BRION, J.:

 

 

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the

Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for

Other Purposes” was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from  the 8th  of August 2011, to the second

Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local

elections. The law as well granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the

Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall

perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall

have qualified and assumed office.”

 

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their

validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court.   These

petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed. 

 

Factual Antecedents

 

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of

autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.  Section 15 states:

 Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.   

 

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous

regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.

 Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

 The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of

the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

 

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through

Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao.”  A plebiscite was held onNovember 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734,

thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  The initially assenting provinces

were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.  RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the

regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

 

          RA No. 9054 (entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous

Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended”) was the next legislative act passed.  This law provided further

refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for

the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

 

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 9140 [1] - on June 22, 2001.  This law reset the

first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001.  It likewise set the plebiscite

to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later thanAugust 15, 2001.

 

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.

The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date. 

 

RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the

2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054,

RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

 

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.

COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various

regional offices to be elected.  But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to

May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

 

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the

postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of

Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.

 

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756),

on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of

Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153

into law.

 

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court

– G.R. No. 196271[3] -assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the

validity of  RA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter,

petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305 filed another petition[4] also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.  

 

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM

elections.  The law gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality:

 

a)     Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House of

Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC,

docketed as G.R. No. 197221;

 

b)    Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the

COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197282;

 

c)     Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary Injunction[7] filed by Louis “Barok”

Biraogo against the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No.

197392; and

 

d)    Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives

against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.

 

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM,

with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional

elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus[9] against the

COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.

10153.

 

          Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro

Solidarity Movement filed their own  Motion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-

Intervention dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court

ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No.

9333, and RA No. 10153.

 

          Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16, 2011.  Thereafter, the parties were instructed to

submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.

 

          On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA

No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should

these cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011. 

 

The Arguments

 

          The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No.

9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1

and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

 

          The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with

the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.  Also cited as grounds are the alleged

violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the “elective and

representative” character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners

challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM

officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they

also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete

violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

 

The Issues

 

 

          From the parties’ submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral

arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:

 

I.       Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

 

II.    Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987

Constitution

 

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

 

A.   Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to

Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

 

B.   Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No.

9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the

corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

 

C.   Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous

regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

 

IV.            Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

 

V.   Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

 

A.   Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

 

B.   Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

 

C.   Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

 

VI.            Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

 

We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.

 

 

OUR RULING

 

We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in

toto.

 

I.  Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate

 

          The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization,

and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987

Constitution, which provides:

 

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noonof June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.

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Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

 

We agree with this position.

 

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local

elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the

Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments

to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.[11]

 

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others

through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the

holding of all future elections – whether national or local – to once every three years.[12] This intention finds full

support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.[13]

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the

Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local

elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

 

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a

constitutional mandate. In Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,[14] we explained:

 It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of

office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year — noon of June 30, 1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phraseholding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x   records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]

 

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be

synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

 

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they

have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the

significance thus attached to them prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] “[a]s the Constitution

is not primarily a lawyer’s document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its

words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.”

 

          Understood in its ordinary sense, the word “local” refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a

particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM for

the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this

classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.

 

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local

governments, as evident from Article X  of the Constitution entitled “Local Government.”  Autonomous regions are

established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted to Local Government.

That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the

Constitution, which provides:

 Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 

 

 

Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization mandated by  the Constitution does not include the

regional elections of the ARMM –unmeritorious.  We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions

below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time

and again for its complete resolution.

 

 

II.  The President’s Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

 

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to

comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution [18] which provides that before bills passed by either the

House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is

when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment.

 

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of the President’s certification of

necessity in the following manner:

 The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also

that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

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That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.

 

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections

with the national and local elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both

the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. 

 

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there

was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:

 The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or

declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]

 

 

 

The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of their legislative discretion – gave full

recognition to the President’s certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.  Under the circumstances, nothing

short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our

power of judicial review.[21]

 

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of

action.  Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's

certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due

our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial

hand.[22]

 

In any case, despite the President’s certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for

three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties

interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them.  Specifically,  the purpose with respect to Members of

Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure

is in progress through the enactment process.[23]

 

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the

proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No.

10153 on the cited ground. 

 

III.  A.  RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054

The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply

with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:

 Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

 Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

 

We find no merit in this contention.

 

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.   As an examination of

these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the

date of the regular elections.  A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM

regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent

laws – RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 – cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not

change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the

law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.

 

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM

elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.

 

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections.  The First

Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the

specific date of the first ARMM elections,[24]leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.

Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27]RA No. 8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29] were all

enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or

provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law.  Consequently, there was no need to submit

them to any plebiscite for ratification.

 

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first

elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 [30] to

reset the date of the ARMM elections.  Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the

ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA

No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter,

Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was

not ratified through a plebiscite.

 

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of

the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently

with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites

embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

 

III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an

irrepealable law

 

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority

(2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving

RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.

 

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a “majority of each House shall constitute a

quorum to do business.” In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the

Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session.   Within a quorum, a

vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts. 

 

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the

Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No.

9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and

served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.   The Court’s

pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the

unconstitutionality:

 

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.

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 A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to

persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34](Emphasis ours.)

 

 

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the

Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the

future legislators’ room for action and flexibility.

III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section

18, Article X of the Constitution

 

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the

plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act.  As we did on the supermajority

requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the

Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution. 

 

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of

autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the

autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite

requirement in order to become effective,[35] questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may

unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would

result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.

 

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that “The creation of the autonomous region shall be

effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the

purpose.”  With these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or

revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of  autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects

specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act – require ratification

through a plebiscite.  These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the

regional government; (b) the region’s judicial system, i.e., the  special  courts  with  personal, family, and property

law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional

government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.[36]

 

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically

mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the

plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial

amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.

 

IV.  The synchronization issue

 

As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that

Congress must provide for and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections.  On this point, an existing

law in fact already exists – RA No. 7166 – as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already

provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional elections.  Thus, what RA

No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the exception

of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is

technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local

elections by express constitutional recognition.[37]

 

To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMM’s regular

elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the

national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013). 

 

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this

problem. These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over

capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections

assume office;[38] (2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those

elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to

Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office.

 

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power

to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

 

V.                           The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

 

A.             Basic Underlying Premises

 

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material premises must be fully

understood.  The first is the extent of the powers of Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate

for the synchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy as recognized and established under

the 1987 Constitution. 

 

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.[39] The legislative body

possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.[40] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and

tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.[41]  Except as limited

by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters

of general concern or common interest.[42]

 

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are

generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the

provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of

Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The

implied limitations are found “in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events

which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law.”[43] 

 

The constitutional provisions on autonomy – specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution

– constitute express limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters,

thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance of the autonomous

region.

 

Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations posed by the prescribed basic

structure of government – i.e., that the government must have an executive department and a legislative assembly,

both of which must be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national government, too, must

not encroach on the legislative powers granted under Section 20, Article X.  Conversely and as expressly reflected in

Section 17, Article X, “all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous

regions shall be vested in the National Government.”

 

The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a standard that Congress must

observe in dealing with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous regions.  The terms of these sections

leave no doubt on what the Constitution intends – the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the power to

legislate on a wide array of social, economic and administrative matters.  But equally clear under these provisions

are the permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the

above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44]  In other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as

they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45] in the relationship between the national and the regional

governments.

 

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are

recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other.  If their compelling

force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country,

while regional autonomy – as the term suggests – directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national

effect cannot be discounted.

 

These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA

No. 10153.  To succinctly describe the legal situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the

regional elections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save for  barangay and sangguniang

kabataan  elections) left it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening

period between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-one

(21) months away – of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013. 

 

The problem, in other words, was for interim measures for this period, consistent with the terms of the

Constitution and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of

autonomy.  Interim measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal landscape. The

Constitution’s Transitory Provisions themselves collectively provide measures for transition from the old

constitution to the new[46]  and for the introduction of new concepts.[47]  As previously mentioned, the adjustment of

elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpired under the Transitory

Provisions.  The adjustments, however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems

that synchronizing regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with us today.

 

The creation of local government units also represents instances when interim measures are required.  In

the creation of Quezon del Sur[48] and Dinagat Islands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an

interim governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan although these positions are

essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to serve until a new set of provincial officials shall

have been elected and qualified.[50]  A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local government

from a sub-province to a province.[51]

 

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and

approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do

violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.  Under these limitations, the choice of measures was

a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

 

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our

discussion of the options available to Congress to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the

ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide.  The proper understanding

of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No.

10153 should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be

faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA No.

10153 the concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it? 

 

B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

 

We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in

the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term – as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.  This provision states:

 Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which

shall be determined by law, shall be three yearsand no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

 

 

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit

prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in  Osmeña v.

COMELEC:[52]

 It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that

they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.

 

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:

 “It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act

postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution.” [Emphasis ours.]

 

Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates

that where the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or

mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable

constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the

constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow. [53] If at all, Congress may only pass

legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is

non-self-executing; this Court, on the other hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate

and called for.[54]

 

          In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no

room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an

interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed

by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

 

          If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result

is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the  extension of

the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly,  i.e., to

act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done

directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. [55] Congress cannot also create a new term and

effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by

Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. [56] Hence,

holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

 

          Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the question of holdover was brought before,

and given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases

with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC,[57] Adap v. Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v.

Comelec,[59]  where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.

 

All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan  officials  whose  terms of office

are  not explicitly provided for in  the  Constitution;  the present case, on the other hand, refers to local elective

officials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative

Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.

Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the term for which

they were originally elected.

 

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it

(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can

only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it

cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.[61]

 

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the

holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy

decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers;

this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,[62] except where an attendant

unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

 

C.  The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

 

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to

immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified

by, the following provisions of the Constitution: Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

 Section 8.  Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and

the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

           

 Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President, states:

xxxx

 Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and

Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

 

 while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

 Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for

xxx the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours] 

 

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of

President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of

Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the

authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.[63]

 

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections

and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional

and other local elections.  By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative

wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with

the other elections.

 

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering

special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC.  This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without

thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating.  To be sure, the Court is not without the

power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave

abuse of discretion.[64]  But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of

Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in

the exercise of its legislative powers.  Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot

compel COMELEC to call for special elections.

 

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the

power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and

regulations relative to the conduct of an election.[65] Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of

special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant.  True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP

881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and can

only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote: 

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. 

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]  

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where  elections have

already been scheduled to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or

destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature

that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision .  Under

the principle of ejusdem generis, the term “analogous causes” will be restricted to

those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These “analogous

causes” are further defined by the phrase “of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election

should become impossible.”

 

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled

but do not take place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous

causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the

hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of

the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof,such election results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5

of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because

of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.

 

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law – i.e., by congressional policy –

and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of

the imagination can these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or

Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections.  Courts, to be sure,

cannot enlarge the scope of a statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor

intended by the lawmakers.[66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and

this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.

 

D.  The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials

 

 

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special

elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the

ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office. 

In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the

Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case

of barangay officials,[67] is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown

when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes, [68] and extended the terms of

the President and the Vice-President[69] in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same

power.  The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. [70]  More

particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local

officials in the ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would

directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

 

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,

the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution

itself commands.  This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall

prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of

the Constitution. 

 

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM

elections instead of acting on their term (where the “term” means the time during which the officer may claim to

hold office as of right and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another, while the

“tenure” represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office).[72] As with the fixing of the

elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.

They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.

 

E.  The President’s Power to Appoint OICs

 

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the

appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to

Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make.  This choice itself, however, should be

examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

 

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications

to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in

order to be recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which

states:

 

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

 

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

 

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of

the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose

appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;

 

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

 

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

 

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.[74]

 

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group

of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed

law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. 

 

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA

No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be

“elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation

whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. 

 

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged  constitutional problem is more apparent than real

and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and

representative character of ARMM positions.  RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the

organic law of the ARMM  (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.  What RA No. 10153 in

fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor

and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices

until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”  This power is far

different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of

the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

 

As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite requirements, the legal

reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054.  RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for

synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail.  And this is how

RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. [75] Aside

from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that

the synchronization requires. 

 

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for Congress

to adopt, given the legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably brought with it.   In more concrete terms and

based on the above considerations,given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the

unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials,

is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as

allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for

Congress to make?

 

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or where the power of

appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is

not “democratic and republican.” For then, the people’s right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said to

be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime.  This is the grant that would frontally

breach the “elective and representative” governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. 

 

But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153

where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance – both under Section 18, Article X of the

Constitution and RA No. 9054 – will not systemically be touched nor affected at all.  To repeat what has previously

been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the

Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.  

 

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local

community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of

necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation

of local government units[76] and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces.[77] These measures, too,

are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis-à-vis the regional

interests involved).  The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of

the inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure

taken in light of the given circumstances.

 

Furthermore, the “representative” character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the

appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the “elective” aspect

shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs.  In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address

concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms

in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.

 

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 – viewed in its proper context – is a law that is

not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the

circumstances.

 

VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

 

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments that upholding the

constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to cancel

elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs. 

This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for

Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of

its legislative powers.  Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively undertake with

respect to elections. 

 

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose

– the synchronization of elections.  It was a temporary means to a lasting end – the synchronization of elections.

Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot

be transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of

elections and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by Congress

to the COMELEC, as above discussed.   

 

Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the

expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now

has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.

 

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months – or

close to 2 years – intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials’ terms expired and the time

the new ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our  Mindanao history – past and

current – teach us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the country’s Muslim

areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the past.[78]  Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the

presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional Legislative

Assembly can be done away with even temporarily.  To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present

circumstances is an absolute necessity.

 

Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the

elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative.   We hark back to our earlier

pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]

 It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative

Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.

 A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it

deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government.

 In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if

one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)

 

As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional

Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the

delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and in

responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the

exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable

measure to take.

 

B.  Autonomy in the ARMM

 

It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat

or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume

that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates – synchronization and regional

autonomy – such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.

 

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction – ut

magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, [81] and one mandate should not be

given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear. [82]  We refer to the Court’s

declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83]thus:

 A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather,

the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and effect.[Emphasis supplied.]

 

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this

Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the

measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must be

respected.  Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any

way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by

the attendant circumstances.  

 

          Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and

local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the

rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections.  This argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits.

 

As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the

framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus

continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the

national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous

determination. As reflected during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:

 Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central

government, but rather an efficient working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective partnership, not a separation.

 Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete

independence. Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political

framework of the nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]

 

This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the

Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be  “within the

framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of

the Philippines.”

 

Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing

it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of

the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to “make it clear,

once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the autonomous government.  Those not enumerated are

actually to be exercised by the national government[.]”[85]Of note is the Court’s pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v.

Hon. Aguirre[86] which we quote:

 Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not

completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions.   Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions.  The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels.   In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development.  But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal.  Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]

 

In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and

concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is

subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in

accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution. 

 

 

Conclusion

 

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate – the synchronization of national

and local elections – when it enacted RA No. 10153.  This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress

undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of

legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot

repeal or amend it.[88]

 

Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a

legislative problem. It is not within the Court’s power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty

of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to

hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of

judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic

government – the separation of powers. 

 

The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in

enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is

patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by

law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner

by reason of passion and hostility.[90] 

 

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an

array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary

adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty

or of a refusal to perform its duty.  We thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners’ claims of grave abuse

of discretion.

 

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that

every statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and

the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. [92] Any reasonable

doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. [93] As this Court declared

in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]

 The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that

the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.  To doubt is to sustain.  This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments.  The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]

 

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153,

we must support and confirm its validity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA

No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law.  We likewise LIFT the temporary

restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011.  No costs