1

A Missed Opportunity:Harris Wofford, Louis Martin and the Kennedy Administrations Civil Rights Agenda

By

Andrew BegleyDecember 2013

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for theMaster of Arts in HistoryDual-Degree Program in History and Archives ManagementSimmons CollegeBoston, Massachusetts

The author grants Simmons College permission to include this thesis in its Library and to make it available to the academic community for scholarly purposes.

Submitted by

Andrew Begley

Approved by:

______Laurie Crumpacker Zhigang Liu

2013, Andrew Begley

Table of Contents

Introduction/Historiography..2

The Campaign10

Calling Mrs. King.20

The Presidency.33

Conclusion..49

Works Cited54

During the three short years of John F. Kennedys presidency, spanning the years 1961-1963, the civil rights struggle pierced the national consciousness as never before. From deadly riots at the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), to fire hoses, police dogs and church bombings in Birmingham, to peaceful demonstrations like the March on Washington, it became impossible for the average American to remain unaware of the civil rights movement. And while President Kennedy used executive action throughout his presidency to achieve gains in civil rights, laying some of the groundwork for the 1964 Civil Rights Act, his commitment to true civil rights reform was always in doubt. Throughout this period, the relationship between the Kennedy White House and civil rights leadership evolved almost on a daily basisat times fairly cordial and at others downright hostile. National civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Roy Wilkins of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and James Farmer of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) applied constant pressure on the President and his advisors to take a stronger stance on civil rights. While presidential advisors Louis Martin and Harris Wofford were able to bring personal relationships with some of these leaders to their positions in the White Houserelationships which at times proved extremely beneficial to the administrationfears of the political ramifications of forging closer ties with the civil rights movement ensured that opportunities for collaboration between the two sides often went unfulfilled. Over the last fifty years, and particularly in the last twenty, a general consensus has emerged within the secondary scholarship on Kennedys civil rights record. Kennedy is often portrayed as a step behind on civil rights, reacting to crises such as Ole Miss and Birmingham rather than acting proactively to address the underlying issues that spawned these pressure points. Historians such as Mark Stern in Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson and Civil Rights and Jonathan Rosenberg and Zachary Karabell in Kennedy, Johnson, and the Quest for Justice: The Civil Rights Tapes structure their narratives around these crises and the eventual passage of the Civil Rights Act. As these titles attest, both view President Johnson as a crucial player in finally securing this legislation. The slow gains made under Kennedy might not have translated into far-reaching changes without Johnsons political coalition-building acumen. While The Civil Rights Tapes differs in that it includes extensive transcriptions of White House meetings during these periods of crisis, both monographs portray Kennedy as slow to support civil rights legislation not because of any personal opposition to reform, but rather because of a fear of the political ramifications of such support. According to Stern, the South and black civil rights became the hammer and anvil of the 1960 election. John Kennedys decision was to strike a precarious balance between the two antagonists.[footnoteRef:1] In The Politics of Injustice: The Kennedys, the Freedom Rides, and the Electoral Consequences of a Moral Compromise, historian David Niven argues that Kennedys political strategy was to pursue a glacial change[footnoteRef:2] approach to civil rights, which called for steady, incremental advances on civil rights issues, while avoiding calling for legislation and other foundational changes in the immediate future. While Kennedy acknowledged that major changes in civil rights were probably inevitable, he believed that these changes could not be forced too quickly upon an unwilling electorate. This glacial change approachand the balancing act that it necessitatedwould continue throughout Kennedys presidency, until events outside of the presidents control forced him towards a stronger stance on civil rights reforms. [1: Mark Stern, Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson, and Civil Rights (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 36.] [2: David Niven, The Politics of Injustice: The Kennedys, the Freedom Rides, and the Electoral Consequences of a Moral Compromise (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 2003), 36.]

While Rosenberg, Karabell, and Stern view the civil rights movement through the administrations response to crisis situations, other works have delved into the day to day workings of the civil rights groups that precipitated these crises through demonstrations, marches and sit-ins. Raymond Arsenaults Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice provides an in-depth look at the planning and execution of COREs Freedom Rides during the spring and summer of 1961. The rides sought to publicize the unlawful enforcement of segregation in interstate travel facilities in the South, and ended up forcing the Justice Department and the Kennedy White House to intervene on behalf of the activists. Arsenault outlines the often heated exchanges between the Kennedy Justice Department and supporters of the Freedom Rides, which testified to the wide ideological gap between nonviolent activists and federal officialseven those who had considerable sympathy for the cause of civil rights.[footnoteRef:3] While Arsenault acknowledges that political considerations necessarily affected the Kennedy administrations reluctance to come out strongly in support of civil rights, he feels that Kennedys adherence to moderation was a disservice to himself and to the civil rights movement. Arsenault includes a telling quote from a letter written by CORE activist Marvin Rich, who wrote that Kennedy had done ever so much more than Eisenhower for the cause for civil rights [but] when measured against our expectations and against the awesome rush of events he has done little.[footnoteRef:4] While Kennedy may not have had much direct control over this awesome rush of events, he did have the potential to provide stronger leadership on civil rights. However, this perspective is not always reflected in the historical literature. [3: Raymond Arsenault, Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 274.] [4: Ibid., 507.]

In John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction, historian Carl Brauer argues that Kennedys focus on civil rightsfrom his use of executive action to building closer ties between his administration and the civil rights movementmarked a profound change from the inertia that had generally characterized [past presidential administrations].[footnoteRef:5] While historians such as Arsenault and Niven fault Kennedy for his delays in pushing for far-reaching civil rights reforms, Brauer argues that Kennedys civil rights advocacy signified a break from the past and created an atmosphere were challenges to the status quo were possible. Brauer cites the oft-told story of James Merediths decision to apply to the University of Mississippi the day after Kennedys inauguration, inspired by Kennedys rhetoric on civil rights and convinced that he would have the federal governments support in his attempt to integrate the school. [5: Carl Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 320.]

Any historical work on civil rights during the Kennedy era cannot be complete without a reference to Taylor Branchs epic narrative history Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-1963, the first of three volumes on the life and times of Martin Luther King, Jr. While King is at the center of the work, Branch charts in great detail the rocky relationships between King and the Kennedys, from Kennedys push to secure Kings support during the 1960 election to later acrimony over the FBIs belief that several of Kings aides were full-fledged Communist agents. Branch writes that in death, the late President gained credit for much of the purpose that Kings movement had forced upon him in lifeacquir[ing] the Lincolnesque mantle of a unifying crusader who had bled against the thorn of race.[footnoteRef:6] While Kennedy may have provided an environment more conducive to civil rights reform than previous presidents, as Brauer argues, painting Kennedy as a champion of civil rights on the level of King is certainly not justified when considering Kennedys overall record on the issue. [6: Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 918.]

Other works that focus strictly on the foundation and strategies of specific civil rights groups, rather than on individual protest campaigns such as the Freedom Rides, generally have little to say about the Kennedy administrations role in civil rights. Inge Powell Bells study CORE and the Strategy of Nonviolence does not include a single mention of Kennedy or his administrationsuggesting that the involvement of the federal government was almost irrelevant in planning and executing the grassroots campaigns favored by CORE. Works such as Clayborne Carsons In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s touch upon the push by Robert Kennedy and other administration officials to move student groups such as the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and CORE away from direct action protests such as sit-ins and marches towards less controversial voter registration campaigns. Both Carson and Arsenault see this move as politically driven, but also acknowledge that the registration of black voters in the South was a vital task within the civil rights movement. SNCC leaders felt that it would be possible to contribute to the Kennedy supported Voter Education Project (VEP) without abandoning the direct action protests that were forcing the administration to deal more directly with civil rights concerns. SNCC and CORE remained in contact with Justice Department officials such as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Burke Marshall, and Kennedy staffers (most prominently Harris Wofford, who served as Special Assistant to the President on Civil Rights) but these interactions rarely affected the day to day goals of these groups. There has been surprisingly little secondary scholarship focusing specifically on the roles that Harris Wofford and Democratic National Committee Deputy Chairman Louis Martin played in mediating the relationships between the White House and civil rights leadership. In their respective roles, Wofford and Martin were instrumental in providing access to the White House for black leadership. Of the two, Wofford has received the more complete treatment in historical narratives, often mentioned in histories concerning Kennedys civil rights record, but never really warranting an in-depth discussion of his role. Branch writes that Woffords departure from the White House in 1962 for the Peace Corps was enough to convince King that the opposition in Washington was not confined to the segregationist fringe of the government.[footnoteRef:7] In other words, Woffords position and influence in the White House (or lack thereof) was indicative of the administrations commitment to civil rights. A full length history of Woffords role in the White House can only be found in a book written by Wofford himselfOf Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixtiesa history/autobiography that provides interesting insights into his relationships with Kennedy and Martin Luther King, and into the way John and Robert Kennedys views on civil rights evolved during these years. [7: Ibid., 586.]

As for the role played by Louis Martin in Kennedys administration, historical secondary scholarship has been almost non-existent. There is one biography of Martin, Walking with Presidents: Louis Martin and the Rise of Black Political Power, written by Journalist Alex Poinsett in 1997, but up to this point there does not seem to be a definitive historical work on Martins role in Kennedys White House. Martin was instrumental in reaching black voters during Kennedys presidential campaign, and after the election worked closely with the White House in putting together a talent search for qualified black candidates for high-level government positions. Originally brought into the Kennedy campaign because of his connections to black business leaders and publishers, and having gained some political experience as a publicity director for FDRs 1944 presidential campaign, Martin would become a trusted advisor to Kennedy on civil rights. Discussing the 1960 campaign, Taylor Branch writes that [Sargent] Shriver recognized instantly that Louis Martin understood the inner workings of the Negro world in a way that could be communicated effectively to Robert Kennedyand the other insiders of the Kennedy campaign.[footnoteRef:8] This understanding allowed Martin to work effectively behind the scenes throughout Kennedys presidency, pushing for civil rights advances both within and outside of the federal government. [8: Ibid., 343.]

Most histories of Kennedys involvement in the civil rights movement follow a similar trajectory, focusing on how Kennedy was slow to act on civil rights early in his presidency, and on how civil rights crises later in his presidency forced him into pursuing substantial civil rights legislation. Sometimes lost within this narrative is the history of how civil rights leaders interacted with the Kennedy administration outside of these crisis situations. This thesis will analyze the relationships between civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King and Roy Wilkins and Kennedy civil rights advisors Harris Wofford and Louis Martin, and show how these advisors roles within the administration were shaped by Kennedys civil rights policies and priorities. Following his narrow election victory, Kennedy had the opportunity to utilize his advisors contacts within the civil rights movement to inform his civil rights agenda. However, his fears of the political ramifications of becoming too closely associated with civil rights groups meant that he did not take advantage of these relationships fully.

The CampaignAs the 1960 presidential election approached, John F. Kennedys campaign scrambled to find support and make connections within the civil rights community. For most in the civil rights movement, Senator Kennedy was a remote figurea supporter of civil rights in the abstract perhaps, but certainly no champion of the cause. Former CORE director James Farmer felt that the candidate had a feeling for, but not enough knowledge or acquaintance with civil rights. I felt that he did not know much about Negroes or their struggle.[footnoteRef:9] This general lack of interest in civil rights is attributable to Kennedys background, both politically and personally. Growing up in an affluent Massachusetts family, isolated from African Americans, Kennedy would not have been introduced to civil rights issues on a personal level. As Martin Luther King, Jr. eloquently described it, [Kennedy] had never really had the personal experience of knowing the deep groans and passionate yearnings of the Negroes for freedom because he just didnt know Negroes generally.[footnoteRef:10] This trend would have held true during Kennedys time in Congress as well, as African Americans made up a very small percentage of his constituency in Massachusetts, and he would not have had a pressing political need to acquaint himself with issues of race.[footnoteRef:11] Additionally, Kennedys primary political interest was in foreign policy. His Harvard thesis on British diplomacy leading up to World War II, published in 1940 as Why England Slept, was Kennedys first foray into a field that he felt would define his presidency. Harris Wofford writes during the campaign that looking ahead, [Kennedy] saw Cuba, Berlin, Southeast Asia, and the domestic economy as the urgent priorities.[footnoteRef:12] Civil rights was simply not at the top of this list. However, while Kennedys primary policy concerns undoubtedly resided elsewhere, it would be impossible for him to completely ignore civil rights during the campaign. As it became increasingly apparent that black voters would play a central role in the 1960 presidential election, the Kennedy campaign began to reach out to black leaders, promising decisive action on civil rights under a new Kennedy administration. [9: James Farmer, Interview by John F. Stewart, March 10, 1967, p. 1, JFKL Oral History Program.] [10: Martin Luther King Jr., Interview by Berl I. Bernhard, March 9, 1964, p. 3, JFKL OHP.] [11: Niven, The Politics of Injustice, 8.] [12: Harris Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1980), 103.]

The most important of these meetings was with Martin Luther King, Jr., whom Kennedy met with privately in June, 1960, one month before the Democratic National Convention, and again in September, after Kennedy had received the nomination. By 1960, four years after the Montgomery Bus Boycott had brought him to national prominence, King was arguably the most influential civil rights leader in the country. Having Kings support for his presidential run would be a huge coup in attracting black voters, who were generally wary of Kennedys civil rights record. During their first meeting, which was arranged by Harris Wofford, King expressed to Kennedy his belief in the need for strong executive action on civil rights, specifically addressing discrimination in federal housing, as well the need for comprehensive civil rights legislation. According to King, Kennedy agreed with all of these points, stating that the sit-in movements that had begun earlier that year had opened his eyes to the injustice facing African-Americans throughout the South, and that if elected he would address these issues immediately.[footnoteRef:13] However, while Kennedys meetings with King seemed to portend a close connection between the Kennedy campaign/administration and civil rights leaders, David Niven writes that there was much internal debate within the Kennedy camp as to whether support from civil rights leaders was in Kennedys best interest. While some courted Martin Luther King Jr. and civil rights leaders, others in the campaign sought to make sure the connection with those leaders remained murky.[footnoteRef:14] Chief among those concerned with Kennedy appearing too close to the civil rights movement was his brother Robert, who was serving as JFKs campaign manager. [13: Martin Luther King Jr., Interview by Berl I. Bernhard, March 9, 1964, p. 2-3, JFKL OHP.] [14: Niven, The Politics of Injustice, 19.]

Like his brother, Robert Kennedy had little experience with race, and was leery of losing support from Southern Democrats on an issue that was not considered to be vital. According to Rosenberg and Karabell, [RFK] cared about race only to the extent that it helped the electoral fortunes of the Democrats. For that reason, he had been unequivocal in arguing that the Kennedy team should not appear to side with Martin Luther King during the campaign.[footnoteRef:15] Perhaps key to the previous statement is that Kennedy should not appear to side with King, particularly in the (white) national press. However, many in the campaign would undoubtedly have been happy if King would have praised Kennedys civil rights record in front of black audiences, whether in churches or in the African-American press, providing maximum impact while limiting Kennedys vulnerability to attacks on a national scale. This strategy was in line with their policy of providing covert civil rights sales pitch[es] for select audiences,[footnoteRef:16] in the hopes of attracting black voters. Ironically, the debate over how to spin Kennedys relationship with King was essentially decided by King himself, who stressed to Kennedy that SCLC policy precluded him from officially endorsing a candidate for office, whatever his personal views on the matter. King offered to provide time for Kennedy to speak at an SCLC event, provided that Richard Nixon was also extended an invitation. However, in the end the political risks of such an event outweighed the potential benefits for Kennedy, and the connection between King and Kennedy would remain out of the spotlight until late in the election campaign. [15: Jonathan Rosenberg and Zachary Karabell, Kennedy, Johnson and the Quest for Justice: The Civil Rights Tapes (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 28.] [16: Niven, The Politics of Injustice, 20.]

In a 1964 oral history interview, Martin Luther King, Jr. remembered that [Kennedy] had to do something dramatic to convince the nation of his commitment to civil rights because there was a feeling that this could turn the election and that he had not quite gotten over to Negro voters at that time.[footnoteRef:17] While Kennedy would have agreed with King about the need to get over to the Negro voters, in an ideal world this would be achieved without making any strong commitments on civil rights. Throughout his presidential campaign, Kennedy attempted to walk a razor thin line that saw him drawing supporters from the ranks of black entertainers and civil rights leaders on one hand, and from conservative southern Democratic senators and governors on the other. Kennedy felt that both of these groups could swing much needed voters his direction, and the fact that they often had diametrically opposed views on race was not going to stop him from pursuing these votes. Among the segregationist southern Democrats that supported Kennedy during the 1960 campaign were Governor Ernest Vandiver of Georgia, Senator James Eastland of Mississippi, and Governor John Patterson of Alabama, all of whom would later come into conflict with the Kennedy administration during direct action protests such as 1961s Freedom Rides. But was it really possible to keep both of these groups satisfied? Perhaps in the short term, this could be achieved through judicious use of private campaign promises and Kennedys patented personal charm, but at some point all of these campaign promises would come due. Historian David Niven writes that Kennedys strategy for appeasing both groups was to pursue a glacial change[footnoteRef:18] approach to civil rights, which involved assuring southern Democrats that he would not be supporting any immediate, radical civil rights advances, while promising civil rights activists that gradual long-term change would be enacted throughout his presidency. While it is debatable whether this strategy was feasible long-term, it is undeniable that it worked during the 1960 campaign, partially because of Nixons complete neglect of racial issues throughout the campaign. This glacial change approach to civil rights would also shape the way the Kennedy campaigns Civil Rights Section would be organized and run. [17: Martin Luther King Jr., Interview by Berl I. Bernhard, March 9, 1964, p. 4, JFKL OHP.] [18: Niven, The Politics of Injustice, 36.]

While Kennedy staffers continued to debate the extent to which Kennedy should allow himself to be associated with civil rights leaders, a Civil Rights Section was created within the campaign, tasked with coordinating outreach to black voters. The Civil Rights Section was part of a larger issues division within the campaign, headed up by Kennedy in-law R. Sargent Shriver.[footnoteRef:19] Shriver held an interesting position within the Kennedy machines hierarchy. In an administration where family ties were often all-important, Shrivers status as an (albeit newer) member of the Kennedy clan ensured that gaining access to the candidate would never be an issue. This access was extremely important, as Kennedy gave great weight to the opinions of his closest advisors. On the other hand, Shriver was viewed as far too liberal by many in Kennedys inner circle, to the extent that Harris Wofford was warned not to associate himself too closely with Shriver, because the insiders thought of him as the House Communist.[footnoteRef:20] While this epithet may have been thrown around somewhat jokingly, for many in the Kennedy administration there could be nothing worse than being considered a communist or a communist sympathizer. Nevertheless, Shriver was valued for his organizational skills during the campaign, and would play an important role in mobilizing support for Kennedy among black voters. [19: Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 60.] [20: Branch, Parting the Waters, 313.]

Meanwhile, the Civil Rights Section worked feverishly on reaching out to black voters, taking on several new members who would provide valuable contacts with civil rights leadership, and go on to act as mediators between the Kennedy administration and these leaders over the next several years. Harris Wofford and Louis Martin took very different paths to acquiring the contacts and expertise that would make them invaluable to the Kennedy campaigns civil rights push. Wofford, an attorney from New York with family roots in the South, attended Law School at Yale and Howard (where he was the first white student in decades), and spent several years studying Gandhian non-violence in India. Wofford would become close to Martin Luther King, Jr. in the mid-1950s, holding speaking engagements during the Montgomery Bus Boycott and offering to help King raise funds for a Gandhi-inspired trip to India of his own. Wofford would later serve as an occasional speech writer for Senator John Kennedy and as counsel to Father Theodore Hesburgh on the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.[footnoteRef:21] It was in his role on the Civil Rights Commission that Wofford would begin to position himself as a link between civil rights leadership and the executive branch. In an August, 1958 memo to Hesburgh, Wofford advocated for a White House conference on civil rights: [21: Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 7; Branch, Parting the Waters, 207-208.]

The President should invite a small group of representative Negro and white leaders to meet with him, or after the initial session with a deputy appointed by him, for serious face-to-face, off-the-record negotiation of possible agreement on a course of desegregation that would be acceptable to the courts and reasonable men on both sides.[footnoteRef:22] [22: Memorandum, Harris Wofford to Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, August 20, 1958, Correspondence Individuals, WIN-WOL folder, Martin Luther King, Jr. Collection, box 41, Howard Gotlieb Archival Research Center at Boston University.]

Wofford would then forward the memo to King, asking for feedback on the proposal and writing that he saw King playing a very key role in these negotiations.[footnoteRef:23] While Eisenhower never agreed to such a meeting, Wofford would continue to advocate for closer relationships between civil rights leaders and the incoming Kennedy administration after leaving the Civil Rights Commission for the Kennedy campaign in May, 1960. [23: Letter, Harris Wofford to Martin Luther King, Jr., September 5, 1958, , Correspondence Individuals, WIN-WOL folder, Martin Luther King, Jr. Collection, box 41, BU.]

While Wofford brought his experiences as a Civil Rights Commission lawyer and Gandhian activist to the campaign, Louis Martin brought an interesting mix of publishing clout and political experience. Martin, who would become the most influential African American in the Kennedy administration, was a luminary of the so-called Negro Press. As the editor and publisher of the Michigan Chronicle in the 1930s and 40s, Martin would throw his papers support behind trade unions and black political candidates, and lobby against discriminatory federal housing provisions. According to biographer Alex Poinsett, Martins advocacy led him to form a network of relationships with black leaders including Walter White, Roy Wilkins, Thurgood Marshall, and Robert Weaver.[footnoteRef:24] It was no surprise then that Marshall and Weavers names appeared during the early period of Kennedys administration, when Martin was intimately involved with a project to forward the names of qualified black candidates for government positions. [24: Alex Poinsett, Walking with Presidents: Louis Martin and the Rise of Black Political Power, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Press, 1997), 36.]

The Kennedy campaign was not Martins first foray into national politics. In 1944, he was recruited by the Roosevelt campaign to help coordinate publicity and press relations, acting as the campaigns point man on outreach to the Negro Press.[footnoteRef:25] Working out of the Democratic National Committee, he helped to secure editorial support for Roosevelt in black newspapers, particularly focusing on how Roosevelts New Deal programs would benefit African American workers. While Martin returned to the newspaper business after the 1944 elections, he would take with him a keen interest in national politics that led him to act as an advisor for three future Democratic presidents: Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Jimmy Carter. Following a yearlong trip to Nigeria in 1959-60, where he served as an advisor to the Amalgamated Press of Nigeria, Martin was contacted by Kennedy press aide Pierre Salinger and then by Wofford, the new coordinator of the campaigns Civil Rights Section, with an offer to join the Kennedy campaign in much the same role that he played under Roosevelt. Wofford would later remember Martin as an important addition to the Civil Rights Section, soon becoming their chief counselor, colleague, and co-conspirator.[footnoteRef:26] [25: Louis Martin, Interview by David G. McComb, May 14, 1969, p. 3, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library.] [26: Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 60. ]

By all accounts, Woffords addition to the Kennedy campaign was instrumental in expanding the role of the Civil Rights Section. Niven writes that Woffords hiring was a crucial decision for racial issues, as Wofford set off to liberalize and energize Kennedys public stance on civil rights.[footnoteRef:27] One of the early contributions made by Wofford and the Civil Rights Section, before Louis Martin even came on board with the campaign, was to push for a strong civil rights plank at the Democratic National Convention in July, 1960. Wofford worked with Chester Bowles, the chairman of the platform committee, and wrote several drafts of the platform. This document would evolve into what Stern calls the boldest civil rights plank since 1948,[footnoteRef:28] which included eliminating poll taxes and literacy tests from voter registration requirements, and creating a Fair Employment Practices Commission. While Stern credits the strength of the platform to the work of civil rights activists among the delegates, as Wofford tells it the final draft was much stronger than Bowles and the Kennedy campaign intended. Bowles, fearing that the platform would get watered-down by southern whites, had two versions ready to go. The first was what he considered an extreme version, which, when rejected, would make the second more moderate version palatable to the southern faction. However, through some miscommunication between Bowles, Robert Kennedy, and the Kennedy delegates, it was the stronger platform that was eventually pushed through. Wofford writes, [27: Niven, The Politics of Injustice, 14. ] [28: Stern, The Politics of Injustice, 26.]

And to the consternation of some and amazement of allof those who proposed the strong plank, those who opposed it, and Bowles who had orchestrated the thingthe total plank of the civil rights people was adopted at the Convention.[footnoteRef:29] [29: Harris Wofford, Interview by Berl I. Bernhard, November 29, 1965, p. 30, JFKL OHP.]

While the civil rights platform was stronger than most on the Kennedy campaign intended, its passage was a victory for Wofford, who was constantly pressuring Kennedys more conservative advisors to allow the candidate to become more involved with civil rights. This platform was also instrumental in helping Wofford and Shriver win over the vast majority of African-American delegates at the convention, ensuring that Kennedy would receive the partys nomination. Throughout the historical literature on Kennedys civil rights record, there is an ongoing debate over the presidents true commitment to civil rights reforms. Was his support for the Democratic Partys strong civil rights plank in 1960 simply a matter of political expediency mixed with confusion surrounding the passage of the stronger plank, or was his outreach to civil rights leadership a natural step forward for a leader looking to gain a better understanding of the movement in order to apply his personal ideals on a national level. While there is a general consensus that political expediency was the major factor during the campaignand during the majority of his presidency for that matterthe extent to which Kennedys own feelings on civil rights played a role in the election campaign remains a little unclear. Louis Martin remembers that while he had not been identified specifically with a lot of the popular fights [before his presidency], his record was not badI dont think anybody questioned his motivations or his real concern for basic social justice.[footnoteRef:30] Kennedy worked to cobble together a strange coalition of civil rights activists and often pro-segregation southern Democrats during his campaign, at times touting and at others glossing over this concern for social justice. However, during the final weeks of his campaign, events would conspire to reveal Kennedys personal concern for civil rights. [30: Louis Martin, Interview by Robert Wright, March 25, 1970, p. 7, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University.]

Calling Mrs. King

Despite campaign manager Robert Kennedys best efforts to keep them out of the national spotlight, Wofford, Martin and the Civil Rights Section would produce one of the defining moments of Kennedys election campaign. A simple call from the candidate to Mrs. Coretta Scott King in October, 1960 has been credited with swinging thousands of black votes to Kennedy, and possibly winning him the election. While it is impossible to quantify the exact impact of the phone call and the subsequent publicity campaign it generated among black voters, it undoubtedly showed these voters a compassionate side of Kennedy that had never been on display before. This episode is also the best example of Kennedys civil rights advisors using their personal relationships with civil rights leaders to influence Kennedys public stance on the issueoften against the advice of his top campaign aides.On October 19, 1960, Martin Luther King was arrested along with 51 others during a demonstration aimed at segregated businesses in downtown Atlanta. Using a tactic that would become standard operating procedure for civil rights activists in such situations, the group refused to post bail, vowing to stay behind bars until trespassing charges against them were dropped. In the meantime, their jailing was publicized by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and other activist groups in order to exert pressure on city leaders to confront the citys segregation practices. The SCLC also telegraphed both presidential candidates asking for support, but neither responded officially. This was hardly surprising, as the Kennedy campaign was generally not in the business of supportingpublicly or otherwisepotentially controversial demonstrations, or of taking any action that could alienate southern Democrats in the weeks leading up to the election.However, spurred by his longstanding friendship with King, Wofford felt obligated to do whatever he could to intervene. Wofford remembers that King had been in jail four days and I, a friend and Kennedys civil rights man, had done nothing.[footnoteRef:31] Without the knowledge of any of the campaign staff, Wofford contacted a lawyer with ties to Atlanta Mayor William Hartsfield, who agreed to speak with Hartsfield about attempting to secure Kings release. While Wofford stressed that his intervention was personal in nature, and not on behalf of the Kennedy campaign, Hartsfield took the opportunity to extricate himself from a politically difficult situation by announcing that Senator Kennedy had requested Kings release. On the strength of this supposed request from Kennedy, a deal was drawn up for the owner of the department store at which King was arrested to drop the trespassing charges. By all accounts, Pierre Salinger, Byron White, and other top Kennedy aides were furious that Kennedy had been dragged into the situation, concerned that his association with King would cost him votes in the South.[footnoteRef:32] However, they also found it impossible to simply deny that anything had happened. The resulting press release from the Kennedy campaign stated (untruthfully) that Senator Kennedy directed that an inquiry be made to give him all the facts on the situation and (truthfully) that the Senator is hopeful that a satisfactory outcome can be worked out.[footnoteRef:33] While the release never expanded upon what Kennedy would consider a satisfactory outcome, as far as his closest advisors were concerned, simply having the story go away would be the best case scenario. [31: Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 12.] [32: Wofford, 15; Branch, Parting the Waters, 355.] [33: Branch, Parting the Waters, 355.]

As it turned out, authorities in Georgia would not let the Kennedy campaign off so easily. While the rest of Kings fellow protesters were released from jail following the Hartsfield agreement, King was detained on a new warrant stemming from an arrest in De Kalb County, Georgia the previous May. King had been arrested for driving without a valid Georgia license (although he did have his Alabama license at the time), and given a $25 fine and a twelve month suspended sentence. The judge in the original case now ordered a hearing to determine whether Kings arrest in the Atlanta demonstrations violated his probation agreement. During the hearing Judge Mitchell found that King had in fact violated his probation, and he was summarily denied bond, sentenced to six months hard labor (later reduced to four) on a chain gang, and whisked away in the middle of the night to a maximum security prison in Reidsville, Georgia. Kings sentencing and treatment immediately drew sharp criticism throughout the civil rights community, and pressure was applied to both presidential campaigns to make a more concrete statement condemning the actions of the Georgia authorities. King himself remembered that Harris Wofford and othersI dont know who else, but I know Harris was very strong at this pointstrongly urged Mr. Kennedy to try to use his influence to do something about it.[footnoteRef:34] Wofford would draft a statement protesting Kings treatment for Kennedy to deliver, but the statement never made it through the gauntlet of Kennedys more conservative advisors. Meanwhile, rumors swirled about a deal in which Georgia Governor Ernest Vandiver would secure Kings release on the condition that Kennedy would make no public statement on the issue. [footnoteRef:35] While Wofford and other civil rights advocates would obviously be relieved if King were released, it seemed that Kennedy would miss an opportunity to demonstrate his basic support for civil rights by intervening in some way. Even in such an obvious case of judicial misconduct, Kennedy was reluctant to disrupt the delicate balancing act he felt was necessary to ensure his election. [34: Martin Luther King, Jr., Interview by Berl I. Bernhard, March 9, 1964, p. 10, JFKL OHP.] [35: Branch, Parting the Waters, 359.]

Kennedys change of heart was brought about by Woffords personal relationship with the Kings, and specifically by a desperate call made by Coretta Scott King to Wofford after her husbands sentencing.[footnoteRef:36] Wofford was the only advisor to Kennedy who was in regular contact with the Kings, and despite his lack of influence among Kennedys top advisors, he was Corettas only hope for spurring Kennedy to action. Coretta was justifiably worried about what would happen to her husband if he had to serve time with hardened white criminals on a chain gang, and Wofford remembers her assuring him, They are going to kill him, I know they are going to kill him.[footnoteRef:37] Wofford, Louis Martin, and the rest of the Civil Rights Section bounced ideas back and forth as to what sort of action Kennedy could take to rectify the situation. Although it had become clear that Kennedy would not make any strong public statements on Kings arrest, perhaps a more low-key, private statement was still possible. In an oral history for Howard University, Martin recalled that everybody was alertedand the problem was, what to do; send a telegram or get thecandidate to do something. Nobody really had any one specific suggestion.[footnoteRef:38] Wofford and Martin eventually decided that the best course of action would be to convince the candidate to make a phone call to Coretta Scott King, stating his sympathy for the position she and her husband were in. Wofford felt that such a call would alleviate some of the personal concerns that Coretta had for her husbands wellbeing, and if it also raised Kennedys profile among black voters, so much the better. [36: Stern, Calculating Visions, 34.] [37: Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 11.] [38: Louis Martin Interview by Robert Wright, March 25, 1970, p. 9, Howard University.]

While Wofford and Martin did not have direct access to Kennedy to propose such a call, their boss in the Civil Rights Section, Sergeant Shriver, did. Wofford provided Shriver with the Kings phone number, and he promised to bring up the subject with the candidate. Wofford remembers that Shiver waited until all of Kennedys other advisors were out of the room before he broached the subject of a call to Coretta, going to great lengths to ensure he was not disturbed while doing so: He got into the room and looked around and he saw all the campaign aides and he concluded that if he brought it up in that crowd it would never happen...But Pierre [Salinger] went out to the press, and Ted [Sorenson] went to finish a speech, and finally Kenny ODonnell went into the john. Shriver put his foot against the door to keep it closed[footnoteRef:39] [39: Harris Wofford, Interview by Berl I. Bernhard, November 29, 1965, p. 24, JFKL OHP.]

Having essentially locked one of Kennedys advisors in the bathroom, Shriver explained to Kennedy that calling a very upset and very pregnant Coretta Scott King was the right thing to do, and that such a call would endear him to the African-American community.[footnoteRef:40] Kennedy agreed to make the call right then and there, telling Coretta: [40: Niven, The Politics of Injustice, 21.]

I want to express to you my concern about your husband. I know this must be very hard for you. I understand you are expecting a baby, and I just wanted you to know that I was thinking about you and Dr. KingIf there is anything I can do to help, please feel free to call on me.[footnoteRef:41] [41: Stern, Calculating Visions, 34-35.]

In light of Kennedys refusal to make any public statements on Martin Luther Kings situation over the preceding days, this offer of anything I can do to help rings a little hollow. However, the phone call was also a step forward for Kennedy, who had remained personally aloof from civil rights up until this point in the campaign. Tellingly, Richard Nixons campaign remained silent on the subject of Kings arrest and imprisonment, concerned about getting drawn into a controversial issue so soon before the election.The backlash that Wofford, Martin, and Shriver received from Robert Kennedy and other campaign staffers after the phone call was reported by the New York Times reveals the extent to which even such a small gesture was viewed as damaging to Kennedys electability. The first to hear from Robert Kennedy was Sergeant Shriver, who received an irate phone call from the campaign manager, accusing him and Wofford of losing Kennedy the election. Wofford and Martin were then called in to RFKs office, and told the Civil Rights Section were not to do anything else controversial through the remainder of the campaign, and certainly were not to publicize Kennedys call to Mrs. King.[footnoteRef:42] However, in a strange turn of events, it was Robert Kennedy himself who would involve the Kennedy campaign further in Kings predicament. Less than twenty four hours after taking his civil rights advisors to task for dragging his brother into such a controversial situation, RFK would call the Georgia judge responsible for Kings sentencing, requesting that King be released immediately. The judge complied, releasing King the next day on $2000 bail. [42: Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 20; Branch, Parting the Waters, 365; Stern, The Politics of Injustice, 37.]

The impetus behind the Kennedys calls to Coretta Scott King and De Kalb County Judge Oscar Mitchell have remained murky to this day. The tone of Robert Kennedys call to Judge Mitchell has been remembered quite differently by Kennedy himself and by his campaign staff. In a 1964 oral history interview, Kennedy recalls holding a cordial conversation with the judge at the suggestion of Georgia Governor Ernest Vandiver. The judge was a good friend of the Governor, and the judge said that if I called and it was a matter of importance, hed make the arrangements. So I called.[footnoteRef:43] This friendly arrangement contrasts sharply with the remembrance of Wofford and RFKs campaign aide John Seigenthaler. Wofford writes that it was extremely improper for a lawyer to make a personal call to a judge arguing for the release of an inmate, but that Kennedy was incensed by the judges treatment of King. He recalls RFK saying, [43: Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, ed., Robert Kennedy in His Own Words: The Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988), 70.]

I called him because it made me so damned angry to think of that bastard sentencing a citizen to four months of hard labor for a minor traffic offense and screwing up my brothers campaign and making our country look ridiculous before the world.[footnoteRef:44] [44: Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 21.]

Seigenthaler remembers a similar tirade, and he has Kennedy saying the more I thought about the injustice of it, the more I thought what a son of a bitch that judge was.[footnoteRef:45] While these conflicting accounts may both have some truth in themKennedy might not have used such strong language while speaking with the judge himselfWofford and Seignethalers accounts of a less cordial agreement ring truer. Throughout the campaign and his time as Attorney General, RFKs support for civil rights manifested itself most strongly in situations where the law was being blatantly and repeatedly broken by segregationists. This often had more to do with a concern for upholding the law than with supporting civil rights activists, but nevertheless Kennedy would respond most viscerally in these situations. When this type of law-breaking impacted his brothers electability or popularity, he was even more likely to react in anger, just as Seigenthaler and Wofford remember. If, then, Robert Kennedys call seems to have been precipitated by his anger over the judges actions and a fear of how the growing public consciousness of Kings situation might hurt his brother in the election, JFKs call to Coretta Scott King remains harder to decipher. [45: Ibid., 21.]

Was Senator Kennedy really concerned about the Kings situation? Did he think that calling Coretta Scott King would help to swing crucial black votes to his side over the last weeks of the election cycle? Did he simply take Shrivers advice on the spot without thinking through the consequences? While Kennedy himself never discussed his reasoning, some combination of concern and lack of foresight seems to be the most likely scenario. During the election and the early stages of his presidency, Kennedy simply did not have enough of an understanding of the civil rights community, and of the importance of Martin Luther King to that community and to the African American community in general, to understand how intervening on behalf of King would influence the black electorate. King himself remembers the call both as morally courageous and politically astute. I think [Kennedy] did something that expressed deep moral concern, but at the same time it was politically soundAnd it did take a little courage to do this, thats the other thing. He didnt know it was politically sound.[footnoteRef:46] Whether or not Kennedy considered the ramifications of the call, there was undoubtedly some level of concern for Kings predicament shown by Kennedy. It was up to the Civil Rights Section to take this expression of moral concern and maximize its political impact for the Kennedy campaign. [46: Martin Luther King, Jr., Interview by Berl I. Bernhard, March 9, 1964, p. 12, JFKL OHP.]

While they had been told by RFK in no uncertain terms not to publicize his brothers personal involvement in the case, Wofford and Martin took RFKs own change of heart on the issueand the fact that the call had already leaked to the pressas a sign that this directive was negotiable. As with many of the projects undertaken by the Civil Rights section, the subsequent publicity campaign centered on the phone call was conceived to stay below the radar of the white press, focusing on churches and African-American owned newspapers. Wofford and Martin conceived of a pamphlet to be distributed to black churches, containing quotes from MLK and Coretta Scott King, as well as Ralph Abernathy and Martin Luther King, Sr. praising Kennedy for reaching out to Coretta. Here was an issue that would finally separate Kennedy from Nixon for black voters: when asked about his position on Kings arrest, Nixon brushed it off with a simple no comment. While Kennedy might not have been aware of the impact Kings arrest had on the black community, Wofford and Martin certainly were, and they did whatever they could to capitalize on any goodwill Kennedys phone call may have generated. Nearly two million copies of The Case of Martin Luther King: No Comment Nixon versus a Candidate with a Heart, Senator Kennedy were printed and shipped throughout the country over the next week.[footnoteRef:47] The blue bomb as it was soon dubbed, due to the color of paper on which it was printed, was vital in cementing the Kennedy campaigns last minute outreach to black voters. [47: Stern Calculating Visions, 37; Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 24-25.]

While it is impossible to quantify just how many votes the pamphlet generated for Kennedy, most historical accounts of the campaign agree that JFKs phone call had a major role in convincing traditionally Republican voting African Americans to come out for Kennedy in record numbers. More than two-thirds of black voters nationwide voted for Kennedy, and a significantly higher proportion of the black population voted than in the previous election in 1956. Historian David Niven writes that as President Dwight Eisenhower would later lament, Nixon lost the election on a couple of phone calls.[footnoteRef:48] Interestingly, those within the Civil Rights Section itself were not as confident about the impact of the calls. Louis Martin believed that Kings phone call was that dramatic last minute touch that did help electrify the electoratethe Negro votersbut I think we would have gotten most of those votes had we not had the King call. This is one of those hypothetical things. Nobody will ever know.[footnoteRef:49] Martin points out that many civil rights leaders had participated in the Kennedy organized National Conference on Constitutional Rights (the term constitutional rights had been substituted for civil rights at the request of Lyndon Johnson)[footnoteRef:50] several weeks before Kings arrest, and he felt that the tide had already turned for Kennedy on the issue of civil rights. As for Wofford, he writes that at the time of the call, no one in the campaign could predict whether the political consequences of the call would be positive or negative.[footnoteRef:51] All Wofford, Martin and Shriver could do was conspire to create an opportunity for Kennedy to show the smallest amount of support for civil rights, and wait to see if the gains made among black voters would offset their losses among conservative whites. [48: Niven, The Politics of Injustice, 23.] [49: Louis Martin, Interview, April 7, 1966, p. 34-35, JFKL OHP.] [50: Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 63.] [51: Ibid., 11.]

JFKs call to Coretta Scott King has been discussed and analyzed in many of the historical accounts of Kennedys campaign and presidencymost comprehensively in Branchs Parting the Waters. In all of these accounts, two general themes emerge repeatedly: the impact that the phone call had on the election, and questions regarding the genuineness of Kennedys concern for the Kings situation. Was this simply a tactical political move, or a heartfelt gesture of support? However, this episode can also be viewed as a prime example of the benefits that came with having civil rights advisors who were personally connected with those within the civil rights movement. Before Wofford and Martin joined the staff, the Kennedy campaign was viewed as completely out of touch with civil rights. When asked in an oral history if some of Kennedys advisors were somewhat out of the mainstream of the civil rights movement, Former Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) Director James Farmer replied that my impression is that they were not terribly close to what was going on.[footnoteRef:52] While Farmer goes on to point out that it was not at all unusual for a candidate for president to be in this situation, the central role that JFKs call to Coretta Scott King played in the election shows just how vital these connections were at a time when civil rights issues were becoming increasingly important on the national stage. [52: James Farmer, Interview by John F. Stewart, March 10, 1967, p. 3, JFKL OHP.]

When asked by John Kenneth Galbraith about the strategy behind the calls to Coretta Scott King and Judge Mitchell, John Kennedy replied that he was not aware of his brothers call to the judge before it happened, and that the best strategies are always accidental.[footnoteRef:53] This seems to have been JFKs only recorded comment on the subject, and he would never talk about the reasoning behind his own decision to call Coretta Scott King. While the calls were not part of any preconceived plan to woo black voters, to call them an accident ignores the groundwork laid by Wofford and others in the civil rights section to make these accidents real possibilities. Wofford certainly could not have predicted that Robert Kennedy would call a judge in Georgia and demand Martin Luther Kings release, but his relationship with the King family enabled him to suggest a phone call from John Kennedy that would do right by his friend while also securing Kennedy some goodwill among the civil rights community. Woffords friendship with the Kings dated back to 1955 during the Montgomery Bus Boycott, and continued throughout his time in the Civil Rights Commission and the Kennedy White House. King recalled that early in the campaign, when he was still unsure of which candidate would be stronger on civil rights, he felt that [Kennedys] basic bent would have to be right because he was at least surrounded by good people, the right people,[footnoteRef:54] namely Wofford and foreign policy advisor Chester Bowles. Without this strong connection to the Kings within his campaign, Kennedy would surely have missed this opportunity to reach out to the African-American community on a more personal level. [53: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 74.] [54: Martin Luther King, Jr., Interview by Berl I. Bernhard, March 9, 1964, p. 6, JFKL OHP.]

Going forward, especially considering Kennedys general lack of knowledge in the field of civil rights, this success could have been used as a blueprint for closer ties between the administration and civil rights leadership, ties which could continue to be mutually beneficial. However, in the wake of Kennedys narrow victory in the general election, the President and his top advisors remained wary of being too closely associated with civil rights activistsespecially the more militant ones who were not content to wait for legislation farther down the road. While Wofford was given the position of Special Assistant to the President for Civil Rights, his ties to the movement meant that he was distrusted and often bypassed by the decision makers within the administration. Rather than recognizing how vital Woffords connections had been during the campaign, Kennedys top advisors were happy to ascribe the benefits of the King affair to a happy accident and move on. Wofford continued to serve in the administration for another two years, but his diminished role contributed to a very rocky relationship between Kennedy and civil rights leaders during these years. Meanwhile, Louis Martin found his own niche within the Kennedy administration, using his contacts with black business leaders and more conservative civil rights activists to recommend qualified black candidates for positions within the administration. The status of Martin as a trusted advisor on black politics and civil rights, and that of Wofford as an unreliable outsider is a reflection of the Kennedy administrations civil rights priorities during this period. Executive action guided by a glacial change model was embraced, while politically divisive civil rights legislation was to be avoided at all costs.

The PresidencyYou told all those lies during the campaign, come down here and lets make them come true[footnoteRef:55] The powers that be to Louis Martin, November 1960 [55: Louis Martin, Interview by Robert Wright, March 25, 1970, p. 5, Howard University.]

While the Civil Rights Section of Kennedys presidential campaign had scored an unexpected success in dealing with Martin Luther Kings arrest in Georgia, after the election it quickly became apparent that this success did not translate into any reassessment of the importance of civil rights for the new administration. Following Kennedys election, Louis Martin became an unofficial member of the Kennedy White House, working out of the Democratic National Committee on a talent search to populate the executive branch with qualified black candidates, while Wofford remained adrift in the new administration for several months before stumbling quite unexpectedly into the role of Special Assistant to the President for Civil Rights. While both men were strongly committed to pushing for civil rights reforms, Martin and Wofford were put in the awkward position of having to justify to their contacts in the movement why there would be no new civil rights legislation in the months after the election. Rather than utilizing these contacts with King, Roy Wilkins and others to help inform Kennedys civil rights priorities, his closest advisors used Martin and Wofford to preach the gospel of minimum civil rights legislation, maximum executive action,[footnoteRef:56] backing away from the promises of legislative action made to Martin Luther King and other African-American leaders during the election. [56: Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 133. In his first meeting with Kennedy after being appointed Special Assistant, Wofford was told that this would be the strategy for civil rights during 1961.]

The strange road that Wofford took to a position in the new administration provides insight into Kennedys and his top aides reluctance to associate themselves too closely with the civil rights movement. While Wofford undoubtedly provided valuable assistance during the election campaign, there was a concern as to whether he would have the best interests of the Kennedy administration at heart when dealing with civil rights. Wofford was one of the top candidates for the position of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights under Robert Kennedy, a position that eventually went to Burke Marshall, a lawyer at the Washington firm of Covington and Burling. Marshall, who had little to no civil rights experience, was chosen in large part because it was believed that he was better suited to approach the issue of civil rights dispassionately. As Branch points out, in no other legal field was ignorance a qualification, but the race issue was so controversial that any history of personal interest was tantamount to a political statement.[footnoteRef:57] It was feared that Woffords personal history would make it difficult for him to have any sort of relationship with Southern political leaders, and Robert Kennedy was unsure if Wofford would be able to approach the position objectively. Discussing his appointments within the Justice Department, Robert Kennedy remembered that, [57: Branch, Parting the Waters, 388.]

The major one that I worried over was the head of the Civil Rights Division. The fellow who should naturally have been appointed was Harris Wofford, who had done work for us on civil rights during the campaign. I was reluctant to appoint him because he was so committed on civil rights emotionally, and what I wanted was a tough lawyer who could look at things objectively and give advice.[footnoteRef:58] [58: Guthman and Shulman, ed., Robert Kennedy In His Own Words, 57.]

Given Woffords commitment to the civil rights movement, these concerns were not unreasonable. The head of the civil rights division was a high profile post, and Kennedy would need to have the utmost trust in whoever he decided to appoint. That being said, Wofford would have brought a wealth of experience, knowledge and contacts to the position, and could have given the Justice Department a much better understanding of the civil rights movement as a whole. While they were certainly capable men, Marshall and Robert Kennedys lack of civil rights experience put them at a distinct disadvantage when formulating civil rights strategies for the Justice Department, particularly early in the Kennedy administration. Following Marshalls appointment to the Justice Department, Wofford remained on the periphery of the administrations (very limited) civil rights agenda, writing a detailed memo suggesting civil rights strategies for the upcoming year, while planning to join Sargent Shriver in a full time position setting up the newly created Peace Corps. However, during a meeting with John Hannah and Father Hesburgh of the Civil Rights Commission on February 7, President Kennedy, when pressed on the necessity of having a White House assistant on civil rights, told Hannah and Hesburgh that Wofford was already working on the issue full time. This was news to Wofford, who had had no communication with Kennedy about his role in the administration, and was completely unaware of any such position. Wofford was called in to the White House almost immediately after this meeting, and was convinced by Kennedy to work only part-time at the Peace Corps, while coordinating White House strategies on civil rights. Wofford writes that Kennedy did not then, or ever, take the time to talk through the issues, or to look ahead and set long-term priorities.[footnoteRef:59] Wofford was simply to use his knowledge of civil rights to work with the Justice Department and other White House officials on crafting executive orders on the issue. [59: Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings, 133.]

The abrupt nature of Woffords appointment suggests that his hiring was a spur of the moment decision, rather than part of any plan to articulate and put into motion a comprehensive civil rights agenda for the new administration. In this position, Wofford would be able to act as a conduit between his civil rights contacts and the White House, but the same concerns about his loyalties which kept him out of the Justice Department would continue to follow him at the White House, ensuring that he would never wield much influence among the decision makers of the administration. Meanwhile, Louis Martin, whose political instincts and insights into the black electorate were valued by many of the same insiders who were wary of Woffords background, was convinced to leave his newspaper on a more permanent basis and come to work for the administration. Immediately following the election, Louis Martin had no intentions of remaining in politics. He had a full time job waiting for him back in Detroit with his newspaper, as well as a position on the board of an insurance agency. However, as Martin himself remembered it, he was called back to Washington for an emergency meeting right after the election, and told by Kennedys advisors that in essence you told all those lies during the campaign, come down here and lets make them come true.[footnoteRef:60] As the point man for promoting Kennedy to the black press during the campaign, Martin had been instrumental in advancing the image of Kennedy as a champion of civil rights. Now that black voters had helped Kennedy win the election, some serious work was needed to make this image a reality. However, this would be no easy task. Historian Carl Brauer writes that, [60: Louis Martin, Interview by Robert Wright, March 25, 1970, p. 5, Howard University.]

During the long campaign [JFK] made commitments that would be difficult for him to live up to as President. He had reassured white Southerners that he would not favor a reinstitution of Reconstruction, yet he had promised Negroes a wide range of Presidential action on their behalf.[footnoteRef:61] [61: Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction, 59.]

Martin did agree to return to work for the Kennedy administration, eventually settling in as a deputy chairman of the Democratic National Committee, where his main task would be to work on a talent search for qualified black candidates to fill government positions. In March, 1961, Kennedy issued an executive order creating the Presidents Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, which would be headed by Vice President Johnson. In a press release describing the new committee, Kennedy announced that,I have dedicated my administration to the cause of equal opportunity in employment by the government or its contractors[and] I have already directed all departments to take immediate action to broaden the government employment opportunities for members of minority groups.[footnoteRef:62] [62: Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, March 6, 1961, Presidents Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity: General, 1961: 6 March-31 July folder, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. White House Staff Files of Harris Wofford, JFKL.]

This type of initiative would have been considered a win-win scenario for the new administration: unlikely to draw criticism from Southern politicians, but useful as an example of the administration taking immediate action on civil rights issues. As far as Martin was concerned, the talent-search was important on several different levels. First and foremost, it would help to level the playing field for African-Americans in government positions, who had generally been confined to low-level and menial posts. Martin had made it clear when he began working for the administration that I never wanted to go into another campaign in which the question of a black man on the Supreme Court and a black man in the Cabinet of the President of the United States was an issue.[footnoteRef:63] Martin was able to make some major breakthroughs on this front. Robert Weaver, who was a personal friend of Martins, was nominated by Kennedy for the new position of Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. However, due to opposition in Congress from Republicans and Southern Democrats, both to Weaver himself and to the creation of this new department, the department was shelved and Weaver was not confirmed until after President Johnson came into office. Nevertheless, it can be said that Kennedy nominated the first African-American to hold a cabinet position in U.S. history. Martins recruiting efforts were not solely focused on top-level positions either. Stern writes that in many departments the systematic recruitment of blacks into middle-level management posts was undertaken with great success.[footnoteRef:64] While the drive to integrate government employment was important in its own right, Martin also saw it as a means by which to show the administrations good faith to civil rights leaders who might otherwise become disheartened with the slow pace of Kennedys civil rights reforms. [63: Louis Martin, Interview by Robert Wright, March 25, 1970, p. 13, Howard University.] [64: Stern, Calculating Visions, 52.]

During the election, the Kennedy campaign had made a host of promises concerning civil rights reforms, both publicly and privately to individual civil rights leaders. These included a wide range of executive actions on behalf of the Presidentmost notably abolishing discrimination in federally funded housing with the stroke of a penas well as pursuing meaningful civil rights legislation. However, given Kennedys narrow margin of victory during the election, Martin recognized that the new President would struggle to push civil rights legislation through Congress early on. So in the interim, Martin remembers, I had to find something to indicate to Black America that we were sincere and honest about our campaign talk.[footnoteRef:65] Martin believed that in working to integrate the highest levels of the Washington bureaucracy, he had found that something. While this may not have been as far reaching as the legislation that many civil rights leaders were hoping for, Martin believed that the Presidents Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity could be used as an example of the administrations good faith. However, while the Committees work undoubtedly produced some important results, many within the civil rights community were not satisfied with the administrations overall civil rights strategy. James Farmer recalled that I did not attach the same importance to [the talent search] as the administration didI was more concerned about elevating the masses, about improving their life, rather than giving them a model in high position.[footnoteRef:66] Farmer and others would need more convincing that the Kennedy campaigns civil rights promises had indeed been sincere and honest. [65: Louis Martin, Interview by Robert Wright, March 25, 1970, p. 15, Howard University.] [66: James Farmer, Interview by Sheldon Stern, April 25, 1979, p. 10, JFKL OHP.]

In addition to his work on the talent-search, Martin, along with Wofford, served as a facilitator of meetings and communication between civil rights leaders and the White House. Martins role, as he saw it, was to push the cause of blacks and push the administration to meet the demands in order to keep strength of support.[footnoteRef:67] This statement is revealing in that it speaks to the dual nature of Martins role within the Kennedy administration. Martin was concerned with making sure civil rights leaders concerns reached the White House, but he also had to find a way to keep the support of those leaders when it was not always politically feasible to act on these concerns immediately. Martin was close to Roy Wilkins, Walter White, and other NAACP leaders, as well as to prominent black business leaders and publishers, as these were the men that he had come into contact with when dealing with labor and housing issues in Detroit, and more generally in the course of running his newspaper. It is not surprising then that Martin pushed for more regular meetings between Kennedy and Wilkins. On the occasion of a visit to Washington by the delegates from the NAACPs annual conference in June, 1961, Martin stressed the importance of Kennedy showing his support for Wilkins in a memo to JFKs appointments secretary, Kenneth ODonnell, writing that Roy Wilkins is a good friend of the administration, and I think it is important to strengthen his leadership at this critical time.[footnoteRef:68] While Martin was surely interested in the NAACP delegates being able to get some face-to-face meeting time with Kennedy, Martin couched the request for a meeting in terms of how it would be beneficial to the administration. Wilkins was one of several national civil rights leaders who was not overly critical in public of the delays in pursuing civil rights legislation early in the Kennedys presidency,[footnoteRef:69] and Martin was subtly hinting that if the Kennedy did not show his support for Wilkins by inviting him to the White House, the administration might soon have to contend with more radical leadership within the NAACP. [67: Louis Martin, Interview by Robert Wright, March 25, 1970, p. 12, Howard University.] [68: Memo, Louis Martin to Kenneth ODonnell, June 20, 1961, Human Rights: Executive, 1961: 11 May-15 November folder, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. White House Central Subject Files, JFKL.] [69: Farmer, James. Interview by John F. Stewart, March 10, 1967, p. 5, JFKL OHP.]

Following one of these early meetings between Kennedy and Roy Wilkins, Wilkins and Arnold Aronson of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights sent Kennedy a memo outlining Priorities in an Effective Federal Civil Rights Program. The memo, written in February 1961, laid out the executive and legislative action that Wilkins thought necessary to meet the goals outlined in the Democrats civil rights platform. According to Wilkins and Aronson,

Both the President and the Democratic platform have properly emphasized that the protection and advancement of civil rights is a shared responsibility among all branches of government. It is not necessary to choose between executive and legislative actions. Neither alone is adequate to accomplish the goal; both are indispensable to it.[footnoteRef:70] [70: Memo, Arnold Aronson and Roy Wilkins, Priorities in an Effective Federal Civil Rights Program, February 6, 1961, Human Rights: 2: Equality of the Races: General, 1961: 16 June-31 July folder, WHCSF, JFKL.]

The memo goes on to describe how each of the platform pledges could be met, and gives suggestions for the timeframe for doing so. Interestingly, the last point in the memo suggests hiring a Special Assistant to the President for Civil Rights, a move that Kennedy would make just one day after the memo was sent, when Harris Wofford was assigned to the position. It is unclear if Kennedy had seen the memo before his meeting with Hesburgh and Hannah of the Civil Rights Commission, but it is possible that it had some impact on the presidents sudden decision to hire Wofford. While Aronson and Wilkins suggestion to hire a Special Assistant for Civil Rights may have had an impact on Kennedys decision to do so, the main argument of the memo was dismissed by Kennedys advisors, namely that executive and legislative action were needed in unison in order to make substantial gains in civil rights. In a meeting with Ted Sorenson, Louis Martin, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Joseph Dolan and others, Aronson and Wilkins were asked to prepare a second, more detailed memorandum outlining the steps that Kennedy could take on civil rights solely through executive action. While it is unclear what Martins role was in the meeting, it was Sorenson who requested that Wilkins and Aronson focus on possibilities for executive action.[footnoteRef:71] The resulting report, Proposals for Executive Action to End Federally Supported Segregation and Other Forms of Racial Discrimination details over 60 pages worth of specific suggestions for executive action, covering everything from federal grants to housing, employment, and military affairs. The report would make the rounds through the administrationWofford mentioned in a meeting of the Subcabinet Group on Civil Rights in September that the document was a useful compilation of [the] main criticisms and proposals in the field, and that it was being forwarded to all the members of the Cabinet.[footnoteRef:72] [71: Memo, Arnold Aronson and Roy Wilkins, Proposals for Executive Action to End Federally Supported Segregation and Other Forms of Racial Discrimination, August 29, 1961, p. 3, Human Rights: 2: Equality of Races: Executive, August 1961: 21-31 folder, WHCSF, JFKL.] [72: Notes, Sub-cabinet Group on Civil Rights, September 15, 1961, Sub-Cabinet Group on Civil Rights: Sub-Cabinet correspondence (3 of 6 folders) folder, White House Staff File of Harris Wofford, box 14, JFKL.]

Although the memo covers a host of important areas for the use of executive action, Wilkins and Aronson are obviously uncomfortable with divorcing potential executive actions from legislative goals. In the beginning of their report they write that they are convinced that many of the civil rights pledges in the Democratic Party platformcan be redeemed only through legislation, [and we] continue to support the legislative recommendations in the February memorandum in the firm conviction that they are not only necessary but long overdue.[footnoteRef:73] On one hand, it had to be encouraging that the administration would seek recommendations for executive action on civil rights. The fact that the report was distributed to Cabinet members meant that at the very least it was reaching the right people. However, the complete lack of movement on legislative issues was worrying. There was a very real danger that the administration would settle for token victories gained through executive action while ignoring major issues that could only be tackled through legislation. Louis Martin was interested in buying the administration some time by touting its successes in fighting discrimination in federal employment and other areas, but legislation could not be postponed indefinitely. [73: Ibid., p. 3.]

In addition to securing meetings with Wilkins and other civil rights leaders, Martin was also successful in lobbying for meetings between the administration and some of his contacts among the African American business and publishing communities. Much like his approach to securing meetings for Roy Wilkins and other NAACP contacts, Martin was interested in showing how building relationships with these men would be beneficial to the administration. In this case, it was probably an even easier sell, as these contacts generally had no ties to any sort of controversial civil rights activism. After sending ODonnell a list of those publishers, bankers, and civic leaders that he felt the president should meet, Martin wrote that we found them useful in one way or the other in the 60 campaign, and they are all personal friends. They represent money and power in the Negro world[footnoteRef:74] Although the Kennedy administration was reluctant to make any strong statements on civil rights, they were well aware of how important the African-American vote had been to the 1960 election, and Kennedy would have been eager to lay the groundwork for 1964 by meeting with these types of influential black business leaders. While Harris Wofford was also heavily involved in lobbying for black leaders to receive private audiences with the President, his relationships with more radical leaders such as Martin Luther King ensured that he would find it much harder to set up these meetings. The differences between Woffords and Martins contacts can also provide insight into why Martin was able hold a position of influence throughout the Kennedy administration and on into Johnsons presidency, while Wofford was out of the White House within two years and serving in Africa with the Peace Corps. [74: Memo, Louis Martin to Kenneth ODonnell, July 9, 1961, Human Rights: 2: Equality of Races: Executive, July 1961: 1-24 folder, WHCSF, JFKL.]

Woffords advocacy for increased meetings between the White House and civil rights leadership, which had begun during his time on the Civil Rights Commission in 1958, continued throughout his time with the Kennedy administration. Although Wofford had helped to set up the meetings between Kennedy and Martin Luther King during the campaign, and had been instrumental in facilitating the phone call from Kennedy to Coretta Scott King later in the campaign, he was unable to secure King an audience with Kennedy in the months after his election. This undoubtedly was partially the result of Kennedys hectic schedule immediately following the election, but it was also the result of a reluctance on behalf of the administration to become too closely associated with King. It was one thing to use this association to help Kennedy get elected, but quite another to give the impression that they were allowing King to influence the administrations priorities in the field of civil rights. Branch writes that, During the changeover of administration, King and the Kennedy people had virtually no face-to-face contact, even privatelyKings name was too sensitive at the time, too associated with ongoing demonstrations that were vexing politicians in the South.[footnoteRef:75] [75: Branch, Parting the Waters, 381.]

During this period, King reached out to Kennedy several times, both by letter and by telephone through Wofford, requesting the opportunity to have what he assured the President would be a mutually beneficial discussion concerning the state of the civil rights movement.[footnoteRef:76] Wofford passed these requests along in March, and would eventually follow up with a memo to Kenneth ODonnell in October stressing the importance of meeting with King in light of the long delay since his requests, and also in light of the several meetings that Kennedy had had with Roy Wilkins in the interim. Wofford wrote that King had told him that he would never again request an appointment personally,[footnoteRef:77] having become frustrated by the lack of dialogue between the two sides. [76: Letter, Martin Luther King, Jr. to President John F. Kennedy, March 16, 1961, Human Rights: Executive, 1961: 11 May-15 November folder, WHCSF, JFKL.] [77: Memo, Harris Wofford to Kenneth ODonnell, October 4, 1961, Human Rights: Executive, 1961: 11 May-15 November folder, WHCSF, JFKL.]

Wofford would have similar difficulties in setting up meetings for groups such as SNCC and the National Student Association, which were even more closely linked to what the Kennedy administration considered radical protest movements than King himself was. Wofford would half-jokingly urge ODonnell to make an appointment for the two groups to meet with the President before they launch fasts in jail or encampments outside the White House asking to see him.[footnoteRef:78] Unfortunately, these groups felt that they were never going to have a meaningful dialogue on the issues with Kennedy or anyone else within his administration. When James Farmer finally met with Robert Kennedy in 1962, he remembered feeling a little coldness and aloofness and suspicion even, while there was much more warmth toward theI wouldnt say conservative, but less activist leaders Whitney Young and Roy Wilkins, but not toward CORE and SNCC.[footnoteRef:79] It is not surprising that the administration was more comfortable dealing with groups such as the NAACPwhich was indeed more conservative and had a longer working relationship with Kennedy and others in the administrationthan with CORE or SNCC, but shutting these more radical groups out may well have been counter-productive in the long run. It was groups such as CORE and SNCC, as well as Kings Southern Christian Leadership Conference, that would spark protests and demonstrations which would force Kennedys administration to confront civil rights issues in a more comprehensive manner. [78: Memo, Harris Wofford to Kenneth ODonnell, June 12, 1961, Human Rights: Executive, 1961: 11 May-15 November folder, WHCSF, JFKL.] [79: James Farmer, Interview by Sheldon Stern, April 25, 1979, p. 9, JFKL OHP.]

While King eventually had several face-to-face meetings with Kennedy later in his presidency, the administrations early reluctance to be linked publicly to King was a symptom of Kennedys all-encompassing fear of losing political support in the South. During the 1960 campaign, Kennedy had been warned by a group of southern governors that if he supported Jimmy Hoffa, Nikita Khrushchev, or Martin Luther King, they would throw their states support behind Richard Nixons candidacy.[footnoteRef:80] Apparently this threat was never carried outdespite Kennedys show of support for King during the campaignbut Kennedy would remain hyper- sensitive about how his civil rights agenda was impacting his political support in the South. Whether we call it minimum legislation, maximum executive action or glacial change or as King himself dubbed it, tokenism, Kennedys middle of the road, executive action approach to civil rights was not conducive to enacting foundational changes, and it prevented him from forming potentially beneficial working relationships with civil rights groups and leaders who were viewed as too politically divisive. In a 1962 article for The Nation, King summed up the dangers of the Kennedy administrations approach to civil rights in this way: [80: Harris Wofford, Interview by Berl I. Bernhard, November 29, 1965, p. 15, JFKL OHP.]

If tokenism were our goal, this Administration has adroitly moved us towards its accomplishment. But tokenism can now be seen not only as a useless goal, but as a genuine menace. It is a palliative which relieves emotional distress, but leaves the disease and its ravages unaffected. It tends to demobilize and relax the militant spirit which alone drives us forward to real change.[footnoteRef:81] [81: Martin Luther King, A Bold Design for a New South, The Nation, March 30, 1963, http://www.thenation.com/article/157763/archive-bold-design-new-south]

While the Kennedy administrations strategy of cobbling together token victories in civil rights was mildly successful in the early stages of Kennedys presidency, civil rights crises during 1962 and 1963 shifted public opinion and forced Kennedys hand in pursuing long-delayed civil rights legislation. James Farmer recalled that based on our experience, the federal government would act only if we created a crisis situationso that it would be politically less dangerous for them to act than for them to remain inactive.[footnoteRef:82] Shut out from any meaningful dialogue with the President, these groups went about ensuring that Kennedy would indeed be faced with these unavoidable civil rights crises. Events such as COREs Freedom Rides, which challenged segregation in interstate travel, and the SCLCs 1963 protest campaign in Birmingham, AL brought the civil rights movement into the nations consciousness as never before, putting increasing pressure on Kennedy and his administration to confront the underlying issues that sparked these protests. [82: James Farmer, Interview by Sheldon Stern, April 25, 1979, p. 2, JFKL OHP.]

Following Alabama Governor George Wallaces stand in the schoolhouse door in an attempt to prevent the integration of the University of Alabama on June 11, 1963, President Kennedy addressed the nation, stressing the moral necessity for civil rights reforms. While the Alabama integration crisis ended peacefullyunlike the one at Ole Miss the previous fall, where two people were killed and thousands of National Guardsmen deployed following rioting at the schoolKennedy finally took the opportunity to pledge his support for civil rights legislation. The President proclaimed that, We facea moral crisis as a country and as a peopleIt cannot be quieted by token moves or talk. It is time to act in the Congress, in your state and local legislative body, and above all, in all of our daily lives.[footnoteRef:83] Over the following months, Kennedy slowly worked to build a coalition of Democrats and Republicans that would be necessary to ensure the passage of a civil rights bill. As fate would have it, Kennedy was not able to secure passage for the Civil Rights Act before his assassination in November, 1963. [83: Thomas T. Lyons, We Face a Moral Crisis: John F. Kennedys Commitment to Civil Rights, June 11, 1963, The New England Journal of History 52, no. 2 (1995): 110.]

During a phone call with the new President soon after the assassination, Martin Luther King told Johnson that, I think one of the great tributes that we can pay to the memory of President Kennedy