CONFLICT PREVENTION AND U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE:

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

THE INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES

KATE SEMERAD ROBERT B. HAWKINS, JR.

NOVEMBER 15, 2001

“It has been often said that power corrupts. But, it is perhaps equally important to realize that weakness, too, corrupts. Power corrupts the few, while weakness corrupts the many. Hatred, malice, rudeness, intolerance, and suspicion are the fruits of weakness. . . . We cannot win the weak by sharing our wealth with them. They will see our generosity as oppression. . . . We are too far ahead materially and too different in our historical experience to serve as an object of identification. Our healing gift to the weak is the capacity for self-help. We must learn how to impart to them the technical, social, and political skills which would enable them to get bread, human dignity, freedom, and strength by their own efforts.”

—Eric Hoffer, The Ordeal of Change, 1952, pp.14–15

“It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out nor more doubtful of success, nothing more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order.”

—Niccolo Machiavelli

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................ 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE.................................................................................................. 2

What This Report Does................................................................................................... 2 What This Report Does Not Do ...................................................................................... 2 Basic Understandings...................................................................................................... 2 Project Scope................................................................................................................... 3

BACKGROUND OF DIALOGUE ON CONFLICT PREVENTION ......................... 4

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict................................................... 4 Conflict Prevention Dialogue at USAID ........................................................................ 4 U.S. Commission on National Security, 21st Century/Hart-Rudman Commission....... 6 International Dialogue on Conflict Prevention............................................................... 6 World Bank Conferences................................................................................................ 7 Private Initiatives ............................................................................................................ 8

WHERE WE'VE COME FROM, WHERE WE'RE GOING...................................... 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 10 USAID MISSION STATEMENT.................................................................................. 12 CHAPTER I STATE OF THE WORLD ............................................................................................. 13

The New Range of Threats ........................................................................................... 14 New Understandings ..................................................................................................... 14 Available Donor Resources .......................................................................................... 15 Changing How We Think About Development ............................................................ 15 The Discussions that Underpin this Study.................................................................... 16

CHAPTER II DEFINING CONFLICT ................................................................................................ 17

Nature of Conflict ......................................................................................................... 17 The U.S. and Conflict ................................................................................................... 19 Conflict Intervention Timing ........................................................................................ 20 The Nature of Conflict’s Solutions ............................................................................... 20 Defining Conflict Prevention........................................................................................ 21 Recommendations on How to Bring Further Definition to Conflict Prevention and the Emerging Policy........................................................................................... 22

CHAPTER III A NEW POLICY FRAMEWORK................................................................................ 26

A Policy Framework for Conflict Prevention? ............................................................. 26 Toward a New Policy Framework ................................................................................ 29 Conflict and Development ............................................................................................ 33 New Governing Strategies for Development ................................................................ 39

CHAPTER IV DEVELOPING A COHESIVE EXTERNAL POLICY STRATEGY FOR USAID COOPERATORS IN CONFLICT PREVENTION .................................................... 46

Intergovernmental Strategies ........................................................................................ 46 State Department........................................................................................................... 46 Defense Department ...................................................................................................... 50 National Security Council ............................................................................................. 51 Congress........................................................................................................................ 52 International Donor Community................................................................................... 55 Private Sector ................................................................................................................ 61 Academic Community .................................................................................................. 64 Private For-Profit .......................................................................................................... 64

CHAPTER V SUMMATION OF RECOMMENDED USAID PRIORITIES, CONCERNS, AND OPPORTUNITIES ......................................................................................................... 65

Recommended USAID Priorities.................................................................................. 65 AID Concerns ............................................................................................................... 68 Recommended Opportunities for Public Information Initiatives.................................. 69

ABOUT THE AUTHORS .............................................................................................. 71 CONFLICT WEB SITES DEVELOPED BY USAID ................................................. 72 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 82

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ICS talked to policy makers at USAID, State, Defense, and NSC, and to the senior staff of members of Congress. We also talked to members of the academic community and representatives of the NGOs and PVOs in the private sector. We thank all of the individuals who gave so freely of their time, and are grateful for the many valuable insights they shared with us. A special note of thanks also goes to USAID’s Core Group on Conflict Prevention, which met with us consistently over the course of this study to share notes and concepts and to test interpretations and feasibilities. We would especially like to thank Richard McCall, Dayton Maxwell, V. L. Elliott, and William Rennison. The value of this report was substantially increased by their knowledge, insights, and enthusiastic participation.

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PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this report was to achieve a better understanding of the policy environment surrounding “conflict prevention” in order to develop an overall strategy for how the U.S. foreign assistance program can best be utilized to reduce conflict in the world. To achieve this purpose, the Institute for Contemporary Studies (ICS) reviewed a large cross-section of the growing body of research and writing on the subject of conflict prevention and conducted numerous discussions with policy experts in and out of government. These discussions were designed to test the current political understanding of conflict prevention, seek where concurrence lies, and assess the willingness to act.

What This Report Does

This report seeks to present four things based on our wide-ranging discussions with foreign policy and national security officials and experts and key Legislative staff: 1) A brief analysis of conflict in the current historical context; 2) A concise definition of the three phases of conflict prevention along with a review of the traditional roles played by various U.S. government agencies; 3) A proposed strategy for focusing foreign assistance resources on preventing and mitigating conflict; and 4) A strategy for implementing a conflict prevention policy in coordination with other government agencies and with Congress.

What This Report Does Not Do

This report does not seek to define the specific operational steps or the management reorganization that will be needed to implement a full-fledged conflict prevention policy. Rather, it seeks to provide an informed policy context and a strategy overview that, if adopted, can give direction at all levels of the management pyramid to the shaping and reshaping of U.S. foreign assistance tools in the prevention of conflict.

Basic Understandings

At the outset, most experts agree that there have been many years of policy drift at USAID. Staff cutbacks, management inefficiencies, and overlays of Congressional earmarks and reporting requirements have increasingly limited the Agency’s ability to respond. This becomes especially true in light of contemporary threats. Additionally, it is generally recognized that the traditional compartmentalization of the roles of the various government departments in the field of foreign policy makes a

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cohesive and agile response to the crisis situations caused by most contemporary threats difficult at best.

Project Scope

The scope of this project was limited by a very short initial time frame (three months) that has been further shortened by a felt urgency to reach resolution as soon as possible in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th. The attacks also slowed our ability to reach a broader cross-section of advisors and, in some cases, reduced the availability of senior administration policy makers to participate in the discussions.

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BACKGROUND OF DIALOGUE ON CONFLICT PREVENTION

Conflict is always present in the world. However, the energies that were released following the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s resulted in an unusual outcropping of internal conflict, or the breakdown of widespread voluntary cooperation within a country. It became apparent not only that the incidence of conflict was growing but also that the nature of conflict was changing. In response to this phenomenon, a culture of “conflict prevention” began to emerge in academic and diplomatic circles. This report keys on the body of work that has grown over the last decade on the subject of modern conflict and how to prevent it, emphasizing interdisciplinary efforts. Listed here are just some of the important historical efforts that have been launched to bring understanding to the modern conflict context and to shape the conflict prevention policy dialogue.

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict was established in May 1994 to “address the looming threats to world peace of inter-group violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict.” The Commission sought to take a “long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts” and determine the “functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence.” The final report of the Commission in December of 1997 sparked an international dialogue on the subject of conflict prevention.

Conflict Prevention Dialogue at USAID

June Workshop

An internal USAID workshop on conflict prevention was held in June 2000 to focus on USAID’s current tools and programs for prevention, and to discuss how the Agency could be effectively organized to do more. For further detail please see: http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/confprev/jun2000/index.html

“One of the major conclusions of the Workshop was that the role of USAID and foreign assistance in the arena of prevention was unclear vis-à-vis the other U.S. foreign affairs agencies. This is true for both short-term operational prevention, related to the time period just prior to and after the onset of widespread violence, and for long-term structural prevention to deal with root causes of conflict. USAID staff were unsure whether the Agency was responsible for directly supporting its own

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“It is a matter of using a network of groups and interests to link and direct their energy and build a critical mass for change and far-reaching legislative and institutional reform within the Executive Branch and between the Executive Branch and Congress.” —Internal AID memorandum

program objectives or those of U.S. foreign policy. . . . More importantly, there was a view expressed that USAID had been crippled by Congressional and Administrative earmarks that, by and large, had turned the Agency somewhat into a social welfare–oriented institution during the last decade. It had lost an economic growth orientation and flexible funding, a sine qua non for prevention.” —Internal USAID memorandum “The reason we don’t get sustainable development is because we don’t do sustainable development.”

—Richard McCall

December 2000

A small group session with Congressional Hill staffers, USAID employees, and members of the Woodrow Wilson Center met to discuss the organization and thrust of the joint conference in January of 2001. For further detail please see: http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/confprev/

January Conference

On January 8, 2001, USAID and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars jointly sponsored a conference in Washington, D.C., entitled “The Role of Foreign Assistance in Conflict Prevention.” Over eighty experts from USAID, the State Department, the National Intelligence Council, DOD, Congressional staff, academic institutions, the business community, and nonprofit organizations participated in the two-day conference. (See http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/confprev/jan2001/index.html and conference report for further detail.)

Web Site Compilation on Conflict

AID’s Web site on Conflict Prevention appears at:

http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/confprev/

USAID Africa Bureau: http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb/

AID has also compiled, under its IMR project, a list of Web sites pertinent to conflict prevention. The list in its entirety appears at the end of this report.

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U.S. Commission on National Security, 21st Century/Hart-Rudman Commission

The Hart-Rudman Commission, launched in July 1998, had three phases and completed its work in February 2001. Its stated goal was to “review national security strategies and provide recommendations for adjusting these strategies to cope with the threats and opportunities that may flow from the future national security environment.” For the full text of the Commission’s report, go to: http://www/fas.org/man/docs/nwc/

International Dialogue on Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention has been an agenda item increasingly at international meetings of bilateral and multilateral donors on the subject since the Conflict Prevention and Post Conflict Reconstruction (CPR) Forum in 1997. Specifically: • October 1997—USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives convened its first meeting.

• April 1998—the World Bank hosted the meeting of the CPR. A Working Group was

established to consolidate the work that had already been done.

• November 1998—the UNDP and UNRISD hosted the third meeting of CPR in Geneva.

• June 1999—Canada hosted the CPR Working Group.

Α An informal task force on conflict, peace, and development cooperation at the

OECD/DAC concluded its work in the spring of 2001. The DAC guidelines for dealing with internal conflict outline 15 points of agreement. A network of DAC members has been established to take over the work of the task force and it is noteworthy that the new network’s chairman, a senior Italian foreign ministry official, is a recognized expert in national security matters.

Α Currently UNDP is developing a set of guidelines on conflict prevention. Α The World Bank is carrying out a major project on conflict and political

violence, which is being headed by the highly respected economist Paul Collier. Α The Fourth EC/USAID Assistance Consultations in May 1999 released a

statement that focused on “Peace-building and Conflict Prevention” as a key theme. Among other things, the conference summary stated that: 1) There would be an exchange of information that could further “enhance efforts to mainstream peace-building and conflict prevention into our current policies and programs”; and 2) those involved in the conference would “initiate joint pilot efforts in up to 10 countries.”

Α The last two G8 meetings referenced conflict prevention as a goal, citing several key areas.

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“As part of this process, a new DAC Conflict Prevention Network will replace the DAC Task Force on Conflict and peacebuilding. . . .The new reoriented DAC Network provides an international forum to bridge the gap between policy makers, academics and practitioners to develop a more robust analytic framework on causes of conflict and risk of instability. . . . In this regard, the OECD and the DAC also provides a hot house and launching pad for discussion in the G-8 and Heads of State Economic Summit processes where conflict prevention.”—Internal USAID memorandum “Sweden’s U.S. Ambassador Jan Eliasson has been one of the intellectual forces behind the concept (and scenes) with EC. Their approach is a ‘Conflict Prevention Ladder’ of 6–8 specific actions from UN surveys of instability and early awareness, confidence building measures and ultimately a Nordic rapid military preventive deployment force. They and the Danes, who take over the Presidency next year, are interested in adding a few more ‘upstream rungs’ to the Swedish and now EC Prevention Ladder’ and carving out a role for development assistance.” —Internal USAID Memorandum

World Bank Conferences

World Bank conferences on conflict held by Paul Collier to date are:

• The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime, and Violence, held at the Bank on February 22, 1999.

• The Economics of Political Violence, cosponsored by the Center for International Studies, Princeton University, on March 18–19, 2000.

• The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime, and Violence, cosponsored by the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (GPACS) of the University of California at Irvine, May 18–20, 2001.

• Identifying Wars: Systematic Conflict Research and Its Utility in Conflict Resolution and Prevention, cosponsored with the European Commission and the Governments of Sweden and Norway, June 8–9, 2001.

• The conference on Economics and Politics of Civil War: Launching a Case Study Project, cosponsored by PRIO and the Government of Norway, June 11–12, 2001.

NOTE: We have not directly addressed the work of the State Failure Task Force because much of it is classified.

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Private Initiatives

Think Tanks

The Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars’ Conflict Prevention Project serves as an important clearinghouse of information on conflict prevention and draws together scholars and policy makers in valuable forums on the subject. The Council on Foreign Relations has established the Center for Preventive Action under the leadership of Retired General William Nash. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the United States Institute for Peace are also devoting considerable resources to the study of these issues.

NGOs

Many traditional PVOs such as Catholic Relief Services, Luthern World Relief, and World Vision have been analyzing their programs through the lens of conflict prevention and seeking redefinition as to how they can better deploy their resources to help in this area. New faith-based organizations such as the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy have formed to provide a bridge between religious leaders and diplomats. These organizations already are establishing a track record for specialized expertise in conflict mediation. Other organizations such as the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, Search for Common Ground, and the International Crisis Group are adding important dimensions to the practice of conflict prevention. The efforts and organizations listed here are just a few of the many and growing initiatives taking place on the subject of conflict prevention.

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WHERE WE’VE COME FROM, WHERE WE’RE GOING

Development numbers show progress as well as reason for concern. In the developing world . . . Α In the last four decades:

Life expectancy increased 20 years on average;

Infant mortality rate fell more than half; Fertility rates declined by almost half. Α In the last two decades:

Net primary school enrollment increased by 13%; Between 1965 and 1998, average incomes more than doubled; From 1990 to 1998, the number of people in extreme poverty fell by 78 million. Α At the start of 21st century:

2.8 billion of the world’s 6 billion people live on less than $2 a day; 6 infants of 100 do not live beyond their first birthday; 8 infants in 100 do not see their fifth birthday; 9 boys in 100, and 14 girls, never attend primary school. Α In the next 15 years: 2 billion people will be born in the world; 97% of them will be in developing countries.

Source: World Bank’s World Development Report 2000/2001

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Agency for International Development (AID) contracted with the Institute for Contemporary Studies (ICS) to conduct an assessment of the current understanding of and support for a United States Government (USG) foreign policy, which had as a critical element the mitigation and prevention of conflict in the world. USAID also sought suggestions for a policy framework for U.S. foreign assistance that used conflict prevention as a core concept. This report summarizes over 100 interviews with key government and congressional officials, representatives of NGOs, and key policy experts. The report’s authors also sifted through a wide range of conference reports and papers being generated on the various issues relative to conflict prevention. As we pursued the discussions, it became clear that there was broad agreement on several fundamental observations: the incidence of conflict is rising in the world; 21st-century conflict is different from 20th-century conflict; conflict is only one threat, but an important one, in a rising tide of new challenges facing the world community; dramatic change needs to occur in U.S. foreign policy strategy and structure to meet these new challenges. Chapter I of this report outlines these basic understandings that in turn underpinned our discussions. In Chapter II the report seeks to bring greater definition to the nature of 21st-century conflict and greater focus to the issues surrounding conflict prevention. On the latter, the report separates the prevention of conflict into three phases: Phase One or “upstream” prevention works to attack the roots of conflict and structurally reverse its potential; Phase Two or conflict-concurrent uses diplomatic techniques to mitigate or reverse conflict already underway; and Phase Three or post-conflict uses emergency measures, reconstruction, and the new beginning of structural development to prevent the reignition of conflict. Following basic understanding of the new world context and the definition of conflict and conflict prevention, the third element of the ICS study sought to gain consensus on the roots of conflict. These discussions centered on issues of governance, as most agreed that violent conflict is first and foremost a sign of political failure. In this part of the discussion ICS coined the phrase “political poverty gap” to describe what must be addressed in conflict-prone countries if conflict is to be averted. The phrase and what it suggested resonated with most discussants. Chapter III recommends to USAID that foreign assistance policy be broadened from one concerned primarily with economic development to one that includes political development. Our research showed that there is an emerging understanding that constituting processes (those processes that create institutions) at all levels of society are fundamental to the maintenance of coherence and order during times of stress. And it is the lack of this constituting process in failed or failing states that has driven them to failure. This, coupled with the problems of disease, illiteracy, hunger, poverty, corruption, or terrorism, makes “illegitimate states” or “incapable states” highly prone to

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collapse. We are beginning to see that this phenomenon of governmental failure creates vacuums where terrorists, narco-traffickers, demagogues, and dictators can exploit the situation for their own ends. ICS believes, along with many of those who talked with us, that foreign assistance has a vital role to play in conflict prevention. Whether or not USAID has a role to play depends on developing a clear mission, a focused use of its resources, and an organizational structure that focuses and integrates effort over the short and long term. The events of September 11th provide an opening and opportunity for the Administration and Congress to consider long-overdue reforms that will allow USAID to be a force for freedom and prosperity for people in developing countries and thereby avert the trend line of accelerating conflict in the world. The policy framework ICS recommends in this report places people, not states, at the center of a new USAID strategy. The overall approach is briefly outlined in the one page following.

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USAID MISSION STATEMENT

To serve the interests of the American people, the foreign assistance program of the United States must be directed to help the people of developing countries become more productive and free!

POLICY FRAMEWORK

1. To prevent the breakdown of order and to promote development, it is at least as important to treat political poverty as it is to treat economic poverty.

3. People, not states, must be the center of all policy decisions. 4. People must be viewed as producers, not consumers. 5. Policies must seek the broadest popular participation. 6. Expanded voluntary cooperation, as it extends resources and expands opportunities,

must be a primary goal for: a. USG interdepartmental; b. International: governments, IFIs, and multilateral organizations; c. Private partners: PVOs, NGOs, for-profits, and corporations.

POLICY STRATEGY

1. All program design must seek multiple outcomes, strengthening governance systems and expanding economic choices.

2. Greater emphasis must be placed on providing assistance at the local or micro level. 3. At the macro level, policy dialogue must stress improving the constituting

agreements that underpin state services, and improving the services themselves that help make people more productive. It must seek to enable self-governance, especially through education, agriculture, health, and rule of law.

4. U.S. aid must be delivered in ways that help prevent violent conflicts. 5. Balance must be sought between:

a. Lengthening time commitments for some activity implementation; and b. Providing greater agility for short-term interventions such as those carried out by

OTI.

PROGRAM EMPHASIS

1. Self-governance and democratic systems 2. Establishing voluntary cooperation 3. Markets 4. Education 5. Agriculture 6. Health

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CHAPTER I

STATE OF THE WORLD

“All of these little wars—a kaleidoscope of wars—are this century’s Cold War.”

—Congressional Staff Member On September 11, 2001, order in the world changed forever. Whether you live in the tropical splendor of Hawaii, the wilds of Alaska, on a farm in Kansas, or in one of this country’s great cities, whatever you considered normal prior to September 11th will never again have the same definition. The terrorist attack was unspeakable, unimaginable, to Americans. However, to many in the world, especially the Third World, these terrorist acts were remarkable only because they happened in America and because they took so many lives. Terrorism and modern conflict have become “normal” for far too many people in the world today. Terrorism by definition targets citizens, not soldiers. Modern conflict does the same. The numbers of people affected by both are growing. To give weight to this observation, during WWII the ratio of military dead to civilians killed was 9:1. Today that ratio has been reversed. In terms of funding, since 1989 the volume of World Bank lending for post-conflict recovery purposes has increased more than 800%. Seven years ago the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) spent 80% of its budget on natural disasters and 20% on man-made disasters. In the year 2000 these numbers were essentially flip-flopped. During the 1990s the donor community pledged more than $60 billion in aid to assist the recovery of three-dozen war-torn countries. And this amount refers only to the amount designated for use between the end of “emergency measures” and the beginning of “long-term development.” Surprisingly, before September 11th, in spite of the dramatic changes in the world since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, there had been no move to perform a comprehensive reanalysis of U.S. foreign policy and its tools with an eye toward modernizing policy assumptions, operating mechanisms, and technologies that could help keep America secure in this new world context. Instead, over the last 12 years the U.S., along with the rest of the world community, has been swept along from conflict to conflict, making ad hoc decisions based on the dated paradigm of the 20th century. This paradigm assumes an order of nations made up of stable governments legitimately representing the interests of the people whom the nation-state governs. In this old paradigm, a nation’s territorial borders were inviolable, and conflict was defined primarily as war occurring between nation-states. The principles of non-interference and sovereignty ruled diplomatic act-react negotiations.

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The powerful force of the energies released in the wake of the failed Soviet empire combined with the powerful reach of information in a newly globalized world to define a new paradigm that was hard to continue to ignore. Questions emerged. How would the U.S., as a unipolar power, lead? How could the growing problem of conflict, erupting primarily intrastate, be addressed, especially when, in effect, no state government was involved? Could a new world order be based in part on agreed-upon human rights principles? What was the optimal balance among multilateral, bilateral, and regional leadership? Options were tried. Each seemed to fall short. The result of this collective indecisiveness about how to lead in the new world context has been expensive in terms of human lives, infrastructure, and money. But for the U.S., the indecisiveness has been additionally expensive in the unrecoverable capital of lost leadership potential. On September 11th, when the terror and conflict roiling in the world boiled over on our doorstep, America fully awakened to the real and potential threats of the 21st century. These threats are not small, nor are they directed only at America or the American people; they are directed at the very essence of civilization as we know it. As President Bush stated in his speech before a joint session of Congress after the 11th, “Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom, the great achievement of our time and the great hope of every time, now depends on us.” But will a deeper understanding or ownership of our vulnerability open this country to the deep changes that will be required in how we conduct our affairs in the world? What kind of change will be needed? To answer these questions and others, we first of all must analyze the nature of the threats that confront us, the resources available to drive the change, and the principles and understandings that shape our thinking.

The New Range of Threats

The National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) Global Trends 2015, published in 2001, states that the threats to world stability are increasingly nonstate factors. The NIC lists such destabilizing factors as ethnically based nationalists, terrorists, or other disaggregated threats such as disease, shortages, crime syndicates, or cyberwar. Potential for conflict in the modern world, therefore, comes less from traditional conflict between nation-states and more from stresses from the breakdown of institutions that are the basis of voluntary cooperation among people and therefore the foundation for order within states.

New Understandings

Increasingly it has becomes clear that the crafting of a new U.S. foreign policy for the 21st century will be characterized, at least in part, by the following understandings:

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Some Statistics • Between 1992 and 1997 total

development fell by 20% among OECD countries.

• Peacekeeping (not counted in

the computations for monies spent on development) rose $3 billion and emergency aid rose $33 billion.

• The ratio of military to

civilian casualties has been reversed since WWII: approximately 9:1 in WWII versus 1:9 now.

• The world is an increasingly fast-paced, complex, and troubled place characterized by a growing number and kind of threats;

• The new threat environment for the U.S. is often asymmetrical and/or not able to be

arbitrated at the traditional nation-state-to-nation-state level; • There are an increasing number of “failed” or “failing” states which destabilize

regions and create “safe havens” for terrorists and other international criminals;

Available Donor Resources

There are at least three negatively reinforcing reasons for a dwindling resource base that can be used to assist structural long-term development in transitioning countries and the countries of the Third World:

1. An overall decreasing level of assistance resources from donor countries;

2. An increasing percentage of those available donor resources being expended on post-

conflict cleanup; and

3. The loss of previous development investments in both infrastructure and human capital.

Changing How We Think About Development

In the same way that the nature of conflict in the 21st century is changing from what it was in the 20th century, the nature of achieving peace, which includes helping people move from poverty to productivity, and from oppression to freedom, needs to change too. In the 20th century we talked about a “War on Poverty.” Our intentions were good, but our rhetoric revealed that “we”—those of us fortunate enough not to be included in the ranks of the poor—would do the work. History has, hopefully, humbled us into the realization that only the poor can overcome their poverty. Poverty is not something that can be cured from without; it must be cured from within. “We,” the well-intentioned, must relegate ourselves to helping free people to be their own best advocates and produce their own way out of poverty. We can help, but we can’t do it for them—nor do they want us to.

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In the 21st century we should no longer be talking about Wars on Poverty. Instead, we should talk about Freeing People to be Productive. This means reducing government strictures that prevent the poor from converting their assets to capital. This means helping free people from daily concerns about their personal security that inhibit their ability to make a living. This includes but cannot be limited to helping people acquire the health care, education, and technology resources that will allow them to maximize their talents and their potentials. We must remember that:

1. Individuals’ freedom to choose—their liberty—is based on the range of choices available to them;

2. The range of possible choices includes economic as well as political decisions; and

3. For most people most of the time, the need for economic decisions is many times greater than the need for political choices.

However, we cannot forget that there are economic decisions that must be made collectively and these occur at many levels of aggregation, i.e., across an entire population, in subnational regions, locally, and within specific communities of interest. If we are to truly secure freedom, we not only must defeat those who would terrorize, those who would oppress, and those who would corrupt, but also must help empower the world’s poor with the capability to overcome their own circumstances.

The Discussions that Underpin this Study

It was in this whole-world context that we talked with policy makers and opinion leaders about developing a new strategic policy framework for U.S. foreign policy, using the U.S. foreign assistance program as a critical tool. Our discussions centered on focusing the U.S. aid investment on helping politically and economically impoverished people to build systems of self-governance from the ground up. We asked policy makers about what role, if any, foreign assistance can and should play in an American foreign policy where conflict prevention, management, and mitigation are key objectives. We asked about building the kinds of systems that will allow the poor of the world to become free and productive citizens, thereby cutting off at the roots the causes of conflict.

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CHAPTER II

DEFINING CONFLICT

“If there is no trust, there can be no collective action.”

—Paul Collier, World Bank economist

“Conflict boils down to money and power—to avoid it you have to get people to share power and make money together.”

—Retired General William Nash

Nature of Conflict

Dr. Paul Collier, director of research at the World Bank and one of the leading authorities in economics on conflict in the world today, cites the following as the key risk factors that must be reduced to check the incidence of conflict:

“Civil war appears as an intense political contest, fueled by grievances which are so severe as to have burst the banks of normal political channels. . . . When the main grievances—inequality, political repression, and ethnic and religious divisions—are measured objectively, they provide no explanatory power in predicting rebellion. . . . By contrast, economic characteristics—dependence on primary commodity exports, low average incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas—are all significant and powerful predictors of civil war. Rebellions either have the objective of natural resource predation, or are critically dependent upon natural resource predation in order to pursue other objectives.”

“A survey of fifteen violent civil conflicts concludes that ‘wars today are rarely started by poor and marginalized people united in battle as an expression of their deep-seated striving for a just society.’ ”

So, while conflict is not new to the world, the nature of conflict is. And the volume and scale of conflict are also new. The profile of modern conflict looks like this: • Conflict is primarily within, rather than between nation-states.

• Conflict’s victims are largely civilian rather than military.

• The number of civilians affected by modern day conflict is high, e.g., over two

million just in Sudan.

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The Costs of Conflict

The costs of conflict to the world community, in U.S. dollars:

Gulf War 114.0 billion (Western powers) Bosnia 53.7 billion (outside powers) Cambodia 12.0 billion Somalia 7.3 billion Rwanda 4.5 billion El Salvador 2.4 billion

In addition to:

Loss of lives Loss of previous development investment Creation of more refugees Economic disruption More conflict Source: The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena, edited by Michael Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance

• A society experiencing conflict is at high risk for falling back into conflict within five years of the hostilities: according to Paul Collier of the World Bank, “50% of post conflict societies return to conflict in 5 years. 50% of the reasons for return to conflict are from the unresolved grievances from before the first conflict, and 50% are a result of the conflict itself . . . conflict is self-reinforcing.”

• International terrorism is more

widespread. According to a senior World Bank official, “It is no accident that Bin Laden is in Afghanistan. What terrorists need is a territory outside the control of any recognized government. We have to concentrate our energies on reducing the number of these safe havens.”

• The world community has no new,

agreed-upon plan on how to respond to intrastate conflicts and/or international terrorism.

• Funding from sales of primary resources newly controlled by the perpetrators of

conflict or from external resources by diasporas both spark conflict and continue to fuel it.

“There is a story about a would-be African revolutionary leader at a training camp in the jungle being asked by a reporter how he would fund his grab for power. He replied, ‘All I need is $10,000 and a satellite phone.’ Asked to explain, he replied, ‘Well, the $10,000 is to buy an army. The phone is to start making deals on the mineral contracts.’ ”—Foreign assistance executive

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Kinds of Conflict According to Robert H. Dorff of the U.S. Army War College, there are three kinds of conflict in the post–Cold War world: “The first is typified by the ongoing situation in the former Yugoslav state. In this case state failure was as much the result of a conscious decision by political elites to seek territorial gain through the use of force as it was a result of eroding legitimacy and institutional failure. The resulting conflict has many of the traditional trappings of a ‘classic’ civil war. In many ways it resembles interstate conflict, having identifiable protagonists, leaders and their armed followers, and territorial bases from which they operate and began the conflict. Somalia, on the other hand, represented what we might call the post–Cold War ‘ungovernability’ form of the failed state. Here we saw a number of competing warlords and clan-like organizations consciously seeking to drive the country into a state of chaos from which they could subsequently carve out their own sub-regions or ‘turfs.’ Conflict in this kind of failed state looks more like ‘gang wars,’ and often the protagonists are more difficult to identify, and leaders have significantly less ability to control their followers than in the more traditional kind of conflict such as in the Yugoslav case. Finally, Haiti provides an example of perhaps yet another kind of state failure. Here one finds less a case of rampant criminality and warlordism than a state in which the institutions and the people were simply exhausted. Military rule by the few was possible not so much because it was forcibly imposed on the people but because it was passively accepted by an increasingly large segment of the public who had grown excessively cynical and pessimistic about the chances for effective governance.”

The U.S. and Conflict

Globalization has broken down many barriers to greater individual freedoms and economic growth, but it has also meant that familiar cultural and societal walls that used to make people feel protected have been challenged and/or broken down as well. This occurrence, coupled with the unmasking of many weak, poorly functioning governments that have failed to provide even minimum security or social safety nets for their citizens, leaves millions of individuals feeling adrift and hopeless. This is a psychological environment that breeds anger and a situation that is ripe for people who would manipulate it for their own ends. Much of this growing anger is directed at the U.S. This is true for several reasons, including the following: • The U.S. is the sole superpower with the ability to create change, yet change is not

happening, or not happening fast enough; • The U.S. is the richest country in the world; the poor wonder why we don’t help them

achieve a better standard of living;

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“The bigger the globalization, the more important the local linkages are.” —State Department economist

• The U.S. is the home of freedom; oppressed people wonder why, if the U.S. has the

power to influence change, they are still voiceless.

Conflict Intervention Timing

At the beginning of the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell said, “the military option should be our last option.” If this is a first principle of U.S. foreign policy, then some thinking outside the traditional diplomatic box must be done to generate multiple, attractive, preliminary options that can help preclude the use of the “last option.” Yet where U.S. interests are threatened, the use of military force is almost certain unless foreign assistance has been applied much, much earlier or much further upstream. When looking at options for reducing conflict, it is important to first recognize that the further along the road toward conflict you go, the greater the potential for failure in averting conflict there is. It is also important to recognize that the closer you move toward conflict, the smaller the degree of flexibility there is in what mechanisms can be applied to avert the conflict. For all of the above reasons, a push for an overall U.S. foreign policy strategy based on preventing or reducing conflict began to take shape over the past several years, mostly outside of government, but increasingly within. An important factor of the discussion amongst and between an interestingly diverse (State, USAID, DOD, CIA) group of conflict prevention advocates inside government circles is the question of prevention timing, or where does one department’s responsibility leave off and another’s begin? This part of the debate is discussed in more detail in a later section of this chapter on “Defining Conflict Prevention.”

The Nature of Conflict’s Solutions

In addition to understanding the causes of modern conflict, their importance to the U.S., and the criticality of good timing and cohesive action, is a new understanding on where conflict’s solutions might lie. ICS discovered three critical problems with much of the existing thinking on how to prevent conflict: 1. Where Does Prevention Begin? So far in the conflict prevention discussion, the

focus has been primarily on mitigation of conflict once its potential has been recognized and/or the need for greater coordination in the post-conflict phase. While these two phases are critical, ICS believes that the main target for conflict prevention needs to be placed on what USAID’s Conflict Core Group calls the “upstream” or

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“The meaning of Conflict Prevention can be so all-encompassing as to be meaningless. It is important to be clear in three areas upfront: What’s the timeframe—where do the phases start and stop?; What kinds of programs— what is included and what is not; and Where is AID’s comparative advantage, leaving other things to other departments.” —Ambassador Steinberg, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy and Planning

pre-conflict phase of prevention. As the World Bank’s Paul Collier states, “prevention is so much easier than reconstruction.”

2. What’s the Cure? As ICS reviewed the emerging literature and the efforts over the

past few years to develop a conflict prevention culture, we began to see the round pegs of new rhetoric trying to be stuffed into the square holes of old forms. It became clear to us that the paradigm of practicing conflict prevention in the 21st century was still captive of the 20th-century paradigm of trying to “save the state.” In other words, while there was recognition of a new problem, the resulting mission statement was still being cast in the terminology of old solutions. For example, even in reference to countries controlled by dictators, policy makers have shown the same bias and made the same mistake as a scholar did in a recent paper when he recommended that, post-conflict, in a totalitarian state, “we [should] build on legitimate institutions of the state.”

3. Do the Diagnosticians Need Retraining? The existing bureaucratic culture

continues to think within the old boxes. For instance, in a world where geographic lines on a map no longer define the state, one group at a recent USAID workshop identified a country as the “appropriate unit of analysis” when setting forth the basic model for strategic planning. Continuing to think inside the old boxes, especially by people who are expected to be on the front lines of observing world changes first-hand, is an overwhelming constraint to developing effective foreign policy for the 21st century.

Defining Conflict Prevention

It is important to be clear in defining what is meant by “conflict prevention.” Since the birth of the current terminology, with the work of the Carnegie Commission, the term “conflict prevention” has served as the catchall phrase for a growing community of individuals talking about and producing work on the subject. And, as the community of people studying and/or practicing conflict prevention has mushroomed, what has been included under the general banner of conflict prevention has also grown. ICS’s review shows that those most deeply involved in conflict prevention tend to use the term broadly to refer to all phases of conflict: 1) Pre-conflict or “Upstream” Prevention—before the emergence of conflict; 2) Conflict concurrent; and 3) Post-conflict through recovery. On the other hand, practitioners viewing conflict prevention from a particular perspective use the same comprehensive language to define only their more limited view or role.

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“Who’s doing what, with what authority? Conflict prevention needs to be integrated into the big picture, it can’t be done bit by bit.” —State Department discussant

For example, depending on what part of USAID they work in, people at USAID use the terminology “conflict prevention” to mean “upstream prevention,” mitigation in conflict-concurrent situations, and work in disaster relief and reconstruction efforts. Colleagues at State talk about “conflict prevention” essentially to refer more narrowly to the diplomatic process prior to and during conflict situations. The military, and others engaged mostly in post-conflict peacekeeping or post-conflict reconstruction, see “conflict prevention” as taking place in this context. A big issue, then, in defining conflict prevention is defining what segment of the timeline of conflict you are addressing. Currently these variances in meaning and shades of understanding make conversing across disciplines and departments confusing and raise unnecessary antagonisms stemming from the protection of turf. It is therefore important to the overall discussion of conflict prevention and most critical to those discussions that will establish and assign responsibilities for conflict management among and between USG departments that greater clarity be achieved in the defining language. While altogether new language could be chosen, we feel that this would be burdensome and time-consuming, and would make the U.S. appear out of step with the rest of the international donor community. Alternatively, we suggest that USAID and the rest of the USG be aggressive in further delineating conflict prevention in order to bring greater definition, understanding, and functionality to the field.

Recommendations on How to Bring Further Definition to Conflict Prevention and the Emerging Policy

Α Adopt a clear, concise definition of conflict prevention objectives that shape USAID’s policy.

AID’s conflict prevention policy seeks to: 1) Eradicate root causes of conflict before it occurs; 2) Mitigate conflict once started; and 3) Assist parties to a conflict to recover stability through addressing root causes and identifying and/or developing the basis for widespread voluntary cooperation.

Α Retain the three, still loosely defined, categories of conflict prevention. Bring further definition within these categories as to USG roles, resource assignments, and program definition.

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“Post intervention peace building is VERY different from conflict prevention before conflict breaks out—before conflict people can settle for varying percentages of whatever is being divided, after conflict everyone expects the division to be equal.” —Retired General William Nash

Pre-Conflict (“Upstream”) Phase

It is clear that USAID is the lead agency in this phase of conflict prevention. ICS recommends that USAID take the opportunity, using this initiative, to redefine the overall direction of U.S. foreign assistance. By using the lens of conflict prevention USAID can garner USG support to refocus and strengthen the role of foreign assistance in U.S. foreign policy. If all aid programming is filtered through the lens of conflict prevention, a cohesive set of priorities can emerge. A rational policy environment can strengthen USAID’s ability to optimally direct U.S. foreign assistance resources. There are two levels of assistance in this phase: Structural Prevention and Operational Prevention. In Structural Prevention assistance should be focused on capacity building starting at the most local level, and should balance that with macro economic and governance reforms. On the Operational Prevention level the State Department would coordinate with USAID in leading government negotiations both in-country and with the rest of the international community present.

Concurrent (“Existing”) Conflict Phase

The lead for this phase of conflict prevention shifts to the State Department with USAID retaining a critical role in staying committed to its programs in Structural Prevention. An increased role should be sought by USAID to secure a place at the table to assure that root causes are addressed in the peace negotiation process. This would also allow USAID to help shape programs promised by the peace process that require aid funding. AID should select several key areas of negotiation for shared responsibility and begin discussions at senior levels as appropriate.

Post-Conflict Phase

This phase of conflict prevention is shared with both Defense and State with USAID taking the lead in several key areas. The extended term of Post-conflict includes: Emergency assistance; Peacekeeping; and Post-conflict structural and economic development. The level of resources available for emergency humanitarian response in comparison to the level available for structural development is one of the issues here. An analysis of the total U.S. funding during this phase, both directly through Defense, USAID, and State and indirectly through the UN and other multilateral development agencies, needs to be analyzed. At the beginning of the decade, international donor assistance provided 20% of its funding to relief and 80%

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to economic development. By the end of the decade these percentages were reversed. This means that, if we are serious about mitigating or preventing conflict, one of two things needs to happen: 1) Greater overall funding needs to occur; or 2) A conscious decision needs to be made to reapportion existing funds. As noted, research shows that conflict is more likely to occur in countries where conflict has occurred in the last five years. A critical factor in the post-conflict phase of prevention then, is to assure that post-conflict assistance is accomplished in a way that minimizes renewed risk of conflict.

Α Negotiate assigned roles in operational and structural prevention.

One of the key hurdles in achieving effective conflict prevention policy will be reaching a new level of understanding with other USG departments on respective roles in conflict prevention. Redefined roles, based on greater cooperation and less pigeonholing, will need to be negotiated. It will be important to define the tasks for which each department will take primary responsibility and what roles will be shared. Following are some illustrative activities of Structural Prevention and Operational Prevention provided in an internal USAID memorandum:

Operational Prevention:

• Assist border discussions and demarcation where borders are in serious dispute; • Fund exploration of options for land reform where current tenure is volatile; • Arrange interfaith action teams to reduce religious conflict in a given setting; • Sponsor open forums to expose corruption and power abuses; • Encourage review of curriculum values inflammatory to integration, pluralism,

and intolerance of different “national-identities” within a political state; and • Fund objective analysis of inequity grievances to show where they could lead to

violence and how to redress them.

Structural Prevention:

• Develop anti-corruption units within and outside government; • Develop good-governance centers in and out of government; • Strengthen independent judiciary and legislative bodies; • Develop centers for independent budget analysis, policy analysis, media

analysis, etc; • Develop structures to deliver essential services on an equitable basis; and • Develop education, religious and traditional authority organizations to imbue

society with values of pluralism, diversity, tolerance, and compromise.

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Α Establish interdepartmental working groups.

• Using ESF funding, USAID should seek a more defined role in providing

technical support to political solutions; • Personnel exchanges between State, USAID, and Defense should be sought to

cross-pollinate expertise, decision-making styles, and understandings; • Working groups should be assigned to work out Memorandums of Understanding

on conflict prevention–related issues. Facilitators external to both State, USAID, and Defense should be appointed to these groups.

Α Establish joint research activities between USAID, State, and Defense.

Set up Learning Centers staffed by personnel from multiple departments and agencies that are designed to study field experience, emerging data from both the international arena and the private sector, and training opportunities.

Α Perform an Agency-wide inventory of conflict prevention models and begin sharing them.

One of the products of the excellent work of the Africa Bureau, which is light years ahead of the rest of the Agency in conflict prevention strategies and analysis, can be found in their inventory of success stories. This can be found at http://inside.usaid. gov/afr/conflict web/success_stories/index.html

On this point, it is important to understand upfront that while it is true there are many activities that can be labeled conflict prevention already occurring at USAID, this does not mean there is a conflict prevention program. USAID’s culture has for so long been “activity” driven when people see that there are a few programs taking place they will feel the objectives have been satisfied. This will of course fall far short of establishing conflict prevention as a coherent policy approach.

Α Use and develop training models.

Utilize the SENSE program as an interdepartmental exercise and also as a training program for mid-level USAID/STATE employees. Invest in the development of new training models for U.S. government employees, PVOs, and NGOs and for use in the field that are focused on “upstream” conflict prevention measures.

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CHAPTER III

A NEW POLICY FRAMEWORK

“Too many policy makers have taken an Olympian view of the globalization process. Once they stabilized and adjusted at the macro level, allowing legal business and foreign investors to prosper and orthodox economists to control the treasure, they felt they had fulfilled their duty. Because they concentrated only on policies dealing with the aggregates, they did not inquire whether people had the means to participate in an expanded market system. They forgot that people are the fundamental agents of change.”

—Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, p. 211

A Policy Framework for Conflict Prevention?

The recognition of a new world context demands, at the least, a review of current policies at USAID and an analysis of their underlying assumptions. The 21st century should force a fresh look at how the Agency conceives its purpose and approaches its work. Yet there have been few comprehensive efforts to review the foreign assistance program, especially as an integral part of U.S. foreign and national security policy, since World War II. One result is that USAID’s authorizing legislation, formulated over 30 years and hundreds of amending pages ago, is greatly confusing. In addition, years of bureaucratic procedures and other detritus have built up. Regulations and mannerisms have been layered in and practiced for so long, and are so much a part of the “system,” that it is not even noticed anymore that they don’t fit in the modern context. Practices such as rotating Foreign Service Officers out of their overseas assignments every three years and moving them to different regions to fulfill career path guidelines put in place many years ago need to be reviewed. Today’s world may demand exactly the opposite—an in-depth knowledge of cultures, countries, and regions that can be gained only through extended service. Maybe not, but procedures as basic as this need to be put on the table and renegotiated with a 21st century spotlight on them. Administrations come and go in Washington. Policies change. But the bureaucracies continue on and change only superficially. Most senior political appointees change a few boxes on the management flow chart, trying to fix operationally what appears not to be working. But what is not working goes much deeper, and there is so little time on the political clock. It is difficult, if not impossible, to get change from moving the management boxes, and starting there it is hard to get to the larger policy framework. Policy is a top-down process. It should be the driver, driving resource allocation. Policy must also be proactive, not stalled in the old act-react patterns it has traditionally followed.

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“We have to come to grips with the fact that we can’t cure the world; however, we can make it more politically, socially, and economically secure.” —Former senior AID official

Conflict Prevention: Rationale, Program, Integrated Policy, or Pilot?

In deciding the role conflict prevention should have in directing or contributing to foreign assistance policy, there are essentially four options: • Option #1: Conflict prevention could be presented as an overall rationale for how

U.S. foreign assistance is directed. This would mean that all programming, budgeting, and prioritizing would be done through the lens of conflict prevention policy.

• Option #2: Conflict prevention could be seen as a major policy or program in a

constellation of other USAID programs, similar to the Population Program. • Option #3: Conflict prevention as a concept could be integrated into other,

preexisting USAID program considerations, such as the Women in Development Program (WID).

• Option #4: Conflict Prevention could be a pilot program, as it was in the Greater

Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI), to test its feasibility before proceeding. ICS has weighed each of these options, and we recommend that USAID choose Option #1.

Why Option #1, the Framework Approach?

The foreign assistance program has been without a cohesive policy framework for far too long. Over the years, the program has increasingly become a collection of projects. This has many ramifications, not the least of which is budgetary anarchy. Most importantly, having a policy framework allows staff to have a rational basis for decision making. A well-conceived policy framework should also provide broad-based organizational coherence, supporting and defining such decisions as training and recruitment needs for personnel as well as operational changes that affect the internal culture of an institution in order to bring it into alignment with the newly profiled needs of a changing external world.

“Over $4 billion is spent on the State Department’s bilateral assistance programs (Economic Support Funds) and USAID’s sustainable development programs. Neither the Secretary of State nor the USAID Administrator is able to coordinate these foreign assistance activities or avoid duplication among them. More important, no one is responsible for integrating these programs into broader preventive strategies or for redeploying them quickly in response to crises. The Congress, too, has no single person to hold accountable for how the monies it appropriates are spent. Moreover, the majority of AID funding is expended through contracts with non-

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“A very wise government official who signed off on billions of dollars of contract awards once told his subordinates: ‘First decide what is right; then decide what is possible. If you let the possible confuse what is right, you will never run a good organization. What is right may not be possible, but you should know what you missed, what you gave up, and what you settled for.” —Joe Fox, Executive Qualities

governmental organizations (NGOs) who often lobby Congress over various AID programs, further undermining the coherence of the nation’s assistance programs.” —Hart–Rudman Commission Report

Option #1 and an Interdepartmental Framework

Having a shared policy framework that works across government departments is critical in gaining a working consensus. Without it, such things as coordination and integration of strategic planning are impeded. The same is true of establishing the premises for relationships external to the U.S. government. New partnerships with the private sector, with other governments, and with multilateral organizations all depend on having a policy framework from which to spring. New policy should result in new investments in such things as new technologies, new database requirements, model building, and training that can be shared interdepartmentally and with the private sector as well. Without the broader definition of what that policy is, these investments can’t occur in an orderly enough or concentrated enough manner to make a difference. The world is overwhelmed by need. Priorities need to be set and choices made. The question is on what basis will those choices be made. A policy framework provides the basis for this decision making.

Based on the selection of Option#1, Part III of this report begins to lay out a policy framework using conflict prevention as the core objective. The following two examples demonstrate just a few reasons why this kind of policy guidance is so needed:

Zimbabwe: A U.S. policy change. Using the conflict-prevention policy lens appears to have averted crisis and conflict: Zimbabwe was about to graduate from the USAID-assisted countries in 1998. At a Mission Director’s conference, in a workshop on Conflict Prevention, the USAID Mission Director in Zimbabwe asked why the U.S. was withdrawing from this country when it was clear to her the country was about to “blow.”

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Toward a New Policy Framework

How does USAID address conflict prevention in a rapidly changing world? As one looks at the world and all the factors that are new or changing, one can get a sense of chaos, with no clear road maps telling us where to go. To many, the challenges of the Information Age, globalization, exploding populations, environmental threats, and deadly conflicts seem insurmountable. The sheer complexity of our modern world seems to overwhelm our modern management systems. Yet history records significant turning points when societies were required to fundamentally change. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, will be one of those turning points. It will dramatically accelerate a changing world that requires us to think deeply and profoundly, and to change.

Nepal: A missed opportunity in preventing conflict due to failure to recognize early warnings, report them, and reallocate resources to thwart them: Two or three years ago the British government told the U.S. that there was a growing problem in Nepal: they feared an Eastern-style revolutionary movement taking root there. The U.S. Ambassador in Nepal ignored the warning. Soon thereafter, U.S. Special Forces did an analysis and reported the same thing. Again, the warning was ignored; it did not even show up in the cable traffic from the U.S. Ambassador. Not only did the State Department turn a deaf ear to the warnings, USAID continued to heap all of its resources into child health and nutrition. Today, Nepal is 50 to 75% controlled or heavily influenced by revolutionaries. USAID monies are still committed to child health and nutrition and the only programmatic add-on is one in electrical power. For security reasons, USAID has been driven out of project areas where it has worked for decades.

A senior USAID official from Washington was sent out; a larger foreign policy assessment was undertaken; USAID did a country conflict assessment. The decision was made not to graduate Zimbabwe from USAID. The follow-on transition strategy came up with several scenarios on what was likely to happen, and on how USAID’s strategy might be modified accordingly. A waiver was obtained from Congress to have USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives do work in Zimbabwe to support the strategy. (The focus was on the Parliamentary elections).

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“This journey does not follow the assumptions of rational planning. The objectives may not be clear, and the path to it is not paved with familiar procedures. This tortuous journey requires that we leave our comfort zones and step outside our normal roles. In doing so, we learn the paradoxical lesson that we can change the world only by changing ourselves. This is not just a cute abstraction; it is an elusive key to effective performance in all aspects of life.” —Robert E. Quinn, Deep Change: Discovering the Leader Within, p. 9

What road map shall we use? Just as conventional warfare will not work against Muslim terrorists, conventional governing and management tools, through centralized states and bureaucratic structures, are unlikely to maximize human development or reduce conflict. Yet, our conditioned response, from years of practice, is to ask how do we build “states” that “work”?

History of Foreign Assistance Policy

The road signs of development’s history make clear that our conditioned response to build a better mousetrap or “build a stronger state” has not so far worked, and is therefore not the model we should look to for the future. The three dominant prescriptions for the Third World, used to direct U.S. foreign assistance over the last 50 years, have been based on the “problem” being diagnosed as: 1) Not enough centralized authority; 2) Too much centralized authority, let’s try privatization; and 3) Perhaps the problem is competence in the centralized state. What lessons can we take from this history of development models that will help us create a more hopeful future? First of all, it is becoming clear to many in the development field that “the state” is not the answer, but governance is. And, in the emerging culture of conflict prevention, legitimate governance is recognized as the most powerful tool in creating sustained development and preventing conflict. Building “strong states” after World War II seemed only natural to Western and aspiring leaders of soon-to-be independent colonies. The development “gap” only seemed to require more capital and the mobilization of resources in developing countries. The problem quite simply was identified as the “missing money” (Rostow 1960). The task was to transform traditional societies into “modern” industrialized states. This required the centralization of authority to mobilize both human and technical resources. The inherited centralized bureaucracy became the chief engine of development. Generally, systems were built to bypass “backward” traditional systems of governance and social organization. In other words, local governance was generally seen as a threat to development. Politically, this first design for modernization in the Third World usually ended up with a centralized state run by a single ruler, and a one-party system replacing a full spectrum of more local, traditional, political systems. The 20th century can be characterized as a century fascinated with bigness and consolidation, which was equally as true of capitalist societies as socialist ones. Thus it is

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The case studies point to the need for analysis to focus on processes of state formation and transition. Violent conflicts are rooted in “pathologies of the state” and conflict in turn leads to profound changes in the nature and capacities of the state. —DFID: Finding 29, 2001

“The tragedy of September 11th will only increase our need to develop new ways of governing our global world and responding to non-state terrorism.” —Senior official, Treasury Department

no wonder that leaders of developing countries were committed to creating command and control systems to “modernize their countries.” Yet what was lost from sight and action was the importance of local information and independent collective action to create social, political, and economic wealth. What is ironic about this history is that as the world strove to build strong states, we instead helped build weak ones that are now failing or, indeed, have already failed. There was either a lack of will, or knowledge, to build states that could meet the following essential criteria: 1. Healthy states tend to be multiconstitutional,

having multiple points of political access to address and solve problems.

2. Effective long-term problem solving will be

multilevel and focus on building political solutions from solid social foundations.

Privatization, Decentralization, and NGOs

By the late 1970s, the poor performance of these approaches was fast becoming apparent. Poor to negative economic growth, political instability, and lack of human development in areas such as education and health were all cause for concern. So, in the 1980s, donors shifted their emphasis to policy reform, privatization of state-owned enterprises, encouraging decentralization to local governments, increasing the growth of NGOs as a means of obtaining more effective and responsive service delivery, and advocacy for those left out of the “political” process. Growing evidence suggests that privatization did increase the efficiency of many developing economies but poverty levels were not affected greatly. Likewise, decentralizations generally failed or were merely programs to extend central government control over local governments. One of the lessons learned from these efforts was that productive markets, privatizations, and increased capacities of NGOs depended on the rich institutional settings in which such enterprises must be nested. Without an enabling legal system, an independent judiciary, and broadly shared norms of reciprocity that must exist in a society, it is difficult for reforms to work. As these trends continued in the developing world we increasingly had to deal with what people call failed states, i.e., states that are incapable of maintaining even minimal levels of public order and productivity.

Good Governance to the Rescue?

In the 1990s donors were forced to pay more attention to failed states. The charters of both the World Bank and the United Nations Development

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Program provided that they work with and through states in providing financial and foreign assistance. The missing “money gap” took a back seat to the “gap in competence” of developing countries. In short, this meant that states would remain the preferred mechanism for development once their capacity and competence through increased professionalism and commitment by their agents were developed. From the donor’s perspective, Good Government means: increased policy output, transparency, better statistical and accounting functions, and an independent judiciary that can sustain the rule of law. It is doubtful that good government is going to solve problems of conflict or pathologies of service delivery and human need in developing countries. The conflict in Sri Lanka is constitutional, based on exclusionary political communities, domination, and weak citizenship. Likewise the “states” of Moldova and Kyrgzstan are artificial and not fitted well to people. In fact one could well argue that both the World Bank and UNDP face a serious constitutional challenge themselves: their inability to deal with real pathologies of failed states—the lack of viable institutions to create productive political associations. In fact, what the World Bank and UNDP focus on is the state and the instruments of government, not governance. Such functions as transparency and information flows are Western concepts dependent in large part on high levels of consensus on their importance and the competitive political systems that demand them.

The Case of the Missing Institutions

Failed states, suboptimal performance of many economies in developing countries, the lack of viable education systems, and increasing levels of conflict have led a number of practitioners and policy analysts to look for deeper structural answers to the problems of development. Increasingly, their focus is on the institutional structures of development. A recent evaluation of foreign assistance for the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) found that “missing, weak or bad institutional arrangements are typically at the root of under provision of public goods in developing countries” (Workshop 2001, p. 8). Institutions can be seen as the rules of the games that coordinate human action, which, according to Nobel Laureate Douglass C. North, “structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic” (North 1990:3). Key public goods necessary for development are constitutions, voting rules, the rule of law, transparent financial institutions, and rich enabling statutes and environments that encourage both public and private entrepreneurship. The Sida report also concludes, “aid is only sustainable when realized within robust institutional settings” (Workshop 2001, p. 8). It is weak or perverse institutional settings that are the roots of the “pathologies of states.” When constitutions are rigged games to favor the elite, the rule of law is used to gain unfair advantage over others, and the poor are denied the right to develop their capacities

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of self-organization to better their lives. It is then we have the breeding grounds for poor economic performance and political poverty.

Looking Back: Faulty Diagnostics

Hindsight is always perfect. Many of the reforms sought over the last 50 years, given the constraints of leaders and events, are understandable. Also missing over the last century has been an awareness of the importance of constitutions and institutions in governing the relationships between men. This lack of understanding of, and focus on, the constitutions of order in societies took away a critical dimension of human development; we shall return to this subject shortly. It was within these frameworks that most development aid, from all donors, took place. But, development history wasn’t all failed states and poor levels of human development, foreign assistance can take a great deal of the credit for successes in countries such as Botswana and Korea in the 1960s, Indonesia in the 1970s, Bolivia and Ghana in the 1980s, and Uganda in the 1990s. Likewise, the Green Revolution in agriculture and health advances such as dramatically reducing the prevalence of disease and infant mortality in many countries can also be attributed to farsighted assistance from donor countries. What didn’t happen in most of these societies is that they never went through a period of constitutional debate and sustained discussion that would create new understandings about how they would govern themselves. Most of the developing countries adopted both the constitutions and administrative structures of their departing imperial masters. Given the artificial nature of most colonial boundaries, is it any wonder that these same societies are now in conflict or achieve less than optimal levels of development?

Conflict and Development

We all have a fundamental interest in seeing that the world is free from poverty. The events of September 11th point to the fact that terrorists will use the symbolism of poverty as one justification for unjustifiable acts. Since poverty has been increasing in some parts of the world and little progress has been made in other areas to eradicate poverty, we must ask ourselves, “Are there new approaches that will allow us to address the issue of poverty and, in the process, take away one of the justifications for conflict?”

Changing the Lens

In a powerful statement, James C. Scott in Seeing Like a State points out how hard it was and is for leaders and analysts to see beyond the state as a key organizing entity and a source of productive political order. Yet to ignore the capacities, assets, and aspirations of the poor is not only to disable any human development strategy but also to serve as a key long-term cause of instability leading to conflict. And this is precisely what most

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developing states and foreign assistance have done: they have destroyed or ignored the possibility of creating institutions that will allow the assets of the poor to be utilized effectively in overcoming their own poverty.

Putting People First

The first principle of conflict prevention is putting the individual first. This should be the operating rule of every development agency in the world. If forcefully and clearly articulated, such a principle would not only take the high moral ground of development but would also replace despair with hope for billions of men and women around the world. Yet to do so requires courage and leadership, as well as a new vision of the future.

The Theory

For the last 20 years there has been a growing dissatisfaction with human development theory both at home and abroad. At its core this dissatisfaction stems from the role individual-citizens have been relegated to—in both government and economic theory—as mere consumers of services provided by someone else. Not only does this approach devalue the human spirit, it impoverishes both the political and economic spheres of life, failing to acknowledge or employ the vast entrepreneurial capabilities of citizens and local communities for joint action in solving problems and creating political wealth. To ignore these vast and untapped capabilities is to mortally wound any development strategy. It is one of the key reasons that more progress has not been made in eradicating poverty in the developing world. This new approach has many names: the asset approach to social policy, the self-governing approach to social and political issues, the microenterprise movement, to name but a few. Michael Sherraden in his now-classic book Assets for the Poor: A New Welfare Policy for America claimed “There have been no theories of welfare centered on the assets of the poor.” When policies are developed to build on the capabilities of individuals and communities, they can create household stability, create a sense of future, increase risk taking, develop personal efficacy and social influence, and enhance the welfare of offspring (Sherraden 1991, p. 148). The work of Hernando De Soto, most recently in The Mystery of Capital, extends this analysis, showing that the poor create capital through their capacities of self-organization in their illegal cities and that they are poor in part because they cannot transform their assets into working capital—a key factor in economic development and well being. Finally, ten years later, the World Bank sees the poor not as liabilities “but rather as creative assets that will contribute more than anyone else to eradicate poverty” (World Bank 2001, p.7).

Do people have the capacity?

Cynics will say that the average man and woman, especially in developing countries, do not have the capacity to create wealth, govern their communities, or resolve conflict. The

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Ambassador William Farrand relates his experience of becoming the supervisor of the municipality of Brcko, a strategic city for all the contestants in Bosnia. Since NATO forces would not provide municipal police services, his priority was to create a multiethnic police force in a community with high levels of distrust and hatred. His first task was to create a working group of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims that began the process of creating a new set of understandings and agreements on how the municipal police force would be structured and operate. Today a multiethnic police force is at work in Brcko. This is an example of a constituting process facilitated by a donor.

following examples answer the cynics and provide the foundation to build powerful development approaches that create wealth and prevent conflict.

Communities have the capacity to resolve conflict—build on that capacity.

Conflict is endemic to all societies. Healthy social, economic, and political systems have institutions and methods to resolve conflicts before they become violent and destructive of human welfare. For example, for centuries the Tribunal de Las Aguas, a water court, has met on Tuesday mornings outside the Apostles Door of the Cathedral of Valencia to adjudicate water use conflicts between member-farmers. A presiding officer chosen by seven autonomous irrigation communities hears and resolves disputes over water between predominantly small farmers. His decisions are based upon governing rules established by the farmers. This is an example of a self-organizing community creating an agreed-upon conflict resolution mechanism. This is not an isolated example of community-developing conflict-resolution mechanisms. A growing body of evidence indicates that such practices are found in fisheries, grassing lands, water use, forestry, and many other sectors. What these examples demonstrate is that conflict prevention is not something external to groups or organizations but rather a key element of any healthy organization. It is a capacity that cannot be imposed but must be enabled and nurtured. The more frequently individuals and communities can resolve conflicts between themselves and in their local communities, the more pressure is taken off a given society. Cooperative order is a function of widespread voluntary cooperation that is, in turn, based on agreements about how cooperation will occur, including how costs and benefits will be shared. These agreements, with the voting rules, are the fundamental institutions or constituting agreements of a society. It is upon these agreements that the institutions of the law, policy regimes, and appropriate regulatory systems are derived. New or effective governing institutions are then the outcome of constituting processes. These are processes in which communities of citizens create communities of common understanding through reflection and choice, which are the foundation on which policies and operational decisions rest.

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Seven years ago, after years of cooperation, clans of the Nuer in Southern Sudan—the Jikany and Lou—began killing one another. It was discovered that the problem creating this violence was a breakdown of the understanding over the use of common resources, particularly water and fishing. The South Sudan Independence Movement and the Presbyterian Church of Sudan brought together over 40 chiefs from the two clans and organized a Reconciliation Conference for what amounted to a 45-day constitutional convention to develop new understanding to regulate the use of the common resources that were at the root of the conflict.

Written constitutions are mere pieces of paper if shared communities of understanding do not underpin them. Even in a war-torn society like Bosnia, with the aid of an outside mediator, three warring ethnic groups were able to reach agreement on a new constitution for their joint police force. The principle is fairly clear: you cannot manage optimally unless you can govern and you cannot govern effectively in a democratic system unless there is broadly shared understanding about fundamental political values—the constitutional foundation of both governance and administration.

Sustained and violent conflict is many times a constitutional issue.

When violent conflict occurs, which in half the cases around the world will occur again in five years, we have a constitutional crisis. What this means is that fundamental consensus, shared understanding, and trust of the principles, practices, and political standing of key groups in a society have broken down, have not been addressed, or were never addressed during the founding of development states. Seeking policy solutions to constitutional issues will not work. These are not just issues of efficient service delivery. For too long policy development has focused on issues of designing the right policies and building the right administrative structures. We have taken states and constitutions as givens, but time has conclusively proven that they are not. A growing body of research and practice points out how important constituting processes are to issues of governance, policy development, and implementation. When trust breaks down, the key political response should be to institute constitutional processes to create agreement on new institutions through which individuals and groups will cooperate voluntarily and govern themselves.

Build and Expand Existing Capacities

The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2015 estimates that the world population will grow from 6.1 billion to 7.2 billion by 2015. Most of this growth will occur in urban areas. “Where the political systems are brittle, the combination of population growth and urbanization will foster instability.” How will the political and legal institutions of these urban areas respond? What governing strategy will they use? Will they build on what is there?

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As Hernando de Soto notes, “It is this tide that has transformed Jakarta, Mexico City, Sao Paolo, Nairobi, Bombay, Shanghai, and Manila into mega cities of 10, 20, 30 million and overwhelmed their political and legal institutions.” Yet de Soto also notes that there is order in these shantytowns or neighborhoods. Associations soon form and such groups provide a number of urban services. Yet to try and create unified governments and management systems in the face of such complexity is an old strategy bound to fail. Rather, we should view these great metropolitan areas as local public economies that are politically deficient and in need of new institutions capable of governing diverse populations. The informal institutions need to be given recognition and legal projects through such instruments as homeowners associations, small-town status, neighborhood governments, and a whole range of special district mechanisms.

Indispensable Producers of Public and Private Goods: People and Communities

A great deal of development is predicated on the notion that individuals and communities in developing countries are incapable of making a real contribution to create social, political, and social wealth. This could be called the tragedy of development: lack of faith, understanding, and use of existing systems of order in favor of states that cannot produce such human order. Farming is a dominant way of life in Nepal—agriculture accounts for 60% of Nepal’s GDP and 80% of its export earnings. Small landholders are still the primary producers of farm products. Irrigation is the key to the production of rice, Nepal’s primary staple and export item. Today there are more than 16,000 farmer-governed systems in Nepal that irrigate approximately 714,000 hectares, or about 67% of all irrigated land. In an exhaustive study of farmer-governed versus modern state-governed systems, Wai Fung Lam found that: 1. Farmer-governed systems had higher levels of productivity and delivered water more

effectively and reliably. Water distribution was also more equitable and systems were better maintained.

2. Farmer-governed systems achieved these results because they spent more time on

building cooperative approaches, crafted and followed their own rules, spent more time monitoring behavior, applied graduated sanctions to violation of rules, and had higher levels of trust with one another

Professor Lam demonstrates that governing structure is not only critical in developing productive human relationships that allow individuals to realize higher levels of their innate potential, but also has a significant impact on economic efficiency through higher outputs. Stake holding, reciprocity, and community are key components of productive social, political, and economic institutions.

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One of AID’s most successful projects, the On-Farm Water Management Project, is located in the Azua Valley in the southwestern region of the Dominican Republic. In 1986 this 10,000-hectare area was being serviced and managed by the Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hidraulicos, with disastrous results. The national government was able to distribute only 50 percent of its water and collect only 32 percent of its water fees from farmers, the lateral canals were unusable, and the area was racked by violence as farmers settled water allocation issues through conflict. Eight years later, through combined efforts by the community, the national government, and USAID, a new form of resource governance flourishes in the Azua Valley. The Dominican government recognized the rights of the farmers to organize, enabling them to create the Junta de Regantes, through which the water users have developed their capacities to govern and through which they now make most of the decisions that affect their lives. The Junta now buys water from the national government and distributes the water through a complex set of users groups that determine the rules for distribution, use, and maintenance of the system. Today farmers pay for 80 percent of their water, have raised their own rates three times, maintain their canals through their contributed labor, and resolve their conflicts through the rules they jointly created. Just as important, the national government, working through the Junta, has been able to reclaim environmentally degraded land and use water more efficiently.

Enabling Capacity

If, as we have shown, the capacities to build constitutions, resolve conflicts, establish and maintain self-governing organizations and create higher levels of wealth in developing countries already exist, why are they not used more often? The following example demonstrates why linking local institution building efforts with national enabling acts is critical to maximizing the wealth-generating capacity of such projects.

While the economic and political wealth of the farm families of the Azua Valley in the example above has been stabilized, there are still two threats to their long-term well-being. First, the title to their land is clouded, meaning that they cannot transfer it nor can they realize the full economic benefit from their land. This example gives concreteness to de Soto’s claim in The Mystery of Capital that most legal systems in developing countries systematically deny poor people access to or use of the natural talents or resources. Also missing are the means to collateralize assets in both the legal system and financial markets. Second, title to their political wealth is granted through administrative regulation by the state, meaning that at any time a change in political power relationships can destroy their community. This means that their right to be self-organizing and to maintain their political identity is always a privilege rather than a right. An exacerbating factor is that the legal and financial mechanisms needed to mobilize the resources rarely exist where they are needed.

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Institutions and Character Are Linked

In the examples above one sees communities actively involved in governing their communities and creating social, political, and economic wealth. The character of these communities is defined by a sense of hope, a sense of a future that makes it worthwhile to invest their time in building productive enterprises. All over the world, people will invest time and scarce resources when they think there is a better than equal chance of a return. In part their sense of future stems from their ability to make and carry out decisions about important issues facing their communities. This in turn is supported by either informal or formal authority structures, which cover the decision-making rights. All too often empowerment programs promise authority but never deliver. If we want people to develop their capacities we must be willing to provide them and their communities with authority to act. Without doing this, we are moralizing and being dishonest.

New Governing Strategies for Development

Given these capacities and their high potential for increasing human returns from development activities, how can the USG take advantage of them? How can we also utilize these potentials to effectively reduce the likelihood of violent conflict? Additionally, how do we make operational the World Bank’s challenge that “people in poverty should not be treated as a liability but rather as a creative asset that will contribute more than anyone to eradicate poverty” (World Bank 2001, p. 7). For without their “creative” contribution there is simply no way we can significantly reduce poverty or conflict in the near or far term.

Framework Issues

The following four framework issues are key in addressing issues of development and conflict prevention. 1. Finding: There is a Political Poverty Gap: it is the key cause of conflict and

underdevelopment and must be addressed. Conflict generally breaks down in a society when the fundamental ideas and agreements that constitute order break down. For it is these ideas and agreements, when given the force of law or the coercive power of the state, that regulate behavior, creating or denying opportunities. Conflict is first and foremost a political failure. In many cases these political failures are the direct result of colonial history, development strategies, and foreign assistance in building hollow states that either cannot or will not build productive political communities or enable them to operate. In short, the political opportunity structure is closed to all but elites, creating the breeding ground for conflict and terrorism. We call this the Political Poverty Gap. Many states in developing countries face serious problems of political poverty: they

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simply do not have a broad enough base of political capital and institutions to create productive and sustainable forms of human association. The growth of the informal sector, both politically and economically, is an excellent proxy for the failure of “states” to create legitimate and decentralized political systems to accommodate the aspirations and needs of their populations. One of the key causes of political poverty is that there is, in fact, too little legitimate political authority in failed or failing states. This poverty stems from the common and working definition of a state as an organization, which has a monopoly over the authority to create law and use coercion. And it is this working definition of the states that creates political exclusion—predatory behavior that lays the groundwork for conflict—because politics becomes a zero-sum game. Vincent Ostrom argues, “Democracies are at risk when people conceive of their relationships as being grounded in command and control rather than on principles of self responsibility in communities of relationship” (V. Ostrom 1977, p. 4). The operational definition of this difference is power as control versus enablement; politics as a zero-sum game or a positive-sum game; a choice between the old politics of manipulation and a politics based on “societies of men and women reflecting and choosing the future.” It is at the core of a politics of conflict prevention. Many states in developing countries are at risk. The alternative is systems of governance. The United States never created a state but rather systems of governance, each with special capabilities as well as limitations. Partnership among systems of governance was the operating principle and should be operating in developing countries as well. This is the only strategy that will create political wealth and allow these countries to compete politically and economically in the global economy. In addressing the poverty gap, four values are key: 1. Democracy must be seen as a way of life, building on the cooperative behavior of

communities of interest coming together to solve joint problems. 2. Healthy states will be multiconstitutional, having multiple points of political

access to address and solve problems.

3. Effective long-term problem solving will be multileveled and focus on building political solutions from solid social and economic foundations.

4. A strong and active citizenry to design local institutions and coproduce public

goods and services is indispensable. For too long the developed world has relied on command and control approaches to political and economic development. It is now time to change this preference and work towards building political systems that are inclusive yet allow real communities to flourish, to enable people to solve their own problems through real political

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partnership, and, finally, to build systems that allow developing communities to grow in their own ways.

2. Finding: Constituting processes are critical to resolving conflict and unlocking

political and economic wealth. It is important to understand the roots of these political failures. They are constitutional in the sense that many of the parties in the conflict do not have recognized standing to participate in the governance of their countries. For constitutions are the rules of the game of politics determining the operational level of politics, which Harold Laswell saw as who gets what, when, and how. Sabetti argues, “What passes for international or national conflict has deep communal roots.” His statement reflects the fact that most people live in multiconstitutional systems and not just country-level systems. He goes on to argue that taking the “whole system of government approach” often defies understanding and effective problem solving (Sabetti 2001, p. 2). Elinor Ostrom argues that policy makers need to understand that “effective and long-lasting constitutions are frequently negotiated at a micro-level rather than at a macro-level of an entire political system” (E. Ostrom 1989, p. 12). We call the processes that communities, regions, and states use to develop fundamental understanding about how they are to be governed constituting processes. If seen, enabled, and worked with they are critical components of any effective conflict prevention strategy.

3. Finding: Sustaining economic growth is a key conflict-prevention strategy. A recent paper by Paul Collier of the World Bank suggests that countries that can sustain 5% economic growth experience very low incidence of violent conflict. A recent World Bank Study on the effectiveness of USAID concludes, “Improvements in economic institutions and policy in the developing world are key to a quantum leap in poverty reduction. Well-timed financial assistance can mean the difference between successful reform and failure. Efforts to ‘buy’ policy improvements in countries in which there is no movement for reform, on the other hand, have typically failed.” Thus, it is in the interest of countries in conflict as well as donors to build a base for sustained reform, not only to reduce poverty but also to significantly reduce the

4. Finding: With wise leadership, conflict can be an opportunity structure.

The political poverty gap also creates a rich set of opportunities for donors. The choice is not between government and the private sector. The choices are to relax the

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rule of sovereignty so that rich systems of governance can be developed. Likewise, the choices are not between small and large systems but between systems of governance that develop rooted local systems yet are tied into regional and national systems. Simply stated, this is the principle of self-rule through shared-rule. Conflict situations provide the opportunity to bring excluded parties to the table, start constitutional discussion, and use programming to build the governing capacities of local, regional, and national institutions. To delay such processes until stability occurs is to allow inertia to rule.

Strategic Considerations

The United States has a strategic opportunity not only to make a significant contribution to prevent deadly conflict throughout the world but also to reclaim the promise of development for citizens around the world. To do this, it must create a new mission with clear strategic goals and policies. The following are principles on which such strategic goals and policies can be built: 1. Articulate a vision: The USG must communicate a powerful vision of hope for the

development aspirations of the poor and democratic forces around the world. Without such a vision it will be business as usual—any road to nowhere is a good road. Then such a vision needs to become the practicing mantra of every agency and professional in the USG’s foreign and national security elements. While we should never try to sell our particular form of government, we should clearly articulate the profound values of the American experiment in self-governance since they resonate with the rest of the world. We should not seek to define happiness but rather to make it possible for individuals to define and responsibly pursue it in their own way.

2. Provide leadership: The USG must lead on this issue. It must take a long-term perspective and build a new national consensus around our commitment to human development. Without this commitment the rest is chaff.

3. Clarify development policy: The USG must foster a new strategic form of diplomacy that focuses on foreign assistance as a key ingredient of building stable and healthy systems of governance. The USG must be clear about the principles of the role of the state in foreign policy and development and must know and understand its objectives.

4. Set priorities: US foreign assistance must focus its scarce development resources on those activities that have the highest probability of accelerating growth and decreasing conflict in the Third World. Since 70% of all poor people still live in rural areas, USAID might want to focus on an integrated strategy of increasing the social, political, and economic wealth of these areas.

5. Govern, then manage: Development must be governed first then managed, building democratic ways of life with strong citizens. This means that USAID’s governance programs must be expanded far beyond the holding of national elections. This should be one of USAID’s most inclusive and important program areas.

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6. Build, maintain, and change institutions: This should be USAID’s first mission in conflict prevention. When trust breaks down, the legitimacy of governing processes must be rebuilt, which can only be done through constituting processes that are seen as fair and inclusive. After years of confusion, USAID must have a clear definition of institutions and institution building. Institutions are the rules of the game. Training administrators to be more professional is not institution building. Building consensus around a new set of governing rules is institution building. Both are important. One cannot be a substitute for the other because we are afraid to take on the “state.”

7. Use integrated strategies with multiple outcomes: While “stovepiping” is a serious issue for donor coordination during conflict prevention, it is also a problem with USAID. Development of local irrigation systems should be seen not only as an economic development activity but also as an opportunity to build local governance systems, a health issue to increase water quality, and a system of governance opportunity to build regional and national water systems based on the rule of law. In developing the rule of law, we must keep in mind that it is important to recognize the needs and issues of efforts of local farmers or local governments to design self-governing systems; we must provide the neutral basis for locals organizations to resolve disputes; and there must exist a legal forum in which local, regional, and national authorities can have disputes adjudicated. This last function is absolutely indispensable in order for individuals and communities to invest their scarce resources. If the national government wins every case, then local efforts will be snuffed out. Finally, since conflict prevention mechanisms are a natural part of all self-organizing efforts, USAID should require that all projects develop these capacities as a key part of their program.

8. Build systems of governance and enabling states will emerge: All programmatic efforts should build constituting process, create enabling environments and acts, and be linked into regional and national strategies.

9. Build the rule of law from the bottom up: This will enable, empower, and give citizens and diverse communities the power to develop their assets as well as standing to pursue legal remedies, including the government. This means that systems of law must be built to connect local efforts with national enabling acts that convey real authority, can be contested in laws of court, and can create sanctioned partnerships between local, regional, and national political agencies. They must avoid the trap of trying to build a unified system of law, which will surely collide with the diverse cultures and traditions in developing countries.

10. Recast the professionals’ role: USAID needs to recast the professionals’ role from one that makes them providers of services in a command and control environment to one in which their primary task is to help individuals and communities build their own capacities to be self-governing. Key to this new perspective will be greater attention to local knowledge, long development time frames, and skill in the arts of association—the constituting processes.

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11. Recast research and development: USG needs to recast its research and development activities so that it can begin to produce useful knowledge for policy makers and citizens on how they can design and build self-organizing and self-governing organizations that create social, political, and economic wealth. This should be accomplished on an interagency basis with USAID as an active participant.

12. Build diverse systems of government: One of the most important choices the USG can make in deciding to enter a conflict setting is to use it as an opportunity to begin to build diverse systems of governance in statist societies. This should be a key decision criterion.

Recommendations:

1. USAID should take a strong leadership role in starting a national and international

discussion leading to a new consensus. America and the world can only benefit from an open and thorough discussion of these issues. This is particularly important in light of the events of September 11th.

2. If USAID decides to make conflict prevention a defining part of its mission, it will have to conduct an internal discussion and evaluation of how it builds integrated teams to address the multifaceted dimensions of conflict.

3. USAID must build its capacity to assist developing countries and communities to create real institutions; this takes time and is a difficult undertaking. To build institutions requires both sound theoretical and practical understanding as well as on-the-ground experience of time and place variables. PPC should consider investing considerable time and resources in building a base of practical knowledge that can be used by staff and policy makers and citizens in the country.

4. The capacity of the Democracy and Governance program and staff must be expanded. USAID must broaden its notion of democracy. While elections are a necessary part of any healthy democracy, they are not sufficient. If one is to build a democratic way of life in which common effort, institution building, and negotiation form face-to-face working relationships, then one must expand both civic and political space to encourage local public entrepreneurship. This will require developing national enabling acts that convey authority and access to fiscal mechanisms. It will also require linking or nesting local efforts with regional and national systems of governance. Legitimately strong states will be enabling states. Critical to this effort will be creating indigenous policy institutes that can create new traditions of thought about issues of governance. Critical thought should also be given to underwriting a long-term project that builds Middle Eastern policy institutes that can begin to design democratic institutions from their traditions.

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5. USAID should develop the tools both to understand and to become involved in constituting processes, bringing interested parties into long-term discussion about crafting institutions that will allow them to start resolving their differences through agreed-upon governing strategies. This requires developing training courses for personnel as well as developing diagnostic and evaluation tools for fieldwork and program assessments.

6. USAID should also take the lead in doing an assessment with case studies of the important lessons learned in Bosnia. From all accounts, a great deal of learning accrued and should be made available to staff and policy makers.

7. Because economic growth is essential for both development and policy development, USAID should consider providing significant funding to the International Center for Economic Growth, which has developed an international network of indigenous policy institutes committed to good policy research and broad-based education in these countries for the Agency. If knowledge is power, then we should make sure, as a country, that other countries have access to important information in addition to creating their own. This is particularly true of the Middle East and South Asia.

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“Interagency cooperation will be essential to understanding transnational threats, including regional conflict, and to developing interdisciplinary strategies to counter them.” —John Gannon, National Intelligence Council “Responsibility for crisis prevention and responses is dispersed in multiple AID and State bureaus and among State’s Under Secretaries and the AID Administrator. In practice, no one is in charge.” —Draft Final Report, U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase III Report

CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPING A COHESIVE EXTERNAL POLICY STRATEGY FOR USAID COOPERATORS IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

“Revolutions in diplomatic affairs are warranted.”

—Patrick Cronin, AA/PPC USAID

Assuming that the prevention or mitigation of conflict is, or will be, either a primary, or one, of the basic components of overall U.S. foreign policy, its considerations should drive the development of U.S. policies with regard to recipient countries, cooperation among and between departments of the U.S. government, cooperation with other donor countries and multinational cooperators, and any government interaction with the private sector, both for-profit and not-for-profit. During this study, two terms we have heard a lot are “stovepiping” and “toolboxes.” Those using these terms were referring to the current bureaucratic organization that only thinks up and down within pre-prescribed boxes. There was a clear call among discussants to “think horizontally.” The “toolbox” issue refers to the growing recognition among USG employees, that the apparatus for making and executing the international affairs of this country needs modernization: new tools and new ways to use them. What follows, then, are some observations and the attendant recommendations that emerged during the course of our discussions and readings.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL STRATEGIES

STATE DEPARTMENT

Prior Attempts at Instituting Conflict Policy

Incorporating conflict prevention into U.S. foreign policy has been tried before. During the ’90s there were the Secretary’s Preventive Initiative (SPI), the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI), and an initiative to include conflict analysis in the Mission Performance Plan process. All of these initiatives were defeated, and it is largely believed that they were defeated by the inability of State and

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“Long-term for the State Department is 6 months.” —Former USAID assistant administrator

USAID to put aside cultural differences, turf wars, and “stovepiping” long enough to work out the necessary comprehensive cooperative agreements to make conflict prevention a shared objective. In addition, according to a former USAID SFS officer, “One of the greatest resistances rightly came from overworked official reporters and analysts who rightly said if you want us to do this, you must tell us what to stop doing to free us to do the conflict prevention reporting and analysis requested.”

A Clash of Cultures

USAID’s relationship with State is essentially a clash of cultures. State’s buttoned up, pinstripe suit, elite approach to dealing with the world is a polar opposite to USAID’s band of revolutionaries in guayaberras. State practices “statecraft” and “thinks like a state” while USAID is more “muddy boot” and people-oriented. State is more married to short time frames; USAID must think in longer time periods. State thinks operationally; USAID must think structurally. Criticisms of State from USAID personnel range from statements such as “policy at the country level is too much based on the personality of the individual Ambassador” to the observation that “too much of what gets done at State, or is decided, is geared on what one believes the news media will report.” Or “State’s attitude is that the turf they govern is the most important in the foreign affairs community and all others are peripheral to it.” On the specific issue of conflict prevention, USAID personnel are still irritated that while State senior policy makers directed Ambassadors to include in the Mission Performance Plan (MPP) a conflict vulnerability analysis, only 3 out of over 100 included it and there were no repercussions. There are several explanations for not following orders. One is simple disregard for the orders. Another is that there was apparent sensitivity to discussing, in writing, a country’s potential for crisis, even in an internal report. But a third is that with the competing demands for many different kinds of reporting, vulnerability analysis was not seen as a priority.

Marrying Two Cultures

Collecting vulnerability data or other conflict pertinent information is one thing; using it is another. As Ted Morse, a 40-year veteran of USAID and a highly respected expert in the area of conflict and its prevention, points out, “seeing” conflict vulnerabilities in a society—in terms of information collected from a wide cross-section of people in the field—and “understanding” what to do with this information or “even seeing it as your job to do anything with it, is the extended problem.” Retraining and cross-education of USAID’s and State’s workforces will be a key necessity in adopting conflict prevention as a strategic objective.

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Comments from Senior State and AID Employees

“One of the classic tensions in international development is also reflected in the conflict prevention field. This is the difference between assistance to SOLVE or address an identified problem, versus assistance to BUILD CAPACITY to prevent or address generic future problems. Both approaches have merit. Both approaches are needed in different situations—but both need to be deployed simultaneously, not consecutively. This could be brought about with a change in perspective—and that will take leadership and training and changed organizational arrangements.”—AID SFS Officer In answer to the question on how people and dollar resources are coordinated for conflict prevention measures at State now: “That’s an open question, with an evolving answer. Informal groups within State meet on an ad hoc basis.”—State Department Official “For adequate conflict prevention we need to get into regional policy making. We also need to take a long look at how the country teams operate and add a crisis modifier section to it.” —Senior State Department Officer “State has done more contingency planning than we have.”—AID Senior Officer “You guys are 30 years ahead of us.”—Retired State Department SFS Officer after attending SENSE “We should avoid the mistake of working on the boxes first. PRD20 collapsed because it didn’t allow you to have a policy framework. It only worked on the boxes.” —Senior AID Advisor “Many conflicts have significant regional dimensions. Yet most of the U.S. foreign affairs staff have bilateral assignments, and single-country operational perspectives.” —Retired AID SFS Officer “Right now, the political and intelligence early warning systems generally have a short-term perspective and cover immediate, not root, causes—totally inappropriate to long-term structural prevention. They tend to alert executive branch leaders to what may appear on CNN, in the media, and in key newspapers in the next day or two that will require “management.” Long-term early warning of impending crises is now considered 3–6 months and only for crises management. Rarely does the political-intelligence community try to predict where violent conflicts could erupt over 0–5 years, where operational prevention could be applied, or in 5–15 years where structural prevention could be focused.” —Retired AID SFS Officer In referring to USG spending on conflict prevention: “It’s important to get a handle on all the pots of money, including what’s at DOD.” —Senior State Department Official

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“Put up your top ten list and we will try to do them.” —Senior State Department Official

Priority Negotiating Points for a USAID/State Agreement on Conflict Prevention:

1. Mandatory inclusion of vulnerability analysis in all Mission Performance Plans

(MPP) with appropriate discipline measures taken if not done;

2. Request for quarterly NSC review of vulnerabilities by regions with participation of staff from Congressional oversight committees;

3. Joint development of training programs for both vulnerability analysis and pre-conflict interventions;

4. Reinstall cross discipline in-service training in Development Studies Program to give perspective of political and military context;

5. Add conflict prevention factors to criteria for promotion panels;

6. Training on conflict should be included in the Foreign Service Officer entrance course (A-100); political craft and economics training courses at NFTAC (Former FSI); State’s Interdepartmental Seminar; National War College; ICAF; SES Executive Seminar; and other training courses;

7. Reinitiate programs such as RADAR (Reporting, Analysis, Decision making And Response) or other early warning models;

8. Review of internal communications systems to allow greater exchange of information between USAID and State. (Currently 90% of State’s communications work on a classified system and 98% of USAID’s work on an unclassified incompatible system.)

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“The next time I go into a post-conflict Bosnia or the like I want somebody from AID riding on the front of my tank.” —Retired General William Nash

“I think we should have teams of professionals from State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, and AID that can go into post-conflict situations and work together.” —Retired General William Nash “When the military tasks are accomplished, the military wants to hand over to another organization to do public security. If AID can’t do it, then what?” —Retired General William Nash “Peacekeeping is so much more expensive to the U.S. because of how we pay into the UN. If the definitions for when Peacekeeping ends and the next phase begins could be tightened it could alter the bill for the U.S.”—State Department Official

“We are trying to do everything at DOD. It would be nice to have some prioritization.” —DOD Staff

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Defense Department Post-Conflict Interface with USAID

The main interface between the U.S. military and USAID is in the Post-Conflict Phase. Each has great respect for the other’s capability in this capacity. Yet both Departments decry the slowness of aid, the lack of overall planning and coordination, and the inadequate preparation for working together in the field. Both USAID and Defense feel that there must be better understanding about the relationship among relief efforts, development efforts, and peacekeeping, and where one stops and the other starts. Both agree that there needs to be far more planning and coordination with other countries in the donor community before everyone finds themselves thrust into a crisis situation. Both USAID and Defense ask questions in regard to the Post-Conflict Phase as to what the pledging process should entail: who participates, what’s the process, how are pledged funds tracked, is there and should there be conditionality of these funds? But the major question between USAID and Defense is what the deadlines and measurements should be for withdrawal from a post-conflict country. These are all issues that need to be worked out interdepartmentally and then extended beyond the two departments to Congress and to the world community.

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The Defense Department OHDCA budget is $55 million: $20–25 million for de-mining, and $25 million for humanitarian purposes, which are separate from conflict funding. Some of this money is used to do things like build schools, but DOD doesn’t have the capability to track what happens to the school after it is built, or necessarily the programmatic capability to make calculations as to whether these expenditures exacerbate conflict, i.e., build a school for one ethnic group at the exclusion of another.

The Defense attaché in each U.S. Embassy has $10–15 million of discretionary spending. Excess property program has a $12 million transport fund attached to it. —Defense Department Official

“We need AID to be flexible, responsible to national security issues.” —NSC official “We need AID to develop a cadre of smart people, long range thinkers, who can be an analogue to State, who have connections within the intelligence community.” —NSC official

Current Interdepartmental Organization To Build On:

• There are informal meetings at the office director level monthly.

• In country, there is DOD coordination with

OFDA. • There is a cross-training program called

CHART (Course in Humanitarian Assistance Response Training) run by OFDA.

• Multiagency training is carried out at DOD

Regional Command Centers in Hawaii and Florida.

Recommendations:

• AID and DOD should have a shared data system. Look at www.hapep.idss.ida.org

• Personnel exchanges should be regularized at

key points in the logistics of planning Post-Conflict Prevention.

• AID should recruit employees from the ranks

of civil affairs reservists.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The NSC needs to play a strong role as the convener of interdepartmental discussions on conflict prevention. Its ability to work across sectors because—as one discussant noted—it “has no dog in the fight” is a critical role.

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“AID has a troubled history; weak and changing leadership, buffeted by other departments. Part of it is that Congress has never really supported it or given it the necessary resources.” —Senior Hill Staff “Either fix the $#* thing or throw it out.” —Former Congressional Staff

CONGRESS

The Congress of the United States has been aware of, and interested in, the subject of conflict prevention for some time. Witness the following:

“Conflict prevention, mediation, and demobilization are prerequisites to the success of development assistance programs. Nutrition and education programs, for example, cannot succeed in a nation at war. Billions of dollars of development assistance have been virtually wasted in war-ravaged countries such as Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan.” (PUBLIC LAW 103-381-October 19, 1994, Section 2, (a) (8))

“The Congress declares, therefore, that a key goal for United States foreign policy should be to help institutionalize conflict resolution capability in Africa.” (PUBLIC LAW 103-381-October 19, 1994, Section 2, (b))

But this and other efforts have been scattered, and under funded or not funded at all. Since programming is resource driven, if no money is attached to an initiative, even if there is a will, there is no way. Partially in response to this particular congressional initiative, the Africa Bureau at USAID has been able to do wonders with very scarce resources and leads the rest of the Agency with a model conflict-prevention program. This has been largely due to some very resourceful and dedicated individuals driving the creation of the program.

The Problem with Foreign Assistance

The U.S. Foreign Assistance program has long had problems with the American public and hence with Congress. There are many reasons for this:

• Expectations for what the program can accomplish, how much it will cost, and the time frame for doing it, have all been based too much on U.S. standards and not enough on the realities of the environments in which USAID carries out its work in the Third World.

• The foreign assistance program has tried to be all things to all people in order to build a coalition for funding. This has resulted in competing constituencies lobbying the Congress for a bigger share of its slice of the pie, and has ended in funding riddled with earmarks.

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• The sheer volume of problems in the Third World overwhelms the amount that

can be appropriated to “fix” it.

A New Proposal

ICS discussed conflict prevention with Hill staff in several contexts: what changes would be necessary in budget presentation and in reform of the Foreign Assistance Act, and what would a policy framework look like? Following are some of the responses from staff members that demonstrate the general degree of receptivity on these issues.

On Budget Presentation:

• “What has happened in the past is we send up a list of activities. They go to different committees. What most Congressional staff sees at AID are a series of spigots, not an overall policy. The funding pots drive the strategy, not the other way around.” —Senior AID Official, Former Congressional Staff.

• “What is the mission of USAID? It hurts the Agency and causes dissatisfaction here not to have one.” —Senior Congressional Staff

• “There are perhaps a lot of things we should be doing, but we lack the clarity.” —Senior Congressional Staff

• After September 11th: “There is a more open mind to listen to the argument.” —Senior Congressional Staff

• “Any major initiative has to come from the Administration.” —Senior Hill Staff

• “The Democracy and Governance Program is an example, by the time you got it through the political process, the program was perverted.” —Senior Hill Staff

On Reform of the Foreign Assistance Act:

• “Cleaning up the FAA will not happen.” Senior Hill Staff

On How a Conflict Prevention Framework Could Be Constructed:

• “How will the cases be selected; the hard or the easy ones first?” —Former Hill Staff

• “Have to have a basic understanding that in countries like Somalia, you must

work, not in defying central authority, but in ignoring it.” —Former Hill Staff

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• “Do you do conflict prevention as part of economic development or economic development as part of conflict prevention?” —Senior Hill Staff

• “Hasn’t conflict prevention always been part of foreign assistance?” —Senior Hill

Staff

• “How does this approach fit with Mr. Natsios’s four pillars?” —Senior Hill Staff

• “Sounds to me like you’re going to need a lot of flexibility.” —Senior Hill Staff

• “Doing a Democracy and Governance program in some countries, I shudder to think what a popular vote might bring you.” —Hill Staff

• “When you bring your proposal up here it has to be very specific and concrete. It should demonstrate how it will stretch money further; show benefits to the program and benefits to the US, while at the same time delivering the traditional values of AID.” —Senior Hill Staff

• “People don’t see conflict prevention as dealing with poverty, they see West Bank kinds of projects.” —Senior Hill Staff

• “We don’t give anywhere near the resources to prevent poverty.” —Senior Hill Staff

• “Even if everybody recognized the problems, there are limited resources.” —Senior Hill Staff

• “One way to sell this program up here is to target regions where the U.S. feels a real threat. Define it so it resonates, pick half a dozen hot spots, and go there first.” —Senior Hill Staff

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“What struck me was attending a donors conference and seeing no organization, no plan. We need broad-based institutional coherence. We need to reach a working consensus. This is an opportunity for leadership by PCC. Now it has a very narrow view of conflict definition.” —State Department Official, IO Bureau “Moreover, the G-8 nations did not come up with any groundbreaking proposals for reducing poverty nor with new and substantial financial commitments.” —Stratfor News Service “And it is heartening to find the Bank (World Bank) admitting that big institutions, imposed by foreign donors in the belief that one size fits all, can sometimes do more harm than good. Now, what about following the fine words with a little practical help?” —The Economist, 15 September, 2001

INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITY

Coordination

The above observers of the international playing field—having no plan, fewer resources, and one-size-fits-all policies—were not alone in their comments. It appears that policy frameworks and coordination are very lacking and need to be worked out among the members of the world donor community. One large step in this direction was taken when the OECD/DAC issued policy guidelines on conflict prevention earlier this year. These guidelines can be enormously helpful in gaining better donor coordination, but there is much more to be done in focusing on key agreements in specific conflict situations. There are some good examples of donor coordination that can be expanded into other areas:

“One of USAID’s earliest achievements in donor coordination was the formation of the Donor Consultative Group on Accountability and Anti-corruption in Latin America and the Caribbean (DCG), part of the AAA Project. Initiated ten years ago, the DCG now includes six bilateral and twelve multilateral development agencies. Through quarterly coordination meetings, DCG members have avoided duplication of effort and conflicting programs, and stretched resources to benefit almost every country in the region. The DCG’s crowning achievement has been the development of a common, computerized financial management system framework that ensure compatibility no matter which donor provides the support.” (USAID, Promoting Transparency and Accountability: USAID’s Anti-corruption experience, January 2000)

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“Though the G-8 communiqué touted current debt relief programs, which total about $53 billion, it failed to propose or support any new relief initiatives. Likewise, the communiqué pointed to its commitment to a $1.3 billion global health fund to fight the pandemics of tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS that grip the developing world. But according to the Financial Times, these funds are merely a re-labeling of existing aid budgets, and the $1.3 billion pledge pales in comparison to the $7 billion to $10 billion annually that the United Nations says is needed.”—Stratfor News Service, 6 September, 2001

“In effective state action and unsatisfactory human outcomes partly reflect the fact that government can influence only a few of the multiple sources of well-being.” “[D]rawing on this framework, countries need to develop their own poverty reduction strategies, in a manner consistent with preservation of culture.” —World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001

Gaining better international policy and operational cooperation agreements needs to begin at home. Much better policy coordination between Treasury, State, and USAID is essential.

Level of Resources

On the subject of development resources, four principle issues need to be on the donor’s table for discussion and resolution: 1. The overall level of donor resources has been

dwindling for many years, and in recent years countries have been defaulting on their pledges.

2. A growing percentage of the available resources (both money and people) has been apportioned for emergency needs in post-conflict situations, further reducing to the straining point the amount that can be used for structural development.

3. Poor (or no) coordination among donors at the country level has resulted in conflicting program objectives, and poor use of often very scarce human resources in the recipient countries.

4. The donor community needs to be united in holding recipient countries accountable for using resources in such a way as to strengthen the ability of its citizens to be productive.

One suggestion ICS raised with discussants that had a very favorable response was to extend available resources by using debt forgiveness as a policy dialogue tool. What ICS suggested was for the U.S. alone, or in concert with other donors, to use existing country indebtedness as a way to direct resources into those sectors such as education or health that result in increasing the assets of the poor. This idea should appeal to both donors and recipients. The donors, like the private banks that have used donated debt for “good,” should receive public support for such a move, at the same time extending their development dollars and gaining greater leverage in how those dollars are spent The recipient countries reduce their indebtedness, pay out in local currency, and have additional resources to support citizen services.

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Cookie-Cutter Approaches

Experience has shown that we can’t take a cookie-cutter approach to development. There is no quick fix, and no one way. The opportunities to help people in different cultures find their way to greater freedom and productivity will vary, sometimes dramatically. Thinking and acting at the local level in development will no doubt take longer, cannot be done from behind a desk, and will require flexibility and creativity. But working with people at the local level, giving them space to allow their systems to take shape, is the only real solution.

Case Study Allowing local entrepreneurs to offer telecommunications service is an important first step in lowering the costs of public access. Pay phones in particular benefit those who cannot afford a household connection. In 1995 Senegal had more than 2,000 private telecenters, each with a telephone and many with a fax machine— four times the number just two years before. By 1998 it had 6,000 Sonatel (the Senegalese public telecommunications company) franchises phone service to the telecenter owner, who may charge a tariff up to 140% above the Sonatel price per call unit. On average, telecenters have paid $3,960 to Sonatel and kept $1,584 each year. The result: public access to telephones has more than doubled. Source: World Development Report from World Bank Source (Ernberg 1998, CSIR 1998)

Case Study The State government of Andhra Pradesh in India has introduced joint forest management on a massive scale. People on the fringes of forests are forming village organizations to protect forests. The organizations work with the state forest department, sharing the responsibilities and benefits of forest restoration, protection, and management. The forest department is responsible for organizing and providing technical and administrative support to the VSSs. Village and VSSs are selected carefully, but people from scheduled castes and tribes are automatically eligible for membership. The VSSs protect the forest from encroachment, grazing, theft, and fire, improving it according to a joint forest management plan. As compensation, the VSSs are entitled to all the forest’s products (nontimber products as well as all the income from the harvest of timber and bamboo) as long as they set aside half the income for the future development of the forest.

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A Case for Greater Donor Coordination: The Coffee Crisis

This year the world’s coffee prices sank to a 30-year low, resulting in real economic hardship for millions of coffee producers. In countries that depend on coffee for a large percentage of their GDP, this spells crisis. The following reply was prepared for a news reporter by Zamorano, a U.S. University located in Honduras:

“In Honduras, where in 1998 coffee accounted for five percent of GDP; 28% of total annual export earning, the lost revenue in 2000–2001 will amount to about 2% of GDP. The 60% decline in coffee export earnings since 1998 is increasing the GOH’s balance of payments deficit and trade deficit. Forgiveness of coffee sector debt could undermine IMF conditionality and ultimately HIPC debt relief. It is estimated that coffee production will plummet this year by up to 40% given the average costs of production hovering around $50 per hundredweight and given that the average farmer will receive an average of $35 per hundredweight. Given the historical lows in coffee prices, adjusted for inflation, it will be difficult for anyone in the raw material supply link to profit.”

What does this example mean in terms of allocation of foreign aid resources and development policy? What does it mean to the region?

• Higher unemployment as coffee producers have to lay off workers. In Honduras, where drought has also been a problem this year and last, 100,000 coffee producers employ from 100,000 to 200,000 permanent employees and an additional 400,000 to 500,000 temporary workers between November and March. Fifty percent of the permanent workers and, it is projected, over 35% of the temporary workers, will not be hired this year.

The program got off to a slow start in 1992 because villagers were hesitant to assume responsibility for forest management. In addition, forest department staff had reservations about joint forest management But in 1999 more than 5,000 VSSs were managing more than 1.2 million hectares of degraded forests in the state. Results are impressive, and the program is expanding rapidly. The degraded forest has sprung back to life, timber smuggling has almost stopped, and cattle grazing is under control. There has been no further encroachment by agriculture on lands managed by the VSSs. Many villagers now work in the forests, and outmigration has declined. Soil conservation has resulted in higher water tables in many areas increasing agricultural production. And local plants and animals are flourishing. Source: Venkataraman and Falconer 1999.

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“What we need is to develop fast instruments to compensate for money lost in trade which can neutralize the triggers for conflict.”—Senior World Bank Official “Multilateral solutions have limitations: Pledged funds don’t always materialize; donors want to retain some control on how and what is done; multilateral bureaucracies have the same problems as other bureaucracies—they tend to be rigid, slow, and uncreative in situations that demand the opposite.” —State Department Official

• Food insecurity for millions. • Migration in search of work and food: U.S. Border patrols detained 28,000

non-Mexican immigrants in the year 2000, including 22,000 from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

• Abandonment of coffee fields; in Colombia there is also the fear that farmers will be forced to switch to illegal drug production in economic desperation.

• Possible crisis and conflict due to the pressures caused by the above. In addition to the pressures of the international coffee crisis, changing priorities for the expenditure of U.S. foreign assistance and its decreasing levels in the region have also been in part responsible for the predicament in which Honduran coffee producers now find themselves:

“While USAID/Honduras helped to create the expansion and quality improvements of coffee production and processing in this country 15 years ago, there has been no assistance since and particularly no marketing assistance.” —Zamorano memorandum

This year’s coffee situation also points to another major problem: the lack of coordination among the countries and institutions in the international donor community. Over ten years ago the World Bank and IMF made massive loans to Vietnam to build up the coffee industry in that country. Vietnam is now the largest producer of an inferior-quality coffee bean and the second largest overall producer of coffee. Vietnam’s increased production is widely considered the primary reason for destabilized world coffee prices. There are several tragic ironies in this story. One is that as traditional coffee farmers in other parts of the world fail, they will require significant amounts of foreign aid and some of this aid will be used to help them diversify their crops. Some of the farmers will be pushed into growing illegal crops, requiring another drain on aid resources to eradicate them. A second irony is that the countries strongly affected by the reduced coffee prices, based on reduced GDP, will not be able to service their international debt. This will mean, of course, that the IMF and the World Bank will declare them in default. To further point up the problem, it was assessed that last year an estimated US$7 billion was made by the producing countries and a sum in excess of US$55 billion was made in consuming countries based on the value of coffee retail sales. When demonstrators at World Bank and G-8 meetings complain about globalization and what it does to

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the poor, some of them are talking about the kind of world system that would allow this level of inequity to exist. This issue would be an excellent one for the U.S. to take a lead in addressing internationally on behalf of the small farmer, and in the context of averting future conflict. In general, there needs to be a much greater degree of coordination of policy, funding, and implementation of programs by the donor community as a whole. The interrelatedness of the economies of the world means that decisions made in one country or one region cause a ripple effect across geographic borders and across continents. There is a great potential that these effects will ultimately contribute to conflict. The community of donor countries and multilateral lending institutions must work together as a whole to rethink their decision-making process through the lens of conflict prevention. Further, the donor governments should consider the means of helping make borrowing countries more attractive to commercial financial markets. It may not be possible to manage how decisions made on every level, or in every sector, impact the whole. But it is clear that better coordination, planning, and information gathering and sharing will affect our ability to forecast major disruptions and hopefully help us to avoid them.

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“The NGO community needs a scenario for how they can be more helpful.” —PVO Official “To the extent that AID could leverage many different kinds of organization like this you’d have the most effective agency in town.” —Founder, new NGO “[T]he positive role played by mediation and pacification agencies should be extended to the non-governmental humanitarian organizations and religious bodies which, discreetly and without ulterior motives, promote peace between opposed groups and help to overcome age-old rivalries, reconcile enemies and open the way to a new and shared future . . . there remains a fundamental duty for all men and women of good will, called to commit themselves personally to the cause of peace: that of education for peace, setting in place structures of peace and methods of non-violence, and making every possible effort to bring parties in conflict to the negotiation table.” —Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II, for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace, January 1, 2000

“Doing CP makes a lot of sense. It’s essentially protecting your initial investment.” “Our staff is looking at all of our programs in a different way.” —PVO Officials

PRIVATE SECTOR

PVOs and NGOs

AID has traditionally done a significant amount of its development work through private, voluntary, nonprofit groups referred to as PVOs. These groups have made extraordinary contributions to the people of the Third World and have substantially extended the ability of the American people to provide aid. While the work of the PVO community has been widely perceived as critical to the U.S. development presence, it has also been seen as captious of U.S. policy and disruptive in obtaining Congressional earmarks. We found in our discussions that new generations of people are gaining leadership positions in this community and there is a rethinking of the what and how of doing business both in the Third World and with the U.S. government. Much of the new thinking is focusing on conflict prevention and the range of issues raised in this report. AID needs to work with the widest possible range of the traditional PVOs and begin to reach out to the new NGOs and think through new relationships. The PVOs and NGOs must be part of the conversation in designing the new USAID policy framework. This discussion should include reviewing and modernizing the systems that appear to be discouraging some groups from considering an USAID relationship.

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Some of the following should be reviewed: 1. An elaborate system of registering with the Agency in order to be funded has built up

over the years. Many newer organizations wishing to do business with the Agency find this system archaic and the contract requirements—based on quantity rather than quality—unacceptable. The whole system should be analyzed:

• “We do quick action, quick turnaround, we have no field team. . . . We are

not at home with a development organization. It’s a very different animal.”

• “Everyone here agreed they didn’t want to do a contract with AID anymore. It just made us concentrate on the wrong things.”

• “We’d like to believe that AID is supporting our program rather than that we are supporting an AID or USG program. This is a fundamental concept.”

2. New “out of the box” thinking needs to occur in this area too; the PVOs can help.

Comments from various PVO leaders:

• “Why not send Habitat for Humanity to train with ethnic teams in Bosnia?”

• “Perhaps we should have a ‘Religion Attache’ in those posts where

religious tension is a recognized problem.”

• “We’ve made it our policy not to look at these [faith-based] issues. We need to change that.”

• “IMDT also works with expatriates from countries in conflict, or diasporas, here in Washington. Currently there are groups from Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. This is an important initiative because in achieving greater understandings, this effort stems the flow of resources back to their homelands to fuel further conflict.”

3. New uses for engaging PVOs in USAID’s work need to be looked at:

• “Citizen engagement is a crucial part of the peace process. More of it needs to occur.”

• “We trained CARE’s workers in conflict prevention. Care has some 11,000 people worldwide, about the same as the State Department.”

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• “We are making sure our actions during emergency measures are not

contributing to conflict.”

• “Additional money needs to be appropriated so the cost of CP isn’t seen as coming out of existing programs.”

• “Our focus is on strengthening local capacities, gaining more municipal participation; teaching people things like knowing their rights to services.”

• “PVOs bring continuity to programs because of our long-term relationships in communities.”

• “We don’t see civil society participation in donor coordination at the country level.”

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ACADEMIC COMMUNITY

Universities and Colleges

A great number of initiatives on conflict prevention are being taken in U.S. universities and colleges, such as papers, conferences, courses, research, and partnership programs in developing countries. Several universities now have majors in conflict prevention and mediation. In addition to these specific initiatives, there are a large number of foreign students studying in U.S. universities each year; the number in 1997 was over 500,000 contributing over $7 billion to the U.S. economy. Forums designed to discuss conflict, its ramifications, and mediation, could be useful in reaching these populations of students. AID should also reach out to the U.S. academic community to help in encouraging a stronger curriculum in international understanding among U.S. students at both the secondary and college levels. Currently only 50,000 U.S. students study abroad annually and only 5,000 of these students study in countries other than England, France, or Germany.

PRIVATE FOR-PROFIT

Multinational Corporations

Time limitations prevented us from holding discussions with representatives of this group, but because of its reach, power, and resources it should not be overlooked. USAID should consider hosting a conference of multinational corporations to discuss how this community can assist in preventing conflict.

Conflict Prevention Services

There are many organizations (such as USIP and CDR Associates) now offering training programs in conflict prevention, international mediation services, and cross-cultural decision-making guidance. A cataloging of these organizations and their services both domestically and internationally should be conducted. It may be advantageous to design a forum to bring these groups together.

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CHAPTER V

SUMMATION OF RECOMMENDED USAID PRIORITIES, CONCERNS, AND OPPORTUNITIES

“I’ve worked almost forty years at AID. I’ve lived in some pretty miserable places, done some pretty chancy things and put my life on the line more than once. But that’s my nature, that’s what makes me tick. Yes, I’d be willing to go out there again; in fact I’d welcome going out there on the front lines again. But I’d like to know that there is a plan and a commitment. You know what I mean? I want to know there is sound leadership and that I’m not making the sacrifice in vain.”

—USAID SFS Officer “AID has been proactively pulled apart.”

—USAID SFS Official

Recommended USAID Priorities

A Priority List for USAID Leadership in Conflict Prevention

1. Provide strong policy leadership. 2. Map out the supporting structural designs. Take a long look at the two most

progressive offices in USAID, Transition Initiatives (OTI) and Democracy and Governance (DG). These offices are filled with innovative people who are on the cutting edge of designing USAID’s future. How these two offices use their resources, money, time, and people is highly instructive. Combining the innovation of offices such as OTI and DG with the suggested design and use of Special Interagency Teams (State, DOD, Justice, Treasury) could make USAID the most effective conflict prevention, mitigation, and reconstruction organization in the world.

• “Our services are demand driven. To give but one example, in PPC’s

library 7 out of 10 of the documents requested there are DGs. We get 170,000 hits on our website every quarter.” —Jim Vermillion, Acting Director DG

• “There’s no dead wood in the whole shop.”

• “The question we need to answer is how does the Agency get from the

Ivory Tower to moving the money and making a difference.”

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Excerpts from a round table with OTI staff: • “The conflict environment is incredibly fluid.”

• “We are ground truthing things all of the time, being able to adjust what

we are doing constantly.”

• “What we are doing here is undertaking the ‘culture of a team.’ ”

• “You have to plan for instability rather than plan for stability, which is what AID does now.”

• On answering how well OTI integrated with the rest of USAID: “It’s tough, because you are moving at two different speeds.”

• “Our colleagues in AID sometimes express the view to us that ‘If you are here, we must have failed.’ Of course that is not true. OTI is doing things they would have liked to do but couldn’t because they were too weighed down.”

• “Hand-offs when we’re leaving are our biggest problem.” 3. As these historical times call for a holistic look at change, ICS also recommends that

USAID leadership balance the option of reconstructing USAID from within, against the option of closing down the Agency and reconstituting it as a more streamlined modern Agency.

4. Revise the R4 process to make policy rather than budget the primary driving influence.

5. Using the Africa Bureau’s conflict prevention unit as a model, set up conflict teams in

other regional bureaus. 6. Decide on a priority list of issues and move to reduce “stovepiping,” increase

flexibility and cooperation, and maximize the stretching of resources through policy discussions and negotiations with other USG Departments, the Congress, and the world donor community.

7. Begin to retool USAID personnel through training (there is a strong need to develop a

culture of training at USAID, including such things as using the SENSE model and developing others), incentives, and recruitment. Hire new people with profiles centered on new expertise needs. Analyze all RASAs, PASAs, etc., to downsize personnel in marginal needs areas and recruit personnel from DOD, State, Treasury, and Justice who give lift to new initiatives.

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“The problem with AID in the interagency context is that it’s not clear what we bring to the table.” —AID Senior Foreign Service officer

• “The first and foremost thing AID needs to do is recruit more and different kinds of people. AID should be focusing on targeted personal services contracts, training, hiring former Special Forces, putting together task force teams for special deployment in conflict situations.” —Congressional Staff

• “One of the things that will be critical is to get in charge of personnel; the

promotion panels particularly.” —Former Congressional Staff

The development and use of models for training and decision making by USAID should be a priority. While technology is expensive to develop, its extraordinary ability to transfer knowledge, teach sophisticated lessons, impart complicated understandings, and demonstrate potential impact of alternative decision making to a broad range of actors is both far-reaching and compelling. Teaching through models allows USAID to build essential staff skills, interchange staff with multiple expertise, stimulate “thinking outside the box,” and develop interagency teams.

Interagency team building can be achieved faster and more comprehensively through the use of training models like SENSE. Models like this give personnel from other departments a deeper understanding of the complexity of the full range of issues USAID manages, and, through that expanded understanding, improve USAID’s place at the policy table.

8. Develop new tools for gathering, predicting, analyzing, and reporting conflict.

Develop a Conflict Prevention Ranking List. Currently, the only list is designed for emergency response (OFDA) and has only a six-month lead-time. Work with national and international partners so as not to duplicate efforts.

9. Design a plan for more regional decision-making.

• “We need the capability to plan beyond the territorial boundaries of countries.

What we need is a comparable SINC organization at the State Department. Perhaps then we could do the kind of planning that would allow us to avoid situations like being successful in driving coke production out of Bolivia only to find we drove it into Colombia.” —Former Congressional Staff

10. Achieve better communication between USAID Washington and the field, where there is a disconnect. On the one hand, you have the field’s inattention to macro policy; on the other you have USAID Washington’s insensitivity to constraints at the Mission level. Establish a consistent process for sieving best practices and packaging them for distribution to other field teams. Use the Africa Bureaus Task Force on Conflict Prevention as the model for this in the Agency.

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• “[T]here are serious concerns about the insufficient staffing in the mission . . .

which has three vacant senior positions. . . . Without more, well-qualified staff, the mission will be seriously hampered in managing even what they currently have on their plates, much less any additional tasks.” —Memo from the field in response to USAID/W request.

11. Analyze all private-sector partners, profit and not-for-profit, and facilitate new

relationships based on new policies. Streamline the contracting process.

• “To the extent that AID could leverage many different kinds of organization like this you’d have the most effective agency in town.” —NGO Leader

• “What you have now are disincentives to include NGOs.” —NGO Leader

• “Everyone here agreed they didn’t want to do a contract with AID anymore. The Agency is so focused on quantity rather than quality.” —NGO Leader

• “We are looking at quick action, quick turnaround. That’s not compatible with AID.”

12. Design a user-friendly USAID Web site that prominently features conflict prevention on the opening page.

AID Concerns

There are many constraints that must be recognized and dealt with at some level in order to modernize USAID and bring it into alignment with the new world paradigm and the rest of USG foreign policy. The primary constraints, according to discussants, are the following: 1. An internal culture that resists, at some levels, working interdepartmentally.

• “AID will be threatened by this approach. The bureaucrats there have a citizen of the world mentality. They will have to be reminded they work for the USG.” —Former Congressional Staff

• “Skepticism, both inside and outside AID, comes from those who fear that conflict prevention will crowd out more traditional programs to which they are attached.” —Senior USAID Official

69

2. Congressional earmarks that undermine the Agency’s ability to formulate and adhere to a cohesive policy framework.

3. The perception that USAID is a broken agency; that the expertise and skill level of

personnel is low, and is inappropriate in meeting the demands of conflict prevention; that funding is too inflexible; and that the Agency is rife with management problems.

• “USAID organizational structure is a bureaucratic morass.” —Draft Final

Report: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase III Report

• “Congress has larded the Foreign Assistance Act with so many earmarks and tasks for the USAID that it lacks a coherent purpose.” —Draft Final Report: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase III Report

• “Responsibility for crisis prevention and responses is dispersed in multiple AID and State bureaus and among State’s Under Secretaries and the AID Administrator. In practice, no one is in charge.” —Draft Final Report: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase III Report

4. AID constituencies’ fear that funding for new directions such as conflict prevention

will crowd out traditional programs that are their funding base. This is important, as these constituencies lobby Congress for more earmarks and for altered policy considerations.

Recommended Opportunities for Public Information Initiatives

As USAID adopts its new policy structure, it is important that the USAID Administrator and his key senior advisors inform both the foreign policy influentials, the public, and the USAID internal audiences. A public affairs strategy should be formulated that incorporates many of the following initiatives.

AID Administrator Speaking and Media Opportunities

The Agency should seek opportunities to place the Administrator before important audiences to talk about conflict prevention and USAID. Opportunities should also be sought to place Op-Ed pieces or longer articles in key newspapers and journals.

Conflict Prevention Forum Series

In consultation with the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Administrator of USAID should develop a one-year program for a series of high-level and public discussions about the U.S. role in conflict prevention. This could be accomplished with the participation of a consortium of Washington-based think tanks

70

such as the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Council on Foreign Relations, USIP, and CSIS. The series would be designed to highlight the spectrum of conflict prevention issues, provide appropriate forums for speeches and comments by Administration spokespersons and members of Congress, and encourage greater public participation. This series should also spawn other seminars, working papers, Op-Ed pieces, and articles in policy journals.

AID Forum Series

In addition to the above, arrange a series of forums for USAID’s various constituencies, led by the Administrator, on the issue of conflict prevention.

Fund Targeted External Partners

There are many tools for conflict prevention being developed by organizations and individuals external to USAID that should be tapped into and, if necessary, further funded. Some examples of this are Paul Collier’s work at the World Bank; Woodrow Wilson Center’s work on developing a clearinghouse on conflict prevention; RAMP’s work on developing a computer resource base for post-conflict activities; and the OECD/DAC Network on Conflict. Review existing programs such as CSIS’s Young Leaders Programs in the Third World, and link up to them. Encourage innovative programs like IMTD’s for educating diasporas here in order to reduce the money fueling conflict situations from expatriates here. Catalog those U.S. universities offering courses or degrees in conflict prevention and determine what cooperative arrangements may apply. Many other examples exist and research should be done on finding and assessing them.

Appoint a Commission on Conflict Prevention

Recommend the President appoint a Commission (members from Executive and Legislative Branches) to shape USG policy on CP and look at legislation and budget issues holistically.

Begin an Awards Program for Peacemakers

Put together an annual awards program that recognizes those individuals, public and private, who have made a significant contribution to reducing conflict. Even if this is not done outside the Agency, it should be considered to reward members of the USAID team who have gone the extra distance in conflict prevention.

Reorient the State Department’s Forum

Review how this forum is currently being used and recommend changes.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ROBERT B. HAWKINS, JR. is President and CEO of the Institute for Contemporary Studies (ICS), a nonprofit, nonpartisan policy research institute. To fulfill its mission to promote self-governing and entrepreneurial ways of life, and to help spur policy reform, ICS sponsors a variety of programs and publications on a wide range of governance issues, including the key areas of entrepreneurship, education, leadership, civil society, the environment, and social policy. Dr. Hawkins is now focusing his attention on creating a leadership institution to train community leaders in the self-governing arts. Appointed chairman of the prestigious bipartisan U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1982, Hawkins worked closely with national leaders on such issues as constitutional reform, education, transportation, and the role of business in the federal system. He chaired the Committee until 1993. Dr. Hawkins has been a fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he also headed their program in state and local government. He has written three books and numerous articles.

KATE SEMERAD is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Contemporary Studies, a consultant and writer. Since 1988 she has worked on behalf of Zamorano, a U.S. university located in Honduras and serving all of Latin America. From 1988 to1991 she served as Vice President of Zamorano, directing the university’s development and communications programs. From 1997 to 2000 Ms. Semerad served as the institution’s Vice Chairman, helping to lead the effort to modernize the curriculum and expand the range of outreach programs designed to provide training and extension to the people in the region. She currently serves as Chairman of the Board of Trustees. Ms. Semerad served President Reagan at the White House in 1981 and subsequently as an Assistant Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), where she was chief spokesperson and directed all public affairs and external liaison programs. Ms. Semerad received “The Administrator's Award for Exceptional Service,” USAID’s highest achievement award. She also received a special letter of commendation from President Reagan for her work in Grenada in the fall of 1984.

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CONFLICT WEB SITES DEVELOPED BY USAID

CONFLICT TOPIC

ISSUE WEB ADDRESS

Conflict Documents Bibliography http://csf.colorado.edu/conres/index.html Conflict Documents EU http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/index

_en.htm Conflict Documents Publications http://www.fewer.org/pubs/main.htm Conflict Documents EU http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/whatsnew/acqlist/newlit0

2.html Conflict Indicators GEDS http://geds.umd.edu/geds/gedsdata.htm Conflict Indicators Health http://payson.tulane.edu/conflict/maps/hlth_ind_migration.htm Conflict Indicators Environment,

water http://terra.geo.orst.edu/users/tfdd/documents/iwra

Conflict Indicators Dataset http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/iiip/ir/sherfacs-overview.html Conflict Indicators Minorities at

Risk http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar

Conflict Indicators Polity http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity Conflict Indicators Radical

Information Project

http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/projects/rip/index.html

Conflict Indicators State Failure http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/stfail Conflict Indicators Paper on

country indicators

http://www.carleton.ca/~dcarment/papers/emperor.html

Conflict Indicators State risk http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/rept97/toc.htm Conflict Indicators Correlates of

war database http://www.crinfo.org/international/index.cfm

Conflict Indicators Conflict Impact Assessment

http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Defense/FCSpeechConfPrev.htm

Conflict Indicators General http://www.fewer.org/research/studindgl.pdf Conflict Indicators Arms

availability http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/4dc394db5b54f3fa4125673900241f2f/10805a47444523884125680f0034a72c?OpenDocument

Conflict Indicators Post-conflict http://www.oecd.org/dac/Indicators/htm/slides.htm#indicators Conflict Indicators Human

Development indicators

http://www.undp.org/hdro/report.html

Conflict Indicators Community capacity

http://www.uwex.edu/ces/ag/sus/html/indicators_of_cs.html

Conflict Indicators Domestic conflict

http://www.wisc.edu/dpls.cat/caSL.html

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CONFLICT TOPIC

ISSUE WEB ADDRESS

Conflict Information Post-conflict environmental assessment (Albania)

http://balkans.unep.ch/albania/reports/foreword.html

Conflict Information Resources http://call.army.mil/fmso/RESRCHLK.htm#Trans Conflict Information Paper on

conflict impact http://cwisdb.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/research/P/3H00/project3H000594.htm

Conflict Information Cyber Terrorism

http://dmoz.org/Society/Issues/Terrorism/Cyber_Terrorism/

Conflict Information Security links http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/security.html Conflict Information Resources http://home.earthlink.net/~vehicool/Flashpoints_Contents.html Conflict Information Virtual library http://lcweb2.loc.gov Conflict Information Post-conflict http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/crisis/monograph/Monograph.ht

m Conflict Information Stability studies http://members.nbci.com/forum_deos/deos.html Conflict Information Conflict

Vulnerability Assessments

http://payson.tulane.edu/conflict

Conflict Information Peace Science Society

http://pss.la.psu.edu/

Conflict Information Case studies http://sfswww.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/files/cases/conflict.htm

Conflict Information Crisis Prevention in the Caribbean

http://surf.undp.org.tt/crisis%20prevention%20and%20recovery/default.htm

Conflict Information Conflict Analysis

http://web.mit.edu/cascon

Conflict Information Donor network http://webnet1.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-home-65-2-no-no-no,00.html

Conflict Information APSA http://wizard.ucr.edu/cps/cps.html Conflict Information EWS http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/iiip/ir/peace.html Conflict Information Conflict and the

environment http://www.ccpdc.org/events/environframe.htm

Conflict Information Training http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/About.htm Conflict Information Post-conflict

resources http://www.certi.org/default.htm

Conflict Information National Intelligence Council

http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/index.htm

Conflict Information Center for Naval Analysis

http://www.cna.org/

Conflict Information Resources

http://www.colorado.edu/conflict

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CONFLICT TOPIC

ISSUE WEB ADDRESS

Conflict Information Virtual analysis bookshelf

http://www.conflictresolver.com

Conflict Information Crime Research http://www.crimeresearch.org.za/organised.html Conflict Information Resources http://www.crinfo.org/international/index.cfm Conflict Information Diamonds http://www.ecprd.org Conflict Information Conflict and the

environment http://www.ecr.gov/what.htm

Conflict Information News and Analysis

http://www.emergency.com/ennday.htm

Conflict Information ADR http://www.humboldt.edu/~isadr Conflict Information Impact

assessment http://www.idrc.ca/peace/en/reports/pcia/

Conflict Information International Red Cross

http://www.ifrc.org/

Conflict Information Index of conflict resources

http://www.immigrationindex.org/conflict.htm

Conflict Information Internet links by theme

http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/themes

Conflict Information Drugs, thugs, and crime

http://www.interpol.int/Default.asp

Conflict Information Resources http://www.intl-crisis-group.org Conflict Information Publications http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/PublRepoInde

_body.htm Conflict Information Articles,

contacts http://www.mediate.com

Conflict Information Crime prevention

http://www.ncpc.org/5pol1dc.htm

Conflict Information National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/

Conflict Information Guidelines http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/cpd.htm Conflict Information Magazine http://www.peacemagazine.org/ Conflict Information Armed conflict

Databases http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ACR/acr.html

Conflict Information War http://www.ppu.org.uk//wars/war_index.html Conflict Information Peace research

and education http://www.ppu.org.uk/pret/pret.html

Conflict Information Links http://www.pscw.uva.nl/sociosite/TOPICS/Power.html#CONFLICT

Conflict Information Article on the “business” of peace

http://www.pwblf.org/csr/csrwebassist.nsf/content/f1d2a3a4b5.html

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CONFLICT TOPIC

ISSUE WEB ADDRESS

Conflict Information ReliefWeb http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf Conflict Information Speech http://www.swp-berlin.org/cpn/main/eucp.htm Conflict Information Journal http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/ Conflict Information Statements at

the UN http://www.un.int/index-en/search-en.html (enter "conflict prevention")

Conflict Information Women http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/armed.htm

Conflict Information Crime prevention

http://www.uncjin.org/CICP/cicp.html

Conflict Information RefWorld http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/welcome.htm Conflict Information Crime

prevention databases

http://www.unicri.it/html/databases.htm

Conflict Information UNRISD http://www.unrisd.org/index.htm Conflict Information War Torn

Societies Project

http://www.unrisd.org/wsp/wsp.htm

Conflict Information Resources http://www.uwm.edu/Dept/CIS/conflict/congeneral.html Conflict Information Research, EWS

(PANDA) http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ponsacs

Conflict Information Article on conflict mapping

http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ponsacs/DOCS/Papers/MappingConflict.htm

Conflict Information Conflict and economics

http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/

Conflict Information Resources http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org/completedprojects.html#ngos

Conflict Information ISA http://wwwfac.wmdc.edu/HTMLpages/Academics/Poli_Sci/PeaceStudies/Web_Final3.htm

Conflict Management Self Assessment http://instruction.bus.wisc.edu/obweb/assess/sa_conf.htm Conflict Management Skills

Assessment http://www.cdaconsulting.com/cmsa.htm

Conflict Network resources http://www.euconflict.org Conflict News Reuters http://www.alertnet.org Conflict News IPS http://www.ips.org/index.htm Conflict News GlobalBeat http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat Conflict News OneWorld http://www.oneworld.org Conflict News ReliefWeb http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf Conflict News Analysis

(commercial) http://www.stratfor.com

Conflict Organization US Army War College

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/index.htm

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CONFLICT TOPIC

ISSUE WEB ADDRESS

Conflict Organization Catholic University (Leuven) Peace Research Center

http://cwisdb.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/research/T/team151112.htm

Conflict Organization SAND http://sand.miis.edu Conflict Organization Development

and Peace Foundation

http://sef-bonn.org/sef/about/about.html

Conflict Organization Post-conflict http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/96144278b17f6ab1852567cf006967ef/13c709885d5b2709852569ae007548f6?OpenDocument

Conflict Organization World Policy Institute

http://worldpolicy.org

Conflict Organization Woodrow Wilson International Center

http://wwics.si.edu/cp/index.htm

Conflict Organization ACCORD http://www.accord.org.za Conflict Organization Amnesty

International http://www.amnesty.org

Conflict Organization Association of the U.S. Army

http://www.ausa.org

Conflict Organization British American Security Information Council

http://www.basicint.org/frmain.htm

Conflict Organization Bonn International Center for Conversion

http://www.bicc.de/info/index.html

Conflict Organization Lists http://www.bonn.iz-soz.de/afb/pri/pri_c.htm Conflict Organization University of

Bradford, Peace Studies Dept.

http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace/home.html

Conflict Organization Center for International Development and Conflict Management

http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm

Conflict Organization Creative Associates

http://www.caii.net/CIT/CIT%20Projects.htm

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CONFLICT TOPIC

ISSUE WEB ADDRESS

Conflict Organization Carelton University (Center for Security and Defense Studies)

http://www.carleton.ca/csds/module1.htm

Conflict Organization Carnegie Commission

http://www.ccpdc.org

Conflict Organization Center for Defense Information

http://www.cdi.org

Conflict Organization Directory of orgs in Asia

http://www.conflict-prevention.org

Conflict Organization Conciliation Resources

http://www.c-r.org/cr/conciliation.htm

Conflict Organization Center for Strategic and International Studies

http://www.csis.org

Conflict Organization DFID http://www.dfid.gov.uk/index.html Conflict Organization FEWER http://www.fewer.org Conflict Organization PIOOM http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/pioom.htm Conflict Organization Fund for Peace http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/cpr/cpr.htm Conflict Organization ICAR (being

updated) http://www.gmu.edu/departments/ICAR/index.html

Conflict Organization The Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice

http://www.haguepeace.org/appeals/english.html#root

Conflict Organization Institute for Defense Analysis

http://www.ida.org

Conflict Organization PeaceNet http://www.igc.org/igc/gateway/pnindex.html Conflict Organization Institute for

International Mediation and Conflict Resolution

http://www.iimcr.org

Conflict Organization International Alert

http://www.international-alert.org/aboutus.htm

Conflict Organization International Crisis Group

http://www.intl-crisis-group.org

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CONFLICT TOPIC

ISSUE WEB ADDRESS

Conflict Organization International Peace Academy

http://www.ipacademy.org

Conflict Organization Institute for Peace and Security Studies (S. Asia)

http://www.ipcs.org/index.htm

Conflict Organization Institute of World Affairs

http://www.iwa.org

Conflict Organization Management Systems International (Transitions)

http://www.msiworldwide.com/applications_trans.html

Conflict Organization OxFam http://www.oxfam.org.uk/campaign/cutconflict/index.html Conflict Organization PeaceBrigades http://www.peacebrigades.org Conflict Organization RAND http://www.rand.org/ Conflict Organization Rockefeller

Brothers Fund http://www.rbf.org/securityprog.html

Conflict Organization OCHA http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/ Conflict Organization SIPRI http://www.sipri.se Conflict Organization Disarmament http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/index.html Conflict Organization Peace and

Governance Program

http://www.unu.edu/p&g/

Conflict Organization USIP http://www.usip.org/ Conflict Organization The Winston

Foundation for World Peace (closed)

http://www.wf.org/cpr.htm

Conflict Organization World Peace Foundation

http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org

Conflict Prevention Article http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/article-pinheiro1999.htm

Conflict Prevention EU communication on prevention

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/ip_01_560_en.htm

Conflict Prevention Root causes (speech on)

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/ip_01_123.htm

Conflict Prevention Literature review

http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/crisis/mapexercise.htm

Conflict Prevention Position paper http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/euframe/euafrica-0105.htm Conflict Prevention Conflict

Assessment guide

http://spot.colorado.edu/~wehr/40GD1.HTM; http://www.newsorlando.com/hockerwilmot.htm

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CONFLICT TOPIC

ISSUE WEB ADDRESS

Conflict Prevention Paper on role of donors

http://wwics.si.edu/cp/appeng.htm

Conflict Prevention Research Project

http://wwics.si.edu/cp/index.htm

Conflict Prevention Impact Assessment Toolkit

http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/d86cbc87319a898c8525677e0072d6f8/df3140172f2aab94852569af00284901?OpenDocument

Conflict Prevention Research http://www.carleton.ca/csds/module1.htm Conflict Prevention CPCC http://www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca/cpwg01.htm Conflict Prevention Crime

prevention http://www.crime-prevention.org/english/main.html

Conflict Prevention Research http://www.csis.org/prevdipl/index.html Conflict Prevention Network for

Central Africa http://www.easurf.org/networking/conflict.htm

Conflict Prevention Paper http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/publ/studies/volume_3/Lucarelli.htm#CP%20Tools%20and%20Activities%20at%20the%20Disposal%20of%20Major%20International%20Organizations

Conflict Prevention Conflict assessment checklists

http://www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/download.htm

Conflict Prevention Assessment Tool

http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/cpr/cpr.htm

Conflict Prevention G8 http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/foreign/fm000713-in.htm Conflict Prevention Paper http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/4dc394db5b54f3fa412567390

0241f2f/3fcb56602885e30f4125698a0030e6d8?OpenDocument

Conflict Prevention Article on root causes

http://www.ifpri.cgiar.org/2020/newslet/nv_0796/nv_0796a.htm

Conflict Prevention Research and Policy

http://www.ipacademy.org/Programs/Research/ProgReseConf_body.htm

Conflict Prevention Paper assessing OAU

http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Africa/PublRepoAfriAssessPrint.htm

Conflict Prevention Government of Japan

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/conflict/index.html

Conflict Prevention Network of NGOs

http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/platform/about.htm

Conflict Prevention Paper on role of NGOs

http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/publicat/nl2/page10.html

Conflict Prevention Africa sub-regional approaches

http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/sfp/part2/056_sub.htm

Conflict Prevention Report http://www.oneworld.org/euconflict/whatsnew/reviews/conflictprevention.html

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CONFLICT TOPIC

ISSUE WEB ADDRESS

Conflict Prevention Paper on use of information

http://www.oss.net/VIRTUAL/

Conflict Prevention Paper on Middle East

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR499/mr499.html

Conflict Prevention EU http://www.swp-berlin.org/cpn/main/eucp.htm Conflict Prevention Trust Fund for

Africa http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/list2a3.htm

Conflict Prevention Project http://www.unfoundation.org/grants/9_31_undp_conflict_prevention_capacity_building_program.asp

Conflict Prevention Report http://www.unu.edu/p&g/conflict-prevention.html Conflict Prevention Youth http://youth.haguepeace.org/hapyouth/English/Conference/con

fprev.htm Country Information Security http://databases.sipri.se/ Country Information Human Rights http://web.amnesty.org/web/content.nsf/pagesbycountrytitle/gb

rcountry+page Country Information Africa (yr 2000) http://www.accord.org.za/bakaccnet/index.htm Country Information Data on African

countries http://www.afdb.org/statistics.htm?n1=9&n2=0&n3=0

Country Information Indicators (TBD)

http://www.carleton.ca/cifp

Country Information Resources http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/links/milorg/indexc.html Country Information Contemporary

conflicts http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/links/wars/index.html

Country Information From Canada http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/geo/menu-e.asp Country Information Commercial

service http://www.eiu.com

Country Information General http://www.emulateme.com Country Information 31 surveys of

African countries

http://www.euconflict.org

Country Information 15 surveys of E&E countries

http://www.euconflict.org

Country Information Human Rights http://www.hrw.org/hrw/pubweb Country Information Red Cross http://www.icrc.org/eng/operations_country Country Information From the UK http://www.ids.ac.uk/eldis/newcountry.htm Country Information Resources http://www.immigrationindex.org/country-data.htm Country Information Peace

Agreements http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/index.html

Country Information Conflict data http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries Country Information South Asia http://www.ipcs.org/index.htm Country Information General http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook Country Information Refugees http://www.refugees.org Country Information Languages http://www.sil.org/ethnologue

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CONFLICT TOPIC

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Country Information Human Rights http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/index.cfm?id=1470; http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights

Country Information Refugees http://www.unhcr.ch Country Information Refugees http://www.unhcr.ch/world/world.htm Country Information Homelands,

autonomy, etc. http://www.visi.com/%7Ehomelands

Country Information Economic data http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html Country Information Africa http://www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/guide3.html

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