A Re-Diagnosis of the Cyprus Conflict: Looking Ahead.

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A Re-Diagnosis of the A Re-Diagnosis of the Cyprus Conflict: Cyprus Conflict: Looking Ahead Looking Ahead

Transcript of A Re-Diagnosis of the Cyprus Conflict: Looking Ahead.

Page 1: A Re-Diagnosis of the Cyprus Conflict: Looking Ahead.

A Re-Diagnosis of the A Re-Diagnosis of the Cyprus Conflict: Cyprus Conflict:

Looking AheadLooking Ahead

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- 23 April 2003- 23 April 2003

(opening of the check-points) (opening of the check-points) a a “solution” process started… beyond “solution” process started… beyond our control?our control?

Greenline regulation… trade of goods Greenline regulation… trade of goods and crossing of persons (Europeans)and crossing of persons (Europeans)… after 1 May 2004… … after 1 May 2004…

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-24 April 2004 Referenda24 April 2004 Referenda

(trauma)……….SIGNIFICANCE (trauma)……….SIGNIFICANCE

First comprehensive solution plan ever (a First comprehensive solution plan ever (a product of 36 years of negotiations, based product of 36 years of negotiations, based on certain parameters and framework on certain parameters and framework agreements)agreements)

First time the Cypriots were asked to First time the Cypriots were asked to decide on their future (self-determination)decide on their future (self-determination)

End of a MYTH (“if let alone, Cypriots can End of a MYTH (“if let alone, Cypriots can solve this problem.”)solve this problem.”)

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-28 May 2004 28 May 2004 UN SG’s Report to the SCUN SG’s Report to the SC

welcomed the decision of the TCswelcomed the decision of the TCs stated that it was the rejection of the stated that it was the rejection of the

solution of the Cyprus problem, not a solution of the Cyprus problem, not a particular planparticular plan

if the GCs want to have a federation if the GCs want to have a federation in which they share power with the in which they share power with the TCs …. this should be demonstrated TCs …. this should be demonstrated by deeds…by deeds…

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Confidence and Trust? Confidence and Trust? R U kidding me?R U kidding me?

Though the check-points are open, no Though the check-points are open, no real progress, real integration is taking real progress, real integration is taking place…place…

In fact, on the contrary, the level of In fact, on the contrary, the level of confidence between the two sides had confidence between the two sides had never been this low and the gap of trust never been this low and the gap of trust between the two sides has never been between the two sides has never been this huge (leadership level is the this huge (leadership level is the WORST).WORST).

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- 8 July (Gambari Process) - 8 July (Gambari Process)

* Establishment of technical * Establishment of technical committees (on day to day problems)committees (on day to day problems)

* Establishment of working groups (on * Establishment of working groups (on substantive issues)substantive issues)

*Confidence building measures*Confidence building measures

How many timed have Tzonis and How many timed have Tzonis and Pertev met so far?Pertev met so far?

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Current Preference Current Preference Ordering Ordering

of the of the Two Ruling Political ElitesTwo Ruling Political Elites

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GC Ruling Political EliteGC Ruling Political Elite 1. 1. OsmosisOsmosis[i[i]]: Papadopulous’ first preference is the solution : Papadopulous’ first preference is the solution

of the Cyprus problem through “osmosis” where the current of the Cyprus problem through “osmosis” where the current de facto de facto Greek Cypriot dominatedGreek Cypriot dominated Republic of Cyprus would Republic of Cyprus would continue to exist and that gradually the Turkish Cypriots continue to exist and that gradually the Turkish Cypriots would be assimilated in the Republic as mere individual would be assimilated in the Republic as mere individual citizens in which they would not enjoy either their political citizens in which they would not enjoy either their political equality or their communal rights as envisaged both in the equality or their communal rights as envisaged both in the UN documents and also in the original 1960 constitution of UN documents and also in the original 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. the Republic of Cyprus.

2. 2. Status QuoStatus Quo: If the “osmosis” strategy is perceived to be : If the “osmosis” strategy is perceived to be unattainable, then the next preference for Papadopulous (and unattainable, then the next preference for Papadopulous (and the wider ruling Greek Cypriot leadership) is the continuation the wider ruling Greek Cypriot leadership) is the continuation of the current situation (i.e., the status quo) in Cyprus which of the current situation (i.e., the status quo) in Cyprus which he finds as a better alternative to a bi-zonal and bi-communal he finds as a better alternative to a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation based on the political equality of the two federation based on the political equality of the two communities as described in the relevant UN Security Council communities as described in the relevant UN Security Council documents.documents.

[i][i] See the full text of Papadopulous’ speech at the UN See the full text of Papadopulous’ speech at the UN General Assembly in 2005 at General Assembly in 2005 at http://www.cyprusemb.se/Dbase/cypemb/archive_352.asphttp://www.cyprusemb.se/Dbase/cypemb/archive_352.asp..

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GC Ruling Political Elite GC Ruling Political Elite cont’edcont’ed3. 3. Permanent Division/DivorcePermanent Division/Divorce: Since the separate and : Since the separate and

simultaneous referenda on the Annan Plan in April 2004, there are simultaneous referenda on the Annan Plan in April 2004, there are increased signs from the Greek Cypriot leadership that even the increased signs from the Greek Cypriot leadership that even the permanent division or a complete divorce of the two communities, permanent division or a complete divorce of the two communities, provided that the Greek Cypriot side receives a sizeable piece of provided that the Greek Cypriot side receives a sizeable piece of land from the Turkish Cypriot side – i.e., “land for peace,” is more land from the Turkish Cypriot side – i.e., “land for peace,” is more preferable to a solution which is based on the political equality preferable to a solution which is based on the political equality and the power sharing of the two communities. However, without and the power sharing of the two communities. However, without a huge side-payment (i.e., a sizeable land) the permanent division a huge side-payment (i.e., a sizeable land) the permanent division of the island is the last preference for the majority of the Greek of the island is the last preference for the majority of the Greek Cypriot political elites. Cypriot political elites.

4. 4. Federation a la Annan PlanFederation a la Annan Plan: It seems like that a federation, : It seems like that a federation, based on the power sharing and the explicit political equality of based on the power sharing and the explicit political equality of the two communities, which would be bi-zonal with regard to the the two communities, which would be bi-zonal with regard to the territorial aspects and bi-zonal with regard to the constitutional territorial aspects and bi-zonal with regard to the constitutional aspects, is regarded as the worst case option for the current Greek aspects, is regarded as the worst case option for the current Greek Cypriot leadership (though many in AKEL disagree with this). Cypriot leadership (though many in AKEL disagree with this). However, it should be indicated that there are also a good number However, it should be indicated that there are also a good number of Greek Cypriot political elites who prefer a federal solution to the of Greek Cypriot political elites who prefer a federal solution to the permanent division of the island.permanent division of the island.

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TC Ruling Political EliteTC Ruling Political Elite1. 1. Federation a la Annan PlanFederation a la Annan Plan: The current ruling : The current ruling

Turkish Cypriot leadership has been repeatedly Turkish Cypriot leadership has been repeatedly indicating since the referenda in 2004 that it is indicating since the referenda in 2004 that it is committed to the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation committed to the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation based on the political equality of the two based on the political equality of the two communities – a la Annan Plan. It should be also communities – a la Annan Plan. It should be also indicated that there is a sizeable number of the indicated that there is a sizeable number of the Turkish Cypriot political elites, especially in the Turkish Cypriot political elites, especially in the opposition, who prefer a “two-states” solution (i.e., opposition, who prefer a “two-states” solution (i.e., permanent division/divorce) to a federation in permanent division/divorce) to a federation in Cyprus. Cyprus.

2. 2. Permanent Division/DivorcePermanent Division/Divorce: The current ruling : The current ruling Turkish Cypriot elites, in case a federal solution is Turkish Cypriot elites, in case a federal solution is impossible to attain, would prefer a “two-states” impossible to attain, would prefer a “two-states” solution in which the Turkish Cypriots would be the solution in which the Turkish Cypriots would be the masters of their house (state).masters of their house (state).

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TC Ruling Political Elite TC Ruling Political Elite cont’edcont’ed3. 3. Status QuoStatus Quo: The current situation is only the third : The current situation is only the third

preference of the current ruling Turkish Cypriot political elites. preference of the current ruling Turkish Cypriot political elites. Compared to all the actors who are involved in the Cyprus Compared to all the actors who are involved in the Cyprus conflict, Turkish Cypriots constitute probably the number one conflict, Turkish Cypriots constitute probably the number one actor who is the least happy with the current situation (status actor who is the least happy with the current situation (status quo) on the ground in Cyprus. Their perception is that quo) on the ground in Cyprus. Their perception is that through their YES vote in the referenda, they deserved to be through their YES vote in the referenda, they deserved to be emancipated from the isolations and restrictions which still emancipated from the isolations and restrictions which still persist. In that regard, they find the current status quo in persist. In that regard, they find the current status quo in which the Greek Cypriots being in the EU despite their NO which the Greek Cypriots being in the EU despite their NO vote and the Turkish Cypriots remaining outside the EU vote and the Turkish Cypriots remaining outside the EU despite their YES vote to unify the island in the referenda despite their YES vote to unify the island in the referenda unjust that needs to be fixed. unjust that needs to be fixed.

4. 4. “Osmosis”“Osmosis”: Despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriots : Despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriots despise the current situation (status quo), they still prefer the despise the current situation (status quo), they still prefer the status quo to the “osmosis” outcome in which they believe status quo to the “osmosis” outcome in which they believe they would be reduced to a minority in a Greek Cypriot they would be reduced to a minority in a Greek Cypriot dominated Republic of Cyprus, in which case they would lose dominated Republic of Cyprus, in which case they would lose their political equality and the right to the power sharing their political equality and the right to the power sharing mechanisms of the central government as described both in mechanisms of the central government as described both in the UN documents and also in the original 1960 constitution the UN documents and also in the original 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.of the Republic of Cyprus.

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The EU Game?The EU Game?

The whole thing is linked to the Turkey-EU The whole thing is linked to the Turkey-EU membership process…. The GC side prefers to membership process…. The GC side prefers to play this game (out of its leagues….), rather than play this game (out of its leagues….), rather than talking to the TCs…. (role of the political elites in talking to the TCs…. (role of the political elites in the EU with regard to a consensus on Turkey???)the EU with regard to a consensus on Turkey???)

So, lack of dialogue (as mentioned above) So, lack of dialogue (as mentioned above) between the two communities… but there is between the two communities… but there is more….more….

+ Lack of a HORZONTAL dialogues among some of + Lack of a HORZONTAL dialogues among some of the segments of the TC society in the north.the segments of the TC society in the north.

+ Lack of a VERTCAL dialogue between the + Lack of a VERTCAL dialogue between the leadership level and the civil society (and the leadership level and the civil society (and the grassroots) in the GC society in the south.grassroots) in the GC society in the south.

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Solution? & DialogueSolution? & Dialogue

At this point, I do not, unfortunately, envisage a At this point, I do not, unfortunately, envisage a solution (based on the agreed upon principles of bi-solution (based on the agreed upon principles of bi-zonal, bi-communal federation) in Cyprus in the short zonal, bi-communal federation) in Cyprus in the short (up to 1 year) or the medium (1 to 5 (up to 1 year) or the medium (1 to 5 years)***[interesting developments in the south years)***[interesting developments in the south regarding the presidential election] run, reached by regarding the presidential election] run, reached by the two leaderships.the two leaderships.

In any case though, for any type of solution – be it a In any case though, for any type of solution – be it a federation or a confederation, or even two-state federation or a confederation, or even two-state solution – there is a huge need for a healthy solution – there is a huge need for a healthy DIALOGUE between the two sides.DIALOGUE between the two sides.

Currently, not even cooperation on the bird flue, Currently, not even cooperation on the bird flue,

human trafficking, drug trafficking, crime etc. human trafficking, drug trafficking, crime etc.

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Lack of Dialogue & Lack of Dialogue & Distortion in the MediaDistortion in the Media

The current lack of dialogue on almost all The current lack of dialogue on almost all levels (see the UN poll), is cementing the levels (see the UN poll), is cementing the permanent division of the island along the permanent division of the island along the current status quo…current status quo… What is more What is more important here is that, the quality of info important here is that, the quality of info of the “other” side is so low and shallow.of the “other” side is so low and shallow.

People are disengaged, un-interested, and People are disengaged, un-interested, and un-motivated…. Those who are not, are un-motivated…. Those who are not, are getting their news and info from very getting their news and info from very biased and distorted sources….biased and distorted sources….

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Alternative ScenariosAlternative ScenariosGiven the above analysis of the preferenceGiven the above analysis of the preferenceorderings of the two leaderships in Cyprus, it isorderings of the two leaderships in Cyprus, it isquite obvious that a “creeping divergence” is thequite obvious that a “creeping divergence” is thenet result currently on the ground in Cyprus.net result currently on the ground in Cyprus.Based on the analysis above and the terminology Based on the analysis above and the terminology

used inused inthe workshop in March 2006 at Oxford, today we the workshop in March 2006 at Oxford, today we

are moreare moreinformed to speculate on the future scenarios in informed to speculate on the future scenarios in

Cyprus. Cyprus. The following are the probable scenarios listed The following are the probable scenarios listed

startingstartingfrom the most probable and going towards the leastfrom the most probable and going towards the leastprobable one:probable one:

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1. 1. Structural Stalemate a la TaiwanStructural Stalemate a la Taiwan: This is the : This is the most realistic scenario given the realities on the most realistic scenario given the realities on the ground in Cyprus today. In this scenario, the TRNC ground in Cyprus today. In this scenario, the TRNC continues to be internationally unrecognized while continues to be internationally unrecognized while at the same time continuing to perform most of its at the same time continuing to perform most of its functions just like the other recognized sovereign functions just like the other recognized sovereign states. Gradually, the international community lifts states. Gradually, the international community lifts the restrictions and the isolations on the North the restrictions and the isolations on the North Cyprus which would eventually TaiwanCyprus which would eventually Taiwanizeize the the TRNC. In such a case, the international recognition TRNC. In such a case, the international recognition of the TRNC would be a natural evolution – which of the TRNC would be a natural evolution – which might first come from some Muslim or Central Asian might first come from some Muslim or Central Asian Turkic speaking countries, provided that there Turkic speaking countries, provided that there would not be a change in the political positions of would not be a change in the political positions of the two leaderships (i.e., the Greek Cypriot the two leaderships (i.e., the Greek Cypriot preference for “osmosis” and the Turkish Cypriot preference for “osmosis” and the Turkish Cypriot preference for federation). preference for federation).

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2. 2. A Co-operative Status QuoA Co-operative Status Quo: This is the second : This is the second possible scenario given the realities on the ground in possible scenario given the realities on the ground in Cyprus today. This scenario is possible only if Cyprus today. This scenario is possible only if meaningful negotiations between the two sided in meaningful negotiations between the two sided in Cyprus start. In that sense, the Gambari process Cyprus start. In that sense, the Gambari process could be the catalyzing element here. The two sides could be the catalyzing element here. The two sides agreed in July 2006 to: (i) establish technical agreed in July 2006 to: (i) establish technical committees to deal with daily issues; (ii) to form committees to deal with daily issues; (ii) to form working groups to deal with the substantive issues of working groups to deal with the substantive issues of the Cyprus problem; and (iii) to implement the Cyprus problem; and (iii) to implement confidence building measures to improve the confidence building measures to improve the atmosphere in Cyprus. If such a process could be atmosphere in Cyprus. If such a process could be started and maintained, then the non-cooperative started and maintained, then the non-cooperative mode of the relations (status quo) could be mode of the relations (status quo) could be transformed to a co-operative one which in return transformed to a co-operative one which in return could lead to either a federal solution as described in could lead to either a federal solution as described in the UN documents or to an “amicable divorce a la the UN documents or to an “amicable divorce a la Czechoslovakia” through the free and mutual Czechoslovakia” through the free and mutual consent of the two sides. consent of the two sides.

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3. 3. Amicable DivorceAmicable Divorce ( (or partitionor partition) ) a la a la CzechoslovakiaCzechoslovakia: An amicable divorce where the : An amicable divorce where the two sides mutually recognize each other and two sides mutually recognize each other and commit themselves to non-confrontational politics commit themselves to non-confrontational politics is possible when the Greek Cypriot elites perceive is possible when the Greek Cypriot elites perceive that the international recognition of the TRNC that the international recognition of the TRNC would be probable or when in a federal solution would be probable or when in a federal solution the Turkish Cypriots would get “the Turkish Cypriots would get “more than what more than what they deservethey deserve““[i[i]] (explicit political equality) in (explicit political equality) in which case the Greek Cypriot elites would want to which case the Greek Cypriot elites would want to negotiate the two-states solution probably with a negotiate the two-states solution probably with a “land for peace” approach in which they would “land for peace” approach in which they would require a sizeable piece of land from the North to require a sizeable piece of land from the North to be yielded to the South. be yielded to the South.

[i][i] This is the Greek Cypriot argument regarding This is the Greek Cypriot argument regarding such arrangements in the 1960 constitution of the such arrangements in the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus as the Vice-President being a Republic of Cyprus as the Vice-President being a Turkish Cypriot with veto rights and that decisions Turkish Cypriot with veto rights and that decisions on certain issues needed separate majority of the on certain issues needed separate majority of the two community members in the House of two community members in the House of Representatives. Representatives.

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4. 4. Conflictual Divorce a la YugoslaviaConflictual Divorce a la Yugoslavia: : This is probably the least possible and This is probably the least possible and the most undesired scenario for all the the most undesired scenario for all the actors involved. Such a scenario actors involved. Such a scenario presupposes some sort of violence or at presupposes some sort of violence or at least a ‘limited war’ on the island (which least a ‘limited war’ on the island (which would automatically involve Turkey) would automatically involve Turkey) after which the abyss between the after which the abyss between the Turkish and Geek Cypriots become Turkish and Geek Cypriots become somewhat permanent. Such a scenario, somewhat permanent. Such a scenario, though very improbable, would mean though very improbable, would mean the permanent derailing in the Turkey’s the permanent derailing in the Turkey’s EU accession process which neither EU accession process which neither Turkey nor the EU can ever afford. Turkey nor the EU can ever afford.