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Accountability Institutions by Joachim Wehner
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Transcript of Accountability Institutions by Joachim Wehner
Performance Budge/ng and Parliamentary Oversight
OECD SBO Performance and Results Network Paris, 25 November 2014
Joachim Wehner
Associate Professor in Public Policy London School of Economics and Poli/cal Science
‘If the House of Commons by any possibility lose the power of the control of the grants of public money, depend upon it, your very liberty will be worth very liNle in comparison.’
William Ewart Gladstone, 1891
Evolu/on of parliamentary control
• The original func/on of parliaments was to consent to taxa/on, later
complemented by control of its use through detailed appropria/ons.
• Nowadays, every fully democra/c cons/tu/on includes a requirement
for legisla/ve approval of taxes and public spending.
• In some OECD countries, management reforms over recent decades
have radically altered the nature of parliamentary control.
• Appropria/on structures reflect the extent to which decisions focus on
results, and the degree of relaxa/on of central input controls.
From money to outcomes
Money Inputs Outputs Outcomes
O r g a n i s a t i o n
Economy Efficiency Effectiveness
Other influences
Source: Ellis and Mitchell (2002: 128).
Source: Extract from the Consolidated Appropria/ons Act, 2014 [United States].
Appropria/on structure (1) -‐ United States
Source: Extract from the Appropria/on Bill 2014 [South Africa].
Appropria/on structure (2) – South Africa
Source: Extract from the Appropria/on (2014/15 Es/mates) Act 2014 [New Zealand].
Appropria/on structure (3) -‐ New Zealand
Source: Extract from the Appropria/on Bill (No. 1) 2014-‐2015 [Australia].
Appropria/on structure (4) -‐ Australia
Source: Extract from the Supply and Appropria/on (Main Es/mates) Act 2014 [United Kingdom].
Appropria/on structure (5) – United Kingdom
Challenges for legislatures (1)
• Tradi/onal input control via detailed line items is based on scru/ny by
financial commiNees.
• Financial commiNees may be reluctant to give up their tradi/onal
approach to scru/ny.
• A focus on results requires a greater role for sectoral commiNees with
the necessary policy exper/se (educa/on, transport, etc).
• Sectoral commiNees may be reluctant and/or lack capacity to engage
with performance data and public spending informa/on.
Challenges for legislatures (2)
• A performance-‐based system requires strong ex post scru/ny to assess
whether promised results were aNained.
• Not all parliaments have audit commiNees that can rely on auditors
with the capacity to carry out performance audits.
• Any adjustments to tradi/onal scru/ny prac/ces need to be compa/ble
with the incen/ves of legislators.
• Legislators’ incen/ves may be such that short-‐term resource control is
preferred to a more medium and long-‐term assessment of impacts.
Challenges for legislatures (3)
• Tradi/onal parliamentary scru/ny is based on the principles of
annuality and specifica/on (Sundelson 1935).
• Results-‐based appropria/ons require a relaxa/on of long-‐standing
budgetary principles.
• Financial scru/ny mechanisms evolved to hold government and/or
specific individuals to account.
• With outcomes it is difficult or impossible to clearly aNribute
responsibility for failure or success in their achievement.
Inputs
Outputs
Outcomes
Focus of scru0ny Control Efficiency Policy
Appropria0on detail High Moderate Low
Execu0ve flexibility Low Moderate High
Essen0al commi<ee(s) Financial Financial / sectoral Sectoral
Time horizon Fiscal year Fiscal year Varied / mul/-‐annual
A<ribu0on Possible Possible Difficult or impossible
Summary of implica/ons for legislatures
Concluding remarks
• A country’s choice of appropria/on structure reflects the legisla/ve-‐
execu/ve balance of power and is inherently poli/cal.
• Performance-‐based appropria/ons require a poli/cal context where
legislators are willing not to exercise detailed input control.
• It is unclear whether a loss of detailed ex ante input control can be
compensated by greater ex post accountability for performance.
• Outcome-‐focused scru/ny in the annual budget process is complicated
by problems of aNribu/on and non-‐aligned /me horizons.