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Running head: Aristotelian Affinities with Emotion Research

Cognition and Emotion: Aristotelian Affinities with

Contemporary Emotion Research

Dr. Konstantinos Kafetsios, University of Crete, Greece &

Eric LaRock, Saint Louis University, USA

Address for correspondence:

Dr. Konstantinos Kafetsios

Department of Psychology

University of Crete

Rethymnon 74100, Greece

email: k.kafetsios@psy.soc.uoc.gr

tel: +302831077532

Fax: +302831077578 Eric LaRock

Saint Louis University

Philosophy Dept.

3800 Lindell Blvd.

P.O. Box 56907

St. Louis, MO 63156-0907

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Abstract

In much of the debate concerning the philosophy and psychology of cognition and emotion,

Aristotle’s theory is taken to support a functionalist, cognition-first account. This brand of

functionalism emphasizes functional role over occupant, or supervenient over

physiochemical, the so-called software versus hardware distinction. We argue, instead, that

this functionalist reading misrepresents Aristotle because it downgrades the significance of

his ideas about the biological bases of emotions and, in particular, affect-first processes in

emotions. In addition to presenting a detailed critique of this functionalist interpretation of

Aristotelian psychology, we offer an alternative reading of Aristotle’s theory of cognition

and emotion that brings to bear certain biological considerations evidenced in his arguments

on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the hierarchical organization of

the biological world. Based on this new reading, we identify affinities with contemporary

research in the cognitive neuroscience of emotion and developmental research on emotion.

Keywords: Cognition and emotion, Affect, Aristotle, Neuroscience

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Cognition and Emotion: Aristotelian Affinities with Contemporary Emotion Research

After reflecting upon the extensive contemporary literature on Aristotle’s theory of mind,

one is left with the impression that Aristotle’s views on cognition and emotion are plausible

mainly because they are compatible with a brand of contemporary functionalism (cf. Cohen,

1987; Nussbaum and Putnum, 1992) that dominates accounts in the philosophy of emotion

(e.g. Solomon, 2000). Although this functionalist approach, which throughout the paper we

call ‘role functionalism’, may represent Aristotle’s views in some respects, we think that it

typically bifurcates nature by emphasizing role over occupant, or supervenient over

physiochemical (cf. Lycan, 1999).

By contrast, we maintain with Robertson (1989) that Aristotle’s theory of psychology

insists, for example, that the ‘emotions are rooted in the appetitonal, biological, and entirely

natural functions of the animal kingdom’ (Robinson, 1989, p. 88). Aristotle would,

therefore, want to include as part of his analysis of the essence of cognition and emotion the

biological material and the characteristic operations associated with it (LaRock, 2002). At

the same time, it is arguable that Aristotle’s theory of psychology is neither reductionistic nor

substance dualist in character. So, rather than merely critiquing the usual functionalist

readings of Aristotelian psychology, we also present an alternative reading of Aristotle’s

theory of cognition and emotion that brings to bear certain biological considerations

evidenced in his arguments on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the

hierarchical organization of the biological world.1

Central to our discussion lies the debate over the primacy of cognitive/symbolic over

affective/first person experience of emotion, which we articulate in the first section. In

section two, we explicate a specific variety of contemporary functionalism (i.e., ‘role

functionalism’) with the purpose of drawing connections between it and the dominant

functionalist readings of Aristotle’s philosophy of cognition and emotion. In the final

section, we formulate a case against the role functionalist reading of Aristotle in order to

motivate our alternative reading. Based on this new reading, we identify affinities with

contemporary research in the cognitive neuroscience of emotion and developmental research

on emotion.

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THE DEBATE ON COGNITION and EMOTION IN MODERN PSYCHOLOGY

The study of emotion has advanced considerably since early theoretical investigations into

its nature and structure. Early theories defined emotions as instincts (e.g., McDougall, 1908),

mainly identifiable with neuro-physiological (bodily) processes (e.g., Cannon, 1927), and

emphasized its intra-psychic aspects in terms of bodily sensations or perceptual processes

(e.g., James, 1884). This was also backed up by the dominant Darwinian (1872) account on

emotion at the time. However, with the advent of the behaviorist dominance emotion became

a ‘terra incognita’ for scientific psychology, as its study was frowned upon and even actively

discouraged. In the latter part of the century, the cognitive paradigm in the social sciences led

to a shift of focus on cognitive processes as prerequisites of emotional experience.

Cognition-first models of emotion have offered a dominant perspective as expressed

through associationist and neo-associationist models (e.g. Bower, 1981), appraisal theories

(e.g. Frijda, 1986), propositional theories (Lang, 1979) and, more recently, multi-level

cognitive models that combine associationist and propositional approaches (ie. Power &

Dalgleish, 1997). Many of these models had had a significant impact on psychological

thought and even clinical applications for emotional disorders and psychotherapy (e.g. Beck,

1976; Power & Dalgleish, 1997).

The term cognition is typically used to refer to a wide range of conscious and unconscious

mental phenomena (perception, beliefs, memory, appraisal, language, problem solving, etc.,

Fletcher & Fitness, 1996). Conversely, the term ‘emotion’ involves cognitive and affective

processes. According to Bedford (1956), emotion is distinguishable from affect/feeling in

that it involves the subjective reaction to a salient event, an evaluation of an event and not

just the event itself. Bedford recognized that subjective reactions and the events associated

with emotion are distinct and that emotions involve subjective entities, which are tied to

certain ends (e.g. when one is afraid of something). In contrast, affect involves first-person

experience (Lambie & Marcel, 2002); it is conceptualized and frequently operationalized in a

uni-dimensional way (Russell & Carroll, 1999) and is closely linked to action tendencies

(Frijda, 1986), as well as to physiological/behavioral indices of arousal and brain structures

(Panksepp, 1992).

Fuelled by the distinction between cognitive and affective aspects of emotion, a major

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debate in psychology concerned whether cognitive processes are necessary prerequisites of

emotional experiences and outcomes. This question divided the community of scientific

psychologists for some time and highlighted the seminal difference between cognition-first

and affect-first accounts of emotion.

Cognition-first accounts of emotion emphasize the role of mostly conscious, cognitive

processes (perception, appraisal, apprehension and memory). This approach has been

encapsulated by Lazarus’ (1982;1984) argument that ‘Cognitive activity is a necessary

precondition of emotion because to experience an emotion, people must comprehend that

their well-being is implicated’ (p. 124). For Lazarus, cognitive appraisal always precedes an

affective reaction and only relevant events to concerns or goals will result in emotion. The

term ‘concern’ incorporates all that matters to an organism and is therefore related to the

organism’s long-term aspirations and immediate context-specific goals (Frijda, 1986);

conscious and unconscious cognitive processes determine whether an event will lead to

emotional reactions. There are several popular models of emotion that adopt this top-down,

cognition-first hierarchy, in experimental (e.g. Ellsworth & Smith, 1988;) clinical (Lang,

1979; Powel & Dalgleish, 1997) and social (Berscheid & Ammazzarolso, 2001; Shaver,

Schwartz, Kirson & O'Connor, 1987) psychology.

In contrast, the affect-first account of emotion as propounded by Zajonc (1980), argued

that initial processing of stimuli (in milliseconds) following sensory registration provides the

affective tone of the stimulus as positive or negative. Zajonc’s conviction was based on a

series of rigorous experimental studies which demonstrated that non-consciously processed

affective information (images presented in milliseconds) suffices to alter the person’s

evaluation and put him or her in a more positive frame of mind (Harrison & Zajonc, 1970;

Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1981). Zajonc went even further to argue that cognitive processes

are subservient to affective processes, that affective reactions show phylogenetic and

ontogenetic primacy, that there are separate neuro-anatomical structures for affect and,

therefore, that affect has primacy over cognition.

More recently, Murphy and Zajonc (1993) admit that “cognitive” can refer to non-

conscious processes but still maintain the position that the initial affective processes are

qualitatively different from quantitative approaches. The important question is thus, whether

unconscious/affective processes should be ‘labeled cognitive’ since ‘they involve low-level

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computations in the perceptual system, one important feature of which is to detect the

affective value of the stimulus’ (p. 67, Power & Dalgleish, 1997).

It is our contention that much of this debate (which is now well over but not entirely

settled see Zajonc, 2003), and ensuing dualisms in emotion research and theory reflects and

perpetuates a central philosophical and epistemological juxtaposition between feeling/affect-

first and cognition-first conceptualization of the human mind and emotions. In this debate,

Aristotle’s theory of the human mind and emotion is almost always used as supporting

functionalist, cognition-first arguments in contemporary emotion research and theory (i.e.

Lyons, 1999; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; Solomon, 2000). For example, in his influential

review on the philosophy of emotions, Solomon (2000) claims that Aristotle has largely

ignored ‘feeling’ or affect and ‘inner sensation’ in general (p. 5) and that the Aristotelian

view of emotion can make sense primarily in the context of a broader ethical concern.

However, we think the dominant functionalist readings of Aristotle’s emotion theory

misrepresent Aristotle’s view, as they tend to bifurcate nature by emphasizing the role over

occupant distinction. To appreciate this latter claim, we will firstly discuss role functionalism

and its alleged connections with Aristotelian psychology.

ROLE FUNCTIONALISM AND ARISTOTLE

The role functionalist theory of mind emerged on the philosophical scene as an alternative

to behaviorism and identity theory (Fodor, 1981). Unlike behaviorism, role functionalists

argue that when we talk about mind, we are referring to a set of mental states defined in

terms of causal roles between perceptual inputs, internal mental processes, and behavioral

outputs. Rather than characterizing the mind merely in behavioral terms, role functionalists

argued for the causal efficacy of mental states. For example, my belief that a tornado is

about to form is caused in me by my perception of cloud formations characteristic of

potential tornadoes; and coupled with my desire to preserve my life, the fear of a potential

tornado will cause me to run to the cellar. Parting company with the type-type identity theory

(Place, 1956; Smart, 1959), role functionalists do not hold that mental states can be identified

solely with physical states of the nervous system, but instead contend that mental states can

be realized in any suitably organized system or other. For example, systems composed of

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silicon and metal, living cells, or perhaps even “spiritual energy”, if properly organized,

could be sufficient to instantiate mental states, so long as the right causal roles were realized

(Fodor, 1981). The stuff that instantiates mental states is entirely contingent, since what is

denied by role functionalism is that a single type of stuff is essential for mind.

The role functionalist can accept conceptual distinctions between mental and neural terms

without also embracing ontological distinctions. If the concept of pain is the concept of a

state that occupies a specific causal role, then whatever state occupies that role is, in fact,

pain. Although the concept of pain is not the concept of a neural state, it is nonetheless

applicable to the relevant causal role in some system or other, an endorsement of the mind’s

‘multiple realizability’ or ‘compositional plasticity’ (Lewis, 2000; cf. Nussbaum and Putnum,

1992).

The explanatory advantage of role functionalism is that it affirms the mental as the causal

source of behavior by insisting that mind is defined by what it does rather than by what it

is—an inter-defined web of causal roles between inputs, inner processes, and outputs.

However, its inherent weakness, which we elaborate in the paper from an Aristotelian

perspective, is that, by emphasizing functional role over occupant, it fails to appreciate the

biological bases of cognition and emotion.

Having formulated a rough sketch of role-functionalism, we are in a position to see how

some contemporary Aristotle scholars map this brand of functionalism onto Aristotle’s

psychological theory. Before looking at specific arguments that favor a functionalist reading

of Aristotle’s philosophy of cognition and emotion, we explain a few key ideas that appertain

to Aristotle’s hylomorphism, namely, his theory concerning the relation between form

(morphe) and matter (hyle), since these ideas underlie his commitments to psychological

theory. Then, we explain some of the alleged general similarities between Aristotle and role

functionalism.

Aristotle’s Hylomorphism and Role Functionalism

Although Aristotle would reject substance dualism, he is by no means advancing a

materialist theory of the type-type identity sort. Aristotle’s hylomorphic view maintains the

following basic thesis concerning human nature: human beings are living substances that are

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neither entirely matter nor entirely form, but an integrated composite of both. Aristotle held

that psyche (soul) is a principle of living organization. Living organization, not simply

organization, is embedded hierarchically in the biological world, from cells to organs and

from organs to animals (De Anima, II, 2, 413a22-413b13)2. Aristotle’s view of soul in

relation to matter is therefore not confined to the question of what composes a human being:

‘Every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite’ (De

Anima, II, I, 412a15).

In order to fully appreciate Aristotle’s view of human beings and material objects in

general, it is important to distinguish between matter as prime matter and matter as a

composite of form and prime matter. Aristotle employs the term “matter” equivocally. In

itself, prime matter does not exist as an actual material object, but exists merely potentially or

as an abstract concept. As pure potentiality, prime matter is the underlying nebulous element

out of which material objects are organized into definite patterns or structures by form. The

material aspect of an object depends on form for its structural configuration and activities

(Carré, 1967, p. 72-73). Because prime matter is formless, it cannot act or be the cause of

anything. Prime matter depends on form not only for organization, but also for causation.

For Aristotle, organized life is a feature of soul embodied in biological organisms and is

irreducible to physics and chemistry. As Grene explains, ‘Organized systems cannot be

understood in terms of their least parts alone, but only in terms of those parts as organized in

such systems’ (1972, p. 411). As the form of the body, the soul is the organizational

principle of biologically based organisms (De Anima, II, 1, 412a27).

Having understood these key concepts, let us now see how contemporary theorists

interpret Aristotle’s view of psychology in role functionalist terms. To begin, Nussbaum

reads Aristotle in a functionalist fashion when she asserts that the psychology of the De

Anima holds that ‘soul is the form or functional organization of a certain kind of body’ and

‘the various “parts of soul” are functional states of matter’ (1978, p. 146).

Elsewhere, Nussbaum and Putnum claim that Aristotle’s psychological theory imbues the

notion that form is ‘compositionally plastic’, which means ‘the same [psychological] activity

can be realized in such a variety of specific materials that there is not likely to be one thing

that is just what perceiving red is, on the material level’ (1992, p. 33). S. Marc Cohen

contends that a proper analysis of Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory will show ‘how close

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Aristotle’s theory of the soul comes to contemporary functionalism’ (1987, p. 104). Cohen

contends that, for Aristotle, ‘matter and form are contingently related. In each case, the

matter might have had a different form, and the form might have been found in different

matter’ (1987, p. 105). Thus, any suitably organized system could be sufficient to realize

mental states, insofar as those states occupy specific causal roles. Beyond these general

connections, Cohen articulates a couple of arguments in favor of reading Aristotle as a role

functionalist, one of which pertains to Aristotle’s views on visual cognition, while the other

relates to Aristotle’s theory of emotion. We will look at Cohen’s role functionalist

interpretation of Aristotle on these issues in turn.

Cohen’s Role Functionalist Reading of Aristotelian Cognition and Emotion

Cohen alleges that matter and form are only contingently related for Aristotle and thus

there is no essential connection between formal and material processes. To illustrate the

argument, he invokes an example from visual perception: ‘there is no essential connection

between, e.g., seeing and any particular type of physiological process’ (1987, p. 105). For

example, Aristotle’s talk about reddening eye-jelly as one perceives something red (e.g., a

rose) is not essentially connected to the activity of sight itself. As Cohen explains,

Aristotle does not identify seeing red with the reddening of the eye-jelly (just as

contemporary functionalists would not identify pain with C-fibre stimulation). Rather,

Aristotle maintains that the reddening of the eye-jelly is only the matter of which the

perception of red is constituted (as a contemporary functionalist might concede that

C-fibre stimulation is the material realization of pain in humans but would insist that

other realizations are at least possible) (1992, p. 61).

On this interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of visual cognition, the stuff that constitutes

seeing is only the matter and therefore holds no essential connection to the perceptual activity

of seeing. By downplaying the material type, the role functionalist reading implies that

‘seeing is [essentially] the perception of color’ (1987, p. 105). The material stuff--the so-

called hardware--merely allows for a particular instance of sight, but is not integral to the

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definition of seeing; for if it were, the role functionalist would compromise an idea central to

his position, namely, multiple realizability. This is an important point, Cohen contends,

because it saves Aristotle’s cognitive theory from an antiquated theory of physiology.

If, then, there is no essential connection between seeing and a specific type of matter, how

are matter and form related on a functionalist reading of Aristotle? In other words, what

precisely is the metaphysical relationship between form and matter, if the formal aspect is

neither identical to nor merely correlated with a single material type? Cohen (1992) alleges

that it is one of supervenience.

The supervenience theory of mind proposes that mental properties are irreducible to but

causally dependent upon physical properties (cf. Kim, 2000). There are no instances of

supervenient mental properties (MP) without the relevant underlying physical base properties

(BP). MP would not have been instantiated at t1 if BP had not been present at that time.

There is an asymmetrical relation that holds between MPs and BPs, such that MPs require

BPs for their instantiation but BPs do not require MPs for their causal work. With respect to

the issue of the causal efficacy of supervenient mental properties, it is important to note that

even apart from a synchronic construal of MPs in relation to BPs, a diachronic construal will

not yield a solution to the causal asymmetry problem. Suppose that MP at time t1 causes

MP* at time t2. Since MPs are instantiated by BPs, MP* occurs only if its underlying base

property (BP*) occurs. Thus, MP* occurs at t2 only because BP* occurs at t2. The problem

for the supervenience theory is that, even if one makes a diachronic move to solve the causal

asymmetry problem, BP* is still sufficient to account for the instantiation and causal role of

MP*. BPs ultimately pre-empt, or exclude, the causal work of MPs, regardless of temporal

considerations. In light of these considerations, it appears that Cohen can embrace both the

role functionalist theory of mind and the supervenience model at the same time only if he is

willing to reject the causal efficacy of mental states.3

As in his reading of Aristotelian visual cognition, Cohen contends that although emotions

are realized in matter, Aristotle held that no essential link exists between the formal and

material aspects of emotions. The physiochemical aspect of emotion is, according to Cohen,

‘just its matter’ (1992, p. 59). What is essential to the role functionalist reading of Aristotle’s

notion of psychological states is not the matter, but instead the right sorts of causal roles

occupied within some material system or other.

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Though Cohen does not draw these connections, a kind of functionalist discussion of

emotion is at least implicit in Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric. The following well-

sited quotation from the Nicomachean Ethics aptly intimates a type of functionalist view on

emotion: ‘Anyone can become angry--that is easy. But to become angry with the right

person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way--this

is not easy.’ (Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1109a24-29). In the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents a

tightly knit account of the connection between the forms of emotion and social action. It is

argued that emotions arise out of concerns people have, which lead to actions (e.g., we

retaliate when angry, approach when in love etc.). This underscores the causal relations

between environmental inputs, the internal mental process, and the behavioral outputs that

role functionalism is founded upon.

However, one other connection Cohen omits in his discussion concerns the distinction

between the object and the stimulus of emotion, the contextual/relational concomitants of

emotion (especially in the Rhetoric). In contemporary psychology, several of these ideas

(such as the close connection between emotion and action and emotion and the social

context) can be found in seminal emotion theories (see Averill, 1994; Frijda, 1986). Whether

these passages entail role functionalism is unclear, especially since they are general enough

to entail a biologically informed brand of functionalism (cf. Lycan, 1999).

CRITICISMS OF ARISTOTELIAN ROLE FUNCTIONALISM

Having examined the role functionalist reading of Aristotle, we are now poised to offer a

detailed critique. To begin, Nussbaum’s functionalist interpretation leads to a severely

attenuated understanding of Aristotle’s notion of soul. Although her construal of Aristotelian

soul as ‘functional states of matter’ (or the functional organization of the body) can account

for organized matter, her interpretation nevertheless seems to exclude the Aristotelian

conception of living organization (i.e., organization qua living). As Aristotle explains: ‘That

is why the soul is an actuality of the first kind of a natural body having life potentially in it.

The body so described is a body which is organized’ (De Anima, II, 1, 412a27). The soul is,

in part, a principle of life that organizes the parts of the body. Therefore, living organization,

not simply organization, captures an essential property of Aristotle’s notion of soul. Living

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organization is embedded hierarchically and is exemplified at three fundamental levels in the

biological world: vegetative (plant life), sensitive (animal life), and rational (human life) (De

Anima, II, 2, 413a22-413b13).

So, even if one were to grant Nussbaum’s functionalist interpretation that soul is

organized matter, this would not entail the further Aristotelian idea that soul is the organizer

of matter. Nussbaum overlooks an important Aristotelian distinction concerning this issue:

organization does not necessarily entail life, but life entails organization. The organizing

activity of soul is a property of living organisms, which is a property wholly missing from

the ‘functional states’ of artifacts and nonliving, natural objects. The property of life (soul)

could not be functionally isomorphic with the silicon and metal bits of an artificial

intelligence machine, or any other artifact, as it is a quality unique to biologically based

organisms. The philosophical upshot is that, for Aristotle, the soul is an organized-organizer

of biologically based organisms. Seen in this light, the material part of the human composite

exhibits a relatively stable structure over time and expresses causal powers and/or relations

because it is organized by form.

A second criticism of the role functionalist reading shows that there is an essential

connection between form and matter for Aristotle. Recall that Cohen’s functionalist reading

of Aristotle insists that there is no essential connection between matter and form, a

consequence of the ‘multiple realizability’ thesis endemic to role functionalism. Despite

Cohen’s role functionalist reading, it seems fairly evident that Aristotle argued for an

essential connection between matter and form, but the essential connection does not entail

any kind of reductionism. Aristotle held to a non-reductionist view of soul and yet

recognized the importance of the type of material to which soul is related:

The body cannot be the actuality of the soul; it is the soul which is the actuality of a

certain kind of body. This is why it is in a body and a body of a definite kind. Hence

the rightness of the view that the soul cannot be without a body, while it cannot be a

body; it is not a body but something relative to a body. (De Anima, II, 2, 414a17-28).

On a related point, the role functionalist reading of Aristotelian psychology conspicuously

leaves out the important explanatory work of Aristotle’s notion of material causation. For

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Aristotle, the material type plays an essential role in defining the nature of a substance and

its peculiar activities. For example, the material stuff t hat makes a saw function in its

characteristic way is iron. The material-type ‘iron’ is necessary for the overall integrity (i.e.,

efficient cutting activity and durability) of a saw (Aristotle, Physics, II, 9, 200a11-13).

In order to augment the above reading of Aristotle concerning the essential connection

that exists between form and matter relative to biological species, one might consider the

following: Aristotle's biological approach to human nature would insist on a qualitative

difference between the neuro-protein that underpins conscious emotion and an artificial

intelligence (AI) machine whose material composition is essentially silicon and metal. First,

unlike non-living artifacts composed of silicon and metal, neurons have the properties of self-

maintenance, homeostasis, and metabolism. Secondly, there are several essential differences

between the parallel distributed processing (PDP) networks of AI and the brain. The brain

contains a myriad of different kinds of neurons (for instance, star cells, pyramid cells, and

chandelier cells). A neuron's specific type and characteristic shape are not inessential to its

operations. Each specific type of neuron performs its own specific function in the brain

hierarchy. It is also interesting to note that different cell types are grouped together in

significant populations of their own kind in distinct areas of the brain. The number of

connections a neuron has depends on its neural type, and this varies in degree from a few

hundred to hundreds of thousands. All of this specified complexity exhibited by different

types of neurons and their inter-relations is absent from the PDP units that make up ‘quasi

neural networks.’ Whereas PDP units can inhibit and excite other units within a network at

the same time, real neurons never perform inhibitory and excitatory roles simultaneously.

Although PDP units have two positions (either fully on or fully off), real neurons are never

fully off but maintain a resting potential prior to inhibiting and exciting other neuronal

events. The training procedures for PDP networks depend upon an external specification of

the trainer's desired output. The human mind-brain hierarchy is much more self-reliant and

does not strictly depend on an outside trainer for all of its outputs. Moreover, PDP networks

cannot play the important role that brain chemistry plays in human cognition and experience.

Neurotransmitters carry chemical messages from neuron to neuron and are known to

influence human cognition and experience in several important respects. For example, when

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specific neurotransmitters are injected into human subjects, the subjects report such effects as

memory enhancement, a sense of joy, hopelessness, and sexual feelings (Copeland, 1993).

The crucial point of this neurobiological excursion is simply to emphasize that Aristotle,

as a biologist, would flatly disagree with those who view neurons on a par with non-living

systems as a sufficient material basis for the realization of conscious emotion. If material

types make a difference in some essential respect, then conscious emotion has a particular

sort of physiochemical basis. Inductively speaking, we only find consciousness associated

with biological systems and this could be because our biology really makes a difference to

our psychology. Putting the point broadly, the functionalist or cognitive-first accounts tend

to refer to the processes/models of emotion as if these processes happen irrespective of

material causation. As a result, this perspective tends to unjustifiably separate rather than

unify emotion and cognition.

Having seen some of the limitations of the role functionalist reading of Aristotle’s view

concerning the relationship between matter and form, we are now prepared to advance an

alternative reading.

A BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGIST READING OF ARISTOTELIAN EMOTIONS

THEORY

As the first systematic biologist, Aristotle endeavored to identify the biological substrates

of emotion and other psychological activities. In De Anima Aristotle argues that emotional

states involve bodily states: ‘It seems that all the affections of soul involve a body —

passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a

concurrent affection of the body’ (I,1,403a16-18). Although the feeling of an emotion is, for

Aristotle, and, for that matter, James (1884) and Damasio (1999) as well, irreducible to its

biological basis, a particular emotional experience depends upon a specific bodily movement,

that is, ‘a certain movement of such and such a body (or part or faculty of a body) by this or

that cause and for this or that end’ (De Anima, I, 1,403a26). Because there is a bodily basis

for emotional experience, one’s perception of emotional information (as the cognition-first or

role-functionalist account would suggest) is not sufficient to produce emotional experience.

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For Aristotle, there are two descriptions that are essential to any emotion, one

physiological and the other psychological. Psychological affections occur if and only if

bodily affections occur. The biologist focuses on the physiological or material aspect of

emotion, e.g., boiling blood around the heart, as in the case of anger, while the philosopher

focuses on the psychological or formal aspect of emotion, e.g., a desire of returning pain for

pain (De Anima, I, 1, 403a30-31). Both descriptions refer to what an emotion is essentially,

which is a specific sort of complex, yet unified, form-matter activity.

It becomes clear from the above and our critique of role-functionalism that Aristotle is in

support of an integrative view of affect and cognitive processes of emotion. On the form-

matter theory of emotion, experience is a necessary but insufficient condition for

understanding the nature of emotion, since the biological basis of emotion is also an essential

feature of understanding emotion. For Aristotle, the subjective nature of emotional

experience is only part of an account of the essence of emotion, since emotion is a complex,

yet unified, form-matter activity. In the remainder of this section we will discuss recent

developments in the Cognitive Neuroscience and Social-Cognitive Neuroscience research on

emotion that supports the Aristotelian thinking of emotion.

Programmatic research by Richard Lane and his colleagues has examined the neurological

substrates of emotional experience (2000). In a key experiment he aimed to determine

whether different varieties of the same feelings, such as happiness, sadness, and disgust,

(induced either through film footage or through the subject’s recall of past emotional

experiences) are mapped on the same or different parts of the brain. The results from the

experiment that used positron emission tomography (PET) showed that the neural activity

associated with film-based and recall-based emotional responses occur in specific brain

regions. Film-induced emotion was correlated with activity in the right mid-cingulate cortex

and recall-induced emotion was correlated with activity in the right anterior cingulate cortex.

These findings support the strong connection that Aristotle put forward between biological

and cognitive aspects of emotion, since mere differences in the experience of the same

emotions necessitate activation in different parts of the brain.

In another experiment, Lane administered the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale

(LEAS) to subjects who underwent a PET. LEAS measures the extent to which a person can

put feelings into words; it also correlates significantly with impulse control and discriminates

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well from tests of verbal ability. Lane found that the conscious mind’s capacity to attend to

specific emotional occurrences activates brain modalities that are typically involved during

conscious awareness of emotion. Subjects whose conscious attention is directed towards

specific emotional stimuli show an increase in neural activity in the rostral anterior cingulate

cortex and medial prefrontal cortex. The rostral anterior cingulate cortex and/or the medial

prefrontal cortex are most likely the neural regions involved in emotional experience. These

particular brain regions are connected with a myriad of neural structures, including the

amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, sectors of the anterior cingulate cortex, and paralimbic

structures; it is important to point out that emotional experience depends on the integrity of

these brain structures. In addition to non-neural somatic activities, the neural substrates

involved in emotion are necessary for conscious emotional experience. In fact, lesions in the

rostral anterior cingulate cortex cause a blinding effect on one’s emotional experience.

Like Lane, Aristotle contends that emotions are specific sorts of complex, yet unified,

psychosomatic (form-matter) activities (De Anima, II, 1, 403a16-18). The physiological

aspect refers to “lower level” unconscious processing of emotional information in specific

parts of the body and brain hierarchy. The psychological aspect refers to “higher level”

conscious processing of emotional information in the conscious mind, which is intimately

unified with the neural and somatic changes involved in conscious emotional experience.

The conscious feeling of a particular emotion is caused by and intimately unified with its

underlying somatic and neural changes.

Moreover, like Aristotle, Lane believes in the hierarchical organization of levels of

emotional awareness that form a continuum between the low (affective) and the higher

(cognitive) levels. The lower levels include visceral activation and action tendencies (which

are closer to affect-first perspectives) and the higher levels include discrete emotions, blends

of emotions and blends of blends (Lane & Pollermann, 2002). Ultimately, “higher level”

conscious emotional experience is contingent upon “lower level” somatic and neural

changes. As Aristotle explains, ‘in the absence of any external cause of terror we find

ourselves experiencing the feelings of a man in terror. From all this it is obvious that the

affections of soul are enmattered accounts’ (De Anima, I, 1, 404a23-25). An affective state

of consciousness is caused by, and therefore concurrent with, particular sorts of somatic and

17

neural changes. Whenever a psychological affection occurs, a concurrent physiological

affection causes it to occur.

Recent research developments in social cognitive neuroscience (Ocshner & Lieberman,

2001) provide further support for the integrative reading of Aristotelian ideas on emotion

promoted in this paper. Social cognitive Neuroscience seeks to explain the neural and

psychological bases of emotional experience and, to that end, it constitutes links between

cognition and emotion. Current studies focus on the role of the amygdala in a variety of

evaluative and social judgment processes. For example, LeDoux (1997) distinguishes

between explicit memory about emotional situations, which he associates with the

Hippocampal system (related with cortical areas), and implicit emotional memory, which he

positions in the Amygdala (affect-related). In a state of fear, the two systems run in parallel.

Evidence from an elaborate research program examining the neuropsychological bases of

fear suggests that emotional learning can happen via pathways that circumvent the neo-cortex

and connect with the limbic system so that emotional reactions can happen without

consciously processing the information (e.g. Jarrell et al. 1987). LeDoux calls this the low

road to emotion and the cortically-mediated the high road. Of course, learning also takes

place through a cortical route. Recently, Sander, Grafman & Zalla (2003) reviewed the

research on amygdala and concluded that in primates socially relevant events seem to have

become, through evolution, the dominant elements of the amygdala’s domain of specificity.

The integration of neurophysiological, cognitive and behavioural elements of emotion in

relation to emotion socialisation are evident in Alan Shore’s book on ‘Affect regulation and

the origin of the self’. Shore (1994) discusses the connections between dispositional and

socialisation (parental care-giving) elements of emotion regulation as they relate to the

maturation of the brain structures and infants’ attachment behavioural system. For example,

less optimal parental interaction with the offspring (being distant, rejecting or over-involved)

is associated with activation of certain emotion brain circuits to do with withdrawal (negative

emotion) and cessation of brain structures to do with approach (positive emotion).

In keeping with Schore’s approach, concurrent research by Shaver and his research group

has connected neuropsychological bases of emotion with secure and insecure attachment

relationships in adulthood (M. X. Cohen & Shaver, 2004). Namely individuals who are

insecure and who tend to follow dysfunctional emotion regulation strategies have been found

18

to use particular areas of the frontal lobe when they process positive and negative emotions.

This follows work on the effects of neurotransmitters (oxytoxin, serotonine) in secure and

insecure persons (Nelson & Panskepp, 1998).

The related psychological construct that reflects the neuropsychological substrates is

emotion regulation. Emotion regulation is by definition about the interplay between affective

and cognitive aspects of the emotion system and involves in one way or another all of Lane’s

hierarchical system. Emotion regulation refers to that reciprocal effect of altering cognitive

activities through emotional states: it is that ‘process in one domain that has the function of

modifying a process in another domain’ (Dodge, 1991, p. 173). This is in line with older and

more recent models of emotion that recognize their synthetic and complex nature (and

function) in integrating: a) neurophysiological/ biochemical, b) motor/behavioural-expressive

and c) cognitive/subjective-experiential components. Izard and Kobak (1991) see functional

emotion regulation associated with a timely response to cognitive cues and action tendencies,

whereas dysfunctional emotion regulation associated with affect that does not promote action

or is in conflict with the organism's action tendencies.

Drawing on Bell and Wolfe (2004) we will also argue that regulatory aspects of

development, as evidenced in attachment research on emotion regulation, can best be

understood by connecting emotion with cognitive processes. Emotion and cognition are

dynamically linked developmentally.

Equally, Aristotle outlined developmental ideas in the analysis of dispositions (hexis).

For example, one may become angry without good reason or afraid in spite of fearless

circumstances. In the former case, if the ‘body is already in a state of tension resembling its

condition when we are angry,’ then our perception of anger relevant stimuli will play a role

in producing felt anger (De Anima, I, 1, 403a19-24). One’s perception of anger relevant

stimuli can cause the body to complete the anger relevant condition it is already in. If the

body had not been in that anger relevant condition, then one would not have experienced

anger, despite one’s perception of anger relevant stimuli (De Anima, I, 1, 403a23). This

analysis says something significant about the nature of dispositions with respect to emotional

behavior. According to Robinson’s reading of Aristotle, the effects of emotion ‘are chiefly

those of amplification; they intensify or energize dispositions that are already in place’ (1989,

p. 85). Just as neural connections strengthen over time as a result of responding to the same

19

or similar data, so also dispositions become stronger over time as a consequence of practicing

the same or similar thoughts and behaviors. This raises important questions about moral

character, which, in this context, we address only briefly.

Aristotle, much like his mentor Plato, subscribed to a developmental model of moral

psychology and maintained that a dynamic, reciprocal interaction took place between soul

and society in the development of moral character (Nichomachean Ethics, I, 1059b5). The

soul unfolds over time and takes on dispositions (and therefore likely patterns of influence on

goal-directed behavior) reflected in the culture through the process of habituation (habitus).

In effect, we become what we practice; and what we practice is largely constrained by the

images of culture (cf. Lear, 1998). On this view, the moral content and inculcation of the

soul’s dispositions in early development is determined by culture and would therefore seem

to lie outside of the agent’s control, a kind of social-to-psychological determinism. However,

Aristotle also suggests that, at a later stage of moral and cognitive maturity, the intellectual

operation of the soul has the capacity to indirectly control emotion-related behavior through

the conscious, deliberate implementation of alternative moral practices (Nichomachean

Ethics, especially books I and X). This form of indirect control could influence the effects

that emotions have on various beliefs and other dispositions related to moral agency. The

ultimate goal of this form of intellectual influence would be to achieve and maintain

emotional homeostasis, an internally stable condition that facilitates human flourishing.

CONCLUDING POSTSCRIPT

Contrary to the role functionalist reading of Aristotle, our biology makes an important

difference to cognition and emotion. We presented an alternative reading of Aristotle’s

theory of cognition and emotion, which attempted to put biology back into Aristotelian

psychology. Toward this end, we argued that Aristotle’s commitment to the hierarchical

organization embedded in the biological world intimates a biologically based psychology that

bears affinities with emotion research in cognitive neuroscience. From Aristotle’s

perspective, the human body exhibits many levels of living organization—from elementary

constituents of the brain’s nucleons and electrons on up to atoms, molecular structures,

neurons, and the cerebral excitation associated with higher cognition—because of the causal

activity of form. In this light, form is understood to be a metaphysical principle of life

20

embedded in and expressed at various levels of organizational complexity in the world of

biological entities.4

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Biographical Notes Konstantinos Kafetsios is in the Department of Psychology, University of Crete. He has held research and teaching posts at the University of Cambridge, Lancaster University and Anglia Polytechnic University-Cambridge. His research interests focus on intra-individual and interpersonal processes relating to adult attachment and social aspects of emotion, emotion regulation and well-being. He is a member of the ISRE (International Society for Research on Emotion) and a graduate of Aristotle University. Some of his recent publications include: Attachment, Emotion and Close Relationships (Tipothito, 2005 in Greek); 'Attachment and Emotional Intelligence Abilities across the Life Course', Personality and Individual Differences, 37 (2004), 129–145; and (with J.B. Nezlek), 'Attachment in Everyday Social Interaction', European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 719–735. Address: Department of Psychology, University of Crete, Rethymnon 74100, Greece. [email: k.kafetsios@psy.soc.uoc.gr] Eric LaRock is in the Department of Philosophy at Saint Louis University. His research interests are in philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience, Greek psychology, and metaphysics. Some of his recent publications include: "Against the Functionalist Reading of Aristotle's Philosophy of Perception and Emotion," International Philosophical Quarterly, 42 (2002), pp. 231-258; "Dualistic Interaction, Neural Dependence, Aquinas's Composite View," Philosophia Christi, 3 (2001), pp. 459-472; "Augustine on Time, Mind, and Personal Identity," Augustinus, XLVI (2001), pp. 251-270. 1 If we were to side with a specific kind of functionalism, it would come close to Lycan’s (1999) formulation because of its emphasis on hierarchical organization in the biological world. Another plausible functionalist view is Prinz’s (2000). Prinz’s functionalist view suggests a way in which to break down the barriers between brain friendly scientists on the one hand and functionalist friendly philosophers on the other hand. 2 All references to Aristotle's works refer to the Complete Works (Aristotle, 1984) 3 There is also the issue of logical coherence: it seems that one cannot subscribe to both role functionalism and supervenience at once, since causal relations are essential to the functionalist theory, whereas the causal exclusion of MPs by BPs is entailed by the supervenience theory (cf. Kim, 2000). 4 We’re especially thankful to a few anonymous reviewers at Theory and Psychology for their helpful comments.