Addressing uncritical following in jurisprudence · 3 embracing any errors of their predecessors or...

Addressing uncritical following in jurisprudence

Abdul Karim Abdullah

Abstract

Taqlid was a key factor in the waning of Islam. With the adoption of taqlid as a

methodology, jurists forfeited a degree of authenticity. For they became beholden to

their predecessors rather than the Quran for their knowledge of Islam. In focusing on

exegeses of the Quran rather than the Quran, the jurists turned from the foundational

text of Islam to derivative texts. In this way, their knowledge became second-hand. The

estrangement of jurists from revelation, entailed by by-passing the foundational text,

restricted the prospects for renewal. For renewal requires re-connecting with the

inspiration that brought the faith into existence in the first place. The elevation of

tradition to the rank of revelation and a corresponding relegation of reason to a position

under tradition, played a key part in the realignment of authorities required by the

adoption of taqlid in jurisprudence. It appears, therefore, that the re-invigoration of

Islam requires addressing taqlid as well as a rehabilitation of rationality and its

restoration to its rightful rank as a faculty of discernment. For taqlid and anti-

rationalism are but different aspects of the process whereby reason makes way for

tradition for the purpose of understanding of revelation.

Key words

Taqlid, education, reform and knowledge.

Introduction

There is no doubt that the key factor in the rise of Islam was the enlightenment of

the Quran, delivered by the prophet Muhammad, (pbuh).1 “No other sacred scripture

has ever had an immediate impact upon the lives of the people who first heard its

message and, through them and the generations that followed them, on the entire course

of civilization.”2

Unassisted human reason is hard put to answer the deepest problems, those

relating to good and evil, as well as right and wrong: “on its own, the human mind is

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incapable of understanding the complete objective truth about, and the higher purposes

of, the human experience.”3

Revelation fills in where rationality falls short. Revelation provides guidance.

The fact that values of ethics were revealed during particular eras hardly affects their

universality or applicability at other times.4 The ethical principles of the Quran make

possible their application at different times and in different contexts.

Following medieval views, however, is unlikely to assist in adapting to present-

day conditions. 5 Expecting past practices to provide responses to present-day

challenges is problematic, as early jurists “could have no conception of the necessities

of the twenty-first century Muslims.”6

Emergence of taqlid

Taqlid is “blind following” of a person or his point of view, without understanding

the rationale for following that view.7 Taqlid requires a person to follow another. It

requires a waiving of reflection on the part of the follower. It required jurists to defer

to the works of their predecessors, rather than refer the root of the Shariah without

reference to prior exegeses.8 In other words, unlike the early jurists, the later jurists

were expected to follow the emerging tradition which was attaining authority in its own

right.

[Taqlid] required that participants in a school tradition … to preserve

loyalty to the tradition by taking into account the interpretative achievement

of older masters … law had to be justifiable by reference to the continuity

and established identity of the school. Muslim jurists were not, as

individuals, in solitary and direct confrontation with revelation: they found

their way back to the meaning of revelation through tradition.9

In this way, subsequent jurists would understand revelation through the eyes of

their predecessors. This had several disadvantages. First, it prevented the later jurists

from accessing revelation directly, without the mediation of their predecessors. Instead

of referring to the Quran, they were expected to accept their predecessors’ explanations

on ‘trust,’ so to speak. However, this exposed jurists to the possibility of unwittingly

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embracing any errors of their predecessors or being influenced by their biases. Taqlid

appeared in stages.10

At first, ijtihad was prohibited. Then in the fifth and sixth centuries,

scholars were restricted to tarjih, or giving preference to the opinion of one

imam or another on questions of fiqh. But then tarjih was prohibited and

scholars were restricted to choosing between rulings within a single

madhhab.11

In addition, taqlid hampered expressions of alternative points of view.12 The

uncritical acceptance of the views of former jurists, however, departs from the tradition

of ikhtilaf (differences of opinion) that characterized the early generations of Muslims.

It also departs from the necessity to provide evidence. For these reasons, taqlid was an

unqualified disaster:

For the ummah, taqlid represents a blameworthy innovation (bid’ah) as

well as a deviation (dalalah) from the straight path. No researcher or

scholar has ever found a valid text from either the Quran or the hadith, or

even an argument based on pure reason, to support Islam’s approval of

taqlid, for the very idea is alien to Islam’s view of humanity. The teachings

of Islam clearly state that all assertions must be supported by either

verifiable evidence or proof … If such conditions cannot be met the

assertion is to be rejected.13

The attempt to make subsequent jurists acquiesce to the explanations of their

predecessors was reinforced by downplaying differences between tradition and

revelation. Tradition itself was presented as ‘revelation,’ even if not of the same rank as

the Quran.

The relationship between revelation and tradition is akin to the relationship

between the Ought and the Is. Revelation represents the Ought, while tradition

represents Is. Revelation teaches principles, tradition exemplifies the application of

those principles in practice.

Following a principle is unlike following its manifestation in history. The

principle lends itself to different manifestations, without necessarily becoming

compromised. A particular manifestation of a universal principle, however, is unique

and time-specific.

4

To equate remaining faithful to tradition with rigidly adhering to a particular

manifestation of tradition is to identify what is incidental to tradition with what is

fundamental to it. A manifestation of a principle is incidental. The principle is

fundamental.

Where principles are marginalized, and emphasis is placed upon time-bound

expressions of precedent, people are prevented from progressing. Indeed, in matters of

religion taqlid is rejected by the Quran. The revealed text exhorts the believers to follow

the Quran rather than their ancestors.14

Rationale for taqlid

Taqlid became widespread at about AD 1000.15 It emerged in part to put an end

to the proliferation of differences of views.16 There may have been an effort to establish

uniformity in the law and in that way to make it easier to administer it, especially by

less knowledgeable judges. 17 Taqlid was justified by the assertion that the juristic

problems were resolved.

Later generations of jurists were expected to adopt the views of the former

generations.18 The “prevailing mindset [was] that a Muslim should follow one or the

other of the established schools of thought and abandon his judgment in favour of

interpretations of the earlier centuries.”19

It was held that the four Orthodox Sunni schools and the substantive legal

rules reached by their masters and set forth in the authoritative treatises

were quite sufficient to deal with any future development … The

conclusion reached favored the closing of the gate of ijtihad, which meant

that no jurist was actually qualified, and therefore no jurist had the right, as

the old masters had, to exercise ijtihad and to elaborate legal rules by direct

reference to the textual sources.20

Taqlid was additionally justified by the view that the earlier generations of

Muslims had a better understanding of Islam than the later generations. The better

understanding was due to the closer proximity of the earlier generations to the prophet

(pbuh).

Proponents of taqlid have often justified it not merely in terms of stylized

assertions about their own intellectual inferiority as compared to their

forbears (sic), whose opinions and rulings must therefore be followed, but

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also as a defence against the temptation of following “mere whim.” Taqlid,

on this view, means disciplined living as opposed to capricious …

interpretations that would make a plaything of the foundational texts and of

the practices based on them.21

The adoption of taqlid was in addition supported by the view that following

reason was unreliable, as it was little different from following desires. This was implicit

in the rendition of hawa, the Arabic word for desire, as “whimsical opinion.”

Effects of taqlid

Taqlid altered the nexus between the believer and the text. The believer no longer

enjoyed, as the early generations of Muslims did, unmediated access to the Quran but

was expected to defer to the views of jurists.22

The legal rules set forth in the juristic treatises of the Sunni schools thus

were considered as constituting the correct and final statement of Shari’ah

law. This by implication meant that the treatises became the primary source

of Shari’ah. The Quran and the Prophet’s Sunnah, on the other hand, were

relegated in practice from primary to remote sources of law, although this

was not openly recognised in theory.23

In this way, taqlid brought into being two classes of jurists, those who referred to

the primary roots of the Shariah (the early jurists), and those that did not (the later

jurists). Juristic authority rather than rational analysis becomes the criterion for

differentiating acceptable perspectives from questionable views. 24

It was expected that a Muslim “should follow one or the other of the established

schools of thought and abandon his judgment in favour of interpretations of the earlier

centuries.” 25 Intellectual activity was reduced to making commentaries on

commentaries.

With the so-called closure of the door of ijtihad, the ulema resorted less and

less to the sources of Shariah finding solutions to problems. Instead of

addressing social issues and attempting new solutions the ulema of the later

ages … occupied themselves mainly with elaboration … of the works of

their predecessors.26

Expecting jurists to restrict themselves to the works of their predecessors without

referring to the Quran effectively prevented the former from accessing the Quran.

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Revelation and the prophetic traditions became “remote” from the later generations of

jurists. The works of the early jurists, by contrast, were brought forward and treated, in

practice, as “primary sources.” This empowered the jurists with authority.

The expectation to follow their predecessors produced the risk, however, that if

any early jurists erred, those that arrived later might fall prey to the errors of their

predecessors.

The requirement to follow one of the leading four schools of thought introduced

a rigidity without precedent in the rich diversity of the Islamic heritage.27 This narrowed

diversity of Muslim intellectual inquiry.28 As a result of taqlid:

the sciences fell into a rapid decline while more rigid forms of instruction

and narrower curricula prevailed … The latitude and diversity of discourse

of religious sciences, kalam, tafsir, hadith, and fiqh gave way to narrower

criteria of kufr, bid’a, and taqlid and the so-called closing of the doors of

ijtihad (sadd bab al-ijtihad).29

The emergence of taqlid did not just dispense with juristic effort (ijtihad); it also

contributed to the rise of fatalism (jabr):

it became increasingly common for political leaders to seek justification for

their mistakes and aberrations by citing this doctrine [of fatalism]. Quite

simply, if their actions and decisions had been determined beforehand, they

could not be held accountable for them, and their subjects could have no

justification for rising in revolt against them. In effect, it gave them a carte

blanche to rule the ummah as they saw fit. As it was to their advantage,

many rulers and court-supported scholars favored it despite the opposition

of the traditional ulama … Taqlid thus cleared the way for fatalism, which

in turn prepared the ground for tyranny, injustice and despotism.30

Taqlid made Muslims less prone to voice dissenting views. “The creative impulse

of Islamic thought suffered setbacks as a result.”31 This further reduced the diversity of

Muslim thought.

Taqlid effectively cut the later generations of jurists from the fount of guidance,

the Quran, that gave rise to the Islamic civilization in the first place. As it was the Quran

that provided the impetus to the rise of the Islamic civilization in the first place,

civilizational renewal will require a re-engagement with the Quran by jurists as well as

the wider Muslim community. This will require first and foremost addressing taqlid.

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Taqlid and ijtihad

The emergence of tradition as an authority higher than reason was aided by the

designation of tradition as revelation. At the political level, the rising prestige of

tradition was reflected in the preeminence of traditionalists in relation to the rationalists.

The elevation of tradition to the rank of revelation reinforced the perception that

“the sayings and opinions of the salaf (predecessors) are nothing short of sacred. This

is especially true in regard to the understanding, ijtihad, and interpretations of the salaf

some of which have been elevated by the traditionalists to the status of revelation

itself.”32 The view that the knowledge of the early Muslims was superior to that of the

later Muslims became, as it were, a self-fulfilling prophecy.

As a result, “in our traditional institutions” the authority of past scholars “is

elevated to the level of the prophet (pbuh) and sometimes even above it.”33 Another

result is that “The word of the Imam of the Madhhab is occasionally followed in

defiance of the world of Allah (s.w.t).”34

In response to the restrictions placed on independent inquiry by the need to defer

to established interpretations, a number of contemporary scholars have called for

“reform and renewal in Islamic thought.”35 In particular, there have been calls “to free

the discipline from the dominance of past scholars.”36

A few writers stressed the need to “appreciate the predominantly rational

approach of the Quran to all religious questions.”37 What is required is to rekindle the

“tradition of reason and intellectual inquiry, which will in turn lead to a culture of

learning among the Muslims.”38

Islam must not be ossified and fossilized by blind imitation of traditional

thought and opinion. Rigid obscurantism, exclusively literalist doctrines

and atavistic doctrines of a past ideal, prevents Islam from being a religion

for all time as intended by Allah. We must be open to the prospect of reform

(islah) and renewal (tajdid).39

The key to the renewal of the Islamic civilization thus lies in overcoming taqlid.40

It needs to be recalled that, “differences of opinion are the basis of all progress in human

thinking and, therefore, a most potent factor in man’s acquisition of knowledge.”41

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Taqlid and Quran

Taqlid also impacted the role that the Quran was to have upon Muslims. As a

result of the need to refer to commentaries on the text rather than the text itself, the

Quran became “remote” not only from the subsequent generations of jurists but also

from present-day Muslims. In the case of the latter, this “distance” is illustrated by the

fact that while not a few Muslims are able to recite the Quran, few actually comprehend

what they recite. Not enough emphasis is placed on the comprehension of the text.

The emphasis on recitation at the expense of comprehension is justified by the

assertion, itself at variance with the teaching of the Quran, that the Quran is a “difficult”

book. As a result of the view that the Quran is “difficult” to understand, Muslims are

generally exhorted to read the sacred text with the help of a teacher to guide them.42

The Quran, however, presents itself as “easy to understand and remember.” For

greater emphasis, this characterization is reiterated in four verses.43 That the Quran was

not intended only for a “select few” is confirmed by the fact the Quran presents itself as

“a message to all the worlds.”44

Focusing on recitation at the expense of comprehension effectively separates

reading of the sacred text from its comprehension. The result is recitation without

comprehension. Indeed, recitation took priority over comprehension. “The basic

approach to Quran studies … emphasized correct pronunciation and memorization.”45

This is problematic:

It is ironic to note … that the vast majority of Muslims are wont to rote

reading of the Quran which is patently vacuous and devoid of thinking. The

Quran is usually read, committed to memory, and cited for its spiritual merit

rather than intellectual stimulation and enrichment. This is evidently not the

advice one obtains from the Quran itself.46

Another observer noted, “our traditional system, for all its virtues, is sharply

criticized … for relying largely on rote learning and parrot fashion repetitions …”47

The result of rote reading is that the message of Islam is poorly understood and presents

a “contradictory and confused picture.”48 The relationship between the divine text (the

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Quran) and the student needs to be re-articulated so as to enable the divine text to speak

to the believer.

Many writers are critical of the current stress on parroting entire sections of

books without exercising reason or critical thought, as a result of which few

students are said to actually properly comprehend what they are taught.

Critics see the madrassas as discouraging debate, dialogue and critical

reflection, and as treating their students as passive students, thus cultivating

a climate of stern authoritarianism.49

What is required is a more intellectual approach in education.50 Thus, the first

step in addressing taqlid in jurisprudence is to address it in education. More emphasis

has to be given to the comprehension of the sacred text than has hitherto been the case.

Also, student centered learning should be introduced. A few institutions of higher

education already use rational approaches:

The method of teaching is through dialogue. The question is put to the

student and they are encouraged to find their own solutions. We do not

mock them if they err; we simply show them that this suggestion does not

work; we help them find the solution. Our method is not the fast food

package that is handed to the students without any effort on their part.

Rather, it is the carefully prepared banquet, which they work to bring about,

and which they greatly enjoy.51

A method that requires exertion and effort on the part of students is preferable to

a method that only requires passive acceptance of “processed” and ready-made

“knowledge.” The Quran encourages thinking and questioning. “Islam … advises

analytical knowledge and understanding that generate insight rather than a purely

dogmatic approach.”52 The Quran needs to be presented in a way that makes it “truly

comprehensible.”53

This method will need to emphasize comprehension as much as pronunciation. In

other words, it will require restoring the balance between recitation and comprehension.

The main challenge in Islamic studies is “how to foster a critical approach while

maintaining loyal commitment …”54 This can be realized by an educational system that

is well-grounded in tradition and is able at the same time to foster “independent thought

based on a well-developed critical ability.”55

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Conclusions and recommendations

The Islamic civilization rose to prominence on account of the guidance of the

Quran. The practice of requiring students to study the meaning of the Quran from

juristic explanations rather than in the Quran itself, meant that Muslims came to obtain

guidance from sources other than those which provided guidance to the earliest

generation of Muslims. The dependence on scholarly commentaries on the Quran rather

than the Quran itself ensured that the later Muslims’ understanding of Islam became

essentially a derivative understanding.

Thus, renewal will require re-opening access to the primary source of the Islamic

civilization, the Quran. Within the institutions of learning, the understanding of

knowledge will need to be broadened, to include comprehension of the text of the Quran

in addition to learning how to recite it. Taqlid will have to make way to a greater

utilization of the mind.

The view that a commitment to faith somehow requires a person to abandon the

use of his reason may be a result of a misunderstanding of attaining religious

consciousness. A commitment to “faith” properly understood does not require the

believer to abdicate the use of his reason.

On the contrary, “faith” requires the engagement of the mind not only at the

empirical but also at the intuitive level. At the basic level, sense perception alerts the

believer to the visible “signs” (ayat) of God. The intellect in turn draws the necessary

inferences from this perception. At the higher (intuitive) level, the intellect or more

precisely what the Quran calls the “heart,” enables the believer to grasp the reality that

lies beyond the totality of what can be accessed by mere sense perception.

• Taqlid needs to be addressed and reliance on the works of past scholars needs to be

reduced.

• A balance in the pursuit of present-day and religious knowledge needs to be re-

established.

• It is recommended to widen the utilization of student centered learning.

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• Tradition should be effectively distinguished from revelation.

Endnotes

1 The word “knowledge” (‘ilm) is mentioned in the Quran more than 700 times in 87

different forms. The Institute of Islamic Knowledge, accessed online on 5 September 2014,

<http://al-quraan.org/about_us.html>

2 Asad, Muhammad, The Message of the Quran, Dar al-Andalus, Gibraltar, 1980, p. i.

3 AbuSulayman, AbdulHamid, Crisis in the Muslim Mind, The International Institute of

Islamic Thought, Herndon, USA, 1993, p. 68, accessed online on 26 March 2014,

<http://deenrc.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/crisis-in-the-muslim-mind-by-abdulhamid-

abusulayman.pdf>

4 One account of modern efforts to respond to the rigidity in usul al-fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) caused by taqlid may be found in David Johnston, “A turn in the

epistemology and hermeneutics of twentieth century usul al-fiqh,” Islamic Law and

Society, Vol. 11, No. 2, Brill, 2004, pp. 233-282; accessed online on 27 Aug. 2014,

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3399305>

5 Al ‘Alwani, Taha J. “Taqlid and the stagnation of the Muslim mind,” The American

Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 8. No. 3, 1991, pp. 513-524, p. 522, accessed

online on 5 September 2014;

<http://i-epistemology.net/attachments/393_V8N3%20December%2091%20-

%20TJ%20Al%20Alwani%20-%20Taqlid%20and%20Stagnation.pdf>

6 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim “Reading the Signs: A Quranic Perspective on Thinking,” Islam and Science, Volume 4, Winter 2006, Number 2, p. 161.

7 Al ‘Alwani, Taha J. “Taqlid and Ijtihad,” The American Journal of Islamic Social

Sciences, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 1992, jointly published by The Association of Muslim

Social Scientists and The International Institute of Islamic Thought, p. 233.

8 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihad, Islamic

Book Trust, Kuala Lumpur, 2002, p. 10.

9 Calder, Norman, Joseph A. Kechichian, Farhat J. Ziadeh, Abdulaziz Sachedina, Jocelyn

Hendrickson, Ann Elizabeth Mayer and Intisar A. Rabb, “Law,” Oxford Encyclopedia of

the Islamic World, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, accessed on Jan 5, 2015.

<http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0473>

10 Ijtihad is the effort by a qualified jurist to arrive at a ruling (hukm) of the Shariah (Islamic

law), based on textual evidence, to a new problem to which no text (nass) appears to apply.

See Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Second revised

edition, Ilmiah Publishers, 1991, p. 366.

11 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim “Methodological Issues in Islamic Jurisprudence,” Arab

Law Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1, Brill, 1996, pp. 3-33, p. 6; accessed online on 27 Aug. 2014,


12 The effects of taqlid on human reason were in a sense the exact opposite of the effects of the European Enlightenment, which elevated human reason to a status higher than was

the case during the time of Church dominance.

12






14 See Q. 5:104-5, 17:36, 21:52-54, and 43:22-24.

15 Murad, Abdal-Hakim, “Understanding the Four Madhhabs,” revised edition now with

footnotes (for Sidi Azhar Usman) p. 33, accessed online on 7 August 2014;

<http://www.teachislam.com/dmdocuments/fiqh_understanding_the_four_madhhabs.pd>

16 Abdelaal Mohamed A. “Taqlid v. Ijtihad: The Rise of Taqlid as the Secondary Judicial

Approach in Islamic Jurisprudence,” The Journal of Jurisprudence, HeinOnline, 2012, pp.

171 – 172, accessed online on 12 Jan. 2015;

<http://www.jurisprudence.com.au/juris14/abdelaal.pdf>

17 Fadel Mohammad, “The Social Logic of Taqlid and the Rise of the Mukhatasar,” Islamic

Law and Society, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1996, pp. 193 - 233.

18 A number of classical Muslim scholars rejected taqlid. See for example, Montada, Josep Puig, “Reason and Reasoning in Ibn Hazm of Cordova (d. 1064),” Studia Islamica, No. 92,

Maisonneuve & Larose, 2001, pp. 165 -185, p. 170; accessed online on 25 Aug. 2014;



20 Butti Sultan Butti Ali al Muhairi, “Islamisation and Modernisation within the UAE Penal

Law: Shari’ah in the Pre-Modern Period,” Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1995, Brill,

pp. 300 – 301, accessed online on 6 August 2014;


21 Zaman, Muhammad Qasim, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, Islam in Modern South Asia,

Oneworld, Oxford, 2007, p. 60, accessed online on 6 Jan. 2015;

http://www.wisdomfort.com/books/WF_English_Books/History_Biographies/ENG_Histo

ry_Biographies_003_MawlanaAshrafAliThanwi_MQasimZaman.pdf

22 Bayat, Zubair Ismail, The Concept of Taqlid or Ittiba’ in Islamic Law, Dissertation

submitted for Master of Arts degree, May 1995, Rand Afrikaans University, pp. 45, 65, 13,

48, 68 accessed online on 8 Jan. 2015;

<https://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10210/12889/bayat_zubair_i_1995_master

%20of%20arts%20in%20islamic%20studies.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

23 Butti Sultan Butti Ali al Muhairi, “Islamisation and Modernisation within the UAE Penal Law: Shari’ah in the Pre-Modern Period,” Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1995, Brill,

pp. 300 – 301, accessed online on 6 August 2014;


24 What is at times overlooked, however, is that even an appeal to authority, whether divine

or scholarly, requires the use of language, and with language a method of structuring it.

The methodology of structuring statements (syntax or grammar) in turn presupposes a

distinction between meaningful and meaningless statements. In all statements, logic or lack

13

of it, plays a significant role. Meaningful statements require the use of valid (logical)

inferences. When inferences are made in an illogical way, conclusions may become

unreliable.

For example, a meaningful inference ought to be free of inconsistencies. A statement

cannot be true and false at the same time. Where contradictions emerge, one of the

statements becomes untenable. A significant part of scholarly effort thus needs to be

directed to the resolution of contradictions and inconsistencies, whether apparent or real.

What also tends to be overlooked is that the human intellect (‘aql) becomes active not

merely when one applies the fourth methodology of arriving at a ruling of the Shariah,

known as ijtihad or juristic effort. The intellect has to be applied with every source of the

Shariah, beginning with the Quran, and likewise with the additional roots of the law. One

should not refer to the Quran without utilizing the intellect.


26 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim “Methodological Issues in Islamic Jurisprudence,” Arab

Law Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1, Brill, 1996, pp. 3-33, p. 6; accessed online on 27 Aug. 2014,


27 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihad,

Islamic Book Trust, Kuala Lumpur, 2002, p. 10.

28 Halstead, J. M. “An Islamic concept of education,” Comparative Education, Vol. 40, No.

4, Special Issue (29): Philosophy, Education and Comparative Education (Nov., 2004),

Taylor and Francis Group, pp. 517-529, p. 526, accessed online on 23 August 2014,









32 AbuSulayman, AbdulHamid, Crisis in the Muslim Mind, The International Institute of

Islamic Thought, Herndon, USA, 1993, p. 36, accessed online on 26 March 2014,

<http://deenrc.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/crisis-in-the-muslim-mind-by-abdulhamid-

abusulayman.pdf>

33 Badawi, M.A. Zaki “Islamic Studies in British Universities: Challenges and Prospects,” in Islamic Studies in World Institutions of Higher Learning, Islamic University College of

Malaysia, 2004, p. 9.



35 While the Arabic islah is typically rendered as “reform,” it has a broader meaning. Islah

also means “repairing,” “rebuilding” or “restoring” something to its original condition. In

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general islah aims to overcome corruption (fasad). Thus, the term islah has a distinctively

ethical connotation. By contrast, the term tajdid is generally translated as “renewal” or

“restoration.” Moreover, the term islah is a Quranic term, while the expression tajdid is to

be found in the prophetic traditions. See Mohamed Abubakr A al-Musleh, Al Al-Ghazali

as an Islamic Reformer (Muslih), A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for

the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Theology & Religion School of Historical Studies The University of Birmingham July 2007, University of Birmingham

Research Archive e-theses repository, pp. 31-33, accessed online on 16 April 2014,

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/172931962/AL-GHAZĀLĪ-AS-AN-ISLAMIC-

REFORMER-MUSLIH>



37 Asad, Muhammad, The Message of the Quran, Dar al-Andalus, Gibraltar, 1980, p. iii.

38 Badawi Abdullah, Islam Hadhari: A Model Approach for Development and Progress, p.

169.

39 Badawi Abdullah, Islam Hadhari: A Model Approach for Development and Progress, p.

39

40 For a critique of taqlid by 19th century scholars, see for example Ahmad Aziz, “Sayyid

Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-din al-Afghani and Muslim India,” Studia Islamica, No. 13,

Maisonneuve & Larose, 1960, pp. 55-78, accessed online on 17 September 2014,

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595240?origin=JSTOR-pdf>

41 Asad, Muhammad, The Message of the Quran, Dar al-Andalus, Gibraltar, 1980, p. viii.

42 This advice is rooted in the view that the reader “should not follow his own opinion”

about the meaning of the Quran, as he is likely to be led astray by his own desires (ahwa). Bayat, Zubair Ismail, The Concept of Taqlid or Ittiba’ in Islamic Law, Dissertation

submitted for Master of Arts degree, May 1995, Rand Afrikaans University, pp. 17, 81, 83,

85, 87, 96, 98, 102, 104, 143; accessed online on 8 Jan. 2015;

<https://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10210/12889/bayat_zubair_i_1995_master

%20of%20arts%20in%20islamic%20studies.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

43 Quran, 54:17, 54:22, 54:32, 54:40.

44 The Arabic term fiqh underwent a change in meaning that was not unlike the change in

the meaning of ijtihad, as noted above. However, while the meaning of ijtihad became

broader, the meaning of fiqh became narrower.

Fiqh originally had a broad meaning. It signified “thinking” or “understanding,” in general. However, as time passed, the meaning of fiqh narrowed to mean “law,” “Shariah,” or

“Islamic law.”

The combined effects of the changes in the meaning of ijtihad and fiqh would imply that

“thinking,” “understanding” or “independent reasoning” was a prerogative of jurists. In

both cases, the changes would have the effect of dissuading the public from even attempting

to “understand” Islamic law. In ijtihad, this would affect even jurists who were expected to

follow in the footsteps of their predecessors.

15







49 Sikand, Yoginder, “Reforming the Indian Madrassas: Contemporary Muslim Voices,” p.

136, accessed online on 12 August 2014;

<http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/Pagesfrom

ReligiousRadicalismandSecurityinSouthAsiach6.pdf>

50 A number of scholars argued for a more intellectual approach in education. For example,

“Muhammad ‘Abduh (b. 1849–d. 1905) was a chief reformer in the movement of Islamic

reform that sprang from Egypt in the late 19th century. He engaged in reform in a time

when Muslim society was in a period of stagnation and decline … His arguments for Islamic reform were firmly grounded within the Islamic discursive tradition that allows for

a critical mode of human reasoning (ijtihad), as distinguished from one opposed to

unreasoned acceptance of established religious authority (taqlid).” Oxford Bibliographies,

accessed online on 22 December 2014;

<http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-

9780195390155-0001.xml>

51 The institution is the Muslim College in London, UK. Badawi, M.A. Zaki “Islamic

Studies in British Universities: Challenges and Prospects,” in Islamic Studies in World

Institutions of Higher Learning, Islamic University College of Malaysia, 2004, pp. 10 – 11.


53 Asad, Muhammad, The Message of the Quran, Dar al-Andalus, Gibraltar, 1980, p. iii.





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