Accounting for Inter-Organizational Accounting for Inter-Organizational Relations: Relations:

the EU, the UN and the Iranian Nuclear the EU, the UN and the Iranian Nuclear Program (2003-08)Program (2003-08)

Spyros Blavoukos (sblavo@aueb.gr) and Dimitris Bourantonis (bouranto@aueb.gr)

Paper for the GOSEM Summer SchoolRethymnon, Sep. 2013

IntroductionIntroduction Inter-organizationalism in IR neglected; Inter-organizationalism in IR neglected;

still large variety of insights from other still large variety of insights from other disciplines (e.g. sociology and disciplines (e.g. sociology and management)management)

Research question: which parameters Research question: which parameters condition relations between IOs?condition relations between IOs?

Narrow down the focus: nested Narrow down the focus: nested organizations (e.g. regional organizations organizations (e.g. regional organizations in the UN system in the UN system →→ EU in the UN) EU in the UN)

Case study: EU-UN and the sanctions Case study: EU-UN and the sanctions towards Iran (2003-8) towards Iran (2003-8)

IOs and Interorganizationalism IOs and Interorganizationalism (I)(I)

IOs strive for organizational autonomy; then IOs strive for organizational autonomy; then why engage in a relationship with another why engage in a relationship with another IO?IO?

Three causes: Three causes: resource scarcityresource scarcity → → performance distressperformance distress

Contingencies: necessity, asymmetry-reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and legitimacy

normative congruencenormative congruence: : ideological and normative attraction of cooperative

engagement

existence of a powerful extra-organizational existence of a powerful extra-organizational forceforce::

induces or enforces joint activities between IOs, motivating ‘voluntary’ inter-organizational cooperation

in nested IOs, consider also differentiated membership and institutional format (e.g. veto right in the UNSC)

IOs and Interorganizationalism IOs and Interorganizationalism (II)(II)

How do we chose the partner IO?How do we chose the partner IO? complementarity of resourcescomplementarity of resources: :

to maximise benefits of cooperation to maximise benefits of cooperation

domain similaritydomain similarity: : similar, not identical; similar, not identical; potential of turf competition and eventual potential of turf competition and eventual

absorptionabsorption

normative orientation of an IO vis-normative orientation of an IO vis-à-vis international cooperationà-vis international cooperation::

embrace of multilateral and cooperative embrace of multilateral and cooperative approaches to IR approaches to IR

Regionalism in the UNRegionalism in the UN Regionalism welcomed in the UN Charter (Art. 52-54):Regionalism welcomed in the UN Charter (Art. 52-54):

ROs activities consistent with the UN purposes and principlesROs activities consistent with the UN purposes and principles states encouraged to go first to ROs before UNSCstates encouraged to go first to ROs before UNSC UNSC may use ROs for the settlement of regional conflictsUNSC may use ROs for the settlement of regional conflicts no enforcement action by ROs without the UNSC no enforcement action by ROs without the UNSC

authorization. authorization. UNSC should be kept fully informed UNSC should be kept fully informed for the for the activities of ROsactivities of ROs

supremacy of universalism over regionalism supremacy of universalism over regionalism undermined in practiceundermined in practice ‘‘ROs have imposed economic sanctions without UNSC ROs have imposed economic sanctions without UNSC

authorizationauthorization

UN gets from ROsUN gets from ROs: : more material and personnel more material and personnel resources, better understanding of the political and resources, better understanding of the political and cultural underpinnings of a regional crisiscultural underpinnings of a regional crisis

ROs get from the UNROs get from the UN: legitimacy: legitimacy

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty System (NPT)Treaty System (NPT)

NPT (1968): NNWS will not acquire nuclear NPT (1968): NNWS will not acquire nuclear weapons and NWS will not proliferate themweapons and NWS will not proliferate them

balance of mutual responsibilities and balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the NWS-NNWSobligations of the NWS-NNWS

Guarantees offered to NNWS by NWS:Guarantees offered to NNWS by NWS: NNWS not to be deprived of the potential NNWS not to be deprived of the potential

benefits from the peaceful use of nuclear benefits from the peaceful use of nuclear energy; in return, NNWS accept system of energy; in return, NNWS accept system of inspections by IAEAinspections by IAEA

security guarantees to NNWSsecurity guarantees to NNWS

EU Nuclear Non-Proliferation EU Nuclear Non-Proliferation PolicyPolicy

Basic documents:Basic documents: Basic Principles for a Strategy against Proliferation of Basic Principles for a Strategy against Proliferation of

WMDWMD (June 2003) (June 2003) European Security Strategy European Security Strategy (ESS)(ESS) EU Strategy against the Proliferation of the WMD (EU Strategy against the Proliferation of the WMD (both both

December 2003)December 2003)

Objectives of EU policy:Objectives of EU policy: universalization and strengthening of the NPT universalization and strengthening of the NPT greater effectiveness and further improvement of greater effectiveness and further improvement of

inspection and verification practices and increased inspection and verification practices and increased detectability of significant violations detectability of significant violations

improving export control and practices improving export control and practices

EU stresses diplomatic containment: use of EU stresses diplomatic containment: use of political and economic ‘sticks and carrots’; political and economic ‘sticks and carrots’; coercion (economic, not military) may follow after coercion (economic, not military) may follow after UN authorizationUN authorization

The EU and the Iranian The EU and the Iranian Nuclear Program (2003-08) Nuclear Program (2003-08)

(I)(I) Stage 1 (2003-5)Stage 1 (2003-5): EU takes the diplomatic lead : EU takes the diplomatic lead

EU offers only economic ‘carrots’ unable to offer the EU offers only economic ‘carrots’ unable to offer the security guarantees that might have sealed the deal or security guarantees that might have sealed the deal or invoke credibly the option of ‘sticks’ to coerce Iraninvoke credibly the option of ‘sticks’ to coerce Iran

Stage 2 (2005-8)Stage 2 (2005-8): negotiations break down, after : negotiations break down, after the Iranian Presidential elections and full the Iranian Presidential elections and full securitization of the issuesecuritization of the issue EU could have imposed sanctions unilaterally (like other EU could have imposed sanctions unilaterally (like other

ROs)ROs)

however, it takes the issue to the UN however, it takes the issue to the UN to enhance effectiveness of any collective response to enhance effectiveness of any collective response to legitimize possible enforcement action in concordance to legitimize possible enforcement action in concordance

with its own normative adherence to multilateralismwith its own normative adherence to multilateralism

The EU and the Iranian The EU and the Iranian Nuclear Program (2003-08) Nuclear Program (2003-08)

(II)(II) from 2006 onwards, US, Russia and China from 2006 onwards, US, Russia and China

increasingly involved ( ‘EU3+3’)increasingly involved ( ‘EU3+3’)

options: either more ‘carrots’ (especially the options: either more ‘carrots’ (especially the security guarantees that the EU was unable to security guarantees that the EU was unable to offer initially) or ‘sticks’. offer initially) or ‘sticks’.

the US tipped the balance to the latterthe US tipped the balance to the latter

the EU orchestrated the first round of economic the EU orchestrated the first round of economic sanctions in mid-2006, having to accommodate sanctions in mid-2006, having to accommodate in the course of intra-UN negotiations the Russian in the course of intra-UN negotiations the Russian and Chinese concerns (to avoid their veto)and Chinese concerns (to avoid their veto)

in 2007, intra-EU cohesion in question; US in 2007, intra-EU cohesion in question; US intervention came in support of ‘hardliners’intervention came in support of ‘hardliners’

ConclusionsConclusions

functionalfunctional and and normativenormative pillars of pillars of the EU-UN relationship as well as the the EU-UN relationship as well as the US presence and the UNSC US presence and the UNSC institutional set upinstitutional set up (veto power of (veto power of permanent members) account for the permanent members) account for the EU diplomatic role in the crisis and EU diplomatic role in the crisis and especially the path to the UN-especially the path to the UN-imposed economic sanctions from imposed economic sanctions from 2003 to 20082003 to 2008

Resource scarcityResource scarcity: : delay in materialising the economic incentives of the delay in materialising the economic incentives of the

2004 Paris agreement, 2004 Paris agreement, incapacity to offer security guarantees incapacity to offer security guarantees a prioria priori exclusion of military intervention: no coercion exclusion of military intervention: no coercion

potential (even as a threat) potential (even as a threat)

Normative congruenceNormative congruence:: EU in quest of political legitimizationEU in quest of political legitimization this was a lacking resource, but its importance depends this was a lacking resource, but its importance depends

on the value it has for an international actoron the value it has for an international actor decision to move the Iranian dossier to the UN rather decision to move the Iranian dossier to the UN rather

than impose sanctions unilaterally reflects also the EU’s than impose sanctions unilaterally reflects also the EU’s normative commitment to collective responsesnormative commitment to collective responses

US presenceUS presence as well as the as well as the other two UNSC other two UNSC permanent members with veto rightpermanent members with veto right:: accommodation of American, Russian, and Chinese accommodation of American, Russian, and Chinese

concernsconcerns