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Joshua Mejia

History 17

15 May 2015

The Abbasid Revolution

The Abbasid revolution was a political revolution that pitted the Abbasid family

and the Umayyad caliphate against one another. The Abbasids—with the help of

agents spreading propaganda—were able to overthrow the Umayyads. The revolution

ended with an armed uprising, but the movement was sparked by a propaganda cam-

paign. The Abbasid Revolution developed with a grassroots propaganda campaign that

formed under the noses of the Umayyads.

The Umayyad Caliphate was in power from 661-750 CE (Egger 45). In 656 CE,

the third Caliph Uthman ibn Affan—a relative of the Umayyads—was assassinated by

disgruntled soldiers from the Fustat garrison in Egypt (Egger 64). Ali ibn Talib, the

Prophet Muhammad's cousin, was elected as the new Caliph following the assassina-

tion of Uthman (Egger 65). The Umayyads were upset by the assassination of their

relative; they expected Ali to find and punish the ones who were responsible (Egger

65). After Ali took no action in seeking out the assassins, he became an enemy of the

Umayyads (Egger 65). The feud grew into a civil war between Ali and Mu’awiya, a

talented governor of Syria and the nephew of Uthman (Egger 65). Ali and Mu’awiya

met at the battle of Siffin, and after several months of skirmishing, they agreed to

arbitrate and end the battle (Egger 65). Not all of Ali's soldiers were pleased with

this; a group of them defected and assassinated him, they became known as the

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Kharajites (Egger 65). Now the position of Caliph was open and Mu’awiya claimed it.

Mu’awiya resided in Syria, and as a result, it became the center of the Muslim world,

politically and economically (Morrissey).

The Umayyad Caliphate held control for 89 years. During this period, the

Umayyads experienced large amounts of growth geographically, militarily, and eco-

nomically (Morrissey). Despite their success, issues within society were beginning to

grow. Non-Arabs weren't treated as equals and with the Umayyads expansion into

Spain, Persia, and Northern Africa, more and more non-Arabs came under control of

the Umayyads (Morrissey). Non-Muslims continued to pay the Jizya—a poll tax that

protected non-Islamic religious worship—and were mostly undisturbed. The problem

arose when non-Muslims started converting on a wide scale (Alkhateeb). Whether it

was do to hope of monetary gain, cultural assimilation, or genuine religious conver-

sion, large amounts of non-Arabs were claiming Islam as their new religion (Alkha-

teeb). Since they were now Muslim, they were going to be exempt from the Jizya.

The Umayyads realized that the Jizya brought in a large amount of tax revenue and

decided to force new non-Arab converts to continue to pay it (Alkhateeb). This went

against Islamic law—Muhammad the Prophet always emphasized equal treatment of all

Muslims—and a divide was now created between those who paid the Jizya and those

who didn't (Alkhateeb). Although it was unintentional, the circumstances involving

land expansion and new converts made this divide racial. Umar II recognized this is-

sue when he took power; He reversed the Jizya payment requirement for non-Arab

Muslims (Alkhateeb). Unfortunately, his family didn't agree with the reversal and poi-

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soned him only 3 years into his Caliphate (Alkhateeb). With Umar II dead, his reforms

were reversed—this act helped provoke the downfall of the Umayyads (Alkhateeb).

The Abbasid family, who's name derives from Muhammad's youngest uncle, Ab-

bas ibn Abd al-Muttalib, were descendants of the Prophet's family (Alkhateeb). Lead-

ing up to the revolution, the Abbasids gained popularity while the Umayyads gained

infamy (Alkhateeb). They learned from previous failed uprisings and knew they had

to keep a low profile (Alkhateeb). They built a well calculated underground network

that relied on patience, and through this network propaganda agents were dispatched

on the Persian provinces where Umayyads were most disliked (Alkhateeb). Unfortu-

nately for the Umayyads, they didn't catch on in time.

The Abbasid movement begins with Muhammad ibn Ali, a member of the

Prophet Muhammad's family (Shaban 150). It is claimed that Abu Hashim al-Hanafiyya

named Muhammad ibn Ali his spiritual successor and the next Imam (Shaban 150). Ali,

began running a secret organization originally set up by Abu Hashim known as

"Hashimiyya" (Shaban 150). Originally, it was an organization established in Kufa con-

sisting of around 30 men, both Arab and non-Arab (Shaban 150). Ali, as leader, decid-

ed to focus their efforts on Khurasan and Merv (Shaban 151). In this region, there was

a general dislike for the Umayyads, but more importantly, there was a large popula-

tion of non-Arabs who would join the cause due to their poor treatment (Shaban 151).

Ali wasted little time, from his outpost in Kufa, he started sending agents to spread

propaganda (Shaban 151). Unfortunately, his agents didn't have much initial success,

and the few who did were executed (Shaban 151).

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With their limited success, Ali was now sending his agents to investigate, but

not to spread propaganda (Shaban 152). The number of agents in Khurasan was now

possibly in the 70's and 12 additional agents—called al-nuqaba—were sent to take the

place of any agents that were killed or dismissed (Shaban 152). In addition, a man by

the name of Bukayr ibn Mahan was dispatched to Merv tasked to help organize and

lead their efforts (Shaban 152). As their efforts were growing and showing signs of

success, they received unfortunate news, Ali had died and his son, Ibrahim ibn

Muhammad was now in charge (Shaban 152). Fortunately, the Umayyad government

was also experiencing a loss; their caliph, Hisham died. The Hashimiyya recovered

from their loss a lot faster than the Umayyads, who faced major governmental prob-

lems (Shaban 153). Many members of the Hashimiyya wanted to act and take advan-

tage of the problems the Umayyads were facing (Shaban 153). Ibrahim realized this

situation was spiraling out of control and decided to send an agent as a representative

to calm matters (Shaban 153). A man by the name of Abu Muslim was sent; it was up

to him to spread the message, gain support, and spark the revolution (Shaban 153).

Who was Abu Muslim? Despite having such a prominent role in the revolution,

very little is know about where he came from and how he joined the Abbasids. When

evaluating his history, it's important to note that historical sources regarding him typi-

cally contradict one another. Various sources originally place Abu Muslims from

Khurasan, Iraq, or Isfahan—although Khurasan seems very doubtful (Lasner 165-170).

His full name is Abu Muslim Abdurrahman ibn Muslim al-Khurasani or in english: father

of a muslim, he who worships the compassionate, son of a muslim, from Khurasan

(Shaban 154) . Although his name includes "from Khurasan" it indicates that he relat-

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ed himself to Khurasan, not that he necessarily came from there (Shaban 154). Most

early Islamic historians agree that he met Abbasid officials in a prison in Iraq, where

he served as a slave (Lasner 167). Due to conflicting sources, its unclear if the Ab-

bassids were their as prisoners, or as travelers who stopped while on a trip to the holy

city, but the end result was the same (Lasner 167-168). Abu Muslim stood out to the

Abbasids, they thought of him as intelligent and politicly gifted (Lasner 167-168).

When they left the prison, they purchased him and had him manumitted. From this

point on, he will work with the Abbasid family up until the revolution (Lasner 168).

It's during this time that he fine tunes the skills that were used to overthrow the

Umayyads (Lasner 168).

The ideologies of Abu Muslim and the Abassids won over many different mind-

sets. The Umayyads had a dynastic system which was very unpopular (Alkhateeb). It

allowed the Abbasids to appeal to groups in regards to the next Caliph. As mentioned

they made claims that Abu-Hashim handed down the title of Imam to their family

(Shaban 150). This can be seen as a proto-Shi'ite idea that would help win over pro-

Alids (Egger 71). Additionally, a large majority of the Muslims, who weren't necessari-

ly Shi'ite, felt an ideal ruler should be a member of the Prophets family in some way—

this effectively won their support as well (Alkhateeb). In order to win over Sunni Mus-

lims, they effectively played both sides of the field. In their propaganda, they

promised to elect in a new member after the Umayyads were dispatched, as long as it

was from the prophets family (Egger 71). The murder of Husayn at Karbala was also

presented as propaganda to both sides and fortunately, although it was critically con-

demned by the Shi'ites, it was also seen as unpopular with Sunni Muslims (Egger 68).

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Outside of religion, there were many issues the Abbasid propagandist used to

their advantage. As noted, non-Arabs were treated as second class citizens, and were

forced into continuing Jizya tax payments even after converting to Islam (Alkhateeb).

Other social issues also existed as well, non-Arabs couldn't become government offi-

cials or have any type of job within the government (Alkhateeb). Non-Arab males

were also not allowed to marry female Arabs and other racial laws even went as far as

restricting non-Arabs from wearing Arabian styled clothing(Alkhateeb). Among the

non-Arabs, Persians were also heavily targeted (Alkhateeb). Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, an

Umayyad governor, disallowed the reading or writing of Persian within the government

or even within the public (Alkhateeb). The continuous pressure upon non-Arabs surely

aided in their willingness to support the Abbasid cause. Aside from non-Arabs,

Khurasani Arabs also developed a dislike for the Umayyads (Egger 71). After moving

to Merv, many settlers purchased land in order to become farmers or merchants (Eg-

ger 71). Between the years 705 and 715, many arabs were conscripted for military

campaigns (Egger 71). This required them to abandon their farms and businesses

which quickly soured their attitudes towards the Umayyads (Egger 71). They were

now open to looking for and supporting a new seat of power. Abbasids propaganda

surely capitalized on these issues and when it came time for Abu-Muslim's final push,

he had the majority of the Muslim people convinced.

In the year 747, the Abbasids and Abu-Muslim had all they needed to spark the

revolution and the black flags were raised (Egger 72). Due to their cleverly crafted

propaganda campaigns, they were able to launch a successful revolution (Egger 72).

The Abbasid revolution not only placed the Abbasids in a seat of power, but also al-

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lowed them to succeed without the Umayyads knowing in time. The importance of

this revolution is staggering. Without it, they wouldn't have made the big contribu-

tions in Muslim history that they're known for today.