ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008FACTS:1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Reward and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.ISSUE:WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutionalHELD:No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection withit, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the

implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries inaid of legislation.Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power asit entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Summary: Francisco vs. House of Representatives (GR 160261, 10 November 2003)

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, super ceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred tothe House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and threeweeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by HouseRepresentatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint isunconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courtsas a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with thecorollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that itsvast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and issupreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the

exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court isthat while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied inSection 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leavethe matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to beinterpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of thecalibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Francisco vs. House of Representeatives G.R. No. 160261

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme CourtChief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment providedfor by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question —as resulted in a political crisis.:

HELD:Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedingswhich were approved by the House of Representatives are unconstitutional. Consequently, thesecond impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred underparagraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is evermindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among thelegislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absoluteautonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by thesovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefullycalibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches mustbe given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutionalbasis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedingswould upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as awhole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when aproposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members was met by a proposal todelete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachmentproceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsementof the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at leastone-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of theHouse, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachmentcomplaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against thesame official within a one year period.The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits onlythe main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justicetransgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not goabout assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicialdominance over the other two great branches of the government.