AbaCUS
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Transcript of AbaCUS
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 1
Challenging the Monopoly of Mobile Termination Charges with an Auction-based Charging and User-centric System (AbaCUS)
Christos Tsiaras, Burkhard Stiller
Department of Informatics IFI, Communication Systems Group CSG, University of Zürich UZH
[tsiaras|stiller]@ifi.uzh.ch
NetSys 2013 Stuttgart March 13, 2013
Background High level architecture The AbaCUS protocol
The AbaCUS main components Summary
Future work
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 2
Background
q Voice service consumer – Caller – Callee
q Voice service price schema – The caller's provider fee – Mobile Termination Rate (MTR)
q MTR is a monopoly – Only home MNO can terminate calls – Voice service consumers does not
consider the termination rate before establish a contract
– MTR raise does not affect MNOs – MTRs are being regulated
Home MNO Competitive MNO
FNO MNO VoIP
Caller
Callee MSISDN
Contract
Call termination service
Call initiation service
X
I need a new contract! Termination rates?
What is this?
MNO
termination rate
Regulator
The termination rates has been raised? Why do I care?
MTR
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 3
AbaCUS high level architecture q The caller can reach the callee
through his home MNO q The callee could be reached by
any MNO – A virtual MSISDN would be needed
q An Auction Authority (Au2) will define which MNO will terminate the call – The call termination service request
parameters are defined by the Quality of Service Class (QoS-C)
– The price for the call termination service is defined by the Termination Rate Class (TeR-C)
– The winning MNO decision is made through an auction
Callee (MSISDN)
Home MNO Competitive MNO
Dial the MSISDN Dial a
virtual MSISDN
QoS-C demand
TeR-C demand
FNO MNO VoIP
Caller
Au2
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 4
The AbaCUS protocol
4: Notify
5: Free to register
6: Register
8: Place a call
Update TeR-C / location & QoS-C
ACK
AbaCUS auction traffic AbaCUS protocol traffic Mobile telephony traffic
ACK
Update TeR-C / location & QoS-C
3: Service request
MNO1 MNO2 Au2
Periodic Updates
Callee Caller
7: Ready to call
1: Callee Data (CD)
2: Response
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 5
Quality of Service Classes (QoS-Cs) q Defines a service request q QoS
– Call set-up priority – Sound quality
QoS-C Call set-up priority Maximum sound quality expected Critical 1st Maximum Excellent 4th Maximum Important 2nd High High 3rd High Normal 5th Good Medium 6th Good Low 7th Good Best-effort 8th Low with possible disconnections Fault-tolerant 9th Low with possible disconnections Poor 10th Low with disconnections expected
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 6
Termination Rate Classes (TeR-Cs)
q Defines the price for the requested service – Call set-up price – Call rate – Virtual dial-in numbers
TeR-C Call set-up price Rate Premium Standard Premium VIP Standard High Gold Standard Normal Silver - High Bronze - Normal Economy - Low Low Standard Low rate after the 3rd minute Budget Low Low rate after the 3rd minute
Special Standard - Free Low -
0900 xyz vwz
0800 xyz vwz
11 xyz Virtual dial-in Numbers (MSISDNs)
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 7
The AbaCUS auction (1)
TeR-C5
TeR-C3
TeR-C5
TeR-C4
TeR-C5 TeR-C5
Vickrey’s auction
AbaCUS auction
1st bid 2nd bid Winning bid
Bidders: consumers Auctioneer: seller
Bidders: MNOs Auctioneer: “caller” (Au2)
Winning bid: higher Price: next lower bid
Winning bid: lower Price: next higher bid
TeR-C3
TeR-C4
TeR-C5
Winning bid: lower Price: lower bid if next higher bid > lower bid + 1
if next higher bid = lower bid + 1
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 8
The AbaCUS auction (2)
All AbaCUS auction results Auction # Winner Draw case
1 MNO1 ✗
2 MNO1 ✗
3 MNO1 ✔
4 MNO1 ✔
5 MNO2 ✔
Draw winners history Draw # Winner
1 MNO1
2 MNO1
3 MNO2
Last two non draw winners history
w1 MNO1
w2 MNO1
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 9
AbaCUS Auction Evaluation
q Honest bids incentive – A winning bid can still be rejected if it is higher than the user’s threshold – A winning bid increases the MNO's chances to win a future auction in
case of a draw • Only the non-draw and the non-rejected winning bids are taken in to consideration
– The winning bidder has a chance to receive a higher TeR-C than the originally requested one
– The second higher bid will be chosen IFF it is higher at most by one respective TeR-C
• “Winner-blocking” is not allowed. A bidder is not motivated to place high bids in order to force the caller to reject the second higher bid, which will be proposed to the caller
q Prisoner's “honest dilemma” – The bidder is honest (H) – The bidder is lying (L) MNO1-MNO2 L-L L-H
MNO1-MNO2 H-L H-H
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 10
Auction Authority (Au2)
Au2 q The area is divided in to grids q The Au2 receives from the
MNOs their bid per QoS-C and grid periodically
q The winning bid per QoS-C, grid, and period is calculated
q When a caller sends a request to the Au2 the precalculated winning bid is proposed to the caller
q The Au2 will reject the MNO's offer if it is higher than the caller's tolerance
MNO1: Normal → Free MNO2: High → Bronze
High request Gold tolerance
High request Free tolerance
High → Gold
Normal → Low
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 11
Stakeholders
MVNO MNO
Network operators
MNO’s & MVNO’s subscribers
Caller Callee Regulator
Social networks Au2
Au2 provider
Legal relation Economic relation
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 12
Summary
q MNOs subscribers – The caller sets his preference – The caller can influence the final price of the call
q MNOs – Potential infrastructure maximization – QoS-guarantee services offer is possible
q Regulators – Low MTRs regulation demand – Dynamic, live, and on-demand MTRs competition
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 13
Future work
q System evaluation in a simulated environment q Protection mechanism in case that a user pay for a
QoS-C but never received it – QoS monitoring/measuring mechanism
• Rely on caller's/callee's honesty?
q System prototyping q Accounting mechanism for call related data q Efficiency of such a system in other markets
– Fixed telephony – VoIP
© 2013 UZH, CSG@IFI 14
Q & A
Thank you!