A Monarchy of Disseminated Courts. the Viceregal Systema

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A Monarchy of Disseminated Courts: The viceregal system. Manuel Rivero Rodriguez (Instituto Universitario La Corte en Europa ‐ Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) Paper that will be read by the author at Panel The Political Organization of the Spanish Court: Courts, Court, Courtiers ~ 20246 Friday, Mar 27th at 10:15 AM until 11:45 AM LOCATION Building: Hegelplatz, Dorotheenstrasse 24/1 Floor: Sixth Floor Room: 1.607 contents Foreword Foreword 1 King’s Court and Viceregal Courts 2 Development of Viceroyal Courts 5 Councils, kingdoms and viceroys 6 A Monarchy of Courts or... disseminated Court? 7 BIBLIOGRAPHY 9

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Transcript of A Monarchy of Disseminated Courts. the Viceregal Systema

  • AMonarchyofDisseminatedCourts:

    Theviceregalsystem.

    ManuelRiveroRodriguez(InstitutoUniversitarioLaCorteenEuropaUniversidadAutnomadeMadrid)

    PaperthatwillbereadbytheauthoratPanel

    ThePoliticalOrganizationoftheSpanishCourt:Courts,Court,Courtiers~

    20246

    Friday,Mar27that10:15AMuntil11:45AM

    LOCATION

    Building:Hegelplatz,Dorotheenstrasse24/1

    Floor:SixthFloor

    Room:1.607

    contents

    Foreword

    Foreword 1

    KingsCourtandViceregalCourts 2

    DevelopmentofViceroyalCourts 5

    Councils,kingdomsandviceroys 6

    AMonarchyofCourtsor...disseminatedCourt? 7

    BIBLIOGRAPHY 9

  • This paper forms part of the research project funded by the Spanish

    Ministry of Education and Science LA RECONFIGURACION DE LA MONARQUIA

    CATOLICA (16401700): LA REORDENACION DEL SISTEMA VIRREINAL HAR.

    HAR201237308C0503.DevelopedatIULCE[InstitutoUniversitarioLaCorteen

    Europa,UniversidadAutnomadeMadrid]www.iulce.es

    The viceroys had a capital relevance at the political and administrative

    system of the Spanish Monarchy. Its institution was celebrated as an ingenious

    legal biction thatsolved thequestion that thesovereignofsuchagreatvarietyof

    territorieshadthechancetogovernallofthem,beingimpossibletobephysically

    ineachofthematthesametime.DuringSixteenthandSeventeenthcenturies,the

    viceregalinstitutiondidnothaveapreciseandspecibicreglamentation,becauseit

    did not exist a normative apparatus that bixed its commitments (Itwasmade in

    1680,whenanewsistemofgovernmentwascreated).Duetothis,theauthorityof

    theviceroyshadvaguelimits.But,theextraordinaryfactthatthedifferentviceroys

    were the incarnation of the king and its alter ego, situate us in front of the

    problemof thenatureand limitationof theirpower.Theywerenot liable toany

    laworrule,sotheycouldactaccordingwiththeirwillswiththeformulaofexcuse,

    seobedeceperonosecumple(Iobey,butIwillnot).

    KingsCourtandViceregalCourts

    Shortly after Philip II had taken possession of his Spanish kingdoms, he

    decided to break with the prevailing diversibied centre by concentrating

    prerogatives in a single place, Madrid. This involved a radical reorganization of

    power, which had a marked effect on the very concept of a viceroy and his

    functions.Whatdoesmeanveryconceptofviceroy?Itmeansanentiresubstitute

    ofthekinginthekingdomduringhisabsence.Phillipsfather,theEmperorCharles

    V, employed pure viceroys, with long mandates, undebined in nature and not

    limited in time. The reasonwas that he never stayed in one place for very long

    time; theviceroywasanexceptional bigurewho ruledduring thekings absence,

    occupying a position that he automatically abandoned when the sovereign

    returned. The king was supposed to live among his subjects and it was

    inconceivable that he should not do so. However, Phillips decision creating a

    permanentplaceforhisCourtwasneitherasradicalasitmightappear.Thereisno

    regulationmakingMadridthecapitalofSpain.Thecitydoesnotseemtohavebeen

    viewedasthecourtoftheMonarchyratherthanasthecourtofalltheterritories,

    norwasitperceivedassuchbyhiscontemporaries.Thechangesweregradualand

    silent,andwentalmostunnoticed,asisclearfromthefactthatitisimpossibleto

    identifytheprecisemoment, theexactdatewhenMadridwasdeclaredtheCourt

    oftheMonarchy.Itneverhappened.

    At the same time, there are some decisions restraining the authority of

    viceroys. The resolutions issued onMarch 10, 1555 by the emperor in Brussels,

    whichlimitedthemandateoftheviceroysoftheIndiestothreeyears,anticipated

    anideaworkedonlaterbyhisson,whenhelimitedthemandatesofthoseofItaly

  • andthecrownofAragon.Limitingthemandatewasregardedasaproblemtodo

    withthepermanentabsenceoftheking,sinceitimpliedthatthealteregoswere

    notconceivedofastemporarysubstitutesfortheroyalpersonbutashisdelegates

    with limited attributes, or, as Juan de Vega feared, governors more akin to

    corregidores thantokings.1

    There were some complementary regal commands reorganizing the

    CouncilsoftheIndiesandAragonandcreatingtheCouncilofItaly,partofageneral

    intentiontoconcentratethecapacityforinterventiononthenewcourt,tomakeit

    the only source of authority. Madrid will be a place where all the networks of

    patronage and clienteles would converge and through which the effective

    governmentoftheMonarchywouldbeexercised.Fixingtheresidenceofthecourt

    of the king, who did not travel except on rare occasions (and never outside the

    Iberian peninsula). At the same time, Philip II introduced the innovation of

    appointingviceroysforonlythreeyears,theproposaltolimitviceregalautonomy

    was precisely in order to give some content to a superior court. In 1558, the

    wordingoftheregulationdoesnotstatethisexplicitly,butitwasclaribiedlater,in

    1574,whentheviceroysofItalyexperienceddifbicultiesinreconcilingtheirown

    courtswiththekings. Ina lettertothegovernorofMilan,thenatureofthealter

    egowasconbirmed:theywerevicarsofthekingintheexerciseofroyalauthority,

    hisdoubles,orotherself,althoughthisdidnotpreventPhilipIIfromwantingto

    be informedabouteverything theydidor toapprove thedecisions they took.As

    timewent by, somepolitical essayists saw this decision to supervise and keep a

    close eye on matters as a distinctive mark of restricted otherness in viceregal

    authority. Pietro Corseto pointed it out by underlining the fact that the king

    authorized the person of the viceroy in public affairs by conferring potestad

    ordinaria [ordinaryauthority]onhim,butwithout transferringpotestadabsoluta

    [absoluteauthority]tohim,sincethiswasinalienabletothepersonoftheking.A

    clear difference was established, in this way, between the sovereign and his

    double.Thekingrecognizednopersonsuperiortohiminthetemporalworldand

    was also above the law, whereas the viceroy had to account for his actions and

    faculties, abiding by the legal system in force at the time. As a consequence, the

    viceroybecamean instrumentof royalauthority,notaparallelone (ashadbeen

    thecaseinthetimeoftheemperor).Agenericmandatecouldbeestablishedbut

    not exhaustive supervision nor, as Juan de Vega had already remarked, was it

    possibletotransformthemintocorregidores.

    ThedebatesurroundingtheforeignviceroyinAragonmaybeillustrativeof

    the limitsof thesubordinationof theviceroy,since inthatkingdomthe local law

    (fueros)didnotallowthekingsofbicerstobeforeigners.Everypost,fromthemost

    exaltedtothehumblest,fromthegovernortothepalacegatekeeper,wasreserved

    fornativesofAragon.Havingaviceroyfulbiltheroleofheadofgovernmentwasan

    innovationthathadnotreallybeenacceptedand,toavoidfrictionwiththenative

    population,CharlesVhaddonehisbest toappointviceroys fromthe territory in

    question.Inakingdomdominatedbysmallgroupsandfactions,thenotionthatthe

    absence of the king was transient meant that the viceroy was limited by the

    provisional nature of his mandate, whilst the sovereigns frequent visits to the

    territoryrestrictedthepossibilityofhisviceroygoverningsolelyforthebenebitof

    membersofhisfamilyandcircleoffriends.In1554,theappointmentofDonDiego

    UntranslatableintoEnglish,isakindofroyalmayors1

  • HurtadodeMendozatooccupytheposition,demonstratedthesovereignsconcern

    tointroducechangesintheviceregalregime.Hisintentionwasnottosubjectthe

    kingdomtoaforeignpower.Themonarchsideawasthatitwasmoreeffectiveto

    putsomeoneneutralinplace,giventhathisabsencewaslikelytobepermanent.

    His intentionwasnot toalter thedelicatechecksandbalanceswhichkept

    thekingdomsinequilibrium;thenewviceroyofAragonhadtocomefromoutside

    the place hewas going to govern and be free of ties of any kind binding him to

    thoseheadministered.ThispurposeispatentlyclearinPrincePhilipsinstruction

    toHurtadodeMendoza;thefactionalconblictsaredescribedinthetextasbeingat

    the heart of the kingdoms problems, and it is tacitly understood that only

    somebody from outside and impartial will be able to resolve them. In Aragon,

    however,abigureofthiskindhadneverbeencalleduponbeforeand,sinceHurtado

    deMendozawasnotapersonofroyalblood,theAragonesesooninterpretedthis

    asmeaning thatwithout family connectionsandwith limited reason, theviceroy

    oughttobeanativeofthekingdom,notaforeigner.Therewereinterpretersofcivil

    law,suchasAntonioLabataorthepublicprosecutor,PrezdeNueros,whostrove

    toprovethattheviceroywasnotanofbicer,because,amongotherthings,hewas

    not subject to any ordinance, but a royal person, as the king could appoint him

    withoutreferencetowhatwasstatedinthefuerosonthesubjectofofbicesinthe

    administrationandgovernment.

    Atlast,thekinghadapragmaticsolution;HurtadodeMendozawentonto

    presideovertheCouncilofItalyandwasreplacedbyabettercandidateinAragon.

    Between 1566 and 1575, an Aragonese viceroy of royal blood, Hernando de

    Aragn, archbishopof Saragossa, combined in his personboth thewishes of the

    king and the regulations enshrined in the fueros. Nevertheless, the question

    remained latent, resurfacing in 1590when viceroyArtal of Aragon, the count of

    Sstago,triedtopreventhissuccessor,themarquisofAlmenara,fromtakingofbice

    on the grounds that it infringed the local law. Sstago was unable to delay the

    moment when he had to step down from ofbice and, in May, Almenara took

    possession. Shortly after, the disturbances known as theRevolt of Aragon began

    and the issue of his appointment was regarded as one of the prime causes

    triggeringtheconblict.

    Almenaraspowersmadehimsubordinatetothekingscourt,yet,paradoxically,he

    alsoowedhisauthoritytothestrengtheningofthebigureoftheviceroy,detached

    fromthelocalpowers,whichqualibiedhimtosetupabona2ideviceregalcourtin

    SaragossathatwasnotincompatiblewiththekingscourtinMadrid.Infact,after

    annexing Portugal in 1580, Philip II had given the binal impetus to a model of

    territorial governmentwhose two fundamentalpillarswere tobe the councilsof

    theCourtofMadridandtheviceroys.Subsequently,underPhilipIIIandPhilipIV,

    thismodelwasexpressedinapparentlycontradictorytermsintheinstructionsto

    viceroys:

    The power to exercise this position and ofbice is very wideranging and free

    because,inpublic,itiswellthat,sinceyouhavetobethereinmyplace,youshould

    have all the authority that is necessary for it. But notwithstanding that power, I

    herebydeclaretoyouthatmyintentionisthatyoukeeptoandcomplywithallthe

    abovementionedthingscompletely.

  • DevelopmentofViceroyalCourts

    There is no doubt that in the binal decades of the sixteenth century the

    courtsoftheviceroysgrewinsplendourandpomp.Theirpresencegrewnotonly

    at a symbolic level but also as centres of power, as evidenced by the growth in

    personneltoservetheviceroys.Thedevelopmentofthebigureoftheviceroyasthe

    political hub of a large number of states within the Monarchy is only

    understandableifwelookattheroleofhighnobilityingovernment,mostlyfrom

    Castile. Quite obviously, harmonious integration had ever existed because the

    nobilityhaditsrootsinroyalty,asitwastheCrownthatbestowedtherank.Atthe

    end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, the Castilian

    noblesoccupied,asof right, thecaptainciesgeneral, embassiesandviceroyalties,

    becauseonlytheyrepresentedtheking,whetherasexecutorsofhismonopoliesor

    as negotiators in his name with other princes or parliaments, that is, with the

    kingdoms.Thischaracteristicwasreinforcedbecausetheverypositionofviceroy

    implied a way of belonging to royalty, of entering the sovereigns family,

    expressed in the formula our cousin, viceroy and captain general; this is one

    reasonwhyvisitorsinItalywereneverallowedtotouchthepersonoftheviceroy

    orhishousehold.20Weobservethiscontiguitybetweenkingandviceroyintheir

    households,whichwereassociatedbothsymbolicallyandphysically.

    Thissymbioticrelationshipwassuchthatitpermittedallthewealthofthe

    highnobility tobeplacedat thedisposalof theCrownso that theirmonopolyof

    themostimportantpostsconstituted,infact,asafeguard;intheabsenceofawell

    organized bureaucracy, they provided the structure for government, supplied

    throughtheirclientnetwork,theirstockofprestige,theirhonourandtheirgoods.

    Inotherwords,theirpersonalcreditconstitutedareservefortheroyalserviceto

    drawon.Onthisspecibicpoint,forexample,theinstructionsoftheIndiesviceroys

    included some directives relating to the organization of the viceroys household

    which,inthemselves,demonstratethewayinwhichthehouseholdofthealterego

    dovetailed with the sovereigns, fulbilling the functions of an alter domus: The

    viceroys should endeavour to use and have in their households the sons and

    grandsons of discoverers, peacemakers and settlers and other distinguished

    people,thattheymightlearnurbanityandhaveagoodeducation.

    FromJuandeVegasletter,writtenin1558,toOlivaresmemorandaof1590,

    theviceroysalwaysrespondedontheassumptionthattheybelongedtoadomestic

    order,oneoffamiliaritywiththeking,andwere,therefore,immunetohavingtheir

    function controlled externally by the law courts and royal ofbicers. They never

    admitted to being subject to higher administrative powers. The honour, the

    underlying philosophy of viceregal governmentmade it impossible to invest the

    bigureof theviceroywithabureaucraticconceptionofhisofbice; theviceroywas

    inspired by a chivalric ethic and understood his function as deriving from the

    personalbondthattiedhimtotheking.

  • Councils,kingdomsandviceroys

    Linkedtotheproblemofredebiningtheofbiceofviceroywastheissueofthe

    inexorable rise of the lawyers and the development of the machinery of royal

    councils inMadrid.Philip IIsplans forreformcametogether in thecreationofa

    blueprint thatwouldbereproduced insimilar terms throughouthispossessions,

    andwhosemost rebined formwas the viceroyalty in the Indies. The viceroys of

    PeruandNewSpainembodiedall the sovereigns functionsat thehighest levels:

    military ones as captains general, judicial ones as presidents of the assize court,

    andecclesiasticalonesasvicepatronsof thechurch in the Indies.Thegovernor

    presidents of the assize courts who exercised similar functions in Chile, New

    Granada, Guatemala, Terra Firma, and so on were in their turn their viceroys.

    Lalindeemphasizedthefactthatfromthekingandhiscouncilsrightdowntothe

    last viceroy with his assize court, the entire government of the Monarchy was

    organizedalongbinarylines;hetermedthisaviceregalsenatorialregime,andits

    specialfeatureineachofthekingdomswastoactasacheckandkeepacarefuleye

    ontheviceroys.HecitedthecaseofCatalonia,whoseassizejudgeswereappointed

    directly by the kingwith the aim of counteracting the power of the viceroy and

    limitinghisautonomy.Thisinterpretationappearstobeconbirmedbytheserious

    conblicts thatarose in1599and1626between theviceroysand theirofbicerson

    theonehandandthejudgesoftheassizecourtontheother.Atthesametime,this

    schemawas imposed in the rest of the Crown of Aragons domains, so that it is

    reasonable to conclude that correcting the lawcourtswas theprerogativeof the

    king:theyweredirectlyaccountabletohim.Ashasbeenobserved,thismodelwas

    validoutsideCataloniaandAragon,andwasapplieduniversallyfromwhatcanbe

    deduced from the texts of Italian jurists, such as Carlo Tapia, or experts in

    institutionsintheIndies,likeSolrzano.

    Itisverycommontoconfusethevoiceandstanceoftheassizecourtswith

    central government; the fact remains, though, that they only ever showed one

    very limited aspect of royal authority. In the sixteenth century, the concept of

    tyranny shiftedaway from the rulerwhomerely followedhisownwhimwhile

    holding thecommongood incontempt towards thekingwho ignored the laws

    andruledwithoutcounsel.Theactofprovidingadvicehadbeentransformedintoa

    legalrulingandentailedcompliancewiththelaw.Theeffectofthelegalarguments

    supporting judicial reviewswas to underlinewhatwas forbidden to the idiots,

    those untutored in the lawwhowould fall into despotism if they took decisions

    withoutknowledgeofthelaw.Aroundtheyear1600,lawyersacquiredavisibility

    inpublicpreviouslyenjoyedonlywhencarryingouttheirfunctionsinthecourts;

    this can be deduced from many testimonies, such as the letter written by the

    Councilof ItalytotheviceroyofSicily, thedukeofMaqueda,remindinghimthat,

    accordingtothepragmaticsanctionofjudgesgownsof1599,theyshouldwear

    their ofbicial dress to all public ceremonies and not only when going to court.

    Wherevertheyhappenedtobe,theywerealwaysjudges,thelivingembodimentof

    theLaw.

    Furthermore, themagistrates, togetherwith the Castilian nobility and the

    military, constituted an inherently itinerant social group, birstly, because their

    careers ordinarily took them to all the courts the length and breadth of the

  • kingdom, and, secondly, because the Court of Madrid was the pinnacle of their

    professional lives. There was a constant stream of judges passing through the

    councils,courtsandassizes,onvisitsbothprivateandgeneral,makingenquiries,

    compilingreports,carryingoutinvestigationsandsoforth.Weknowthatlawyers

    trained in Bologna, who completed their cursus honorum in the Milanese

    magistracy,endedtheirdaysaspresidentsoftheassizecourtinCharcas, inPeru.

    The various local judiciaries, apart frombeing subject to constant vigilance, also

    enjoyedahighdegreeofintercommunication,enablingthetransferofprocedures

    andatendencytowardsstandardizationofpractices,illustratedbytheattemptto

    create a Sicilian Consiglio Collaterale in 1612, or the reform of the Sardinian

    assizesin1606whichseparatedcivilfromcriminalaction.

    The result of all this was that the lawyers, formed a social group able to

    visualize the Spanish Monarchy as a political and jurisdictional unit, not as a

    compositeoffreestandingstateswithnoconnectionsbetweenthem.Thepractice

    ofjudgesbeingcooptedontothecouncilsofMadrid(whichbegantobecommon

    from 1595 onwards, and general from 1600) demonstrates this fact. The

    attendanceofcooptedjudgesandcouncillorsatcouncilmeetingsarosefromthe

    practiceofcallinginmembersofacouncilworkinginanotherareatoaskfortheir

    opinion as legal experts. Jurisprudence and legal practice made it possible to

    discussmattersoflaworgovernmentwhichwentbeyondthescopeofthelawsof

    each individual kingdom, with the Italian, Castilian, Portuguese and Aragonese

    magistratesexchangingknowledgeandexperienceor binding commonground in

    law.

    The unitary vision that the lawyers displayed implied a perception of the

    kings council thatwasnot tied to a singleplace;when the judgesof theMexico

    assizes introduced themselves in public, they stated after their name that they

    werefromtheCouncilofHisMajesty inNewSpain,asimilarafbirmationto the

    one made by the judges of the Consiglio Collaterale in Naples or those of the

    Audiencia in Catalonia. They situated themselves in an intermediate position

    between the king and the kingdom: before the king, they were the voice of the

    kingdom; before the kingdom, the voice of the king and before everyone, they

    representedtheLaw.

    AMonarchyofCourtsor...disseminatedCourt?

    In the second half of the twentieth century, historians of institutions

    sustainedan interpretation thatpaidprivilegedattention to thebureaucracyand

    origins of the modern state. In line with this type of analysis, it was taken for

    grantedthatthepoweroftheviceroyswanedtothebenebitofthecourtinMadrid.

    From1561,centralpowerwasstrengthenedasaresultofbixingapermanentseat

    ofgovernment,andthepowerrelationswithinthevastCatholicMonarchybecame

    interplayofopposingforces,ofthecentreversustheperiphery,astateoftension

    between centrifugal and centripetal impulses. This reading of the situation saw

    administrative renewal at the level of the state cancelling out particularisms,

    developingantinobleandanticonstitutionalpolicies(inotherwords,contraryto

  • therepresentativeassembliesoftheEstatesandthelawsemanatingfromthem),in

    favourofabsolutism.AwellknownseriesofstudiesonthekingdomofNapleshas

    pointed out that the buildup of power at the centre converted the potestas

    viceregia intosomethingresidual, theresultantstrippingawayofauthoritybeing

    linkedtotheexpulsionoftheNeapolitanaristocracyfromhighofbice.Thejudicial

    institutions,thatis,theNeapolitanhighcourts,theCollaterale,theSommaria,the

    Vicara, and the provincial assizes wielded power because they were state

    institutions.

    In the other side,most recently, someHistorians focused their studies on

    power microphysics. In line on Foucault philosophy, they paid attention on a

    differentscheme,debiningtheSpanishMonarchyasaPolycentricone.Theyignore

    theCourtdisseminationandtheroleofcouncilsandlawyers.Whenthesocialand

    political processes are scrutinizedmore closely, these analytical schemas do not

    work.Earlierwedescribedhow, at the endof the sixteenth century, the concept

    andpracticeofgovernmentwasconsolidatedasadualitybetweengubernaculum

    and jurisdictio,making thepairedviceroyjudiciarymodeluniversaland that this

    relationship was more complex than the one expressed as a system of mutual

    surveillance.Inunireddatur,maxim57oftheEmpresasmoralesypolticaspara

    unprncipeCristiano[MoralandPoliticalMaximsforaChristianPrince],Saavedra

    FajardoemphasizedthatthegovernmentoftheMonarchyofSpain[is]foundedon

    such sound judgement that the kingdoms and provinces that Nature separated

    havebeenbroughttogetherbyprudence.EveryonehastheirrespectiveCouncilin

    Madrid:oneeachforCastile,Aragon,Portugal, Italy,theIndiesandFlanders.But

    healsoadvised,ThekingofSpaindoesnotruleinItalyasaforeignprince,butas

    anItalianprince.Thepointhewasmakingwasthatthankstotheviceroys, Italy

    wasgovernedinItalyandfromItaly.

    In the seventeenth century, the power of the viceroys was anything but

    residual.Inprotocol,thestyleofaddressforaviceroywasequivalenttothatfora

    Prince,becauseaviceroywithplenipotentiarystatuswasthekinginthekingdom.

    Duality between Senatus and viceregal government is explained in a text called

    NoticiageneraldeelEstadodeMiln,sugobiernoy formaao1645, itsays:only

    twobodiesrepresent theking in thisState, thegovernor in thenatural formand

    the Senate in the mystic. The quotation in itself is quite enlightening. In

    Covarrubiassdictionary,naturalisdebinedasEverythingthatisaccordingtothe

    natureofeachonewherenatureisacondition,whereasmysticmeansmuchthe

    sameasbigurative:thatwhichgivesshapetomatter.(IntheVocabulariodelasdos

    lenguas,toscanaycastellanabyCristbaldelasCasas,mstico[mystic]istranslated

    intoItalianby2igurativo[bigurative]).Mysticrepresentationisnoneotherthanthat

    manifestedby theregepatria identity,embodying thedefenceof theLawand its

    observance;anaturalrepresentationwhich,comingdirectlyfromGod,subjectsthe

    populationtotheobedienceofhisperson.

    Both these representations of the sovereign, the natural and themystic, neither

    transmitadistantcentralpowernoraretheyextensionsofit.Webindourselves,in

    fact, in aMonarchywith adiversibied court,where theking is absent, but at the

    sametime,presentonaccountofthedualityofhisnature.

    In this way, the kingdoms across the councils were permanently in the

    presence of the king and he could attend to them in person, for themagistrates

    keptthepatriaaliveintheroyalretinue.Conversely,theviceroyswiththeircourts

    kept the presence of the natural lord alive among his subjects. The relationship

  • betweenthecourtinMadridandthecourtsoftheviceroyswasbasedonthisdual

    interplay.Thisrelationship,however,graduallybecameunbalancedbecauseofthe

    changeswroughtduringPhilipIVsreign.ThecountdukeofOlivaressetinmotion

    changesthatdelegatedgreaterexecutivepowertotheviceroysatthesametimeas

    heremovedCouncilsauthoritycreatingalotofjuntas(informalcommissions).It

    is aworking hypothesis thatwe are exploring in current research, probably the

    revoltsof1640werenot the resultofa reactionagainst centralization,butquite

    the reverse; they were a reaction to an imbalance in which the courts of the

    viceroysweregraduallycuttingtheirtieswiththecourtoftheking.Inthestrictest

    sense,theywererevoltsofloyalty.Thepopularcry:longlivetheking,deathtobad

    governmentcalled,precisely,fortherestorationofthebigureofthekingasfather

    andprotector, one thathadbecome increasingly remoteandmediatedbynobles

    andlocalelites.Theycryagainsttheabsenceofatruekinginthekingdom.

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