Addressing Supply Chain Security with Split Manufacturing
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Transcript of Addressing Supply Chain Security with Split Manufacturing
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Addressing Supply Chain Security with Split Manufacturing
Ted HuffmireSummer UCI CECS Seminar
July 27, 2012
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Disclaimer
• The views presented in this talk are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Department of Defense.
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Outline
• Motivation and Background• Option 1: Reconfigurable Hardware• Option 2: 2D Split Manufacturing• Option 3: 3D Split Manufacturing• Conclusions and Future Work
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Motivation and Background
• Motivation and Background• Option 1: Reconfigurable Hardware• Option 2: 2D Split Manufacturing• Option 3: 3D Split Manufacturing• Conclusions and Future Work
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What is Hardware Security?• Many of the issues of hardware security are similar to
traditional computer security– Malware, authentication, program analysis, patches, insiders, social
engineering, developmental attacks, evaluation, certification and accreditation, flawed implementations, protocols, system-level issues, network security, usability, economic incentives, complexity.
• Anything can be hacked, but the attacker has finite resources. – Shades of grey rather than black-and-white (“broken” or not)– Make attackers toil, and design systems that “win” decisively– Each security technique has its advantages and disadvantages, and
we must understand each technique's limitations. Even crypto has limitations. We need to know what specific attacks each technique is capable of preventing.
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What is Hardware Security?
• Opportunities of hardware– High performance
• Custom processors for crypto, deep packet inspection, etc.
– Direct control– No intermediate OS layers– Physical separation
• Challenges– Semantic gap– Engineering and fabrication costs
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What is Hardware Security?• Foundry Trust
– Malicious Hardware (a.k.a. “gate-ware”)• Trojan Horse, Rootkit, Kill Switch
– Design Theft (Protecting Intellectual Property)– Start with a secure design before addressing fabrication security
• Operational Attacks– Power Analysis, Fault Injection, Heating, Optical– Cold Boot, Probing, Math Errors
• Developmental Attacks– Malicious Design Tools– Malicious IP
• System Assurance– Security Architecture, Key Management, PUFs– Formal analysis of IP cores (not a panacea)
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What is Hardware Security?• Interfaces [Schaumont 2009]
– Secure hardware is part of a bigger system.– Secure hardware interfaces are tricky:
• How do you distinguish red wires from black wires? – Secure hardware interfaces do not exist yet! – Current secure hardware serves software
• Composition [Schaumont 2009]– This is not trivial. – To resist side channels, you must avoid redundancy. – However, fault tolerance requires increasing redundancy. – How can you build fault-tolerant, side channel resistant systems?
• Metrics [Schaumont 2009]– Security is dimensionless. – Metrics are absolutely necessary to do meaningful research.– Without metrics, it is impossible to analyze trade-offs.
• Education: Electrical Engineers are trained to make things happen rather than to make bad things NOT happen [Schaumont 2009]
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Trustworthy Tools and IP
• Stripped-down alternative design flow
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Option 1
• Motivation and Background• Option 1: Reconfigurable Hardware• Option 2: 2D Split Manufacturing• Option 3: 3D Split Manufacturing• Conclusions and Future Work
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Tradeoffs
• Software vs. Hardware– Generality vs. performance– FPGAs are in between
• ASIC performance comes at a high NRE cost– Fabrication– Verification
• Security– IP is vulnerable in overseas foundries– Reduce problem of trusting foundry to problem of
trusting FPGA
CPU ASICFPGA
General-Purpose Application-Specific
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Option 0?
• Running software on a CPU– Software is loaded onto the CPU in a secure facility
after fabrication• Coprocessor
– One chip is manufactured in a trusted foundry; the other in an overseas foundry
– The two reside on the same circuit board
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Reconfigurable Hardware
• FPGA Fabric
SDRAM (off-chip)
DRAM
DRAM
DRAM
DRAM
DRAM
DRAM
DRAM
DRAM
DRAM
DRAM
DRAM
DRAM
FPGA chip
μP
μP
μP
μPSR
AM B
lock
BRAM
BRAM
BRAM
BRAM
BRAM
BRAM
BRAM
BRAM
FPGA Fabric
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Trusted Design in FPGAs
• Source: [Trimberger 2007]
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Option 2
• Motivation and Background• Option 1: Reconfigurable Hardware• Option 2: 2D Split Manufacturing• Option 3: 3D Split Manufacturing• Conclusions and Future Work
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2D Split Manufacturing
• Design in the US• Fabricate through the first or second metal
layer at an insecure facility• Finish the metal layers 2 through 12 in a
trusted facility
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2D Split Manufacturing
• To achieve this, the IARPA TIC Program will use a FEOL and BEOL set of processes– FEOL = Front End of Line– BEOL = Back End of Line
• The final ASIC is the result of the combined FEOL and BEOL processes
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2D Split Manufacturing
• Questions– What is the interface?
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2D Split Manufacturing
• Source– http://www.iarpa.gov/solicitations_tic.html– http://www.iarpa.gov/TIC_Presentations/
TIC_Proposers_Day_20110727.pdf
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Option 3
• Motivation and Background• Option 1: Reconfigurable Hardware• Option 2: 2D Split Manufacturing• Option 3: 3D Split Manufacturing• Conclusions and Future Work
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[Koyanagi05]
•
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[Koyanagi05]
• Timeline
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Alternative 3-D Approaches
• PoP [Lim10]
Wire Bonding (SiP) [Amkor09]
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Alternative 3-D Approaches
• PoP [Lim10]
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Alternative 3-D Approaches
• [Amkor10]
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Examples of 3-D Systems
• Network-on-Chip [Kim07]
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Examples of 3-D Systems
• Network-on-Chip [Kim07]
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Examples of 3-D Systems
• Particle Physics [Demarteau09]
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Examples of 3-D Systems
• Chip Scale Camera Module [Yoshikawa09]
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Examples of 3-D Systems
• 3D-PIC 3-D CMOS Imager [Chang10]
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Examples of 3-D Systems
• 3-D Stacked Retinal Chip [Kaiho09]
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Examples of 3-D Systems
• 3-D Stacked Retinal Chip [Koyanagi05]
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Medical Image Processing
• [Cong 2011]
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Examples of 3-D Systems
• 3-D FPGAs [Razavi09]
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Examples of 3-D Systems
• 3D-MAPS: Many-core 3-D Processor with Stacked Memory [Lim10]
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Some Data on 3D• [Kim 2012] 64 CPU cores joined with 256K of SRAM: 63.8GB/s memory bandwidth• [Yoshikawa 2009] CMOS image sensor: 55% reduction in volume and 36% reduction in
footprint• [Loh 2007] 3D floor plan for Pentium 4: 15% improvement in performance and power;
10.3% improvement in clock frequency for Alpha 21364; 3D version of dynamic non-uniform cache architecture reduces L2 access time by 50%; 3D stacking can allow the cache size to increase, reducing average memory access latency by 13% and reducing off-chip bandwidth by 3x
• [Black 2006] 3D stacked DRAM cache can reduce cycles per memory access by 13% on average and by as much as 55% while reducing off-chip bandwidth and power by 55%
• [Loh 2008] Optimizations to 3D DRAM that result in 1.75x speedup over prior 3D-DRAM approaches; L2 miss handling architecture that achieves an extra 17.8% performance improvement
• [Puttaswamy 2005] 3D-partitioned cache can reduce latency by 21.5%, reduce energy consumption by 30.9%, and increase IPC by 12%.
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What is 3Dsec?
• Economics of High Assurance– High NRE Cost, Low Volume– Gap between DoD and Commercial
• Disentangle security from the COTS– Use a separate chip for security– Use 3-D Integration to combine:
• 3-D Control Plane• Computation Plane
– Need to add posts to the COTS chip design• Dual use of computation plane
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Trustworthy System Security through 3-D Integrated Hardware3DSec:
Secu
rity
Laye
rPr
oces
sor
Laye
r
Cross Section
Post
Silicon Layer 2
Silicon Layer 1
Goal: Build trustworthy systems using commercial hardware components
Problem: Integrating specialized security mechanisms is too costly for hardware vendors
Idea: Augment commodity hardware after fabrication with a separate layer of security circuitry
Anticipated Benefits:
Configurable, protected, low-cost hardware security controls that can override activity in the commodity hardware
Privacy Applications:
Detect and intercept the execution of malicious code
Prevent the microprocessor internals from being exploited to leak crypto keys
Tag and Track private information as it flows through a processor
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Pro’s and Con’s
• Why not use a co-processor? On-chip?• Pro’s
– High bandwidth and low latency– Controlled lineage– Direct access to internal structures
• Con’s– Thermal and cooling– Design and testing– Manufacturing yield
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Cost
• Cost of fabricating systems with 3-D– Fabricating and testing the security layer– Bonding it to the host layer– Fabricating the vias– Testing the joined unit
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Circuit-Level Modifications
• Passive vs. Active Monitoring• Tapping• Re-routing• Overriding• Disabling
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3-D Application Classes
• Enhancement of native functions• Secure alternate service• Isolation and protection• Passive monitoring
– Information flow tracking– Runtime correctness checks– Runtime security auditing
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Self-Protection and Dependency Layering
• Can a 3-D control plane provide useful secure services when it is conjoined with an untrustworthy computation plane?
• Yes, provided:– Self-protection– Dependency Layering
• Applies to overseas foundry– Option 1: FPGA fabric– Option 2: FEOL layer(s)– Option 3: computation plane
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Conclusions and Future Work
• Motivation and Background• Option 1: Reconfigurable Hardware• Option 2: 2D Split Manufacturing• Option 3: 3D Split Manufacturing• Conclusions and Future Work
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Conclusions
• Option 1– Design never goes to foundry– Simple and inexpensive– Bit-stream decryption mechanism is vulnerable to
side channel attack on fielded device.– Caution: Attacker can cause serious harm by
modifying the FPGA fabric even without knowledge of the final design to be loaded onto the FPGA
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Conclusions
• Option 2– Only BEOL knows connections between devices
made in FEOL stage– What is the interface between FEOL, BEOL?– Cost? Complexity? Feasibility?– Caution: Attacker can cause serious harm by
modifying FEOL layer(s) even without knowledge of BEOL layers.
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Conclusions
• Option 3– Computation plane manufactured in untrusted
foundry, control plane manufactured in trusted foundry
– Caution: attacker can cause harm by modifying computation plane even without knowledge of control plane.
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Conclusions
• Option 3– 3D probing for testing purposes is harder for 3D
than for 2D– It is not trivial to chemically remove package of
3DIC, break bond between tiers, and tap the TSVs– Tiers are tightly bonded and have no exposed
shared buses or I/O pins– Future work: secure protocols between tiers
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Conclusions
• Option 2 vs. Option 3– Both are challenging. What is the interface?– Option 2: Can we depend on untrusted FEOL devices?
Can we protect ourselves from them? Can same FEOL wafer design be used for many different BEOL designs? Can we tap, override, disable, reroute, etc.? Can we decouple security and non-security functionality?
– Option 3: Can we use untrusted computation plane? Can we protect ourselves from them? Can same computation plane be used with many different control planes (or alone)?
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Split Manufacturing
• Discussion Points– Can we trust the result of split manufacturing?– Could this approach harm security?– What are the challenges of 2D?– What are the challenges of 3D?– Is it worth it? When is it worth it?– Why not use trusted foundry always?– Are trusted foundries a band aid solution to offshoring
trend?– Can we do everything from scratch?
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Questions?
• faculty.nps.edu/tdhuffmi
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Additional Slides
• Additional slides
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Split Manufacturing
• 2-D• 3-D
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Face-to-Back Bonding
• Rerouting bus signals