Admin Law Compilation

7/28/2019 Admin Law Compilation

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V. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

Marina vs. Gamilla

FACTS:

Sometime in May 1986, the UST Faculty Union (USTFU) entered into an initialcollective bargaining agreement with the University of Santo Tomas (UST) wherein USTundertook to provide USTFU with a free office space at Room 302 of its Health CenterBuilding.3

On 21 September 1996, the officers and directors of USTFU scheduled a generalmembership meeting on 5 October 1996 for the election of the union officers. However,respondent Gamilla and some faculty members filed a Petition4with the Med-

Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) seeking to stop theholding of the USTFU election.5

Meanwhile, on 2 October 1996, Rev. Fr. Rodel Aligan, O.P., Secretary General of theUST, issued a Memorandum to the Deans, Regents, Principals and Heads ofDepartments regarding the holding of a faculty convocation on 4 October 1996.6

On 4 October 1996, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin issued a temporary restraining order(TRO) in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001, enjoining the holding of the election of theUSTFU officers and directors. However, denying the TRO they themselves sought,Gamilla and some of the faculty members present in the 4 October 1996 facultyconvocation proceeded with the election of the USTFU officers. On the other hand, thescheduled election for 5 October 1996 did not push through by virtue of the TRO. 7

In the succeeding week, on 11 October 1996, petitioners filed with the DOLE a petitionfor prohibition, injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporaryrestraining order,8seeking to invalidate the election held on 4 October 1996. HCDAcE

Two months later, on 4 December 1996, UST and USTFU, represented by Gamilla andhis co-officers, entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a period of five(5) years from 1 June 1996 up to 31 May 2001. The CBA was ratified on 12 December1996.9

In another front, the Med-Arbiter issued a TRO dated 11 December 1996, enjoiningGamilla and his fellow officers to "cease and desist from performing any and all actspertaining to the duties and functions of the officers and directors" of USTFU.10

On 27 January 1997, at around eleven in the morning (11:00 a.m.), respondentsGamilla, Cardenas and Aseron, with some other persons, served a letter of even dateon petitioners Mario and Alamis, demanding that the latter vacate the premises locatedat Room 302, Health Center Building, UST the Office of USTFU. However, only theoffice messenger was in the office at the time. After coercing the office messenger to
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step out of the office, Gamilla and company padlocked the door leading to the union'soffice.11

On 5 February 1997, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila

a Complaint12for injunction and damages with a prayer for preliminary injunction and

temporary restraining order over the use of the USTFU office.

Trial Court sided with petitioners and ordered the defendants to to refrain from

preventing/disturbing in any manner whatsoever the plaintiffs in entering the said

premises.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the Trial Court on the ground that

petitioners' cause of action in the complaint before the trial court is inextricably linked

and intertwined with the issue of who are the legitimate officers of the USTFU, which

issue was then being litigated before the DOLE. The appellate court held that Civil Case

No. 97-81928 and Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-016 appear to be the same, with theobservation that the civil case merely "grew out" from the labor case. It also cited the

prohibition against the issuance of injunction in any case involving or growing out of a

labor dispute, unless otherwise provided by law.23It added that it would have been

more appropriate for the RTC to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the subject

case before issuing the assailed orders.

HELD:

Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations

in the complaint40and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the

plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

As pointed out by petitioners, the Court of Appeals erroneously categorized the instantmatter as a labor dispute. Such labor dispute includes any controversy or matterconcerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation ofpersons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms andconditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate

relation of employer and employee.45Jurisdiction over labor disputes, including claimsfor actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations is vested in Labor Arbiters and the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC).46

On the other hand, an intra-union dispute refers to any conflict between and amongunion members. It encompasses all disputes or grievances arising from any violation ofor disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, not
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excepting cases arising from chartering or affiliation of labor organizations or from anyviolation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the LaborCode.47In contrast, an inter-union dispute refers to any conflict between and amonglegitimate labor organizations involving questions of representation for purposes ofcollective bargaining; it includes all other conflicts which legitimate labor organizations

may have against each other based on any violations of their rights as labororganizations.48Like labor disputes, jurisdiction over intra-union and inter-uniondisputes does not pertain to the regular courts. It is vested in the Bureau of LaborRelations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor.

Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-016 entitled "Eduardo J. Mario, Jr., et al. v. Gil Gamilla, etal." before the BLR is neither a labor nor an inter-union dispute. It is clearly an intra-union dispute.

The case before the trial court, Civil Case No. 97-81928 entitled Eduardo J. Mario,Jr., et al. v. Gil Gamilla, et al.,49on the other hand, is a simple case for damages, with

an accompanying application for injunction. The complaint essentially bears thefollowing allegations: that despite an outstanding temporary restraining order prohibitingthe holding of an election of officers, respondent Gamilla and others proceeded to holda purported election; that there was a case pending before the DOLE questioning thevalidity of the supposed election; and, that respondent Gamilla with two other persons(later learned to be respondents Aseron and Cardenas) compelled the office messengerto vacate the premises of the USTFU office, and thereafter padlocked the room.Petitioners alleged respondents' act of padlocking the office was without lawful basis,and had prevented them from entering the office premises, thereby denying themaccess to personal effects, documents and records needed in the on-going cases bothin the DOLE and in the complaint a quo, and ultimately precluding the union from

serving its members.

Fundamentally, the civil case a quo seeks two reliefs one is for the removal of thepadlocks on the office door and restraining respondents from blocking petitioners'access to the premises, while the other is for the recovery of moral and exemplarydamages.

Prior to the institution of the civil case, petitioners filed before the Med-Arbitration Unit ofthe DOLE-NCR a petition for prohibition, injunction with a prayer for preliminaryinjunction and temporary restraining order against herein respondents for the latter'sassumption of office as elected USTFU officers. Specifically, they prayed thatrespondents be enjoined from claiming to be the duly elected officers of the union andfrom performing acts for and in behalf of the union.

The propriety of padlocking the union's office, the relief sought by the petitioner in thecivil case, is interwoven with the issue of legitimacy of the assumption of office by therespondents in light of the violation of the union's constitution and by-laws, which wasthen pending before the Med-Arbiter. Necessarily, therefore, the trial court has no
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jurisdiction over the case insofar as the prayer for the removal of the padlocks and theissuance of an injunctive writ is concerned.

Let us go back to the claim for damages before the lower court. Art. 226 of the LaborCode provides, thus:

The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in theregional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original andexclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of eitheror both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and alldisputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation orinterpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be thesubject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.

Thus, unlike the NLRC which is explicitly vested with the jurisdiction over claims foractual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages,54the BLR is not specificallyempowered to adjudicate claims of such nature arising from intra-union or inter-uniondisputes. In fact, Art. 241 of the Labor Code ordains the separate institution before theregular courts of criminal and civil liabilities arising from violations of the rights andconditions of union membership. The Court has consistently held that where noemployer-employee exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may beresolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or any collectivebargaining agreement, it is the regional trial court that has jurisdiction.55

Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such, can exerciseonly those powers which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes.Consequently, matters over which they are not granted authority are beyond theircompetence.56While the trend is towards vesting administrative bodies with the powerto adjudicate matters coming under their particular specialization, to ensure a moreknowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them, this should not deprive thecourts of justice their power to decide ordinary cases in accordance with the generallaws that do not require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply. 57Intheir complaint in the civil case, petitioners do not seek any relief under the Labor Codebut the payment of a sum of money as damages on account of respondents' allegedtortuous conduct. The action is within the realm of civil law and, hence, jurisdiction overthe case belongs to the regular courts.58

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor,and NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURTOF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,INC., respondents.
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Facts:

Toribio claimed to have laid off workers from National Labor Union due to the shortage

of leather soles in the Ang Tibay factory.

The Court of industrial relations, represented by the Sol-Gen forwarded a motion for

recon with the Supreme Court.

On the other hand, the National Labor Union prays for the vacation of the judgment ofthe trial court and have a new trial in CIR on the grounds of:

1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis

2. the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but ascheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NationalLabor Union, Inc., from work.

3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme

4. The company union was an employer dominated one ( National Workers

Brotherhood)

5. Laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.

6. the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source ofdissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made

applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor

legislation of American origin where industrial peace has always been the rule

7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.

8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.

9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.

Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue for the trial?

Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR.

There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here wasdue to their union affiliation or activity.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions arespecifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is morean administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of thenation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government . Thefunction of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organiclaw, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial orquasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employersand employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. Ithas jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, andsettle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting,employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, theprovisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance forpurposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial oragricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising fromdifferences as regards wage shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions oftenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers and


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between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number ofemployees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and suchindustrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Laboror by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary ofLabor as existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public

interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the courseof such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settlethe dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directedby the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent factsrelated to the industry concerned or to the industries established in a designatedlocality, with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adoptingfor such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or amaximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or lessees tolandowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in thesettlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation forthat purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and

compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies betweenlabor and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here amingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigiddoctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of

procedure, and is not bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also include

any matter necessary for solving the dispute.

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free fromthe rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable

cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements

of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

Some examples that it must follow are:1. right to a hearing

2. consideration of evidence by the court

3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of

having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial decisions in an admin

court so as to free them from technical rules

5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the hearing. The court

may also delegate some powers to other judicial bodies.

6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy. It mustnt merely

accept the views of a subordinate.

7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the decision.

The record is barren and doesnt satisfy a factual basis as to predicate a

conclusion of law. Evidence was still inaccessible. The motion for a new trial

should be granted and sent to the CIR.


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Suntayvs People

Facts:

the proper steps in order that accused Suntay, allegedly in the US, be brought back to

the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law; and of prohibitionto enjoin the DFA Secretary from canceling the petitioners passport without previous

hearing

On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a

verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon

City, alleging that on June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia Nubla, with lewd design,

somewhere near the UP compound in Diliman and had carnal knowledge of her, and

Alicia being a minor of 16 years old

(so go rape diaynisi Alicia nubla)

On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty recommended to the City Attorney

of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City

Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of theAssistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed

against the herein petitioner.On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was

granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs

On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco,

California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school.

On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the

petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City

after preliminary investigation had been conducted


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On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an

order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the

National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose

of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with

in accordance with law."

On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United

States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the

passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to

answer the criminal charges against him.However, this order was not implemented or

carried out in view of the commencement of the proceeding in order that the issues

raised may be judicially resolved

Petitioners Claim:

while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports,

"such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel

or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the

Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of

law.

Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior hearing

Held:

Where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the

country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in the exercise

of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted

whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process

does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an

officer vested with it upon are undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal

charge against the passport holder hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as aprerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the

due process law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in

him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such

hearing.


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Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have been granted a "quasi-

judicial hearing" by the respondent Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the

passport issued to him. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason

for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where

the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to

evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his

discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted

whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process

does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an

officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal

charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a

prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the

due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested

in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such

hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of lawclause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be

violative of the said clause.

The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, petitioner-appellee, vs. EMILIO L. GALANG, in his

capacity as Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellant.

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in

this country for three years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged employee of the

Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. He applied for

extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view,

however, of confidential and damaging reports (Exhibits P, Q, and R) of Immigration

Office, Benjamin de Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a

gambling front than the enterprise for promotions of local and imported shows that it

purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspected of having evaded payment of his

income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration, in a communication of 10 September

1959, advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee

has been denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5

days. Thereafter, counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision

of said Board, but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied, on 11

September 1959, in this tenor:


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"In reply to yours of even date requesting that you be furnished copy of the decision,

order or resolution of the Board of Commissioners denying the application for extension

of stay of Mr. GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, please be advised that, pursuant to

immigration practice and procedure and as is usual in such cases where the result is a

vote for denial, for reasons of practicability and expediency, no formal decision, order or

resolution is promulgated by the Board

In view thereof, you and your client are advised anew that Mr. Bisschop is hereby

required to depart within five (5) days of this notice."

No request for reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to

forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de

Bisschop filed the present case on 18 September 1959.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the Commissioners of Immigration

are required by law to conduct formal hearing on all applications for extension of stay of

aliens;

b) Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that said Commissioners are enjoined to

promulgate written decisions in such cases.

Ruling of the Court:

We fully agree with appellant's contention on several grounds.

The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of theExecutive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely

discretionary on the part of immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No.

613, otherwise known as the Philippines Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the

procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to uphold the argument that

courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration

authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may

warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due

process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the letter of appellant-

commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a

preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of

appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the

deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily,

the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in

this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings.

With respect to the contention that the decision of the Board of Commissioners on


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matters of petition for extension of stay of aliens should be promulgated in writing,

appellee relies on Section 8 of the Immigration Act, which provides that in "any case

coming before the Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two members shall

prevail". However, we agree with the Solicitor General that the word "decision", as

employed in this section, obviously refers to the number of "votes" necessary to

constitute the decision of the said Board. The Sampaguita Shoe case (102 Phil.,

850), which was taken into account by the lower court, is not applicable to the case at

bar; it applies to judicial decision, as provided in Section 1, Rule 35, of the Rules of

Court. On the other hand, as pointed out in appellant's brief, where the intention of the

lawmaker is otherwise, the immigration laws specifically enumerate when the decisions

of the Board of Commissioners shall be in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a

decision of the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of admission or exclusion of

aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the

Board of Commissioners in cases of deportation under Section 37, paragraph (a) and

(c). But there is nothing in the immigration law which provides that the Board ofCommissioners must render written decisions on petitions for extension of stay.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, , vs. COURT OF APPEALS an d SOLAR

TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION,

Facts: 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solarimmediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution sourceinstallations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leadingto the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.

According to the Board, Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporationis involved inbleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30 gallons per minuteand 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leadingto the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% waschanneled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP).

Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of pollutants ona level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its ImplementingRegulations.

A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ ofExecution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.

Acting on the motion for recon filed by Solar, the Board issued an Order allowing Solarto operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection andevaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities.


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Solar, however, went to the RTC on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunctionagainst the Board. RTC dismissed.

CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to thatcourt for further proceedings. CA declared the Writ of Execution null and void.

Issue: Whether CA erred in reversing the RTC on the ground that Solar had beendenied due process by the Board.

Ruling: Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex partecease and desist orders. It may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastesdischarged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safetyor welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed"the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."

On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to

life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex partecease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastesdischarged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect ofdischarges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by theCommission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there isprima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards.

Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter ofallowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex partebasis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involvedpresents an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal orplant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission existing at any giventime may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or wastedischarge, the general standard of an "immediate threat to life public health, safety orwelfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary.

Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards havebeen set by the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life."

From the reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidencebefore the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximumallowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and thataccordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist orderissued by the Board.

Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October 1986 based on theresults of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC.


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Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after theNovember 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violationof applicable standards was confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to havebeen remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-visSolar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of

untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River, presumably loath tospend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in anoperating condition.

In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a localgovernment official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of theGovernment charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particularindustrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory andregulatory provisions.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like

that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutiveand untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannotbe made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety ofsuch orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such asthose which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevantpollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated inthe exercise of that persuasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, andgeneral welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animallife, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional common place thatthe ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities ofprotecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of policepower. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, havecompelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could inany case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTPon an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled toreduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits byimposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare andcomfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutes and theirimplementing regulations.

Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests thecorrectness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a publichearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis ofsuch ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all thatis required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we havehere. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested

judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D.No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequentpublic hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court toseek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to


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the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled that the Board in fact gave Solar authoritytemporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewatertreatment facilities and then another analysis of effluent samples could be taken andevaluated.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision ofthe Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 inA.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial courtdated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar tocontest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at apublic hearing before the Board.

Montemayor vs Bundalian

FACTS:

Montemayor was the OIC-Regional Director, Region III of DPWH. He was removed

from office due to a letter-complaint submitted by respondent Bundalian to the

Philippine Consulate where the petitioner was accused of accumulating unexplained

wealth which he allegedly amassed through lahar funds. With the letter were attached

documents such as the Grant Deed for a big-ass house in California and an SPA for

petitioners sister-in-law authorizing her to purchase the property. The Consulate

forwarded the complaint to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption for

investigation. The petitioner then submitted his counter-affidavit but refused to submit

his SALN. He also defended that similar charges against him were discharged due to

insufficiency of evidence. PCAGC then submitted its report to the Office of the

Pressident which concurred with the PCAGC that his property was unlawfully acquired.

His appeal to the CA was likewise dismissed. On appeal to the SC, he contended that

the decisions of the Office of the President and the PCGAC in establishing his guilt were

not supported by evidence.

ISSUES: 1. WON he was denied due process 2. WON the charges against him were

not backed by substantial evidence WON the dismissals by the Ombudsman of similar

complaints were binding on the current case (res adjudicata).

HELD:

1. He was afforded due process because he was given the opportunity to be heard,

he was represented by counsel and he was allowed to present his counter-

affidavit. He also was able to attend the hearings and filed motions in his favor

before the PCAGC.


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2. On the third issue, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of

similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative

case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the

decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case

subject of this review. The doctrine ofres judicata applies only to judicial or

quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative

powers.[15]Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible

criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same

alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by

the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President

over him. As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was administrative in

nature, the doctrine ofres judicata finds no application in the case at bar.

3. LASTLY AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, on the second issue, there is a need to lay

down the basic principles in administrative investigations. First, the burden is onthe complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in hiscomplaint.[10]Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Itmeans such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequateto support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable mightconceivably opine otherwise.[11]Second, in reviewing administrativedecisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of factsmade therein are to be respected so long as they are supported bysubstantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh theconflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwisesubstitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to

the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matterswithin the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grossabuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate thepower of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidencein an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do notauthorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted tothe administrative agency concerned.

In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the subject property was in hisname. However, he insisted that it was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo who paidfor the property in installments. He submitted as proof thereof the checks issued

by Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the property. His evidence,however, likewise fail to convince us.

With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to petitioner to prove non-ownership of the property. He cannot now ask this Court to remand the case tothe PCAGC for reception of additional evidence as, in the absence of any errorsof law, it is not within the Courts power to do so. He had every opportunity toadduce his evidence before the PCAGC.
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Ocampo vs. ombudsman

Facts:

Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of theNational Irrigation Administration.

K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) wrote a letter to

NIACONSULT requesting a training proposal on small-scale community irrigation

development

NIACONSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers

ADBN, thru its representative, Deutsche Gesselschaft Technische

Zusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic ofGermany paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee

NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S. Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner

demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN which petitioner

personally received

Despite receipt of the letter, petitioner failed

NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative

case before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or

willful breach of trust

Finding enough basis to proceed with the administrative case, the Administrative

Adjudication Bureau of the respondent OMBUDSMAN, on February 17, 1992, issued an

order10requiring petitioner to file his counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt

Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with the said order.

A year later, or on March 17, 1993, respondent OMBUDSMAN issued anotherorder11giving petitioner another chance to file his counter-affidavit and controvertingevidence

. Again, petitioner failed

respondent OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed Resolution, the decretal portion of whichreads:

"Withal, for such dishonesty, untrustworthiness, and conduct prejudicial to theservice as established by overwhelming evidences, it is respectfully
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recommended that respondent Jesus C. Ocampo be discharged from theservice, with forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual disqualification to holdoffice in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation;

PETITIONER moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case claiming that he was

denied due process

that the administrative case was resolved on the basis of the complainant'sevidences, without affording him the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit and topresent his evidence

that the criminal complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based onthe same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case, wasdismissed by the Regional Trial Court on February 24, 1997

the dismissal of the criminal case, petitioner manifests that the administrativecase can no longer stand on its own and therefore should be dismissed

RULING:

DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL ACTION WILL NOT FORECLOSE ADMINISTRATIVEACTION

The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply sayingthat the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyondreasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction

Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedingswhich merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind mightaccept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as theprocedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrativeproceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily bebinding on the other.

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT BE FULLY EQUATED TO DUEPROCESS IN ITS STRICT JUDICIAL SENSE

In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are notstrictly applied

A PARTY WHO CHOOSES NOT TO AVAIL OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWERTHE CHARGES CANNOT COMPLAIN OF A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS

Petitioner has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He wasrequired to answer the complaint against him. In fact, petitioner was givenconsiderable length of time to submit his counter-affidavit


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It took more than one year from February 17, 1992 before petitioner wasconsidered to have waived his right to file his counter-affidavit and the formalpresentation of the complainant's evidence was set

Thus, petitioner's failure to present evidence is solely of his own making andcannot escape his own remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator

JUDGMENT

SERRANO vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

petitioner, he "filed an application with the Public Service Commission requesting

authority to operate a taxicab automobile service within the City of Manila and from said

city to any place in the Island of Luzon open to motor vehicle traffic and vice versa, with

the use of fifty (50) units."

"the Public Service Commission denied completely [his] application . . . It is not known

from the decision appealed from whether the application of the petitioner was dismissed

for lack of interest or failure to prosecute or denied for failure to qualify."

A motion for reconsideration was filed and denied by respondent Public ServiceCommission. Hence the present petition for review.

Petitioner relies on the constitutional provision that "no decision shall be rendered by

any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law

on which it is based."

Ruling:

Publ ic Service Comm ission is no t a court of record

The above constitutional mandate does not lend support to petitioner's plea. Its wordingis clear and definite. The obligation to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law

on which the decision is based is incumbent on a cour t of record.

The Public Service Commission is not a court of record within the meaning of theabove constitutional provision. So it was held by us in Dagdag v. Public ServiceCommission,8with its categorical pronouncement of the Commission not being "a

judicial tribunal," its functions being "limited and administrative in nature."Reference was made in the above decision to the earlier case of Filipino Bus
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Co. v. Philippine Railway Co.,9where not once but twice it was explicitly stated that thePublic Service Commission is "not a court."

Quasi-judic ial tr ibunals sho uld, in al l controv ersial quest ions , render i ts d ecis ion

in such a manner that the part ies to the proceeding can kn ow the var ious issu es

involved, and the reasons for the decis ions rend ered.

It does not mean, however, that the non-inclusion of the administrative tribunal within

the scope of the above constitutional provision justifies the summary disposition of

petitioner's application in the manner followed by respondent Public Service

Commission. In Ang Tibay v. Court,10speaking of the Court of Industrial Relations,

which is likewise an administrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicial powers like the

Public Service Commission, we made clear that while it is "free from the rigidity of

certain procedural requirements," it does not mean "that it can, in justiciable

cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and

essential requirement of due process . . ." Seven cardinal primary rights, which, thisCourt held, must be respected, are enumerated, the last being "that quasi-judicial

tribunals," and the Public Service Commission is one of them, "should, in all

controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the

proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the

decisions rendered.The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority

conferred upon it."

There is a need then to remand the matter to respondent Public Service Commission so

that it could consider the evidence and discharge the function committed to it by law.

IN RE MATTER OFTHEPETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS( PIO NERIA vs.COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION)

FACTS:

Pio Neria(Petitioner) seeks to inquire into the legality of his arrest by agents of therespondent Commissioner of Immigration, and his subsequent detention at the Bureauof Immigration's detention station.

Petitioner arrived at the Manila International Airport from Hongkong. The immigrationinspector at the airport, not satisfied with the petitioner's travel documents, referred the

matter of their admission to the Board of Special Inquiry for investigation "to determinefiliation and paternity to a Filipino citizen". The Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 conducteda hearing. The said board on August 2, 1961 deliberated on the case and unanimouslyvoted for petitioner's admission. into the Philippines. This written decision wassubsequently submitted to the members of the Board of Immigration Commissioners,who attest that he "was admitted as a citizen of the Philippines".
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Commissioners aftera reviewby it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings within oneyearfrom the promulgation of said decision."

HOWEVER, the minutes of the meeting of the new Board of Commissioners show thatas late on August 8, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners was, only deliberating on

the case of the petitioner. The alteration of the date of the decision of the new Board ofCommissioners from August 8, 1962 to August 2, 1962 was deliberate. On August 2,1962, it did not reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, becausehaving actually deliberated on the case of the petitioner on August 8, 1962, it could nothave on August 2 resolved to reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of Immigration Commissioners as abody deliberated on and voted for the reversal of the decision of the Board ofSpecial Inquiry No. 1, the review motu propr iowas effected 6 days beyond theone-year period fixed by section 27 (b). The said decision of the Board ofImmigration Commissioners, and the warrant of exclusion issued on the strength

of such decision, are therefore, null and void, for "lack of jurisdiction," since thedecision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 by that time had already become"final."

The respondent also contends that the petitioner's petition forhabeas corpus wasprematurely filed, because he did not first appeal the decision of the Board ofImmigration Commissioners to the Secretary of Justice, who, by law, is vested withpower of control and supervision over the said Board.

11We have already held that the

principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable "where thequestion in dispute is purely a legal one",12 or where the controverted act is"patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess ofjurisdiction

and "nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done" thereon.

13

The case atbar falls under this exceptions.

Manila Electric vs. Phil. Consumers

Facts:

On September 11, 1974, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, with the

objective of enabling the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates "within the

reach of consumers," promulgated Presidential Decree No. 551 providing for the

reduction from 5% to 2% of the franchise tax paid by electric companies.

On February 5, 1982, the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed

with the Board of Energy (BOE) a "Petition for Specific Performance, Damages and

Violation of P.D. No. 551" against the Manila Electric Company (Meralco), docketed as

BOE Case No. 82-198. PCFI sought for the immediate refund by Meralco to its


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customers of all the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551, through the reduction of its

franchise tax from 5% to 2% on the basis of Section 4 of PD 551:

"Sec. 4.All the savings realized by electric franchise holders fromthe reduction of the franchise tax under Section 1 and tariff reductions

and tax credits under Sections 2 and 3, shall be passed on to theultimate consumer. The Secretary of Finance shall promulgate rules andregulations and devise a reporting systems to carry out the provisions ofthis Decree."

In its answer to the petition, Meralco alleged that it was duly authorized by theBOE in its Order dated March 10, 1980 in BOE Case No. 79-692 to retain the disputedsavings; and that the said Order had long become final.

On November 25, 1982, the BOE issued its Decision dismissing PCFI'spetition, declaring that Meralco was indeed authorized by the BOE, in BOE Case

No. 79-692 which have long become final and executory for the respondent (PhilConsumers) did nothing to seek relief or to appeal from the said order of March10, 1980.

PCFI filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied hence the petitionfor certiori (g.r. 63018) which was dismissed on the ground of lack of meritholding that: When this petition was filed on January 27, 1983, the November 25,1982 ruling was already final and executory. Moreover, the March 10, 1980

judgment rendered in BOE Case No. 79-692, where Meralco had filed a motionfor authority to defer passing on to customers the savings from the reduction offranchise taxes, was not appealed or questioned by the petitioners. Instead, they

filed BOE Case No. 82-198 on February 5, 1982 or almost two years later,raising the same issues against the same parties. BOE's questioned decision inCase No. 82-198 used the facts in BOE Case No. 79-692 for its conclusions. Notonly had the March 10, 1980 decision confirmed the findings of the Minister ofFinance on Meralco's accounts and finances but in filing the second case, the

petitioners were asking for a readjudication of the same issues in anotherchallenge to these same findings.

Four years thereafter, PCFI and a certain Edgardo S. Isip, private respondentsherein, filed with respondent RTC a petition for declaratory relief, docketed as CivilCase No.Q-89-3659 who prayed for a ruling on who should be entitled to the savings

realized by Meralco under P.D. No. 551. Once again, they insisted that pursuant toSection 4 of P.D. No. 551, the savings belong to the ultimate consumers.

Meralco, in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of resjudicata, citing this Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 which affirmed the BOE'sDecision in BOE Case No. 82-198.


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On January 16, 1991, respondent RTC rendered the assailed Decision declaringnull and void the Resolution of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 63018 and on the basisof the Dissenting Opinion of the late Justice Claudio Teehankee, held that the disputedsavings belong to the consumers and that the decision of the BOE is ultra vires being awell-settled rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear, it leaves no room for

interpretation. The memorandum issued by the Minister of Finance which was made thebasis of the decision of the Board of Energy has no legal effect because Sec. 4 of P.D.No. 551 is clear and unequivocal.

Meralco moved for the reconsideration of the above decision but wasdenied hence Meralcos petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

WON Meralco is duly authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of thefranchise tax under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12%

allowable rate recognized in this jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Petition is meritorious. The issue has long been settled. Thus, the relitigation of thesame issue in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 cannot be sanctioned under the principle of res

judicata.

Res judicatameans a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; athing or matter settled by judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first action isconsidered conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other

admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all other mattersthat could have been adjudged therein For a claim of res judicatato prosper, thefollowing requisites must concur: 1)there must be a final judgment or order; 2)the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and theparties; 3)it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4)there must be,between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.

All the above requisites are present in the records:

FIRST REQUISITE there must be a final judgment:

It is beyond question that this Court's Resolution dated October 22, 1985 in G.R. No.63018, sustaining the BOE's Decision dated November 25, 1982 in BOE Case No. 82-198 which dismissed PCFI's petition, attained finality on December 4, 1985. In fact SChad long ago issued an Entry of Judgment stating that said resolution had alreadybecame final and executor and is recorded in the Book of Entries.

SECOND REQUISITE the court which rendered the final judgment must havejurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties:


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There is no question that the BOE has jurisdiction over the subject matter and theparties herein. Under P.D. No. 1206, the BOE is the agency authorized to "regulateand fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies .'' As such, it has

jurisdiction over Meralco, an electric company, and over the savings it realized underP.D. No. 551. It bears stressing that P.D. No. 551 was passed precisely to enable

the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates within the reach ofconsumers. Clearly, the matter on how the disputed savings should be disposedof in order to realize a reduction of rates is within the competence of the BOE.

THIRD REQUISITE it must be a judgment or order on the merits:

The BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198 is a judgment on the merits. A judgmentis on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties basedon the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections.

After according both parties the opportunities to be heard, the BOE disposed of thecontroversy by resolving the rights of the parties under P.D. No. 551. In its Decision, the

BOE declared in clear and unequivocal manner that Meralco "has been duly authorizedto retain the savings realized under the provisions of P.D. No. 551" and that privaterespondent PCFI's argument to the contrary is "untenable." The BOE's Decision wasupheld by this Court in G.R. No. 63018.

FOURTH REQUISITE there must be between the two cases identity of parties,subject matter and causes of action:

There is identity of parties between the two cases. BOE Case No. 82-198 was a contestbetween private respondent PCFI, as petitioner, and Meralco, as respondent. Civil CaseNo. Q-89-3659 involves the same contenders, except that respondent Edgardo Isip

joined PCFI as a plaintiff. But his inclusion as such plaintiff is inconsequential. Aparty by bringing forward, in a second case, additional parties cannot escape theeffects of the principle of res judicatawhen the facts remain the same. Resjud icatais not defeated by aminor difference of parties, as it does not requireabsolute but only substantial identity of parties.

The subject matters of BOE Case No. 82-198 and Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 arelikewise identical since both refer to the savings realized by Meralco from the reductionof the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551. The subject matter of an action refers to thething, wrongful act, contract or property which is directly involved in the action,concerning which the wrong has been done and with respect to which the controversyhas arisen. In both cases, the controversy is how the disputed savings shall bedisposed of whether they shall be retained by Meralco or be passed on to theconsumers.

With respect to identity of causes of action, this requisite is likewise present. In bothcases, the act alleged to be in violation of the legal right of private respondents isMeralco's retention of the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551. While it is true thatBOE Case No. 82-198 is one for specific performance, while Civil Case No. Q-89-3659


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is for declaratory relief in the ultimate both are directed towards only one relief,i.e., the refund of the disputed savings to the consumers. To seek a court's declarationon who should benefit from the disputed savings (whether Meralco or the consumers)will result in the relitigation of an issue fairly and fully adjudicated in BOE Case No. 82-198.

Clearly, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action. Thedifference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. The doctrine ofres judicatastill applies considering that the parties were litigating for the same thing and moreimportantly, the same contentions. As can be gleaned from the records, privaterespondents' arguments in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 bear extreme resemblance withthose raised in BOE Case No. 82-198.

The pronouncement of the BOE in BOE Case No. 82-198 finding such fact to be"beyond question" is clear and not susceptible of equivocation. This pronouncementwas sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 63018. In finding no grave abuse of discretion

on the part of the BOE, this Court saw the wisdom of its assailed Decision. Thus, thisCourt held: "[I]n dismissing the petition for specific performance, the BOE authorizedMeralco, in lieu of increasing its rates to get a more reasonable return on investmentswhile at the same time refunding to consumers the benefit of P.D. No. 551, to insteaddefer the passing on of benefits but without the planned increases. Instead of givingback money to consumers and then taking back the same in terms of increased rates,Meralco was allowed by the BOE to follow the more simplified and rational procedure."

Nasipit Lumber Company vs. NLRC and COllado

Facts:

Juanito Collado is a security guard, guarding the premises owned by NALCO. Duringhis watch, some properties of NALCO were stolen and Collado was implicated in thetheft and placed under preventive suspension.

NALCO filed a petition (application) for clearance to dismiss Collado with the RegionalOffice No. X of the Department of Labor. Collado opposed, but failed to appear on thescheduled hearing despite notice.

On October 12, 1976, the application for clearance to dismiss was approved in an orderissued by Regional Office No. X Officer-in-Charge Roy V. Seneres.

Collado filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order on the ground that he wasnot given an opportunity to rebut the false findings or adduce evidence in his favor. Hefurther denied participation in the theft.


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The case was elevated to the Secretary of Labor. On June 7, 1978, Acting Secretary ofLabor Amado G. Inciong issued an order affirming the order of Officer-in-Charge Roy V.Seneres thereby grantingpetitioner's application for clearance to dismiss Collado.

Instead of resorting to this Court on a petition for certiorari,8on October 9, 1978,

Collado filed a complaint before the Butuan District Labor Office, Butuan City, for unjustdismissal and reinstatement with backwages and benefits.9Without going to specifics,Collado averred therein that his termination from employment "was unfounded, unjustand illegal, based as it was on uncorroborated and malicious suspicion, insinuation andhearsay, and characterized by harassment."

NALCO filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. It alleged that in view of ActingSecretary Inciong's aforesaid order, Collado did not have any sufficient cause of actionand therefore his complaint was a nuisance.10In its position paper, NALCO added thatbecause Acting Secretary Inciong's order had become final and executory, the issue ofillegal dismissal had also become res judicata.

The case having been certified for compulsory arbitration, on January 29, 1979,Executive Labor Arbiter Ildefonso G. Agbuya rendered a decision ordering NALCO toreinstate Collado to his former position withoutbackwages and without loss of seniorityrights.

Both parties appealed the decision. The labor arbiter, upon appeal, awarded backwagesto Collado and that the case has not been barred by res judicata.

Held:

The two principal issues presented to this Court for adjudication are the applicability ofthe principle ofres judicataand the legality of Collado's reinstatement withbackwages and without loss of seniority rights.

On the first issue, we hold that this is one of the cases wherein the pronouncement ofthis Court thru Justice Vicente Abad Santos in Razon vs. Inciong19applies. The Courtstated therein that the principle ofres judicata may not be invoked in labor relationsproceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are "non-litigious andsummary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law." Saidpronouncement is in consonance with the jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res

judicataapplies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise ofadministrative powers.20

The requirement of a clearance to terminate employment was a creation of theDepartment of Labor to carry out the Labor Code provisions on security of tenure andtermination of employment. The proceeding subsequent to the filing of an application forclearance to terminate employment was outlined in Book V, Rule XIV of the Rules andRegulations Implementing the Labor Code. The fact that said rule allowed a procedure
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for the approval of the clearance with or without the opposition of the employeeconcerned (Secs. 7 & 8), demonstrates the non-litigious and summary nature of theproceeding. The clearance requirement was therefore necessary only as an expeditiousshield against arbitrary dismissals without the knowledge and supervision of theDepartment of Labor. Hence, a duly approved clearance implied that the dismissal was

legal or for cause (Sec. 2).

On the legality of Collado's dismissal, we hold that the NLRC abused its discretion indirecting his reinstatement with two (2) years backwages. The relation betweenpetitioner and Collado is now strained by the latter's violation of the trust and confidencereposed on him as a member of the security force, a position impressed with a highdegree of trust.22Proof beyond reasonable doubt of an employee's misconduct is notrequired when loss of confidence is the ground for dismissal. It is sufficient if theemployer has "some basis" to lose confidence or that the employer has reasonableground to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned isresponsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered

him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.

Clavanovs HLURB

Facts:

Clavano sold a house and lot in Cebu to Sps. Tenazas, who paid 50% of the purchase

price. Alleging the spouses default, Clavano refused to accept their subsequent

payments and instead sued them for rescission of the contract and forfeiture of all prior

payments made. This was however dismissed.

The spouses filed a specific performance complaint with the HLURB Cebu

Regional Office against Clavano to compel it to honor the contract. They asked for

judgment compelling Clavano to accept their payment and to execute a Deed of

Absolute Sale in their favor, plus damages. The HLURB Regional Office ruled in favor of

the spouses, and this was upheld by the HLURB in its Decision, and the Office of the

President. The petitions of Clavano in the CA and the SC were not given merit due to its

failure to comply with rules on civil procedure.

When the HLURB Decision lapsed into finality, the HLURB Regional Office

issued a Writ of Execution. Eventually, the spouses complained via a motion to the

HLURB, alleging that there were defects in the housing unit, that the Deed of Absolute

Sale was unnotarized, and that the TCT was still in Clavanos name. They also asked
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Clavano to pay the corresponding expenses re: notarization fees and taxes, among

others. HLURB granted this motion via an Order.

Clavano contests this, saying that the HLURB Order amended the final HLURBDecision which, according to Clavano, has been fully executed. Clavano also pointed

out that in the contract, it was agreed upon that the spouses will be the ones to answer

for the expenses involved in the transfer of title. HLURB, in another Order, denied

Clavanos motion for reconsideration. The CA upheld the HLURB Orders, and so the

Sheriff demanded from Clavano the reimbursements sought by the spouses.

Held:

Since the HLURB Decision has become final, the agency is left with no other

authority but to enforce the decisions dispositive portion, which it can no longer

amend, modify, or alter in a manner affecting the merits of the judgment. Clavano

is correct in availing of the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part

of the decision; consequently, where the order of execution is not in harmony

with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order has pro-tanto novalidity. Subsequent HLURB orders requiring Clavano to pay for the expenses incurred

do not fall within the ambit of the HLURB Decision. The Orders cannot be considered

part of the decision which must be executed against Clavano. The obligation to pay for

such expenses is unconnected with and distinct from the obligations to execute and

deliver the deed of absolute sale and the certificate of title.

The HLURB or the CA cannot order Clavano at this late stage to reimburse the

charges and fees relative to the transfer of title when the spouses did not allege this

obligation nor pray for this relief and did not attempt to prove this cause of

action. Sps. Tenaza only sought the enforcement of the mutually binding contract tosell so that they could finally own the house and lot but did not ask for the transfer of the

title at Clavanos expense.

Likewise, the assailed Orders do not involve supervening events where the

court a quo is allowed to admit evidence of new facts and circumstances and thereafter

to suspend execution of the judgment and grant relief as may be warranted which may


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or may not result in its modification. The responsibility for the expenses for registering

and titling the subject house and lot - a matter pre-dating the filing of the complaint with

the HLURB, and in fact, written in the contract to sell - does not qualify as a supervening

event.

The foregoing matters, in addition to alleging them in the complaint, shouldhave also been heard during the trial on the merits before the HLURB where the

parties could have proved their respective claims. However, believing that the assailed

rulings were merely part of the execution of the HLURB Decision, the HLURB instead

precipitately resolved the issue in favor of the spouses without notice and hearing.

Since the Orders are a wide departure from and a material amplification of

the final and at least executory HLURB Decision, they are pro tanto void and

absolutely unenforceable for any purpose.After the decision has become final

and executory, it can no longer be amended or corrected except for clerical errors

or mistakes.

Under the circumstances,

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