Abortion and Organ Donation-Patricia Beattie Jung

8/2/2019 Abortion and Organ Donation-Patricia Beattie Jung

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Abortion and Organ Donation: Christian Reflections on Bodily Life SupportAuthor(s): Patricia Beattie JungSource: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall, 1988), pp. 273-305Published by: Blackwell PublishingStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40015096

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ABORTION AND ORGAN DONATIONCHRISTIAN REFLECTIONS ON BODILY LIFESUPPORTPatricia Beattie Jung

ABSTRACTIn this essay I arguethatchildbearing nd variouskindsof organdona-tion are morally analogous activities. I argue, further,that the ethos ofgiftgivingoughtto informouranalysesof bothof these forms of bodilylifesupport.This reframing f the abortionandorgandonationdebatesyieldsnewinsights nto two relativelyneglected subtopics.First,thoughfrequentlyasserted,few havedemonstratedwhybodilylifesupport especially in the form of childbearing cannot be morallyre-quired.Thiscomparisonyields insights nto the reasons for suchan axiom.Second,while the givingof bodily life support s sometimes exhortedandalmostalways respectedand admired, ts intelligibility ndpoliticalmean-

ingfulnessas a moralchoiceis rarelyexplored.Thisanalogicalwagerrevealswhy one oughtto give anotherbodilylife support. n summary,he analogyyields insightscrucial to the developmentof cogent argumentsregardingboth the groundsfor and limits of the responsibility o give bodily lifesupport.Further, he analogy displaysthe disparitybetweenwhat has been de-mandedtraditionallyof those who are pregnantand of those men (andwomen)whoby virtueof tissue or bloodtypecan offerotherformsof bodilylife support.The analogyenables reflectionon abortion(andorgandona-tion)to develop n a contextfree of sexist biases.Finally, ffortsaremade toassess this giftgivingethos in lightof the feminist"hermeneutics f suspi-cion"regarding rgumentswhichhave andcan sacralizevictimization.

INTRODUCTIONIn this essay I intend to explore two interrelated opics: first, I willdelimit he responsibility o givebodilylife support; econd,I willanalyzeChristian ustifications for both the giving and refusing of bodily lifesupport.Both of these topics have beenneglected n muchof the literature

dealingwith bodily life support.Many, ncludingmost recentlythe IowaState SupremeCourt, have asserted that such a gift cannot be legallyrequiredand therefore its giving ought not be coerced.1 But few have273


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274 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsdefended that assertion, beyond claimingas the courts have that com-pulsory bodily life supportwould violate an individual's ightto privacy.However,one mayask:why is this particularnvasionof privacy ntolera-ble, whereas others arelegallysanctioned, f not enjoined?2Inher book Abortionand the RomanCatholicChurch, 1978)SusanT.Nicholson argues that the teachingsof the Roman Catholic church onbodily life supportareinconsistent.Abortion ollowingrapeis forbidden,while the responsibility o offer other forms of bodily life support, shethinks, is quite limited. She quotes Gerald F. Kelly in this regard:"Onemusthelpa needy neighboronly when it can be done withoutproportion-ate inconvenience and with a reasonable assurance of success" (Kelly,1951:553-554) emphasis hers). Obviously,Nicholson believes that therapevictim has no special parental esponsibilities oward hefetus, and isonly a neighbor o it. She concludes, with only passingattention o whatshe calls the "special nature of bodily life support,"that the RomanCatholicproscriptionof abortion ollowingrapeis wrong.There are several difficultieswith her argument.First, it is not at allclearthatrapevictims haveno parentalresponsibilities this is discussedin more detail in endnote#7). However, he chargein inconsistencystillstands,of course,because the RomanCatholicchurch(andcommon aw)has neverdemandedof parentsthat they offerother forms of bodily lifesupport to their children except under the circumstances detailed byKelly.The lawhas never mandatedorgandonationby parentsto childreneven when Kelly'sconditionsarefulfilled.Second, it is not clear that Kelly'sstatementof the principleof bene-ficence is all that limited. It is not evidentthat in all imaginablecases ofproblempregnancies hat the "inconvenience" f the pregnancywouldbeout of proportionwith the good that could predictablyensue from adecision to sustain the life support.Indeed,one could imaginea Utopiansituation of optimal medical, financial and emotional supportwhere itwould be clearly disproportional o abort on the basis of a cost-benefitanalysis. Beverly WildungHarrisonin her book, OurRight to Choose,recognizesthis as a logical (thoughnot at presenta historical)possibility.

InsuchaUtopian orld,wherewomen'siveswere eally alueda world,etus insist,quiteunlike he one we know!),t probably ouldbe possibleoadhereo anethicwhichaffirmedhatabortionshould eresortedo onlyinextremis,o savea mother'sife.(Harrison,983:18)The sameargument ould be developed n regard o otherforms of bodilylife support, includingbone marrowand organ donations, etc. In thisessay, however,I will arguethat bodily life supportcan not be morallyrequiredof persons.It is my contention hatno personcan demandaccessto anotherperson'sbody to theirblood,forexample and thatabortion,


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ChristianReflectionson Bodily Life Support 275alongwith otherrefusals to give bodily life support,oughtnot be forbid-den.Second,let us assume for the sake of argument hattraditionalRomanCatholic eachingsas epitomized n Kelly'smaximare indeedquite imitedand hence contradictthe RomanCatholicprohibitionof abortion ollow-ing rape. Why conclude that the injunctionagainst abortion should bedropped? ndeed,perhaps he moralerror nthe tradition ies on the otherside of the polarity, n its minimalism.Why not arguethat persons areabsolutely requiredto give assistance to others, includingall forms ofbodily life support?Nicholson did not demonstrate,but instead merelyasserted, that the gift ethos which currently nformstransplantationssethicallyfittingor appropriate. intendto demonstrate hat there aregoodreasons for interpretingboth organ donation and childbearingas giftrelations.In this essay, I also intend to articulatesome of the reasons why aChristianoughtto initiateand/or sustain the givingof bodilylife support,as well as examinethe feministsuspicionof thegiftethos. While he givingof bodily life supporthas traditionallybeen exhorted and almost alwaysrespectedandadmired, ts intelligibility ndmeaningfulness or Christianfeminists is problematic.In light of their deconstruction of traditionalrationales or such sacrificialgiving,I will describein the finalsection ofthis essay what the gift of bodily life supportandits refusalmightmean.Thiswill be discussedin termsof both childbearing ndorgandonation.

REFRAMINGTHEACTIVITY: DEFENSE OF THEANALOGYToaccomplish hese goals, it is necessaryto definebodily life support.By this term, I mean to designateany form of assistance that entails theinvasion of the giver's body and which consequently serves to sustainanother's ife. This activity arises with particular requency in two bio-medical contexts:obstetricsandtransplantation.ndeed,it is my conten-tionthatchildbearing ndvariouskinds of live organdonationaremorallyanalogousactivities.3Donations from living persons, whether of (1) renewableparts of thebody, such as skin, blood, and bone marrow, 2) pairedorgans, such aseyes andkidneys,or (3) (forthe sake of argument)unpairedvital organs,such as the heart or liver, are forms of bodily life support. Similarly,pregnancy s a formof bodilylife support.An optimalpregnancy nvolvesthe massive (though temporary)physical modificationand the minor(permanent) odilytransformation f the mother,allforthe sake of and insupportof fetal life. At worstit mayinvolve mutilation caesareansectionorhysterectomy)done solely forthe benefitof thefetus, thoughatpresent


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276 The Journal of Religious Ethicsmost frequently such procedures benefit both mother and child. Preg-nancy, like organ donation, is a form of bodily life support that can gravelythreaten the life of the donor. When women's experience of pregnancy istaken seriously, the invasive element in the experience is quite prominentin the reframing of the activity. In an essay aptly entitled "The MoralImplications of Regarding Women as People: New Perspectives of Preg-nancy and Personhood," Caroline Whitbeck makes the following claim.

Possession and inspirationprovidethe closest analogy to the ultimatelyunique experience of pregnancy.The difference in the experience of awantedpregnancyand thatof an unwantedpregnancys as differentas thetwo experiencesof inspirationandpossession.(Perhapsall or most experi-ences of inspirationhave some element of possession in them and viceversa, and similarlywith wanted and unwantedpregnancies.) Whitbeck,1983:264)One obvious strength of my proposed analogy is that it takes seriously notonly women's life supporting role in pregnancy, but also their experienceof it.Analogies in moralargumentareusuallynot proposedwithouta pur-pose. My intent in highlighting he similarities between these variousactivities is to allow the moral traditionbehindorgandonationto informthe argumentsaboutabortionandvice versa. Theethos thatpervades hemedicalliteraturedealingwithorganandtissue transplantationss thatofgift-giving.4 ndeed the gift metaphorso pervadesthe discussion of in-formedconsent in such matters that motives of duty or guiltarejudgedsuspect, because it is argued heyreflectthe donor'smisunderstandingfthe discretionarynatureof the actora less thanvoluntary"consent" o it.The ethos that pervadesthe medical and traditionalChristian iteraturedealing with abortion is that of the duty of nonmaleficence,and thelegitimateviolationsthereof.

By drawingan analogybetween these formsof bodily life support,5hope to increase our understanding f both the limits of andthe reasonsfor the responsibilityone person mayhave to give bodily life supporttoanother.If a moralanalogybetweenchildbearing ndorgandonationcanbe established,then perhapsit will yield clues as to why abortionoughtnot be prohibited.Perhaps t will also yield clues as to why the givingofbodilylife support hrougheitherorgandonationor childbearing ughttobe encouraged. t should, naddition,be noted that theanalogywillenablethis argumentto be developed in a context free of sexist biases. As afeminist,I believe it is altogetherappropriateo applya "hermeneutics fsuspicion" o the moraltradition urroundinghe currentabortiondebate.Upon comparison,it is hardto miss the disparitybetween what "con-servatives"have demandedof women who arepregnantand what those


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ChristianReflectionson BodilyLifeSupport 277same persons view as obligatory n regards o otherforms of bodily lifesupport,whichnot incidentallycan be offeredby men.6It is also the case thatmost moralanalogiesarenot self-evident.Giventhe controversialmplicationsof this analogy,a defense of it is clearly inorder. One may object to the claim that these activities are morallyanalogouson at least the following ivegrounds.With he exceptionof thesecondand finalobjections,each criticismof theproposedanalogycan beinterpretedas an argument or the claim that there is a stricterrespon-sibility o bearchildren hanto donateorgans,and that while theformer sa duty,the latter is supererogatory.

(1)First, t canbe argued hat it is notpossibleto compareorgandonationwithpregnancy,becauseby definitionpregnancyentailsspecial (parental)obligationsnot necessarilyentailedin organtransplants.The analogy(sothe objectiongoes) obscures a distinctivefeatureof pregnancywhich ismorallysignificant, f not decisive, in that this special obligationcreatesastricterobligation o sustaina pregnancy han to donateorgans,etc. One

could argue,as Nicholson has, that since a rapevictim does not partici-pate voluntarily n the sexual act thatproducedthe fetal life, she has noparentalobligation o the fetus andconcludethat "the moralproblemofabortion ollowingrape"oughtto be "conceptualizedas thatof the bodilylife supportone humanbeing owes another"(1978:80) emphasismine).Thisrebuttal,however,does not withstandcarefulscrutiny.7In cases of bothtransplantsandpregnancy, ontractual esponsibilitiescan come into playand donorsmayhave variousdegreesof parentalandotherspecialobligations.Thepointis, however, hatcritics of this analogyassume that parentalduties requireone to give bodily life support.Yet,what strikesthem as obvious in regard o pregnancyand motherhood ssomehow obscured when they consider what ought to be requiredofhistocompatibledonor fathers (and mothers).Consistency requiresthatchildbearingand paternal(parental)organ donation both be viewed aseitherobligatoryor discretionary.

(2)It mayalso be objectedthat fetal life is not morallyconvertiblewith

other forms of human life.8 This is indeed a hotly debated equation.However, t is notmyintention o defendthiskeyassumption,butto adoptit for the sake of the argumentthat follows. Therefore,this essay is


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278 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsaddressed o three differentaudiences: 1)those who holdthisassumptionabout fetal life to be true; (2) those who wish to examine this issueexclusivelyas it relatesto organdonations andhencewill ignoreportionsof this argument);and (3) those who wish to explorethe moralramifica-tions of thisreconceptualization f pregnancy, venthough heydon'tholdthis presumptionabout fetal life. I hope to make it evident thatwhile thestatus of fetal life is clearly an importantquestion,even fromwithin themost conservative framework t is not the decisive issue in the abortiondebate. Much can be gained by exploringother frequentlyoverlookedissues whichprofoundlyaffectbodilylife support.

(3)A thirdobjectionto this analogycan be made on the basis of the so-called "passive-active"distinction.In the case of transplants,bodily lifesupport nvolves the questionof ourresponsibility o give andourrighttowithholdsupport.However, n the case of pregnancy,bodilylife support sa "given" exceptperhaps n cases involvingsurrogatemotherhoodortheuse of the "morningafter"pill)and the central ssue is the questionof the

withdrawalof bodily life support.Refusalin the formercase is a passiveinstance of "allowing o die,"whereas in the latter t is an activeinstanceof "killing."Within he framework f this objection,the dutynot to kill is viewedasstricter than the responsibilityto supply organs. In respondingto thisobjection, I must begin by explainingthat throughout his essay I willassume thatabortion mpliesprimarilyhe severingof thehost or donativerelation. It does not necessarily imply either the death or killingof thefetus.9 It is of course true that at present the withdrawalof maternalsupport early (beforethe 20 week mark) n the gestation process invari-ably results in fetal death. It is also true that some abortiontechniques(theD andC/aspiration nd the salineinjectionmethods,forexample)killthe fetus, thoughsometimes"only"allowing t to die.Proponentsof thisobjectionrecognizethatnotallimaginablenstancesof "allowing o die" arejustifiable.Likewise, they recognizethat not allimaginable nstances of "killing"are unjustifiable.They claim, however,that all other morallyrelevantfactorsbeing equal, one must have morereasonto kill thannot to save primarilybecause it is arguedthat such apractice would erode the trust essential to the health care partnership.(Interestingly,n other contexts of death anddying, the dutynot to with-hold life support s generallyviewedas stricterthan the obligationnot towithdraw life supportbecause of the time requiredfor diagnostic andprognostic udgments.)At anyrate,the validityof this premise s thetopic


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ChristianReflectionsonBodilyLife Support 279of much debate among many ethicists both withinand without the bio-medical context. Once againfor the sake of argument, et us takeupthemost conservativeperspectiveand assume thatthis premise s true. Whatwould its implicationsbe forthe topics underconsideration?It would follow that allowinga person to die of, say, renal failurebyrefusing o donatea kidney akes lessjustification hankilling hepotentialrecipient,all othermorallyrelevant actorsbeing equal. Similarly,t wouldfollowthat abortion echniqueswhichmerelyterminate he host relation,even though they mightinvariablyresult in fetal death, wouldbe prefer-able to those methods thatentail the killingof the fetus, all othermorallyrelevant actorsbeing equal.Onthe basis of these implicationsproponentsof thisobjectionconcludethat since abortion requently mplieskilling hefetus, it requires more justification than the refusal to donate organs.Indeed,theyfrequently umpto the furtherconclusionthatpregnancycanthereforebe required,but organdonation s discretionary.My response is twofold.First, as I understandcurrentabortionprac-tices, the methodsemployedto terminatepregnancyvary,because, as amatterof fact,allothermorallyrelevant actorsarenotequal specifically,those techniquesare employedwhich best ensure maternalwell-being,which can varyconsiderablywith differentmethods at differentstages inthe gestation process. Second, it does not necessarily follow that preg-nancycanbe mandated. t may simplybe the case thatorgandonation smorediscretionary hanchildbearing.

(4)Fourth,this analogy maybe objectedto on the groundsthat the phys-ical relationship of pregnancy is natural and normal, whereas thenurturanceand dependencyassociatedwith organdonation is patholog-

ical or biologically nonnormative.Both are instances of "giving life"which is good. However,Lisa Sowle Cahill (1981:14)suggests that "allother thingsbeing equal," pregnancyconstitutes an intrinsicgood to bepreserved,whereasthe donativerelation s to be avoidedwhen possible.Childbearings a premoralgood towardwhich human communitiesarenaturally nclined.Thus she concludesa more seriousor weightierset ofreasonsis necessary "tojustify the destructionof such a 'positive'rela-tion of dependency (physical or otherwise)" than of an intrinsically"negative"one.This is a formidableobjection to the proposed analogy, particularlysince Cahillis careful not to interpret his argumentas supportiveof anabsoluteprescription orprocreation. ndeed,she suggeststhatcontempo-rary moraltheology is rightin its efforts to avoid the dangersof phys-


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280 TheJournalof ReligiousEthics

icalism. However, otally ignoring he moralsignificanceof corporealitysequally problematic or her. Hence, the analogyI propose obscures ac-cordingto Cahillthe nonpathological haracterof the bodilylife supportconstitutive of pregnancy.It is certainly rue thatthe gestationprocessis normal, n the sense thatthe fetal need for dependencyis neithercaused by a disease like renalfailurenor does it originate rom some sort of trauma.10 urthermore, newould be foolish to arguewith Cahillwhen she suggeststhat the donativerelationship,unlikepregnancy, ughtto be avoidedwhenpossiblethroughthe preventionand/orcuringof variousdiseases andinjuries. ndeed I willeven grantthat pregnancyconstitutesan intrinsicgood to be preserved.Consequently,because there is some kindof responsibility o maintainallintrinsicallygood states of affairs,there is some kindof responsibility ocontinue pregnancy n every case and this is not true in regard o organdonation.However, Cahilljumps from these premises to the conclusion thatchildbearing s (unlikeorgandonation)a primafacie duty or obligationmandatedby the naturalrequirementsof justice. Thoughdefended atlength in the midsection of this essay, I reject her conclusion for thefollowing wo reasons.First,neitherchildbearing unlikechildrearing) ororgan donation are responsibilitieswhich can be equitablydistributedamongallmembersof the humancommunity. econd,theyare bothbodilyforms of life support.Therefore hey are highly discretionarygifts, andought only be encouraged.In summary,Cahill'sargument evealsa significantpointof disanalogy.However, his difference s onlyrelevant o an evaluationof theseactivitiesinsofaras they oughtto be enjoined.One cannotconclude,as does Cahill,thatthis differencerendersone activity(pregnancy)obligatory,while theother is merely supererogatory.The reframingI propose reveals thatneitherform of bodily life supportcanbe legitimatelyrequired.

(5)Finally,some feminists mightobject to the proposed analogy on thegroundsthat childbearing unlikeorgandonation) s an activitythatonlywomen can do. Furthermore,hey argue, t is a responsibility houlderedat presentin a worldwhich is largelyhostile to both womenand children.Thus, they argue,the responsibility o donateorgansis stricterthanthatwhich can be ascribedto childbearing, ll other factorsbeing equal.Clearly,because of its requirements orhistocompatibility,he respon-sibility for most types of organ donation cannot be equally allocated.Nevertheless, this naturallottery is not influencedby gender factors,


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ChristianReflectionson Bodily LifeSupport 281which are of particular ignificancegiventherealityof most women's iveswithinpatriarchy.Here againwe areconfrontedwith a formidableobjec-tion. This is clearly a morally significantpointof disanalogy.However,Ibelieve it is relevantonly to a comparisonof pregnancyandorgandona-tion as acts of supererogation.Because bothforms of life supportare (1)bodilyand (2) incapableof equal allocation,neithercan be viewed as adutyor obligation.It is this insightwhich I believethe proposedanalogymakes clear,andwhich I will defend at lengthin the mid-sectionof thisessay.In summary,despitenotabledifferences,these activities organdona-tionandpregnancy aremorallyanalogous n significantways.I intendtowager that the moral traditions behind these instances of bodily lifesupportwillfruitfully llumineone another. ndeed t is mycontention hatthis mutualreframingof the activities will yield insights crucial to thedevelopmentof cogent argumentsregardingboth the groundsfor andlimits of ourresponsibility o givebodily ifesupport.Beforeproceeding othese tasks, it is necessaryto clarifywhatit means to sayanactivityoughtto be done,if it is not thereby,morallyrequired.

REFRAMINGTHENOTION OF OUGHTIn his pamphlet, "Supererogation:An Analysis and a Bibliography,"WillardSchumakersuggests that there is more to morality han what isminimallyrequiredof us.Supererogations possiblebecausewhilewealways avea right o our airshare fbenefits ndcanalways ightly eforced oacceptour air hare fburdens,t is sometimesmorally referableorus to take essthanour airshareofthe benefits f ourcommonifeor to voluntarilycceptmore hanour airshareofburdens;ndwhenever e do so foraltruisticeasons,weareacting upererogatorily.Schumaker,977:33)

Forexample, simplybecause it is morallypermissable n some situationsnot to forgive does not mean that one ought not forgive or that suchpraiseworthy orgiveness s of only marginal ignificance o moral ife.As Schumakerpointsout (1977:42),Kantis correctin his claimthat ifpersonswerejust, then therewould be no direneed forcharity.However,it is equallytrue and significant hat as a matterof fact persons are notalways ust. Indeed,Kant'sprogram ven when interpreted s entailingaform of moral community establishes only those principlesand rulesnecessaryfor a barelyhuman,social existence. There s no need, I wouldargue, for either philosophicalor theological ethicists to restrict them-selves to such a truncatedconceptionof theirreflectivetasks. There is a


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282 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsneed,even if not a Hobbesianone, to establishthenecessaryconditionsofmorality. t is an appropriate ndimportant ask. However, he contentofthe moral ife is not exhaustedby suchwork.Since it is my aim in this essay to explore some of the reasons whyChristiansought and ought not to offer the gift of bodily life support,Imust sketch somethingof the framework hroughwhich I interpretandevaluatethis activity.Thus, this essay will be explicitlyboth theologicalandpolitical.It will criticizea modern iberal heoryof communityn lightof anexplicitlyChristianvision.11Insummary,hereare at leasttwo broadlevels of responsibility.First,there are those "oughts"which arerequisitefor a barelyhuman,social existence. Theseminimalobligationsareduties,the fulfillmentof which is appropriately equiredby all moral commu-nities.Second,there are those "oughts"which stem fromother visions ofcommunal ife which exceed or go beyondthat of a barelyhuman exis-tence. The"oughts"are best thoughtof as self-imposedby the self's desireto be in its fullness a certainkindof personandto createa certainkind ofcommunity.It is my intention n this essay to examinethe limits of andgrounds orthe responsibility o give bodily life support.In the next section of thisessay, I will analyze what it is about this kind of gift this gift of one'sbodilyself, as distinguishedroma giftof one'sproperty that makes it achoice to be encouragedandcommended,etc., but not required itherbyChurchdisciplineor civil law. In the finalpartof the essay,I will explorewhy in light of the Christianvision of life a believer "ought"or "oughtnot" to give bodilylife support.

BODILYLIFE SUPPORT SHOULD NOT BE REQUIREDBYCANON OR CIVIL LAWAll humanbeings have an obligationor duty to give some minimaldegreeof assistance to others in life threatening ituations.Conversely,byvirtueof a person'shumanity,he or she may lay claim to or havea moralrightto minimalassistance from others in perpetuating is or her own life.Thisthesis is put forward n orderto distinguishmy positionfrom others.It is at least intelligible thoughI believeerroneous) o delimitthe respon-sibilityto give bodilylife supportby attempting o demonstrate hatthereis no general positive duty to give assistance to others and hence nospecific dutyto offerbodilylife support.12 intend to clarifythe "specialnature" of bodily life support by explainingits immunityfrom what Iregardas the legitimate generalrequirementsof both social justice andbeneficence.


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ChristianReflectionson Bodily Life Support 283MinimalAssistance Oughtto Be RequiredBy LawTheobligation o assist othershasrootsinboth ustice andbeneficence.Theobligation o give assistanceto anothercan be derived romtwo verydifferentconceptions of justice. On the one hand, it can springfrom areciprocaltheory of justice. Minimalassistance is requiredbecause allpersons have received and continue to expect to receive such "mutualaid"fromothers.On the otherhand, t can be argued hat thereare certainprimarygoods like self-preservation, ealth maintenanceand procrea-tion towardwhichhumancommunitiesarenaturally nclined,and there-forejustice requiredprima acie that all persons pursuethese communalgoods.Eachtheory,albeit in very differentmanners,helps illumine he moralintuitionthat a starving "thief" can have a right to or can legitimatelyclaimthe "stolen"bread.Tothe degreethat anagentis responsible or hisor her neighbor's"need" that is, has profited n some fashion from theexploitationwhich producedand sustains it to that same degree,he orshe is requiredby justice to go beyondthis minimal evelof assistance. Insome cases then, the starving"thief"maybe said to havea rightto this"donor's" read.However,no single "donor"canbejustly required o carrya genuinelycommunalburden.It is not alwaysthe case that the starving"thief"has arightto this "donor's"bread. For these reasonsthe traditionhas rootedthe generalobligation o give assistancein beneficenceas well asjustice.Charity s possible for three reasons: (i) not all persons carrytheir fairshare of social burdens; (ii) some communalresponsibilitiescannot befairlydistributed,but ratherfallby virtue of the naturaland/orhistoricallotteryon the shouldersof single individualsor institutions; iii)personscan voluntarilygive up theirfairshareof socialbenefits.Whathas all this to do with bodily life support,especially with child-bearing and organ donation? First, it establishes that (nonbodily)lifesupportcan be requiredby the demandsofjustice of bothindividualsandcommunities.However, t also establishesthatsuchlife supportcan some-timesbe at least in parta matterof charity.Why?Becausefor a varietyofreasons, single individualsare asked to shouldera burden,the respon-sibility orwhich is nottheirsalone.It is importanto understand hat bothorgandonationandchildbearing realwaysin part(if not largely)acts ofcharity.This has been clearly recognized in regardto organ donation and isexpressedwell in the giftethos whichillumines hatactivity.Even thoughin theory the responsibility or some types of organdonation(eg. blood)could be fairly distributed, n fact many people cannot (say, for healthreasons)or do not carrytheir fair shareof this communalburden. Thus


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284 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsmost blood donorsgive morethanmightbe theoreticallyrequiredof themby justice. Indeed many give who will neveruse their fair share of thecommunal blood supply.The beneficentcharacterof organdonationisvividlydramatizedwhen the requirementsor histocompatibility ecomemore complex, as in bone marrow ransplants. n such a case a donorisasked to carry alone a burden,for which their responsibility(as say adistantcousin)maybe miniscule.Likewise,childbearings always npart(ifnot largely)an act of charity.This, however,has not been widely understood nor is it reflected n thetraditionalethos surrounding bortion. The life supportof childrenis ajoint parentalresponsibilityas well as a communalone. Yet duringthegestation period this burden can not be equitablydistributedeven intheory.Mothersalonecarrychildren o term.Thefactthateverypregnantwomancarriesfarmore than her fairshare of this responsibility s simplyvividly dramatizedwhen pregnancyresults from rape or the failure ofcontraceptivemeasures,when it threatens he mother's ife, or when it isaccompaniedby totalpaternalor social abandonment.However, implybecause bothorgandonationandchildbearing re acts(at least in part)of charitydoes not automaticallymeanthey oughtnotberequired.Becausejustice cannotalwaysenjointhis "donor" o give his orher loaf of bread to the starving"thief"does not mean that such a gift ispurelydiscretionary.As David Littlepointsout in "MoralDiscretionandthe UniversalizabilityThesis," beneficence can give rise to obligations.Therobustpasserbycan be blamed f he or she fails to savethe drowningchild by rollinghim/herout of the puddle.The donor can be blamedforfailingto feed the starving"thief,"even if the "thief"has no rightto thisdonor'sbread.Thus I must show what it is aboutthe gift of a womb orother bodily organ that makes it discretionary.Why should bodily lifesupportnot be required?Bodily Life Support s a GiftIn struggling o identify the logic of beneficentacts, Little identifiessome of the criteriafor determining he extent to which assistance isdiscretionary. n my opinionone factorinfluencing he determination fthe discretionaryqualityof a beneficent act is the extent to which the"gift" n questionis trulya gift. Some gifts aremoregenuinelygifts thanothers. Comparea gift of money to the gift of a friendship.The latter ismoretrulya gift,and thusmorediscretionary otherrelevant actorsbeingequal),because friendshipbelongsmore to andis moreexpressiveof thegiverthanis money.

Thegivingof breadto the starving hief is only minimallydiscretionarybecause the breadbelongsto the donoronly in a minimalway.Evenif one


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ChristianReflectionson Bodily LifeSupport 285assumeson a penultimateevel,as didThomasAquinas,that the notionofprivatepropertybest serves communalneeds andresponsibilities,vis-a-vis the goods of the earth, it does not follow that one can ultimatelypossess or own wealthor property, tc. One is finallyonly a stewardoversuch goods. The savingof the drowningchild is morediscretionary hanthe giving of the bread because an agent's actions, labor, skills, etc.,belong more to him or her are more personal than property.Hence,theyaremore of a gift. (Intheparticularcase citedby Little,the rescue isstill requiredbecause the costs and risks of the saving activity are sominimal.Even thoughthe "gift" s morepurelya gift, its givingremainsobligatory.)Whatis the extent of the discretionarynatureof bodily life support?Can it ever be said that a needy "thief"hasa right o this "donor's" lood,bone marrow,or womb, etc.? What kind of gift is this? Is the giving ofsuch assistancethroughorgandonationor pregnancyever obligatory? fpersonshave a generalobligation o assistothersbased on thedemandsofboth justice and beneficence, may this not include bodily forms of lifesupport?If not, why not? Persons do not have a dutyto give bodily lifesupport o others.Nobody, simplyas a humanbeingin need, has a claimto the use of another'sbody.Charles Friedin his discussion of "bodilyintegrity" s a negativeright n his book,Rightand Wrong, 1978)offers afruitfulexplanationof the "specialnature"of bodilylife support.Whileheadmitsthatagentshavea generalobligation o assist minimallypersonsinurgentneed, this moralrequirement oes not includebodilylife support.So, forexample,blood donationsare in hisjudgementpurely"discretion-ary" options. This is so because when the demands of justice or bene-ficence conflict with those of autonomy, he lattergenerallytake prece-dence overthe former. Thereare,of course, exceptionsfor Fried.Somedemands of justice e.g., the duty to contribute a fair share overridesome conceivable preferences.)However,bodily integrityfor Fried isessential to "the sense of possession of oneself," and hence an agentcannot use anotherperson'sbody againsthis or her will withoutviolatingthe more primaryobligationto respect that person as a person (Fried,1978:154).This is quitecorrect.InaccordwithJamesM.Gustafson, wouldarguethat "man's'sovereigntyover himself to use Kierkegaard'sphrase, isfundamental o any serious moral view of life" (Gustafson, 1968:112).Bodily integrity is viewed descriptively as a foundationof agency orconditionnecessaryfor humanaction.In the workof AlanDonagan,TheTheory of Morality (1979), such a condition becomes the basis for anormativeudgment.In orderfor a personto actmorally,his or herbodilyintegritymust be respected by others. (Indeed,we do not hold persons


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286 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsaccountable orchoices made underundueduress or coercion.)Thereforethe agentmustrespectthese samefeaturesof agencyin others.13But why drawthe line at bodilylife support?Whynot view an agent'sbody regardlessof genderas one of life'sgoods (likefood, property, tc.)which can like otherobjectsbe possessed, exchanged,confiscatedand/orrightlyclaimedby another?Whyis bodily integritya conditionnecessaryfor agency? Bodily life supportcannot be requiredpreciselybecause thehumanbody is not like the other goods of creation which an agent canobjectifywithoutdistortion.The body is not like otherpossessions. Onedoes not have a body one is embodied.

Granted,there are many lived experiences of the body which temptpersons to objectify the body and stoically treat it like a stranger.Forexample,agentsare oftenaffectivelybeseigedby theirphysicalneedsandmustoccasionallyfight hemoff,as if theywereforeign nvaders.Oragain,severalmedical techniqueshave at theirfoundationan analogybetweenthe body and a machine in need of upkeepor repair.Accordingto PaulRicoeur(1966:87),"here lies the temptationof naturalism, he invitationto deprive he experienceof thebodyof its personal raitsand to treat t asany otherobject."If so much of our experienceof the body temptsus to treat it like anobject,thenwhy notaccepttheinvitation?Whyview suchaninvitationastreasonous?Primarily t is because such objectificationsbreak down ac-cordingto Ricoeur.Upon close inspection they do not fit our personalexperience of the body, le corpspropre. "I do not know need from theoutside,as a naturalevent,butfromwithinas a lived need ..." (Ricoeur,1966:87). n Freedom and Nature,RicoeuradoptsGabrielMarcel'sbasicintuition about the ultimateunity of the subject and object. This is forRicoeurthe realmeaningandmysteryof incarnation.Thisprimordialink,"thisinherence of a personal body in the Cognito"(Ricoeur, 1966:88),smost evident when the experience of embodimentis analyzed on theprereflective evel. In his philosophyof the will, Ricoeur uses the phe-nomenologicalmethodto unravelMarcel's nigmatic nsightand to elabo-rate systematicallythe meaningof incarnateagency.In his analysis thiselusive unifyinglink between consciousness andbody which is incarna-tion is disclosed to be "already unctioning"prior o reflectionat the coreof the decision-makingprocess.Forexample,Ricoeuranalyzesmusculareffort,a typical experienceofthe body as object. By attending o the prereflective evel of this experi-ence, he is ableto demonstrate hat the bodycan be experiencednotonlyas recalcitrantly lienbutalso,andprimarily, s anavailable ervant o thewill. The prereflectiveexperienceof bodily docilityis difficult o capturebecause it shrinks away from attention. However, as Ricoeur notes,


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ChristianReflectionsonBodily Life Support 287(1966:310)"onlywillingwhichis alreadyeffectivelydeployedcan encoun-ter limitations.Externalresistancepresupposesthe docilityof the body."Persons do not have a right to or claim upon parts or the use ofanother'sbody,becauselivingbodiesareprimordially ersonal.All objec-tificationsof the body are abstractions rom this lived unity.Therefore,while the needy "thief" may have a just right to another'spropertyorwealth,such claimsmaynot be extendedto another'sbodywithout directviolation of the obligation to respect persons as persons. While bene-ficencemayimposeuponall agentsa requiremento give certainkinds of"gifts" gifts which are only marginallygifts it can never requireofagentsso pureandpersonala giftas the giftof one'sbody.This is a claimfor the most part accepted but inconsistentlyapplied by traditionalbio-ethicists.For example,in their now famous debates about experimentson chil-dren both Paul Ramsey and Richard A. McCormick(albeit to a lesserextent) recognize the moral significanceof this axiom. For Ramsey,itgroundshis absolute prohibitionof any nontherapeuticexperimentsonchildren.ForMcCormick,t groundshisprohibition f any nontherapeuticexperimentson childrenwhich(1)aremorethanminimally nvasiveor (2)carryany significantrisk. Even for McCormick,only routineweighingsand bloodwork-upscanbe tolerated.Both men(althoughagainto varyingdegrees) recognizethe moralsignificanceof bodilyintegritywhenanalyz-ing the ethics of organdonation.However,neitherRamseynor McCor-mick (like many moraltheologians)recognizeas significant he claim tobodily integritymadeby women in regard o theirreproductive apacity ngeneral,andboth tendto deny its significance n the abortiondebate.In a recentessay entitled"Abortion nd the SexualAgenda:A CaseforPro-LifeFeminism,"SidneyCallahan einforces hisposition.Therein henotes that no one ought to "be forced to donate an organor submit tootherinvasivephysicalprocedures or howevergood a cause"(Callahan,1986:232).But this rightto bodily integritydoes not applyto childbearingaccordingto Callahan(1986a:234),because when pregnant"one's ownbody no longer exists as a single unit but is engenderinganotherorgan-ism'slife."I would concurwithCallahanwhen she claims that a woman'srightto control her own body does applyto self-regardinghoices aboutmastectomies, contraceptionand sterilization,and I have taken as ax-iomatic her premise that the fetus is not like a cancerous tumor orsubhumanparasite.Further, agreethatchildbearings clearlyan other-regardingactivity and that this other can be intelligibly regardedas aperson, whose very life is dependent upon maternalbodily support.Yetisn'tsuch also the natureof organ-donation:hatis, isn't the "goodcause"the preservationof anotherperson's ife? It strikesme as blatantly ncon-


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288 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicssistent to grant potential donors the right to refuse to participateintransplantprocedures,yet view childbearing s required.The analogy I have proposedillumines the fact that a womandeniedaccess to either birth control or abortionis forced into childbearing ahighly invasive experience with significant risks against her will.Ramsey,McCormick and Callahanwould never tolerate such abuse ofeither children or reluctantorgan donors.14Werethey consistent, theywould not be able to tolerate this abuse of pregnantwomen. As it stands,they contribute o andendorsethatlong traditionwhichregardswomen'sbodies as objects to be controlledby others, if not by their fathers orhusbands,then by the state.Like McCormick,I believe agents ought to give minimalbodily as-sistance even to strangers. ndeed, nthe concludingportionof thisessay Iwill outlinesome of the distinctivelyChristian easonsfor suchgift-giving.However,McCormickerrs when he argues that this can be requiredofagents by the demandsof justice. He moves in this direction n order toemphasize (in contrast to Ramseyand others) the essentially communalnatureof justice. Corporateobligationsare constitutiveof the moral ife.He is correct when he arguesthatpersons arenot properlyconstruedasautonomous, f thattranslates nto anatomistic ormof individualism. t iscounter-intuitiveo deny thatthere arecertaincommunalgoods includ-ing health maintenanceand disease control towardwhich human com-munities are inclined and thatagentsarerequired o pursuethese goals.While I am most sympathetic with McCormick'semphasis on thecommunalcharacterof personsand withhis warinessof the currentsurgeof liberal nterest n "autonomy," believe he is mistaken n his attempt olink the responsibility o give bodily ife supportwith the requirements fjustice. The communal character of human agency can be accuratelyportrayedonly when it is recognizedthat persons are not parts of, butrather"wholes within a whole"(Ramsey,1970).

One final comment about bodily integrityseems in order.Many,es-peciallyRomanCatholic,pro-lifersview anti-abortionegislationas anal-ogous to anti-slaveryand feminist"equalrights" egislation.Fromwithinthis perspective the anti-abortionist, abolitionist, and feminist all areviewed as seeking egalrecognitionof andprotection orgroupswhosefullhumanityhas not been generallyrespected. Sidney Callahan n a jointinterviewwith her husbandon theirbook,Abortion:UnderstandingDif-ferences, represents his perspectivewell.

Justas womenandblackswereconsideredoodifferent,ooundeveloped,toobiologicalo have oulsorrights spersons, o thefetus s nowseenasmerebiologicalife.(Callahan,986b:)


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ChristianReflectionson Bodily Life Support 289Womenwho "want"abortions, like slaveownersand slave dealers, areviewedas coerced intoforfeiting heir"rights"by pro-life egislation.But are these reallyanalogous ypes of legislation?Theallegedconflictof rights in the nationaldebate over slaveryappearsin retrospectto beobviously bogus, once slaves are recognizedas persons and not merelyproperty.At most, there was conflictbetween humanrightsandindividual(aswell as regional) inancial nterests.However,as my argumentdisplays,even when fetuses are recognized as persons, an authentic conflict ofrightscanremain.Theright eopardizedby anti-abortionegislation s notthe rightto disposeof fetal "property" s one sees fit,but rather he rightto havecontrolover one'sownbody.This basicright o bodilyintegrity anand sometimesdoes standin directconflictwith the other'sbasicrighttolife.15None of the ethicists who, like McCormick,would argue that somemeasureof bodily life supportvia participationn routine studies can berequiredof persons contend on the groundsof justice that organtrans-plantscan be requiredor that abortion ollowingrape can be prohibited.This would demandthat a single individualcarryan unjustshare of thesocialburden.Whileas a memberof society,therapevictim sharespartialresponsibilityfor this fetal life, (in addition to her portion of parentalresponsibility), t is blatantlyunfair o ask her to carrythe full burden oflife support.I wouldonly reiteratehere that this is true(though o a lesserdegree)of everypregnantwoman.In summary,one maywish to arguethat beneficencemaylegitimatelyrequireof allpersonsthe givingof certainkindsof "gifts," particularly fobjectifiablepossessions. Nevertheless, the more personal the gift, themore"gifty"anddiscretionarytbecomes.I can thinkof no morepersonalandintimate ype of gift than the gift of one'sbodily self- whethergivensexually, in pregnancy, hroughvarious forms of organ donation, or assacrificed or another.The morea gift belongs to, indeedis, another, hemore truly it is a gift. In his discussion of Sacraments as God's SelfGiving,JamesF. Whitemeditateson the natureof gift-giving.

Whenwe givea giftwe do not ordinarilyay,"This s mybody,"or "This sme,"but this is what we mean.And the receiverunderstands he gift thisway,and not merelyas ananonymousobject.(White,1983:20)One can only give in the purest sense of gift-givingwhat one is. Thus,communalresponsibilityoughtnot be conceptualized n such a wayas todistortthe bodily integrityof persons.Likewise, t shouldnot placeunfairburdenson individuals.Furthermore, ot even minorformsof bodily lifesupportwhich theoreticallycould be fairlydistributed like blood dona-


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290 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicstions) can be requiredof personsbecause of the specialnatureof embodi-ment.16The ethos of gift-giving hat currentlypervadesthe practiceof organtransplantations the only ethos appropriateo the "specialnature"of allforms of bodily life support.This ethos shouldbe extended to our moralunderstanding f both pregnancyandabortion.Healthcareprofessionals(andI wouldadd moraltheologians)are appropriately escribedby Foxand Swazey (1978) as "keepers of the gates," that is, as agents whofacilitategift-givingand who guard against the theft or confiscation ofwhatby its very naturecan only be freely given.In her discussion of thewider moral frameworkof abortion.Beverly WildungHarrisonin OurRight to Choose makes the followingassertion:

Weneedalsoto acknowledgehebodily ntegrityf anymoral gentas afoundationalonditionof humanwell-being nddignity.Freedom rombodily nvasion .. is no minoror marginalssuemorally; ather,t iscentralo ourconception f thedignity f theperson.Harrison985:196)My purposein this section hasbeen to explainand ustify the axiom.Theconclusion that neitherpregnancynor organ donation should be man-datory does not imply that all or even most refusals to offer bodily lifesupport (throughorgandonations or childbearing) an be morally usti-fied. Bodily integrity s a necessary but not self-evidentlysufficientcon-dition of morality.

BODILYLIFE SUPPORT:A CHRISTIANFEMINISTASSESSMENTOF ITS MEANINGSTheoverarchingpurposeof this section of my essay is to assess the gift

ethos in lightof the feministsuspicionof anymoralframework hatmightcall for the self-sacrificeof women.ThoughI haveexplainedwhy I believebodily life supportshouldnot be mandatedof any person, I have yet toexaminewhat it mightmeanfor a Christian o give or refuse to give suchgifts either throughorgandonation or childbearing.17 learly"ought" nthis instancedoes not meanrequired.Furthermore, s the proposedanal-ogy reveals, the decision to bear a child, like that to donateorgans, is acomplex decision throughwhich the gift-giverattempts to serve andbalancea numberof competingvalues.Thoughthey maybe obvious, a briefrehearsalof some of these com-petingresponsibilities s in order nsofaras it will establishthe context formy analysisof self-sacrifice ndits refusal.Let us begin by listingsome ofthe factors that might enter into a decision for or against donatingan


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ChristianReflectionson Bodily Life Support 291organ.The donor'sgeneral physical and emotionalhealth and life-situa-tion, the value of and likely impactof donationupon his or her life-plan(includingpresentas well as future career considerationsandfamilyandsocial life ramifications), he extent to which the community (family,church,andtownspeople)will support(bothfinanciallyandemotionally)thedonorand his orherdependents,the value of therecipient's ifeas wellas therecipient'sbest interests(whichare not inallcases obviouslyservedby extending that person's life), and any special responsibilitiesof acontractualorigin that the donor may have to either the recipient orothers all of these factorsarenormallyconsideredrelevant o a decisionregardingorgan donation.18Obviously, there is considerableroom forconflictamongthese goods, and it is not alwayspossible to balance them.In some circumstances,they may be mutuallyexclusive, that is, some-times morally egitimateconcernsmust be sacrificed orthe sake of otherconcerns.Decisions regarding hildbearing reanalogous.All of the factors iden-tifiedaboveare likewisemorallyrelevant o a woman'sdecisionto abortorbear a child. In her essay "FamilyPerspectiveon Abortion,"TheodoraOoms notes that when one listens carefullyto women who speak abouttheirchildbearingand abortiondecisions, the languageof "care,respon-sibilities and relationships" s emphasized(Ooms, 1986:98).Abortion isnevera "simple"choice based on a singlefactor,such as the valueof fetallife or maternalhealth.Pregnanciesbecome problematicwhen no wayofbalancing the various responsibilities outlined above can be found.Whether erminated rnot,thesepregnanciesneverhavemorally"happy"endings.At best in suchtragiccircumstances,one aims to follow the leastevil course of action. As Whitbeckdemonstrates,women do not ever"want"abortions.Medeais a false imageof women;it is the productofmisogyny.Those who take women'sexperiences seriously could neverdescribe an abortion,whether spontaneousor induced,as "a matteroflittle consequence." Further,women ought not be deceived about orveiled fromthe developmentalrealityof abortedfetal lives. Paternalism,howeverbeneficent n origin,robs women of the opportunityo face theirsituationand their decision truthfully,with integrity,courage, and self-respect. Within this wider understandingof the problem, let us firstunraveland then critically assess the traditionalclaim that Christiansoughtto give bodily life support,even when this entails self-sacrifice.Fromthe Kantian"moralpointof view" others areproperlyperceivedas strangersand decisionsaboutbodilylife supportare"purelypersonal"and "private." n contrast,within the Christianstory a (non-patriarchal)familymodel is the lens throughwhichpersons areperceivedas morallylinked to one another by obligations of mutual respect, service, andsupport.These arenot merely"specialrelations"constitutedby optional


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292 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicssocial contracts.Theserightsandobligations n regard o one anotherarenot relatedmerelyto the performance f orfailure o perform ertainacts.Theyarenot subject only to voluntarycontrol.Theyarealso "thruston"agentswho findthemselves "stuckwith"needy others.Accordingto Hauerwas,life is out of humancontrol,and this is notproblematic or him.Nor does it troublehimthat these relationsmaybringneitherhappinessnor self-fulfillment n a penultimateevelto agents.Thatis not what the morallife is chiefly all aboutgiventhis vision. The morallife is more contingentthan social contract theorists would have us be-lieve.

It is theChristianelief,nurturedythecommand f Jesus, hatwe mustlearn o loveoneanother,hatwebecomemorenearlywhatwe weremeantto bethroughherecognitionnd oveof thosewe didnot "choose"olove.(Hauerwas,981:227)Therefore, implybecause thereis no voluntaryor contractual elation othe needyrecipientdoes not meanthere is no responsibility o offerbodilylife support.(This does not, however,mean one cannot distinguishbe-tween varyingdegreesof responsibility nherent n varying orms of rela-tionships.)Persons find themselves linked by virtue of blood or tissue type, ofrape,of their sexual or social nature to otherpersons in need of bodilylife support.These needy others are experiencedas unalterable"givens"in an agent's ife. Theirburdensomeanddifficultpresenceis experiencedas totally beyond voluntarycontrol.It is not now,evenif it mightbe in thefuture,humanlypossibleto reverse n allcases the processof renal ailureor prevent in all cases the rape-inducedor otherwise unwelcome con-ception (unless it is verifiedthat this is in fact what the "morning-after"pill does). These are part of the radicallyinvoluntarynecessities whichgroundand limithuman reedom.Thoughsuchgivensare unalterableheyneed not crush humanfreedombecauselike otherbrutefacts of life, theyare not only unalterable utalso received.Agentshavea choice abouthowthey are going to respond to such burdens and difficulties.This choiceinformsandis informedby the dispositional tancethe agenthas assumedin relationto the finitudeandfrailtyof humanexistence in general.Such a faithstance is not mereintellectualascent to dogmas,etc., butentails a commitment o see andrelate to "reality" hrougha certain ensor canonical set of presumptions.We canonly knowwhat it means to givebodily life supportto those whose need crashes into our lives within thecontextof a particularaith ramework.Forexample,one caninterpret ndevaluate he decision of a rapevictimto bear the fetus to termonlyin lightof a particularvision of reality.


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ChristianReflectionson Bodily LifeSupport 293TraditionalChristianFaithPresumptionsAs Hauerwasnotes, "the Christianrespect for life is first of all astatement,not aboutlife, but aboutGod"(1981:226). ndeed,in the firstinstanceit is a statementabout God'sultimatesovereigntyover all of life.A voluntaristcommitment o or love of the potential recipient s not thenecessarymoralprecondition orthe givingof bodilylife support.On thecontrary, uch bearingof the otheris the conditionforthe understandingof what love is in a world where God, not humankind, s in ultimatecontrol.BeforeGod humans standin radicalpoverty, heir life and valuehang,as it were, by a providential hread.From this perspective,human exis-tence andworthcome as a giftfrom God.Apartfrom thispresumptionofnakedness, any humanactivity includingthe giving of bodily life sup-port willbecomea formof idolatrous,self-aggrandizement.hus,fortheChristian o offerbodilylifesupport s to convict oneself to a lifeof radicalpoverty n a worldwhereGodis sovereign.Implicit n suchanadoptionof the otheris a latentvaluation. t is a signof the ultimate rustworthiness f life. It is also a symbolof hope,for theworldprovides ittle objectiveevidence that such confidence is justified.Presumingthat life is a gracious gift from God does not entail beingdeceived about the frailtyand faultednessof human existence. Like thepresumptionof a person'sinnocence, this belief is indefeasible.Whileitreadilyadmitsthe existence of counterexampleslikeguiltypersons),theydo not undermine he presumptiontself. It is for Christiansa faithclaimmade fromunderthe shadowof the Cross.Forexample, t is not to assertthat objectively renal failure or fetal deformations are gracious gifts.Ratherit is to assert that the lives of those who sufferfrom such evils,despitetheircostly and burdensome eatures,remaingraciousgifts.It is toconsent to one'sownfrail andfaulted ife as graciousgift.It is not to seekorto yield passivelyto suffering,but ratherwhenunavoidable,o adoptit.TheMoralImplicationsof the TraditionalViewFurthermore,he faithfulagent is one whose particularresponses toothersand whose life as a whole is characterizedby these presumptions.TheChristiannot only comes to perceivelife as graciousgiftbutbecomesa gift-giver,extendsfavors,mercy,etc., to others. To see faithfullyone'slife as gracedis, in a word, to live graciously.In his Biblical theology,SharingPossessions, Luke T. Johnson (1981:108)concludes that "themandate of faith in God is clear: we must, in some fashion, share thatwhichhas been givento us by Godas a gift."Tograsp,hoard,or hold onto the world'sgoods, includingourselves, is not a proper hanksgiving.AsJohnson 1981:99)notes inhis exegesis of Sirach,"itis notenoughto keep


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294 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsfrom oppressionand injustice;covenantwith God demandsthat we de-liver the oppressed."Oragain,as Hauerwaspoints out, to believe in theparenthoodof God is to learn to see others, includingstrangersand evenenemies, as siblings."We must be a people who standreadyto receiveandcare foranychild,notjust as if it were one of our ownbutbecause,infact, each is one of ours"(Hauerwas,1981229).19Thussharing he giftof life seems to be a consequenceof accepting hecosmology of Christian aith. MonikaK. Hellwigwritesof this dominicalcalling,

In a wide sense we areall called to be parents o one another, o bestowonothersthe life andblessingwithwhichwe havebeenblessed,that s, to blessothers with the substanceof ourownlives. (Hellwig,1976:44)This leads to atleast one other kind of reasonChristiansmayofferforsuchself-giving.Thislatterreason focuses not so much on what Christiansarecalled to do,but ratheron who they are called to be.Christiansare called to be images of God in the world.The paradig-maticexampleof such animageis the Kenotic Christ(Phil.2:5-8),whoseoutpouring s celebrated in the Eucharist. For Christiansthe death ofJesus is not adequatelyportrayedas the surrogate acrificeof the perfectscapegoat,the meritsfrom which they passively profit.Insteadthe deathof Jesus is seen as foundational o a covenantcommunity n which Chris-tians areactiveparticipants.That s why, according o Hellwig,the centralactionof the Eucharist s not thepassive,individual eceptionor eatingoffood,but the communalsharingof it. Christiansare to be livingincarnatesigns to the world of that divine self-giving.Thisexplainswhy the primi-tive Church old the tale of herearly martyrs n Eucharistic erms.Thoseearly Christianswho witnessed the sacrifice of the martyrswere clearlyconscious of the prototypicalcharacterof their gift. From this point ofview,it seems very fitting hatorgandonationbe described n Eucharisticlanguage that is, as the sheddingof blood and the breakingof the bodygivenas testimonyto one'sexperienceof God.20Traditionally,he Church has recognizedat least one woman'spreg-nancy as havingthis same prototypicalcharacter. n their perceptionofanddevotion to Mary, he Mother of God, Christianshavebornewitnessto certain beliefs about the purposeof humanexistence. In his book, TheLife of the World, the Russian Orthodox theologian AlexanderSchmemanndiscernsin the celebrationof the Theotokos he exclamationthat "fromall eternityall creationwasmeantandcreatedto be the templeof the Holy Spirit,the humanityof God"(Schmemann,1963:61). n hervery bearingof the Christ,Mary imagedGod's self-gift.Her traditionalstatus as the paradigmatic iscipleof Christ s rooted n herwillingness ogive of herown flesh so that the worldmightsee the face of God.


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ChristianReflectionson BodilyLife Support 295

In her reflectionson the meaningof the Eucharistic claim that onepersoncan be the breadof another,Hellwig writes:Literally ndphysicallyhis is alwaysrueof themother f the unborn runweanedhild,and t is not accidentalhatthe Bibleuses the imageofmother o describeGod'snurturing.. . Nor is it accidental r undulyfancifulhatmysticshave poken f Jesusandhisrelationshipo theChurchin termsof motherhood.Hellwig, 976:27)

My purposeherehas been three-fold.First,I wished to give some indica-tion of how centralself-giving, ndeedsacrifice, s to Christian aith andtothe sacramental expressions which constitute the Church. Second, Isought to highlightthe explicit connection that has been made in thetraditionbetween childbearing nd God's own self-giving.Far frombeingowed anyone or a right,childbearing s most appropriately iewed as agracious gift, not unlike God's own gratuitousPresence. Third,I havesuggestedthatorgandonationcanbe rendered ntelligibleandmeaningfulwithinthis samevision of life.FeministReformationsof the TraditionAt this point it is important o delineate and respondto the feministcritiqueof this view of the Christian aithexperience.It mightbe outlinedas follows.People,womenespecially,need to take chargeof andrespon-sibilityfor their lives. They need "to own," not relinquish,control overtheir ives. Second,formany people,womenespecially,sin is experiencedprimarily s self-negation r neglect,not as hubrisor self-aggrandizement.The call to gracious iving appearsat best to romanticizeservitudeand atworst to sacralize victimization. Feminists have documented thesadomasochistic expressions such theology has given rise to in thechurch'shistory.They have further documentedthat in fact Christianityhas operatedwith a doublestandard:womenare called to self-renunciationnd submis-sion, whereas men are empoweredand given leadership positions. Har-risonis well worthquotingat lengthon this point.

Themorally ormative,acrificial ehaviorxpectedromwomen n rela-tionto childbearingndchildrearingeverapplieso thepublicactionsofmen.Men'sivesare o begoverned ystrict onformityo"duty"onstruednarrowlys observingstablishedonventionalehavior.Women, y con-trast, reexpectedo achieve "supererogatory"orality. lthough omenhave moralobligationsn relation o procreation,his sort of theologydouble-bindss. Weareadmonishedo be obedient ndpassivebutsimulta-neouslyaretoldthatwe wereborn o be moreresponsiblehanmenfornurturingumanwell-beingndembodyingnethicof sacrifice.We ive na


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296 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsworld where many,perhapsmost, of the voluntarysacrificeson behalf ofhumanwell-beingare made by women, but the assumptionof a specialobligation o self-givingor sacrificeby virtueof beingbornfemale,repletewithprocreativepower s male-generateddeology. Harrison,1985:62)

In light of such discrepanciesas these, it strikes me as wise to be sus-picious of attemptsto sanctifythe "crucifixion" f womenfacingburden-some and unwantedpregnancies.It is equallyappropriateo be waryofarguments hatmightforce "martyrdom" n potentialorgandonors.Clearlyfeminists are correct in assertingthat God is neither a divinechild abuser nor a sadist. God'sself-giving n the Incarnation ed to theslaughterof Calvarynot by divine design but by reason of sin, as ex-pressedin both the Prometheandriveforpowerandself-negation,with itscorrespondingabrogationof personaland social responsibility.However,Christianfeminists would be wise to be suspicious of other additionalcultural assumptionsproduced by patriarchy, ncludingthe prevailingdesire to avoidsufferingat all costs. It is appropriateo be waryof all thatresults,to use Dorothee Soelle'sterm,in the "narcotizing f life."It is theexperienceof pain, she arguesin TheStrengthof the Weak, hatenablesus to empathizeon a personallevel andeventuallyconnect on a politicallevel with others. SidneyCallahan 1986b: ) speaks to this pointdirectlywhen she notes that "the fetus is to a womanas a womanhas so oftenbeento the dominantmale in a positionof weaknessandvulnerability."In my own attemptto weave together these feminist and traditionalChristianinsights, I have reached the following tentative conclusions.First, it is important o distinguishservitudefrom servanthood.Thoughsufferingaccompaniesboth, servitude is an involuntaryoppressionthatobjectifies, subordinates,andviolates persons, whereasservanthood s avoluntaryvocation that seeks to break the cycle of powerlessness,domi-nation, and violence in which we are all trapped.21Thoughwithin bothframeworksa service may be offered unilaterally,within a system ofservitude this is normative.In contrastmutualityand solidaritycharac-terize servanthood.Thedifference s not foundin the distinctionbetweena sadistic master servitude)and a masochistslave(servanthood), s somewouldargue.On the contrary, ervanthoodas I define t breaksaltogetherwith the master/slaveparadigm,by seekingto empowerand liberate all.Powerin this new context stems not from dominion over and isolationfrom others, but is rathera strengthrootedin connection and solidaritywith others, especially the weak.Second, the willingnessto carry an unwantedchild to term can bemeaningfullyunderstoodas a sign of solidaritywith the weak amongus.And,correspondingly, decision to abort n thiscontextcanbe seen as ananalgesicchoice, a headlongflight romsuffering.Communitieshatoffer


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ChristianReflectionson Bodily LifeSupport 297no webof support orpersonsfacingsuchchoices, which do notrecognizeas heroic the choice to so serve, must be held responsible for theirsystemicsupportof slavery.To offerthose who sufferonlyopiatesis in thelongrun to supportoppression.Many on both sides of the abortion debate continue to romanticizepregnancyand motherhood.This romanticmythblindsmanyto the realproblems and devastatingconflicts pregnantwomen frequentlyface. Itblinds others to the work, delayed gratification, uffering,and sacrificeconstitutiveof even planned,ordinarypregnancies.Romanticismaboutmotherhoodreflects a failureof persons on both sides of the abortiondebate to take the experienceof womenseriously.Third,the refusal to carrya burdensomechild to termcan be mean-ingfullyunderstood as an importantsymbol of self-affirmationor somewomen. By this I do not mean raw egoism or selfishness (thoughsuchremainsa possibility).InsteadI referto that measureof self-loveand self-respectwhich is notonly theprerequisiteorandenablerof other-love,butalso its fittingcorrelate.Correspondingly, decision to continuea preg-nancycouldbe interpreted s a blindslavery o a life the responsibility orwhich one has forfeited.Communities,ecclesial or civil, which seek tomandate childbearingonly reinforce the powerlessness and violationmanywomenhavesystematicallyexperiencedwithin those same commu-nities.In making his assertionI wish to distinguishmy ownpositionregard-ing sufferingand self-sacrifice romthatexpressed by Lisa Sowle Cahill.In her essay, "Abortion,Autonomy and Community," he argues thatfeministswho affirm he moralmaturityand adulthoodof women mustencouragethem to "recognize hat some humansituationshave unavoid-ably tragic elements and that to be human is to bear these burdens"(Cahill,1986:271-272).WhileI concurwith Cahill's ejectionof the avoid-ance of the tragicvia both romanticismandmasochism,I wish to assertthat elementsof whatis authenticallyhumancan be expressedboth in thedecision to abortandin the decision to bear the burdensomechild.Self-love and other-loveare both normativelyhuman forms of love. Whatmakes the choice tragicis precisely the fact that neitheravailableoptioncan expresshuman ove in its fullness.Sucha "double-reading"f the choices women make about childbear-ing offers small comfort to those who sought in this part of my essay a"solution" o the abortionproblem.It does howeverclarifyfor Christianfeministswhatit mightmeanto make such choices in a worldthat is trulyan originalblessinghowevermarredby originalsin.

Finally,somewhatparallel udgmentscan be reachedin regardto thepracticeof organdonation.As the first notedby Parsons, Fox, and Lidz(1972),Christianity an framethe giving of bodily life support n such a


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298 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsway as to make it both intelligibleand commendable.Through he dona-tion of varioustypes of organs,persons mayenflesh certaintruths aboutthe purposeandcharacterof allcreation.Thus,the inabilityon the partofsome (e.g., Fellner, 1971)to understandor encouragelive donationbe-tween unrelatedpersons may reflect not limits intrinsic to bodily lifesupport,but rather the convictions constitutive of the modern liberalvision of life. In the future as the risks of graft vs. host disease areminimized,unrelated ive donationsat least of bone marrowwill becomeincreasinglysignificant rom a medicalstandpoint. t would seem to be atragicform of myopiaif the medicalcommunitycontinues to judge unre-lated live donationsas inappropriate,f notautomatically uspect.22Unre-lated live donation s not only intelligiblebutmaybe a sacramental ct forsome.

Clearly,however,health care professionalsneed to remainwary ofthose "volunteers"manifestingmasochistic tendencies. As "keepers ofthe gate" they oughtto be especiallycautious of compensationstructuresthat mightensnare those who are economicallyoppressedinto a person-ally treasonous forfeiture into the objectificationand sale of theirbody.This is alreadya reality in many inner city blood banks. The power ofbiomedicalcommerce to erodethe giftethos which surroundsmost otherforms of organdonation should not be underestimated.

NOTES1. In this case WilliamHead, a lukemiavictim, wished to participaten anexperimentalprocedure involvingbone-marrowransplants rom a non-relateddonor. Because computerrecords indicated that Mrs. X might be a possiblematchingdonor for Mr. Head, she was invited to participate n the researchprogram.Sherefused, ndicating he wasunwilling o be a donor "unless t was fora relative."Afterbeinginformedof herdecision,Mr. Head soughta court orderwhich would compel the researchersto reinvite Mrs. X., informingher that aspecific patient mightbe helpedby herdonation.For more information boutthiscase andJudgeJ. McCormick's 983ruling,see Levine andVeatch,1984:83-85.For additionalegal precedentsagainstcompulsoryorgandonation,see McFallv.Shimp,No. 78-17711In Equity(C.P.Allegheny County,PA, July 26, 1978).2. HereI have in mindsuchthingsas requests or informationegarding ne'ssexualpartners or the sake of either(1) encouragingpaternaleconomic supportfor an unwedmotherand childor(2)containinghe spreadof venerealdisease.Or,perhapsmorerelevant,f thepolicehavereasonto suspectthat someone's ife is indanger, they may invade one's home without a search warrantor the owner's

permission.3. This analogyhas its deepest roots in the fictionalcase createdby JudithJarvis Thompsonin her article, "A Defense of Abortion"(1971).It is furtherdevelopedby Mattingly(1984).


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ChristianReflectionson BodilyLife Support 2994. This literaturewould includesuch books as these:RayYorkeCalne,M.D.,A Gift of Life(NewYork:BasicBooks, 1970);ReneeC. Fox and JudithP.Swazey,TheCourageto Fail (Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, 1974);J. Hamburgerand J. Crosnier,"Moral and Ethical Problems in Transplantation,"n HumanTransplantationditedby FelixT.Rapaport ndJean Dausset(New York:Gruneand Stratton, 1968);Roberta G. Simmons, et al, Gift of Life (New York:JohnWiley,1977);RichardM. Titmuss,The GiftRelationship(New York:PantheonBooks, 1971);and such essays as: W.J. Curran,"AProblem n Consent:KidneyTransplantationn Minors,"New YorkUniversityLaw Review 34 (May,1959):891-98;J. Dukeminier, r.,and D. Sanders,"OrganTransplantation: Proposalfor RoutineSalvagingof CadaverOrgans,"New EnglandJournalof Medicine279

(August 1968):413-19; A. M. Sadler, Jr., and B. L. Sadler,"A CommunityofGivers,Not Takers,"TheHastings CenterReport1415 October1984):6-9; andWilliam .May,"Religious ustifications or DonatingBodyParts/' TheHastingsCenterReport15/1(February1985):38-42.5. It is mistaken to think of metaphoricalcomparisonsas establishingasubstitutionaryelationshipbetweenterms.Rather, he analogicalwagersets upan interaction(not interchange)between the terms, the fruit of which is newinsightinto that which is compared.Though he argumentwhichconstitutes thebody of this essay is not developedanalogically(in the substitutionary enserejectedabove),it does rest upon the insightsyieldedby such reframingof theactivities. In his book, Womenand Equality: ChangingPatterns in AmericanCulture 1977),WilliamH. Chafearguesthat the popularanalogybetween womenandblackshaspermittedus newunderstandingsf "social control."At this levelof generalizationt is veryuseful.It is less (oraltogethernot) useful,Chafeargues,in exhibitingthe material conditionswhich accompanyeither sexual or racialoppression.Theanalogy developed n my essay willpermitus newunderstandingof the reasonsfor and limits of the obligationto give bodily life- upport.For amoredetaileddiscussion of the natureand role of metaphoricalhinking,see thenow classic essay by Max Black entitled "Metaphor."6. This same "hermeneuticsof suspicion"should be appliedto the growingconsiderationof prophylactic forthe fetus)cesarean sections at term. For moredetailed nformation boutthe current hapeof thisdiscussion,readthe brief notesubmittedby GeorgeB. FeldmanandJennieA. Freimanonthattopicto TheNewEnglandJournalof Medicine(FeldmanandFreiman,1985).Consideras well thegrowingdiscussion among both jurists and biomedical ethicists about forcingpregnantwomento undergofetal therapies.See Engelhardt,1985.7. In this essaythe questionof whethervoluntaryparticipationn sexualactsalone or morepointedly,with the failureof contraceptivemeasures establishesa parentalrelationcan not be addressed n detail.However, wish to suggestthatevenif contractual onsiderationshave a legitimaterole to playin the determina-tion of the extent of special parentalobligations, they do not settle the matter.Familyobligationsare at least in partnon-contractualn origin.Clearlya rapevictim does not have as much of a parentalobligationto her child as one who"planned"her pregnancy;nevertheless,she still has some parental obligation.Childrendo not choose theirparents;personsdo not volunteer o be partof afamily.Insteadwe find ourselves inescapablyand inextricably"stuckwith" our


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300 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsfamilyandobligated o them, whetheror not these parents,siblings,or childrenbenefit us. My point is that contract theory alone cannot explain the moralsignificanceof a person's willingnessto have and care for children,particularlythose who are unexpected,burdensome,or otherwise unwelcome,since thesechildrenhighlightthe non-voluntary,uncontrollableand risky nature of even"planned"parenthood.It is simply erroneous to assume, in Lisa Sowle Cahill'swords, that "onlyfreedom creates moral obligation" 1981:15).In contrastto this liberalfallacy,Cahillaccurately uggeststhatpersonsaresocial not only by contractbut also bynature.Agentsarenaturally nterdependent nd boundby the obligationsof thisinterdependence.Thuspregnancyandgestationcanbe viewed as primordial ndprototypicalexamples of this naturalsocial interdependence.8. Even though this essay is deeply indebted to the work of Thompson(referredo inEndnote#3), I agreewithWitbeckwhen she argues hatit is almostabsurd to envision the fetus as a dependent adult-stranger.Such an analogyisvisualizedin photographicandcinemagraphicssays when fetuses areportrayedas mini-astronautsloatingaboutin "inner"spaceconnectedby an umbilical ifeline to their"mothership." ome weaknessesin this analogyareobvious:fetusesare neither adultnor strangers;mothers are not objectifiable hingslike space-ships.A strengthof the analogy s equallyobvious: the fetusis usually dependentupon the mother for survival, houghsome in the third trimestermaybe viable.According o Whitbeck,"aclaimmoreworthyof examinations the claimthathuman fetuses are relevantlylike newborn humanbeings." (1985:254)Somestrengthsof this analogyare obvious: fetuses are immatureandbloodrelations;mothersarepersons,notobjectscontrolledby others; ikeneonates,fetuseshavevoraciousappetitiesandplacenearlyconstant,at times quite taxing,demandsontheir caretakers.Furthermore,ike newborns, etuses arespeechless:theycannotarticulate heirneeds or defend hemselves.Theyareextremelyvulnerable: his isa form of dependance quite unlike that of the astronaut.A weakness of thisanalogy s also obvious:thoughboththenewbornand the fetus aredependent, heneonate'ssurvival s not tied exclusivelyto the care of one particularndividual.Thoughneitheranalogy s perfect, he second one is more lluminative nd lessproblematic.Yet,it hasnot informedmuchof the abortiondebate.Why?Women'sexperienceshave been excludedfromthe pool of wisdomuponwhich our collec-tive moral imagination eeds. Astronautsare apparentlymore familiar o thosewho have controlledthe terms of the abortiondebate than neonates.9. Beyondthe 20-week mark,the fetal survivalrate can increase f the abor-tion is done by hysterotomy(a technique resemblinga C-section) or by theinjectionof prostaglandinswhichsimulatea normaldelivery).Whencombinedwith the increasedavailability f neonatal ntensive care nursuries, hese factorsgeneratetwo new moralquestions.First,how shouldpostabortionneonatesbetreated?Second,givena reasonablechance of fetalviability, houldcertainmeth-ods of abortionbe legally mandated?In his commentaryon a 1976 Californiabill which attemptedto establishguidelines on this matter,Leroy Walters reached the followingcommendableconclusions.(1) All newbornsshould be treatedequally.As "wardsof the state,"


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ChristianReflectionson Bodily Life Support 301postabortionneonates shouldbe givenneithercompensatorynorpunitivetreat-ment.(2) Womenshould not be required o assumehigherrisks for the sake of aviablefetus, "justas the law should not requireparentsto rescue their childrenfromburningbuildings." f, however,amongabortionmethodsthereemergesanalternativewhich lowerstherisksfor boththepregnantwomanandfetus, then thestate can(andI wouldaddoughtto) mandatehe safermethod, or the rightnot toofferbodilylife support to terminatepregnancy)s not identicalwith the righttofetal death (Levine and Veatch, Eds., 1984:5-6).Furthermore,rom within thisperspectivea woman'srightto terminatepregnancys not identicalwith the rightto fetalexperimentation.No one has everargued hat a histocompatibleparent'srefusal o donate a kidney o a childsufferingrom renal ailurecanbe interpretedas proxyconsent to nontherapeuticesearchon the "dying"recepient.Thecase,shouldthere be one, for experimenting n abortusesrests elsewhere.10. Inone sensepregnancymaybe said to result rom rauma,as in the case ofrape,or result from a psychologicaldisease such as immaturityamongthe re-tarded.Notice, however, hat in both instances it is the "donor"who is eithertraumatized r diseased.The(fetal)"recipient's" ependencyremainsnon-patho-logical in origin.11 Thiscritiquewillbe developedalongthe linesproposedby StanleyHauer-was (1981).He seeks to developan ethicaltheoryof the classicaltypewhich canaccount for the moral life's dependence upon a certain vision of community.Thereinhe engagesin a polemicagainstmodernpoliticalliberalism.As RonaldDworkin ndicates 1983:32),iberalisms not a singlepolitical heory."Thereare,in fact,two basic forms of liberalismand the distinctionbetween themis of greatimportance."Whilebothversionsseek to encourageequalityandlegalneutralityvis-a-visself-regardingnd/or upererogatoryctions,these conclusionsare basedon quitedistinctrationales. n one form of liberalism,equality s the fundamentalvalue andthe concernforpublicneutralitys a derivativenjunction ervedonly tothe extentmadenecessaryby thepriorcommitment o egalitarianism.n the otherformof liberalism,neutralitys the decisivevalue.It is this latter ormof liberalismwhich Hauerwasattacks, citing as defects its basis in moralskepticismand itsessentially negativepoliticalvision.Its emphasisuponindividual reedomand itsdiscrediting f dependenceon andties to others areviewedas symptomatic f thisethos for the uncommitted.12. Within he Anglo-Saxonegal tradition, trangersareusuallynot requiredto aidorrescue one another. ndeed,when it reviewed he oldcommon-law rimeof "misprisionof a felony,"the U.S. SupremeCourtof 1822ruled that strangerswere notrequired ven to reportcrimesto legitimateauthorities.Lest thisportionof my argumentbe misinterpreted, believe a sound,moral case can be madeagainst his aspectof ourlegal heritageand that we oughtto be expectedin someminimalwayto be our"sibling'skeeper."Thus,I wouldargue hatboth moralandlegal pressureshouldbe brought o bear on those who can assist victims of crime,suchas the witnessesof KittyGenovese'smurder n New Yorkand the spectatorsof the gang rape of the womanin Big Dan's Bar in New Bedford,Mass.13. Thisessaydiverges rom the theoryof Donagan n that it seeks to do morethan delineatewhat must be protectedby articulating vision of what must be


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302 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsencouraged. n this sense, it has a much less restrictednotionof what is properlyconstruedas moralargument.14. Ramsey, t shouldbe noted,even argues againstthe "routinesalvagingofcadaverorgans"when consent cannotbe presumedon thegrounds hat"asocietywill be a better humancommunity n whichgivingandreceivingis the rule,nottaking orthe sake of good to come."This is so evenwhen thegood at stakeis lifeitself. "The moralsequels that mightflow from educationand actionin line withthe proposed Gift Acts may be of far more importancethan prolonging ivesroutinely."Even corpses ought not to become involuntary"donors"(Ramsey,1970:210).The communalrevulsion to the unauthorizedharvestingof cadaverpituitaryglandsfor humanitarian urposesin the mid-1960swas a contributingfactorto the developmentof the UniformAnatomicalGift Act of 1968.Pro-choicegroups express an analogouskind of shock in responseto forcedpregnancy.15. In his essay, "Abortion:A ChangingMoralityand Policy?"McCormickarticulatesa theoretical rameworkwhichseemscompatiblewith thepositionI amdeveloping,yet he fails to delineateexplicitlyits implications.Foran act ... to be the lesser evil (allthingsconsidered), heremust beat stake human ife or its moralequivalent,a good or valuecomparable olife itself. This is notwhat the traditionalormulationsay,but it is where thecorpusof teachingson life taking eads.(McCormick,1979:39)For example,human freedom as expressedin political sovereigntyhas longbeen acceptedas sucha valuewithinthejust wartradition. havebeenarguingnregardto abortionand organdonationthat humanfreedomexpressedin bodilyintegrity s also such a value.16. There is a counter-exampleo this argumentwhich must be considered.Bodilylife supporthas traditionally een required f soldiersduringwar.Further,one might maginecompulsorypregnancyand/ormandatoryorgandonationrea-sonable shouldthe survivalof the nationand/orspeciesever come to dependuponit. In addition, houghwe have awardeddecorationsof honor,such as the PurpleHeart,to those honorablywounded n actionagainstthe enemy, strictly speakingwe havenot interpreted uch sacrificesas aboveandbeyondthe call of civic duty.Onlywhen a soldiertakesupmorethan his (or her)fair shareof the risk wouldwejudge the sacrificeto be supererogotory ndconfera meritoriousaward suchasthe BronzeStar.)Although hereis considerabledebate aboutthe extent of one'scivic responsibilities n peace time, there is a wide consensus that military(oralternativethough still potentiallylife threatening)service can legitimatelybemandatedduringa nationalemergency.Thispracticewouldappearat firstglanceto underminemy claimthatbodilylife supportoughtnot be required.However,reject that conclusion for three interrelated easons.First,thoughthis has varied hroughouthe historyof the draft,manykinds ofdefermentsandexemptionshave been granted.Thoughnot necessarilyall legiti-mate, the factors considered relevanthave been gender, age, health,education,career, ortune alathe lottery),religious,moral,andfamily especiallydependent)related.Therefore, ocietyhasclearlyrecognized heillegitimacyof making ucharequirementexceptionless.Second,while the rationale or each classificationvaries, severalof the defer-ments are rooted at least in part in the conviction that this potentialconscript


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ChristianReflectionson Bodily Life Support 303wouldbe asked to shoulder more than his fair shareof the burden.Only if thesituationworsens or as a last resortwouldit be appropriateo drafthim, if ever.While some are comfortablewith compulsorymilitaryservice duringpeace-time,most wouldarguethathazardousdutyshould remainvoluntary.Bodily lifesupport s a sacrificethat can be mandatedonly in a nationalemergency.Thus itwould seem that the military"counter-example"nderconsiderations in fact anexceptionwhich proves the rule. As a society we have not requiredbodily lifesupport or the sake of singleindividualsbut instead mandatesuch sacrificeonlyin extremis.17. My attention o the distinctivelyChristian ationalesbehind the giftethosshould not be interpreted s a claim thatonlyChristians an intelligibly ngageinbodilylife support.There are lots of non-Christianrameworkswhich can rendergift-givingmeaningful.18. This is clearly not meant to be a comprehensive ist. It is, however,arepresentative ampleof the varietyof factors relevant o such decision-making.19. DorotheeSoelle (1984) ells a Jewishstorythat makes a similarpoint."Anold rabbi once asked his students how one couldrecognizethe time when nightends andday begins. 'Is it when,froma greatdistance,you can tell a dogfromasheep?'one studentasked. 'No,' said the rabbi. 'Is it when,froma greatdistance,you can tell a date palmfrom a fig tree?' anotherstudent asked. 'No,' said therabbi.'Thenwhen is it?' the students asked. 'It is when you look into the face ofanyhumancreatureand see yourbrotheror yoursister there. Until then,nightisstill with us."20. It is importanto note herethatsuchlanguageand magesarenotunique oChristianity.n her recently publisheddiaries, Etty Hillesium,a Dutch womanmurderedat Auschwitz, wrote of her efforts to comfortand aid fellow Jews asfollows(Hillesium,1985:195):"I have brokenmy body like bread and shareditout. ..." The unleavenedbreadof Passoverwasalwaysunderstood o be not onlya sign of freedombut the bread of afflictionas well. It mightalso be noted thatWilliamF. May(1985:42) peaksof organdonationas a "fittingand directsign"ofthe Christian'sEucharisticparticipation.21. At first glance, my emphasison the voluntarycharacterof servanthoodmay appearto contradictmy earlierrejectionof liberalism.By voluntaryI amreferringnot only to those burdens hat mayaccompanycontractualagreementsbut also to those unexpectedburdens he bearingof which we maychoose eitherto refuse or consent to.22. At some medicalschools, renal specialistsautomaticallyview unrelateddonors as "crazy"and declare them to be "obviously" ncompetent.

REFERENCESBlack, Max1954- "Metaphor."Proceedingsof the AristotelianSociety, 55: 273-94.1955


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304 TheJournalof ReligiousEthicsCahill,Lisa Sowle198

Abortion and Organ Donation-Patricia Beattie Jung

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