A Ruse By AnyOther NameSimon HendersonOctober 2019Version 1.2

© 2020 Simon Henderson

deceptionbydesign.com

AcknowledgementsA version of this article first appeared inVolume 1 of The Shift (2019) by Ben Earl,published by studio52magic.com.

Original cover photo by Marius Teodorescu(edited). unsplash.com/@marivsteo

Introduction“I honestly beleave it iz better tewknow nothing than two know whatain’t so.”[Original colloquial spelling]Billings (1874, p. 286)

If one reads the websites of manyprofessional magicians, one soonencounters widespread claims of expertisein “deception”. Many magicians claim thatthey are a “Deception Expert”, a“Deceptionist”, a “Master Deceptionist”(presumably, somebody who has advancedbeyond the level of mere “Deceptionist”?),a “Master of Deception”, a “DeceptionArtist”, or even a “Master of the DeceptiveArts”. They advertise shows with titles like“Deception”, “Beyond Deception”, “AnEvening of Deception”, and “The Art ofDeception”. And the association betweenmagic and deception has been furtherperpetuated by the 2018 ABC show‘Deception’, about a magician who isrecruited by the FBI to work as a consultingillusionist, helping them to solve crimes.

Why is it that so many magicians claim tohave expertise in deception as opposed to,say, magic? Are such claims valid? Havethe performers who make these claims everstudied, or even considered, deception asa topic distinct from magic? Do theyunderstand the relationship between magicand deception? And can they even definewhat deception is?

This series of articles intends to helpmagicians develop a better understandingof deception so that they can advance theirprofessional practice. The articles drawfrom the author’s career-long cross-disciplinary study of the topic and willdiscuss deception as a generalisedphenomenon that is independent of, andtranscends, domain. The series invites

readers to consider more deeply therelationship between magic and deception,the reasons why the study and practice ofmagic provide only partial insights into thebroader field of deception, and how a morecomprehensive understanding of the topicof deception can inform and advance thetheory, study and practice of magic.

This introductory article seeks to define andbound the topic of deception and exploressome of its core characteristics.

The Ubiquity ofDeception

“Deception is everywhere”.Artist Jim Sanborn, creator ofcryptographic artwork for the CIA (inZetter, 2010)

Deception exists throughout life. It occursat all levels from the microbial to thegeopolitical, and in every environment,including terrestrial, aquatic, and airbornesettings. Bacteria employ molecularmimicry to trick their hosts into letting thementer cells so that they can survive longenough to reproduce. Plants use scent andvisual mimicry to attract, predate on, andpollinate using insects, and employ a widevariety of different forms of deception, forsurvival and reproduction. Deception isused by fish, reptiles, amphibians,arthropods, birds and mammals, with manydifferent systems of deceptive signallingand behaviour that occur across a broadswathe of the electromagnetic spectrum.Children learn to lie at an early age, and theemergence of plausible lying is indicativethat they are employing higher-levelcognitive functions, including theory ofmind (the ability to conceive the world fromthe perspective of others), and theconstruction of narrative - both skills thatare fundamental to all human deception.

Deception occurs in almost every area ofhuman endeavour, including advertisingand marketing, archaeology, art,confidence tricks, fashion, forgery, fraud,gambling, health, intelligence, linguistics,military deception, music, packaging,politics, practical jokes, the psychicindustry, science, social engineering,special effects, sport (as a legitimate tactic,

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and as cheating), theatre, and many otherareas. And yes, deception also occurs inmagic. Increasingly, deception is becominghighly prevalent in cyberspace, wherehumans fool each other, humans are fooledby software, software is fooled by humans,and software is fooled by other software.

Deception is sometimes malevolent,resulting in the target (i.e. the focus orobject of the deception) suffering someform of disadvantage, such as a scam thatsteals their money. However, what isgenerally less well appreciated is thatdeception can also be benevolent, whereinthe target benefits from being deceived.Examples of benevolent, pro-socialdeception occur in art, comedy, drama,education, entertainment, fashion, beauty,make-up, gambling, magic, medicine,parenting, practical jokes, sport, storytelling& fiction, theatre, trompe l’oeil, visualeffects, white lies, etc. For example, in apharmaceutical application, a foul-tastingand inedible cough mixture might be‘repackaged’ using pleasant flavouring as a‘wrapper’, so that the medicine becomespalatable and can be ingested by a patientto treat the symptoms of their cough.Interestingly, the deceptive strategiesemployed in all such benevolentapplications are precisely the same asthose used within cases of malevolentdeception. This recurrence of strategyraises a range of important issuesconcerning the ethics of deception, thatmay form the basis of a future article.

From the partial selection of domainsidentified above, one can begin toappreciate the vast span of environmentsand forms in which deception occurs tocreate an advantage for the deceiver, andoften for the target too. Before divingdeeper into the characteristics ofdeception, however, let us first define a fewterms.

Defining DeceptionWhen seeking to understand whatdeception is, a perhaps obvious place tostart would be a dictionary. However,dictionaries turn-out to be surprisinglyweak sources for those seeking clarity on

the topic. For example, the OxfordDictionary of English defines deception as:

“[To] deliberately cause (someone)to believe something that is not true,especially for personal gain.”Oxford English Dictionary (2016)

This definition falls short in severalrespects. First, it implies that truth orfalsehood is a binary either-or state (i.e.things are true, or not true), and does notconsider the possibility of varying degreesof truth, partial truths, subjective truths,contested truths, and unknown truths (foran excellent exposition of the complexnature of truth, see MacDonald, 2018). Thesecond problem is that the definitioncannot accommodate situations in which adeceiver wishes their target not to believe atrue situation. The definition, therefore, isunable to accommodate situations in whichan entity is operating covertly, and wantsthe target to have no suspicion, let alonebelief as to their real identity or behaviour.A third, more fundamental problem withthis definition is that it is entirely feasible todeceive a target without lying and bycommunicating using nothing but the truth.This form of deceptive strategy is referredto as ‘paltering’ (Rogers et al., 2017), andcan be lingual or temporal. This importantand often overlooked fact highlights thelimited utility and value of lying and lie-detection paradigms for making sense ofthe broader field of deception.

In the context of a magic routine, forexample, the performer might have a cardselected by a spectator, memorised bythem, and then returned to the deck. Theselection is controlled to the top of thedeck, at which point the performerannounces “I swear I have no idea whatyour card is…” moments before heglimpses the selection, and then goes intoa regular overhand shuffle. “I also have noidea where your card is in the deck. I swearI’m not keeping track of it. This is a realshuffle, and I promise that I will not try tosneak a look to see what your card is.However, if you can concentrate on yourcard, I will see if I can tell you what you arethinking of.” All of these statements are100% true and constitute an example oftemporal paltering. In this case, truthfulstatements expire just after they have been

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communicated faithfully, thereby creatingan understanding in the head of the targetthat is itself based on expired (and notcurrent) truth.

Other domains in which deception occursemploy their own localised definitions, butthese are often specific to application anddo not generalise well to deception morebroadly. They also often have other inherentproblems - for example, military definitionsof deception often fail to distinguishdeception from influence, and a numberdefine deception as being prejudicial to theinterests of a target. As discussed earlier,deception can, in many applications,intentionally be advantageous to a target.

Some years ago, the author formulated aworking definition of deception that soughtto address these concerns and set thenotion of deception against a morecontemporary, pragmatic and utilitarianpsychological foundation (Henderson,2011). Over the intervening years, thedefinition has remained extant in the face ofextensive road-testing, critique andutilisation by many hundreds of deceptionpractitioners from across a wide variety ofdifferent domains. Deception is defined as:

“Deliberate measures to induceerroneous sensemaking andsubsequent behaviour within atarget audience, to achieve andexploit an advantage.”Henderson (2011)

Let us now consider the differentcomponents of this definition.

Deception is a deliberate act.

The definition begins by suggesting thatdeception is a deliberate and intentionalact, a view shared with a range of otherauthors and researchers in the field(including Buller & Burgoon, 1994;Galasinski, 2000; Caspi & Gorsky, 2006;Carrion et al., 2010). As a result, activitiesthat unintentionally or accidentally induceerroneous sensemaking are non-deceptiveacts, and should more accurately beconsidered as mistakes, misinterpretations,misunderstandings, gaffs, etc. It istherefore not possible to deceive byaccident.

Deception is induced.

Deception occurs via a process ofinduction. A deceiver deliberately engagesin a specific action or actions intended tofool the target. Deception does not, andcannot, happen by itself.

Deception works by inducingerrors in sensemaking.

A vital component of this definition relatesto the notion of ‘erroneous sensemaking’,meaning that the deceiver leads someaspect of the target’s understanding of theworld to be wrong, or in error. It is thisfocus on error that differentiates deceptionfrom other related concepts, such asinfluence, persuasion or coercion, etc. Foran explanation of how sensemakingfunctions, see Klein et al. (2006b, 2006a);and Klein et al. (2007). For an account ofhow magic manipulates sensemaking, seeHenderson (2017).

The goal of deception is behaviourchange.

Deception aims to change the futurebehaviour of the target. If there is nobehavioural change in the target resultingfrom their erroneous sensemaking, thesame outcome could and would have beenachieved by the deceiver doing nothing.

In many domains, the deceiver’s goal forthe target’s behaviour change may bestraightforward. For example, in militarydeception, the goal may be to get theenemy to move their defences to onelocation so that you can surprise them byattacking from a different direction (such asthe ‘left hook’ strategy used by Gen.Norman Schwarzkopf in Iraq during theFirst Gulf War). Similarly, in sport, thedeception goal could be to fool theopposing team into deploying theirdefenders against an empty-handed runnerwho convincingly mimes carrying the ball,whilst the real ball carrier crosses the goalline unopposed on the other side of thefield. And in a cyber phishing attack, thehacker’s goal could be to get their target toclick on a link that will result in malware(software that compromises the integrity ofa computer system) being installed on theircomputer to record and transmit their

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keystrokes as they enter their bankingcredentials.

In other domains, the deceiver’s behaviourchange goal for the target may be moresubtle. For example, it may be less obviouswhat behaviour change a magician wouldseek in their spectator. In this case, it isworth considering what the target’s (i.e. thespectator’s) immediate and longer-termbehaviour would have been had thedeception failed. The spectator at the showmay have groaned with displeasure anddisappointment at not being fooled orentertained, would not have applauded,would probably have told others how badthe show was, would suggest to others thatthey do not go to see the magician, theymay demand a refund, and they probablywould not go to future shows by the samemagician. However, by strongly fooling thespectator (i.e. inducing error in theirsensemaking, leading to surprise, and asense of awe and wonder), their behaviourwould likely be the opposite of each ofthese reactions.

Deception is directed towards adefined target audience.

A deceiver directs deception towards aspecific, identified and bounded targetaudience. The deception target may be anindividual, a group, an organisation, a moreextensive populous, and potentially evenhigher levels of human collective, such as anation state. A target may also compriseany system that exhibits some form ofbehaviour, and within which behaviourchange may be sought, including computersoftware, an algorithm, hardware controlsystems, etc.

Successful deception createsadvantage for the deceiver, andsometimes the target.Deception seeks to obtain an exploitableadvantage for the deceiver, for example:

· Military deception - in militaryoperations, the deceptive forcedefeats its enemy.

· Trompe l’oeil - the artist attractsvisitors to his show through word ofmouth and potentially induces themto buy his work.

· Magic – the magician earns moneyfrom her show, with the audiencewriting good reviews,recommending the show to others,and paying to come back to seefuture shows.

· Casino cheating – the card sharpleaves the casino with more moneythan he went in with.

· Practical jokes – the prankster gainspleasure and entertainment fromtheir prank succeeding.

· Environmental fraud - the petroleumcompany’s selective use of the onestatistical model that (seemingly)‘proves’ their low levels ofenvironmental impact, receivesbenefit from the resultantgovernmental permissions to buildfurther processing sites, ultimatelyleading to higher profit.

Deception can also result in mutual benefit,wherein both the deceiver and the targetgain benefit when the deception issuccessful. For example:

· When a magician successfully foolsher audience, the audience benefitsfrom the pleasure of being wowed,delighted and entertained, and themagician benefits by receiving theaudience’s praise, money, word ofmouth publicity, and futureattendance at their shows.

· When a chemistry teacher teachesher class a model of an atom,simplified to the point of beingfundamentally incorrect (as herstudents are not yet capable ofgrasping the more accuratequantum field theory), she benefitsin multiple ways. Her class learnsthe principles of atomic weight andthe periodic table, they pass theirexams, and they hit the school’stargets. Her pupils benefit fromlearning the basic principles of

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chemistry, leading them to obtaingood grades and better universityand employment prospects.

Is It Feasible to DeceiveOne’s Self?It seems logically coherent toconceptualise deception as a transactionalact that is committed intentionally by oneperson or organisation (i.e. the deceiver)against another (the target). However, manystudents of deception suggest thatdeception does not entail a deceiver foolinga target; instead, that the target alwaysdeceives themselves (for example, seeDemosthenes, 349BC/1852, p. 57; LaRochefoucauld, 1678/1871, p. 16;Rousseau, 1762, p. 150; von Goeth, 1908,p. 94; Hoffer, 1955, p. 260; etc.). However,the notion of a target somehow being ableto fool themselves seems intrinsicallyparadoxical. Three broad schools ofthought exist concerning this issue, theIntentionalist, Motivationist and Deflationistperspectives. Each is now summarised.

The ‘Intentionalist’ Perspective

The Intentionalist Perspective (e.g. Talbott,1995) posits that self-deception in effectoperates internally on the same basis asinter-agency deception, whereby a deceiverintentionally seeks to induce their ownerroneous beliefs. This creates a situationin which the self-deceived person holds atrue belief while at the same timeincorrectly believing the contrary. The viewpostulates a partitioned belief system, inwhich one part believes the truth, and thispart intentionally brings-about theerroneous belief in the other part. Forexample, in Aesop’s fable about The Foxand the Grapes (Baldwin, 1824, pp. 42-44)a hungry fox first sights some grapes thatappear purple, ripe and sweet; but after herealises he cannot reach them, he decidesthat they are too green to eat. He,therefore, intends to deceive himself; and isleft holding onto parallel contradictoryviews.

The ‘Motivationist’ Perspective

An alternative view, the ‘Motivationist’perspective (e.g. Nelkin, 2002) posits thatstrong desire for certain incorrect beliefsabout the world to be true can lead tothese desired beliefs overriding andeventually replacing original correct beliefsabout the world. For example, considerPerson A, whose partner, Person B, diesunexpectedly. Person A’s desire toreconnect with Person B is so strong thatthey decide to visit a psychic, despitebeing highly sceptical about their claims.As a result of the psychic stating that theyhave made contact with Person B andseeming to pass-on detailed personalinformation from them, Person A’s scepticalbeliefs are overwhelmed and replaced bythe belief that it is possible to communicatewith the dead. In this case, there is nointent for Person A to deceive themselves,as the deception occurs only as a side-effect of the desire to believe. There is alsono requirement to hold conflicting views, asone view becomes replaced by another.

The ‘Deflationist’ Perspective

A third view, the ‘Deflationist’ perspective(e.g. Scott-Kakures, 2012) suggests thatself-deception occurs as a consequence ofbiased cognitive processing that is itselfthe product of the motivational states of thesubject. For example, if I strongly wishsomething incorrect to be true, I may paymore attention to information that confirmsor supports my wish than information thatweakens or disconfirms it. At some point,in light of all the positive supportingevidence I have collected that supports mywish, I am led overwhelmingly to theconclusion that my incorrect belief must betrue. For example, if I am open-minded(and thus undecided) as to the possibilitythat the moon landings have been faked, Imay decide to research the matter formyself. Online searches take me to a sitethat provides some shocking, exciting, andpossibly plausible information that, if true,would prove that the moon landings werefalsified. As a result, I conduct furthersearches looking for additional evidencethat corroborates this information andhappen to find plenty. After some timeconducting further research, the amount ofevidence I have gathered showing that the

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moon landings are false is now sooverwhelming (and with so littlecontradictory evidence available) that Ihave no choice but to believe that theywere a hoax. In this manner, my desire forsomething to be true has biased theinformation I search for and subsequentlyfind, which in turn leads me to search formore of this same type of information.Eventually, the weight of this one-sided‘evidence’ is so overwhelming that I amcompelled to adopt a false belief.

Despite widespread and popularsuggestions that all deception is self-deception, none of these theories helpexplain the vast majority of deception thatoccurs in the natural world. Whilst thepsychological belief formulation processesmanipulated by a deceiver to fool a targetexist in the head of that target, the agencythat acts upon these processes is externalto them. An important question, therefore,is to consider who does the ‘heavy lifting’required to make deception work – thedeceiver or the target? Before unpackingthis issue, however, it is first necessary toconsider the relationship between influenceand deception, and the consequences of atarget discovering the use of deception.

The RelationshipBetween Influence andDeceptionAs deception seeks to bring about changein the target’s behaviour, all deceptioninfluences the target’s behaviour. So, isdeception merely influence, or are influenceand deception somehow different?

Influence is defined here as:

“Deliberate measures to inducedesired sensemaking andsubsequent behaviour within atarget audience, to achieve andexploit an advantage.”Henderson (2011)

Note the critical difference in this definitioncompared to that for deception – the term‘erroneous sensemaking’ has beenreplaced by the term ‘desiredsensemaking’. It is this difference that sits

at the heart of what deception is, whatdeception is not, and how deceptionrelates to other similar concepts. Whilsterror in the target’s sensemaking isfundamental to deception, error is notnecessary within a target’s sensemaking forinfluence to occur. For example, a targetmay be incentivised to change itsbehaviour through the offer of financialreward. In this case, the target is influencedto change its behaviour by (correctly)making sense of the reward offered, and noerroneous sensemaking or deception isinvolved. Deception is thus a class ofinfluence, differentiated from other types ofinfluence by its specific focus on inducingerror in the target’s sensemaking. As aresult, all deception involves influence, butnot all influence involves deception.

Next, we shall consider issues relating tothe discovery of deception.

Secrets, Revelations andSurprises

“… the most critical observer shouldnot even suspect, let alone detect,the action.”Erdnase (1902, p. 83)

Erdnase’s principle from The Expert at theCard Table applies to a wide variety ofdeceptions in which even the target’ssuspicion as to the mere possibility ofdeception could prove disastrous, in somecases even life-threatening to the deceiver.For example, consider undercover policeofficers infiltrating a violent criminal gang,Special Forces operating covertly behindenemy lines, or even a card sharp cheatingin a dubious game of poker, etc.

In some cases, the target may gain benefitfrom the revelation, or their discovery of,deception employed against them. Forexample, a visitor to an exhibition of workby French artist Bernard Pras might passthrough the door of a gallery to findthemselves facing a portrait of Malian actorSotigui Kouyate. Only when they changeposition within the gallery, and thus theirviewpoint, can they discover, appreciate,and enjoy the fact that the exhibit is ananamorphic installation that works byexploiting human perceptual processes.

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The portrait is entirely illusory. In reality, itcomprises a spatial assembly of treebranches, sticks, clothes hanging on a lineand scattered on the floor, a palm frond,broken crockery, etc., which, when viewedfrom a single forced perspective, align toform the impression of a portrait of theactor.

In other cases, the use of deception willalways necessitate a reveal, irrespective ofthe deceiver’s desire or intent for thisrevelation to occur (note that the term‘reveal’ here refers to the recognition on thepart of the target that deception has takenplace, and is not related to the notion ofexposure in magic). Whenever a magicianperforms an effect, an impossible outcomeis always revealed at the effect’sconclusion, thereby serving to let thespectator know that deception hasoccurred. In many forms of militarydeception (for example, fooling the enemyas to the timing or location of an attack)once the real attack occurs, the deceptionis inevitably revealed, and the enemy forcebecomes aware that they have beenfooled. In both of these instances, therevelation of the deception createssurprise. When the target is not aware thatdeception is present or has occurred, theydo not experience surprise. For more onthe manipulation of sensemaking toachieve and amplify surprise in magic, seeHenderson (2017).

In summary, some circumstances dictatethat a deceiver only gains an advantage ifthey remain covert, and their use ofdeception is never discovered. In othercases, a deceiver only gains benefit if thetarget becomes aware that deception hasoccurred. And in other forms of deception,there is no option but for the deceiver toeventually disclose their use of deceptionto the target. The advantages anddisadvantages of these different outcomesare context, situation, and goal dependent.

Once Deception HasBeen Discovered, Can ItBe Repeated?Revelation of the use of deception to atarget may result in a range of problems forthe deceiver. The deceiver may suffer asignificant loss of initiative and be unable tocontinue with their deception plan. A covertcapability is compromised and now has tobe burned (i.e. given up or written-off). Thedisclosure may lead to an expectation onthe part of the target about the deceiver’spotential use of deception in the future,leading the target to increase theirvigilance, monitoring and security.However, just because the target knowsthat you have used deception to fool thempreviously, this does not mean that thedeceiver cannot use deception (even thesame deception) to fool them again.

Good deception should always seek todivorce method from effect, for example bycreating false expectations in the head ofthe target, or suggesting false solutions –strategies that are also intrinsic to effectivemagic (e.g. see Tamariz, 1988; Lamont &Wiseman, 2005, pp. 75-80). This meansthat whilst the target may indeed realisethat they have been fooled, they will notnecessarily know how they were fooled.

When portraying false solutions, thedeceiver can plant false clues that will leadthe target to conclude incorrectly that theoutcome was achieved using a differentmethod (i.e. the target is driven to beabsolutely certain, but absolutely wrong).Even if the target does suspect orsomehow has deduced correctly how theywere fooled, this creates a set ofexpectations that can be exploited (forexample by changing the method throughwhich the same outcome is achieved nexttime). Also, real activity can be portrayed asdeceptive activity (to be dismissed by thetarget), exploiting and confirming thetarget’s suspicions that deception mayoccur - a strategy known as ‘reversedeception’. An example of reversedeception occurred during OperationBertram in El Alamein in 1942, whenCommonwealth forces dumped wastematerials under camouflage nets, makingthem appear to be ammunition or ration

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dumps. Axis forces noticed these, but,ignored them as no offensive actionfollowed and the ‘dumps’ did not change.This allowed the 8th Army to build upsupplies in the forward area unnoticed bythe Axis, by replacing the rubbish with realsupplies and ammunition (Barkas & Barkas,1952).

Revelation of the use of deception to thetarget does not preclude its future use.However, good deception should alwaysbuild-in the capability to deceive the sametarget again in the future.

Who Does the ‘HeavyLifting’ in Deception?

“Such things as we being bewitcheddo imagine, have no truth at alleither of action or essence, besidethe bare imagination.”Scott (1584, p. 318)

An important, yet overlooked, principle inthe design of deceptive action is that theformulation of erroneous belief occursentirely inside the head of the target (notethat this does not constitute self-deceptionas an external source, the deceiver, stillinduces the deception). Consider the‘Ghost Tap’ effect (Marshall, 1980, pp. 17-18) in which a performer seemingly provesthe presence of a spirit to a spectator, whofeels a tap on the back of their head whilstwhist the magician’s hands appear to beoccupied, the index fingers of each of themagician’s hands resting on the spectator’sclosed eyelids. The effect is achieved bythe magician swapping his two indexfingers for the index and middle finger ofone hand as soon as the spectator closestheir eyes, thereby leaving one had free toexecute the taps. The position of the handsand fingers are reversed just before thespectator opens their eyes again.

Despite the incredibly simple mechanicsupon which this effect relies, it can,(especially when amplified by setting anappropriate scene, and the use of engagingnarrative) provoke an incredibly strongreaction from the spectator, includingshrieks, leaping into the air, stunnedsilence, profound confusion, or somecombination of these. Immediately after the

effect, it is also usual for the spectator tolook behind them, to see who it was thattapped them on the head (the effect worksbest if done in a one-to-one setting, withno other people around). The experiencethat the magician has, and the experiencethat the spectator has are very different. Tothe spectator, at the time of being tappedon the head, it genuinely feels as if a thirdentity is in the room with them. However,for the magician, in practical terms, theydeliver some patter, swap fingers, and tapthe spectator on the head with their freehand.

The effect demonstrates how a target’smind can take just a couple of fragments ofinformation and mentally use these tofabricate a rich, vivid, and visceral (yetentirely erroneous) internal mentalexperience, that feels vastly different fromthe simple, subtle, means used to induce it.This asymmetry between the simplicity ofthe method and the magnitude of its effectoccurs in many cases of deception. It helpsexplain why simple actions can create suchpowerful, deceptive effects, such as balsawood and canvas being used to simulatean entire army convincingly in the middle ofthe Egyptian desert (Barkas & Barkas,1952), security penetration testers gainingaccess to secure government buildingsusing nothing more than a pizza deliverybag (Dupuy, 2014), and people successfullyusing fruit to hold-up and rob banks(Hartley-Parkinson, 2019; Times of Israel,2019).

“Too great cleverness is butdeceptive delicacy, true delicacy isbut the most substantialcleverness.”La Rochefoucauld (1678/1871, p. 17)

It is the target that does all the ‘heavylifting’ involved in being deceived. It is theythat put the pieces together, they assemblethe narrative, they fill-in the gaps, theymake the wrong assumptions, they projecttheir thoughts incorrectly into the future,and they make erroneous sense of what ishappening. In doing so, it is the target whobuilds an erroneous world, an erroneousbelief, erroneous assumptions, anderroneous expectations in their head.

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The target’s subjective experience of realityand their resultant beliefs about the worldmay be very different from their objectivereality and the real state of the world. Thisis important when it comes to designingdeceptive action. For example, imagine aclient tasks you to make their target’shouse vanish into thin air. The target arriveshome from work, and as they are walkingup to the front door, their house evaporatesin front of their eyes, leaving no trace.There are many potential ways to achievethis – bulldozers, wrecking balls andexplosives may come to mind. Whenviewed through the lens of deception,however, it becomes clear that you do not,in reality, have to make the house vanish.Indeed, it is readily apparent that it isimpossible to make a house vanish intothin air! Deception creates an opportunityto use significantly more elegant andefficient means to achieve the desiredoutcome – by shaping the target’s beliefsabout events, as opposed to trying tocreate the events for real. Indeed, it may beimpossible, or too risky, or too expensive tocreate such events. However, inducingerroneous beliefs about those eventshaving occurred may indeed be feasible, below risk, and be significantly cheaper thanproducing the events for real. Instead ofthinking about bulldozers, wrecking ballsand explosives, we instead begin toconsider lighting, projection, black art,sound effects, misdirection, inflatables, set-design, rumours, witnesses, news reports,misdirecting a target towards a simulacrumof their house, etc. The two approaches tothe problem are very different.

When seeking to do something thatinvolves affecting a target’s experience ofreality, it is not necessary to create thatexperience for real; only to allow the targetto believe that they have had thatexperience for real.

These are just some of the corecomponents of deception, but of course,there are many others. Other elements,dimensions and principles of deception willform the basis of future articles.

SummaryDictionary definitions of deception areinadequate. Accordingly, deception isdefined here as: “Deliberate measures toinduce erroneous sensemaking andsubsequent behaviour within a targetaudience, to achieve and exploit anadvantage.” Deception is an intentionaltransaction that occurs between deceiverand target. It is possible to deceive withoutlying, and also to deceive using nothingmore than the truth. Deception is a form ofinfluence, and therefore, all deceptioninvolves influencing, but not all influenceinvolves deceiving.

Deception seeks to change futurebehavioural outcomes to the benefit of thedeceiver, and often the target too. If thetarget’s behaviour does not change as aresult of their erroneous sensemaking, thesame outcome could and would have beenachieved by the deceiver doing nothing.Revelation of the use of deception to thetarget does not preclude its future use;however, good deception will always build-in the capability to deceive the same targetagain in the future. And it is usuallyfeasible, cheaper and less risky to create abelief in having experienced impossibleevents in the head of a target than toattempt to construct and administer suchevents for real. This simplicity of method isa crucial point for all deception planners tobear in mind, irrespective of their domain ofprofessional practice.

Deception occurs everywhere that lifeexists, at all levels from the microbial togeopolitical. But does anything linktogether these different forms ofdeception? What are the common threads,and where are there differences? In laterarticles, I shall seek to un-weave anddisentangle some of the threads thatconstitute this seemingly complex tangledweb. I will discuss how deceptive principlesfrom magic have been exploited in otherdomains and will explain why a cross-disciplinary study of deception isfundamental to enhancing deceptivepractice in any area of application,including magic.

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In the next article, I shall address in moredetail the relationship between magic anddeception and will highlight fundamentalissues in deceptive practice where thetheory and practice of magic have little tocontribute. By highlighting such limitationswith the generalisability of magic,magicians should start to see how theirpractice sits in relation to the broader fieldof deception, and what they can learn fromother domains where it occurs.

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