A Note of Clarification on Economic Surplus’

GEORGE DALTON Boston University

N A recent controversy (Harris 1959; Pearson 1957, pp. 320-341), i t is made I clear that the term “surplus” is used by anthropologists in several meanings and for several purposes. Because of the important roles which have been as- signed to material surpluses, especially in analyzing problems of institutional change and development, clarity concerning such a “treacherous” (see Knight 1941) term seems particularly necessary.

This paper will argue three points. (1) Even when the term surplus is used in an unambiguous sense having direct reference to empirical fact, the role of a material surplus as inducer of socio-economic organizational change is not a t all certain. (2) When the term is used in ex post facto analysis of some unob- served change, or to explain some complex social structure, surplus becomes a definitional identity and its role as inducer of socio-economic organizational change is incapable of empirical proof or refutation: it is a logical construct which need not have any connection with actual events. (3) Lastly, as it is used in a market-organized economy, the term surplus has special meaning wholely unlike that in non market economies. The first two sections will refer to those types of nonmarket-organized economies studied by anthropologists. The third section will refer to a market-organized economy such as that of the present-day United States.

I. SURPLUS AS EMPIRICAL FACT

If it is explicitly recognized in any society that “this season” there is an unusually large amount of one or more material goods compared to the ex- perienced norm of the past, we will call the extra output a factual surplus. AS empirical fact, a surplus simply means that more of something is currently available than previously, and the society recognizes that such is the case.

I t is the purpose of this section to show that the importance of such a sur- plus can vary greatly, depending on the society’s socio-economic institutions and values, and the specific conditions under which the surplus arose.

(1) The amount of such surplus must be specified as well as the form it takes. If this season’s larger output is only slightly larger than usual (indeed, even if i t is much larger), the society may not recognize the existence of a sur- plus, in which case nothing may be changed by its appearance and conven- tional distribution. Actually, it would be meaningful to say that despite the increase in output no surplus has arisen, because none is recognized. Further, it will make a difference if the surplus represents a net increase in total output, or whether it consists of an expansion of one component of output while others are contracting (as usually occurs in war situations). A third possibility is that while there has been no change in the amounts and varieties of goods compared

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to last season, there has been a change in their appropriation (distribution), so that some groups of people have acquired what i s to them “surplus,” but what is not surplus to the society a t large.

(2) Was the experienced surplus accidental (an unexpected windfall)? If so, was i t unprecedented? If accidental surpluses have appeared occasionally in the past, it is likely that the society already possesses some mechanism(s) for dealing with them. Further, if the accidental surplus is regarded as a highly irregular occurrence-a gift of the gods-there need not be any socio-economic change induced by its sporadic appearance.

(3) Was the surplus deliberately contrived? If so, the “surplus” probably was regarded as both necessary and important because it had been created for a specific purpose, such as war or an unusual trading expedition. But here again should be ynderscored the possibility that the extra output for some special use was derived not from a growth in the total-a factual surplus-but rather via a diversion from its normal use.

(4) Was the purposefully contrived surplus the result of an unusual inten- sity of conventionally applied effort, or did it result from some technological or organizational innovation, or from a military venture (war booty)?

(5) Did the extra output consist of a new type of foodstuff or other ma- terial item? If so, our concept of surplus-an experienced increase in material output-becomes ambiguous unless it is further refined. If a new type of good was produced in place of some of the old, there can be no clearcut surplus be- cause new and old types of goods are not directly comparable in quantity. Whatever the quantity of the new good, it cannot (without redefining surplus) be measured against last season’s quantity of old types of output. In general, when goods are measured in their natural units (hundreds of yams) rather than by money prices or by some measure of effectiveness in specific use, there is no way of comparing two aggregates of differently composed items and saying that one is definitely larger than the other.2 Of course, in the special case where this season the normal output of the usual goods is produced, plus some amount of the new good, the latter represents extra output and unambiguously can be called surplus.

(6) Was the purposefully contrived surplus acquired this season the recog- nized beginning of a permanently higher level of available material goods; or was it regarded as temporary, the surplus disappearing with the fulfillment of the purpose for which it was originally contrived?

In summary, even in its simplest meaning-as experienced fact-surplus can be of widely varying importance, depending on the society’s specific insti- tutions and on the special conditions which created the surplus: whether there was a growth in the total or a different allocation from a n unchanged total; whether the extra output was recognized or not; whether i t consisted of one type of good or several; whether i t was temporary or permanent, accidental or deliberately created, induced by conventional means or by an innovation.

It should be pointed out that when the term surplus is meant as it is above, to denote an experienced growth of output, i t would be better to avoid using

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the term altogether. “Surplus” bears the (market derived) connotation of redundancy, an amount over and above what is really useful or necessary, an excess of something. A deliberately contrived surplus (excess) would not make sense. It would be a contradiction in terms because the extra output would be deliberately sought only if i t were, so to speak, earmarked prenatally. Whether or not an accidental increase in output would be in fact regarded as redundant (unnecessary), would depend wholly upon the social apparatus of the com- munity, i.e., its structured mechanism for dealing with windfall increases in output and the conventional attitude toward the specific good(s) which had increased in quantity.

11. SURPLUS AS AN ANALYTICAL CONSTRUCT

I t becomes clear from the Pearson-Harris controversy and the literature cited therein (Pearson 1957:339-341; Harris 1959: 198, 199) that the impor- tance attributed to material surplus stems from uncritical use of the concept as an analytical device, rather than as a term to describe a recognized growth in actual output. As an analytical device, surplus is derived as a definitional identity-a logical construct-and is used as a deus ex machina which allegedly explains complex social structure or some unobserved socio-economic develop- ment.

Surplus is a definitional identity when it is related to the existence of non- food producers; and i t is an ex post facto rational construct when it is asserted as a necessary and/or sufficient pre-condition for social stratification or divi- sion of labor. In the extreme case it is further asserted that the very appear- ance of a material surplus induces (causes) social stratification.

I t should be emphasized that a syllogistic chain of deduction underlies the usage of surplus as a rational construct: every man must eat; if a man does not produce food for himself he must acquire food from other men; let us call this acquired food surplus; therefore, by definition, every society which has non- food producers must have a food surplus. An example is the following by Gordon Childe:

The stone axe, the tool distinctive of part a t least of the Stone Age, is the home-made product that could be fashioned and used by anybody in a self-contained group of hunters or peasants. It implies neither specialization of labour nor trade beyond the group. The bronze axe which replaces it is not only a superior implement, it also presupposes a more complex economic and social struc- ture. The casting of bronze is too difficult a process to be carried out by anyone in the intervals of growing or catching his food or minding her babies. I t is a specialist’s job, and these specialists must rely for such primary necessities as food upon a surplus produced by other specialists. Again, the copper and tin of which the bronze axe is composed are comparatively rare, and very seldom occur together. One or both constituents will almost certainly have to be imported. Such importa- tion is possible only if some sort of communications and trade have been established and if there is a surplus of some local product to barter for the metals (Quoted by Kluckhohn 194952).

Some ambiguities inherent in the meaning of surplus as a definitional iden- tity, and difficulties in its use as an ex post facto rational construct, can be stated as follows.

(1) I n the above quotation from Childe, two different bundles of goods are defined as surplus: the food acquired by nonfood producers and the locally

486 American Anthropologist [62, 1960

produced stuff which is (by assumption) traded off. Such usage is wholly non- empirical. If the natives themselves do not regard the two kinds of produce as “surpIus”-as things apart from other material goods-an artificial dichotomy is read into the data. Such distinction between surplus and nonsurplus goods is only justifiable i j it serves some analytical purpose capable of empirical proof 07

refutation. As a definition, surplus cannot by itself be assigned a causal role without empirical proof. For example, a key passage in the above quote is the following: “The bronze axe which replaces it [the stone axe] . . . presupposes a more complex economic and social structure . . . these [bronze-axe makingj specialists must rely for such primary necessities as food upon a surplus pro- duced by other specialists.” What are the theoretical implications of such de- duction? That societies using the bronze axe must be more complex than those using the stone axe? That technological change is the most frequent (or most probable) inducer of socio-economic organizational change? That a prior in- crease in foodstuffs is a necessary condition for making use of bronze imple- ments? None by any means is necessary. Division of labor based upon sex is found a t relatively low as well as high levels of material subsistence. Bronze is an amalgam the proportions of whose components may vary considerably. Therefore, some bronze implements may require little more work than do stone implements. In a word, one cannot prove a theory of social change with definitions.

(2) An unproved social primacy is attached to food compared to other goods and services. I n one deus ex machina use of surplus, an initial situation is assumed in which all are food producers (food being a biologjcal necessity). Then a food surplus arises which allows the support of nonfood producers, e.g., priests. The implication is, that because religion is not necessary for bio- logical survival, it is a second-class sort of service, a luxury, which must have come later in time than did food production: (‘ . . . mankind must first of all eat and drink, have shelter and clothing, before i t can pursue politics, science, religion, art, etc.” (Engels 1883: 16). Such usage assumes that because food is necessary for biological survival, it must be socially valued more than goods not necessary for biological survival. But such is frequently not the case. The social importance attached to a good or service (e.g., kula armbands) may have little to do with its need for physical survival. Indeed, an outstanding characteristic of primitive prestige economy is the all-abiding concern for goods necessary, so to speak, for social survival.

Surplus, when analytically so used, serves as the basis for an empirically unwarranted exploitation theory: if only the material goods necessary for bio- logical survival are important, then the services of priests and political heads are, by definition, of lesser importance. The question then is raised, how does the rank and file become seduced into accepting this scheme of things in which they surrender material goods (by definition) of primary importance, to re- ceive back (by definition) only less important services? “. . . the almost universal inequities which seem to mark the distribution of surplus economic goods is striking. This surplus wealth, it is apparent, goes to two groups, those who govern, and those who command techniques for placating and manipulating the supernatural forces of the

DALTON] Economic Surplus 487 universe. The members of these groups are, therefore, to be regarded as belonging to a leisure class in that they, like their families and their retainers, profit from the social leisure which this eco- nomic surplus represents. They are . . . members of a leisure class . . . only in the sense that the goods they deal in consist of intangibles whose production does not require the exercise of the manual labor their less privileged fellows give to the production of the essentials to life they pro- duce. . . . Having attempted to sketch the conditions which make for the production of an eco- nomic surplus and the social leisure it represents, two further points must be considered. The first concerns the manner in which non-producers of subsistence goods obtain the support of their fel- lows and entails a description and analysis of the devices employed to ensure them command of the surplus they must have in order to live and function. The second point bears on the measures taken by those who benefit from the economic surplus to ensure that those who do not so benefit remain content with their lot” (Herskovits 1952: 414).3

Surely it is the definitions and values of the analyst, not those of the soci- ety being analyzed, which make the posed questions seem i m p ~ r t a n t . ~

(3) Not only is it true that surplus as a definitional identity is incapable of empirical proof or refutation, but when surplus is identified with the pres- ence of nonfood producers, the term loses empirical selectivity because i t is a rare society which does not have nonfood producers. What may be an empirically unimportant uniformity among societies (the presence of nonfood producers) is elevated to a position of theoretical primacy.

(4) In its analytical use as an ex post facto rational construct to explain social change, surplus implies a one-way causational sequence : material sur- pluses somehow arise which then induce (or make possible) more complex social organization. But the reverse could also be the case: a change in social organization inducing an increase in output, or a rearrangement of its uses so that (even without any growth in output total) one group gets more, or more of one particular good gets produced.

111. SURPLUS I N A MARKET-ORGANIZED ECONOMY

In an economy in which the participants derive most of their livelihood from market sales-both the sale of “factor inputs” such as labor or the use of land, and commodity outputs (finished goods and services) as do profit-re- ceiving entrepreneurs-the term surplus commonly has been used in three different meanings.

In Marx’s formal analysis of industrialized market capitalism, surplus value was a definitional identity expressed in terms of money price: the differ- ence between the money labor cost of producing a commodity and its final sales price. In the aggregate, i t was the sum of all market derived nonlabor incomes, i.e., rent, profit, and interest. The material output equivalent of aggregate sur- plus value consisted of all the consumer goods purchased by nonlaboring classes, plus additions to capital equipment purchased by entrepreneurs. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out that Marx’s definition, like that im- plicitly used by Childe and Herskovits, is not empirically derived. I t proves or disproves nothing; i t merely defines from the point of view of the definer, not from the point of view of the social participants. The same chain of deduc- tion underlies Marxian surplus: only labor can produce value; if the laborer receives less value (market determined wage) than he produces (product price on the market), we will call the money differential “surplus value.”

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Another analytical use of a surplus concept in market economy appears in formal economic theory derived from Ricardo. Here the concept relies on the important distinction between factors of production which are variable in marketable supply and those which are inelastic-temporarily or permanently fixed in quantity and therefore unresponsive in supply to price changes. I n the case of a fixed factor supply, a Ricardian “rent” arises which is regarded by economists as “surplus” in a special sense: it is a payment made for the use of something (say, land), which if not made, would not reduce the quantity forthcoming. Pure economic rent is different from other factor payments in that it is not a necessary “supply price.” The same quantity would be sup- plied even a t a lower market price. That there is a price a t all is due to com- petitive demand for something relatively scarce. I n the same sense, the price of a Rembrandt painting is a “surplus” or economic rent, the exact amount of which is determined by competitive demand. The supply of Rembrandt paint- ings is fixed; if the price fell, the supply would remain unchanged. Ricardo first developed the concept in regard to land, but later market theorists have shown that land is just one of a family of such cases of fixed factor supply. As a contrast with the previously discussed concepts of surplus as an analytical device, the Ricardian rent concept is illustrative. Because it is grounded in empirical fact-the actual and recognized conditions of factor supply in a market-organized economy-it is an analytical device with direct application to empirical processes, problems, and policies.6

A third meaning of surplus in a market-organized economy is that asso- ciated with the farm commodities bought by the United States Government in its price-support program. Here the meaning of surplus is both empirical and unambiguous, but significantly different from our previously considered meanings. Surplus consists of that amount of any commodity which, during a given period of time, cannot be sold on the market a t some specified (parity support) price. The characteristics of such surpluses are worth describing in detail.

(1) The surplus exists because of very special institutional rules. If the rules were changed so as to remove parity support prices, the surpluses would disappear as uncontrolled market price fell to that level a t which the entire quantities forthcoming could be sold. Alternatively, if the rules were changed so that much less was produced, the surpluses would disappear because the uncontrolled market price would rise to that level a t which the quantities forthcoming could be sold a t parity price on the private market (i.e., without the government buying any).

(2) The surplus is socially recognized as being in excess-an amount over and above what is regarded as desirable.

(3) A unique aspect of market-determined surplus stems from the fact that whether or not a surplus exists depends entirely on institutional criteria (market prices), rather than on a physical increase in absolute quantities of produce. The special result follows that in market economy it is possible to have surpluses even if the total quantity produced this season is less than it

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was last season. If market price falls below parity price for any reason (e.g., a shrinkage in demand), there is a recognized surplus no matter how the total quantity this season compares to last season.

IV. SUMMARY

I n general, there are two basic meanings that can be attached to economic surplus. I n an empirical sense it can refer to some specified portion of material output which is recognized as being in some way different from the socially defined norm. The importance of such experienced surpluses can be highly variable. What difference, if any, the surplus makes, depends on how it came into being and the special institutional apparatus and values of the society experiencing it. With regard to the meaning and usage of surplus as empirical fact, three points especially should be underscored if ambiguity is to be avoided: in each context it should be made clear whether the term is meant to describe an experienced increase in total output of usual material goods, an increase in one component of usual goods while the total has declined, an in- crease acquired by one social group out of an unchanged total, or the produc- tion of a new type of good qualitatively different from the old. Secondly, if i t is believed that for some specific society experienced surpluses have been impor- tant, it is necessary to establish how the surpluses arose. Deliberately con- trived surpluses can be created by social policy (such as taxation) as well as by technological innovation. Finally, only in a market-organized economy is it clear that empirical surpluses are recognized as being functionless and super- fluous, surpluses being institutionally defined in market terms as those quanti- ties of commodities which cannot be sold a t some specified price.

The second general meaning of surplus derives from nonempirical defini- tions and is employed analytically. In two of the cases cited, surplus was de- fined as material goods acquired by nonfood producers (Childe and Herskovits) and as the money differential between labor cost and product price, or, what is the same thing, the incomes and outputs acquired by nonwage receivers in a market economy (Marx). Such usage is nonempirical in the sense that the social participants do not recognize the defined surpluses as being apart from nonsurplus outputs (or incomes). I t is important to realize that surpluses so defined are rational constructs, which-in themselves-do not prove or dis- prove anything concerning the role or importance of the defined surplus in the process of institutional change or in accounting for social stratification. To build an elaborate superstructure on definitional foundations, as is sometimes done in evolution theory, entails oversimplification and unwarranted surety about complex processes. Indeed, such theorizing contains a methodological act of faith in the relevance of definitional categories to real-world structures, which is unseemly in the social sciences, and, a t the least, should not remain implicit.

NOTES

I am most grateful to Karl Polanyi of Columbia and to Paul Bohannan of Northwestern for their very helpful suggestions and comments.

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2 If material goods were measured by their effectiveness in fulfilling a specific purpose, we could then indicate which of two qualitatively different bundles of goods was larger. For example, if a bushel of rice contained three times the calories of a bushel of wheat, we could say that for food subsistence the bushel of rice was greater than the bushel of wheat.

A similar orientation is reflected in Harris (1959: 198), “The decisive question now becomes: what force or incentive makes the food producers surrender a portion of their necessary food sup- ply in order to support a class of nonfood-producers.”

4 Herskovits himself points out that the attitudes of those who contribute to the material sup- port of rulers and priests is far from that of hostility due to any feeling of exploitation: “It cannot he maintained on the basis of our existing knowledge that from either a psychological or an ethno- logical point of view, attitudes of blame are held by those who contribute to the support of their superiors. Rather we find far more frequently a lively pride in display, a drive toward emulation, a joy in following sanctioned leadership, and pleasure derived from the fact that adequate direc- tion is being given political or religious matters by those whose competence is based on the divine order, or inherited position, or special training” (1952:482,483).

6 I t was the theoretical basis for Henry George’s policy of the single tax. The “surplus” (eco- nomic rent) could be taxed without reducing the quantity of land. Another application was in rent control policy during and after World War 11. Housing already in existence is in fixed supply. Rental rates on such housing can be reduced (or prevented from rising) by law, without the quantity diminishing.

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ENGELS, FREDERICH 1883 Speech a t the graveside of Karl Marx. I n Karl Marx selected works, V. Adoratsky

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1949 Mirror for man. New York, Whittlesey House. KNIGHT, F. H.

1941 Anthropology and economics. Journal of Political Economy 49: 247-268. PEARSON, H. W.

1957 The economy has no surplus: critique of a theory of development. Zn Trade and market in the early empires, K. Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg, H. W. Pearson ed. Glencoe, The Free Press.