A RE-EXAMINATION OF AL-ASffARl'S THEORY OFKASB ACCORDING TO KITAB AL-LUMA'

By BINYAMIN ABRAHAMOV

Man's moral responsibility for his actions is a tenet of Islamic revelation whichno Muslim has ever tried to reject. Likewise, the notion of God's omnipotence,which the Qur'an teaches, has never been challenged by Muslims. However,there is a great difficulty in explaining how true moral responsibility coincideswith God's omnipotence; if God creates all things, He also creates man's actions,and this being the case, man cannot be responsible for them.1 As is well known,the Mu'tazilite solution to the antinomy of God's omnipotence and man'sresponsibility consists in affirming man's capability, granted to him by God, ofcreating his own works.2 Adhering to their principle of God's justice, theMu'tazilites asserted that if God were to create a man's unbelief whilecommanding him to believe, He would be unjust in punishing him for unbelief,since the man could not, in this situation, help but disbelieve. According to them,ought implies can.3 In upholding man's responsibility for his own actions, theMu'tazilites saved God's justice, but according to the Ash'arites, detracted fromGod's omnipotence. The Ash'arites taught that since God is the sole creator, Hecreates human actions. In order to safeguard both God's omnipotence and man'sresponsibility, al-Ash'ari, having been influenced by the teaching of al-Najjar,4

developed a theory of kasb (lit. acquisition)5 according to which God createsman's actions while man appropriates6 them and thus becomes responsible forthem.

1 Cf. Wolfson, Kalam, p. 663f. The debate between the Mu'tazilites and the predestinariansconcentrated from a very early stage of the Kalam on the question of who creates man's act: is itGod or man himself? See Schwarz, "Acquisition", p. 355.

2 The verb used is aqdara, i.e., to grant a man a qudra (power or capability), or to cause him tohave a qudra. See al-Ash'ari, Maqalat, p. 199,3-6. For the term qudra in the teaching of 'Abd al-JabbSr see Peters, God's Created Speech, pp. 200-4.

3 See Watt, Free will, p. 69.4 Cf. Schwarz, "Acquisition", pp. 368, 375. Al-Najjar was in turn influenced in this issue by

the IbadI theologian 'Abd Allah Ibn Yazld, who wrote an anti-Qadarite tract not long after179/795. See W. Madelung, "The Shfite and Kharijite contribution to pre-Ash'arite Kalam", inIslamic Philosophical Theology, ed. P. Morewedge, New York 1979, p. 128. Idem, Streitschrift desZaiditenimams Ahmad al-Nasir wider die ibaditische PrSdestinationslehre, Stuttgart 1985, pp. 10,58-63.

5 Other renderings of this term are as follows: a. "appropriation" according to W. M. Watt,"The origin of the Islamic doctrine of acquisition", JRAS (1943), p. 237. Idem, Free Will, p. 104.b. "endossement" according to R. Brunschvig, "Devoir et pouvoir. Histoire d'un probleme detheologie musulmane", SI 20(1964), p. 19. c. "toeeigening" according to F. L. Bakker, Deverhouding tusschen de almacht Gods en de zedelijke verantwoordelijheid van den menchin de Islam,Amsterdam 1922, p. 72. Cf. Schwarz, "Acquisition", p. 357.

6 According to Schwarz, the verb kasaba was employed by early thinkers, as well as by al-Ash'ari and his contemporaries and successors in the meaning of "to do", "to practise", "to carryout", "to perform" an action. See "Acquisition", pp. 375ff. Idem, "The Qadl", p. 229f.

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Schematically described, the theory of kasb has three constituents: a. God'screation of man's action, b. God's creation of man's power or capacity (quwwa oristifa'a) for appropriating this action, c. Man's appropriating the action createdfor him by God (iktisab). The relationships among these constituents and the typeof connection between each of them and man's body account for the differencesamong the various theories of kasb as developed in the Kalam. Let us take forexample two theories, that of Dirar and that of al-Najjar. Dirar ibn 'Amr (d. 815)seems to have invented the theory of kasb.1 According to him, man's capabilityfor appropriating (element b) any action God creates for him (element a) existsbefore the action takes place and constitutes a part of his body. It is a power Godcreates in man from birth. Accordingly, man creates his action (element c), and itis thus a free action of his own.8 Contrary to Dirar, al-Najjar9 taught that Godcreates in man the power to appropriate the action simultaneously with Hiscreation of the action itself.10

Following al-Najjar, al-Ash'ari states that God creates the action in mansimultaneously with His creation of the power to appropriate the action. Now,how can the appropriation be man's own free action when God creates the powerover it and the act of appropriation itself? Al-Ash'ari tries to answer thisobjection by making a distinction between involuntary movement (fyarakatidtfrar) and appropriated movement (ftarakat iktisab). Involuntary are suchmovements as shaking from palsy or shivering from fever; appropriatedmovements are those like going and coming, approaching and withdrawing.Man necessarily knows the difference between these two types of movementthrough his consciousness; he knows that he cannot prevent involuntarymovements from occurring while the opposite is true with appropriatedmovements.11 Thus it seems phenomenologically that man has freedom ofaction. But ontologically speaking, the difference lies in the fact that anappropriation takes place in virtue of man's created power (quwwa mufydatha),12

whereas an involuntary movement, also created by God,13 takes place withoutpower existing in man. That God creates man's power to appropriate the actionand the action itself simultaneously was interpreted by later authors to mean thatman's power to appropriate has no influence over the object of his power(maqdur), i.e., the action.14 Consequently, opponents regarded the notion of kasb

7 See Schwarz, "Acquisition", p. 367. On Pirar see J. van Ess, "Pirar ibn 'Amr und die'Cahmiya', Biographie einer vergessenen Schule", Der Islam 43(1967), pp. 241-79,44 (1968), pp.1-70, 318-20. Watt, The Formative Period, pp. 189ff.

8 See al-Baghdadl, al-Farq, p. 130. Wolfson, Kalam, pp. 667-70.9 Al-Najjar died in the earlier half of the third/ninth century. See J. van Ess, Der Islam

44(1968), pp. 56ff. Watt, The Formative Period, pp. 199-201.10 See Wolfson, Kalam, p. 670.11 See al-Ash'ari, al-Luma', par. 92.12 See ibid, par. 89.13 See ibid, par. 93.14 See Wolfson, Kalam. p. 691.

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as meaningless, since they perceived no difference between involuntary actionsand appropriations.15 It is true that nowhere does al-Ash'ari indicate that thecreated power to appropriate has no effect on the appropriation, and this mayallow the possibility that al-Ash'ari thought of man's using a power granted tohim by God to effect his act. Nevertheless the question of the relationshipbetween the created power to appropriate and the act of appropriation andconsequently the question of the antinomy of God's omnipotence and man'sresponsibility in al-Ash'ari has not been answered satisfactorily in either theKalam or in modern scholarship which has tried to explain al-Ash'ari's theory ofkasb.

Several scholars have attempted to explain the term kasb and the theoriesconnected with it, their development through the ages and their connection withthe verbs kasaba and iktasaba appearing in other contexts.16 Frank's article "Thestructure of created causality according to al-As'ari, an analysis of Kitab al-Luma', pars. 82-164"17 is the first attempt to analyze the doctrine of kasb from anontological point of view. The following aims first at commenting on Frank'sview of al-Ash'ari's theory of kasb and second at setting forth a differentapproach to al-Ash'ari's theory.

According to Frank, man's power (qudra), which is an accident of his being, isa power of efficient causality created for him by God. Through this power theaction takes place. Explaining the relationship between God's creation of man'saction and man's causality (the power of causation created for him by God),Frank asserts: "In that God creates it (causality) at the moment of the act, He is,in a sense, the creator of the act, but in that the qudra through which the eventtakes place is in every respect a determinant attribute of the being of the humanagent (for as a created accident inhering in him it does not differ ontologicallyfrom the others which constitute his being at the moment) the causality is his andhe is in a true sense the agent of the act".'8 Man is the owner of the act and since itis determined by him he performs it. Thus the term kasb is used to denote freehuman action which is brought to realization through man's created power.19 Itfollows that God's omnipotence is not impaired, while man's responsibility ispreserved too.20. Frank continues (pp. 31ff) to elucidate al-Ash'ari's theory

15 See Schwarz, "The Qadl", p. 244f.16 See ibid, p. 229f. Idem, "Acquisition", pp. 355ff and the references given there.17 Studio Islamica 25 (1966), pp. 13-75.18 See ibid, p. 31. Basically, Gimaret (Theories, p. 84f) accepts Frank's approach without

elaborating on it.19 See ibid, p. 26.20 Al-Jubba'I, al-Ash'ari's master, and other Mu'tazilite thinkers admitted that man's power

of creation of his acts is granted to him by God, but it precedes the occurrence of the act and thusis independent of God's creation; man is the sole creater of his acts. Cf. Frank, ibid, p. 24f. Idem,"Remarks on the early development of the Kalam", in Atti 3 cong. studi arabi e islamici, Ravello1966 (publ. 1967), n. 322.

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through examining paragraphs 82-164 in al-Luma' according to his thesis thatqudra means a power of efficient causality.

Before commenting on Frank's thesis I would like to refer to somemethodological questions which have bearing on the understanding of the issueunder discussion. The first concerns the nature of the Kalam. In his QuranicStudies Wansbrough argues that the method employed by a scholar determines toa certain extent the results of his research.21 Regarding the Kalam as a"theological science" not an "art of contradiction making", Frank attempts toshow that in several issues, such as God's attributes, the Kalam appears as ahighly systematic theological philosophy disconnected from polemics.22 Thisgeneral approach to the Kalam is also expressed in Frank's treatment of al-Ash'ari's theory of kasb. It is true that Frank refers to the debate with theMu'tazila, but the debate is in the background; al-Ash'ari, in Frank's view, aimsat developing an overall theory, not only at answering the opponent's objections.There is nothing objectionable in holding the view that al-Ash'ari developed asystem of thought which clearly resolves the antinomy of God's omnipotence andman's responsibility. The question one should ask is whether Frank's results arenot conditioned by his method more than by the material occurring in the al-Luma'.

The second methodological point concerns the use of terms and definitions. Isit possible that an author should have held a theory of causality withoutemploying the terms and definitions pertinent to this theory? Whoever thinksthat the answer is in the affirmative should explain why the author does not usethe terms needed in spite of the data which prove that he should have knownthem.

Thirdly, for our understanding of al-Ash'ari's theory of kasb, can we rely onlater authorities who put forward or explain it? If we can, then we must beconsistent in following their interpretations, unless there are good textual reasonsfor our departure.

Fourthly, the question of kasb can be dealt with through several aspects:philological, theological, epistemological and ontological.23 Treating the kasbtheory from an ontological point of view requires us to examine all its elementsunder this aspect, including man's consciousness. For consciousness, as we haveseen, differentiates between an appropriated and an involuntary act.

Returning to the second point: nowhere in the al-Luma' are the terms qudra oristi\a'a defined or alluded to as an efficient cause. Al-Ash'ari refers to power(qudra) as an accident distinct from man. He proves this through a familiar

21 See J. Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation,Oxford 1977, p . 9 1 . Idem, BSOAS 43(1980), p p . 361-3 .

22 See "The Kalam, an art of contradiction-making or theological science? some remarks onthe question", JAOS 88(1968), pp. 295-309.

"Schwarz's articles ("Acquisition", "The Qadi") and other articles mentioned in"Acquisition" par. Ill belong to the first two aspects.

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Kalam argument.24 That he does not define isti(a'a is very probably owing to thefact that there was no controversy between him and most of the Mu'tazilaconcerning the consideration of istitaa as an accident. The debate with theMu'tazila was about the question of whether this accident precedes the action(the Mu'tazilite view) or coincides with it (the Ash'arite view). Moreover, theabsence of the definition of istitaa cannot be attributed to the absence of anydefinitions of terms in this book, for the term kasb is defined. The real meaning(haqlqa) of kasb, according to al-Ash'ari, is "that the act proceeds from itsappropriator (lit. acquirer muktasib) in virtue of a created power (bi-quwwamuffdatha."25 Had al-Ash'ari thought that qudra was efficient cause, he wouldhave defined it as such. Frank admits that al-Ash'ari does not give a concisedefinition of qudra and that al-Ash'ari's argumentation "assumes the under-standing of the definition."26 Both efficient cause ('illaja'ila), which had alreadybeen used by al-Kindi,27 and secondary cause (sabab) were unquestionablyknown to al-Ash'ari. He himself reported that the Shfite Mutakallim Hishamibn al-Hakam (d. 795)28 had used the term sabab in connection with man'saction, not as a natural cause: According to Hisham, man's action does notproceed from him unless God creates an inciting cause (sabab muhayyif) for it.29

Frank does not claim that the best possibility of understanding al-Ash'ari'stheory of kasb is through defining qudra as efficient cause, but rather that thisdefinition is what al-Ash'ari really intended. But given the probability that therewas some kind of common comprehension of al-Ash'ari's doctrine by bothopponents and adherents (probably this comprehension was also the outcome oforal transmission of the ideas of the master to his disciples), it does not stand toreason that no one knew that al-Ash'ari had thought of qudra as an efficientcause. Furthermore, Frank's attitude towards later authorities is not clear.Indeed, he says that "one must be very cautious in reading back into the thoughtof al-As'ari the elaborations of his later followers, particularly those of [Fakhr al-Din al-]Razi",30 but does not elaborate on his criterion for this "reading back".

24 See al-Luma' par. 122 (McCarthy 's translat ion): " Q . W h y do you say tha t m a n is capable invirtue of a capacity which is distinct from h im? A. He is sometimes capable and sometimesimpotent, just as he knows at one t ime and does not know at another, and now moves and againdoes not move. Therefore he must be capable in virtue of something distinct from him, just as hemust be knowing in virtue of something distinct from him, and as he must be moving in virtue ofsomething distinct from him. For if he were capable of himself, or in virtue of somethinginseparable from him, he would not exist save as capable. But since he is sometimes capable andsometimes incapable, it is true and certain that his capacity is something distinct from h im" .

25 See al-Luma', p . 42, 11. 1-2 of the Arab i c text. Cf. a l -Ash 'ar i , Maqalat, p . 542, 11. 8 - 9 . 1shall t ry to explain later the mean ing of bi-quwwa mulfdatha.26 See Frank, " T h e structure", p . 54.27 See J. Jolivet and R. Rashed, "a l -Kindi" , El1, vol. V, p . 122f.28 See on him W. Madelung, " H i s h a m ibn a l -Hakam", El2, vol. HI , pp . 496-8.29 See al-Ash'ari, Maqalat, p . 40f. Wolfson, Kalam, p . 672f.30 See Frank, " T h e structure", p . 40, n. 1.

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Sometimes he is helped by such authorities31 and sometimes he plainly rejectstheir understanding of al-Ash'ari's notions.32 In my opinion, one may rely on thefollowers of al-Ash'ari for the understanding of his theory so long as theircitations and interpretations of his notions have a valid basis in al-Ash'ari's texts.

It is now time to penetrate to the heart of the matter. As has been stated above,in al-Ash'ari both an appropriated movement and an involuntary movement arecreated by God ;33 in the former man feels he has power and thus is not compelledto act, while in the latter he feels he has no power and thus cannot prevent the actfrom occurring. Man knows this difference by a necessary knowledge. In statingthis, al-Ash'ari passes from an ontological discussion to a phenomenological one.Here lies one of the main obstacles to the understanding of his theory. For al-Ash'ari does not continue to analyze other elements of human action such as thesource of the will or the source of the power to will, as one would expect in anoverall theory of action. He does not tell us to whom the power to will belongs, toman himself or to God, whether God creates it for man at the moment the actiontakes place or before the occurrence of the action, or whether it is an inherentelement in man. However, since, according to al-Ash'ari, God wills and createsall things,34 one may conclude that He wills and creates man's power to will aswell as the will itself. Although al-Ash'ari does not mention the power to will, it isevident that according to al-Luma' pars. 49, 65,159 man cannot will unless Godwills. Thus, it is true that from man's point of view, i.e., from his consciousness,he feels free to act, but from an ontological point of view his power to will, his willand his feeling or his knowledge of both the power to will and the will are createdby God. In the light of this, Frank's notion that "qudra, in human agent, implies aprior freedom of conscious and deliberative choice"35 is untenable, unless oneunderstands both freedom and choice as created by God. Thus, man feels he isfree, but he is really compelled to act. His feeling is also created by God.Furthermore, al-Ash'ari himself does not. mention "choice" and "will". Bothterms recur at later stages of the Kalam, from al-Baqillanl onwards.36 Had al-Ash'ari not thought that man's act of the will is also created by God, he wouldhave been led to admit an infinite chain of appropriations, for what causes a willto arise is another will and so forth, and each will in turn needs an act ofappropriation.37

Al-Ash'ari's conception of the substrate (mahalt) of an act poses another

31 See ibid, p p . 30, 40.32 See ibid, p p . 6 4 - 8 .33 See al-Luma, pars . , 9 3 - 4 .34 See ibid, pars . 49, 65, 159.35 See F rank , " T h e s t ructure" , p . 63 a n d passim.36 See Schwarz, "The Qadi", p. 249, nn. 80-2.37 See al-Jurjanl, Shark al-mawaqif, p . 246. Cf. S. P ines a n d M. Schwarz , " Y a h y a ibn 'Adi ' s

refutation of the doct r ine of acquis i t ion (iktisab)", Studia Orientalia Memoriae D. H. BanethDedicata, Jerusalem 1979, p p . 68, 78-9 , 92 -4 .

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difficulty for understanding Frank's theory. In the Kalam man's acts are onegenus of accidents which inhere in the atoms, or in the bodies composed of theseatoms. An act has as its substrate either the whole body of a person or the part ofthe body by means of which it is performed.38 Although al-Ash'ari does not statewhich of the two possibilities he prefers, it is evident from pars. 127, 129 that heprefers the second possibility.39 His adversaries pose an objection: if man'squdra, which co-exists with the act in time and in the same substrate, inheres inthe limb or organ by means of which the act is performed and not in his body as awhole, how can he be responsible for his act?40 Frank's theory faces the otherform of the same dilemma: his definition of qudra as "the actuality of the agentinsofar as he is the cause of his act" and his definition of this actuality as "anaccident of his Being",41 mean that qudra inheres in the whole body. But thiscontradicts what al-Ash'ari holds concerning the substrate of the act. It alsocontradicts al-Ash'ari's doctrine of capacities. For if the qudra inheres in thewhole body but only the hand moves, there is a qudra in a substrate without theoccurrence of the act.42

The simultaneity between the act and the power over it is another element ofthe theory of kasb stated plainly by al-Ash'ari. If the power, which is momentary,preceded the moment of the act, the act would occur by means of non-existentpower, which is impossible. This of course does not undermine Frank's theory,which deems the power as efficient cause, since an effect may come to be at thevery moment of the existence of the cause.43 The problem is whether the textassumes any impact (ta 7/wr) of the created power on the act of appropriationwhich is also created by God. The only allusion which may indicate that al-Ash'ari thought of such impact appears in the definition mentioned abovewhereby appropriation means that the action proceeds from its appropriator invirtue of a created power (bi-quwwa muljdatha). Now, the preposition bi may beinterpreted to indicate either a condition, or simultaneity (between the power andthe act)44, or a means45 through which the act takes place, or a cause of the act. Ishall prove later that al-Ash'ari most likely regards the quwwa muhdatha as anecessary condition for the occurrence of the act. According to laterMutakallimun, al-Ash'ari thought that the human power had no impact on theact.46 Schwarz asserts that al-Shahrastam was wrong in attributing this view to

38 See Schwarz, "The Qadi", p. 232, n. 17.39 Cf. Frank, "The structure", p. 60.40 See Schwarz, "The Qadl", p. 246, p. 258, n. 126.41 See Frank, "The structure", p. 54f.42 See al-Luma', par. 127.43 See Frank, "The structure", p. 55f.44 See W. Wright, A Grammar of the Arabic Language, rep. Cambridge 1967, p. 163f.45 Cf. al-Ash'ari, Maqalat, p. 542,11. 2-3. Gimaret considers the phrases waqa'a bi or yakunu

bi as signifying, in this context, only a cause-effect relation. See Theories, p. 84.46 See al-Jurjanl, Sharh al-mawaqif, pp. 237, 245. Schwarz, "The QadI", p. 248, n. 78.

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al-Ash'ari47, but he does not prove his assertion. The fact that the denial ofimpact appears for the first time in al-Juwayni,48 does not necessarily prove thatal-Ash'ari adheres to impact, especially when al-Ash'ari's text does not show thathe holds to impact and later Ash'arite scholars, whose report about al-Ash'ari'sother parts of the kasb theory are accepted as true, attribute the denial of impactto him. This being the case, Frank cannot rely on al-Ash'ari's believing in impactwhich the texts do not show.

The points outlined thus far cause us to question Frank's understanding of al-Ash'ari's theory of kasb. Other comments will be put forward below inconnection with certain sections of the al-Luma'. The following will be anattempt at explaining al-Ash'ari's theory of kasb from another point of view.Contrary to Frank, I do not think that al-Ash'ari introduces in the al-Luma' anoverall theory which solves the problem of God's omnipotence vis-a-vis man'sresponsibility. Whereas the Mu'tazilites insisted on the principle of God'sjustice, which made them confront questions such as how there can be twocreators, God and man, of one act, al-Ash'ari and his followers, who adhered toGod's omnipotence, had to answer the objection of how man can be responsiblefor an act created for him by God, and especially how God can be spoken of asjust when He creates evil, for whoever creates evil is an evil-doer. Thus, thepoints of departure of both schools established the character of the questionsasked.

Al-Ash'ari is of the opinion that God not only creates man's action,49 but isalso its only real agent.50 That God is the creator and the real agent of man'saction lays al-Ash'ari open to the charge that God is an evil-doer (jd'ir) when hecreates evil in man.51 In order to meet this charge al-Ash'ari states that Godcreates in man his action, be it an act of appropriation or an involuntary act.Concerning an involuntary movement, the meaning of "man moves" is that he isone in whom movement inheres (ma'nd al-mutaljarrik anna al-haraka hallathu),and this cannot be possible with regard to God, i.e., God cannot be spoken of asmoving. The same holds true with reference to kasb; God creates it in man and isits real agent, but the act is performed in man, not in God. Man is called anappropriator (muktasib), because the act takes place through power created forhim by God. Thus al-Ash'ari deduces from analogy that just as God does notmove when He creates movement, so He is not an evil-doer when He createsevil.52

Paragraph 92 is of crucial importance for the understanding of al-Ash'ari's

47 See Schwarz, ibid.48 See al-Juwayni , Irshad, p p . 207-10. Idem, Lumd ft qawa'id ahl al-sunna, ed. M. Allard

(Textes apologetiques de Guwaini), Beirut 1968, p . 165, 1. 8.49 See al-Luma', par . 82.50 See ibid, p . 40, 11. 9-10. Cf. G i m a r e t , Theories, p . 85, n. 39.51 See ibid, par . 97. By way of impl icat ion this charge migh t also be d r a w n from par . 90.52 See ibid, pars . 89, 97.

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theory of kasb. As we have said above it treats the difference between anappropriation act, which is performed through a qudra, and an involuntary act,which is performed without a qudra. Saying that through necessary knowledgeman differentiates between the two types of action, al-Ash'ari enters into theregion of phenomenology as I have noted above. It is true that man knows thedifference between the two types of action, but is that knowledge not also anaccident created in man by God? It is not impossible to answer this question inthe affirmative. Al-Ash'ari understands the term kasb according to the theory ofatoms and accidents.53 He seems to assert that God's creation of man's actions islogical; man cannot feel in himself a power without the latter having beenimplanted in him as an accident. God's omnipotence is absolute but with thequalification of logic; contrary to e.g. §alih al-Qubba's view (see below), Godcannot create visual perception along with blindness.54 The term iktisab from anontological point of view only expresses the relationship between man's body (orpart of his body) and the qudra and the act created for man by God. In this theory,man's knowledge or power is distinct from him. He feels or knows that he haspower and that he is not compelled to act, but again this feeling or knowledge isalso a created accident. There is a logical connection among the accidents createdfor man by God. God cannot create in man an accident of feeling of powerwithout creating at the same time an accident of power. This logical connectionamong accidents and bodies is also expressed in the view that without a limbthere is no qudra and without qudra there is no iktisab. Each element whichconsists in the occurrence of an act seems to be a necessary condition of thefollowing element.55 Paragraph 129 and what follows prove this notion.

This paragraph56 should be examined against the background of the claim ofsome Mu'tazilites that capacity consists in the soundness of the bodily structureand the healthiness of the organs and their freedom from ailments.57 Accordingto al-Ash'ari, the organ alone does not serve as a condition for the performance ofan act. Being a substrate of the qudra, it serves as a condition of the qudra which

5 3 See note 24 above and pars. 125, 131.5 4 See G o o d m a n , "Causal i ty" , p . 101.5 5 Cf. Wolfson, Kalam, 704f and my "al-Ghazal i ' s theory of causality", Studia Islamica

67(1987), pp. 75-98.5 6 McCar thy ' s translation reads as follows: " Q : Is it not t rue that the nonexistence of the l imb

entails the nonexistence of the ac t? A. The nonexistence of the l imb entails the nonexistence ofthe power, and the nonexistence of the power entails the nonexistence of the acquisition. For ifthe l imb does not exist, the power will not exist. But it is because of the nonexistence of the powerthat the acquisition is impossible - when the l imb does not exist - and not because of thenonexistence of the l imb. If the l imb were inexistent, and the power existed, the acquisitionwould take place. Fur thermore , if the acquisit ion were impossible only because of thenonexistence of the l imb, then when the l imb existed the acquisition would exist. But since thelimb can exist in conjunction with impotence, whereas, when the power is inexistent there is noacquisition, we know that the acquisit ion does not take place, because of the nonexistence of thecapacity, and not because of the nonexistence of the l imb . "

5 7 See al-Ash'ari , Maqalat, p . 229, 11. 15-6.

RE-EXAMINATION OF AL-ASH'ARl'S THEORY OF KASB 219

inheres in it, just as the qudra is the condition of an appropriation act. The qudra,which is an accident, produces with the atoms of the body a substrate in whichthe action takes place. This substrate is a condition for the occurrence of kasb.When al-Ash'ari says that: "If the limb were in-existent, and the power existed,the appropriation would take place" (par. 129), he does not mean to contradicthis definition of kasb (the action proceeds from its appropriator in virtue of acreated power, [par. 92], i.e., that there is a necessary connection between thepower and the substrate), but to stress, as he really does, that if the appropriationwere impossible only because of the non-existence of the limb, then when thelimb existed the action would take place. The qudra serves as an immediatecondition for the occurrence of the act. When an appropriation does not occur itis not on account of the non-existence of a limb, since a limb can exist withimpotence, but rather on account of the non-existence of the qudra. The sameholds true with regard to life (par. 130), the knowledge of weaving (par. 131) andthe constitution of a body (binya par. 132) all of which can exist in conjunctionwith impotence.

Here al-Ash'ari makes a point against Abu al-Hudhayl's stand that an act cantake place in the absence of life58 and against §alih al-Qubba's stand that "it ispossible for God to create seeing along with blindness and knowledge along withdeath".59 Likewise, it may be assumed that he tries to refute here the notion heldby the followers of Abu al-Husayn al-$alibi to the effect that power, knowledge,hearing and seeing may inhere in a dead body.60 Al-Ash'ari does not accept thevoluntaristic occasionalism held by $alih al-Qubba and Abu al-Husayn al-§alihi.According to him, on the one hand, God acts in the world freely, but on the otherhand, He is restricted in his acting to a natural sequence of actions. That al-Ash'ari believes in a regular succession of events61 is also proved in par. 124 inwhich al-Ash'ari demonstrates that the action occurs simultaneously with theexistence of the power over it.62

Al-Ash'ari's discussion of 'ajz (impotence, incapacity) as opposed to qudrafollows the preceding topic which deals with the relationships among theconditions leading to the occurrence of an action. 'Ajz is defined as man'sabsolute impotence to perform an action because an organ is missing or isafflicted, or because of a similar reason. In such cases qudra cannot inhere, since

58 See ibid, p . 232, 11. 5-6." S e e ibid, p . 406, 11. 14-5. Goodman, "Causality", p . lOlf.60 See ibid, p. 309, 1. 1 3 - p . 310, 1. 1. Goodman, ibid, pp. 102-4.61 The use of the term ajraal-'ada ("He made a custom". See al-Ash'ari, al-Luma', par. 131) is

a significant indicator of this belief.62 "Moreover, if the act could begin to exist, despite the nonexistence of the power, and if the

act could take place in virtue of an inexistent power, then burning could be effected by the heatof an inexistent fire after God had turned the fire into cold, and cutting could be effected by aninexistent sword after God had turned the sword into a reed, and the cutting could be done by aninexistent limb - all of which is impossible. So if that be impossible, the act must begin to existwith the capacity at the very moment that the latter begins to exist" (McCarthy's translation).

220 RE-EXAMINATION OF AL-ASH'ARl'S THEORY OF KASB

it has no substrate. The situation of absolute absence of power must bedistinguished from a situation in which qudra for a certain act is missing due tothe fact that the agent does not perform this act (or omits to perform, Wl-ishtighalbi-tarkihi) and performs its opposite (al-ishtighal bi-diddihi).63 Since, according toal-Ash'ari, the object of power, the action, exists simultaneously with the powerover it, when one disbelieves, i.e., when one has the power of unbelief, he isunable to believe. There cannot be two opposite accidents in the same substrateat the same time.64 It is in this sense that the unbeliever can be regarded as"incapable of belief", while God simultaneously imposes upon him theobligation of belief. By way of implication, the unbeliever can believe at anothermoment,65 for he then has the structure of body which can receive the accident ofqudra and hence the accident of the action.66

In sum, al-Ash'ari's concern is to explain how God is the creator of all man'sacts and their real agent while at the same time He cannot be described throughthese acts. His analysis of the occurrence of actions in man serves to prove that"man is able" means the possibility of his being a substrate of each of twocontradictory acts. Thus he answers the question of how God imposes preceptson man while the latter is incapable. Al-Ash'ari is more interested in solvingproblems concerning God's omnipotence than in establishing man's moralresponsibility, which he accepts as a postulate without trying to demonstrate it.The question of freedom of will and choice does not arise at all.67 He succeeded infulfilling the aim of his discussion. He could not succeed in answering questionswhich he did not pose. The question of man's moral responsibility as againstGod's omnipotence is treated from the point of view of God's omnipotence. Evenwithin the discussion of taklif, the important point al-Ash'ari emphasizes isGod's way of acting, or the conditions through which God's power acts.68

Abbreviations

Al-Ash'ari, al-Luma': Al-Ash'ari, Kitab al-luma' fi al-radd 'ala ahl al-zayghwal-bida'': The Theology of al-Ash'art, ed. and tr. into English R. J. McCarthy,Beirut 1953.

6 3 See ibid, par 135. Schwarz, " T h e Qadi" , p . 233f, n. 22. For al-Ash'ari , omitt ing a thing (notdoing a thing) means doing its contrary. See al-Ash'ari , al-Luma', p . 20, 11. 1-2.

6* See Peters, God's Created Speech, p . 142f.6 5 See Frank, " T h e structure", p . 63.6 6 See ibid, pp . 66, 68.6 7 Al-Baqillani, however, ment ions the terms "cho ice" (ikhtiyar) and " in ten t ion" (qasd).

According to him, " in ten t ion" is created. See al-Tamhid, par. 527. Schwarz, " T h e Qadi" , p . 238,n. 38. In my opinion, in establishing the creation of " in tent ion" , al-Baqillanl seems rightly tointerpret al-Ash'ari 's notion of kasb.

6 8 I am indebted to Prof. Lenn E. G o o d m a n who read this article and made valuablecomments .

RE-EXAMINATION OF AL-ASH'ARl'S THEORY OF KASB 221

i Al-Ash'ari, Maqalat: Al-Ash'ari, Maqalat al-islamiyyin wa-ikhtilafal-musallin,; ed. H. Ritter, Wiesbaden 1963.1 Al-Baghdadi, al-Farq: Al-Baghdadi, al-Farq bayna al-Firaq, ed. Tana'Abd al-! Ra'uf Sa'd, Cairo n.d.I Al-Baqillani, al-Tamhid: Al-Baqillani, K. al-tamhid, ed. R. J. McCarthy,I Beirut 1957.

Frank, "The structure": R. M. Frank, "The structure of created causalityaccording to al-As'ari. An analysis of the Kitab al-Luma', pars. 82-164", Studia

j Islamica 25 (1966), pp.13-75.' Gimaret, Theories: D. Gimaret, Theories de Vacte humain en theologie

Musulmane, Paris 1980.| Goodman, "Causality": L. E. Goodman, "Did al-Ghazali deny causality?",I Studia Islamica 47 (1978), pp. 83-120.j Al-Jurjani, Sharh: Al-Jurjani, Sharh al-mawaqiffi 'Urn al-kalam (al-mawqif al-\ khamis fil-ilahiyyai), ed. Ahmad al-Mahdi, Cairo 1976.

Al-Juwayni, Irshad: Al-Juwaym, K. al-irshad ilia qawati' al-adillaji usul al-\ i'tiqad, ed. Muhammad Yusuf Musa and 'All 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-Hamid.

Peters, God's Created Speech: J. R. T. M. Peters, God's Created Speech. A studyin the speculative theology of the Mu'tazill Qadi l-Qudat Abu l-IJasan 'Abd al-Jabbar bn Ahmad al-Hamadani, Leiden 1976.

Schwarz, "Acquisition": M. Schwarz, " 'Acquisition' (kasb) in early Kalam",in Islamic Philosophy and The Classical Tradition, ed. S. M. Stern, A. Hourani and

: V. Brown, Oxford 1972, pp. 335-87.Schwarz, "The Qadi": M. Schwarz, "The Qadi 'Abd al- Gabbar's refutation of

the As'arite doctrine of 'Acquisition' (kasb)", Israel Oriental Studies 6 (1976), pp.229-63.

Watt, Free Will: W. M. Watt, Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam,London 1948.

Watt, The Formative Period: W. M. Watt, The Formative Period of IslamicThought, Edinburgh 1973.

Wolfson, Kalam: H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, Cambridge,Mass. 1976.