Admin Digests 1

7/21/2019 Admin Digests 1

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1

Aratuc vs. COMELEC88 SCRA 251

FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the BatasangPambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results ofthe elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte,

Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan andCotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken byRegional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. ASupervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque hadconducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities inthe election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board ofCanvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by theKB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questionedresolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the firsteight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning

candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: “As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, theComelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extendingits inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.”“The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from anyappellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provisionanywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control andsupervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too

well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office havingsupervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or oughtto have done.



2

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory BoardG.R no. 96266

FACTS: Private respondents filed an application for oil price increase was granted by public no.

the provisional increase. On December 18, 1990 the court dismissed the petition and reaffirmERB’s provisional increase without hearing pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to theissuance of said order, a hearing was conducted but the petitioner failed to appear at saidhearing .The petitioner contends that the provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violateddue process for having been issued without notice and hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting provisional oil increase without prior notice is valid.

HELD: Yes, it is valid. While E. O 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude theboard from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase, subject to final disposition of whether ornot: to make it permanent; to reduce or increase it further; to deny the application. Sec. 3, par. eis akin to temporary restraining order. It outlines the jurisdiction of the grounds for which it maydecree a price adjustment, subject of notice and hearing. However, under Sec. 8, it may orderthe price increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome of theproceeding. The Board is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisionalauthority, however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.



3

Maria Elena Malaga, et al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et al.

GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and

Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of

a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last day for submission of pre-qualification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened

on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm

of 2 December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not

allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having

been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December,

petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming

that although they submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to

accept them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order

prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December,

defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited

from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by

PD No. 1818, which provides: “Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisd iction to

issue any restraining order… in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure

project… of the government… to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official

from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project…”

Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a

state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national

government or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the

prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like

the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the

petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed was aninfrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of PD 1818.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such that it

would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.

HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the

department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some

if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,

usually through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and

GOCC’s. The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institution—refers to

any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions

relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state universities and

colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above definitions that

ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER , it is apparent

that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body

nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the

procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to

shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the

anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly

issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have beendenied.

First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changedthese deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants. Second, PBAC was required toissue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for theproject to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimate project cost was betweenP1M and P5M.



4

Beja Sr. vs. Court of Appeals207 SCRA 689

FACTS: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastresupervisor in 1975 and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988,the General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz

for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules andregulations, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they werepreventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the districtattorney for region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit.On December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manageralso for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conductprejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja wasalso placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case wasredocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed itto the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja anopportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition forcertiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two

days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing ofadministrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorariproceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of theadministrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case andproceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/ortemporary restraining order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction overadministrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of thePhilippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.

HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without

the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case topreventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to investigateand decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA.With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA wascreated through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPAwere vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council.Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power “to appoint, discipline and remove, anddetermine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel”. OnDecember 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created thePhilippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works,Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987

reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained itsattached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to theDOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and controland administrative supervision, “Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship between thedepartment or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy andprogram coordination”. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from theDepartment to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision andcontrol or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship” between theDepartment and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and programcoordination.” With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agencyfrom the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even anagency under a Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference

with respect to appointments and other personnel actions “ in accordance with thedecentralization of personnel functions” under the administrative Code of 1987. The Lawimpliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the powerto investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with anadministrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject theemployee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted inaccordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of

Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to subjectpetitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of theDOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA – AAB-1-049-89. The AABdecision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is REMANDED to thePPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.



5

Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)

FACTS:

Eugenio, the Deputy Director of Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, applied for a CareerExecutive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. But before she got the rank, the CSC

passed Resolution No. 93-459, reorganizing itself and changing the CES Board (CESB) to Officefor Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission (OCES).

ISSUE:

W/N CSC usurped legislative function of Congress by abolishing the CESB and transferring its

budget to OCES

HELD:

CESB was created by PD 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as CESB was created by law, itcan only be abolished by the legislature. While CSC has the power to reorganize under Sec. 17,

Chap. 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V. of the Administrative Code of 1987, this must be read withsec. 16, which enumerates the offices under the control of the CSC. CESB is not one of such

offices.

CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to CSC. Thisessential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent

Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondentCommission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally

inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.”



6



7

DE LA LLANA V ALBA

FACTS:

De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking toenjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister ofJustice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of

inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA,unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated

from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit ofthis character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution

has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as

provided for under the Constitution.

RULING: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from

their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of itsincumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There

can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case

of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in thatsense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure

does not arise.



9

Medalla vs. Sayo103 Phil. 587

FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr, is the chief of clinics of the Caloocan Citygeneral Hospital, Caloocan city. Private respondent Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the ResidentPhysician thereat. When the position of assistant hospital administrator of the Caloocan City

general hospital became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan citymayor Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as assistant hospitaladministrator private respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner,Dr. Medalla, Jr, Protested Dr. Mackay’s designation and subsequent appointment allegingamong others that, chief of clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank. The then acting city MayorVirgililo P. Robles, who succeeded former mayor, now Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his4th endorsement dated September 20,1978, sustained Mackay appointment stating that as of

April 18, 1978 when Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to assistant hospital administratorfrom his previous position of Resident Physician, he was next in rank to the said higher positionby reason of his having completed all academic requirements for the certificate in Hospitaladministration…contrary to the claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978.Dissatisfied, Medalla elevated his case to the Civil Service Commission on appeal. On

December 29, 1978, the Civil Service Merit Systems Board issued Resolution No. 49 sustainingMedalla's appeal and revoking Mackay's appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator. Uponautomatic review by the Office of the President, Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Claverendered a Decision on April 24, 1979 declaring that the appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as

Assistant Hospital Administrator in the Caloocan City General Hospital is hereby revoked and the positionawarded in favor of appellant Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla.

ISSUE: Whether or not that appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as assistant hospital Administrator is valid

HELD: Medalla is entitled to appointment as Hospital Administrator. The prescribed procedure has beenfollowed by petitioner Medalla He had appealed to the department head and from thence, in view of thelatter's unfavorable action, to the Civil Service Commission and thereafter to the Office of the President.Resolution No. 49 of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board its Decision of June 27, 1979, and theDecision of the presidential Executive Assistant dated April 24, 1979, were all rendered in Medalla's favor.The special reason given by the Acting City Mayor for Mackay's appointment, which is, that lie hadcompleted all academic requirements for the Certificate of Hospital Administration, is not tenable, sinceMedalla himself was found to be in possession of the same qualification. But while the qualifications ofboth petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay are at par, yet, it is clear that the position of Chiefof Clinics is the next lower position to I hospital Administrator under the organizational line-up of thehospital. Consequently, at the time of Mackays appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator andsubsequently hospital Administrator, Medalla outranked Mackay who was only a Resident Physician. It istrue that, as the respondent City Mayor alleges, a local executive should be allowed the choice of men ofhis confidence, provided they are qualified and elligible, who in his best estimation are possesses of therequisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and judgement.

9

However, as reproduced heretofore, the Decision of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board, upheld by theOffice of the President, contains a judicious assessment of the qualifications of both petitioner Medallaand private respondent Mackay for the contested position, revealing a careful study of the controversybetween the parties, which cannot be ignored. The revocation of Mackay's appointment reveals noarbitrariness nor grave abuse of discretion.



10

Lianga Bay Logging v Enage

FACTS

The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each

other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a

common boundary-the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-whereby the eastern boundary ofrespondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary. Because of reports ofencroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas, the Director of Forestry ordered a

survey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their respective concession areas. Thedecision fixed the common boundary of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and

Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. as that indicated in red pencil of the sketch attached to thedecision. In an appeal interposed by respondent Ago, docketed in the Department of Agriculture

and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 2268, the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose Y. Feliciano, in a decision dated August 9, 1965 set aside the appealed

decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled that "(T)he common boundary line of the licensedareas of the Ago Timber Corporation and the Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., should be that

indicated by the green line on the same sketch which had been made an integral part of theappealed decision."

4

Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President, where in a decision dated June 16,1966, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr., the ruling of the then

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed. 5 On motion for reconsideration,

the Office of the President issued another decision dated August 9, 1968 signed by then Assistant

Executive Secretary Gilberto Duavit reversing and overturning the decision of the then ActingSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and affirming in toto and reinstating the

decision, dated March 20, 1961, of the Director of Forestry.

Thereafter, Ago brought the action in the CFI

ISSUEWON the CFI has authority to hear and decide the case.

RulingThe Court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition and holds that respondent judge, absent any

showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no competence nor authority to review anew the decision in

administrative proceedings of respondents public officials (director of forestry, secretary of agriculture

and natural resources and assistant executive secretaries of the Office of the President) in determining

the correct boundary line of the licensed timber areas of the contending parties. The Court reaffirms the

established principle that findings of fact by an administrative board or agency or official, following a

hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board, agency and/or

official(s) have gone beyond their statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted

arbitrarily and without regard to their duty or with grave abuse of discretion.

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11

Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board

FACTS

In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory

Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise thevideogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was

a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie

industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PDimposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on thefollowing grounds:

There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because

the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assistthe VRB in enforcing the said PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s argument are correct.

HELD: No.There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not beingtasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek

assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the verylanguage of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and

limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and controlof the [VRB].”



12

Rabor v CSC

The Facts:

Sometime in May 1991, Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City,advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of

sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government

service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" issued by theGovernment Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this"Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended tocomply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following date

"2/28/91." In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City.Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:

"Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office

of the President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder quoted:

'Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be

retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not

exceed six (6) months.’

IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador Rabor as Utility Worker

in that office, is already non- extend[i]ble."

Accordingly, on 8 August 1991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of

Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for work effective August 16,1991.

Decision:

We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after anemployee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the

foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law.

"Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of

compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the

government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2)delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for

employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various governmentexaminations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by 'extendees' who have long passed the mandatory

retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they mayqualify for old-age pension."

Applying now the results of our reexamination of the instant case, we believe and so hold that CivilService Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor andaffirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.

"It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity thatcorresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and

promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for thereason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for themultifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is

that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in

contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes."The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative

regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislativeauthority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for

the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30,

1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660;

Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). x x x. The rule on limiting to one year theextension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)years, but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S.

1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the

law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply

perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.



13

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD and GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC.

G.R. No. 11952; March 26, 1997

FACTS:

This Special Civil Action seeks to prohibit respondent Civil Aeronautics Board from exercising jurisdiction

over private respondent's Application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and

Necessity, and to annul and set aside a temporary operating permit issued by the Civil Aeronautics

Board in favor of Grand International Airways, allowing the same to engage in scheduled domestic air

transportation services, particularly the Manila-Cebu, Manila-Davao, and converse routes.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) alleges that GrandAir does not possess a legislative franchise authorizing it

to engage in air transportation service within the Philippines or elsewhere. Such franchise is, as argued,

a requisite for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity by the respondent Board,

as mandated under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent GrandAir, on the other hand, posits that a legislative franchise is no longer a requirement

for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or a Temporary Operating Permit,following the Court's pronouncements in various jurisprudential cases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Congress, in enacting Republic Act 776, has delegated the authority to authorize the

operation of domestic air transport services to the respondent Board, such that Congressional mandate

for the approval of such authority is no longer necessary.

HELD:

It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly

designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated,

even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held thatprivileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative

franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature. The trend of modern

legislation is to vest the Public Service Commissioner with the power to regulate and control the

operation of public services under reasonable rules and regulations, and as a general rule, courts will not

interfere with the exercise of that discretion when it is just and reasonable and founded upon a legal

right.

The Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,

or Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator, who, though not possessing a

legislative franchise, meets all the other requirements prescribed by the law. Such requirements were

enumerated in Section 21 of R.A. 776. There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which

indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a

domestic air transport operator. Although Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress' control over any

franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it does not mean Congress has exclusive

authority to issue the same. Franchises issued by Congress are not required before each and every

public utility may operate. In many instances, Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to

government agencies, specialized particularly in their respective areas of public service.



14

US v Ang Tang Ho

FACTS

In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No.

2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said

act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue thenecessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to thisAct, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20,

1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho,a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said

amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August

1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as

charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed thesentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act priorto the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one

cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when boththe law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly

what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policyrequired to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner

in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated,and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its

terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in

form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effectin future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.



15

Restituto Ynot Vs IAC GR NO 74457 March 20 1987 CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat

from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were

confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,

Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the

slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.

Petitioner sued for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo

issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond

of twelve thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After considering the

merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the

said carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,

ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to

rule on the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the

petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumedvalidity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this

case for the reason that the present condition demand that the

carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the

small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not

however, comply with the second requisite for a valid exercise

of the said power which is, "that there be a lawful method." The

reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose

sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police powerbecause the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not

reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is

unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its

authority in behalf of the public, it must be: 1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from

those of a particular class, require such interference; 2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon

individuals.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property asprescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "bedistributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National MeatInspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersalas the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase"may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilousopportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standardand the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when theymake their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunatebeneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named cansupply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their ownexclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that isnot "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and thereforeinvalid delegation of legislative powers.



16

Pelaez v Auditor General

FACTS

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – thiswas purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in

part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and maychange the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare

may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibitthe auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez

claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had beenimpliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or

their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “Ifthe President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality

which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from

being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipalitycan be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC,

Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President byvirtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch

of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administrationof a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said

law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out orimplemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficientlydeterminate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his

functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declarationof policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of

every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine,with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his

authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require

– is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. Inthe first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which

immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat ofgovernment within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.”

Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requiresand NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently

legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

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