A Reply to Craig's Metaethical Argument II (v. 7.4)

8/22/2019 A Reply to Craig's Metaethical Argument II (v. 7.4)

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A Reply to William Lane Craigs Metaethical Argument (aka Craigs Moral

Argument).

1. ntro!uction.

". #$%ecti&ity.

".1. #$%ecti&e statement s or%u!gments' an! o$%ecti&e matters .

".". #$%ecti&e moral &alues an! !uties.

".. # $%ecti&ity an! min!!epen! ence. #$%ecti&e pain an! o$%ecti&e *ear.

".+. #$%ecti&ity an! necessity.

. A tra!itional &ie, on moral &alues an! moral !uties-

+. aturalism' moral &alues an! !uties ' pai n an! *ear .

/. Morality an! !eterminism.0. Color' eo$iology an! genetic engineering.

2. 3eauty' eo$iolog y' an! ean!erthals .

4. Craig on $eauty an! e&olutio n. More etraterrestrials' an! more ean!erthals .

5. Morality' e&olution' an! e&olutionary counter*actuals.

1 6 . Morality an! eo$iology .

11. Morality an! eo$iology . 7ome o$%ections.

1 " . Morality an! eo$iology . Moral 8,in 9arth.

1. #ntological *oun!ation or groun!ing .

1 .1.Craig:s *oun!ational con!itions.

1 .". Craig:s theistic *oun!ational accoun t' an! Craig:s *irst premise .

1.".1. ;uplicate min!s.

1.".". n*ormati&e i!enti*icatio n accounts an! conceptual pro$lems.

1."." .1.


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1.2 . < reen stu** an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions.

1.4 . # $%ecti&e kin!ness an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions.

1.5 . #$%ecti&e cruelty an! Craigs *oun!ational con!itions.

1.16. #$%ecti&e greatness.

1.1 1 . ?alue! properties-1.1 " . ormati&ity.

1 .1 ontheism ' ontological *oun!ation s ' an! $ur!en.

1+. 9 &olution an! sel* sacri*ice' an! generally human $eha&ior.

1/. Moral o$ligations ' legal o$ligations an! comman!s.

10. @ru!ential reasons &s. moral reasons-

12. Accounta$ility.

14. Conclusio ns .

1. ntro!uction.

In this article, I will raise a number of objections to his Craigs metaethical argument (aka Moral

Argument), arguing that hes failed to establish or ro!ide good reasons to think that the first remise

is true"

#he formal argument is$

%&$ If 'od does not eist, then objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not eit"

%$ *bjecti!e moral !alues and duties do eist"

C$ 'od eists"

Additionall+, I will briefl+ address other arguments he makes usuall+ in the same contet as the

metaethical argument, like an argument from moral accountabilit+"

efore I go on, Id like to oint out that I do not claim originalit+" In fact, I took most of the ideas in

this article from a number of different, often multile, sources" -./

". #$%ecti&ity.

In his defense of a metaethical argument, Craig sa+s that a something is objecti!e if it does not deend

on an+ones oinions, and its subjecti!e if it does" -r&/

0o, that raises some 1uestions, like$

a. 2hat kind of 3something counts4

Are we talking about objecti!e judgments, or statements4 5acts4 0omething else4


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Craig doesnt sa+, but in his defense of the metaethical argument, Craig talks about objecti!e

!alues and duties, as well as objecti!e truth -r&/, and imlicitl+ about objecti!e statements and6or

roositions when he talks about what holds true-r/indeendentl+ of what eole belie!e"

In a different article 7 not defending the metaethical argument but clearl+ referring to it 8, Craig

also talks about objecti!e facts" -r 9 / -& /$.2hat kind of :deendence: is rele!ant4

In the rest of this section, I will anal+;e the matter of objecti!it+ in the contet of Craig:s metaethical

argument"

". #$%ecti&e statements or %u!gments' an! o$%ecti&e matters.

awkins belie!es that ?ahweh eists"

@sing the word 3objecti!e and other words in those statements in an ordinar+ sense, its clear to me

that there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether 0& is true, there is an objecti!e fact of the

matter as to whether 0 is true, and there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether 09 is true"

#he+re all false"

In that ordinar+ sense of 3objecti!e, I would also sa+ that whether combustible materials contain

hlogiston is an objecti!e matter, so is the matter(s) of whether 0anta Claus eists and flies in a sleigh,

and so is the matter of whether =ichard >awkins belie!es that ?ahweh eists"

As for Craigs use of 3objecti!e, whether all combustible materials contain hlogiston, whether 0anta

Claus eists, etc", are matters that do not deend on an+ones oinion, so those matters and the

corresonding statements seems to meet Craigs re1uirement for objecti!it+ as well"

2hat about 094

Is 09 objecti!e, in the sense of the term 3objecti!e used in Craigs metaethical argument4

In a sense, whether 09 is true deends on one of >awkins beliefs 7 namel+, whether he belie!es that

?ahweh eists"

owe!er, that is not the rele!ant kind of deendence when it comes to ascertaining whether a

statement, a matter, etc", is objecti!e, in the sense in which Craig uses the word 3objecti!e in the

contet of the metaethical argument"

If that were the rele!ant kind of deendence, its clear that moral judgments would often not be

objecti!e in the sense of 3objecti!e used in Craigs metaethical argument, since 7 for instance 7 we

can set u scenarios in which, sa+, whether ob has a moral obligation to refrain from utting some of


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the white substance in the sugar bowl that is on the table 7and which is in fact sugar 7 in his fathers

coffee does deend on facts such as whether, sa+, ob believesthat the substance in 1uestion ispoison"

ut there is no reason to think that Craig meant to count that kind of deendence against objecti!it+,

and there seems to be no other sense in which 09 would deend on an+ones beliefs"

0o, it seems that in the cases of 0&, 0 and 09, objecti!it+ in the ordinar+ sense of the term outlinedabo!e and objecti!it+ in the sense of the term used b+ Craig in his metaethical argument go together"

0till, one ma+ ask whether Craig 7 at least, when it comes to the objecti!it+ of statements 7 is actuall+

using the word 3objecti!e in the same sense as the ordinar+ sense outlined abo!e, or 0&, 0 and 09 are

just cases in which the referent of the term 3objecti!e in the ordinar+ sense outlined abo!e and the

referent of the term 3objecti!e in the sense of the term used b+ Craig in his metaethical argument,

haen to o!erla"

A number of his statements strongl+ suort the h+othesis that the meaning is the same or

aroimatel+ close to that, at least when it comes to the objecti!it+ of statements, matters, etc", desite

some obscurit+ in Craigs formulation, since 7 for instance$

a.In his defense of the metaethical argument-r&/, Craig makes a classification of matters between

objecti!e ones and matters of ersonal taste or oinion" *bjecti!e matters would be those that do

not deendent on eoles oinion, whereas those that do deend on that would be subjecti!e,

and those would be matters of taste, or oinion"

$.Craig also uses such eamles of non8objecti!it+ (i"e", matters of taste or oinion) in the

contet of his argument against ga+ relations-r 9 /, where he also makes some of the main

metaethical claims he makes in the contet of his metaethical argument"

In that contet, hes using the term 3objecti!e in the usual sense 7 he does not tr+ to define it in

that contet, but rather aeals to the intuiti!e gras of the term"

In that contet, he also ooses matters of fact to matters of taste, or matters of oinion"

#hose considerations also allow us to infer how Craig classification works for matters" In that case,

there would be two categories$

1. Matters of fact, or objecti!e matters"

".Matters of oinion, matters of taste, or subjecti!e matters"

#here might be debatable subtleties about, sa+, whether there are some differences between the

meanings of 3its a subjecti!e matter, 3its a matter of taste, 3its a matter of oinion, 3there is no

objecti!e fact of the matter, 3there is a fact of the matter, etc", but for now, we ma+ establish the

following e1ui!alences, which seem to be in line with common usage of the terms, and also seem to

match Craigs usage$


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91 A matter M is objecti!e if and onl+ if M is a matter of fact if and onl+ if M is not a matter of

oinion"

9" A statement or judgment 0 is objecti!e if and onl+ if there is a fact of the matter as to

whether 0 is true if and onl+ if there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether 0 is true"

%erhas, someone might disagree with the e1ui!alence between 3there is a fact of the matter as towhether 0 is true and 3there is an objectivefact of the matter as to whether 0 is true" I will address the

issue in this contet later"

".". #$%ecti&e moral &alues an! !uties.

2hile the meaning of 3objecti!e in the case of statements, judgments, matters, etc", aears clear

enough, the terms 3objecti!e !alues and 3objecti!e duties in Craigs metaethical argument are more

obscure"

2hen addressing the matter, Craig makes a distinction between what he calls 3moral !alues and 3moral

duties, and associates the first with good and bad, and the second with right and wrong" -r&/

I artiall+ agree with Craigs distinction, though not comletel+" #he degree of agreement is not

entirel+ clear" 5or eamle$

1.I do not see an+ difference between sa+ing 3ob beha!ed immorall+ and 3ob beha!e in a

morall+ bad wa+" More generall+, I do not see an+ differences in the meaning of 3morall+ bad

when alied to actions, and 3morall+ wrong"

*n the other hand, 3morall+ bad is also redicated of agents, and as such its a character trait,

whereas 3morall+ wrong is redicated of actions onl+"

Craigs elanation of the distinction he makes is not sufficientl+ detailed for me to tell whether

he would disagree with an+ of m+ assessments in oint &"

".*ne ma+ talk about doing something that is 3a necessar+ e!il, and in that case, a erson ma+

be bringing about something bad 7 or e!il 8, but in order to re!ent something worse 7 for

instance 8, and withoutbeha!ing in a morall+ bad6morall+ e!il wa+"

Craigs elanation of the distinction he makes is not sufficientl+ detailed for me to tell whether

he would disagree with an+ of m+ assessments in oint "

.Also, in that contet, I do not think that 3a necessar+ e!il, or 3something bad, means morally

e!il, or morallybad" And it seems robable to me, gi!en his words, that Craig would disagree

with m+ assessment on that matter"

+.I would make a distinction between bad things, situations, e!en beha!iors, agents, etc", and

morallybad beha!ior, agents, etc" 5or instance, a child d+ing of cancer is a bad situation, but I

dont know there is an+thing morallybad about it, as long as no moral agents are in!ol!ed in


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causing it" Also, the beha!ior of some agent ma+ be a bad thing without being morall+ wrong, or

morall+ bad" 5or instance, a crocodile drowning a child in order to eat him is a bad thing" ut the

crocodiles beha!ior is not morallybad, as far as I can tell" Its not morall+ an+thing"

Craig:s elanation of the distinction he makes is not sufficientl+ detailed for me to tell whether

he would disagree with an+ of m+ assessments in oint B"/. As for goodness, I would agree of course that there is a difference between morall+ good

actions and morall+ obligator+ actions" 5or instance, some actions in!ol!ing self8sacrifice are

lausibl+ morall+ good but not obligator+, but suererogator+" It seems clear that Craig accets

that distinction too"

0till, here we ma+ stick to Craigs distinction for the sake of the argument, since whether hes right

about that articular oint makes no rele!ant difference in the contet of the objections to his

metaethical argument Im going to raise"

owe!er, in an+ case, his elanation of the distinction between good6bad and right6wrong does not

elucidate what Craig means when he claims that objecti!e moral !alues and duties do exist, though he

ro!ides some information that we ma+ use to anal+;e his claim" *n that note, we can tell the

following$

1" In asserting the second remise, Craig is sa+ing that there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as

to whether, sa+, the olocaust was immoral" And the same goes for other moral matters"

"" Its clear also that the second remise does not onl+ entail that there is an objecti!e fact of the

matter as to whether, sa+, the olocaust was immoral 7 and the same for other matters about right

or wrong or -morall+/ good or bad, etc"8, but also at least that some judgments like 3A has a

moral obligation to , 3? is morall+ good, etc", are true", for some actualbeha!ior or agent ?,

and some actual agent A"

2e can tell that " is true for the following reasons$

".a.If the second remise onl+ entailed that there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to

whether beha!iors are right or wrong, etc", then that would be comatible with a moral

error theor+" As a arallel, the statement 3All combustible materials contains hlogiston is

objecti!e, but false"

". $.#he reason for the actualit+ re1uirement is that without it, then also a moral error

theor+ would seem to be comatible with the second remise" 5or instance, let:s sa+ theor+

#& holds that$"

".$.1. #here is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether the olocaust and other

beha!iors are morall+ wrong, whether some agent has a moral obligation, etc"


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owe!er, no actual agent has an+ moral obligations, or is morall+ good or morall+

bad, etc"

".$.".0tatements like 3All immoral beha!iors are immoral, 3If a erson has a moral

obligation not to lie, then that erson has a moral obligation not to lie, 3All moral

obligations are moral obligations, 3All entities who ha!e at least one moralobligation ha!e at least one moral obligation, etc", are all true, and furthermore

necessaril+ true"

".$.. It:s metah+sicall+ ossible that there is some agent that has a moral obligation,

but actuall+, no agent has an+ moral obligations, and gi!en the wa+ the world actuall+

haens to be, there will ne!er be an+ agent who will ha!e an+ moral obligations

and6or will be morall+ good or bad, etc"

0o, #& is a moral error theor+" ut it seems clear that Craig intended to rule out all such

theories in his second remise, and thats also clear gi!en the arguments he gi!es in suort

of it"

0o, based on the abo!e, we can tell that the second remise of Craigs metaethical argument at least

imlies the two following two conditions$

#M?;1 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3D is immoral,

3? is morall+ good, 3A has a moral obligation to , etc", are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of

the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone claims that ga+ se is immoral

among humans 7 as Craig does -r9/8, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether

that claim is true, and so on"

#M?;" 0ome statements of the form 3A has a moral obligation to are true, and some

statements of the form 3? is morall+ good are true, and so on, where ? is an actual beha!ior of a

erson, or a erson, A is an actual agent, etc"

#he two issues are !er+ different ones, as the hlogiston and 0anta Claus eamles 7 for instance 7

illustrate"

5or eamle, 0& and 0 are objecti!e statements, but all statements of the form 3D contains hlogiston

are false" 0imilarl+, someone might maintain that *ME>& is true, but *ME> is false 7 and so, that a

moral error theor+ obtains, etc"

Also, for instance, to sa+ that no statement of the form 3D contains hlogiston is true for an+ actual D

is !er+ different from sa+ing that, at least for some D, whether D contains hlogiston is a matter of

taste, or a matter of oinion, or that there is no objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether D contains

hlogiston, etc"


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I will address that distinction in the contet of Craigs claims in greater detaillater"

5or the moment, gi!en the anal+sis so far, and desite some obscurit+ in his argument, we can tell that

at least % entails *ME>& and *ME>"

0till, some 1uestions remain, like$

a. >oes % meanthe same as the conjunction of *ME>& and *ME>4$.If not, are % and the conjunction in 1uestion at least necessaril+ e1ui!alent conditions4

'i!en how Craig argues, it seems to me that a" is lausibl+ true 7 and hence, so is b"

owe!er, in an+ case, Craigs arguments in suort of % are essentiall+ an aeal to human intuitions

in suort of *ME>& and *ME>and nothingbe+ond that, so if % imlied something not implied

b+the conjunction of *ME>& and *ME>, Craig would ha!e failed to suort the remise, and so

his theistic case would fail on account of that, indeendentl+ of other considerations"

Moreo!er, there seems to be no good reason to grant an+thing be+ond those conditions"

'i!en that, and since % entails the conjunction *ME>& and *ME>, we ma+ consider the conditions

necessaril+ e1ui!alent" In other words, we ma+ assume in this contet that b" is true 7 which seems to

be the case, an+wa+, gi!en man+ of Craigs words"

@nder that understanding, lets accet Craigs second remise"

".. #$%ecti&ity an! min!!epen!ence. #$%ecti&e pain an! o$%ecti&e *ear.

As a arallel to the claim that objecti!e moral !alues and duties do eist, lets consider the claim that

objecti!e ain does eist" As in the case of *ME>& and *ME>, the claim that objecti!e ain eists

means the same as or is at least e1ui!alent to the conjunction of the following two conditions$

#@1 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3D is in ain are

objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone

claims that ob is in ain 7 ob is a secific agent 8, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter

as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use Craigs own distinction, whether ob is in ain

is not a matter of oinion, but a matter of fact"

#@" 0ome statements of the form 3A is in ain are true, where A is an actual agent"

Fow, the claim that objecti!e ain eists, so understood, is true"

5or eamle, just as the matter of whether there is a cat on a secific mat o!er there is a matter of fact,

not a matter of oinion, so is whether the cat that is on the mat 7 lets sa+ there is one, named :ob: 7 is

in ain"

Also, there are some actual agents that are in ain"


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0imilarl+, we ma+ consider objecti!e fear, and it:s clear that objecti!e fear does eist" 5or eamle, if

Alice is a secific erson, whether Alice afraid of the actual cat that is on the mat, or whether she fears

tarantulas, are matters of fact, not matters of oinion"

Moreo!er, it:s clear that some actual agents do fear some things"

0o, objecti!e fear does eist"Fow, there is a sense of :mind8deendent: in which fear, ain, etc", are mind8deendentstates.

owe!er, the meaning of 3objecti!e (and 3subjecti!e) used b+ Craig in the contet of his metaethical

argument is notrelated to that matter"

#hat said, there are two oints that I would like to address here$

1.It might be argued that its not ossible for ob to eerience ain without belie!ing that he is

eeriencing ain" >oes that mean that whether ob is in ain deends on ob:s beliefs, and so

it:s not an objecti!e matter4


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0o, in short, it seems that objecti!it+ in the contet of Craig:s metaethical argument is not about mind8

indeendence and mind8deendence 7 at least not unless there is a sense of the mind8

indeendence6mind8deendence classification that matches the matter of fact6matter of oinion

classification"

".+. #$%ecti&ity an! necessity.2hile this section is not re1uired in the contet of Craigs metaethical argument,7 this section can be

seen as a long side note 8, I think the matter of necessit+ might be imortant in the contet of some

ontological metaethical arguments for theism, if some oints are raised, so I will address it"

2hile objecti!e fear and objecti!e ain do eist, its clear that there are ossible scenarios in which

the+ do not" It:s true thatpossibly, no agent experiences pain or fear.

Fow, let 2& be a scenario in which there is ne!er an+ entit+ that eeriences an+ ain"- B /

If 2& were actual, then objecti!e ain would not eist" owe!er, there would still be a fact of the

matter as to whether a secific entit+ G that eists in 2& is in ain" Moreo!er, the matter of whether an

entit+ in 2& is in ain would not be a matter of oinion" =ather, the fact of the matter would be that no

entit+ in 2& is in ain"

Fow, lets consider objecti!e moral !alues and duties"

It seems that on Craigs ontolog+, the claim that objecti!e moral !alues do eist would be necessaril+

true 7 since Craigs ontolog+ osits that 'od is necessar+ 8, but the claim that objecti!e moral duties do

eist would be contingentl+ true, since lausibl+ 'od could refrain from creating an+ entities to whom

he would issue an+ commands, so *ME>would not be true with regard to moral obligations, and

since the second remise affirms that both objecti!e moral !alues and objective moral duties eist, it

seems that the second remise is, on Craig:s ontolog+, contingentl+ true"

0ince I see no good reason to belie!e that a necessar+ agent eists, or that necessaril+, there are agents,

or that necessaril+ there are entities that are morall+ good, or morall+ bad, or ha!e moral obligations,

etc", I would reject both a claim that objecti!e moral !alues necessaril+ eist, and a claim that objecti!e

moral duties necessaril+ eist"

*f course, to be clear, if 2- B / is a scenario in which objecti!e moral !alues and6or duties do not eist,

it does notfollow from that that whether some agent (sa+, a shark) that eists in 2 has a moral

obligation, or is morall+ good, etc", are matters of oinion, or that statements like 3Its immoral for an+

adult human to torture infants for fun, or 3If an adult man were to torture infants for fun, he would be

acting immorall+, would not be true in 2"

ut the contingenc+ of the claims that objecti!e moral !alues and6or duties eist is not roblematic"


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0o, in short, uon reflection, I see no roblem in granting the second remise from a non8theistic

ersecti!e, but I would refrain from granting that its necessaril+ true 7 in an+ case, Craigs own

osition seems committed to the contingenc+ of the second remise, for the reasons gi!en abo!e"

. 8he *irst premise.

#he first remise of Craigs metaethical argument is that if 'od does not eist, then objecti!e moral!alues and duties do not eist"

5or now, I will not address the issue of what Craig means b+ 'od, and focus on the conse1uent"

0o, in order to defend the first remise, Craig more or less elicitl+ assumes a scenario in which 'od

does not eist, and makes some arguments- H / in suort of the claim that in such a scenario- /,

objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not eist" - J /

owe!er, there some !er+ different wa+s in which someone might argue that, in a certain scenario,

objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not eist" 5or instance, someone might otentiall+, and under the

assumption that God does not exist$

a.Argue for the conclusion that *ME>&is false" - K /

$.Argue for the conclusion that*ME>is false"

c.0omehow argue for the conclusion that the conjunction of *ME>& and *ME>is false,

without making a secific argument for the falsit+ of one of them in articular"

5or instance, if *ME>& is false, then there is no objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether, sa+, the

olocaust was morall+ wrong 7 or erhas there is in that case, but not in man+ othersL I will lea!e

those issues aside to simlif+"

*n the other hand, if *ME> is false, it seems that there is an objecti!e fact of the matter 7 namel+,

its not the case that the olocaust was morall+ wrong"

0o, one ma+ wonder what Craig is arguing for"

In his defense of the metaethical argument-r&/, he first asks 7 rhetoricall+ 7 whether without 'od,

moral issues are akin to matters of taste, like whether chocolate tastes better than !anilla" #hat suggests

that hes tr+ing to sa+ that without 'od *ME>&would be false, and there would be no objecti!e fact

of the matter as to, sa+, whether the olocaust was immoral 7 or other moral judgments 8, and also that

it would be a matter of taste, etc"

*n the other hand, in the same contet, Craig claims that without 'od, the terms 3good and 3e!il

would ha!e no reference oint" ut that actuall+ suggest an error theor+, at least for 3good and 3e!il,

since taste judgments lausibl+ do ha!e referent oints e!en if seaker8deendent, and its imrobable

that he would argue that without 'od, an error theor+ holds for good and e!il, but instead right and

wrong are matters of taste"


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0o, what is Craig arguing for4

In another ost -r 9 /, Craig sa+s that without 'od, those who claim that right and wrong, and good and

e!il, are matters of taste, would be absolutel+ correct, that the matter becomes one that deends on

culture, and so on" #hat clearl+ indicates that hes claiming that without 'od, *ME>& is false"

?et, in the same document, he claims that without 'od, e!er+thing is ermitted" ut that seems to be aclaim that 3eha!ior is ermissible is true for all , which would also iml+ that 3A has a moral

obligation to D isfalse, for all A, D, and so on, rather than 3its ermissible to me, but not to +ou, etc"

0o, Craig aears to be juming between claiming that without 'od, a moral error theor+ obtains, and

that without 'od, some sort of seaker8relati!ism or subjecti!ism- / is true"

is arguments do not seem to be of much hel figuring out what hes tr+ing to establish, either" e

goes on to make a number of claims, but were not closer to establishing what it is that hes tr+ing to

show would haen without 'od"

0till, lets take a look at what a theist would robabl+ need to establish if he claimed without 'od,

*ME>&is false, and what he would need to establish if he claimed that without 'od, *ME>is

false"

2ith regard to *ME>&, it seems that at the !er+ least, in order to establish that without 'od, *ME>&

is false, a theist would ha!e to show that without 'od, at least one of the following conditions obtains$

i.>ifferent cometent seakers of moral language mean different things when the+ make moral

statements, e!en if the+re using all terms correctl+"

ii.Moral statements are statements aboutthe seaker (e"g", like 3D is immoral means 3I do not

like D)"

iii.#he standards each human being is using when assessing moral wrongness, goodness, etc",

!ar+ from erson to erson- & . / in ideal conditions"-& & /

#hose conditions o!erla to some etent, but thats not a roblem"

0o, regarding condition iii, that is notthe same as establishing that there is moral disagreement 7 which

is clear 8, or that different eole sometimes ha!e differenttheories about what the roer standards are

7 which is clear as well"

=ather, a theist would ha!e to establish that, when different -actual or otential/ human beings use their

own sense of right and wrong without making an+ errors, the+ come u to different moral assessments

sometimes 7 or ma+be a sufficient number of times, but lets lea!e that aside to simlif+" - & . /

5or instance, as an analog+ to this, it ma+ be that ob uses his gustator+ taste and sa+s that the

chocolate cake tastes better the ale ie, whereas Alice uses hers and sa+s the ale ie tastes better,


13/94

and neither of them is making an error in the use of their sense of gustator+ taste, which are the

standards the+ use for assessing tastiness" 0o, under ideal conditions, the difference ersists"

In order to establish that without 'od, *ME>&is false, it seems to me a theist !er+ robabl+ would

ha!e to establish that without 'od, the facult+ or faculties cometent seakers of moral language use to

make judgments of right and wrong or good and e!il- & /, are such that the+ di!erge in a sense similarto what the gustator+ taste eamle shows, or erhasthat i.or ii.obtain, for the following reason$

If the human sense of right and wrong and6or good and e!il con!erge under ideal conditions - /, !er+

robabl+ there would be an objecti!e fact of the matter in the sense of 3objecti!e rele!ant in this

contet, at least if eole mean the same b+ the terms"

5or instance, if there is con!ergence under ideal conditions, and Alice sa+s that the olocaust was

immoral, whereas ob sa+s that the olocaust was not immoral, it seems at least one of them is making

7 deliberatel+ or not 7 a false claim, since in ideal conditions, the+ would both con!erge to one

assessment 7 in this case, that it was immoral" It seems, in articular, that whether the olocaust was

immoral lausibl+ would not be a matter of oinion, or of taste" #he same would al+ to other moral

judgments"

%erhas, a theist might sa+ the+ do not need iii", because the 3human beings condition is allegedl+ too

restricti!e, and that there would be no objecti!e moral !alues and duties if there are some other, non8

human agents (sa+, aliens from another lanet), with something akin to a sense of right and wrong or

good and e!il, but associated with different beha!iors, states, etc", from the ones the human sense or

senses are associated with"

owe!er, that would ha!e to be argued for, and that would seem to re1uire arguing some moral

semantics, since the theist in 1uestion would ha!e to show 7 for instance 7 that the aliens utterances

count as moral claims 7 rather than onl+ something akin to them 7 and that are rele!ant to assessing

whether there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether some beha!ior is immoral, e!en though in

other cases 7 e"g", color 7 whate!er the aliens do or sa+ does not count when it comes to objecti!it+"

I will take a look at alien eamles in greater detail later, since Craig uses them, e!en though he does

not elain what hes tr+ing to establish with that eamle 7 i"e", is he tr+ing to establish *ME>&, or

*ME>4 And how4

5or now, I will oint out that Craig claims hes not doing moral semantics, but moral ontolog+ -rB/-rH/,

+et establishing i.' ii.' iii", or e!en the alien !ariant, would seem to re1uire arguing about the meaning of

moral terms 7 i"e", it would recisel+ re1uire arguing moral semantics"


14/94

In order to establish that, he would ha!e to show that without 'od, all statements like 3D is immoral,

or all statements like 3D is morall+ good, etc", are untrue"

ow might he argue in suort of one of those conclusions4

*ne wa+ would be for him to consider man+ h+othetical scenarios without 'od, and argue that in all

of them the claim 3D is immoral would be untrue" Clearl+, that is a very heavyburden"Indeed, if we use our sense of right and wrong intuiti!el+, it seems clear that an adult human torturing

children for fun is beha!ing immorall+, e!en if we stiulate in the scenario that 'od does not eist" In

fact, whether 'od eists is intuiti!el+ orthogonal" 'ranted, a theist might sa+ that the+ ha!e different

intuitions" ut wh+ should we ut aside our intuitions and accet his4

An alternati!e aroach would be for the theist to, sa+, tr+ to show that the meaning of the term

3immoral is such that the claim 3D is immoral, where D is an actual beha!ior, entails the eistence of

certain entit+ that would not eist without 'od" A simle eamle would be if, sa+, 3D is immoral

meant 3'od forbids D, but thats not the case, so the theist would ha!e to defend another h+othesis, if

he were to take this route"

In an+ case, it seems that the theist would ha!e to do some moral semantics if he tried that course of

action" Also, of course, in order to establish such claims about the meaning of 3immoral, the theist

would still need to aeal to his intuiti!e gras of the terms, and so to his sense of right and wrong" ut

wh+ should we follow his sense of right and wrong, instead of ours4

In the secific case of Craig, he sa+s that in his metaethical argument, hes not doing moral semantics,

but moral ontolog+ -rB/-rH/"

Is there another route4

In an+ case, its hard to see also how a theist might go about establishing results about moral ontolog+

without doing at least some moral semantics"

#hat said, I will consider Craigs secific claims and arguments in suort of %&, granting that

objecti!e moral !alues and duties do eist, under the understanding elained abo!e"

. A tra!itional &ie, on moral &alues an! moral !uties-

According to Craig-r/, moral !alues were traditionall+ considered anchored on 'od, and moral

duties were considered to come from 'ods commandments" In that contet, 'od is understood to be

the 30ureme 'ood" Also, Craig maintains that by definition, 'od is the greatest concei!able being

('C)"-rH/ -rHb/

Fow, while 3moral duties is a term in Gnglish, the concet of moral duties eists in other languages as

well" As for 3moral !alues, the eression is somewhat obscure, but in an+ case, the concets of


15/94

morall+ good and morall+ bad eist in other languages as well, and so does the concets of justice 7

which Craig refers to as a moral !alue"

0o, once we take that into consideration, its clear that Craigs claim is not true as a general claim about

humans, or human ci!ili;ation, etc", but is limited to some cultures"

5or instance, in China, eole do not traditionall+ belie!e that their obligations ha!e to do with thecommands of 'od" In fact, the+ traditionall+ do not belie!e in 'od, in the sense in which Craig is using

the word 3'od"

#hat wa+ is not articularl+ recise (e"g", the word :greatest: is not so clear in that contet), but it:s clear

enough to tell that 'od is not the creator of some Chinese folk religions, like %angu or 0hangdi, and

isnt an+thing osited b+ uddhism, either, or b+ an+ religion common in China"

Also, in Naan, there is no traditional belief in the eistence of 'od, or on an+ anchoring, etc", of

goodness or of moral obligations in an+ones nature and6or commands, or in an+ other agents for that

matter" #here are different religious beliefs, like 0hinto or uddhism, that influenced each other and

had more or less accetance in their !arious forms at different times, but in an+ case, the+ did not osit

a 'od8based moral ontolog+, or an+ di!ine commands, and so on"

In fact, historicall+, there are lent+ of cultures without belief in 'od, and without a belief that moral

obligations were the commands of certain entities, e!en if most eole in those cultures traditionall+

belie!e or belie!ed in different entities that are sometimes called in Gnglish 3gods, but which do no

metaethical work" 0imilar oints al+ to moral goodness"

0o, its not the case that traditionall+, among humans, moral goodness was considered to be anchored in

'od or in an+ other entit+ for that matter, and the same goes for moral duties" Instead, beliefs on the

subject aear to !ar+ widel+ from culture to culture, and sometimes within cultures"-& 9 /

+. aturalism' moral &alues an! !uties' pain an! *ear.

Craig claims that the most oular !iew among atheists is Faturalism, which Craig describes as the

!iew that science and science alone determines what eists" 2hat eists is what our best scientific

theories of the world re1uire" If something is not re1uired b+ our best scientific theories of the world,

then it does not eist"-r/

Fow, Craig does not sa+ there whether its our currentbest scientific theories, some future theor+ that

will lausibl+ be de!eloed"

If its our current theories, then its !er+ ob!ious that Faturalism so defined is false, since there are

man+ matters of eistence of objects that remain unsettled in resent8da+ h+sics 7 for instance 8, and

there almost certainl+ are articles we do not know about +et, etc"


16/94

ut moreo!er, e!en if one includes future theories, it seems clear that neither human scientists nor an+

ost8human beings -& B /will disco!er all of the things that eist on all of the lanets in the entire

uni!erse, and in articular, that if there are alien lifeforms elsewhere in the uni!erse, chances are some

7 e!en most 7 of them will ne!er be disco!ered b+ human or ost8human beings"

0till,perhaps, in his definition of :3Faturalism, Craig meant that Faturalism is the !iew that whatkinds of entities eist is somehow determined b+ science alone, or something along those lines" #hat

would raise 1uestions about how 3kinds and 3entities are understood in his contet, so more recision

on Craigs art would be needed, but in an+ case, at the very least, Faturalism so defined is robabl+

unjustified, since there seems to be no good reason to think that human beings e!en or ost8human

beings will e!er ha!e the kind of eistemic access that it robabl+ would re1uire, under an+ reasonable

understanding of Craigs definition"

In an+ e!ent, Craigs claim that Faturalism so defined is the most oular !iew among atheists seems

to be also unjustified"

ut roblems for Faturalism so defined aside, lets assess Craigs claim that on Faturalism, there are

no objecti!e moral !alues$

In suort of that claim, he gi!es the eamle that one cannot find moral !alues in a test tube"

Its a strange eamle" 0cience is not done onl+ in test tubes" In an+ case, if one cant find moral !alues

in a test tube, then it seems that similarl+, one cant find fear or ain in a test tube" 2hat would be the

difference4

If Faturalism 7 as defined b+ Craig 7 is committed to the claims that objecti!e ain does not eist

and6or that objecti!e fear does not eist, and so on, then we can easil+ tell that Faturalism so defined is

false, indeendentl+ of the re!ious considerations about alien lanets or articles, and indeendentl+

of metaethical considerations as well"

ut erhas, someone might claim that on that kind of Faturalism, objecti!e ain does eist, since our

best theories about, sa+,pain, seem to re1uire that there is objecti!e ain, e!en if we cant find ain in a

test tube" 0imilarl+, it might be claimed that since our best theories about, sa+,fear, re1uire that there is

objecti!e fear, there is objecti!e fear on naturalism so defined"

owe!er, in that case, one ma+ also oint out that our best theories in s+cholog+ seem to re1uire that

objecti!e moral duties do eist" 5or eamle, based on our best theories in s+cholog+ and

eeriments, we can tell that objecti!e antisocial ersonalit+ disorder does eist, and such disorder is

characteri;ed as """ a er!asi!e attern of disregard for, and !iolation of, the rights of others that

begins in childhood or earl+ adolescence and continues into adulthood-& H /


17/94

#hat seems to re1uire that others ha!e rights that can be !iolated in the first lace" Also, its not the case

that those rights in the definition are legalrights" 0urel+, eole ma+ well meet the criteria for ha!ing

antisocial ersonalit+ disorder e!en if the+ li!e in, sa+, a failed state, or generall+ a lawless land"

Alternati!el+, a brutal ruler with antisocial ersonalit+ disorder ma+ resect the law 7 onl+ he makes

the laws that he likes"ut if there are rights, lausibl+ necessaril+ there are duties"

Moreo!er, Craig ro!ides no good reason to think that our best scientific theories will not re1uire

objecti!e moral !alues as well" 5or instance, stud+ing the conditions in which children are more likel+

to becomegood persons isa erfectl+ !alid scientific research goal -& /, as long as we ha!e a

reasonabl+ good eistemic access to moral truth 7 which Craig accets" 'ranted, a theist might claim

that if theism is not true, that would not be a !alid research goal" ut the burden would be on him" #he

oint here is that Craig ro!ides no good reason to think that in the future, scientists will either be

theists or reject such research rojects"

0o, ifwe include s+cholog+ and6or neuros+cholog+, in the definition of 3Faturalism, then Craig has

failed to establish that on Faturalism so defined, % is false"

*n the other hand, ifwe eclude s+cholog+, neuros+cholog+, etc" from the definition, then

Faturalism as defined b+ Craig is committed to the non8eistence of objecti!e ain, leasure, anger,

fear, etc"L in that case, it:s !er+ ob!ious that Faturalism so defined is false, e!en if we don:t consider

metaethical 1uestions"

ut in an+ case, a non8theist need not worr+ about that" 0he ma+ siml+ not adhere to Faturalism as

defined b+ Craig 7 I don:t adhere to it, for instance 8, and oint out that 7 for instance 7 she still sees no

good reason to belie!e that 'od eists 7 I don:t, for eamle"

/. Morality an! !eterminism.

In another article, Craig also maintains - r & ./ that without freedom, our choices are not morall+

significant, and that there is no freedom if determinism is true"

I would sa+ that if we cannot make choices of our own free will, then lausibl+ we cannot beha!e

immorall+, and we cannot ha!e moral obligations" ut Craig does not seem to ro!ide an+ good reason

to susect that if determinism is true, we cannot make choices of our own free will, or an+thing like

that"

G!en granting for the sake of the argument that the libertarian concetion of free will is coherent, that

does not entail that the libertarian account is true"

In fact, unless the regular concet of making choices of ones own accord or ones own free will 7

which is what lausibl+ is needed for moralit+, freedom8wise 7 has ontological commitments


18/94

incomatible with determinism 7 or with causal determinism, if someone makes that difference and

claims the roblem is onl+ with causal determinism 8, it seems there is no difficult+ in this contet"

ut Craig does not show that there are such ontological commitments in the regular concet of free

will" =ather, he claims that we would be like uets, etc", controlled b+ the strings of sensor+ inut

and h+sical constitution, but does not ro!ide a definition of 3h+sical, or elain wh+ we would notbe making our choices freel+"

In articular, causation at a lower le!el does not seem to den+ causation at a higher le!el" 5or instance,

e!en if there is a causal elanation in terms of articles of the e!ent consisting in a lioness killing a

wildebeest, that does not entail or suggest that she did not kill the wildebeest, or e!en that she did not

kill the wildebeest because she was hungr+" If a theist claims otherwise, the burden would be on them"

*f course, this is b+ no means a comrehensi!e anal+sis of comatibilist accounts of freedom" ut

there is no need for that here"

Craig claims, in the contet of one of his defenses of the claim that moralit+ needs theistic metaethical

foundations, that freedom re1uires non8determinism 7 and a secific kind of non8determinism 8, but has

not shown that that is the case"

0. Color' eo$iology an! genetic engineering.

As art of his defense of the metaethical argument, Craig also considers some h+othetical scenarios in

which aliens e!ol!ed differentl+,-r& & / and claims that those h+othetical scenarios suort his claim

that without 'od, there are no objecti!e moral !alues and duties"

I will address the secific case of objecti!e moral !alues and duties later, but first, I will consider other

cases, as a means of introducing arallels"

0o, lets consider the h+othesis that objecti!e color does eist, which 7mirroring the anal+sis in the

case of objecti!e moral !alues and duties7 means the same as the conjunction of the following two

conditions, or is at least e1ui!alent to the conjunction of the following two conditions$

#C1 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3D is green, 3? is

red, etc", are objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or

instance, if someone claims that the cucumber on the table is green 7 ointing at a secific table 8,

then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use

Craigs own distinction, whether the cucumber on the table is green is not a matter of oinion, or

a matter of taste"

#C" 0ome statements of the form 3D is green, or 3? is red, etc"", are true, where D, ?, etc", are

actual objects"


19/94

Incidentall+, it seems Craig agrees that objecti!e color does eist"-r&&b/

Fow, we alread+ know that, e!en here on Garth, different animals ha!e different !isual s+stems that

react to different arts of the GM sectrum" 5or instance, there are birds that can see light that is either

infrared or ultra!iolet"

Fow, lets consider the following scenario$#here is a secies of intelligent social alien (sa+, seciesO&) that e!ol!ed on another lanet, and

the+ ha!e also a different !isual s+stem, which is stimulated b+ light in a wa+ that is considerabl+

different from the wa+ in which our human !isual s+stem is stimulated"

0eciesO& has a language shared b+ their entire secies, and words that the+ use in a wa+ similar

to the wa+ we use color words in our human languages"


20/94

sense of 3objecti!e in the contet of the metaethical argument, is not affected, threatened or otherwise

debunked b+ the eistence of such different secies"

Moreo!er, objecti!e color does eist, and in the scenario, so does objecti!e seciesO&8color"

2hile seciesO&, with those articular traits, is a h+othetical one, it seems that for all we know, there

ma+ well be elsewhere in the uni!erse a secies of intelligent, social aliens with a !isual s+stem !er+different from the human !isual s+stem, color8like language, true objecti!e color8like statements, and

so on"

Fow, there might be some hilosohical sense of 3objecti!e in which, erhas, such scenarios ro!ide

e!idence against the eistence of objecti!e color" I will not take a stance on that, but rather oint out

that that would not be rele!ant in this contet, because thats not the sense of 3objecti!e were talking

about"

An alternati!e scenario would be one in!ol!ing human genetic engineering"

5or instance, using comuters and other technologies, we can set u a camera or set of cameras that

take !ideo footage but change the wa+ it looks to us, color8wise" 2e can use cameras sensiti!e to light

in a sectrum of around, sa+, from BB.nm to JH.nm instead of the !isible sectrum from 9.nm to

J..nm, and then set it u so that on a comuter screen, the cameras sectrum is translated into our

!isible sectrum assigning color according to some rules of our choosing, so that the images on screen

look to us differentl+ from the wa+ the+ would look to us if we were to look at the objects directl+

under some usual da+light conditions, and instead the+ look like the wa+ some entities similar to us but

with a different !isual s+stem that resonds to a sectrum from BB.nm to JH.nm might see them"- & K /

In this case, we would see things like that due to a combination of the cameras, the comuter, etc", and

our e+es 7 which we would use to look at the comuter screen 8, without an+ genetic engineering, but

in a distant future, using genetic engineering, erhas someone might modif+ a grou of humans to see

things in that wa+"- & /


21/94

case of aliens with different !isual s+stems 7 not seciesO&, but any other secies that ma+ be used for

a similar argument 8, we are not e!en justified in sa+ing that the+ are not actual.

In other words, we do not ha!e grounds for claiming that there are no intelligent and social alien

secies with language and with different !isual s+stems like the ones suggested abo!e in the entire

uni!erse"2. 3eauty' eo$iology' an! ean!erthals.

In his rel+ to an objection to the metaethical argument, Craig claims that the e!idence suorts that

beaut+ is objecti!e" -r & / In a different contet, he claims that there are objecti!e aesthetic

judgments-r& 9/, and clearl+ indicates that he also belie!es that some statements of the form 3D is

beautiful are true"

0o, lets consider the h+othesis that objecti!e beaut+ does eist, which means the same as the

conjunction of the following two conditions, or is at least e1ui!alent to it"

#31 0tatements 7 or judgments, or whate!er one calls them 7 of the form 3D is beautiful are

objecti!e, in the ordinar+ sense of the term 3objecti!e mentioned abo!e" 5or instance, if someone

claims that a secific landscae is beautiful, then there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to

whether that claim is true, and so on" #o use Craigs own distinction, whether that landscae is

beautiful is a matter of fact, not a matter of oinion"

#3" 0ome statements of the form 3D is beautiful, are true, where D is an actual object"

*ne detail here is that one might wonder whether abstract objects would count in *" owe!er,

addressing that issue would be unnecessar+ for the uroses of the arguments at hand, so I will eclude

them just to simlif+"

#hat aside, ersonall+, I think that * is true, and that lausibl+ in mostcases we encounter, there is

an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether an object is beautiful" owe!er, I think there are cases in

which that is not so, and the roortion of cases in our eerience might not be small enough for me to

accet *&, e!en if one accets a usual degree of tolerance" 0o, I would take no stance on whether

*& is true"

owe!er, there is no need to get into that in this contet, so lets grant that the conjunction of *& and

* is true" 0o, objecti!e beaut+ does eist"


22/94

articularl+ unaealing" 0uch aliens ha!e language that is akin to our language about beaut+ in

the wa+ the+ use it, etc", but associated with !er+ different things" - & /

After reflection on the scenario, it seems intuiti!el+ clear to me that whether some aliens e!ol!ed

differentl+ 7 seciesO or something like that- / 8, has no bearing on whether the truth8!alue of

aesthetic judgments deends on what eole belie!e, or on whether such judgments are true"Intuiti!el+, what aliens do or ercei!e does nothing to undermine our sense of beaut+, or our judgments

of beaut+, or the belief that objecti!e beaut+ does eist, etc"

2e would still make objecti!el+ true judgments of beaut+, and the aliens would make objecti!el+ true

judgments of seciesO8beaut+, etc"

'ranted, someone might insist that if such aliens eisted, then there would be no objecti!e beaut+"

ut if someone made such a claim, he would ha!e the burden of backing it u"

Moreo!er, if thats the osition of someone who also maintains that objecti!e beaut+ does eist, then

he"s committed to a claim about exobiology ranging across the whole universe, namel+ the claim that

aliens like seciesO do not eist" - / ut wh+ should an+one belie!e that the+ ha!e such knowledge

about eobiolog+4 And wh+ should we belie!e that he does4


23/94

In his rel+, Craig makes a number of claims and imlication about beaut+ and e!olution -r&/,

including the imlication that if our sense of beaut+ comes from e!olution without 'od, then that

undermines either our belief that objecti!e beaut+ eists, or at least the reliabilit+ of our areciation of

it"

As the eamles gi!en in there!ious sectionillustrate, there seems to be no good reason to belie!e so"*n the other hand, the scenarios gi!en in the re!ious section would seem to be a serious challenge to

$raig"sstance on beaut+"

5or instance, it seems that Craigs !iews entail that if something likeseciesOdoes eist, either there

is no objecti!e beaut+, or at the !er+ least one of the two secies 7 i"e", seciesO or humans 7 has a

massi!el+ unreliable sense of beaut+, and there would aear to be no good reason to trust the human

one"

?et, Craigs osition is that objecti!e beaut+ does eist, and that the human sense of beaut+ is at least

generall+ reliable" ut thatseems to commit $raig to a wide!ranging claim about exobiology, namely

that nothing like species#% evolved anywhere in the universe. - /

I suose someone might suggest that if 'od eists, there is no undermining e!en if such aliens do

eist, and our sense of beaut+ is still generall+ reliable" ut that would not work, because as long as

Craig rejects the distinction between beaut+ judgments and seciesO8beaut+ judgments, then either

theywould ha!e a massi!el+ unreliable sense of beaut+ 7 rather than a generall+ reliable sense of

seciesO8beaut+ 8, or wewould ha!e a massi!el+ unreliable sense of beaut+"

ut that would seem to take awa+ an+ good reason to think we got the right sense of beaut+ e!en

assuming 'od eisted 7 wh+ think 'od referred us, rather than the aliens he also created4

In an+ case, it seems that one wa+ or another, Craigs osition commits him to a uni!erse8wide

eobiolog+ claim on the matter$ either a claim that nothing like seciesO eists in the whole uni!erse,

or that if the+ do, the+ ha!e a massi!el+ unreliable sense"

ut moreo!er, Craig claims that it would be somehow anomalous, gi!en an e!olutionar+ account of our

sense of beaut+ 7 without 'od 7 that we would areciate beaut+ in other secies, not just humans, or

in humans of the same se, etc" ut his claims are on e!olution mistaken, for a number of reasons, such

as the following ones$

1.In the case of humans of the same se, there ma+ well ha!e been an ad!antage 7 i"e", on

balance, in the ancestral en!ironment, it was conduci!e to reroducti!e success 7 to being able to

make assessments of beaut+ of indi!iduals of the same se, gi!en that otential mates of the

oosite8se were able make them" #hat would allow both men and women to comare

themsel!es with otential cometitors, redict beha!ior of otential mates, etc"


24/94

owe!er, that factor is surel+ not the whole stor+, e!en if it ma+ ha!e la+ed some role"

#here are more general considerations about e!olution that Craig is missing, like the following

oint$

".Adatations that were on balance conduci!e to reroducti!e success in the ancestral

en!ironment often had side effects that were not rele!ant to fitness and sometimes, or side effectsthat, on their own, would ha!e been detrimental in terms of fitness, but resulted from the same

gene mutations that conferred ad!antages that offset those disad!antages in that en!ironment, etc"

Also, in some cases, there ma+ be some traits that would be on balance slightl+ detrimental to

reroducti!e success toda+, but were not so in the ast, etc"

As eamles of some of the traits in some of the re!ious categories, we find some artificial

sweeteners sweet but there was no ad!antage to that" Its a conse1uence of adatations to other

things" Also, there was no ad!antage in finding lethal antifree;e tast+, though there was no

disad!antage in an en!ironment with no antifree;e, etc" #he same goes for other animals" 5or

instance, man+ animals find ethanol !er+ aealing, and so on"

I dont know all of the causes we areciate beaut+ in other animals" It ma+ ha!e something to do

with our abilit+ to ercei!e good health, and erhas a number of other traits, but thats

seculati!e"

owe!er, in an+ case, the oint here is that Craigs objection is not warranted" More recisel+, his

claims are based on a misunderstanding of resent8da+ e!olutionar+ biolog+, which result in

mistaken redictions about what would result from an e!olutionar+ rocess that occurs b+ the

mechanisms osited b+ modern science and nothing else" *n that note$

.Craigs objection is a bold claim or imlication about human biolog+ and e!olution"

Gssentiall+, hes iml+ing that the e!olutionar+ rocess, onl+ b+ the mechanisms osited b+

science 7 or !er+ similar ones 7 would notresult in the mental traits that we obser!e in humans"

*n that note, he clearl+ imlies that if our araisal of beaut+ in the oosite se were the result

of natural selection, a +oung woman with a big nose and a hareli would look as beautiful to

him as a fashion model"

#here are se!eral objections one ma+ raise to that claim, but I will focus on just one, which is in

an+ case decisi!e$ Craig bases his assessment on the false assumtion that non8theistic e!olution

would result in seual attraction being e1ual gi!en e1ual otential to be fertile" ut that isnt how

natural selection works" 0urel+, it:s not just the number of otential offsring that counts, but

man+ other factors, such as that otential offsring:s chances in turn to reroduce, which deend


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also on a number of different factors, including their abilit+ to attract mates with genes that would

gi!e them a good chance of reroducti!e success, and so on"

0o, there are man+ causes for the o!erall, on8a!erage attracti!eness of some traits, such as the

fact that the+ ma+ be cues to good health, etc", or seual selection, and a long etc"

Craig seems to be very confused about natural selection, and generall+ about the mechanisms ofe!olution roosed b+ resent8da+ science"

In an+ case, and with resect to seual attraction, we ma+, of course, also take a look at the issue

of otential or actual !ariations from secies to secies" 2e ma+ consider the case of, sa+,

warthogs" #he+re ugl+" ?et, the+ do not seem to be articularl+ attracted to much more beautiful

animals, but rather, to other ugl+ warthogs" #he same seems to go for a ll otherugl+ animals" *f

course, thats not remotel+ surrising gi!en e!olution b+ the mechanisms acceted b+ resent8da+

science, or !er+ similar ones"

#hat aside, we ma+ consider another eamle that oses a serious challenge to Craigs !iews on beaut+

and e!olution$ Feanderthals" 2hat if someone were to bring them back, b+ means of cloning4

#hen, one ma+ consider the statement$

=Adult, health+ modern humans are more beautiful than adult, health+ Feanderthals"

0ince objecti!e beaut+ does eist 7 as Craig maintains, and as I concede for the sake of the argument 8,

there is an objecti!e fact of the matter as to whether F is true" 0ince 7 as Craig imlicitl+ indicates 7

our sense of beaut+ is generall+ reliable, chances are that our sense of beaut+ is correct and that F is

true"

ut lets sa+ that we ask Feanderthals" Assuming no distinction between beaut+ and Feanderthal8

beaut+ 7 a distinction that Craigs osition seems incomatible with 8, the+re almost certainl+ going to

make the wrong assessment, namel+ that F is false" ut wh+ should one think that Feanderthals had

such a defecti!e sense of beaut+4 ow do we know we didnt get the defecti!e sense in the first lace4

%erhas, someone might claim that Feanderthals would not be able to learn a sufficientl+ sohisticated

language and would not understand the 1uestion" ut that would be a claim about Feanderthal biolog+

that would be in need of defending" Moreo!er, its hard to see how that would e!en matter"

Also, someone might suggest that there are -or were, deending on the case/ beautiful modern humans,

and beautiful Feanderthals, but not comarable, beaut+8wise" ut the roblems is that our sense of

beaut+ tells us that Feanderthalswere comarable with modern humans, and the+ were uglier, e!en

assuming in both cases +oung and health+ indi!iduals"

In light of the re!ious considerations, we can tell that Craig:s stances on beaut+, e!olution, and the

relations between them are all mistaken"
http://www.china.org.cn/top10/2013-03/21/content_28317819.htmhttps://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/top-20-ugliest-animals-time-gallery-1.1276977https://encrypted.google.com/#gs_rn=14&gs_ri=psy-ab&tok=AlThrjA9llNzEay33pPYUg&cp=10&gs_id=2t&xhr=t&q=ugly+animals&es_nrs=true&pf=p&output=search&sclient=psy-ab&oq=ugly+anima&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_qf.&bvm=bv.47008514,d.dmQ&fp=485fc16f0e7b3da8&biw=800&bih=417http://www.china.org.cn/top10/2013-03/21/content_28317819.htmhttp://www.china.org.cn/top10/2013-03/21/content_28317819.htmhttps://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/top-20-ugliest-animals-time-gallery-1.1276977https://encrypted.google.com/#gs_rn=14&gs_ri=psy-ab&tok=AlThrjA9llNzEay33pPYUg&cp=10&gs_id=2t&xhr=t&q=ugly+animals&es_nrs=true&pf=p&output=search&sclient=psy-ab&oq=ugly+anima&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_qf.&bvm=bv.47008514,d.dmQ&fp=485fc16f0e7b3da8&biw=800&bih=417


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5. Morality' e&olution' an! e&olutionary counter*actuals.

In suort of the first remise, Craig argues against what he derogatoril+ calls 3herd moralit+ 8 humans

ne!er li!ed in herds, and neither did their ae ancestors, but ne!er mind that 8, and makes a number of

claims$ -r& & /

In articular, he claims that if moral !alues are just the roduct of biological and social e!olution,those reall+ arent moral !alues, but siml+ conditions under which the human secies will

flourish"


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moral obligations, which deend on mental faculties, howe!er we got to ha!e them 8, there would

alwa+s be a moral obligation to beha!e in a wa+ conduci!e to human flourishing"

1.!. Craig claims that a socioath who rejects what he calls the 3herd moralit+, would not be

doing an+thing morall+ wrong on that !iew" ut for that matter, someone might sa+ that if our

3herd color e!ol!ed, then there would be nothing red about 3sto traffic lights on a similar non8theistic e!olutionar+ !iew, or that on such a !iew, there would be nothing ugl+ about warthogs if

our :herd beaut+: e!ol!ed" @on reflection, I see no good reason to belie!e either Craigs claim

about the socioath, or the arallel claims about color or ugliness, or that the mistaken accounts

that osit that there is alwa+s a moral obligation to act in a wa+ conduci!e to human flourishing

ha!e anyroblem with moralobjectivity. =ather, the roblem with such accounts is that that they

make a false universal first!order ethical claim" 5or that matter, theories in!ol!ing ethical and

metaethical claims that osit that there is alwa+s a moral obligation to belie!e that Nesus is lord

and sa!ior, at least for adult humans who ha!e read the 'osel and some others, also make a false

uni!ersal first8order ethical claim, but do not ha!e an+ roblem with objecti!it+"

Also, in addition to the abo!e, Craig maintains that if we could rewind e!olution, then a different entit+

with a considerabl+ different set of moral !alues and duties might ha!e resulted instead of humans, and

if so, neither their !alues nor ours would be right" owe!er, Craig does not do an+thing to establish his

claims" 5or instance$

".a" #hose entities would ha!e had to resol!e roblems similar to the ones our ancestors faced, so

ma+be there would not be such !ariation after all, if the initial conditions are the same" B"

".$" Craig has not elained wh+, assuming that there might be such differences if we could

rewind e!olution, that would ro!ide an+ e!idence in suort of the claim that without 'od,

objecti!e moral !alues and duties do not eist"

5or eamle, we ma+ consider the same argument about rewinding e!olution in the case of color

!ision" ut as the rele!antl+ similar eamle of seciesO&illustrates, that would ro!ide no

e!idence against the eistence of objecti!e color without 'od" Craig ro!ides no argument in this

contet in suort of the claim that it would make a difference in the case of moralit+L rather, he

seems to assume that the eamle of rewinding e!olution hels his case"

16. Morality an! eo$iology .

Craig also considers some eamles of aliens from the Andromeda gala+ who come to Garth and

attack, either raing and killing humans, or eating humans" - B /

Fow, Craig has not shown that e!olution would not be con!ergent in the case of moralit+, at least for

social entities" ut we ma+ grant that there is such difference"


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0o, lets sa+for the sake of the argument that the aliens in 1uestion 7 sa+, seciesO9 7 e!ol!ed !er+

differentl+, but the+ do ha!e a sense more or less similar to our sense of right and wrong, and to our

sense of good and bad- & /L those faculties are similar to ours in the wa+ using them normall+ feels to

them, in the role that the+ la+ in discussions about what to do in their societ+, etc", but associated with

different beha!iors and6or situations, entities, etc"In articular, their sense of seciesO98right and seciesO98wrong does not associate an+ negati!e

e!aluation with their actions of in!ading the Garth and eating humans"

0o, lets sa+ that the+ in!ade the Garth and eat humans" - H /

0eaking of those scenarios, Craig claims$

Craig

I think this etraterrestrial illustration is a !er+ owerful illustration that, in the absence of 'od,

human moralit+ isnt objecti!e" It has no more claim to be objecti!e than some etraterrestrial

alien moralit+"

efore I address those claims, and on a terminological note, in the cases ofcolor,andbeaut+, I used the

terms color 8 rather than human color 8 as oosed to seciesO&8color, and beaut+ 8 rather than

human beaut+ 8 as oosed to seciesO8beaut+, resecti!el+" 0imilarl+, I will here use moralit+

8 rather than human moralit+, which Craig uses8, as oosed to seciesO98moralit+- & J /,

resecti!el+" ut thats merel+ terminolog+"

0o, in the ecert 1uoted abo!e, Craig makes at least two claims"

1.A claim that the etraterrestrial eamles show that, without 'od, objecti!e moral !alues and

duties do not eist"

".A claim that without 'od, human moralit+ has no more claim to be objecti!e than some

etraterrestrial moralit+ 7 with the terminolog+ I introduce abo!e, that would be moralit+ and

seciesO98moralit+ in the eamle in 1uestion, resecti!el+"

2hat to make of those claims4

In the case of claim &", Craig does not elain whether that alien eamle is suosed to show that

*ME>&is not true without 'od, or that *ME>is not true"

ut in an+ e!ent, Craig seems to ro!ide no reason to susect that objecti!e moral !alues and duties

would not eist, in the sense of &objective" used by $raig in his metaethical argument,just because of

the alien eamle"

#o be clear, Im not claiming that there is no technical sense of 3objecti!e used in hilosoh+, in which

the alien eamle would not show that moralit+ would not be objecti!e" ut the rele!ant oint here is

that the alien eamles do not show that without 'od, sa+, whether the olocaust was morall+ wrong


29/94

has an+thing to do with what an+one 7 human or alien 7 belie!es and so, in the sense of &objective"

relevant to $raig"s metaethical argument.

If someone claimed otherwise, the+ would ha!e to argue that oint" ut its not illustrated b+ the

eamle, as Craig resents it"

As for claim ", assuming sufficient similarit+ between our moral sense and seciesO98moral sense interms of how the+ feel it, work, etc" 8 ecet that associated with different beha!iors, situations, etc" 8,

then claim " seems to be lausibl+ true, just as seciesO&8color and seciesO8beaut+ are also

objecti!e" ut that does nothing to establish the first remise"

'ranted, someone might claim that the case of moralit+ is rele!antl+ different from the case of color

and6or from the case of beaut+, etc", but that would ha!e to be argued for"

In articular, someone might claim that the difference is that judgments of beaut+, and also moral

judgments, are e!aluati!e judgments, but color judgments are not" owe!er, in that case, the+ would

ha!e to elain in what sense and6or how there is an e!aluati!e comonent that is relevant to the

matter of objectivity, in the sense in which $raig uses the word &objective"" #he burden would be on the

claimant"

Also, someone might claim 7 for instance 7 that the meaningof moral terms is such that moral

judgments ha!e ontological commitments incomatible with the eistence of something like seciesO98

moralit+, and so that if such secies, or a rele!antl+ similar one, eisted, then all judgments of the form

3D is immoral, 3D is morall+ good, etc", would be objecti!e but all false, or some other !ariant"

owe!er, that would be a matter of moralsemanticsthat would ha!e to be argued for as well" As it

stands, uon reflection, I see no good reason to think that that is so"

*n that note, lets consider the following scenario$

Millions of +ears into the future, humans or ost8human beings- & B / make contact with intelligent

social aliens" umans or ost8humans are more ad!anced, so e!en though the aliens turn out to

be hostile, the+ can be handled"

Fow, after stud+ing the aliens, -ost/8humans figure out that the aliens do not ha!e a sense of

right and wrong and good or bad but something more or less similar to them in the wa+ outlined

earlier"

I doubt that millions of +ears into the future, -ost/8human beings would belie!e that 'od eists, but

regardless of what the+ belie!e on that matter, it seems intuiti!el+ clear that the+ would not and should

not consider their findings about the aliens e!idence suorting the conclusion that the olocaust was

not immoral"


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In fact, the immoralit+ of the olocaust and eobiolog+ seem to be orthogonalmatters, regardless of

theistic belief"

At least, uon reflection, I do not see an+ good reason to belie!e otherwise, and Craig does not seem to

ro!ide an+"

All that aside, and as an alternati!e objection, a theist might raise the issue of genetic engineering"2hat if someone made geneticall+ modified humans, sa+ 'M8humansO9, with a slightl+ different

sense or senses, instead of a sense of right and wrong, or good or e!il4

#he+ wouldnt be something comletel+ alien like seciesO9, but something !er+ similar to humans,

but not 1uite the same"

A roblem I see with that scenario is that such modifications might result in conflicts between different

arts of the mind, unless erhas the changes are massi!e" ut lea!ing that aside, I will address the

matter of entities that are !er+ similar to humans but not 1uite the same in the section dedicated to

Moral #win Garth scenarios" #he genetic engineering cases, assuming the+re nomologicall+ ossible,

would be handled in the same fashion"

11. Morality an! eo$iology . 7ome o$%ections.

In there!ious section, I argued that Craigs argument from etraterrestrials fails to suort his

conclusion" In this section, I will consider some objections, and offer some relies, but before I go on,

and to be clear, I do not claim that Craig would raise the same objections or similar ones"

#$%ection 11.1

If something like species#' existed, invaded Earth and ate humans, they would clearly be acting

immorally. Even science fiction examples illustrate that aliens that attack like that are behaving

immorally. In other words, they ought to refrain from eating humans. (ut the previous analysis

indicates that, without God, they would not be acting immorally, contradicting our moral

intuitions.

Reply

1" #here!ious anal+sis is not committed to the 1uestion of whether seciesO9 aliens who in!ade

the Garth and attack humans would be acting immorall+" Its comatible with at least the

following two !iews$

1.a.#he aliens are acting immorall+, but the+ do not ha!e a sense that allows them to know

that" #he+ are not acting seciesO98immorall+, though"

1.$.#he aliens are not be acting immorall+" In fact, nothing that the+ do is immoral" 0ome

of the things the+ do might be seciesO98immoral, but in!ading Garth and eating humans

are not among them"


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I do not think that &"a" is the right !iew, though, but other non8theists might not ha!e an+ !iews

on the matter, and that does not seem to be a roblem either wa+"

*f course, e!en if &"b" is the roer interretation 7 which I find lausibl+ correct 8, that does not

mean that the situation consisting in aliens of seciesO9 eating humans is not a bad situation" In

the sense in which, sa+, the situations consisting in crocodiles eating +oung children or +oungchildren slowl+ d+ing of cancer are bad situations 7 though not morall+ bad, as far as I can tell, if

no moral agent is resonsible 8, we ma+ roerl+ sa+ the e!ent or situation consisting of

seciesO9 aliens eating humans is a bad situation or e!ent"

*n the other hand, in the scenario, lausibl+ the e!ent or situation consisting in aliens of

seciesO9 eating humans is not a seciesO98bad situation of e!ent 7 assuming the+ ha!e

something akin to that good6bad distinction but associated with different situations, etc" 8, and

erhas eating humans is e!en a seciesO98good situation or e!ent, though that would not iml+

that eating humans is seciesO98morall+8obligator+"

".#he claim that its clear that those aliens would be acting immorall+ is imlausible" In fact,

while there!ious anal+sis is not committed to the 1uestion of whether seciesO9 aliens who

in!ade the Garth and eat humans would be acting immorall+, after reflection, it seems lausible

that the+ wouldn"tbe acting immorall+" - / #he+ do not ha!e a sense of right and wrong that

would tell them its immoral, e!en under ideal conditions" #he+ do not seem to ha!e the right

kind of mind to beha!e immorall+, as far as I can tell"

As for science fiction aliens, the+re often made in the writers image, so to seak"

In other words, e!en though those fictional agents -fictionall+/ e!ol!ed on different lanets,

wherethe+ e!ol!ed is not the issue, but rather, what kind of mind they have"

5or that matter, man+ of those fictional aliens feel seual attraction towards humans, because

writers usuall+ make them with human8like minds, e!en though in case of contact we should

eect aliens not to be 7 normall+, at least 7 seuall+ attracted towards humans"

*n the other hand, someone ma+ ha!e come u with some fictional ad!anced aliens that do not

ha!e moral obligations 7 some fictions ma+ not be secific enough to determine that"

#his is not to sa+ that real aliens would ne!er ha!e moral obligations" If the uni!erse is

sufficientl+ big, there might be aliens that e!ol!ed with minds like ours, including a sense of right

and wrong and good or e!il 7 rather than the seciesO9 analogue, or an+thing like it"

. #hat aside, according to Craig, 'od eists and a creatures moral obligations are 'ods

commands" If so, then if seciesO9 e!ol!ed on some lanet 7 guided b+ 'od, erhas 8, then it

seems that those aliens would not ha!e a moral obligation not to eat humans, since the+ do not


32/94

ha!e a sense of right and wrong that tells them not to eat humans, and then lausibl+ 'od would

ha!e not commanded them not to eat humans"

0o, it seems that e!en on Craigs theor+, if those aliens eisted, in an+ case the+ would not ha!e a

moral obligation not to eat humans" ut then, wh+ would it be a roblem for non8theists if, on

non8theism, those aliens lausibl+ would not ha!e a moral obligation not to eat humans4'ranted, a theist might claim that such aliens or rele!antl+ similar ones are metah+sicall+

imossible, but that in articular entails that those aliens, or an+ rele!antl+ similar aliens, do not

eist an+where in the uni!erse, which a wide8ranging claim about eobiolog+, encomassing the

entire uni!erse" 2h+ should we belie!e that a theist has such knowledge of eobiolog+4

#$%ection 11."

)n that kind of evolutionary account, who is to say that it"s not morally obligatory for individuals

of species#' or a relevantly similar species to invade the Earth and eat humans because they like

the way humans taste*

Reply

2e can tell b+ our sense of right and wrong that that would not be a moralobligation for them, or for

an+one" #hat would not be morality, and we can tell because were the ones with the sense of right and

wrong, not aliens of seciesO9" #hose aliens ha!e a sense ofspecies#'!right andspecies#'!wrong,but

thats a different thing, like seciesO&8color !ision is not color !ision, and a sense of seciesO8beaut+

is not a sense of beaut+"

#hat aside, its not at all clear to me that natural selection in our uni!erse would fa!or something as

different from our moral sense as what is roosed here 7 though almost certainl+ it would if the

uni!erse has infinitel+ man+ lanets"

Im just granting that for the sake of the argument" ut e!en if the+ did ha!e aspecies#'!moral!

obligationto in!ade the Garth and eat humans, that is not a moral obligation to do so"

5or eamle, lets consider the following scenario as an analog+$


33/94


34/94

the moral sense of &should" among humans, then it actually means the same. +he same for other

terms.

Reply

'oing b+ m+ intuiti!e gras of the terms, it seems !er+ imlausible to me that the meaning of our

moral terms is like that"owe!er, assuming for the sake of the argument thatthe terms would mean the same as this rejoinder

holds 7 which I reject 8,and also assuming for the sake of the argument that there is or there might be

such huge !ariations between secies 7 a matter on which I take no stance 8, and further assuming for

the sake of the argument that seciesO9 actuall+ e!ol!ed, then there would seem to be two distinct

ossibilities$

a. 0eciesO9 aliens lausibl+ would ha!e a sense of right and wrong generall+ reliable as a means

of ascertaining the moral obligations of indi!iduals of their species, whereas we humans ha!e a

sense of right and wrong generall+ reliable as a means of ascertaining the moral obligations of

humans"

#his might result in moral obligations to eat us, etc", which would be counterintuiti!e"

$. A moral error theor+ is true"

ut I ha!e no good reason to belie!e our moral terms are like that at all"

*n the other hand, a theist raising objections &&"9 and &&"B would seem to be committed to a osition

that entails the disjunction of the following otions$

c.Aliens like that do not eist"

!. Aliens like that are ha!e a !astl+ unreliable sense of right and wrong"

e" Aliens like that ha!e a moral obligation to eat us if the+ find us in a situation like the one

outlined abo!e, or similar obligations"

owe!er, c. is a statement about eobiolog+ ranging across the whole uni!erse, and there is no

e!idence for thatL e.is !er+ counterintuiti!e, and !.seems unjustified 7 wh+ would their moral sense be

the flawed one4 8, and also has the following roblem if the theist suorts >i!ine Command #heor+$

If the moral obligations of those aliens are 'ods commands, how does 'od gi!e them commands if

the+ ha!e such a !astl+ unreliable sense of right and wrong4

As I mentioned, I see no good reason to think that our moral language is like that" *n the contrar+, I

think its definitel+ not like that at all, and the aliens in 1uestion would be talking about something else"

#$%ection 11./

(eings with a human level of intelligence or superior but with no moral obligations are

metaphysically impossible, with the possible exception of God, who does not have any moral


35/94

obligations because an entity"s moral obligations are God"s commands, and God is not giving

binding commands to himself.

Reply

1.


36/94

If our sense of right and wrong comes from evolution without God, then there are no moral

obligations. ow could a mindless process impose a moral obligation*

Reply

#hat is a different kind of 1uestion, not directl+ related to the art of Craigs argument I addressed

abo!e, but that aside$1.#he e!olutionar+ rocess would not be imposingan+thing ecet in a figurati!e sense" Moral

agents are agents with some kind of mind, howe!er the+ came to eist, whether b+ e!olution or

b+ some other means"

In other words" as long as the e!olutionar+ rocesses or an+ other rocess results in minds of the

right kind, those entities might be morall+ good, bad, beha!e immorall+ 7 and hence, ha!e moral

obligations, etc" - J /

In fact, this is intuiti!el+ clear, and it illustrates another roblem with Craigs metaethical

argument, namel+ that it has a conclusion that flies on the face of moral intuitions"

5or instance, we ma+ set u a scenario in which 'od does not eist, and Nack kills children just

for entertainment" Intuiti!el+, its clear that in that scenario, Nack would be acting immorall+" #he

resence of 'od is orthogonal to it" I will get back to this oint later"

"" 2hile a theist might claim that the e!olutionar+ rocess would not result in minds, or in the

right kind of mind, thats a claim that he would ha!e to argue for"

#$%ection 11.2

+here cannot be such thing as species#'!morality. +here is only morality. If species like

species#' evolved on different planets, then at most one intelligent social species would have the

true morality, and all of the rest would be morally confused by a vastly flawed sense of right and

wrong, and of good and evil. (ut then, what would be the reason for believing that our faculties

are the reliable ones, rather than the faculties of some aliens*

Reply

As in re!ious cases, whoe!er made such a claim would ha!e to argue for it" As it stands, after

reflection, I see no good reason to belie!e so"

In fact, it seems highl+ counterintuiti!e, as the contacteamle indicates"

Moreo!er, also as before, someone who maintains that we do ha!e a reasonabl+ reliable moral sense

+et raises objection &&"J, is committed to a claim that there are no aliens rele!antl+ similar to seciesO9

in the whole uni!erse"

1". Morality an! eo$iology . Moral 8,in 9arth.

I argued in re!ious sections that Craig does not establish that his alien eamlessuort %&"


37/94

owe!er, there are other arguments a theist might make, also in!ol!ing entities with something similar

to a moral sense in some wa+s, but not 1uite the same"

*n that note, I think an interesting case to consider would be some of the Moral #win Garth eamles,

and in articular the scenarios resented b+ organ and #immons in aers like Few 2a!e Moral

=ealism Meets Moral #win Garth-r&B/,or Anal+tical 5unctionalism Meets Moral #win Garth" -r1//G!en though organ and #immons use the eamles in a !er+ different contet, the scenarios raise the

issue of aliens with different faculties, so I think the+ are lausibl+ rele!ant in the contet of Craigs

metaethical argument for theism" I will focus on the eamles in the second aer" -r1//

0o, the authors elain that some of the differences in the mature folk moralit+ of humans and #win

Garthers resecti!el+, result from some secies8wide s+chological differences between Garthers (i"e",

humans) and #win Garthers" -r1//

#he reference to a mature folk moralit+ is made in the contet of their rel+ to anal+tical moral

functionalism 7 which a non8theist need not endorseL ersonall+, I dont 8, but essentiall+ the rele!ant

oint here is that some human moral judgments would differ from some moral or moral8like judgments

of #win Garthers, as a result of their different secies8wide s+chological makeu, and e!en uon

careful reflection"

2hen resenting these scenarios, organ and #immons consider two h+otheses, wh

A Reply to Craig's Metaethical Argument II (v. 7.4)

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Transcript of A Reply to Craig's Metaethical Argument II (v. 7.4)