U N D E R S T A N D I N G D A E S H A S E M A N T I C N E T W O R K A N A L Y S I S O F D A E S H P R O P A G A N D A

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Capstone Project

Submitted by Alysha M. Tierney

18 April 2017

© 2017 Tierney

http://fletcher.tufts.edu

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction.........................................................................................................................................4A. Background...................................................................................................................................................4B. Research Question.......................................................................................................................................9C. Motivation...................................................................................................................................................10

II. Literature Review..........................................................................................................................14A. Daesh and Jihadist Violent Extremism.................................................................................................14B. Theoretical Framework: Monroe Price................................................................................................17C. Radicalization.............................................................................................................................................19D. Importance of Narratives and Framing...............................................................................................26E. Content Analyses and Semantic Analyses............................................................................................28

III. Analytic Framework....................................................................................................................31A. Possible Answers........................................................................................................................................32B. Hypothesis...................................................................................................................................................33C. Observations of Valid Hypothesis..........................................................................................................34D. Description of Method..............................................................................................................................35

IV. Methodology and Data................................................................................................................40A. Steps to Clean Data and Construct the Networks..............................................................................40

V. Evidence and Observations of Whole Network.......................................................................44A. LDA..............................................................................................................................................................44B. Histogram....................................................................................................................................................45C. Sphere of Influence Networks.................................................................................................................47D. Observations...............................................................................................................................................48

VI. Evidence and Observations of Individual Issues...................................................................49Issue 1................................................................................................................................................................51Issue 2................................................................................................................................................................53Issue 3................................................................................................................................................................54Issue 4................................................................................................................................................................55Issue 5................................................................................................................................................................57Issue 6................................................................................................................................................................58Issue 7................................................................................................................................................................59Issue 8................................................................................................................................................................60Issue 9................................................................................................................................................................61Issue 10..............................................................................................................................................................62Issue 11..............................................................................................................................................................63Issue 12..............................................................................................................................................................64Issue 13..............................................................................................................................................................65Issue 14..............................................................................................................................................................66

VII. Discussion.....................................................................................................................................67VIII. Policy Implications....................................................................................................................70IX. Conclusion......................................................................................................................................72X. Bibliography....................................................................................................................................73Appendix A: LDA Results Combined Network............................................................................79

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Appendix B: LDA Individual Issues................................................................................................80Appendix C: Sphere of Influence Reports – America.................................................................87Appendix D: Sphere of Influence Reports – West........................................................................88Appendix E: Sphere of Influence Reports – Islam.......................................................................89Appendix F: Sphere of Influence Reports – Muslim...................................................................90

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I. Introduction “We are in a battle, and...

more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.”1

– Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

A. Background Technology, communications, globalization, and internal conflicts have combined to

form a potent milieu that has fueled the growth of violent extremism around the globe. These

factors have given terrorist and radical groups the tools to propagate their messages around the

world to attract followers and horrify audiences. The Internet has enabled extremist

organizations to more easily disseminate propaganda, recruit and organize. These groups have

historically taken advantage of media and technology to spread their message and to gain and

maintain followers. Now, social media platforms have given these groups access to a global

audience. The world is seeing an unprecedented number of foreign recruits from Kazakhstan to

Canada join the ranks of groups such as Daesh. Policy makers have focused on how Daesh has

built a sophisticated online presence and recognize the importance of counter narratives; yet,

little research has been done to critically examine the messages Daesh uses to attract followers.

Technology alone is not sufficient to attract sympathizers, fighters and followers. Another

portion of this equation is what Daesh is selling.

Both policy and academic work has focused on the online prowess of extremist

organizations such as Daesh. Studies have been done to analyze their online capabilities. It is

true that Daesh has built a robust online presence. However, their presence alone does not attract

30,000 plus foreign recruits and countless sympathizers. Daesh invests significant time and effort

1 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi, 2005, CTC Library.

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into developing propaganda pieces such as videos, magazines, memes, and images. Their videos

and imagery are slickly produced. Yet, production value and presence alone cannot gain

sympathizers. More attention needs to be paid to the messages that Daesh imports into these

propaganda pieces. Current research does not quantitatively and qualitatively look at the types of

messages embedded in these content pieces.

It is true that it has become popular to study the case of Daesh. Scholars, pundits,

officials, and others have focused on the case of Daesh and at times over exaggerated its

importance. If Daesh exploits feelings of isolation amongst segments of the Western population

and creates a new transnational identity narrative then this narrative can successfully be

employed again. As will be elaborated upon further, Daesh is an outgrowth of Al Qaeda in Iraq

that has attempted to establish a “caliphate” in portions of Syria and Iraq. During the time of this

writing, Daesh is losing prestige by losing territory and legitimacy as Iraqi, Kurdish, and

coalition forces move on Mosul and Raqqa. Though Daesh may not hold large swaths of territory

before this paper is produced, I argue that analyzing the case of the robust propaganda machine

of Daesh is crucial in understanding how Daesh or Daesh 2.0 has been or could be successful at

gaining more sympathizers and followers in the future. Daesh may come and go especially in the

form we see at present; however, their strategic narrative techniques and messages may continue

on not only with Daesh but also with whatever violent extremist group may step in to be the next

evolution.

Not since the 1980s from the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan has there been such

a large number of foreign fighters.2 During the 1980s conflict with the Soviet Union, it is

2 Neumann, Peter R. “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s.” ICSR. 26 January 2015. http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/

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calculated that nearly 20,000 foreign fighters traveled to Afghanistan.3There have now been over

30,000 foreign fighters that have traveled to Iraq and Syria to support groups such as Daesh.4

The recruits come from anywhere between Kazakhstan to Canada. As of December 2015, 27,000

to 31,000 people from at least 86 different countries had traveled to Iraq and Syria to join Daesh

or other violent extremist groups.5 Of this number, approximately 5,000 people had traveled

from Western Europe and 280 from North America. The recruits from Western Europe had more

than doubled between June 2014 and December 2015.6 In the United States, the numbers have

been significantly lower. As of fall 2015, American officials had 900 active investigations

against Daesh sympathizers in all fifty states.7 It is also reported that 250 Americans have

traveled or attempted to travel to Iraq or Syria to support these groups.8 As of October 31, 2016,

US officials had charged 109 individuals on Daesh-related offenses since arrests began in March

2014.9

The numbers in the US are significantly lower due to cultural and social issues as well as

governmental and legal policies. Moreover, this significantly lower number of foreign fighters

from the US is furthered by the strategic value to Daesh of having homegrown violent extremists

perpetrate attacks within the US. Daesh does not just seek recruits to make up the caliphate in

Iraq and Syria but rather seeks sympathizers who can carry out attacks in their homelands. In

3 Hegghammer, Thomas. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad.” Quarterly Journal: International Security, vol. 35. no. 3. (Winter 2010/11): 53-94 4 Kroet, Cynthia. “UN: 30,000 foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.” Politico. 5 July 2016. http://www.politico.eu/article/united-nations-30000-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-isil-terrorism/ 5 “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq.” The Soufan Group. December 2015. http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf. Page 3. 6 Ibid. 4 7 Vidino, Lorenzo and Hughes, Seamus. “ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa.” The George Washington University Program on Extremism. December 2015. https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report_0.pdf. Page ix. 8 Ibid. ix. 9 “GW Extremism Tracker: ISIS in America October 2016 Update.” The George Washington University Program on Extremism. October 2016. https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Oct.%202016%20Snapshot.pdf

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2015, Al Qaeda and then Daesh released a pamphlet called “Safety and Security Guidebook for

Lone Wolf Mujahideen.”10 In 2015 and 2016, the US has seen lone wolf attacks that cited violent

extremist ideology as their reason for perpetrating attacks against civilians. Federal Bureau of

Investigations Director, James Comey, stated, “In San Bernardino, we saw a different dimension

which is the home grow radical extremist to kill innocent people on behalf of a foreign terrorist

organization, to claim a foreign terrorist organization and try to give it credit for acts of

violence.”11 Later in Director Comey’s testimony he spoke of the particular challenge of

identifying people online who have been radicalized by “consuming propaganda and trying to

stay beneath our radar.”12 Moreover, Director Comey in the summer of 2016 testified again in

front of Congress but now on the mass shooting that took place in the Orlando nightclub. Though

the perpetrator, Omar Mateen pledged allegiance to Daesh it is more likely than not he was a

homegrown violent extremism that was partially radicalized through consumption of online

propaganda such as Daesh’s.13 The linkage between the violent extremist groups and

perpetrating attacks abroad may be explicit such as what we saw in the Paris attacks. However,

the linkage between violent extremist and the terrorist organization may not be as direct. The

Internet has allowed the propagation of lone perpetrators or groups of perpetrators who become

inspired from the ideology and propaganda of the terrorist groups.

10 Ryan, Michael W.S. “How DAESH’s Lone Wolf Guidance Increases the Group’s Threat to the United States.” The Jamestown Foundation. 24 December 2015. https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-how-daeshs-lone-wolf-guidance-increases-the-groups-threat-to-the-united-states/ 11 Shootings in San Bernardino: Hearing before the Judiciary Committee, Senate, 114th Cong., (9 December 2015) (statement of James Comey, Federal Bureau of Investigations Director). https://www.c-span.org/video/?401606-1/fbi-director-james-comey-oversight-hearing-testimony 12 Ibid. 13 FBI Briefing on Orlando Mass Shooting (13 June 2016) (statement of James Comey, Federal Bureau of Investigations Director): https://www.c-span.org/video/?411063-1/fbi-director-james-comey-briefs-reporters-orlando-mass-shooting-investigation

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Propaganda and media output are central to violent extremist groups’ efforts such as

Daesh as this output acts as a “force multiplier.”14 In Fall 2016, the Combating Terrorism Center

at West Point released a revealing report on Daesh media activities and organization called

“Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts.”15 The findings in

this report will be discussed later in this paper. However, the report lays a useful foundation to

understand the scope and structure of Daesh media output. The study finds that the “Islamic State

has leveraged an effective combination of technology, language expertise, and centralized

management to create a media organization that enables the group to project an image of power,

order, and sophistication.”16 The products appear in 28 languages but online followers around the

globe also participate in translating these pieces into different languages.17 The propaganda thus

has broad reach to bolster the image of Daesh and to inspire, incite and instill fear. The Internet

has made it increasingly easy to access such material. Though platforms have attempted to take

down such material, as soon as videos, memes, images, and magazines are released anyone can

copy and reproduce them. Thus, it becomes a virtual game of whack-a-mole to take down

content. Moreover, websites and organizations that are interested in researching this content tend

to link directly to these pieces.

14 Milton, Daniel. “Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. United States Military Academy. October 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf. 15 https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/communication-breakdown-unraveling-the-islamic-states-media-efforts 16 Milton, op. cit. 1. 17 Ibid. 49

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B. Research Question

The central research question asked in this study is: why has Daesh been so successful?

In particular, what narratives have made Daesh successful at radicalizing and recruiting

Westerners? I hypothesize that Daesh has exploited the current “dominant” national identity

narrative espoused by the West that marginalizes and isolates Muslim voices. Daesh has then

constructed a related narrative that denounces this marginalization and constructs a new

transnational, “Muslim” identity. If the West provides no answers on what it means to be modern

and Muslim, Daesh has filled that space.

It is true that this study focuses solely on the narratives that Daesh employs in its

propaganda. Essentially, the research hones in on what messages Daesh thinks are effective to

radicalize and recruit. Significant follow up research would be warranted to analyze how

audiences and those vulnerable to radicalize consume these messages. Daesh may think that a

certain message is effective but it may not be the main message that is attractive with followers.

However, it is important to look at what Daesh is saying to gather a baseline for what narratives

dominate the content of its propaganda. I will only be looking at which messages Daesh uses in

its premiere magazine, unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this paper to study which

messages elicit more response and attention from the intended audience.

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C. Motivation

This study aims to analyze not only how Daesh uses social media and the Internet to

spread propaganda but also to study how Daesh cultivates specific narratives within their

premiere text, Dabiq. The purpose of analyzing the effectiveness and resonance of specific

narratives used by Daesh helps to illuminate what foreign and domestic sympathizers find

appealing about the group. Moreover, if one is able to find out what narratives are effectively

being used by Daesh then policy makers, NGOs, and others can possibly develop effective

counter narratives.

As will be discussed later, Daesh has multiple sources of propaganda. The sophisticated

bureaucracy of content creation and distribution produces text, videos, audio, and images to

reach various audiences. Many of these would be proper sources to look at what narratives are

employed. However, I chose to focus on the 14 English-language versions of Daesh’s online

magazine Dabiq. Dabiq was first published in July 2014 and its latest issue was published in late

July 2016. Focusing on the text within this magazine provides a deep case study in the different

narratives Daesh uses in its propaganda as it allows many dozens of pages for the authors to

express their views of their ideology in great depth. Moreover, having a consistently published

propaganda piece over many months allows a longitudinal study to be done on what narratives

may be employed at different times and how these may change throughout the months as Daesh

has evolved. These issues be studied individually then also has a whole. I will break the issues

into 14 different semantic networks to analyze the narrative clusters within them. I will then

combine the 14 issues into one large semantic network to analyze the overall narrative clusters

that are prevalent in the aggregate. Dabiq allows a consistent piece to study that spans several

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years to gather a complex picture of the themes and topics that Daesh propagandists seek to use

to reach, radicalize and recruit.

Moreover, I was further motivated to understand the themes that Daesh uses as it has

direct implications for the field of countering violent extremism. In 2015, the White House

defined countering violent extremist (CVE) as “the preventative aspects of counterterrorism as

well as interventions to undermine the attraction of extremist movements and ideologies that

seek to promote violence. CVE efforts address the root causes of extremism through community

engagement, including the following programs:” building awareness, countering extremist

narratives, and emphasizing community led intervention.18 Thus, a key piece of CVE

programming should focus on offering robust and diverse alternative narratives that can break

the violent extremist echo chamber. The first piece in constructing these effective alternatives is

to understand the actual messaging that the violent extremists employ. Thus this research of

quantitatively analyzing the underlying themes in Dabiq helps to show what messages Daesh

sees as effective. Having this baseline allows communities, nonprofits, the private sector and

others to then construct appropriate and potentially effective alternatives to delegitimize,

discredit and offer an alternative to what Daesh is selling.

Many CVE programs have tried to get the message right before but have failed. Both the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and in the State Department have undertaken unsuccessful

media campaigns to dissuade young people from joining violent extremist groups. The FBI’s

main campaign is called “Don’t Be a Puppet: Pull Back the Curtain on Violent Extremism.”19

This campaign is aimed at students and teachers. The purpose of the game is for students to

18 “FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.” The White House. 18 February 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism 19 “FBI | Countering Violent Extremism.” Accessed November 8, 2016. https://cve.fbi.gov/.

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undertake a series of tasks concerning ideologically motivated violent extremism to free the

puppet of its strings. “Don’t Be a Puppet” has hit all of the wrong notes. The American

Federation of Teachers, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination League, and many other

community organizations have come out against this campaign as being ineffective and

discriminatory.20 By executive order in 2011, President Obama created a new team within the

State Department called the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC).21

The purpose of the CSCC was to “coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public

communications activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists

and terrorist organizations, especially al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents, with the goal of

using communication tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and extremist violence and

terrorism that threaten the interests and national security of the United States.”22 One of the

CSCC’s main media campaigns was “Think Again, Turn Away.” The campaign sought to

delegitimize Daesh by exposing its hypocrisy and violence. However, the efforts were at best

ineffective and at worst played into the hands of the violent extremists. The CSCC’s Twitter

account would engage with sympathizers often giving them a platform to further their views.23

Several videos that the CSCC produced such as “Welcome to the Islamic State Land” showed

violent scenes from Daesh’s own recruitment videos showing executions and beheadings. This

show of violence only further used Daesh’s own recruitment tactics and did not appropriately

counter message. In 2016, CSCC was rebranded and revamped to become the Global

Engagement Center where its efforts focus more on partnerships and empowering other voices to 20 Sidahmed, Mazin. “FBI’s Don’t Be a Puppet game targets Muslim youth, teachers’ union says.” The Guardian. 26 August 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/26/fbi-dont-be-a-puppet-terrorism-muslim-teachers 21 “Executive Order 13584 --Developing an Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism Communications Initiative.” Whitehouse.gov, September 9, 2011. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/09/executive-order-13584-developing-integrated-strategic-counterterrorism-c. 22 Ibid. 23 Katz, Rita. “The State Department’s Twitter War with ISIS Is Embarrassing.” Time Magazine. 16 September 2014. http://time.com/3387065/isis-twitter-war-state-department/

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challenge violent extremist narratives.24 It can be argued that government campaigns to counter

extremist ideology have failed in large part due to a misunderstanding of what attracts people to

the extremist narrative. In effectively understanding what is attractive about the Daesh narrative,

the government can then empower and resource partners to effectively develop an

24 “Global Engagement Center.” US Department of State. https://www.state.gov/r/gec/

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II. Literature Review

A. Daesh and Jihadist Violent Extremism Background and Leadership

To best understand the Islamic State’s vision of state creation and the role of

sympathizers and recruits, we must first create a profile of the Islamic State. The Islamic State

evolved from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI has its roots in the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi was a key figure in the founding of AQI and sought to force the U.S. out of

Iraq and hinder the governmental transition.25 Initially, AQI found support amongst Sunni forces

due to the common goal of expelling the United States from Iraq. However, AQI’s violent

tactics, use of foreign fighters, killing of civilians, and incitement of sectarian violence isolated

former supporters.26 In 2006, al-Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. airstrike leading to Abu Ayub al-

Masri as his successor.27 Masri named Abu Umar al-Baghdadi as the head of the Islamic State of

Iraq. AQI’s tactics and alienation of the Sunni population contributed to the Anbar Awakening

ultimately allowing the U.S. to undermine the ability of AQI to operate.28 In 2010, both Masri

and al-Baghdadi were killed in an American airstrike.29 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took control of

AQI.

Following the US withdrawal from Iraq and the political tensions, AQI took advantage of

the vacuum and resumed its attacks. Moreover, the Syrian Civil War functioned as a training

group and a tool for expansion for AQI.30 In 2013, al-Baghdadi renamed the group the Islamic

State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Al Qaeda and ISIS would later split due to disputes over mission

25 “The Islamic State | Mapping Militant Organizations.” Accessed November 27, 2015. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1.

26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.

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and involvement in Syria. In January 2014, ISIS defeated Iraqi forces and took control of

Fallujah. Just months later, ISIS conquered Mosul. In June 2014, ISIS rebranded itself as the

Islamic State (IS) and declared a Caliphate.31

As mentioned previously, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the leader of the Islamic State. He has

the reputation as being the “invisible sheikh” and is largely secretive.32 He is known to be highly

organized and a ruthless battlefield tactician.33 Moreover, there are open tensions between Al

Qaeda and the Islamic State. Al-Baghdadi refused to swear allegiance to Al Qaeda’s Zawahiri

and disobeyed his wish to leave Syria to Al-Nusra Front.34 The Islamic State is a hierarchical

organization that functions as a pseudo-state under al-Baghdadi. Though there is a dispersed

network of recruiters, sympathizers, and lone wolves that create a flatter structure around the

globe.

Estimates vary concerning the size of the Islamic State’s forces. The Central Intelligence

Agency estimates that the Islamic State has 20,000-30,000 fighters35. Other sources claim that

the ranks are up to 200,000 people.36 Islamist sources claim that 90% of the fighters in Iraq are

Iraqis while 70% of fighters in Syria are Syrian.37 Each month the United States’ airstrikes kill

about 1,000 Islamic State fighters. However, these strikes do not diminish the ranks of the

31 Ibid. 32 “Profile: Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.” BBC News. Accessed November 27, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-

middle-east-27801676. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 “CIA Says IS Numbers Underestimated - Al Jazeera English.” Accessed November 27, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/cia-triples-number-islamic-state-fighters-201491232912623733.html. 36 “Isis Have Army of 200,000, Claims Kurdish Leader.” The Independent. Accessed November 28, 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-islamic-militants-have-army-of-200000-claims-kurdish-leader-9863418.html. 37 “Saddam’s Former Army Is Secret of Baghdadi’s Success.” Reuters, June 16, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/16/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi-insight-idUSKBN0OW1VN20150616.

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Islamic State since there are nearly 1,000 recruits entering Iraq and Syria every month to

replenish the ranks.38

Ideology of the Islamic State

The central thrust of the Islamic State is the ideology that underpins it. The Islamic State

is prolific in its use of social media and international communications platforms. They have

utilized these mechanisms to distribute their ideology. The Islamic State adheres to an

uncompromising and dogmatic strain of Salafi Jihadism, which is far more conservative than its

peer Al Qaeda.39 The texts and speeches of the Islamic State stipulate that all Muslims should

only associate with other “true” Muslims and cannot associate with others; fighting the Islamic

State is apostasy; and Shi’a Muslims are apostates and deserving of death.40 Following Iraqi

Sunni territorial acquisition in June 2014, the Islamic State declared itself the caliphate. The

Islamic State directed all Muslims to give Baghdadi bay’a, or allegiance, as caliph41 and all

jihadi groups were to accept the Islamic State’s supreme authority. The Islamic State has

conquered territory to build a caliphate and aims to attract recruits to help constitute its state.

This is novel in that Al Qaeda was able to establish bases in weak states; however, Al Qaeda did

not acquire and govern territory as if it were a state in a long-term fashion. The Islamic State

represents a unique threat due to its holding of large swaths of territory in which it implements

its strict ideology and form of governance.

38 “Vice President Biden, Inside the Air War, The New Burma.” Accessed November 27, 2015. http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/vice-president-biden-inside-the-air-war-the-new-burma/. 39 “The-Ideology-of-the-Islamic-State.pdf.” Accessed November 27, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-state-bunzel/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid.

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B. Theoretical Framework: Monroe Price

In 2002, Monroe E. Price established a framework for understanding national identity

narratives, which he called “the market for loyalties.” Price defines market for loyalties as a

system in which “large-scale competitors for power, in a shuffle for allegiances, use the

regulation of communications to organize a cartel of imagery and identity among

themselves…This market produces “national identity” or “community.”’42 This cartel is

composed of vested interests, which represent the voices of the major power structures that

create, reproduce, and maintain the national identity that is favorable to their positions in power.

Depending upon the power of this cartel, it can become difficult for new narratives and

organizations to enter the market especially if they are outside the relatively narrow range of

acceptable versions of national identity.

Moreover, there are those in society who are marginalized by the current, dominant

national narrative or identity. This analytical framework proves useful in attempting to

understand how Daesh has been so successful in garnering foreign recruits. We can think of

Daesh as a new entrant into the “Western” market, but I will explore whether their narratives

were aligned with the current national narratives in the West of Muslim communities being the

“other.” In addition, new technologies such as Twitter, Tumblr, and online-based magazines

have aided their entry into the market for loyalties. Prior to these new technologies, it would

have been difficult for Daesh’s message to reach a wider audience and gain foreign recruits. The

Western governments and companies are now attempting to push Daesh out of this market

through regulation, censorship, and counter narratives. Price’s market for loyalties frame is

useful in analyzing how Daesh has become an entrant. In Price’s framework, entering the Market

42 Price, Chapter 1: New Role of the State; Chapter 2: Stability, Transitions and The Market for Loyalties (p.32).

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for Loyalties is difficult both because of the narratives and because of the infrastructure needed

to break into and play in the market. As mentioned, the Internet and modern communication

technology have lowered the barriers for entry and challenged the monopoly once held by

traditional media outlets and nation states. The availability of these technologies thus has great

implications for countering violent extremism work. Governments and organizations can seek to

stifle violent extremist use of these platforms and/or create narratives that can also compete on

these same platforms.

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C. Radicalization What makes someone vulnerable to radicalization?

Radicalization has been widely researched in historical and recent scholarship. More than

ever, understanding the drivers of violent extremism has become paramount to security concerns

around the globe. Countless studies have been done to identify key variables and factors that can

radicalize someone. Researchers have analyzed socio-economic conditions, education,

technology penetration, culture, and countless other variables. However, there is no one universal

key that can best explain when and how someone becomes radicalized. In a 2010 United States

Institute of Peace report, Colonel John M. “Matt” Venhaus analyzed interviews and personal

histories of 2,032 foreign fighters for al-Qaeda.43 From this analysis, he concluded that there are

a diversity of reasons someone becomes a foreign fighter. He categorized them as such: revenge

seekers, status seekers, identity seekers, and thrill seekers. Colonel Venhaus noted “potential

recruits have an unfulfilled need to define themselves. Al-Qaeda’s ability to turn them to violent

is rooted in what each seeks: revenge seekers need an outlet for their frustration, status seekers

need recognition, identity seekers need a group to join, and thrill seeker need adventure.”44 Al-

Qaeda is able to craft a narrative that is alluring to these four groups in which recruits fight

against anti-Muslim sentiment in a global, idealized movement.

In 2015, the George Washington University’s Program on Extremism released “ISIS in

America” which analyzes the Americans who have joined or are sympathetic to Daesh. The

researchers found that a “highly complex and individualized process” shaped by the interaction

of structural and personal factors were the drivers of extremism.45 American Daesh sympathizers

were motivated from a range of issues that were at times overlapping: sympathy and compassion

43 Venhaus, Colonel John M. “Matt.” “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda.” United States Institute of Peace Special Report. May 2010. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR236Venhaus.pdf 44 Ibid. 45 Vidino and Hughes, op. cit., 15.

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for the victims of the Bashar al Assad regime; fulfilling perceived religious obligations; and a

search for belonging, meaning, and/or identity.46 There is no one trigger that researchers have

identified as the silver bullet for identifying and intervening in the radicalization process.

Rather, this process is a complex interplay of social, cultural, economic, identity and others

factors that is highly contextual and individualized. Thus, looking at the narratives that Daesh

The Process of Radicalization

The US Federal Bureau of Investigations identified the radicalization cycle as being

composed of four steps: pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination and action.”47 The pre-

radicalization stage, as mentioned previously, is highly individualized in terms of motivations.

This can be self stimulated or catalyzed by others through the internet, religious institutions,

schools, work, prison and elsewhere.48 The second stage is identification in which the individual

accepts the cause while becoming increasingly isolated from his/her former life and accepting a

new social identity.49 The third phase is indoctrination, during which the individual gets further

immersed in the group and bolsters the social identity. At this stage, “the indoctrination activities

involve small group and individual participation that allow the recruit to know and recognize his

own potential as a jihadist. The convert’s confidence increases or decreases in relation to his

experience and training. Moreover, the activities are essential to know at which level the convert

can ultimately participate and how much he can prove himself worthy to the cause.”50 The fourth

stage is action. This violent or non-violent method is the operationalizing of the beliefs into

action. The individual or his/her group then prepares and perpetrates an attack.51

46 Vidino and Hughes, op. cit., 15-16. 47 “(U//FOUO) The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad.” Federal Bureau of Investigation. 10 May 2016. https://cryptome.org/fbi-jihad.pdf. Page 4. 48 Ibid. 4 49 Ibid. 4. 50 Ibid. 8. 51 Ibid. 8.

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In a 2014 Brookings Institute study on the threat of terrorism from Western foreign fighters,

created a complementary framework to that of the FBI. This schematic model of foreign fighter

radicalization included five key steps: deciding and becoming motivated to fight; traveling to a

foreign country to participate in jihad, training and fighting to gain skills; experience, and a

network; returning to one’s home country; and plotting a terrorist attack or recruiting others to

foreign jihad.52 This model seems to involve the specific action of traveling to a foreign country

and becoming a “foreign fighter.” This second model is also pertinent to the threat of foreign

fighters returning from Syria and Iraq to perpetrate attacks back in his/her home countries.

The New York Times reported on the radicalization of a young woman from Washington

state.53 Alex, as the article calls her, was a 23 year old that was being groomed by Daesh to travel

overseas to join its “Caliphate.” After seeing the beheading video of journalist James Foley by

Daesh, Alex searched Twitter for Daesh sympathizers out of “a horrified curiosity” and readily

found accounts willing to answer her questions.54 She remarks how the Daesh accounts politely

answered her questions and then asked her about her own life. Alex then began to regularly

engage with an alleged Daesh fighter named Monzer Hamad who answered her questions about

Islam and sent suggested readings. As time went on, Alex began communicating with dozens of

Daesh sympathizers online.55 This created a circle and an echo chamber around her that sought to

provide an answer to the loneliness she felt and provide a purpose for her. Her new circle began

to send her packages that included hijabs, prayer rugs and books on Daesh’s interpretation of

52 Byman, Daniel and Shapiro, Jeremy. “Be Afraid, Be a Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.” https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Be-Afraid-web.pdf The Brookings Institute. November 2014. Page 7. 53 Callimachi, Rukmini. “ISIS and the Lonely Young American.” The New York Times. 27 June 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online-recruiting-american.html 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid

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Islam, and chocolate.56 She became increasingly isolated from her old life and the Twitter

accounts instructed her to keep these discussions private from her family and friends as well as

instructing her who she should and should not follow online. A recruiter, Faisal Mostafa, began

encouraging her to travel to Austria to be introduced to her future husband. This ended only

when Alex’s grandmother intervened and reported this grooming process to the authorities. The

case of Alex chronicled in The New York Times is illustrative of the FBI’s first three phases of

radicalization: pre-radicalization, identification, and indoctrination. Alex was an identity seeker

who found a community online that was willing to engage with her and developed a social group

around her. The recruiters isolated her from her previous social and religious groups while

pushing her to recreate her identity. She was on the third phase of indoctrination when her family

intervened. If her family had not intervened, it was likely that she would have attempted to travel

to Austria and then travel further to Iraq or Syria. Unlike male recruits, Alex likely not have been

used as a fighter but rather as a wife and mother to support her husband and create the next

generation that would inherit the “Caliphate.”

Daesh’s Propaganda Methods and Radicalization

As the process of radicalization and recruitment is complex, Daesh and other similar

organizations employ a variety of tools and tactics to reach audiences. Recruits can be self-

radicalized as the case about Alex in the New York Times illustrates. Recruits can also be

influenced by a group of their peers or family members.57 A key ingredient in each of these cases

is the reading, viewing and sharing of official and unofficial Daesh propaganda to help fuel the

process of radicalization and recruitment. In the online space, Daesh’s use of social media

56 Ibid. 57 Vidino and Hughes, op. cit. 15.

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technology is not new, but they have developed a sophisticated way of “gaming the system.”

Daesh has used the structure of such services like Twitter to amplify its message.

Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger are key researchers that focus on Daesh and radicalization

especially in the online space. J.M. Berger in his ISIS Twitter Census for Brookings Institute

notes it is difficult to discern an exact census of Daesh supporters on various social media

platforms due to account suspensions and privacy restrictions. However, researchers estimated

that from September through December 2014 there were at least 46,000 Twitter accounts used by

Daesh supporters on Twitter both active and inactive.58 The Twitter universe can be broken

down into subcategories of first, second and third tier groups following the “1 percent” rule.59

The first tier accounting for 1 percent of accounts create and verify the content to be that of

official Daesh messaging. The second tier, about 9 percent of affiliated Twitter accounts, retweet

the link with a hashtag as well as retweet each other’s tweets and write new tweets.60 The third

tier are general supporters who repeat the actions of the second tier but on a mass scale. Before

Daesh gained a large-scale presence online, they engaged in a “fake it till you make it”

marketing campaign. Daesh worked to have their hashtags appear in Twitter’s trending topics

category by coordinating with followers to send Tweets with a specific hashtag repeatedly in a

short period of time. The organization also used bots to amplify the messages. The exposure

from trending hashtags would create a cascading effect. Daesh also played off of other trending

58 Berger, J.M. and Morgan, Jonathon. “ISIS Twitter Census.” Brookings Institute. March 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf. Page 2. 59 Theory in Internet activism that participation in an Internet community breaks down to 90% only view content, 9% engage with content/active, 1% very active and create the content. McConnell, Ben and Huba, Jackie. “The 1% Rule: Charting citizen participation.” Church of the Customer Blog. 3 May 2006. https://web.archive.org/web/20100511081141/http://www.churchofthecustomer.com/blog/2006/05/charting_wiki_p.html 60 Stern, Jessica, and J. M. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. Ecco, 2015. Page 155.

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hashtags such as the World Cup to gain presence on Twitter.61 Additionally, a Daesh

sympathizer designed an app called “Dawn of Glad Tidings, “ which was an Android and Twitter

app that allowed users to read an official Daesh newsfeed and, for consenting users, would take

control of the user’s Twitter account to automate tweets.62 When Daesh made an offensive

against Mosul over 40,000 tweets were posted largely due to the help of the app. At the time, this

led to the top search result for “Baghdad” on Twitter being an image of an Daesh soldier

inscribed with the “We are coming, Baghdad.”63 The Dawn of Glad Tidings app has since been

shutdown. These tactics were designed to use the structure of Twitter to rank Daesh messages

high in trending topics regionally and around the globe. A user could easily stumble across these

messages and once one Daesh affiliated account was followed more and more would be

recommended to the user.

An October 2016 study by West Point is one of the first reports to systematically and

comprehensively analyzes Daesh’s media efforts and structure. The report finds that AQI/Daesh

has been cultivating its media efforts, structure and strategy for over a decade.64 The group

messages not only to the broader global audience but also to its internal population in the

territory it controls/controlled.65 There is a centralized media effort with bureaus set up to focus

on specific regions. Below is a graphic compiled by the West Point study to illustrate the

bureaucratic media efforts by Daesh:

61 Stern, op. cit., 147 - 157 62 Stern, op. cit., 148-149

63 Berger, J.M.. “How ISIS Games Twitter.” The Atlantic. 16 June 2014. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/.

64 Milton, Daniel. “Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. United States Military Academy. October 2016. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ISMedia_Online.pdf. Page 4. 65 Ibid. 4.

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The researchers found documents dating to as early as 2005 that speak of AQI/Daesh’s media

strategy to appeal to the people. Its media strategy had three phases: setting the ideological

groundwork by “publishing the true faith” and “explaining the jihadi system and what is needed

from the people of Iraq”; highlighting the need; and AQI/Daesh as the solution to this need.66

Daesh’s official and unofficial media outlets release videos, picture reports, pictures/images,

audio, and magazines.67 The study coded these outputs as fitting into broad thematic categories

of military, governance, commercial, religious, lifestyle, and other.68

66 Ibid. 3-4. 67 Ibid. 22. 68 Ibid. 23-30.

Figure1FromWestPointpage15

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D. Importance of Narratives and Framing

A 2013 article by Mark A. Finlayson and Steven R. Corman in the International Journal

of Language Data Processing investigates why there has been a resurgence in military interest in

narrative. First, Finlayson and Corman define a narrative as a combination of story and

discourage that is “a cognitive tool that has co-developed with human language and culture: it is

tailor-made to communicate complex constellations of actors, motivations, plans, goals, actions,

causes, and effects in a succinct, easily-digestible format.”69 The military has been interested in

narratives to not only use on and instructs its soldiers for better performance but also for strategic

communications in asymmetric conflicts. The researchers note, “narratives tap significant

cultural resources, and in the hands of a skilled communicator can be used to frame events in

strategically useful ways.”70 Narratives “consolidate memory, shape emotions, cue heuristics and

biases in judgment, and influence group distinctions.”71 Thus, narratives are powerful tools that

can be leverage to radicalize, de-radicalize, influence, and much more. However, understanding

what narratives resonate is crucial in being able to influence.

Studies have shown there is no single model of radicalization for all individuals.

Economic or educational indicators are insufficient in explaining one’s susceptibility to violent

extremism. A 2016 report by researchers at the University of Maryland empirically assessed US

domestic radicalization. Their research found “that both a sense of community victimization and

a radical shift in individuals’ cognitive frames are necessary conditions for radicalization to

violent extremism... These findings suggest that successful CVE programs and counter-

69 Finlayson, M.A. and Corman, S.R.. “The military interest in narrative.” Sprache und Datenverarbeitung, Special Issue on Formal and Computational Models of Narrative, 37 (1–2) (2013), pp. 173–191 . Page 174. 70 Ibid. 175. 71 Sanchez, Justin. “Narrative Networks.” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. http://www.darpa.mil/program/narrative-networks

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narratives need to address feelings of community victimization in ways that challenge myths and

misperceptions, but also acknowledge legitimate grievances.”72 In short, this research reveals the

importance of narratives and framing in radicalization and counter-radicalization. Narratives that

utilize victimization and frame collective grievances in this way can become fodder for someone

embarking on a path to violent extremism.

.

72 Jensen, Michael, and Gary LaFree, Patrick A. James, Anita Atwell-Seate, Daniela Pisoiu, John Stevenson, Herbert Tinsley. "Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR)," Final Report to the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. College Park, MD: START, 2016. https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_NIJ_EmpiricalAssessmentofDomesticRadicalizationFinalReport_Dec2016_0.pdf. Page 6.

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E. Content Analyses and Semantic Analyses There have been handfuls of studies done on examining the content of Daesh propaganda.

Daesh is prolific in its output of media and text and it is largely all readily accessible on the

Internet. Thus, it has been a fertile ground of research for scholars. In 2015, the Quilliam

Foundation, which is the world’s first counter-extremism think tank, released a report “The

Virtual Caliphate: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy.” The Quilliam

Foundation was responding to a need in the academic and policy research that dug into the

narratives and themes that Daesh employs in its propaganda. The study noted, “‘high production

value’ and ‘high definition’ are the new buzzwords of today’s terrorism. While they may be

appropriate terms, they have stopped us from rationally assessing the organisation behind the

glossy propaganda.”73 The report further explained:

It is only after we have achieved an understanding of the motivations and objectives that

drive the Islamic State media machine that we can begin to challenge it effectively. How, for

example, can we be expected to develop a counter-narrative without knowing what narratives

we are countering? How can we propose effective counter messaging strategies unless we

understand what and how exactly the messages that we are countering are being

disseminated, and to what purpose?74

This report understands the importance of knowing what Daesh is saying. The researcher,

Charlie Winter, documented over one thousand pieces of propaganda campaigns. Winter distilled

the pieces into six key narratives: brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging, and utopia.75

73 Winter, Charlie. “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy.” London: Quilliam, 2015. http://www.almendron.com/tribuna/wp-content/uploads/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy-1.pdf.Page 4. 74 Ibid. 4. 75 Ibid. 5.

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Winter explains these six narratives as assisting Daesh in creating a comprehensive brand that

offers an alternative way of living and offers change and transformation.76 He further noted that

propaganda alone does not typically radicalize and “there must always be an external human

influencer to spark and sustain the radicalization process…What propaganda does do, though, is

catalyse the individual’s radicalization and concentration their already-held sympathies.”77 This

content analysis by the Quilliam Foundation was one of the early reports and studies that focused

on understanding the narratives within Daesh propaganda.

Matteo Vergani and Ana-Maria Bliuc from Monash University conducted a quantitative

analysis on the first 11 issues of Daesh’s Dabiq magazine. These researchers used a

computerized text analysis program LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count).78 This

quantitative study on Daesh’s rich, primary source text looked at how the language evolved over

the issues to “reveal implicit motives, emotions and objects of interest, which emerge from the

analysis of relevant quantity of text.”79 The study found that affiliation of maintaining group

cohesion and group identity is the most important motive found in the analysis.80 Furthermore, as

the issues evolved there was an increased attention paid to women;81 as Daesh needs to attract

women who can be wives and mothers to reinforce the “Caliphate.” This linguistic quantitative

analysis of Dabiq provides insightful analysis to better deeply understand the propaganda and

narrative trends over time.

There are two other important studies of note that seek to combine quantitative and

qualitative aspects of analyzing text of extremist propaganda. Travel Morris of Norwich

76 Ibid. 6. 77 Ibid. 6-7. 78 Vergani “War-of-Keywords.pdf.” Accessed September 9, 2016. http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/sites/default/files/War-of-Keywords.pdf. 79 Ibid. 9. 80 Ibid. 16. 81 Ibid. 17.

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University in 2012 submitted a paper for the 2012 European Intelligence and Security

Informatics Conference titled “Extracting and Networking Emotions in Extremist Propaganda.”

This brief paper suggested and briefly modeled how the CASOS ORA and Automap software

can be used to understand the relationship between emotive phrases in extremist propaganda to

best understand how propagandists construct their narrative and content.82 In August 2016, the

Terrorism and Political Violence journal featured a report by Julian Droogan and Shane Peattie

in the. Droogan and Peattie employed thematic network analysis on Al Qaeda’s Inspire

magazine. Droogan and Peattie’s “methodology consists of a six-step analytic process designed

to facilitate the identification and presentation of themes within textual data. Thematic network

analysis ultimately allows for the presentation and analysis of textual themes as visual thematic

networks.”83 This analysis showed that Inspire’s themes focus not only on the West and Muslim

populations but also on “local politics and broader religious issues.”84 They were also able to

deduce a shift away from anti-Western themes to local issues and “martyrdom” of Al Qaeda

affiliates in jihad operations.85 This unique approach to coding, classifying, mapping and

interpreting propaganda serves as a useful but also highly interpretable tool for understanding

extremist propaganda.

82 Morris, Travis. “Extracting and Networking Emotions in Extremist Propaganda,” 53–59. IEEE, 2012. doi:10.1109/EISIC.2012.33. Page 53. 83 Ibid. 53. 84 Droogan, Julian and Peattie, Shane. “Reading jihad: Mapping the shifting themes of Inspire magazine.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2016. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2016.12115271. Page 1 85 Ibid. 1.

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III. Analytic Framework Research Question:

What narratives have made Daesh so successful at radicalizing and recruiting

Westerners?

Analytic Framework:

Theoretical Framework + Connecting Price and Daesh

Daesh’s successful entry into the market can be explained using Monroe Price’s

theoretical framework. The two key factors are national identity narratives and technology. I will

focus on Daesh’s use of narratives to create a national identity. Price’s framework proves useful

in attempting to understand how Daesh has been so successful in garnering western, foreign

recruits. Daesh is a new entrant into this “market” and it has been a successful entrant into this

market. This success can be explained in part by technology but also through the use of

narratives that Daesh has constructed. I hypothesize that Daesh has exploited the current

“dominant” national identity narrative espoused by the West that marginalizes and isolates

Muslim voices. This narrative or theme can be labeled “victimhood.” Daesh has then constructed

a related narrative that denounces this marginalization and constructs a new transnational,

“Muslim” identity and a call to utopia.

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A. Possible Answers In analyzing the use narratives, there are four possible answers:

1. We see a high percentage of a victimhood narrative

2. We see a high percentage of utopia narrative

3. We see both #1 and #2

4. We see neither #1 nor #2. Instead there are other prevailing narratives in Daesh’s

propaganda.

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B. Hypothesis I hypothesize that we will see option #3. We will see Daesh frequently use a narrative

that puts forth victimhood but then offers a “utopia” to overcome this victimhood. We will also

see Daesh construct a new national identity narrative of what it means to be modern and Muslim.

Daesh is attempting to fill this national identity gap with Western Muslims in hopes of attracting

specific vulnerable segments as recruits or sympathizers. According to Price’s Market for

Loyalties framework, the current oligopolistic nation states must not be properly serving a

segment of the audience. In addition, a new entrant must be willing to serve this audience and

develop a national identity narrative that is attractive. Having these two components is essential

in making Daesh a successful entrant into the market of loyalties. Moreover, historic and current

media regulations have protected the “cartel” from new entrants; however, regulations have not

kept pace with the tools and platforms offered by social media platforms. Thus, Daesh has been

able to exploit the Internet to bypass regulations and this monopoly to reach targeted audiences.

Explain Possible Evolutions

How the narratives change over the fourteen issues will also be examined. There is expected

to be a change in the narratives throughout different issues. We could see these possible

evolutions throughout the issues. I will study the fourteen issues individually and analyze how

narratives changed throughout the issues. As the terrorist group has evolved, it is possible that

earlier issues of Dabiq will focus on belonging and victimhood while latter issues could focus on

reaffirming organizational prowess via narratives of war and brutality as the group loses

territory. There could be any number of combinations of how narratives shift throughout the

issues.

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C. Observations of Valid Hypothesis For the four narrative explanations we would observe the following if each were true:

1. “Victimhood” appears in more than 75% of overall LDA topic categories. The spheres of

influence of “West” and “America” are more than 75% associated with terminology

relevant to “victimhood.”

2. “Utopia” appears in more than 75% of overall LDA topic categories. The spheres of

influence of “Islam” and “Muslim” are more than 75% associated with terminology

relevant to “Utopia.”

3. “Victimhood” and “utopia” account for 75% or more of overall LDA topic categories.

The spheres of influence of “West” and “America” are more than 75% associated with

terminology relevant to “victimhood.” The spheres of influence of “Islam” and

“Muslim” are more than 75% associated with terminology relevant to “Utopia.”

4. We do not observe 1-3 but rather other narratives are most prevalent and frequently used.

For the possible evolutions we would observe the following if each were true:

1. Heavy narrative construction of “victimhood” and “utopia” during the first seven issues.

2. Heavy narrative construction of “victimhood” during the first seven issues.

3. Heavy narrative construction of #”utopia” during the first seven issues.

4. Heavy narrative construction of neither “victimhood” or “utopia” during the first seven

issues

5. No difference between narrative construction in issues 1-7 versus in 7-14.

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D. Description of Method

To identify this narrative, I am performing a semantic network analysis of the 14 English-

language issues of Dabiq. For the 2013 conference on Applications of Social Network Analysis,

Philipp Drieger described semantic network analysis as a building upon a visual text analytics

system “that allows for a user-centered visual exploration and analysis of complex semantic

networks. By folding linear text into a network of interconnected words, this system provides an

alternative view on text and enables the analyst to explore the context of semantic structures.

Compared to the sole linear reading of a text, the system helps to gain analytical insights from

the given semantic network. The interpretation of semantic structures is supported by the

interplay of quantitative and qualitative analysis of the network structure.”1 Thus, semantic

network analysis allows analysts to explore not only the concepts within a linear text but also the

context around these concepts as they exist within the overall text being explored.

A semantic network is a network of concepts within a particular corpus of text. The

concepts are words or common phrases. Concepts are then assigned a tie to other concepts within

that same text based upon their proximity to one another. These connections between concepts

are then mapped out in a network that shows the proximity and how close concepts are to one

another within a corpus of text. Standard network analysis techniques can then be applied to this

semantic network to quantitatively and qualitatively analyze the text.

I have constructed a semantic network from the content of the 14 Dabiq magazines and

will be applying standard network analytic techniques to detect key phrases and ideas within the

texts. I have identified key words that are related to national identity for which I will analyze the

spheres of influence (e.g. America, West, crusaders, Muslim). I will study the spheres of

influence of these specific words to see the associate language with each of them. Spheres of

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influence tell you what concepts your concept of interest is connected to. This is analogous to the

ego network concept in network analysis which analyzes a node of interest and the nodes that are

directly or indirectly connected to the node of interest. Here, I am analyzing what concepts and

how frequently the concepts are connected to America, West, crusaders, or Muslim.

I will further analyze the network using latent Dirichet allocation (LDA) that will allow

me to find unobserved groupings of texts and phrases within the network. In technical terms,

LDA is a “generative probabilistic model for collections of discrete data such as text corpora.

LDA is a three-level hierarchical Bayesian model, in which each item of a collection is modeled

as a finite mixture over an underlying set of topics. Each topic is, in turn, modeled as an infinite

mixture over an underlying set of topic probabilities.”86 In short and simple terms, LDA is a

means to automatically discover topics/themes within a text. LDA is topic modeling process that

is used as a text-mining tool to uncover the connections and closeness of concepts within a text.

This, I postulate, will show me these narratives/topics that Daesh uses in the Dabiq magazines.

Upon receiving the LDA reports for the networks, I will then classify the LDA topics into

seven thematic categories: brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging, utopia, and other. This

narrative classification borrows upon the work of Charlie Winter in his content analysis for the

Quilliam Foundation.87 I have hypothesized that the national identity narrative that Daesh uses

focuses on victimhood and belonging. If this is so, narratives related to victimhood and

belonging will represent a larger portion of the LDA topics within Dabiq.

As the LDA and sphere of influence reports produce reports of individual words or

phrases, I have constructed a taxonomy of how to categorize words into relevant themes:

86 Blei, David M., Ng, Andrew Y., and Jordan, Michael I. “Latent Dirichlet Allocaton.” Journal of Machne Learning Research 3 (2003) 993-1022. 87 Winter, op. cit.

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Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia

Kill, prisoners,

imprison,

Foley, slaves,

concubines,

execute

Warn,

Accept,

repent,

forgive

Crusader,

embarrass,

kufr, uproot,

liberate,

revolt,

Crusade, Jihad,

Security,

Nusra, jawlani,

operation, army,

reach, position,

territory, PKK,

fight, blood,

conquest

Brother,

belong,

gathering,

call

Murtaddin,

shariah,

bless, rule,

lead,

kalimat,

declare,

call,

wisdom,

Ummah,

bayah,

wife/wives

I have employed Charlie Winter’s categorization while including a column for topics that are

“unclear.” The first topic is brutality, which is associated with words such as slave, enslave,

execute, prisoner(s), Foley, and kill. The second topic is mercy, which is associated with words

such as warn, accept, repent and forgive. The third topic is victimhood, which is associated with

words such as crusade(r), embarrass, kufr, uproot, liberate, and revolt. The fourth topic is war,

which is associated with words such as campaign, fight, blood, conquest, territory, PKK, Nusra,

Iran, Russia, and more. The fifth topic is belonging, which is associated with words such as

belong, gather, call, brother, and brotherhood. The sixth topic is utopia, which is associated with

words such as khalifah, ummah, shariah, rule, bayah, wife/wives, and others. The final topic is

“unclear,” which simply represents conglomeration of words that do not fit into one coherent

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topic. It is important to note that the meaning of words change based upon the context and the

other words/concepts that are present within the LDA results.

I will then use this same data to analyze the individual semantic networks of the 14

issues. This will be the semantic network of the individual issue and not the combined semantic

network of the 14 texts. This will allow me to see how narratives and network measures have

changed over time. This can help shed light on whether Daesh has shifted its narrative to on-the-

ground circumstances.

As the data becomes complex, it is useful to evaluate the overall presence of the

narratives in a clear format. The research question seeks to answer which construction of

national identity Daesh employs to inspire audiences. I have hypothesized that Daesh will focus

heavily on the victimhood and utopia narratives. The chart below will be filled in with the results

from the LDA and spheres of influence analysis to show the overall percentage of each narrative

used in the corpus of text.

LDA

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

% % % % % % %

AmericaSphereofInfluenceTheme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

% % % % % % %

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WestSphereofInfluenceTheme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

% % % % % % %

IslamSphereofInfluenceTheme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

% % % % % % %

MuslimTheme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

% % % % % % %

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IV. Methodology and Data

A. Steps to Clean Data and Construct the Networks To perform these functions, I have undertaken a multi-step process to find, extract, map, and

analyze the text data.

Step 1: Retrieval of Dabiq

First, I retrieved the issues of the English language version of Dabiq from The Clarion

Project.88 I then converted the pdfs of each issue into separate text files. While converting the

pdfs to text files, I reviewed each text file to ensure proper conversion and cleaning.

Step 2: Automap Cycle

To perform the mapping and cleaning functions, I used software from Carnegie Mellon

University’s Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems

(CASOS).89 I used the CASOS developed AutoMap to extract the network map from the

unstructured text documents. AutoMap allows the extraction of content analytic data, semantic

network data, and other functions.90 This software also includes tools for text mining to pre-

process and clean data. CASOS describes the Automap functionality:

“these pre-processors include such sub-tools as a pdf to txt converter, non-printing

character removal, and limited types of de-duplication. Text pre-processing condenses

data into concepts, which capture the features of the texts relevant to the user. Statement

formation rules determine how to link extracted concepts into networks. The

postprocessors include such procedures that link to gazetteers and augment the coding

with latitude and longitude, belief inference procedures, and secondary data cleaning

tools. In addition there are a series of support tools for creating, maintaining, and editing

88 “The Islamic State’s (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine | Clarion Project.” ClarionProject.org, September 10, 2014. http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq. 89 “CASOS Institute.” CASOS. http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/index.php 90 “Automap.” CASOS. http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/automap/

Tierney 41

delete lists, generalization thesauri, and meta-network thesauri. AutoMap uses parts of

speech tagging and proximity analysis to do computer-assisted Network Text Analysis

(NTA). NTA encodes the links among words in a text and constructs a network of the

linked words. AutoMap subsumes classical Content Analysis by analyzing the existence,

frequencies, and covariance of terms and themes”91

Once, I loaded the text files into AutoMap I utilized the suite of text processing tools built

into the software to clean the data. This included named-entity recognition (i.e. coding all

“Obama,” “Barack Obama,” President Obama” as one entity), stemming (i.e. changing words

into their word stem such as willing and willed to will), and deletion (i.e. deleting non-imperative

parts of sentences such as articles and pronouns). I further applied a delete list and thesaurus that

I had built based upon my reading and analysis of Dabiq. The thesaurus was used to instruct

AutoMap on specific nouns, phrases, or other relevant concepts unique to Dabiq such as “Abu

Bakr al-Baghdadi,” “Islamic State,” “Bashar al-Assad” and others. This was used to ensure that

AutoMap recognized these proper nouns and concepts as one term and not in their individual

parts. I further instructed AutoMap to only produce a network with concepts that appeared more

than five times within the individual texts to assist in controlling the size of the network. Based

upon these pre-processing instructions and inputs, AutoMap then produced 14 individual

semantic networks of the Dabiq and then one combined network map of these 14 texts.

Step 3: Analysis in ORA

To perform the network analysis on the created Dabiq semantic networks, I used

CASOS’s ORA Pro. CASOS describes ORA as “a dynamic meta-network assessment and

analysis tool…It contains hundreds of social network, dynamic network metrics, trail metrics,

procedures for grouping nodes, identifying local patterns, comparing and contrasting networks, 91 Ibid.

Tierney 42

groups, and individuals from a dynamic meta-network perspective.”92 Once I loaded in the

semantic network files created by AutoMap, I was able to run specific reports on the networks to

analyze the concepts within these text networks. I first analyzed the combined network of the 14

issues. I then analyzed the network of each issue individually. I ran the below reports on the

combined network then on the 14 individual networks:

Sphere of Influence: The Sphere of Influence report analyzes how a particular node (here a

word) is connected within the network. I ran this report on pre-identified concepts that relate

to the research question of interest: “America,” “West,” “Islam,” and “Muslim.” I was

interested in understanding the concepts in the network that were contextually similar and

close to these terms of interest. The Sphere of Influence report analyzes and ranks “Shared

Nodes” which are concept nodes that share the most similar links as the node of interest. This

report provides that top ten nodes that have the largest number of neighbors in common with

the node of interest. The report also produces general statistics for the node of interest such

as frequency and centrality. Again, this was performed on “America,” “West,” “Islam,” and

“Muslim,” in the combined network as well as the 14 individual networks.

Key Entity Report: The Key Entity Report performs the standard network analysis measures

such as centrality, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector.93 This report further provides

general statistics on how many words, sentences, clauses, and words per sentence are within

the text of interest. This report is helpful in informing general statistics about the texts and its

network.

Topic Analysis Report – Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA): The Topic Analysis-LDA report

was run on each network as well as the combined network to discover topics within the texts.

92 “ORA” CASOS. http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/ 93 I asked ORA to only run fast network measures due to research interest and processing bandwidth.

Tierney 43

As described earlier, LDA employs a topic-modeling algorithm that groups the concepts

within the text into topics. I instructed ORA to produced an LDA report of only the top 10

ranked topics. This report produced the top 10 words that were determined to be in the topic.

Using this probabilistic model can find groups of similar concepts within the text corpus that

are treated as topics.

Tierney 44

V. Evidence and Observations of Whole Network

As described in the methodology section, I first created a semantic network that

combined all 14 issues of Dabiq. With this combined semantic network, I sought to analyze the

topics and relationships that are represented throughout the issues. I was interested in if Daesh

uses a narrative of victimhood and Utopia.

LDA of Whole Network

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

10% 0% 30% 40% 10% 0% 10%

A. LDA The LDA analysis produced 10 topics with 10 key words per topic. This model’s purpose

is to determine clusterings of words within the network that are similar. This resulting report

produced three topics that concerned victimhood and no topics that concerned belonging. In this

combined network, victimhood and war seemed to be prevalent topics.

Tierney 45

B. Histogram Since this phase was an analysis on the combined issues it was helpful to provide basic

content analytic data such as work frequency and density. The top ten most frequent words used

in all issues of Dabiq are: Allah, Islam, Muslim, will, Ibn, America, people, Jews, Syria, and

Khalifah. Looking at the word density it is apparent that the top four words (Allah, Islam,

Muslim, and will) are used with far great frequency compared to other words in the text. These

results are not surprising given the subject matter.

Tierney 46

Tierney 47

C. Sphere of Influence Networks Issue America Sphere

of Influence: Victimhood

West Sphere of Influence: Victimhood

Islam Sphere of Influence: Utopia

Muslim Sphere of Influence: Utopia

Whole Network

10% 10% 60% 60%

America: Low Level

The sphere of influence network for the term “America” was analyzed for terminology

relevant to the narrative of victimhood. For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to

“America” only one term “abandon” was relevant to the narrative.

West: Low Level

The sphere of influence network for the term “West” was analyzed for terminology

relevant to the narrative of victimhood. For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to

“West” only one term “crusade” was relevant to the narrative.

Islam: Moderate Level

The sphere of influence network for the term “Islam” was analyzed for terminology

relevant to utopia. For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” six terms

“Allah,” “Muslim,” “Khalifah,” “religion,” “apostate,” and “jihadist” were relevant to the

narrative.

Muslim: High Level

The sphere of influence network for the term “Muslim” was analyzed for terminology

relevant to the utopia narrative. For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim”

six terms “Allah,” “Islam,” Khalifah,” “religion,” “jihadist,” and “kufr” were relevant to the

narrative.

Tierney 48

D. Observations This network was created from combining all fourteen issues of Dabiq. There is a high

concentration of certain terminology such as “allah,” “Islam,” and “Muslim.” This is in part to be

expected from the text but does show that identity can play a key part in the focus of these

magazine issues. However, there is little victimhood narrative construction appearing within the

sphere of influence reports of the key terms but somewhat more presence of this narrative in the

LDA analysis. This holds implications for what national identity narrative Daesh employs to

reach audiences. Another distinct observation is that the all-issue network is less comprehensive

than the individual issues. Individual issues tend to have a specific theme thus combining all of

the issues together is more difficult to analyze and decipher.

Tierney 49

VI. Evidence and Observations of Individual Issues

Whole

Issue1

Issue2

Issue3

Issue4

Issue5

Issue6

Issue7

Issue8

Issue9

Issue10

Issue11

Issue12

Issue13

Issue14

LDABrutality 10% 0% 0% 10% 30% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% LDAMercy 0% 10% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 10% LDAVictimhood 30% 10% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 0% 0% 20% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% LDAWar 40% 20% 40% 20% 50% 50% 80% 10% 30% 50% 10% 60% 50% 40% 90% LDABelonging 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% LDAUtopia 0% 50% 40% 50% 0% 20% 0% 50% 70% 10% 60% 10% 30% 30% 0% LDAUnclear 10% 0% 20% 10% 20% 20% 10% 30% 30% 20% 20% 20% 20% 30% 30%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

100%

%ofTop10LDATopics

LDATopic%OverTime

Tierney 50

WholeNetwork

Issue1

Issue2

Issue3

Issue4

Issue5

Issue6

Issue7

Issue8

Issue9

Issue10

Issue11

Issue12

Issue13

Issue14

AmericaSphereofInfluence:Victimhood 10% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 40% 30% 30% 20% 30% 40% 30% 40% WestSphereofInfluence:Victimhood 10% 20% 0% 0% 50% 50% 30% 30% 40% 10% 10% 60% 40% 10% 40%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

%ofTopTenSimilarConcepts

America+WestSphereofInfluence:Victimhood

Whole

Network

Issue1

Issue2

Issue3

Issue4

Issue5

Issue6

Issue7

Issue8

Issue9

Issue10

Issue11

Issue12

Issue13

Issue14

IslamSphereofInfluence:Utopia 60% 40% 50% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 30% 30% 30% 20% 40% 30% 40% MuslimSphereofInfluence:Utopia 60% 60% 30% 20% 20% 20% 20% 50% 50% 30% 30% 30% 50% 30% 30%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

%ofTopTenSimilarConcepts

Islam+MuslimSphereofInfluence:Utopia

Tierney 51

Issue 1 A. LDA

This resulting report produced low levels of the victimhood narrative and moderate levels

of the utopia narrative.

LDA of Issue 1 Network

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 10% 10% 20% 10% 50% 0%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 1 20% 20% 40% 60%

America: Low Level 2 – The sphere of influence network for the term “America” was analyzed

for terminology relevant to the narrative of victimhood. For the top 10 concepts that shared a

similar context to “America” only two terms “crusaders” and “apostasy” were relevant to the

narrative.

West: Low Level 2 - The sphere of influence network for the term “West” was analyzed for

terminology relevant to the narrative of victimhood. For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar

context to “West” only two terms “crusaders” and “American” was relevant to the narrative.

Tierney 52

Islam: Moderate Level 4 - The sphere of influence network for the term “Islam” was analyzed

for terminology relevant to the utopia narrative. For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar

context to “Islam” with four terms “Allah,” “Muslim,” “soldiers,” and “call” were relevant to the

narrative.

Muslim: Moderate Level 6 - The sphere of influence network for the term “Muslim” was

analyzed for terminology relevant to the utopia narrative. For the top 10 concepts that shared a

similar context to “Muslim” with six terms “Allah,” “Islamic State,” “Islamic,” Khalifah,”

“Ummah,” and “mujahidin.”

Tierney 53

Issue 2 A.LDA

This resulting report produced no level of the victimhood narrative and moderate levels

of the utopia narrative.

LDA of Issue 2 Network

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 0% 0% 40% 0% 40% 20%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 2 0% 0% 50% 30%

America: Not Represented - For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America”

no terms were relevant to the narrative.

West: Not Represented - For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” no terms

were relevant to the narrative.

Islam: Moderate Level 5 - For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” with

five terms “Allah,” “Muslim,” “soldiers,” “call,” and “scholars” were relevant to the narrative.

Muslim: Low Level 3 - For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam,” “Allah,”

and “Messeng.”

Tierney 54

Issue 3 A. LDA

This resulting report produced no level of the victimhood narrative and moderate levels

of the utopia narrative.

LDA of Issue 3 Network

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

10% 10% 0% 20% 0% 50% 10%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 3 0% 0% 20% 20%

America: Not Represented - For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America”

no terms were relevant to the narrative.

West: Not Represented - For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” no terms

were relevant to the narrative.

Islam: Low Level 2 - For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” with two

terms “Allah” and “Muslim.”

Muslim: Low Level 2 - For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islamic” and

“Allah.”

Tierney 55

Issue 4 A. LDA

LDA: This resulting report did not have topics representative of narratives of victimhood or

utopia..

LDA of Issue 4 Network

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

30% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 20%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 4 0% 50% 20% 20%

Sphere of Influence Networks

America: Not Represented - The sphere of influence network for the term “America” was

analyzed for terminology relevant to the narrative of marginalization. For the top 10 concepts

that shared a similar context to “America” no terms were relevant to the narrative.

West: Moderate 5 - The sphere of influence network for the term “West” was analyzed for

terminology relevant to the narrative of marginalization. The top 10 concepts that shared a

similar context to “West” that were relevant to the narrative were “Muslim,” “Islam,”

“America,” “crusade,” and “Allah.”

Tierney 56

Islam: Low Level 2 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah” and “Muslim.”

Muslim: Low Level 2 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that were

relevant to the narrative were to “Islam” and “Allah.”

Tierney 57

Issue 5 A. LDA LDA: This resulting report had only one topic representing victimhood and two topics

representing the utopia narrative.

LDA of Issue 5 Network

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 0% 10% 50% 0% 20% 20%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 5 0% 50% 20% 20%

America: Not Represented - For the top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America”

no terms were relevant to the narrative.

West: Moderate Level 5 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Muslim,” “Islam,” “America,” “uproot,” and “Allah.”

Islam: Low Level 2 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah” and “Muslims.”

Muslim: Low Level 2- The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that were

relevant to the narrative were to “Islam” and “Allah.”

Tierney 58

Issue 6 A. LDA

LDA - This resulting report had one topic representative of victimhood; however no topics

related to utopia.

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 0% 10% 80% 0% 0% 10%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 6 40% 30% 20% 20%

America: Moderate Level 4 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America” that

were relevant to the narrative were “embarrassment,” “brothers,” “Muslim,” and “Islam.”

West: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Muslim,” “Islam,” and “America.”

Islam: Low Level 2 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah” and “Muslims.”

Muslim: Low Level 2 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that were

relevant to the narrative were to “Islam” and “Allah.”

Tierney 59

Issue 7 A. LDA

This resulting report had no topics with the victimhood narrative but 5 topics related to the utopia

narrative.

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

10% 0% 0% 10% 0% 50% 30%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 7 40% 30% 20% 50%

America: Moderate Level 4 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America” that

were relevant to the narrative were “Allah,” “submit,” “Muslim,” and “Islam.”

West: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Muslim,” “Islam,” and “Mujahidin.”

Islam: Low Level 2 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah” and “Muslims.”

Muslim: Moderate Level 5 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that

were relevant to the narrative were to “Islam,” “Mujahidin,” “Allah,” “religion,” and “Khalifah.”

Tierney 60

Issue 8 A. LDA

This resulting report showed no utilization of the victimhood narrative while seven topics were

consistent with the utopia narrative.

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 0% 0% 30% 0% 70% 30%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 8 30% 40% 30% 50%

America: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah,” “Islamist,” and “Muslim.”

West: Moderate Level 4 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Muslim,” “Islam,” “crusaders,” and “Allah.”

Islam: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah,” “mujahidin,” and “Muslims.”

Muslim: Moderate Level 5 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that

were relevant to the narrative were to “Islamist” and “Allah.”

Tierney 61

Issue 9 A. LDA

This resulting report had two topics representative of victimhood and one topic related to the

utopia narrative.

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 0% 20% 50% 0% 10% 20%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 9 30% 10% 30% 30%

America: Low Level 3- The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah,” “crusaders,” and “Muslim.”

West: Low Level 1 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” that were

relevant to the narrative was “Islam.”

Islam: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah,” “mujahidin,” and “Muslims.”

Muslim: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that were

relevant to the narrative were to “Islam,” “Jihad,” and “Allah.”

Tierney 62

Issue 10 A. LDA

This resulting report had no topics representative of victimhood and six topics related to the

utopia narrative.

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 10% 0% 10% 0% 60% 20%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 10 20% 10% 30% 30%

America: Low Level 2 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah” and “crusaders.”

West: Low Level 1 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” that were

relevant to the narrative was only “Islam.”

Islam: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah,” “Sharia,” and “Muslims.”

Muslim: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that were

relevant to the narrative were to “Islam,” “Sharia,” and “Allah.”

Tierney 63

Issue 11 A. LDA This resulting report had no topics representative of victimhood and one topic related to the

utopia narrative.

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 0% 10% 60% 0% 10% 20%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 11 30% 60% 20% 30%

America: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Muslim,” “Islam,” and “crusaders.”

West: Moderate Level 6 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Islam,” America,” “war,” “Muslim,” “crusaders,” and “Allah.”

Islam: Low Level 2 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah” and “Muslim.”

Muslim: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that were

relevant to the narrative were to “Islam,” “Khalifah,” and “Allah.”

Tierney 64

Issue 12 A. LDA

This resulting report had no topics representative of victimhood and three topics related to the

utopia narrative.

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 30% 20%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 12 40% 40% 40% 50%

America: Moderate Level 4 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America” that

were relevant to the narrative were “Muslim,” “Islam,” “Allah,” and “crusaders.”

West: Moderate Level 4 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Islam,” America,” “Muslim,” and “Allah.”

Islam: Moderate Level 4 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah,” “Khalifah,” “jihad,” and “Muslim.”

Muslim: Moderate Level 5 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that

were relevant to the narrative were to “Islam,” “Khalifah,” “mujahidin,” “jihad,” and “Allah.”

Tierney 65

Issue 13 A. LDA

This resulting report had no topics representative of victimhood and three topics related to the

utopia narrative.

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 0% 0% 40% 0% 30% 30%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 13 30% 10% 30% 30%

America: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Muslim,” “Islam,” and “Allah.”

West: Low Level 1 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” that were

relevant to the narrative was “Allah.”

Islam: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah,” “Khalifah,” and “Muslim.”

Muslim: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that were

relevant to the narrative were to “Islam,” “Khalifah,” and “Allah.”

Tierney 66

Issue 14 A. LDA

This resulting report had no topics representative of victimhood or utopia.

Theme Brutality Mercy Victimhood War Belonging Utopia Unclear

Overall

Representation

0% 10% 0% 90% 0% 0% 30%

B. Sphere of Influence Networks

Issue America Sphere

of Influence:

Victimhood

West Sphere of

Influence:

Victimhood

Islam Sphere of

Influence:

Utopia

Muslim Sphere of

Influence: Utopia

Issue 14 40% 40% 40% 30%

America: Moderate Level 4 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “America” that

were relevant to the narrative were “Muslim,” “Islam,” “West,” and “Allah.”

West: Moderate Level 4 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “West” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Muslim,” “Islam,” “Allah,” and “America.”

Islam: Moderate Level 4 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Islam” that were

relevant to the narrative were “Allah,” “religion,” “call,” and “Muslim.”

Muslim: Low Level 3 - The top 10 concepts that shared a similar context to “Muslim” that were

relevant to the narrative were to “Islam,” “jihad,” and “Allah.”

Tierney 67

VII. Discussion

In the Dabiq magazine series, the dominant narratives of victimhood and utopia are not

the predominant narrative utilized by Daesh. War is the most predominant narrative employed by

Daesh based upon the LDA analysis. This applies to the whole network of Dabiq aswellas

whentheindividualnetworksareanalyzed.However,thenarrativeofutopiadoesfeature

moreprominentlythantheotherfivenarrativesofbrutality,mercy,victimhood,belonging,

and“unclear.”ThesphereofinfluencereportsforIslamandMusliminthecombined

networkandtheninthefirsttwoissuesofDabiqdoshowconceptsthatareassociatdwith

utopia.However,theutopianarrativeconceptassociationforIslamandMuslimthen

decreaseinsubsequentissuesofDabiq.Thevictimhoodnarrativedoesnotappear

frequentlyintheLDAreports.Similarly, the sphere of influence reports for America and West

were not heavily associated with concepts related to victimhood.

Overall,thisanalysisdemonstratesthatthenarrativesofvictimhoodandutopiaare

notthecentralnarratives may be just peripheral narratives and not at the core of what Daesh

publishes. Using Monroe Price’s Market for Loyalties framework, there are national identity

narratives that Daesh constructs to compete in the market; however, this national identity

narrative is largely not about utopia or victimhood. Rather, this national identity narrative is

more strongly constructed via war and the military conquests of Daesh. The analyses show that

other narratives are far more prevalent within the magazine issues. In my analysis of the data

results, the narrative of battle victory, violence, and aggression were far more prevalent and

highly represented within the findings. Many scholars have pointed toward Daesh’s initial

military victories and holding of territory as drivers of the group’s success. Successfully holding

territory was further seen as a way to differentiate Daesh from Al Qaeda and a main selling point

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for potential Daesh recruits. Moreover, as Daesh has lost territory and its international image has

been weakened, the group has seen a sharp decrease in the flow of foreign fighters, sympathizers

and recruiters.94 Violence, victory, and spoils may in fact be the key narratives that Daesh

employs in its propaganda as well as key drivers for its potential pool of recruits.

Furthermore, though Dabiq offers an ideal text-based and long-form propaganda piece to

mine narratives the function of the magazine could be quite different from other propaganda

pieces. It is possible that in solely studying Dabiq, Daesh may focus on military victories and

violence in Dabiq. While in other propaganda outlets, the narratives may be quite different – or

they could be the same. Further research is warranted on other propaganda materials such as

videos, the new Daesh magazines, memes, discussions forums, tweets, and more to gain a

holistic understanding of the common narratives employed throughout each. In addition, further

research is need on how impactful Dabiq is on radicalization compared to other pieces of Daesh

propaganda. My analysis only focused on the narratives used by a terrorist organization, it did

not focus on how the target audience interacts with, consumes, and reacts to the propaganda

pieces.

Another facet of the discussion is what Daesh writes and produces versus what compels

its audience. It could very well be the case that Daesh imbues its propaganda with violence,

claims of military victories and territorial acquisition. Yet, those may not be the narratives that

are most relevant to the audience. It is possible that the audience focuses on peripheral

narratives. Though it could very well be the case that Daesh produces just what the audience

would like to read and digest. Further research on the consumption of Daesh propaganda and

94 Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. “Number of Foreign Fighters Entering Iraq and Syria Drops by 90 Percent, Pentagon Says.” The Washington Post. 26 April 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/04/26/number-of-foreign-fighters-entering-iraq-and-syria-drops-by-90-percent-pentagon-says/?utm_term=.c602f4e42829

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audience reaction and interpretation of it is warranted. This could be done through interviews

with former extremists or even an analysis of the online Daesh sympathizer landscape. To fully

understand what narratives are being consumed and digested study of the intended audience

needs to be performed. This would provide a more nuanced picture of what makes certain

propaganda pieces attractive or not.

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VIII. Policy Implications The policy implications of my research then focus on what counter narratives and actions

can be undertaken to undermine Daesh’s message. Below are several policy recommendations:

I. Focus on “War”

In Dabiq, Daesh focuses on battles, conquest, victory, and violence. If we assume that the high

presence of this narrative is indicative of what attracts sympathizers to Daesh then those seeking

to counter Daesh’s message should construct a message that focuses on how Daesh is losing.

This counter narrative should hone in on how Daesh has lost a significant amount of territory and

is becoming weaker day by day. In short, Daesh is a weak loser.

II. Degrade Daesh Militarily

A central component of portraying Daesh a “weak loser” is militarily degrading the organization.

With more military defeats and loss of territory, Daesh becomes is unable to showcase territorial

gains and military prowess. Winning the war on the ground may be a crucial part in winning the

war of narratives.

III. Focus on “Dystopia”

Another narrative prevalent in Dabiq, especially in earlier issues, is utopia. Daesh portrayed its

“caliphate” as a highly functioning state where sympathizers – regardless of national background

– have flocked to in order to establish a new life for themselves. The counter narrative should

then focus on how the “caliphate” is no utopia. Using former members of Daesh and those who

lived under their control are crucial in exposing this hypocrisy.

IV. Who Tells the Story?

These counter narratives will be ineffective if the messenger is not credible. Western

governments such as the United States and France cannot be the messengers. Rather, those

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wishing to employ counter narratives must have credibility within communities. Former

extremists, peers, family members, and figures that hold influence within communities may be

best positioned to deliver these alternative narratives.

V. Implications for Daesh 2.0

Territory, military success, and claims of utopia have been key ingredients in the success but also

the fall of Daesh. At present, Daesh is embattled with coalition forces and is expected to collapse

as a governing entity. Understanding these ingredients and how Daesh sold itself, policy makers

should focus on denying future terrorist organizations the ability to acquire territory and project

itself as an idyllic community with great military success. Thus it is critical to deny Daesh and

the next generation of terrorist organizations the ability to conquer and hold territory. Moreover,

demonstrating that this next terrorist group offers no utopia nor victory further erodes the

resonance of the violent extremist narrative and ideology.

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IX. Conclusion To win the war of ideas, we must understand what Daesh is selling. Daesh sells

empowerment and identity, which it links to success, conquest, and purpose. Daesh is now a

faltering organization as it loses territory and its former prestige. However, the group tapped into

an identity that was powerful. Future terrorist groups will learn from this example and only

enhance these narratives. We must be ready to produce effective and credible counter and

alternative narratives as well as deny such groups military success and territory.

It is my hope that the research put forth in this analysis will provide a useful quantitative

analysis of what Daesh sees as the most effective narratives to put in its premiere propaganda

piece. However, there is still a significant gap in understanding these narratives: which identity

narrative actually resonates with the intended audience? The return or capture of disillusioned

former extremists can help answer this question. Interviews with these “formers” can illuminate

what they found most compelling in the propaganda pieces. Moreover, technology and social

media networks can also illuminate what propaganda pieces and messages are most widely

shared, retweeted, and propagated through networks. Understanding how audiences interact with

these narratives is crucial to building a fully impactful counter narrative strategy. This research

provides a useful starting point for more fully understanding what Daesh is trying to sell.

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Appendix A: LDA Results Combined Network

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Appendix B: LDA Individual Issues

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Appendix C: Sphere of Influence Reports – America

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Appendix D: Sphere of Influence Reports – West

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Appendix E: Sphere of Influence Reports – Islam

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Appendix F: Sphere of Influence Reports – Muslim