"A Savage and Romantlc War" - Spaln 1833- 1840, Part 5THE BATTTE OF ORIAMENDI

by Conrad Caims. Ilhntrated by Ralph Weaver

This account of a shon and relatively self'conlained campaign of theFirstCarlist Warhasbeen wrilen mainly lo give a detailed accountofhow the war was fought in the north of Spain and the problems andtechniques of both sides. The campaign invohed a fair amount offighting. nuch ofa nobil€ although bloody narure. and a spectacularpitched battle as itsclinax. It was also of*ide historical significance inthal itsoulcome reversed Carli$ fonunes and led rhe P.etendeis party1o the royal expedition, rhe failure ol which was perhaps the mostsrgnllrcanl evenl rn tne waf.

I believe that this article. *hen ft* published in The ForcignCo espondent, ga\e thefitst full account in English in lhe 20th cenrury.I have relied on relatively few works. Pifala gives a detailed account,on€ written from a Liberal point of view but perfectly fair to theCarlists; Apalategui is unashamedly infavourofthe Pretender and waswiting jusl after Franco\ forces (including Carlists) had Non the lastSpanish civil war, bui he also has much useful information and knowsrhegroundwell. Fenerera1. svolume in lhe monunent al Histotid deloadicionaLisno ffparol is equally panisan. It is based panly onApalategui, butalso uses andprints infullCarlistdocuments, includingthe ofiicialaccounl of the finalbanle. Ahhough the lasl was lhe BntishAuxiliary Legion's greatest fighl, some of its chroniclershad relumedhornei neverthele$. there are several useful accounts from B.itishllrilers. all rather confused and none entirely agreeing wilh the others.

There are also lwo laluable pictures oflhe batlle by British anists.T.L. Hornbrook. marine painier 10 the Duchess of Kent, was aneyewitness, and his on-the-spor drawing was published as one of theIithographs in fvelr? ri?ws in tie Bdrgrc pror',rcen copies are in theNationalArny Museum and lhe RoyalMarines Museum. The RolalMarines Museum also possesses a large oilpainting bv DavidCunliffe.probably done afew years later, *hich $aslalien from the Hornbrookview.It shows the hillofLa Venia from the west and giles rather moreprominence to rhe Royal Marines than to the British Auxiliary Legion.

The map of the battlefield is based on several sources. Myreconstruction ol the action of 16 March shows lhe position of the forcesatthe stanof theCarlist attack. The troopdispositions are largelytakenfrom a detailed plan in Humftey (a Spanish version of it appea6 inPirala): the terrain features come from Dersonal obsenation and amuch simplified version of the r|,ade.�n 1:25.N0 Mopa TopagfifbaNaciondl, sheet 6411. nre barilef ield itself is f elativelv intaci, althouehthe toqn ol Herndnr hds srosn a lol. se\eral of rhe ioad\ or l8 r- .rillexist, butthe Astigaffagalridge, which played so imponanl apart, hasbeen reDlacedbvaconcrete structure. Mosrofrhe larrnhouses are fromthe 20ili century, bul there is one 100m (328fi) east of ihe 98m (321ft)sDor heishr whichcould $ell have beenthere at the time.Ilisthe son ofBaquelarmhouse, wirh its good srone valhand smallwindows. whichcould easily be turned inlo a stfongpoinl.

tncal place names have be€n difficult. The battle on 16 March hasbeen called Hernani after the town. or Oriamendi after th€ l65m(541ft) hiu forning parr of the ridge overlooking the rown and byexiension ihe ridse itself. British wrilefs lend to use Orianendi todes{ribe a differenl and more spectacularhill, La Venra (196m [643rt]).on the extreme left ofthe line. Both hills were crowned Nith forts. OnOriamendi was F €/e O'Dorn?ll, built ofstone and surrounded by aditch(Apalategui. l00ipl. 7):onLaVentawasacircularforr{hichvillbe described later and whose stone and earth remains still cro$n theheight. Confusion also exisisbecause place names hav€ changed since1837, and I {ound itimpossible to identify precisely one or rwo fe,hresmentloneo rn some accounls.

ln early 1837the Cadists had not recovered from amajorsetback, thefailure of their second siege of Bilbao, which had been relieved byEspartero on Chrishas Day, 1836. Ashad happened so olten before,the Carlhts were conined lo the provinces of Guipizcoa. Vizcaya.Alava and Navarre, holding nuch of the landbut none ofthe inponanrcities. They possessed some 10,000 infantry, I,500 cavalry and {l guns,

alld faced 59,000 Crhtino foot and 2,400 horse in the field and 23,200and 300 respectively in gardsons (Pirala, 30-31).

The Carlists' first action following their defeat was the replacementof Lieutenant-General Bruno Villareal as Commander-in-Chi€f of theArmy ofthe Nonh by the Inlanre Don Sebaslidn Gabriel de Borbdn,the nephew of Don Carlos, who had been born in 1811. Perhapsb€cau)e Ferrer di(lil,ed Don Srba\ti,n, qho laler $as lo recoenrsel.abel la l larqueen. heaccuse. hrm or rnconj ' re nLy a nd claim{hi l rhereal talenl in the army was his veteran chielofsiaff, Gonzdlez Moreno(Ferref.36-38: Don Sebasiiifl\ address of30 Dec€mber 10 his nen onrakhgcommand appea$ on 3001).

The Cristinos did little in Jannary 1837, and this inactivity wasunfonunate, because lhey should have followed up their successes bytaking advantage of the habit of Carlisl soldiers to go home afier asetback. An offensive at thh stage would, howeler, have been v€rydifEcult if not imDossible. since the ,r'reraler were as exhausted as theCarlists. In addiiion, the former were, as often oc.urred. short ofmoney a without supplies; moreover, the weather was what $ould beexp€cted inJanuary in Spain. The Carlisls took advantage ofthe lull infighting to call np all bachelon. married men without children andwidowers betw€en 18and 50to the army and to reorganise thei.forces.At the end ofFebruary they had 17 oftheir46 batlalions and all ten oitbeir aquadrons in seven commands in Navane dnd the rest in lheBasque prolinces. Don Carlos eshblished his royal headquarters atAndoain. where he was guarded by a halberdier conpany and theGuias de Naw at nearby was Hernani. a small to\ln some sevenkilornetres (4yr milet fiom San Sebaniin which commanded ihe''Royal Road fron San Scbarliin ihe rather stronger Cristino forceunder Lieutenanl-Gcncral Georse de LacvEvans. TheCarlistshad nohopc ol bking the ciry, bur thair prese;ce had kept Evans and hisBritish Auxiliary Legion from doing much since their arrival in April1836 (Pirala, 25, 29-ll; Fener. 38-40).

The relative concentrarion of the Carlisis save the Cristinos thechance to airenpt an operarion which tht had tried in 1835(Apalategui, 9l). namel] to use $eir advantages of numbers andsecure, fonified bases to launch a concentric attack on the Carlisrs,depriving iheln of space in which to manoeuvre and forcing lhem lofighladccisilc banle. Thc l;rpralcrwould use lheir three field anniesin lhe norrhern thealre. Evansi in San Sebasliin, Saarslield\ inParnplona and Elpartero\ in Bilbao. to converge on the Carlists andprevent theirescape. Orders $ere given not to molestthepopulace bydeedorword .andon10Marchi83?theoffensivebegan.Theplannedpoint of convergence of the forces Nas Oyarzun, near San Sebaslidn{Pirala. l9-26: Spiers. 90).

The Cristinoj DIan was ootimisric. In order to concefl lhemovemenrs oflhrea arnies. sevaral condilions had to be salisfied, notlhe lean ol ihem being efficiem communication. Although letterstravelled between Esparlero and Evans ir iwo days (Spien,92). theyprobably did so by sea, alld the Carlists central position meant thalfiey could discover more ealilywhar each ol $e Cristino generah wardoing rhrn rhe latter could about lhe actionsoflheircolleagues.

The inlerior lines and suDerior mobilitv ofthe Cadists allo*ed DonSebasridn to concentrate a;triking forc€ under his command of eightbattalions. three squadrons and a mountain anillery battery. Aparlfrom the force under Guiladalde, this was th€ Carlisrs'only majorconcent.ation. since thev Dlanned for$eir other forces to delend theirown arens. There was no hope that the latter \r,ould defeat theCristinos, bui DonSebasritntrustedthattheywouldbe abletoslowtheenemyso thathisnyingcolumncould rushtohelp. defeatthe Crislinos,and move to deal with another Cristino army. Don Sebastien seemslohave been eager for barrle on the right terms because a spectacularsuccess vas just what would be neededto revitalise Carlisr spirils.

Anolherdifficulrvofthe Cristinos was the lack ofrotaltrusr betweenthe three Benerals. Espartero, in overall command, was a competentleader, having nsei rapidly because of his successes in the field.Saanfield. who had devis€d the plan ofcampaign. wascaptain-gen€ralof Navarre and may have been somewhat jealous of Espartero's

PLANS OF CAMPAIGN

25

Dromotions. Evans was to be an acconDlisbed field commander in theCrimeanWar. but inthiscampaignhedoes not seem lo have been at hisbest. A mercurial man. his letters show that his vie\ls of his allieschanged according to circumstances afld his mood; at one stage hefavoured the replacement of Espartero by Saarsfi€ld (Spiers, 90'91).

TIIE MOVEMENTS OF ESPARTERO AND SAARSFIELDfie easi€st fashior in which to describe the elents is to abandonchronology and deal with the Cristino armies in tum. Espartero leftBitbao according ro plan on 10 March with 28 battalions (F€rrer, 40),and almost at once he came across Carlisls in field fonfications.Charges by pan of the ldncdror and Cozadores ol the Royal Guard andthe line cavalry regimenls Rdy and nnd routed the enemy. On the 12thhe reached Durango, {,here, against the spirit of the enterprise, hehalted to improve the forriiicalions. Not until the 16th did he mov€,havhg lefr the Royal Guard division to hold Durango. On th€ nighl ofthe l9th he heard of fte disaster which had befallen Evans on the 16lhand concluded that the safest course of action \ras to rctreat. Thepullback began on the 20th in lery rainy weather, and the armyr€gain€d Bilbao the next day. Both days saw heaif fighting, since theCarlisrs hanied their bag-aagei aboui a rhousand men were lost oneither side, and considerable deeds of valour were perform€d byEspad€ro\ troops (Pirala. 65-68; Ferrer, 45).

It appears that Espartero had largely defealed himself. He wasprobably faced by only ten battalions of Carlists. which at the beginningof lhe cnmpaign were sration€d around Vizcaya. There \tas no r€asonor excuse for halting at Durango. As before and after, the generaldisplayed a methodical approach to warfare. This soinelimes stood himin good stead - for exanple, during the taking of Mo.ella in 1840 butwas nol suilable for a quick offensive against a mobile €nemy.

Saarsfield left a day larer than Espartero, wirh 10,300 foot, 4{0 horse,eight mounlain guns and two companies of sappen. The vanguardconsisted of light troops; next was an independent brigade; then thecavalry of lhe French Foreign Legion and a squadron of the ,odn, fineregimenl,350 men in alli lhen the 4lh Division, of six battalions; andlan the Fr€nch Foreign Legion infantry, perhaps only 2,0m $ong(Apalategd,92). The Carlists hadbul forrbattalions andsome cavalryto face these trooDs. but Don Sebaslidn was cominsto their aid.

The fine $,eaft;r of l1 Ma.ch was folloved b! a t;rrible sno{sronn in

the nrahr vhch cauied suHering to the Cristino army and ilsleader -Sa,^iield had said lhat he ! oul-d Dut uD silh whar his men had lo andhe camDed out with them. This axamDle tlas about the limit of hissoldierlv soirit. On the 12th he relumed to Pamplona after no nor€rhan skirniishins. defeated bv rhe weather and the threat of disease(Pirala,4445; F"errer, 4G4l): The Carlist field army was now lree todeal whh Evans. Lhe mosl vigorous of lhe Crislino generah. DonSebasridn aDDears lo hate wailed al Iruran, lo the norlhwesl olPamplona. u;til rhe momins of the lslh (Ap3lalegui. l0l). p€rhapshecalse he *anLed ro makeiure lhar Saarsfi;ld wo-uld not renev fus

U*

EVANS'S ACTIONS ON lOMARCHBom in 1787, Evans $a. no less a politicalSeneralthan his youngopponenr A radicdl [4P. he was the leader of lhe Brilish AuxilidryLegion.a lorce $i lhan rnir id ls irenglhof l0.000men*hich walparlottheiDanisharmvand which had be; servinsin SDainsince the 'umnelof 18i5. ks rwo-yearconnacl wasdue Io en-d in lune I83?. Apan fromone of ils two lancer regiments, which was on detached senice, theLegion garrisoned San Sehslidn. The facr rhal the cily cas a pon andrl\.o\il!on near rhe French border made it a sood base lbr allach lothe sourh against Tolosa and advances into Carlist-held tenitory

-L,6 a",6h&.LlrdrEeron

between it and France. It $as accordingly recognised as one of thegovernmenr c mot imponanr ba\es and qa\ alwa). \ltonSl) held. Inaddir ion ro rhe I egion. Lva n\ had a field bar lery of Royal Anrlleq . oneofRoyal Marine Adlleryand a battalion of Royal Marines under l,ordJohn Hay; the laner was commander of the Royal Navy squadron{hose shiDs and men had been lendins assistance lo the Cristinos lorseveral veirs. Evans aho had severaithousand SDaniards under hiscommaid. includins 210 officers and 5.130 men who had arrived on 7February (spier5, ei).

The Cadirrs had builr numerourfo rfred porir ion. rn rhe cou ntry.rdealound San Sebastidn, and these usually consisted of irenches,banicades andfonifi€d houses- On 5 May 1836lhe Legion had clearedthe San Bartolomeo heishls. verv close to the fonressofSan Sebaslidnandoverlooking the fa;ous b€aahofLaConcha (Pocock,3-5). On l0March 1837 Evans crossed onto the risht bank ofthe Urumea River bva bndee ol boal. . d.emi-oermanenr 6xrure of SJn Sebz\r i i jn ! \hich isshown in anolher Hornb;ook lirhosraoh. and noved on the Carlisttrenches and barricades on the hilltof Anetzagana abour 3km (1.86miles) from the town and on the nearby position of Alza. Other parts ofthe attacking force had been sent by sea to Passajesin order to tum theCarlist riaht flank.

According to Carlist sources (Apalategui. 981 Fener, 42) lheCistinos sionned lhe positions lhree times and were repulsed eachlime. bul rhis claim does not seem to be conect. There was indeedheavy fighting on ihe 101h, the Carlists losing,t92 dead and woundedand the Crisrinos twice that number (Pirala,432i Spiers,92), but byevening the Carlists had fetreated. Accoding to an anonymousmemberof the Legion. the Carlistartilleryhadexhausteditsball. grapeand canister bv noon. anditwasreduced 1o firinsstones and iheheadofa large sledgeLarBner, then blank cartridges, b:efor€ beingwilhdra$nin order to aloid being captured ('Volunleer". 38-39). The RoyalMarine Artillery guns flred spherical case'shot, which, as earlier,proved tobe the only way in which artillerycould harm Carlists in theirtrenches fField.35).

THEACTIONS OUTSIDE SAN SEBASTIAN. I1.15MARCH

After achieling this success, Evans could follow his plan to advance upthe Urumea valley, both sides of which he controlled for a fe$kilomelres from its mouth. to take the to'Jn ofHernani. whose caplurevould be anolher blow for the Carlis$ and would probably force thePretender to leale Andoain. Duringtbe nexi few days there wasninorskirmishing. and on the moming of the 12th rhe Cadisrs senl sixcompanies of ca:/dof€r to reconnoitre the baliiefield: the! recovered100 precious muske$ and looted clothcs fror]l the; dead foes.Guiladalde r€tned from illhealth and w3s replaced by Pedro Iturriza-

Both sides lpent the period of inaclivity foriifying iheir positions,which $,as very wise in the case of the Carlists. Like Espartero, Evansseemsto have been worried by the possibiliiy ofcounter attacks. and,atleaston this occasion, heshowed hirnselftobe rco slo{ in follo$ingup a beaten eneny. Allhough the Cristinos inproved the defences onthe hills which thev had caotured. rhe Carlists concenlraled their efforison the ridge of Orianeidi. a prominent lealure which overlooksHemanifrom the north. The ridge runs wesl from the bndge overtheUrumea at Astiganaga lor jusl orer a kilomeire, lhen bends nonhwest,ending on the conical hillofLa Venta. On the last vas a circularfon,with turf walls said to be 15fi (4.75m) high andwhich had ro be climbedby ladders because there was no gate. In the fon was a flagpole and abomb-proof magazinei the fon, which incorporated old€r works,mounted four guns. On Oriamendi hill was Fuedr O'Donn?I, as theLibenles called it, built of stone and ditched (Apalategui, i00;Somerville. 405. 436-38).

ln the evening of the l1th Evans receiled a lener of the 9th fronSaanfield. which h€ interoretedto mean that the lalterhad abandonedthe original plan of heading for Vera and Oyafl unand insleadintendedto attack Hemani f om the south. In his lette$ and memoirs Evansstated thal he launched his frontal assault on Hcrnan over urcOriamendi ridge in order ro distract Carlist forces from opposingSaanfield\ approach. His modern biographer has attacked the claimsince it "hardly wananted the risk of a premalufe attack, withinsufficient forces. apainst a lovn so vital to the Cadht cause lhal it wasbound ro be heavilllelended (Spiers. a2). The cnncrsm is a senousone. since ifEvans had not decided to Dress the offensive the defeat of

16 March would not have occuned, but it ignores several things. Firsdy,Evans did not kno{ until3pn on the l6lh, when il was too late tomatter, that Saarsfield had withdrawn lo Pamplona (Spiers, 93), and h€would have failed in his duty had he not pressed the attack. Secondly,Evans hadjust won animportant position;as Napoleon hadsaid. on€should "reinforce success' . Last. his arny outnumbered the Carlists,probably by about two to on€. If he had attacked the Oriamendi ridgeon the l2tbor 13th he would probabh have triumphed. sinceitwasonlythe surprise arrivalofDon S€bastien on the 16th which ruined his planstotake Hernani.

Tle attack on the ridge from the nonh took place on a wet and snowy15 March. Three days before the sappers and niners of the Legion hadbuilt a second bridge of boats across the Urunea (Humfrey,34), andElans used it to ferry his forces, less a battalion and a half kept atPaslajes and Amelzagana, and a ball€ry on lhe laner'shill, to the Ieftbank of the river. On the left fiant, Godfiey\ and J6uregui's Brigadeswere to take the Carlist righr, which was based on Aguene, now the siteof a large hospilal. Chichester\ and Filzgeraldi Brigades fomed thecenlre; they were 1o attack the Carlist centre on the Orianendi hill. Theright, under Rend6n, consisled ofhis o\r,n vanguard division, the lstLancers of the Legion, and the Royal Marines. Apan from the rockettroops of the Legion and four mountain guns with Chichester, all tbeartillery was under Rend6n. although since the ground was verybroken. wheeled guns found it difficult to operate over much of thebaxlefield (Fener, 4243 i Pirala, 35 i Humfrey, 31, 35).

The attack succeeded on all honrs. The battle aDDears to have lastedfron about lpn to about 6pm, and the action vrafierce everywhere.The Carlisl battalions lought three deep, but were forced to retreatalter the fods on La Venta and Oriamendi fell to the 9lh and l0tftregiments of the British Auxiliary Legion and the Pincera lineregiment (Apalategui. 101; Somerville. 449). The forl onLaVentawashit by Congreve rockets, which had been brought up by mules andwhich caused dreadtul in;uries to the sarrison. This lime the CarlhBwere unable toremove theirguns. andlhey*ere spiked or d€stroyed.The BritishlanceBtried lo charge seleraltimes. but were prevent€d byihe groundr however. their pfesence is said to have delerred CarlistcounreFattacks (Somenille.437 38. 451-52; National Army MuseumMS.6087-199, general order of 20 March 1837).

By lhe evening of rhe 15th the Cristinos rnust have thought that theworst was over. They were on a ridge o,rerlookng the plain in whichstood Hemani. To the *esr of the town was the rocky and precipitoushillofSanla Barbara. Any atiack would have to cross the plain in tullvie$. $en climb the ridge from the south. a tougher proposition thanan attack from rhe nonh. A retired officer of the British AuxilianLegion (Shas. 654-55). unon heanng of the later events. said thatEvans should have spenl the night ofthe 15th fonifying the ridge, andHumfrey.shoNas present in the battl€. said thal the beech trees {hichcovered the ridge should have been felled to make an impenetnblebanier and rhat a large farmhouse on the easr of the ridge should havebeen strengthened (Humfrey, 37). Leaving asid€ the tiredness oi thetroons. howe!e.. these sratenents se€m like wisdom after the event.The Cristinos had *on two acdons in succession and were poised for anearly advance against a much inferior enemy th€ flext day; in addition,this lime they had no natural obstacles to overcome. So confidentwercthe Cistinos of success that one Sanlesteban, the organist of SantaMaria, conpos€d a celebratory march which was played by the Cristinobands on the ridge that night;so pessimisric wer€ the Carlisls that theold men. women andchildren ofHernani w€re evacualed (Apalategui,r02\.

THEBATTLEOF 16 MARCHTle main ortline ol events is clear- althoush accounts contradicl oneanotherin certain maiters. and some of tht eyewitnesses, particuladyAlexander Somerville. are confusinsin theirnanalives. what followsis mv reconsrruction. althoush theavidence could lead to somewhatdiff;enr interprelarions of d;tails. particularly of events on the centreof the field.

The Dlan shows the Crisrino Dosidons at the slart of the Car'istcountei-attack. ll isclearthal thd units had remained $here they hadbeen ovemight and had not reordered ftenselves aiter having takenthe ridge. Renddn'sDivision andChichester's Brigadewereinterming-Ied in a manner which would have made control needlessly difficult.Mosl of th€ army was still on the ridge. The clunsiesl troops 0he Royal

Marines, lancers and wheeled anillery) were to the west of La Venta,wh€re the gound \ras more suitable for them to manoeuvre; here theyalso guarded the main road to Safl Sebasden, which was lined withhouses and walled gardens for part of its l€ngth (Humftey, 36). Th€bridge at Astigarraga was nol held, although it should have been saI€enough sinc€ it was overlooked by th€ lst Reginent British AuxiliaryLegion on rhe end of rhe ndge above. The arrack wasdhead] naning.llrlh Godfrr)\ Brigade advancinB m rhe cenrre and Jdureguiispreadout on the righr attacking Santa Barbara. Some of the baltalions appearto have been en gueni a (Pirala, 38). The first action of the day hadalready taken place: Cadist lancen had chareed rhe C/irp.lSoraoutsidi Hernaniand were in tum driven back bia auadron df BhishIancels (Henderson. 1G11.

The Carlists position mist have looked fairly desperate to them. Thefighting on the 10th and l5th had caused not only exhaustion but ahohea\.y losses, with a third of the offrc€rs beine out of action. DonSebaitiin's flying colunn was also tired, havingiurched fton Iruzanto Tonosa on the 15lh and then another 15km (9 miles) ovemiglt inord€r to anive at Hemani fiom 6.30am on the 16th- It had been only onrhe eveningof lhe lSth thal aconlereDceof the generalso[lhe flyingcolumn ha-d decided lo gire baLtle. the ahematr-ve suggestion hahn!been to retum to face Espartero. Four guns had been lost by the Carlistforces on lhe .idge on the l5th. leaving only seven pieces in batteri€s inand amund Hemani and the four light guns brought by Don Sebastirn'sr€inforc€m€nrs (Pirala, 36,39). Nevertheless, ihe Carlists reorganisedlheir lorces and began a lhree-pronged ar\auh on rhe posirion: ofthelderuler. probablisome lime in the-late moming.

27

The Carlist right win8, ofsix battalions, atlacked the exrreme lelt ofthe Libefiles. the hill then known as Bertizarrn and rhe areaoverlooking the bridge ar Ashgana8a. lt appears rhal five bauahonsapproached the enemy alonglheeasL banl ofrhe Urumea andcrosed

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The position of the Legion is put by Somerville offte 8lh Reginent.He says thai th€ 6th Regiment. which was stationed near his otn unit,wdichargedbyrhe-wholeol lheCarl is lcavalry burheldlhemoff wirhvolle) fire Accordrng ro hrm. rhe olh. Tlh andSlh Regimenl(, betnAinrhe raar.5uffered rhe wor.r srnce they had lo cover lh'e army. relr;al,and he himselfwas stillfiAhtinq three hounafterthe Marines had leftthe field. He alleges thatiot o-nlv were the Marines noben€r soldierslhan lhe legionarie.bul rhal lher {ere hardl} engaged. being kept oulofrhe balile b) Hay (Somerville. 115-.1q. Jo0:o|.534). Anolh-er Ggionunil which did wellwas the ht Lancea. whichhalledaDursuinscohimnb) achargelNanondlArm) Mu\eum VS 0807. lo! . generalofueror2lMarch 1837J.

the bridge. This movement $ould nor have been possible. or at leaslwould have been very difficult, if the bridge had beei propedyguarded, but it is likely that bythe time the five battalions were ar th€crossins the a'befdler (lst Re8imenr Brirish Auxiliary Legion and aSpanish baltalion) had already been dnplaced. Tle 6th GuipfzcoaBattalion. in a colunn of cornpanies led by the cdzador company inskinnish order, rushed the Bertizanin hill withort firing a shol. earningthe ritle ofthe .lron Battalion . The 6rh led the other file batlalionsdown the eneny flank. creating great confusion and threatening thewhole of Evanis army. At some time duringthe progress ofhis unit,volii"ralio (Pnvate) Josd Aneaga of the 'lron Battalion killed theofficer carrying ihe colour of the 9th Regiment British Auxiliaryl-egion. Whelher this evenr took place near the righl ofthe l,ireraler'line. where lhe 9th was stationed, or whelher Carlisl wdten havewrongly identified the unit and in fact it was the lst or 4th regimenlBritish Auxiliary Legion, willprobably never be known (Apalategui.105'6r Ferrer.66.302r Pirala.39-40). Pirala statesthat the tvo letunostCrisiino units were not displaced solely by the 6ih Guipizcoans, butfled only when their flank was turned by ihe.lih Alalese.

Tle Carlisi centre launched a frontal assaull up rhc ridge on theCrislino cenlre, led by Bruno Villareal. slick in hand. Despite lhevaliant efforls ol EvanJs nen, €speciallv the Oviedo ProlincialR€gim€nt. which attempred ro stem the retreai. rhe assaull was alriunph for lhe Carlisls. Frefre O Donnel/ fell aft€r anexplosion, andaccording to tadition the bodies lay!o thickly around one house ihatthe! had to be bumed instead ofbuded. Il is also said lhat the Carlisistended to allow Spanish Cristinos to escape and cut dovn the Bdrih.perhaps because oftheir halred of Lulherant. perhaps because lheBrilish were clumsier and sloser moving than lheir allies. or perhapsjusr because the Carlisrs wanted ro loot the Bntish Red Coats (Pirala.40-41 i Apalategui. 108).

Only the Carlisl left. which numbered five or six battalions againstdouble their number. met with less than iotalviciorv. Henderson saidthat about lpm he heard awailinSofbugles from Santa Barbara. oui of\thich rushed a mighty cloud of skirmishen. followed by a densecolumn ofNavarrese infanrry (no Navarrese were on this fron0. Thiscolumn rouled the 2nd Spanish Line Infanrry. which. along with therest ofJdureguis command. was spread out in rhe plain before SantaBarbara. and Henderson clains thar wirhin 20 minuks of itsappearance the Carlist column was at the footofLaVenta (Hendenon,19iHumfrey.10 41). HereitNascheckedbyrheRoyalMarinesandthebulk of the Crislino a.tilletY.

It is a matter of conlroversy ,s to whar exlent the British regularssaved Evans s army at this poinl. Tle historians ofthe Royal MarineAnillery claimed that the Spaniards and rhe Legion had been dnvenback in disorder when Lieutenanl-Colonel John Owen of the Marin€sdeploy€d file of his seven companies and drove off the Carlists. Thelarter rried 1o tum the righr flank of the Marines. but it was guarded bythe sixlh comoanv and rhe RovalMarin€ Anilierv. Field adds for theMarines that ihe sea soldiers ;ade use ol breast\iorks and quotes aneyewihess, Lieulenant Richard Steele ofthe Royal Marine Arliilery,to the effect that the Marinesformed column and line severaltimes rorestore order. Lieurenanl H. Nichols ofthe RoyalEngineers, who wasaho there. said thal the Mafines volley fire was beautiful to see'compared wilh the usual skirmnhing fire of the war (Fraser andCarr-Laughton. 368-69; Field, 36-37). Evans caused considerableoffense in his order of 21 March by holding up the Mannes as anexamole of steadiness to the Lesion.

I"'UMANDPOST.MORTEMPirala (41) eives the Crislino losses on 16 March as over ,00 dead, 900$'ounded and 137prisoners, including eight officers and 90 men of rheOviedoRegiment. Humfrey(31) staresthalthe toralcasualtiesfor t0rol6 March vere 2.4{|(l. On the l6th lhe Carlists suftered 70 dead and 473wounded. including Manuel Oliden, colonel ol the 6th cuiprizcoaBafldlion. according ro Don Sebalrian\ offi(ial de,pdrch. or 88 dead,664 wounded and some pri\one^ acordrne to Pirala. Other vicrimswere the 200 families *hich had lost their h6mes in rhe fiehlinaofiheweek The \ictors look guns (presumably rhe four mounrain gu-ns wrthch'cherrers Brigadel. aongr;\e rockel.. 110.000 muster c;nrid8es.mrsical insruments. andthe musicoflhe mafch to celebrate a Crisiinovictory, which last ther nade ihcir own under rhe tiile Himno d?Oriam.ndi (Ferrer. 45. 303 i Pirala. 1l ).

The Carlists tr€ared Oriamendi as a very imponant victory,celeblarinz a Te Deun in Tonosa. srriking a special nedal for thetroops. and issuingthe usualponpous proclanation in the Napoleonicstyle (Ferrer. 45. 304). Rarher more inlcresting is Don Sebastiin\officialreDon (Ferrer.l0l-31. *rirten on l8 March. He stales lhattheenemy numbered 11.000 men und 12 guns, probably a slight€xagger tion as regards the men and rn underestinate oflhe gurs byfour. Hisremark ihatatthe srart of the ballle some Cristino battalionswere en guernlla bet{een Oriamendi and Hernani shows lhat Evanshad staned his advanc€. albeit in an uncoordinated fashion, when hisarmv was attacked. DonSebastian ahostatesthatthere were five hoursof h;a!'y fighring*hich ended about spm.

The army and its commander had good cause to be proud of theiroerformance. Half the Carlist armv had been denoralised and hadiuffered many ioses in successile d;feats. and the other half had beenexhausted by a longnarch. Itwas onlyon the eveningofthe l5th rhatDon Sebasti6n decided. against the advice of Moreno. to give batle(Pirala. 39). His plan was extremely daring. Il involved the splitting ofhis force into three bodies which could find il very difficult to help oneanolher if something went wrong and also the sending of one of thebodies across a river which ir would have to recross by a single bridgecommanded by lhe fo€ it was to joir the banle. Although DonSebastian had never faced the British. he would have been aware ofrh€ir clumsiness. but repons of rhe earlier battles would also have rcldhim rhal some ofElanss army were more agile Spaniard.. Only totalconfidence in the ability of his lroops could have per$laded DonSebastiln to do what he did, and only success justified his aclions.

The Cristinos narurall! set abour explaining why lhey lost andseeking€xcuses. Humirey,whohad notwanteda battle there at all, andwhose alternativeplanhad notbeenlakenup, accused Evans of makingseveral nistakes. He clained ftat 10.000nen wer€ holding a posilionsuirable for 30,000, bur $is slaremenr is nonsense. The density ofrroops wasmuchthe same asat Busaeo(1809) and theposition almostas good;what had changed was that the British Auxiliary Legion wasnot of the same quality as the troops ofWellin$ont army and ftallheLegion faced an eneny more capable of springing surprises and in manyways more dangerous ihan ihe French regrnent!. Humfrey said thateleryon€ knew that the Astigarraga bridge woutd be the point ofattack, bur again, this statement appears to be "generalship byhindsight , for it would hale taken a rash general to have done whatDon Sebasden did (Humfiey. 32, 37 38).

It is unJair to €ritise Evans for fighting the barle. it is jusr to point outrhar hr dispo'iLions were fault). E\en rf he war not erpecting acounte.attack. he should have taken bettercare to organhe his forcesand reassemble the bdgades afler the battle oflhe 15th. He knev onlytoo well ho'{ much faster the Carlisrs moled oler $i! sort of terrain

29

than his men. especially the Briiish, and he should have placed hisregiments in positions where they could suppon each other rather tbanallow them to suffer the Carlist assault with litde mutual help. Inparticular. it was an eror to have allo'{ed Jauregui's and Godftey'sBrigad€s io adlance unsupponed so far in advance of the ridge, andespecially not in open order across a plain.

For the Carlisrs, Oriamendi wiped out the dejection which rhey hadfelt sinceBilbao. and their new self-confidence in the summerof 1837was to have a monumental effect on the outcome ofthe war. For lheCristinos, the defeat proved to be rather less than a catastrophe.lt didnot alter the course oflhe camoaien as a whole. in so far as Evans wouldnot have been able ro havri pioceeded much further after takingHemani because Saarsfield and Espanero had been behaving in asluggish nanner. The battle had been bloody, but not as much as soneothen; Cadist and Cristino armies had taken and would take harderpoundinglhanlhatmetedouton 16March. The arny had run, but onceinside the walk of San Sebaslitn ii was oerf€ctlv safe. Ar had beenshown in the Peninsular war and this co;flict. S;anish arnies had agreat capacity to recover after deleats and come oit fighting.

Tle l,esion suffered wont from the Doint of view of morale. BritishtloopE lac-ked the resilience of Spaniards after defeat, and the less thanlotally supportive attitude of Elans tovards his men did little toimprove theirspiits. On 19 March he consolidated the three brigadesinto two: the 7rh R€sineni b€cane Dan ofrhe Rifl€s and the 9th andl(]th became one unii Tte general w;s pariicularin his prais€, singlingout the lancers, artillery, Rifles, 6th, 9th and l0th regim€nts of theLegion, and abole all the British regulan. Oddly enough, in hispublished account of lhe battl€ he accused Hay of withdrawirg theMarines too early (Nadonal Army Museum MS. 6807-199, generalorders of 19 and 21 March 1837: Evans.80 8i).

It was indeed unfortunate that in the eves ofsome of the membersofthe Legion its worst delear should have overshadowed its realachievements. Evais himsel{resainedhisoDlimism afew davs after thebarlle lSpreA. qoi. and Lhe Legion wenr ori ro rake nor onl! Hemani.but also the Carlist tenitory a. far as the French bord€r in May, whenmosr of rhe Carlisrs had left to follo* the Pretender to Madrid.

THECARLISTARMYSome discrepanciesexist in the sources ior the a|mv$hjch foughtin thebattles of 10 to 16 March, but the main details are be-vond dispure.General Guiladalde h€ld the positions outside San Sebaslidn Nith alleighl of lhe Guiprizcoa baltalions. Shorily before 10 March he $asreinforced by the lst Navarrese Battalion and the lrd and 6rh Vizca! anBattalions. All these lnits except lwo Guiprizcoan battalions. whichwere sent in the wrong direclion. foughi on 10 March (Pnala, 30. 33,35). Belorethe 15lh the 6lh Guipfzcoanswere senl lo DonSebastidn;they returned ro the fight with the nying column on the morning of the16th (Pnala,35).

All sources agree lhat Don Sebastain s flying colunn consisted ofeight battalions. three squadrons and four mountain guns (Pirala, 32;Ferrer. 43i Apalalegui. 103-4). but ir appears rhat rhe Carlisr vriiersundercstimated the nunberofbattalions aheady at Hemani, believingthe total to be only six by the end of 15 March. If$e assume that there$'er€ in fact ten battalions, as has been calculaied above, and rharApalategui. 104, h in error in stating ihat the 1st Navanese *ere part ofthe flying column, a reconstructed order of battle vould give a rotalof18 banalions, or 19 iftwo from Aragon were present. Assuming thateach batralion had about 650 men and allo*ing for losses on the i0thand l5th,the total would have been perhaps about 10,000infanlry.

Gen€ral.in-chi€t El Infanre Don Sebastirn Gabriel de Borb6nChi€f of slaft: Lieutenant General Don Vicente Gonzalez Moreno

Right wingBrigadierlturiza: three Guiprizcoan battalions, including the 6thBrigadier Sopelanai $ree Alavese battalions. including the 3rd and 4thlApalategui lists only rwo Alavese batlalions, brt Don Sebastirn\d€spatch states that there were ihree. )Ce reLieutenant-General Bntno Villareal Gecond-in-command): 1st AIavaB^ttalion, Ganaderos del EiircitoBrigadier Pdrez de las Vacas (reserve): lst Navarre BaMlion, lstC^srille Ba'dalion kl batalon del Rev)Colonel Alzd (in suppon ofVillareai): three Guipftcoan baitalions

\,

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Left s'ingBrigadier Qfilez: Aragon battalion (sometimes given as AragonBrisade)Brigadier lturriaga: lstandsth (or lst and2nd) Guiprizcoan BattalionsBrigadierGoiri (in suppon): 3rd and5th Vizcayan battalions

ftree squadrons of Navarrese lance|s, seven guns in redoubts. fourmounta'n guns around Hernani

TIIE CRISTINO ARMYUnlike the Carlist army, which had been bngaded a few hours beforegoing into battle, the Cristino troops foughl larg€ly in pennanentbrigades and divisions, in which they had been organhed for months.fi€ order of battle shows the situation on lhe morninq ol 16 March1817. The rerms left. righl and cenrre have nosignrficanc;other than a\indicalions of the positions of the lroops that day. Tle army had notbeen divided into three wings, and the positions ofthe brigades hadbeen different on the 15th. They had remained where they had beenafter capturing the ridge.

As shown by the plan, the vanguard dilision wa5 fiagmented, withunits intermingled beiween brjgades ofthe British Auxiliary l-egion,and some banalions had been stationed betw€en units in rhose ofChichestefs Brigade, dividingthe la&r in two. Tle vanguard divisionhad been organised into a 1st Brigade under ColonelLlanos, ol threebatialions, and a 2nd Brigade under Colonel Munoz (two battalions)for the action of 15 March (Apalategui, pl.5).

The exact details olthe Spanish unils rernain a mystery. Evanslish aballalion of manne rnfanrD (550 men). two ofrhe 2nd Lighl Infanlry(1.200 men) and rhe r litia reg'menr\ of Segov; (280) and Olredo(250) as preienl al Oriamendi (Evans. ?8: rhe O\redo dnd SeCoviaRegiments were actually provincial and nol militia). Writjng nanyyears later, Henderson recalled thal the Ja6n, Oveido, Zaragoza andSegovia reginents were in action on the 10th;all were provincialunitsapan from Zaragoza, which was a line reginent (Henderson, 4).

The numbers ofthe battalions in the order ofbattle corresponds towithin half a battalionorsowithHumfrey'slistof Evans sfi eld force onl0 March, not including those in forts incapable ofnore aciive duties.as e;ght regiments of tbe British Auxiliary Legion, 13 Spanishbattalions (one of which was the Clapeko'ir), a baxalion of RoyalMarines, a "smallbutefficient"bodyof lancers, and 16 guns (Humfrey,31). He adds that these troops totaued 14,000 men;Evans claims (78)thnl the Royal VanneJ numbered d50. Alowing for losses up ro 15March and lhe men oflhe !ansuard divi\on who were nor in lhe line olbattle. Evans's force on the 1-6th vas Drobablv abour me same slze asDon Sebastian\; the latter claimed it;umberdd l2,0tj0 (Ferrer.301).

There wrre originall) ren red.codred regrmenl( of lhe BnrishAunlary tegion. The 2nd and 5th had b€en dissolved in iS36 and the3rd, although mentioned as late as 3 March 1837 (Nadonal ArmyMuseum MS.6807'199, generalorderof3 March 1837). appears not rohave laken pan in the campaign, and if slill in exisrence would havebeen us€d on garrison duty. The only mention ofthe 3rd in bartle is inHenderson.21, which I suspect is an error or a misprint.

Gemral-in{hief: Lieutenant-General George de Lacy EvansRignt qingBngadie' Jduregui: 5lh Division {fire Spanish baualrons. Includrngrome kom rhe 2nd Lighl Infdntry. dnd rhe line regiment Ptin(,'sa).supponed by lst l-ancen. Brilirh Au liary Legon. barralion ol RolalMarines. l2 guns (Bnrish Auiiliar) Legnn. Ro)al Anillery. RoyalMarine Adillerv)

C€ntreqrig,dier Codfrey: 6th and 7rh Regiment!. Brilish Au\ilary Legion.

Bdgadier Renddn: Vanguard Drvisron tfive dnd a haf or si\ Spa shballa[on. were on lhe field on 16 [4arch. anorher one and a iralf arPassajes and Ametzagaia. These included th€ Oviedo provincialregimenl and ar leasta bandlionearhof lhe line regimenrs ( anlla and/nfan,e. on the left and cenre ofrhe ridse)Brigadier Fitzgerald: 8th, 9th and l0th Regiments, Brirish AuxitiaryLegon

Left wingBrigidier Chichesteri lst, 4th and Rifle Regiments, British All\iliaryLeSron

l

British Auxiliary Legion rocket troop. four mountain guns

BIBLIOGRAPIIYa.ont^e accou ol hp Bntb,/4'.rrrfiy r"Bron (Scdrboroush. 1837,l lhe accounl by Volunreer ' lP.F. Apalaregui. O/idnendi (San Sebasritn. 1940).Sir George de hcy Evans. Men orunda of the contest in Spain \London,r840).Melchor Fener er al, His@tia del tradicionalismo ?sparol (29 vols.seville and Madrid,194l-60), vol. 13.EdvardFraserand L.G. Carrr.rL^ulhron,The Ro]|f'l Marine A i ert(2vols. London. 1930) vol. LC. Field. B/,rin r Sea,Soidieff, (2 vols. London,1924) vol.2.Roben H€nderson. Ii€ rrld iet of three queens: a narmtive of penonalad,eflrp (2 vol., I ondon, l8ooi, \ol. 2 lmemoi's b\ zn ofti(er ol rheLst Lzncet5. Bntrsh Auxi l ian LeeronlLH. Humfre]. A (on.tp.p' ier o1 thi canpatga ot the British I egiontfl Spain r London. lSJ8llbvdn ohice, orrhi Bn'i\h'Au liaq Legr;nl.Sni. Marshal l -Com$li l . jBr i lFh

drd In rhe f inrCarln ' wa; . , l i ryoi/odry (London), March 1976.\alional Am] [4u.eum. London. MS. 0807-l9a lBnrilh {u liar)Legron ceneraror0ersl.Antonio Pi'dla y (riado. Hirotia dc ta Brcfta civl. \ de la\ patrido,,r?ral v.r./ifla ro \ol\. Madnd. l85r:retrinred Ia84) rol d.John Pocock. Bntish interention in the Firsi Carlisr War". Soldtuff o/rftr o&?e,l (London), vol.39(i984).Charles Shaw, Penoral nen ons an.l correspondence (2,rols.lan iol.,1817) lfron a retired colonel of rhe 5rh Regimenl of rhe BririshAuxiliary Legionl.Alc\dnder Somerville. Hnror) ol rhe Bnt^h Lqron and war in Span(l ondon. I83ql lmemor's of d rrgeanl in lhe eth Regrmenr oi rheBritish Auxiliary Legionl.E.H. Spie$. R?dkal ecnprul lMancherler. I s8l I ld hte or Sir ceorge deLac) F\dns $hich make. murh u5e ol hi \ (orre\pondencel.

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