil liberties were either denied or subjected to restraints.13 Many ofthese actions were directed at the bureaucracyto tailor it to suit the inter-ests and whims of the ruling party. Large-scale dismissals on political orother frivolous grounds were rampant throughout the life of the regime,14and the constitutional protection of public servants was either removed ormade ineffective. They became insecure and to a large measure demoral-ized, their initiative, creativity, and enterprisefrustrated by persistent in-terference in routine matters. Those who had the audacity to expressdisapproval of the unwarranted meddling of the political cutthroats ortheir servile followers were either affronted or removed from the adminis-tration for their "misdeeds."

AdministrativeReform EffortsDespite the fact that the Mujib regime was opposed to the bureaucraticsystem as it worked in Pakistan, it made little concerted effort to remodelit. Administrative reform, in its real sense, was not one of the regime'smajor concerns. It had more important things to take care of-consolidat-ing its position in the society by whatevermeans possible. However, underpressure from different interests, especially its more moderate sympathiz-ers, and to uphold its earlier commitment to debureaucratizethe adminis-tration, the regime declared its desire to go for "sweeping" changes.Its first action in the direction of administrative change was the appoint-ment of two temporarybodies-the Administrative and Services Reorgan-ization Committee (ASRC) and the National Pay Commission (NPC)-todiagnose the administrativeproblems and recommend reform measures.15The terms of reference of the ASRC were too broad given the smallnumber of persons on the Committee and the limited time made availableto it. It was asked not only to look at the public service in its entirety butalso to make recommendationson reorganizationof the entire administra-tive structureencompassing both national and local levels. The objectivesof the NPC, on the other hand, were confined to devising a new pay struc-ture, but one embracing the entire public sector. Thus, its terms of refer-ence also were broad and its members had to work hard to develop an

13. A. K. Khan, "People Deprived of Fundamental Rights," Holiday, August 20, 1972,pp. 1, 8.14. T. Maniruzzaman,"Bangladeshin 1974: Economic Crisis and Political Polarization,"Asian Survey, 15:2, February 1975, pp. 117-28.

15. M. M. Khan, and H. M. Zafarullah, "Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic In-transigence in Bangladesh,"in G. E. Caiden and H. Siedentopf,eds., Strategies or Adminis-trative Reform (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1982), p. 140.


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appropriatepay structureacceptable to both the government and the pub-lic servants.The most significant recommendationsof the ASRC were the consolida-

tion of the various categories of cadres or sub-cadres of the public service,and the creation of a single classless grading structure with a pay scaleestablished for each classified position based on evaluation of its difficultyand responsibility.16The Committee was forceful in its attacks on the in-stitutionalized and elitist nature of the inherited bureaucracy and urgedpublic servants to close the gaps that existed among the different cadresand occupational/professional groups. Two other major recommenda-tions of the ASRC concerned the development of a sound personnel ad-ministrativesystem with emphasis on merit and equity and the creation ofa decentralized administrative structure. 7The NPC formulated a ten-grade pay scale in consonance with theASRC's proposed ten-gradeservice classification. In the new structure thedisparitybetween the highest and lowest scales was considerably reduced,but in doing this the NPC condensed more than 2,000 existing levels ofpay without considering the deleterious effects this might have on effi-ciency and morale.18 By the same token, the arbitraryassignment of payscales to differentpositions created anomalies and, consequently, dissen-sion and dissatisfactionamong the affectedpublic servants, who also con-sidered the new scales out of tune with the galloping inflation of that time.

Curiously, while the recommendations of the NPC were partiallyadopted-some were not due to objections of the senior generalist bureau-crats who saw their status being reduced by the new pay policy-those ofthe ASRC were totally ignored and subsequently shelved. Meanwhile,political unrest developed and the regime directed all efforts toward itsown survival. The bureaucracywas utilized as a potent instrument for thispurpose and, understandably, nothing was done to displease it. Thus, abureaucracy that had been denounced by the regime for its imperviouscharacterwas now relied upon by the same regime for its political artifice.

Appointments n the Public ServiceA vacuum was created after 1971 by the exodus of a large number of non-Bengali public servants who had previously manned central (as well asprovincial) establishmentsin the eastern wing of Pakistan. To fill the void,the Bangladesh government decided on a crash staffing program. How-

16. Report of the Administrativeand Services Committee, Part I, Dhaka, 1973, p. 25ff.17. See ibid, Part II.18. Report of the Pay and Services Commission,Part II, vol. I, Dhaka, 1977, p. 8.


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HABIB MOHAMMAD ZAFARULLAH 467ever, it was guided by political considerations and instead of opening thedoors to all those qualified to enter public service, the country's first re-cruitment scheme centered around a particular group of people. Onlythose who had "actively" fought in the war of liberation were entitled tocompete for positions by taking "tests" that left a lot to be desired. Ap-pointmentswere made on the criterionof patronage and not on the basis ofperformance,even in these tests. And when no places could be found formany of those selected for the public service they were provided with jobsin the nongovernmental sector. Others who had no political connectionshad to face trying circumstances in the hope of making a career in thepublic service.19

Another examination for a different target group-the nonfreedomfighters-was conducted to select candidates for midlevel positions. Thiswas a better organized test but its standardstill was well below that of thecivil service examinations that had been held in Pakistan. Those who weresuccessful in this examination were placed on probation and trainingbefore being given appointments on the basis of their performance in a"final passing out" examination.20 Interestingly, when it came to theirplacement in permanent jobs, the government made all sorts of odd deci-sions that nullifiedthe rationale of the entire selection process. Defaultersand those who failed in the examination often were given jobs while manyof the successful ones were either denied a place in the public service orwere offered lower level positions. Many of the latter accepted theselowrated jobs against their wishes because of the enormous difficulty offinding jobs commensurate with their qualifications.Thus, due to its own follies, the government failed in its initial efforts toattract people with sound academic qualifications. Instead of formulatinga viable personnel policy that would address the needs of the administra-tion and the goals of nationbuilding, the regime resorted to gimmicks thatimpaired its administration. The haphazard recruitment and selectionprocesses coupled with the unsympathetic attitude of the political leader-ship toward the bureaucracy could not induce men of ability and highcharacter to enter the public service.

MaladministrationMaladministrationwas another marked feature of the period. The initialfervor among the people to serve the new nation with dedication that fol-

19. Zafarullah and Khan, "Staffingthe Higher Civil Services in Bangladesh."20. S. Rahman, "Recruitment Through Competitive Examinations Since 1972," Adminis-

trative Science Review, 9:4, December 1979, p. 5.


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lowed independencegradually faded, and government employees displayedno exception to this. Patriotism made way for self-centered motives. Hardpressed by inflationary conditions, corruption crept into the life of manypublic servants; they took to illegal practices, and absenteeism becamerampant as they began to pursue other business either independently or inassociation with colleagues. Those who could not manage to enter a busi-ness made frequent use of bribery. Indolence and apathetic attitudes to-ward work were also characteristicof the period, particularly among thosebelonging to the lower ranks. They tended to come and go as they pleasedwithout adhering to their prescribedhours; even when present they hardlyworked full time. The higher public servants, for their part, abused theirofficialpositions in all kinds of ways and for a variety of purposes. Publicfacilities were overused for private benefit and pecuniary advantage wastaken in the performanceof officialduties, thereby inflating governmentalcosts. Added to, and perhaps more significant than the behaviour of thepublic servants, was the deep-rooted outmoded institutional pattern ofpublic administration.In sum, the system of public administration in Bangladesh during itsfirstthreeyears was characterized by the political alienation of the bureau-cracy, inefficientadministration,lack of political commitment to improve-ment, bureaucratic factionalism, irrational staffing practices, excessiveoverhead in expenditures of public funds, and sinecures.

Trends During1975-81Early in 1975 things began to change in the administration of the country.There were many reasons for this but, to a large extent, changes in thepolitical environment were responsible. In consonance with its politicaltendencies, the Awami League transformed the multiparty parliamentarysystem into a monolithic presidential one.21 The constitution was thor-oughly amended to provide for the creation of a one-party system and theconcentration of effective powers in the hands of the president. But thissystem was short-lived, liquidatedwithin seven months by a military coup.A variantof the earlierregime was then put in power, only to be removedand replaced by a strong military regime that took total control of thecountry following a series of coups and counter-coups.22 For 44 monthsthe country was under martial law, ruled under regulations that were ex-

21. SeeT. Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath (Dhaka: Bangla-desh Books International, 1980), chapter 2, for an analysis of the events leading to thechange.

22. L. Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution (London: Zed Press, 1979), p.154ff.


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HABIB MOHAMMAD ZAFARULLAH 469traconstitutional. When this regime was "civilianized" in April 1979, itretained the presidentialsystem and added a parliament, but one that hadno independent powers. The only differencebetween this system and theearlier presidentialone was that the new government was to operate in amultiparty situation. Obviously, all of these changes had wide-ranging im-plications for the administrationof the country.

From Bureaucratic Servility to BureaucraticDominance

We have noted how the political leadership tried to subdue the bureau-cracy during the initial years of independence, but in the end, as a lastmeans of keeping itself in power, the Mujib regime changed the politicalstructure of the nation and in the process turned to the bureaucracy forsupport. The leadership began to rely more and more on senior publicservantsfor advice on important issues. Political appointeeswere replacedby public servants in key positions in the Secretariat and public enter-prises, and they began to handle the bulk of the decisions made.23

After the military takeover in late 1975, the bureaucrats emerged as apotent force in the governing of the country. The bureaucracy, in fact,shared power with the military as is evident from the composition of theCouncil of Advisors to the president24and the National Economic Coun-cil, the highest policy making body. The Planning Commission was reor-ganized with the bureaucrats occupying the important positions. In allpublic organizations, the generalists manned the top positions, and in thefield administration,members of the erstwhile generalist services held themuch sought-after posts of commissioner or deputy commissioner, thechief coordinators with immense power and prestige in the districts anddivisions. Wielding such enormous powers, these bureaucratswere able toscrap all laws that were made by the Mujib regime to "control" publicservants. They were in charge of their own career management and thusformulated rules that ensured their continued advancement in the govern-mental hierarchy. Even after the restoration of political activity in thecountry in 1978 and the returnof people's representativesthrough generalelections in early 1979, the bureaucratic elites continued to act as "states-men in disguise," designing and executing important public policies withthe support of their political superiors. All in all, during 1975-81 there

23. E. Ahamed, "Dominant BureaucraticElites in Bangladesh"in M. M. Khan and H. M.Zafarullah, eds., Politicsand Bureaucracyin a New Nation: Bangladesh (Dhaka: Center forAdministrative Studies, 1980), pp. 163-64.

24. The first Council of Advisors included seven public servants.


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was total reinstatementof bureaucraticpower, largely due to the failuresof the politicians in running the country.

From Factions to Interest Groups/Micro-Bureaucracies

Although the bureaucracyin Bangladesh as a whole emerged triumphantin the second half of the 1970sin its struggle for greater power and author-ity in the political system, its internal dynamics tore it asunder. Factionshitherto based upon political patronage or "participation"in the war ofliberation disintegrated or intermingled over time. New alignments orrealignments formed and an entirely new pattern emerged.25 The earlierfactions were replaced by another set of micro-bureaucracieswith distinctfeatures, memberships,and group values. The basis of the groupings waseither the original formal recruitment into and membership of public ser-vants in a particular cadre, or their professional or academic backgrounds.Therefore, based on one of these criteriaand the dynamics of group behav-ior, there emerged a number of interest groups or micro-bureaucracies,some even with undefined boundaries and thereby overlapping, but withconflicting objectives. Each of the groups considered itself a self-containedentity and looked upon the others as competitors. Only when mutual in-terests were at stake did they form temporaryalliances. Departmentalismwas an outcome of this phenomenon, preventingcohesion and integrationin administration. Departments manned exclusively by a particularmicro-bureaucracy (e.g., the Accountant General's Department) stressed subop-timization of goals.Those public servants charged with the performance of pure administra-tive functions were divided into two broadgroups, the ex-CSPs and the ex-EPCSs,26 each antagonistic to the other although apparently manifestingtogetherness. Those involved in the performance of specific functions inthe audit or accounts branches, customs, excise, police, taxation, and otherdepartmentshad their respective alignments and were opposed to the ad-ministrative group which, they believed, acted against their interests. Fi-nally, the technocrats-scientists, engineers, doctors, and otherprofessionals--were grouped together in specific categories. All these in-terest groupsor micro-bureaucracieswere obsessed with the promotion of

25. Khan and Zafarullah, "Public Bureaucracy n Bangladesh," p. 162; T. Maniruzzaman,"Administrative Reforms and Politics within the Bureaucracy in Bangladesh," Journal ofCommonwealth nd ComparativePolitics, 17:1, March 1979, pp. 47-59.

26. Like the CSP, there was a generalistcadre in pre-independentBangladesh belonging tothe East PakistanCivil Service (EPCS).


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HABIB MOHAMMAD ZAFARULLAH 471their own values and goals in contradistinction to those of the administra-tion as a whole.

From Bureau Shuffling to BureaucraticReformsThe early years saw the Mujib regime's incoherent efforts to make andunmake public organizations. Bureau-shufflingwas a common phenome-non, and posts and offices were created not for specificadministrative pur-pose but to benefit particular persons. These turned out to be sinecuresentailing little work or responsibility. The efforts of the ASRC, as we haveseen, were wasted, the regime losing its commitment to implementing itsrecommendations. The military regime of Ziaur Rahman (Zia), withinmonths of taking over, expressedits desire to thoroughly overhaul the ma-chinery of governmentwith all its concomitant parts. For a start, a reformplanning body, the Pay and Services Commission (P&SC), was appointedto devise a suitable pay and service structure. The P&SC delved deep intothe existing anomalies and contradictions of the system and came out withsome concrete recommendations. One of its themes was that the publicservice should be subservientto the political leadership, politically neutral,and responsiveto the demands of the society. It proposeda structure con-sisting of four tiers vertically set according to the nature of the work, de-gree of responsibility, and the level of qualificationsrequiredin each tier.27The service was further divided into 29 organized cadres, each performinga particular set of functions. The P&SC also called for the creation of asuper cadre at the top of the pyramidstaffedby men of "superiorintellect"and "vision" from each of the cadres. A new pay structure also wasdesigned that was quite distinct from that of the NPC.The military government enthusiastically accepted the reports of theP&SC and followed its recommendations with minor modifications. Allthe existing services were brought under a unified structure with 14 maincadres.28 The government declared that under the new system equality ofopportunity in promotions would be ensured, and the creation of the supercadre would enable the most talentedamong the functional cadres to reachthe highest echelons of the public service. In the new pay structure,21 payscales were incorporatedwith a massive increase in the disparity betweenthe highest and the lowest levels.

The government personnel system was streamlined with the amalgama-tion of the two public service commissions into one body. The Establish-27. Report of the Pay and Services Commission,Part I, vol. 1, Dhaka, 1977, p. 53.28. These were: administrative, agriculture,education, economic and trade, engineering,

finance, foreign affairs, health and family planning, information,judicial, postal, enforcement,railways, and secretariat.


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472 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 4, APRIL 1987ment Division was reorganized and its status elevated to that of a full-fledged ministry. In the public sector, to lessen overhead costs and dupli-cation of functions and to increaseproductivity, the number of public cor-porations were reduced through mergers; some, considered redundant,were closed down. Training institutions were created and encouraged toplay an active role in development administration. To improve adminis-trative procedures, new rules were framed or existing ones refined, andnew manuals and guidelines were designed.Although a new beginning was made in reorganizingthe chaotic publicservice and increasing efficiency, the agenda for reform was still incom-plete. Partial reform of the structural-functionalaspect of the bureaucracymight have been achieved, but administrative reform that would have hadwider societal impact remained unfulfilled.

From Caprice to CompetitionUntil 1976, no moves were made to rationalize the public service recruit-ment and selection system, which was unplanned and cumbersome. Themilitary regime took the firststep to systematize these processes, and rulesfor conducting open competitive examinations were announced in late1976 to select men of ability for superior positions in the administration.Two such examinations were held during this period, and their standardswere high compared to those held earlier and were akin to examinationsconducted in Pakistan. The prescribedsubjects covered most of the disci-plines in the arts; social sciences; pure, applied, medical, and agriculturalsciences; and engineeringand technology. Psychological and medical testsalso were included. The minimum educational qualificationrequiredto sitfor these examinations was a university first degree; the minimum andmaximum ages were 21 and 25 years, respectively.The two examinations held in 1977-78 and 1979-80 attracted a largenumber of candidates but the number of positions available was small.29Many individuals appointed on the basis of these examinations were ofsound academic caliber, however, in assigning them to particularpositionsless emphasis was given to performance-i.e., only 40% of the positionswere filled on the basis of merit. The remainder were allocated on thebasis of equal opportunityand affirmativeaction with the result that somewho placed low on the merit list were given positions in the much sought-afterservices, superseding many who had done better in the examinations.It may be noted here that despite the amalgamationof the various services

29. 2,439 and 1,870 candidates sat for the first and second examinations, respectively;thevacant posts totaled 139 and 196.


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HABIB MOHAMMAD ZAFAR.ULLAH 473and according them similar status and privileges, young people still crave acareer in the foreign or administrativeservices because of the prestige andpower these represent in society. Thus, attempts to make the public ser-vice representative are seen as a negation of merit by many, both insideand outside the bureaucracy.30 However, the introduction of systematicprocesses for entry into the public service during the period was a signifi-cant stride forward.

From Bureaucratic Indifference to BureaucraticIntransigence

The efficacy of the bureaucracy, as we noted earlier, was greatly curbed bythe Mujib regime. Except for a small number of public servants who en-joyed the personal favor and confidenceof the political leadership,the ma-jority of the bureaucrats were suspect and looked down upon by thepoliticians. This antibureaucraticattitude put psychological strains on thepublic servants, and their morale and performanceboth declined. One ofthe effectsof the transformation of the system of government in early 1975near the end of the Mujib regime was politicization of the bureaucracy. Anumber of serving bureaucrats were inducted into the AL, the only legiti-mate political party.31 In the new administrative structure, senior publicservants were also appointed as district governors, supposedly politicalposts. This enabled the bureaucratsto move closer to the center of policymaking and helped them reflect their aspirations in governmental deci-sions.

During the Zia regime, the public servants had even greater opportuni-ties to consolidate their positions and mold the administration to furthertheir interests. This became evident when the P&SC was preparing theblueprint for administrative reform, and each of the micro-bureaucraciesput pressureon the government to heed its suggestions for change. Whilethe proposals of the nongeneralist micro-bureaucracieswere more or lessbalanced, those of the generalistswere gearedto strengthentheir hold overthe administration. The nongeneralists, however, were determined not tolet the generalists enjoy a superior status. What followed was a period ofchaos characterizedby frequent strikes or stop-work intervals in govern-ment departments and continuous mud-slinging among the interestgroups. Most intriguing was the manipulationand maneuverby the gener-

30. M. M. Khan and H. M. Zafarullah,"Equal Employment Opportunity and AffirmativeAction: Bangladesh," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society forPublic Administration, New York, April 1983.

31. In the 115-member central committee of the party were 21 senior bureaucrats.


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474 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVII, NO. 4, APRIL 1987alists to redirect the course of administrative reform.32 All this precipi-tated a crisis, with the regime losing control of the situation and forced bythe craft of the unassailablebureaucratsinto compromise and concession.Intransigence won over indifference, with the bureaucracy becoming aforce to be reckoned with.

From Maladministration to BureaucraticIntemperance

The drawbacks of the administrative system that Bangladesh inherited atindependence were many. No concerted efforts were made by the Mujibregime to overcome the problems and maladministration was the upshot.These problems continued to cause administrative maladies in the latterpart of the decade, and to complement them, others of a more severe na-ture emerged and lowered the credibility of the administration.For the first one or two years after independence, corruption was moreor less confined to the political structure, but later it extended into thepublic service. By the middle of the decade, corruption had spread itstentacles to envelop the entire administration,and its practice became en-demic, institutionalized, and an accepted norm in society. Among thelower ranks, bribery was the most common form of corruption. Peoplerequiring the services of a particular department or agency had to pay"tips" to gain access to an important official, to have applicationsprocessed, to speed up the movement of files, to have a letter issued, tohave goods and luggage cleared at airports and seaports, to obtain reserva-tions on public transport, to get a certificateor document attested, to paypublic utility bills, and so on. Many higher level bureaucratsin positionsof power and influence also took to corruption,33 and it would takevolumes to make a comprehensive list of the ways they did it. Anybodywho failed to comply with the demands of a corrupt public servant wouldonly add to his difficultiesin getting a job done. In Bangladesh, not onlypublic officialsbecame corrupt, they made others partners in corruption.Many reasons may be cited for this decline in integrity, but red tape in

32. Khan and Zafarullah, "Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic Intransigence . . .,"pp. 146-149.33. In October 1977, the government formed a National Committee on Conduct of CivilServants. It was composed of four senior officers and a member of the Planning Commission.It was to "meet once a month and ... review the conduct of officers in regard to corruption,morality, high-handedness, behaviour unbecoming of an official, doing things against publicinterest and living beyond means." It is understood that the Committee never undertook itstask. Government Notification No. 4/31/77 of the Committee, October 14, 1977. Adminis-trativeScience Review, 8:1, December 1978, p. 54.


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HABIB MOHAMMAD ZAFARULLAH 475administrative procedures, lack of political surveillance, the high cost ofliving, and, above all, the decline in social and cultural values can be iden-tified as major ones. Corruption was not the only vice to afflict the ad-ministration. Public servantsbecame overbearing and unresponsive to thedemands of the populace. Access became difficult and the ordinary personhad to face unconcernedbureaucrats n every kind of relationship with theadministration. They were simply not interested in serving the people;they lacked the temperament and motivation to do so and behaved witharrogance and selfishness.

From Centralization to Over-CentralizationThe centralized nature of the administration even underthe parliamentarydemocracy of 1972-74, stifled the active participationof the people and thelower-ranking public servantsin nation-building activities. Public agenciesor, for that matter, elected bodies in the field became local organs of statepower without any authority to run themselves;all decisions were taken atthe top ignoring peculiar local conditions or needs. Later, the Zia regimeincreased the degree of centralization and the web of central control wasextended to reach the villages.34 Although "decentralization"and "peo-ple's participation" were commonly uttered phrases in the public speechesof important governmentofficials, including the president,the regime paidonly lip service to accomplishing these goals, and real control remained inthe hands of senior bureaucratsin the capital. Local institutions were en-couraged to grow and develop, only to be taken over by center officials orbrought under their authority. Local government bodies had virtually noautonomy or self-governing powers; their officially nominated members,formally belongingto a host of so-called nation-building departments,tookorders from the headquartersand did not performtheir tasks according todecisions of the local bodies of which they were members.Public enterprises also were not free from the clutches of governmentcontrol. Their autonomy was on paper only; major policy decisions weretaken in the ministries,35and sometimes even trifling matters were re-ferred. The EstablishmentDivision was responsiblefor appointments andtransfers of senior personnel of the enterprises,a role it played ratherillog-ically in that chairmen and directors were appointed to industrial corpora-tions, for example, without considering technical requirements andcapabilities. The undue interferenceof the central government in the af-

34. M. M. Khan and H. M. Zafarullah, "Rural Development in Bangladesh: Policies,Plans and Programmes," Indian Journal of Public Administration, 26:3, July-September1980, pp. 5-6.

35. Zafarullah,"Public Corporations in Bangladesh."


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fairs of public enterprisesdiluted their role as autonomous organizations,and they took on the shape and character of government departments.

ConclusionsBangladesh entered its second decade in 1982, but the problems and weak-nesses of the public administration system still endure. The successiveregimes since independence have been diffident in action, and instead ofbringing about radical reforms for which circumstances were favorable ondifferentoccasions-i.e., immediately after independence or after the mili-tary takeover in 1975-they furthered the cause of bureaucratizationeither willfully or by default. The pace of whatever reformwas attemptedwas uneven and did not spread over the total administrative fabric. Eventhough the public services were unified, the creation of separate functionalcadres gave rise to animosity among them when it came to questions ofstatus and privilege. The way the country was governedby the politiciansalso had profound impact on administration. Dictatorial measures of theMujib and Zia regimes necessitated a preeminent, but not always right-eous, role for the bureaucracy n society. The bureaucracywas not utilizedto achieve the goals of an independent developing polity, but as a prosaicnecessity for the performance of traditional and routine functions.

Today, the people of this poverty-stricken nation languish under an ad-ministrative system that has nothing much to offerin the way of dignifyingtheir lives. Development administration requires, as foregoing conditions,veritablepolitical commitment and sincere administrativesupport. For anadministrativesystem to serve its purpose, it must have the capacity andpotential for external adaptation and internal integration, innovation, andconsolidation.36 To infuse dynamism, it is necessary to lubricate the ad-ministrative machinery regularly by inducting into it people of merit andability, indoctrinating them to serve the people, and, above all, steeringthem toward a sense of mission in the performanceof their tasks. It is nottrue that all bureaucratsin present-day Bangladesh are vice-ridden, high-handed, inefficient, or irresponsible. Quite a few are unblemishedand seri-ous in their tasks. In the past, some of them have shown creativity andinnovationin administrative performance,but were not always appreciatedor recognized by many, especially the political leadership. Indeed, com-prehensive reform of the administrative system is in order, encompassingthe macro, micro, and meso levels with implications for bureaucraticper-formance in service of the public interest.

36. L. C. Gawthrop, BureaucraticBehavior in the Executive Branch: An Analysis of Orga-nizational Change (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 173-85.

Administration in the First Decade of Bangladesh Some Observations on Developments and Trends

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