Actions Speak Louder Than Words SI 03-Libre

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Symbolic Interaction, Volume 26, Number 3, pages 405426, ISSN 0195-6086; online ISSN 1533-8665.

2003 by the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction. All rights reserved.Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press,Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.

Direct all correspondence to Clinton R. Sanders, Department of Sociology, Box U-2068, University ofConnecticut, Storrs, CT 06269; e-mail: [email protected].

Actions Speak Louder than Words:Close Relationships between Humansand Nonhuman Animals

Clinton R. SandersUniversity of Connecticut

Symbolic interactionism and other sociological perspectives traditionallyhave not attended to a significant form of close relationshipthat whichexists between people and the companion animals with whom they sharetheir everyday lives. After a brief presentation of a portion of the relevantliterature that deals with how humans understand and interact with theiranimal companions, I present the process by which caretakers come todefine the unique identities of their animals and the ways in which thehuman-animal couple identity shapes public interaction. Since play, mutual

gaze, and speaking for animals are key elements of friendly human-animalinteraction, I discuss these activities as central to the process by whichcaretakers establish and express intersubjective connections with their ani-mals. Finally, I maintain that attention to human-animal relationships holds

promise for advancing an appreciative understanding of how personhood,mind, and culture are constructed in the process of interaction. Of special

significance to the broadening of the interactionist perspective is that theunderstandings and emotional connections that bind people and their ani-mals are created and maintained in the absence of a shared body of lin-

guistic symbols.

Relationships, which are composed of routine and patterned interactions, are cen-

tral to the symbolic interactionist view of social life. Relationships range from those

that are instrumental, emotionally uninvolving, and typically of short duration to

those that are intrinsically rewarding and long-term and in which participants have

considerable emotional stake. Conventionally, interactionists and other analysts ofsocial life have seen the interdependence, commitment, and emotionality of close

relationships as existing within, and sustained by, the symbolic exchanges of hu-

mans. I maintain that this characterization of close relationships is overly restrictive.

It excludes from consideration a class of affiliations that are commonplace,1 imbued


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406 Symbolic Interaction

Volume 26, Number 3, 2003

with emotion, and central to the shaping of the identities and selves of those in-

volved. Traditionally, conventional sociologists (e.g., Perrow 2000:473) have ignored

or denigrated relationships between people and their companion animals. How-ever, the intense, involving, and routine interactions forming these relations are

worthy of serious attention and have the potential of adding significantly to the so-

ciology of intimate exchanges.

Until fairly recently, sociologists have disregarded human-animal relationships.2

Constrained by what Rollin (1997) calls the commonsense of science, sociology

routinely has portrayed nonhuman animals as mindless, emotionless, self-less, react-

ing rather than acting, apprehending rather than comprehending, and existing only

in the immediately situation.3 It has defined peoples associations with them as fic-

tive or the consequence of anthropomorphic folk delusions.

This dismissal is based largely on the linguicentric Cartesian assumption that,lacking the ability to use symbols, nonhuman animals are qualitatively distinct from

humans. George Herbert Mead (1907, 1962) frequently used examples of non-

human animals as a backdrop to his discussion of the (supposedly) unique abilities

of humans to construct meaning; to engage in minded behavior; and to create, re-

flect on, and present the self. Lacking the basic resource of symbolization, animals

could not think or engage in the complex form of social interaction premised on

shared symbols.

The animal does not think. . . . In order that thought may exist there must besymbols, vocal gestures generally, which arouse in the individual himself the re-sponse which he is calling out in the other, and such that from the point of viewof that response he is able to direct his later conduct. (Mead 1962:73)

Following Meads lead, symbolic interactionists and other sociologists consistently

have excluded animals from serious consideration, since, not being human, [they]

can in no way be social or cultural beings as this would be a contradiction in terms

(Noske 1989:8283).

In the following discussion, I reexamine close relationships to move beyond the

limiting anthropocentric orthodoxy that presents the bonds and interactions be-

tween humans and nonhuman animals as qualitatively different fromand, by im-plication, inferior tothose between humans. Following a brief overview of the key

discussions of human-animal relationships that exist, I examine the relevance of

this type of social exchange for identity. Here I present the central issue of how

people come to ascertain the unique identities of their companion animals while in-

teracting with them. I also emphasize how a close relationship with a companion

animal shapes the human caretakers identity both as an individual and as a member

of the human-animal couple.

Next, I turn to examine the close relationship with a companion animal as a form

of friendship. Like human-to-human friendships, those between people and com-panion animals assume intersubjectivity. Play, as I argue, requires participants to

evaluate the situation, define the perspective of the other, andin the context of


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Actions Speak Louder than Words

407

mutually understood rulesmake decisions about how to act in concert. In addi-

tion, I discuss gaze and mutual direction of attention as central elements of the inter-

subjectivity that supports interspecies friendship. This section on human-animalfriendship concludes with a brief presentation of a typical feature of the relation-

ship. Caretakers commonly give voice to what they understand to be the thoughts

and feelings of their animal companions. This process of speaking for demon-

strates the practical definition of the (animal) other that arises out of routine rela-

tional experience.

After discussing central components of human friendships with animals and

showing how these relationships are established and sustained, I suggest three is-

sues of basic interest that we may conceptualize more broadly and fruitfully explore

by directing systematic attention to interspecies relationships. First, I maintain that

a sociology of human-animal relationships provides a rich context in which to ex-plore how we construct and assign the designation person. Next, I present the is-

sue of mindedness and argue that the conventional, linguicentric perspective on

mind-as-internal-conversation is inadequate and confining. In contrast, I propose

an expanded view of mind that, like personhood, we can best understand as arising

out of social interaction. In essence, I maintain that people do mind as a coopera-

tive interpretive process that does not depend on the ability of all parties to express

their thoughts lingustically. Finally, I discuss culture as a collection of shared under-

standings that arises out of face-to-face interaction. Culture provides the basis for

evaluating immediate situations, interpreting the perspective of others, and devisingmeans for achieving goals, and, as such, it establishes the foundation for effective

collective action. As caretakers pursue the everyday routines that express and solid-

ify their relationships with their animal companions, they cooperatively create a

private, interspecies culture that is simple and immediate and acts as an effective

practical basis for interaction.

Identity, personhood, empathy, love, mindedness, culture, and other key issues

are of considerable interest to interactionists and are of central relevance for the so-

ciology of close relationships. The central point of this article is that these key issues

may be fruitfully explored if we turn serious and appreciative attention to the human-

animal bond and the social exchanges that both define and result from this uniqueform of sociation. This task requires that we move beyond the analytic restraints

imposed by the presumption that shared symbols are the sole foundation for real

intimate relationships and authentic interactions.

THE LITERATURE ON HUMAN-ANIMAL RELATIONSHIPS

Since Bryant (1979) advocated that increased attention should be paid to the zoo-

logical connection, analysts of social behavior from a variety of disciplines have

been heeding his call. Due to early interest in the therapeutic utility of interactionswith animals (Levinson 1965), a significant proportion of the extant literature has

focused on the positive impact of relationships with animals on the physical and


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psychological well-being of their human partners (e.g., Baun et al. 1984; Beck and

Katcher 1996:12559; Friedmann et al. 1980; Hendy 1984). A related body of work

has examined the uniquely intense relationships between people with disabilitiesand their assistance animals. These works highlight the impact of the human-animal

relationship on peoples identities and self-definitions (e.g., Michalko 1999; Sanders

2000), emotional health (e.g., Valentine, Kiddoo, and LaFleur 1993; Zee 1983), and

public encounters (e.g., Hart, Hart, and Bergin 1987; Warnath and Seyfarth 1982).

Since peoples interactions with companion animals typically occur in the family

context, the place of animals in familial relationships has received considerable at-

tention. This literature regards household pets as full-fledged participants in the

family system (e.g., Cain 1983, 1985; Hickrod and Schmitt 1982) and as playing a

significant role in shaping relationships among human family members (e.g., Beck

and Katcher 1996:4062; Smith 1983).Arguably, the richest body of literature dealing with human-animal relationships

focuses on how people come to define their animal companions as unique individu-

als, comprehend their mental experience, and organize everyday exchanges based

on these understandings. Fidler, Light, and Costall (1996), for example, interviewed

students about their evaluations of dogs thought processes after showing them a

series of videotaped sequences. They found that experienced pet caretakers were

significantly more likely to define the filmed behavior as having resulted from the

dogs understanding of the situations and responding with deliberate actions. In a

similar vein, Rassmussen, Rajecki, and Craft (1993) surveyed students to ascertaintheir perceptions of animal mentality and, in a later study, used the same research

approach to examine the defined differences between the thoughts and feelings of

dogs and humans (Rassmussen and Rajecki 1995). In general, the authors found, al-

though the students acknowledge that dogs and humans have different cognitive

abilities, they hold that the mental processes of dogs and humans are qualitatively

similar.

Studies employing ethnography, semistructured interviews, and introspective

analysis of personal experience with companion animals have added depth to the

portrayal of peoples understanding of the mentality and emotions of animals and

how they use this understanding to shape interactions and relationships. For ex-ample, Sanders (1993) discussed how dog owners come to regard their nonhuman

companions as unique, thoughtful, and emotional participants in social exchanges.

In a parallel article, Alger and Alger (1997) examined the similar perceptions and

experiences of cat owners. Focusing on human relationships with dogs and horses,

respectively, Shapiro (1990) and Wipper (2000) have emphasized the central role

played by touch in establishing the human-animal relationship and communicating

feelings and intentions in the course of interaction (see also Beck and Katcher

1996:7895).

Although this is not an exhaustive list of the growing literature on human-animalrelationships produced by analysts of social relationships and behavior, it pro-

vides ample testimony to the increased interest in the topic. As I maintain, this area of


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409

interest provides an excellent foundation for examining not only the substantive is-

sues listed above but also matters of central relevance to the interactionist study of

intimate relationships. Since companion animals typically are regarded as friendsand act as partners in everyday interaction,4 attention to peoples associations with

them can offer a unique view of how close relationships shape the construction and

communication of identity, give rise to routine interactions that express and sustain

friendship, and may be effectively grounded in empathetic understandings without

the limits imposed by language.

IDENTITY AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH COMPANION ANIMALS

Identity is a central concept in sociological psychology. Although scholars disagree

somewhat about the specific elements of the concept (Cerulo 1997; Strauss 1997;Stryker and Burke 2000), identity is, essentially, a social categorization composed of

the characteristics one uses when defining his or her self and those that are employed

by others to orient interaction. Identity is both the basis for and consequence of inter-

action. As Stone states:

[I]dentity establishes what and where the person is in social terms. . . . [W]henone has an identity, he is situatedthat is, cast in the shape of a social object byacknowledgment of his participation or membership in social relations. . . . Tohave an identity is to join with some and depart from others, to enter and leavesocial relations at once. . . . To engage meaningfully in some transactions itis enough to know merely what the parties areto know their identities.(1981:18890)

Identities arise and are employed in specific situations and serve as major defini-

tional pegs (Goffman 1963a:57) by which actors make sense of themselves, co-actors,

and the situation that encompasses and constrains their interactions. In turn, identity is

connected to actors roles, statuses, histories, and group memberships. It establishes a

persons connections to others and demonstrates his or her uniqueness from others.

CONSTRUCTING ANIMAL IDENTITYIdentity construction in the context of interspecies interaction has some unique fea-

tures in that problems involved in the linked processes of altercasting (Weinstein

and Deutschberger 1970) and taking the role of the other are reduced when coac-

tors share similar experiences, orientations, and symbol systems. Nonhuman ani-

mals do not employ conventional symbols and have perspectives markedly differ-

ent from those used by their human associates. Thus the mutual understanding and

assignment of complementary roles that are the foundation for routine collective

action typically are tentative and emergent.

Within the person-companion animal relationship the caretakers approach tothe animal-other presupposes a preexisting identity: the animal is elementally defined

as a species representative. He or she is assigned the characteristics encompassed


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by culturally shaped definitions such as cat, dog, bird, and so forth. The hu-

man actor refines this basic categorical identity (Cahill 1998:136) when he or she

takes into account the breed characteristics of the companion animal. To a certaindegree, understandings of species characteristics are an element of the general pop-

ular culture (e.g., dogs are friendly and tractable; cats are aloof and resistant to

training). Knowledge of breed characteristics is central to the subcultural worlds

that revolve around particular species and commonly is incorporated in practical

guides intended to aid inexperienced people interested in acquiring a companion

animal: Dalmatians are unpredictable, terriers are high strung and energetic,

Arabian horses are fiery, quarter horses are solid, and so forth (e.g., Hart and

Hart 1988; Pugnetti 1980; Rees 1984). Those embarking on relationships with com-

panion animals can use this basic categorical identity information to anticipate the

problems they might encounter and match their requirements and personalities tothe animal they eventually acquire.

While the defined attributes contained in species and breed categories form the

foundation for a persons assignment of a basic identity to his or her companion an-

imal, the person sees the nonhuman other as much more than a species or breed re-

presentative. Typically, the person regards the animal as an individual with an iden-

tifiable history, discrete personality, and unique tastes. For example, an experienced

dog owner interviewed by Sanders described the characteristics of her dogs breed

and then spoke of her animal companion as a unique individual who did not display

these categorical features:She wanted to be Shirley Temple, but was born a dog instead. . . . Malamutes arepeculiar dogs. Some people just dont know how to deal with them. They expectthem to be like a Golden or somethingGo over there and sit in the corner!and they just do it. You have to be strong with a Malamute. They arent that domes-ticated. They are raised to pull sleds and you want them to be able to decide thingslike if the ice is too thinto think for themselves. If you arent strong with themthen they think they are the boss and you are going to have real trouble. Shes notlike that. Shes just the sweetest. She is like that in the show ring. She makes eyes atthe judges and charms them. Shes sweet with most people. (1999:155)

In very different terms the phenomenological psychologist Shapiro describes the

centrality of shared historical experience in shaping his relationship with and feel-

ing for his dog, Sabaka:

History informs the experience of a particular animal whether or not it can tellthat history. Events in the life of an animal shape and even constitute him or her.. . . Sabaka is an individual in that he is not constituted through and I do not livetoward him as a species-specific behavioral repertoire or developmental se-quence. More positively, he is an individual in that he is both subject to and sub-

ject of true historical particulars.. . . I can not replace him, nor, ethically, can Isacrifice him for he is a unique individual being. (1989:187)

The process of assigning names to encountered objects is central to the produc-tion of the namers orientation to and action toward that object. As Strauss

(1997:2024) puts it:


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411

To name is to know and the extent of knowing is dependent upon the extent ofthe naming. . . . The act of naming is central to any humans cognition of hisworld. . . . The naming of an object provides a directive for action . . . and arouses

a set of expectations toward the object thus classified.

A major means, therefore, by which the caretaker solidifies the unique identity of

the animal companion is by assigning the animal a name. One indication of the

crucial importance of naming as a way to cast the individuality and unique identity

of an animal is that conventional ethologists5 strongly discourage the assignment of

names. Settings such as factory farms and animal shelters6 also strongly discour-

age naming. In these settings, workers conventionally regard animals as objects

rather than individual beings and believe that affording them individual identities

could potentially thwart organizational goals. Phillips (1994), for example, discusses

the strong disinclination of laboratory scientists (but not technicians) to individual-ize lab animals by assigning them names. As she points out, naming an animal

would transform it from a piece of scientific equipment into a pet. Such individ-

ualization would, in turn, make the use of the animal in painful experiments and his

or her eventual sacrifice more emotionally problematic.7

A variety of factors shape the choice of the name assigned to a companion ani-

mal. Popular culture plays a role, as humans name animals after those in films,

newspaper comics, and on television (e.g., Garfield, Tramp). The animals individual

attributes also shape this choice as he or she is named for special physical features

(e.g., Freckles, Fluffy, Brandy) or notable behaviors and interests (e.g., Nibbles,Spinner, Bones). However, the most common convention is to give the companion

animal a human name, thereby symbolically casting him or her in the role of virtual

person with uniquely individual characteristics (see Cain 1983:75; Harris 1983). As

Beck and Katcher (1996:1112) observe:

The pets name goes beyond the individuality provided by breed and the asso-ciation . . . to some word or symbol that links that animal and person. . . . Theact of naming implies that these animals are going to be given special treat-ment and that individual attributes or personalities are likely to be claimed forthem.

The pivotal importance of the companion animals name as an identity reference

point in human-animal interaction is illustrated in Mitchell and Edmonsons re-

search (1999). In their observations of play exchanges between dogs and their care-

takers, they note that the animals name was the second most repeated utterance

(next to the command Come) used during interspecies play.

THE IMPACT OF THE HUMAN-ANIMAL RELATIONSHIPON CARETAKER IDENTITY

One of the most significant connections between identity and associations with com-

panion animals is seen in the animals impact on how caretakers are socially defined.


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Historically, in Western cultures the ownership of expensive and nonfunctional

animals indicated upper-class status (Ritvo 1987; Serpell 1986:3847). In contrast,

when owned by members of the lower classes, these animals were defined as anunwarranted indulgence (Ritvo 1988:27).

To some extent, ownership of expensive, pedigreed, or rare animals continues to

demonstrate a persons economic position. More commonly, however, animal com-

panions now symbolize important elements of their caretakers lifestyles, recre-

ational interests, and self-identities (Aylesworth, Chapman, and Doscha 1999). In

addition, pet keeping demonstrates the caring and sociable nature of the person.

Lockwood (1983), for example, found that undergraduate college students rated

people pictured with animals in TAT-style scenes more sociable, happier, and less

tense than those who were not.

The identity-shaping impact of association with a companion animal is especiallyapparent when people and animals are together in public. In these circumstances

the human and animal assume a couple identity (Blumstein 1997:3089; Felmlee

and Sprecher 2000:36768) as those they encounter treat them as a unit. For good

or ill, other people socially link the identities and behaviors of people and their ani-

mal companions.

The vast majority of extant research demonstrates the positive identity effects of

being accompanied in public by an animal. Companion animals act as social facili-

tators (Robins, Sanders, and Cahill 1991).8 In one of the best-known studies of the

sociability effects of being accompanied by a companion animal, Messent (1983,1984) observed people walking in an urban park. Those with dogs spoke with

strangers more frequently during each walk and held significantly longer exchanges

than did those without a dog present (see also Rogers, Hart, and Boltz 1993).

Studies of persons with disabilities accompanied in public by their assistance ani-

mals show a similar pattern. Disabled individuals interviewed by Hart, Hart, and

Bergin (1987) reported that they had an average of eight positive encounters with

strangers when in the company of their service dogs. In contrast, they only had one

positive encounter when alone. In an observational study of wheelchair users both

with and without assistance dogs, Eddy, Hart, and Boltz (1988) found that people

accompanied by dogs received significantly more social acknowledgment than didthose without dogs.

In public situations of identity construction and display, therefore, animals serve as

social facilitators in that they are sources of mutual openness (Goffman 1963a:131

39). They offer strangers an easy and nonthreatening focus of short-term inter-

action. However, for both everyday pet owners and those who depend on service

animals, being defined as constituting a with (Goffman 1971:19) with an animal is

not always an identity-enhancing experience. The visually impaired guide dog users

interviewed by Sanders (2000), for example, spoke of their assistance animals as

sometimes stigmatizing in that they publicly demonstrated their owners degradedidentity (Goffman 1963b). In addition, the service dog frequently attracted un-

wanted attention; strangers initiated unsolicited and inconvenient interaction with


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the owner, defining him or her as an open person because of the dog (Goffman

1963a:126). For example:

The major thing that annoys me the most about having a dog has nothing to dowith the dog itself. Its going into public places like shopping malls and havingpeople kind of invading your personal space. [They want to] pet the dog, talkabout the dog, ask about the dog; their kids are going crazy over the dog. It is aninvasion of personal space. Its like when you go to the mall you are a movie staror something. You cant get anywhere and you cant get done what you want todo. It is something you get used to, but it does get to you. (Sanders 2000:135; seealso Cahill and Eggleston 1994)

The linked identity of people and their companion animals has yet another po-

tential problematic consequence. As the most responsible member of the human-

animal couple, everyone expects the person to control the animal. Consequently,when the animal bites, fails to mind the caretaker, jumps on strangers, or in other

ways breaches the boundaries of appropriate public behavior, the caretakers

identity suffers. He or she becomes the focus of others judgmental responses and

must engage in remedial work (Goffman 1971:95187) to repair the identity dam-

age and reestablish the more or less smooth flow of human-to-human interaction.

Based on observations of dog-person couples in public settings and in a puppy kin-

dergarten, Sanders (1990) details eight excusing tactics (placing blame on the im-

mediate situation, redefining the impropriety as cute, overtly disciplining the of-

fending animal, and so forth) employed by caretakers to remedy the negative identityeffects precipitated by their dogs misbehavior. Use of these remedial moves dem-

onstrates that people are aware of a negative reflection process (Cialdini and

Richardson 1980) relative to their association with their animal companions. They

recognize that their social identities are linked to the identity of the human-animal

couple in that people and their animals act together to present both collective and

individual definitions of self and the situation (Goffman 1959).

Identity, then, clearly is central to the relationship between people and compan-

ion animals. To the extent that a person is more or less successful in taking the role

of the (animal) other, his or her mutual interactions are knowable and predictable,

and then the person and his or her animal can effectively engage in collective ac-tion. Further, the persons association with the animal companion affects his or her

identity. The person-animal couple identity shapes human-to-human interactions.

In both public and private situations, the human partner must offer excuses, explain

the animals experience, exercise control, and engage in other forms of identity

work (Blumstein 1997:3089) whereby the shared identity of the human-animal

couple is displayed, enhanced, or repaired.

As with other close relationships, the linkage between the person and the animal

companion has a significant impact on the self-identity of the human partner

(Blumstein 1997). To the extent that human-animal interactions proceed more orless smoothly and rewardingly, the person incorporates certain positive elements

(responsible, knowledgeable, etc.) into his or her self-definition.9Since, as discussed


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next, a person commonly defines his or her relationship with a companion animal as

a form of friendship, routine interactional experiences within this close relationship

have special salience for the persons self-identity and general level of relationalsatisfaction.

THE HUMAN-ANIMAL FRIENDSHIP

If you want a friend for life, get a dog.Harry Truman (quoted in Rubin 1985:15)

As a general form of association, close relationships are those in which participants

mutually shape and connect their behavior, emotions, and thoughts. This inter-

dependence consists of sharing strong and enduring commitments with frequent in-

teractions (Clark and Reis 1988; Kelley et al. 1983). In friendship, a special type ofclose relationship, mutual understanding of the perspectives and routine responses

of the parties involved is of key importance (Kenny and Kashy 1994). This under-

standing allows friends to construct a stable and durable relationship and provides

the foundation for anticipating a mutual future (Blumstein 1997:316; Hays 1989:34).

In turn, friendships are emotionally rich because friends share companionship, pro-

vide mutual support, act as confidants, and enjoy shared activities. Emotional con-

nectedness assumes that friends like each other, see each other as warm and sup-

portive, and recognize each others unique and appealing personal characteristics

(Sprecher 1998). People symbolize and reinforce their friendship relationship byclose proximity, physical contact, and mutual gaze (Argyle 1992:5657; Fehr 2000).

People commonly understand their connections to companion animals through

defining them as members of the family (Cain 1983; Voith 1983). Alternatively, or

in conjunction with this familial incorporation, caretakers most commonly define

their pets as special or close friends (Nieburg and Fischer 1982; Stallones et al.

1988). They understand and sustain their friendships with animal companions in

much the same way as they do human-to-human friendships. The partners in the re-

lationship spend time together and share routine activities. People feed, groom,

touch, speak to, and incorporate their pets into holidays and other ritual events

(Alger and Alger 1997; Sanders 1993; Smith 1983).Play is a social activity in which players direct their actions toward a mutually de-

fined goal, but shared understandings about appropriate moves and counter-

moves constrain the means of achieving this goal. Play participants recognize that

the interaction is supposed to be frivolous or pleasurable (Mitchell 1990:200204).

Mutual play is a central mode of interaction between people and their nonhuman

friends.10 In contrast to human-with-human play, in which competition is a central

factor, human-animal play does not have winners or losers since keeping the play

interaction going is the primary shared goal. In addition, because human and ani-

mal players have different levels of mental and physical ability (humans are moredeceitful and animals more agile, for example), participants must learn to adjust

their efforts in order to sustain the play interaction (Beck and Katcher 1996:3133).


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415

In other words, both person and companion animal must, in a rudimentary way,

take the role of the other and adjust their actions on the basis of this orientation.

Human-animal play requires that the players communicate the definition of thesituation and the rules and goals of the game through their actions. Mechling em-

phasizes the communicative nature of play in describing interaction with his Labrador,

Sunshine:

The game of fetch was truly interactive. I was not always in control of the game.Sometimes Sunshine would fetch the ball but stop on the way back to me someten feet away. He would begin a slow retriever stalk, then drop the ball in frontof him and assume the familiar canine play bowforepaws extended flat onthe ground, the body sloping upward toward his erect hind-quarters, tail wag-ging. This is the canine invitation to play. In this case, however, we were already

engaged in a game, so his message to me was that he, too, could exert somepower and control in the game. (1989:313; see also Shapiro 1990:186)

As a routine form of friendly interaction, then, human-animal play involves com-

municating a mutual definition of the situation and designating certain physical ob-

jects as game pieces. Playing necessitates that the players recognize and antici-

pate each others orientations and expectations (Allen and Bekoff 1997:87114;

Mitchell and Thompson 1986). Although ostensibly frivolous, play is a key example

of human-animal communication. Within its mutually understood boundaries the

players honestly or deviously signal their intentions, adjust and shape their own and

the others actions, and reinforce the communicative connection at the heart ofeffective collective action.

Shared focus of attention and mutual eye contact are central to all forms of face-

to-face interaction (Duncan and Fisk 1977:8088; Kendon 1977:1351), but they are

of special significance in interactions between friends. Sharing attention demon-

strates a measure of shared subjectivity (Myers 1998:95, 98). Sanders, using obser-

vations made while interacting with his companion dogs, discusses the importance

of mutual gaze and its implications for taking the role of the other:

When [the dogs] look at me they usually pay attention to my eyes. I have noticedon walks how important looking is to them. A common way that one will com-

municate to the other that she wants to play is by staring. During play they havea variety of ways of signaling time out. In addition to stopping and avidly sniff-ing someplace, a player can effectively suspend the game by staring fixedly offinto the middle distance. The other dog typically responds to this move by look-ing to see if there is actually anything important to look at. They do the samewith me. If on the walk I stop and look in a particular direction, they will stop,glance at me, and gaze off in the direction I am looking. This seems a fairly clearindication of their elemental ability to put themselves into my perspective. In aliteral sense they attempt to assume my point of view. If I look at somethingthey conclude that it is probably something important. (1999:144)

Sustained eye contact signals the close character of the relationship to coactors(Argyle 1992:50) and to those in their presence (Goffman 1971:188237). The re-

search on peoples interactions with their companion animals (e.g., Cain 1985;


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Sanders 1999:143) shows that mutual face gazing is an extremely common form of

nonverbal interaction. As in close human relationships, sustained eye contact is an el-

ement of intimacy that symbolizes and reinforces the human-animal connection, andattention to facial expression provides interactantsboth human and animalwith

information about the subjective experience of the other. In their observations of

the interactions between veterinary clients and their animals in a waiting room,

Beck and Katcher (1996:43, 8589) noted that a person would frequently hold the

animals head and stare into his or her eyes in much the same way parents make eye

contact with their children.

The ability to give voice to what another is thinking is a key indicator of intersub-

jectivity and an important element of the mutual knowledge of the other shared by

intimates. This activity is commonly seen when parents speak for their infant children

(what Kaye [1982:182] terms the he says phenomenon) and is an important factorin defining the nonlinguistic other as a person (Cahill 1998:13940; Goffman 1981:86

87). This display of intersubjectivity is also a common feature of peoples relation-

ships with their companion animals. Myers (1998:12), for example, notes how the

nursery school children he observed tended to put words in the mouth of the ani-

mals with whom they interacted. Similarly, Arluke and Sanders (1996:6181), using

observations of human-animal interactions in a veterinary clinic, describe a number

of examples of people giving voice to what was on the [animals] mind. Frequently,

speaking for the animal is primed when the caretaker asks the animal a question

and then voices his or her response. In the veterinary clinic clients would commonlyspeak for the patient when describing the symptoms that precipitated the visit. In

speaking for his or her animal in this way, the person demonstrates special knowledge

of the other and cooperatively constructs the mind of the nonhuman friend.

All of these friendly routines are sustained within a highly emotionalized rela-

tionship. Caretakers regularly speak of the ability of their animals to feel emotion11

and empathically understand the emotions of their human friends (Alger and Alger

1997; Sanders 1993). This understanding of the others emotional experience orients

the human actors behavior toward the animal and acts as a practical basis for suc-

cessful and satisfying collective action. Further, the animals defined ability to read

and respond appropriately to the caretakers emotional experience enhances thefriendship. An individual interviewed by Sanders touchingly described his golden

retrievers empathetic abilities:

He just seems to sense [your mood] somehow. You can be in a different roomand be down. Recently when [my daughter] was in her room he just seemed toknow where to go . . . he sensed that somewhere in this househis doghousethere was something that was not quite right. He sought [her] out and was justthere. One day I was sitting on the front porch kind of blue about some thingsand he just snuggled in theretotally noninvasive. Just If you want to pet me,pet me. Im here if you need me. (1999:2122)

Close relationships, which involve emotional bonds and shared intimate knowl-

edge, have negative as well as positive elements. Intense conflicts, fear of loss, concern


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417

with overinvolvement, and other painful experiences are part of the dark side

(Felmlee and Sprecher 2000:371) of friendships. Consequently, friends commonly

experience some degree of ambivalence about the quality, consequences, andcourse of their shared close relationship (Hays 1989; Kurth 1970).

In that people perceive them as both objects to be possessed and used and indi-

vidual beings to be understood and loved, companion animals have a liminal status

that results in a distinctly ambivalent general cultural orientation to them (Arluke

and Sanders 1996:16786; Tuan 1984). This cultural ambivalence, together with the

subordinate status of companion animals within the human-animal association, all

too frequently leads to abuse, thoughtless disregard, and, ultimately, termination of

the relationship.

More commonly, however, the emotional connection that binds the typical close

relationships between people and their companion animals means that committedowners anticipate and react to the termination of these relationshipsthrough ill-

ness, accident, straying, or voluntary euthanasia precipitated by the animals age or

infirmitywith intense sorrow. For example, a dog owner interviewed by Sanders

offered an acquisition story in which she described special feelings she had for

her dog and her sorrowful anticipation of eventual loss:

I just told my parents I wanted a dog. I was living with my parents then. A ladydown the street had a litter. I went in and immediately he came right over tome. It was love at first sighthe chose me. I remember it was really snowing

that night and we couldnt get to the grocery store. My mother made himchicken soup. To this day he goes wild when he smells chicken soup. Everytime I make it he gets half. Sometimes this annoys my roommate Hey, Iwanted some of that. But he is more important. Hes not a dog to me. Hes mybest friend. He loves me and I love him. When I come home from work heshappy to see me and I am happy to see him. I try to spend quality time withhim every day. . . . He gives me love. He cant live without me and I cant livewithout him. Its so hard to see him getting old. I just dont know what I woulddo without him. (1999:23)12

Like other close relationships, then, those between people and companion ani-

mals are characterized by commitment and ambivalence, rewards and problems,

connectedness and loss. As seen above, these sociologically neglected relation-ships (Felmlee and Sprecher 2000:370) share many of the characteristics found in

friendships between humans. However, unique differences between the partici-

pants in these common and emotionally involving relationshipsspecifically, that

the interactants are members of different species and the animal partner lacks the

ability to use human languageprovide a foundation for exploring issues of key

interest and expanding the scope of symbolic interactionism. In short, through ex-

amining the everyday exchanges between people and animals we can gain an en-

riched understanding of the social processes by which the designation person is

constructed and applied, the phenomenon of mind arises within social relation-ships, and culture is interactionally created as a framework for effective collective

action.


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PERSONS, MINDS, AND CULTURE

The designation person is the most elemental social identity. It provides the foun-dation for, and is constructed in the context of, relationships. As a basic categorical

identity, personhood may be acquired or lost, given or taken away, solidified or ad-

justed within the flow of interaction that comprises relationships. Everyday, face-to-

face social exchanges provide the materials used in the collaborative manufacture

(Cahill 1998:136) of the person as interactants define the immediate situation, act in

particular ways, and attend to each others responses. To the extent that responses

are appropriate to the situation and coactors understanding of each other, person-

identities are enacted and reinforced.

Based on a shared history and knowledge of the others unique personality,

tastes, emotions, and routine responses, caretakers come to regard the compan-ion animals with whom they have relationships as persons and treat them as

such. The animals personhood is an interactive accomplishment based on his or

her definition as it arises in the context of the relationship (Bogdan and Taylor

1989:136). In applying a person schema (Howard 1995:93) to shape and under-

stand his or her interaction with the animal, the caretaker commonly makes a

distinction between person and human. The animal is a person in the sense

that his or her perspective and feelings are knowable; interaction is predictable;

and the shared relationship provides an experience of closeness, warmth, and

pleasure. In an important way, the distinction between relationships with hu-mans and with animal-persons is central to the special character of the human-

animal bond. Because they are not human relationships, those with companion

animals are constant rather than contingent. The animals response to his or her

companion does not depend on the latters appearance, age, economic fortunes,

abilities, or the other vagaries that, for good or ill, constrain human-to-human

relationships.

Similarly, mind is an interactional accomplishment. Mead (1962:73) regarded

mind as an internal linguistic activity, and, therefore, denied its existence in non-

human animals. This Meadian conception of mind-as-self-conversation is, I main-

tain, unnecessarily restrictive. As we interact with others, we premise our actionsand responses on the presumption that the content of our minds has some basic re-

lationship to what and how our coactors are thinking. However, the elemental evi-

dence for this presumption is drawn from our interpretations of others behavior

and the predictive utility of these interpretations. As people interact with infants

(Russell 1997), alingual humans (Bogdan and Taylor 1989; Goode 1994), and non-

human animals (Alger and Alger 1997, Wieder 1980), they regard the ability to

focus attention, manipulate objects, seek or avoid certain experiences, and engage in ac-

tion directed at achieving particular ends as persuasive evidence of mind. The greater

familiarity with the otherthe closer our relationship with him or herthe moreconfidence we have in our understanding of the content of his or her mind and our

ability to gauge his or her intentions (Herzog and Galvin 1997). Casting off the


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419

linguicentric and anthropomorphic restraints of conventional views of mind frees

us to appreciate an expanded world of social relationships and understand the in-

teractions from which they are constructed. On the other hand, denying the realityof wordless minds (Terrace 1987) would not allow us to make sense of the follow-

ing description offered by an experienced dog owner or draw the reasonable con-

clusion at which she arrives.

We halfheartedly train the dogs to sit on the floor in a long stay while we eatour meal. I think sharing food is very important; so do they. It becomes, how-ever, too disturbing, and weve limited them to table food at the end of themeal. But Toby has problems with waiting when theres butter on the table.Toby lies down, hops up, drops his head on the table, positions it next to thebutterit is always the buttersighs over the butter. . . . He must think weare awfully stupid not to understand what he wants. . . . Once, though, thetemptation being overwhelming, Toby thought through the problem of howto get the bread and butter. He did not lie down on command but left theroom. We heard him rummaging around in the house, up and down the stairs,until he finally appeared with a treasure: a roasted pig ear. . . . Toby is al-lowed to take one out of the box each day. He had obviously hidden this one.He laid it at my feet. Naturally Toby received a piece of bread with slabs ofbutter. Toby reasoned and came up with the idea of trade. (Lerman1996:11213)

Culture, like personhood and mindedness, is constructed and shared throughinteraction. As Becker (1986) observes, the most minimal definition of culture is

that it is composed of mutual understandings (conventions) that interactants use

to coordinate their activities (collective action). Culture arises as a response to

situations and lends predictability to interaction.

In the relational context of friendship, interactants commonly create what Fine

(1981:267) refers to as a private culture. Friends use these dyadic traditions to

test whether they are sensitive to the same aspects of the immediate experience

and whether they share a common orientation toward this experience, to symbol-

ize their intimacy, and to activate a sense of a shared past (Mechling 1989:312

13). As is the case in human-with-human friendships, close relationships betweenpeople and companion animals give rise to a dyadic culture that encompasses es-

tablished routines (what Collins [1989] calls natural interaction rituals), mutual

knowledge of and feeling for the other, and expectations about the predictable

course of interaction. What is unique about the culture shared by humans and ani-

mals, and of special significance in advancing an interactionist understanding of

human-animal relationships, is that these conventions arise and are effectively

communicated despite the fact that the parties in the relationship do not share the

ability to employ a common system of linguistic symbols. As with the definition of

personhood and the social construction of mind, the creation, communication, andcompetent use of culture is not dependent on language (see Depre 1990; de Waal

1999:636).


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CONCLUSION

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their

simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because it is al-ways before ones eyes.)

Ludwig Wittgenstein (quoted in Fine 1998:102)

I have offered a brief, and admittedly somewhat rhetorical, discussion of a type of

close relationship that until fairly recently has been largely unexamined in conven-

tional sociology. My primary goal has been to advocate the movement of inter-

species interactions and relationships into the repertoire of issues on which interaction-

ists focus. This movement requires that we reject (or at least bracket) conventional

social scientific and cultural beliefs about the qualitative differences between hu-

mans and nonhuman animals. Serious attention to human-animal relationships re-quires that the anthropocentric commonsense of science be replaced with the

ordinary commonsense of everyday social actors derived from their routine expe-

riences with their animal companions (Silverman 1997).

The primary goal of symbolic interactionism is to make social life intelligible.

The central orienting principle guiding the achievement of this goal is that humans

act toward things based on the meanings that emerge through social interaction

(Blumer 1969). It may be that the reality of those who foster close relationships

with companion animals, see them as thoughtful and reciprocating, construct their

unique identities, and regard them as full-fledged partners in collective action is an

anthropomorphic delusion. Clearly Mead believed this to be the case:

We, of course, tend to endow our domestic animals with personality, but as weget insight into their conditions we see there is no place for this sort of importa-tion of the social process into the conduct of the individual. They do not have themechanism for itlanguage. So we say that they have no personality; they arenot responsible for the social situation in which they find themselves. . . . We putpersonalities into the animals, but they do not belong to them. . . . And yet thecommon attitude is that of giving them just such personalities as our own. Wetalk to them and in our talking to them we act as if they had the sort of innerworld that we have. (1962:18283)

But, to remain true to the interactionist view of human beings as actively in-volved in evaluating situations, defining others, having goals, devising reasonable

plans of action, and coordinating their interactions with others, I submit that we

must see those who foster close relationships with animals as more than the delu-

sional victims of folk psychology.13 As active and practical creators of meaning,

caretakers base understandings of their animal companions and construct effective

relationships with them on routine experience with their behavior in context

(Mitchell and Hamm 1997).

Theoriesbe they folk or sociologicalare best judged by how useful they are

rather than by whether they are right or wrong (Bernstein 1990; Feyerabend 1975).Because of the linguicentric constraints imposed by our Meadian heritage we have

emphasized the differences that exist between humans and nonhuman animals and


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421

have lost sight of all that we share with them (Murphy 1995:692). In failing to rec-

ognize the fact that we live in an interactional community composed of both human

and nonhuman members, we have ignored an area of social life that is common-place, emotionally rich, and of significant analytic interest. Moving nonhuman ani-

mals and peoples relationships with them into the realm of sociological visibility

(Oakley 1974:5) promises to shed light on commonplace worlds of social inter-

action to which conventional interactionism has, until recently, turned a blind eye.

Acknowledgments: I am grateful to Kathy Charmaz and the anonymous review-ers for their comments and suggestions. Portions of this discussion were presentedat the 8th International Conference on Human-Animal Interactions (Prague, 1998)

and the meetings of the Eastern Sociological Society (Boston, 2002).

NOTES

1. According to recent figures collected by the American Veterinary Medical Association (1997),companion animals live in 58.9 percent of U.S. households. Americans own 59 million cats,52.9 million dogs, 12.6 million birds, 5.7 million rabbits and ferrets, 4.8 million rodents, 3.5 mil-lion reptiles, and 55.6 million fish.

2. For an early exception, see Bain 1929.3. For critiques of Meads views with regard to the social abilities of nonhuman animals, see

Alger and Alger 1997; Myers 1998:12025; Sanders 1993.4. Testimony to the centrality of peoples relationships to their pets is seen in a survey conductedby the American Animal Hospital Association (1996) in which close to half of the womenquestioned said that they relied more on their dogs and cats for affection than they did ontheir husbands or children. Fifteen percent of the elderly questioned in a Swedish study(Adell-Bath et al. 1978) stated that they considered their pets their most significant sourceof social contact and that this relationship gave their lives meaning.

5. See Speier (1970:20917) for a discussion of the centrality of personal names in close inter-human relationships.

6. An anonymous reviewer with personal experience in an animal shelter observed that dogs andcats typically were given names by the workers in her facility. An important distinction here isthe difference between kill and no-kill shelters. In the former, the emotional toll of eutha-

nizing healthy but unadopted animals is increased when the animals are named and thus indi-vidualized (see Arluke 1994). In no-kill shelters, in contrast, naming is routine since the individ-ualized animals will, at worst, simply remain as residents of the shelter (see Alger and Alger2003).

7. When she attempted to publish a paper based on her early work with chimpanzees, the prima-tologist Jane Goodall encountered criticism from reviewers because she insisted on namingthe animals she observed and referred to them as he and she rather than it (Bekoff1998:16).

8. Eighty-three percent of pet owners questioned by Adell-Bath and her associates (1979)agreed with the statement My dog gives me the opportunity of talking with other people.Thirty-seven percent of the members of pet-owning families studied by Cain (1983) observedthat their companion animals helped to increase their social contacts.

9. A study by Kidd and Feldmann (1981) found that elderly pet owners used more positive ad-jectives when describing themselves than did nonowners, and Serpell (1981) reports thatwomen who owned dogs saw themselves as significantly more attractive than did nonowners.


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10. Hart (1995:16465) cites one study in which dog owners maintained that 44 percent of theirinteraction with their dogs involved play (36 percent for cat owners).

11. For a general discussion of animal emotion see Masson and McCarthy (1995).

12. See Simon 1984 and Stallones 1994 for discussions of the negative features of close relation-ships with companion animals.

13. Cahill (1998) makes the same point in his discussion of folk psychology and the part it playsin the social construction of the person.

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