A framework for evaluating international cooperation in space exploration
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Transcript of A framework for evaluating international cooperation in space exploration
ARTICLE IN PRESS
0265-9646/$ - se
doi:10.1016/j.sp
$This is a
International A�CorrespondE-mail addr
macardin@mit.
Space Policy 24 (2008) 181–189
www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol
A framework for evaluating international cooperation inspace exploration$
David Andre Broniatowski, Michel-Alexandre Cardin, Shuonan Dong,Matthew J. Hale, Nicole C. Jordan, Deanna R. Laufer, Charlotte Mathieu,
Brandon D. Owens, Matthew G. Richards, Annalisa L. Weigel�
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
Abstract
Today’s spacefaring nations lack a systematic framework for evaluating international cooperation proposals that takes both political
and technical concerns into account. By simultaneously considering technology and policy, a more informed decision may be made about
how best to cooperate. An original framework is set forth for identifying and evaluating different cooperative schemes for their impact on
technical and political concerns. The strength of this framework is then illustrated using a case study of US and Italian cooperation.
r 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
International cooperation is becoming an increasinglyimportant part of today’s space programs. Nevertheless,today’s spacefaring nations lack a systematic frameworkfor evaluating international cooperation proposals. Such aframework should have both technological and policycomponents so as to capture, for instance, the effectsof international prestige in this high-tech enterprise. Bysimultaneously considering technology and policy, a moreinformed decision may be made in order to improve futurecooperative schemes.
A literature review of international cooperation in civilspace exploration found that publications fall into threemain categories: (1) those that argue for a particular modeof cooperation [1–5]; (2) those detailing the transactioncosts of international cooperation and suggesting means of
e front matter r 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
acepol.2008.09.012
revised version of a paper first presented at the 57th
stronautical Congress, held in Valencia, October 2006.
ing author. Tel.: +1617 253 1207; fax: +1 617 258 0863.
esses: [email protected] (D.A. Broniatowski),
edu (M.-A. Cardin), [email protected] (S. Dong),
u (M.J. Hale), [email protected] (N.C. Jordan),
u (D.R. Laufer), [email protected] (C. Mathieu),
du (B.D. Owens), [email protected] (M.G. Richards),
du (A.L. Weigel).
reducing these costs [6–10]; and (3) those analyzing pastinstances of cooperation and seeking to explain therationale for the cooperation seen [11–13]. Such ap-proaches to international cooperation have not explicitlyconsidered technology and policy together. The result hasbeen cooperative schemes that are politically attractive butless justifiable on a technical basis. On the other hand,those schemes that are not politically feasible will neverreach fruition regardless of their technical feasibility.A framework is proposed in this article for evaluating thefeasibility of, and incentives for, international cooperationby analyzing the costs and benefits of various cooperativeschemes. The resulting framework is unique becauseit considers both technical and political concerns in theevaluation process, allowing for an effective trade-offbetween the two domains.This framework is intended to fill a void in the literature
by suggesting modes of cooperation appropriate underdifferent sets of techno-political circumstances. The pro-posed framework is intended to provide a nation withan analytic construct for various schemes of cooperationwith foreign partners. To accomplish this, the frameworkdefines three technical parameters, two policy parameters,and six forms of international cooperation. As shown inFig. 1, choices among types of international cooperationare informed by both technical and policy parameters in
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Types of
International
CooperationPolicy
Parameters
Technical
Parameters
Framework
Fig. 1. The three types of parameters informing the framework.
1Presumably, membership in such an institution will involve some role
in institutional decision making (e.g., the member nation may have a vote
in all decisions, the high level decision making role may rotate among the
member nations, etc.).
D.A. Broniatowski et al. / Space Policy 24 (2008) 181–189182
order to construct a partnership that is both viable andproductive. A case study lends concreteness to the frame-work by illustrating the process by which recommendationsfor international cooperation are derived.
2. Framework description
Use of the framework has been broken into six discretesteps aimed at creating a systematic approach to evaluatinginternational cooperation schemes. Fig. 2 shows thesequence of these six steps. In this approach, there arethree types of parameters that are required to informthe framework, namely, technical parameters, policy para-meters, and types of international cooperation. The threetechnical parameters are widely acknowledged determi-nants of system success, largely known to technical expertsas ‘‘cost, schedule and performance,’’ whereas the twopolicy parameters generally capture impacts upon foreignand domestic policy concerns. These categories can befurther expanded or refined by the user of the frameworkas appropriate to the problem to which it is being applied.
Each of these steps is described in order of executionbelow.
2.1. Step 1: choose countries to analyze
The first step in applying any model of internationalcooperation is to choose at least two countries for whicha particular cooperative arrangement will be analyzed.In this framework it is first necessary to explicitly identifythe country that is contemplating cooperation. Wedesignate this the ‘‘primary nation.’’ Second, it is necessaryto explicitly identify the nation(s) that the primary nation isconsidering for cooperation. We designate this the ‘‘partnernation(s)’’.
2.2. Step 2: collect data on technological capabilities and
policy goals for each country
Once a set of nations has been selected for analysis, thenext step is to determine the motivation and ability thateach nation possesses to engage in a cooperative endeavor.Any nation lacking the appropriate political drive forspace-related activities will be unwilling to cooperate.Similarly, the lack of any substantial technical contri-bution from a potential partner will preclude cooperation.
The primary purpose of this data collection is to determinethe capabilities and incentives for cooperation.
2.3. Step 3: identify feasible cooperative schemes
Once data have been collected regarding the goalsand technological abilities of each nation under analysis,this information may be applied to inform the choiceof cooperative schemes. In particular, schemes that areinfeasible because of a dearth of technological capability orbecause of substantial political opposition may be elimi-nated from consideration. This step thus requires asystematic and mutually exclusive list of cooperativemethodologies.In this article six different cooperative methodologies are
explored based on past experience and proposals made inthe literature. Each cooperative methodology is summar-ized in Table 1, which is ordered by the degree ofcontribution from the partner nation (i.e. the partner’sdegree of contribution increases from no contribution atLevel 0 to greater degrees in the subsequent levels).These six levels of cooperation were chosen as repre-
sentative of a range of engagement strategies betweenpartnering nations. Inspiration for the definition of thevarious levels of collaboration was drawn primarily fromcurrent and previous instances of collaboration betweenthe USA and other nations (several of which are providedas examples in Table 1). Nevertheless, a potential user ofthis framework might add or subtract other cooperationmodalities as appropriate to the problem at hand. Becauseof the prior modes of collaboration in which the USA hasbeen involved, the main emphasis in the framework is onbilateral collaboration and close variants thereof. Levels0–4 are primarily descriptive of bilateral cooperationefforts or loose aggregations of bilateral collaborativeefforts. In other words, the primary nation maintainssovereignty over its role in the collaboration in these levelsand does not necessarily yield that sovereignty to a formalinstitution of nations. Furthermore, for any given colla-boration effort, the primary nation can choose tocollaborate with more than one partner nation and/orformal institutions of nations, such as ESA, providingthat it does not become a member of those institutions.Level 5 cooperation, on the other hand, requires theprimary nation to yield some sovereignty over highlevel decisions to the institution of which it is a member.1
Future work could involve greater elaboration of Level 5modes of collaboration (perhaps with the introductionof sublevels) and/or more detailed treatment of thepotential difficulties involved in using Levels 0–4 to classifywhat might be considered less formal versions of Level 5collaboration.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 1
Six types of international cooperation representing varying levels of
contributions from participants
Cooperation
level
Type Description
0 Non-
collaboration
In this limiting case, there is no
collaboration.
1 Short-term niche Short-term acquisition of a
‘‘niche’’ capability from a country
that can contribute to a particular
area. An example from the
perspective of India is the use of
US instruments on the Indian
lunar probe Chandrayaan-1.
2 Long-term niche Long-term attainment of a niche
capability from a country that has
a recognized expertise/interest in a
particular area. Some examples
from the perspective of the United
States are the use of the Canadian
robotic arms and European
Spacelab modules on multiple
Space Shuttle missions.
3 Critical path Collaboration on vital parts of the
space exploration architecture. An
example from the perspective of
the United States is Russian
participation in the International
Space Station.
4 Parallel missions Involvement in a mission or series
of missions spearheaded by a
foreign partner for mutual benefit.
Examples from the perspective of
the United States are the US
participation in the Mir program
and the use of US instruments on
the Indian lunar probe
Chandrayaan-1
5 Multinational
institutional
All participating nations
contribute resources to a space
organization (e.g., the European
Space Agency) that sets priorities
and assigns responsibility for
development and delivery.
Table 2
Technical and policy parameters considered in the framework
Technical parameters Policy parameters
1. Cost 1. Primary nation’s political utility
2. Schedule 2. Partner nation’s political utility
3. Performance
1. Choose countries to analyze
2. Collect data on policy goals, technical capabilities
3. Identify feasible cooperative schemes
4. Assess effects of feasible schemes
5. Identify each nation’s preferred scheme
6. Identify win-win cooperation schemes
Fig. 2. Flow chart of six steps required to implement the framework for evaluating international cooperation.
D.A. Broniatowski et al. / Space Policy 24 (2008) 181–189 183
2.4. Step 4: assess effects of feasible schemes
After identifying appropriate cooperative schemes, theeffects of those schemes are evaluated for their effect onthe technical and policy parameters listed in Table 2. Thetechnical parameters are cost, schedule and performance(including safety and risk) of the space system designchosen to satisfy the cooperative scheme. These parametersare of primary interest to the program manager. The policyparameters are the political utility of the primary nationand the political utility of the partner nation(s) foreach cooperative scheme. For both nations, these utilitiesare related to the effects of their space-related activitieson their national pride and prestige, national security,domestic economy, the countries’ influence on policy at theglobal and regional scales, and their maintenance ofdesirable technical capabilities. Although these policyparameters are not collectively exhaustive, they areconsidered representative of the set of concerns facing anation that may choose to engage in internationalcooperation. Other policy concerns that might be moresalient at the time the decision is made can easily beincorporated into the framework. Note that uncertaintiesin these parameters are not explicitly captured within thisframework. Rather the assessment of policy and technicaloutcomes should incorporate the best available informa-tion at the time of decision making. An explicit acknowl-edgement of the range of uncertainty surrounding theseoutcomes would further inform the analysis, and is left tofuture work.
ARTICLE IN PRESSD.A. Broniatowski et al. / Space Policy 24 (2008) 181–189184
2.5. Step 5: identify each nation’s preferred schemes
In an ideal situation a cooperative scheme that improvedboth the technical and policy parameters for a nationwould be selected. In practice, some schemes will favorparticular parameters over others. In this case the frame-work as presented allows decision makers to explicitlyidentify and choose between technical considerations andpolicy considerations in order to make a well-informeddecision on the type of cooperation to pursue.
2.6. Step 6: identify win–win cooperation schemes
The primary nation and the partner nation(s) may havevery different notions of the ideal way to cooperate witheach other. This framework can aid in the negotiationprocess between nations by helping each to understandexplicitly which technical and which policy parameters arebeing improved, and thus provide a better understandingof the impacts of cooperation. This greater understandingwould provide clarity and transparency, which could yielda better and more informed choice on how to proceed withcooperation to the mutual benefit of all parties involved.
By combining technical design issues and politicalconcerns, this approach to analyzing the effects ofinternational cooperation is of use to both the policymaker and the program manager. In addition, synergiesbetween the technical and political realms may allow forthe identification of cooperative scenarios that are winnerson both their technical and policy aspects.
3. Case study
To lend concreteness to this methodology, a case studyinvolving bilateral cooperation between the USA and Italyis presented here to analyze potential cooperation betweentwo countries using the framework just described. Ananalysis of multilateral cooperation using this framework isleft for future work. The evaluation is summarized in astepwise manner as presented in Fig. 2.
3.1. Case study step 1: choose countries to analyze
We chose to analyze cooperation between the USA andItaly and to do so from the viewpoint of the formeras it embarks upon its new US Space Exploration Policy(USSEP), a long-term plan that explicitly calls forinternational cooperation [14]. The Italian Space Agency(ASI) has a history of cooperation with the UnitedStates on projects ranging from scientific missions to theInternational Space Station (ISS) [15]. The history of thiscooperation dates to 1988, and has been fruitful for bothcountries. ASI advertises a number of successful coopera-tive endeavors with NASA, including joint participation inthe Cassini mission, the ISS and many scientific missions[16]. In May 2004 ASI and NASA agreed to furtherincrease their cooperative efforts within the context of the
USSEP. US–Italian cooperation has also successfullyweathered potential policy conflicts within the spaceexploration arena. For example, ASI contributed crucialsubsystems to the Cassini probe, which generated publicopposition from environmental groups and prominentscientists because of its plutonium power source. The delaysin the construction of the ISS, concomitant with the loss ofthe Space Shuttle Columbia, which also imposed a policystrain on relations between NASA and most of itsinternational partners, did not affect ASI as strongly thanksto the combined technical and policy nature of Italy’s contri-bution, i.e. the multi-purpose logistics module (MPLM). TheItalian MPLM, though not officially on the ‘‘critical path,’’served as an enabler for ISS construction and specializedcomponent transportation, thereby ensuring that it would beused relatively early on in the ISS construction process.Unlike the Japanese Kibo and European Columbus modules,the Italian MPLM had been used prior to the loss ofColumbia, thereby allowing some policy benefit to accrue toASI and the Italian government. Italy was therefore con-sidered an appropriate candidate for a case study to evaluatepotential cooperation. Because the analysis is referenced withrespect to the viewpoint of the USA, Italy is referred to as thepartner nation throughout this case study.
3.2. Case study step 2: collect data on technology
capabilities and policy goals for each country
Both the United States and Italy have credible technicalcapabilities in space, and expect to use space exploration tofurther their domestic and foreign policy goals.
3.2.1. American technical capabilities
With its extensive history in space, the USA has many ofthe technical capabilities necessary to carry out the USSEP.Among the USSEP’s major milestones is completion andservicing of the ISS through 2015. The Space Shuttlewill support this mission until its retirement in 2010.The completion of the ISS mission will occur in parallelwith the development of the next generation launch andexploration vehicles: the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle(CLV) and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV).The return of humans to the Moon, planned for 2018, isintended to lead to the creation of a lunar outpost thatwill be used, among other things, to develop and testtechnologies for an eventual human mission to Mars.
3.2.2. American policy goals
American space exploration policy, governed by theUSSEP, calls for a ‘‘sustained and affordable’’ explorationof space with commercial and foreign involvement. TheUSSEP explicitly calls for NASA to seek internationalparticipation [17]. More broadly, American domestic andforeign policy objectives for its space program include:
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national security; � national pride and prestige;ARTICLE IN PRESSD.A. Broniatowski et al. / Space Policy 24 (2008) 181–189 185
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maintaining a capable technical workforce; � economic well-being; � demonstration of solidarity with allies; � shaping policy on the global scale.While initially establishing itself as the dominant partnerin its collaborative experiences in space—other than the inApollo–Soyuz Test Project—and structuring these projectslargely to avoid technology transfer, the USA has em-braced increasingly larger roles for its partners in the SpaceShuttle and ISS programs [18]. That said, however, theUSA’s history of leadership in spaceflight could createconcerns over its acceptance of roles in collaborativeefforts that are largely perceived as secondary.
3.2.3. Italian technical capabilities
Italy has significant technical capabilities to contributeto a cooperative project. Its construction of the MPLMfor use on the ISS gives it credible experience in buildingflight modules for human spaceflight. Italy also has strongcompetences in communications systems design, gainedthrough experience with the Cassini Saturn orbiter [19].Italy has recently focused efforts in favor of the develop-ment and deployment of habitation technologies for theISS rather than on basic research.
Moreover, Italy has played a leading role in theestablishment of an international Master’s program inSpace Exploration and Development Systems, which aimsto prepare the future of the European industry in the fieldof space exploration.
3.2.4. Italian policy goals
The primary goals of the ASI include fundamentalresearch, development of economic strength and industrialactivity, encouragement of growth within the space sector,balance between national Italian space activities andparticipation in ESA, and international cooperation insuch space development activities as the ISS, the EuropeanGMES program and similar international cooperativeendeavors [19].
More broadly, Italian domestic and foreign policyobjectives for its space program include:
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national pride and prestige; � maintaining a capable technical workforce; � economic well-being; � demonstration of solidarity with allies; � shaping policy on the regional scale.3.3. Case study step 3: identify feasible cooperation schemes
Of the six cooperative schemes presented in this frame-work, three are not feasible because of technological orpolitical considerations, and may therefore be ruled out.This restricts the analysis to the remaining three coopera-tive schemes, aiding in tractability.
3.3.1. Non-collaboration
This type of cooperation represents a degeneratecase because of the stated interest in pursuing cooperationfrom both nations, and the history of cooperation betweenthem. Barring a major change in the political or technicalenvironments of these nations, non-collaboration can beeffectively ruled out based on political grounds.
3.3.2. Short-term niche
Short-term niche cooperation takes advantage of anexisting competence within the partner nation to fill a non-recurring need for a particular mission. Cooperation onthis level implies that the partner nation has nearlycompleted development of, or has already developed, aspecialized capability that may be used in a domestic orforeign space program. Short-term niche capabilitiesare typically restricted to one, or a limited number, ofmissions. This type of cooperation with Italy mightinvolve the deployment of an Italian instrument on a USscientific mission. An example of this type of cooperationis the Italian Drilling and In-Situ experimentationsystem on NASA’s Phoenix Lander, which takes advantageof experience gained by Italy during ESA’s RosettaMission.
3.3.3. Long-term niche
Long-term niche cooperation similarly takes advantageof an existing competence within a partner nation to fill arecurring but non-critical need on a long-term mission ormultiple missions. Cooperation on this level implies thatthe partner nation has already developed, or has nearlycompleted development of, a highly specialized capabilitythat will be used on a recurring basis. The distinctionbetween long-term niche and critical-path capabilities isone of schedule. In the Program (or Project) Evaluationand Review Technique (PERT) [20], the critical path is thesequences of tasks in the program (or project) that,if delayed, will delay the completion of the program(or project). Long-term niche capabilities can be developedon a parallel flow to the main developmental flow (i.e. thecritical path) and thus experience delays (up to some point)without delaying the overall project. Furthermore, ifnecessary, a mission or program can sometimes continueabsent a long-term niche capability. A critical pathcapability, on the other hand, is required to achieve theprogram’s, or mission’s, objective on schedule. This type ofcooperation with Italy might involve Italian constructionand/or operation of a supporting and non-critical compo-nent on a multi-mission American program. An example ofthis type of cooperation is the Italian MPLM, used toresupply the ISS or to deliver consumables to humanexploration missions departing from low-Earth orbit.
3.3.4. Critical path
Critical path cooperation takes advantage of an existingcompetence within a partner nation to fill a critical needfor a particular mission or set of missions. Cooperation on
ARTICLE IN PRESSD.A. Broniatowski et al. / Space Policy 24 (2008) 181–189186
this level implies an expressed mutual dependence betweennations. When nations choose to engage in critical pathexploration, they create a program that requires anothernation’s cooperation for the timely success of the mission.Such a decision by the primary nation may derive from thetechnological, financial and political needs of the primarynation and/or an explicit statement from the partner nationthat it will accept nothing less than a critical path role. Thistype of cooperation with Italy might involve the Italianconstruction of a necessary or integral component on amulti-mission American program. A hypothetical exampleof this type of cooperation is the Italian construction of apressure vessel for the American Orion CEV based uponMPLM-derived technology.
3.3.5. Parallel projects
Parallel projects occur when two nations have similarand/or complementary spacefaring capabilities and goals,and may therefore cooperate with one another as a matterof opportunity and for mutual benefit. The notion ofparallel projects specifically implies that the primary andpartner nations could potentially accomplish a similarproject without the assistance of each other, yet additionalmutual benefit would be derived if one or both of theprojects were executed and designed with an option for thenations to cooperate with each other in some way. In anextreme example, the partner nation could use one of theprimary nation’s launch vehicles instead of its own toimprove launch performance of the mission while provid-ing the primary nation with access to a portion of thescience data.2 In more limited cases, the primary andpartner nations could make provisions to include instru-ments and/or crewmembers on each other’s missionsas a form of strategic redundancy in the event that onenation’s mission is cancelled or unsuccessful.3 Because Italyexecutes its space exploration endeavors primarily throughparticipation in the European Space Agency and cooperat-ing with other nations outside Europe, and lacks its ownnational, autonomous space exploration program, it isunlikely that Italy and the United States would engage inparallel projects as defined above. At the current time, we
2The NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory has already examined the
possibility of using the Ares V launch vehicle for US robotic exploration
missions in addition to US human exploration missions [21]. The benefits
of such a practice would include increased launch performance for robotic
exploration missions and improved economies of scale and scope for the
Ares V program, providing a win–win situation for the customer (i.e. the
Science Mission Directorate of NASA) and the supplier (i.e. the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate of NASA). Though the focus
of JPL’s study involved cooperation between different directorates of the
space agency of only one country, the possibility exists for such a practice
to be applied to international cooperation.3The US is currently evaluating options for a human mission to a near
Earth object [22]. However, such a mission has not explicitly been
identified as a core goal of the USSEP and therefore may never be
approved. Thus, the arrangement of a parallel project with another nation
could provide a vital source of redundancy in the pursuit of the objectives
of such a mission.
rule out this type of cooperation as infeasible on technicalgrounds, although it may become possible in the future.
3.3.6. Multinational institutional
As defined in Section 2.3, multinational institutionalcooperation implies there is an overarching space agencythat is responsible for directing the efforts of eachcooperating nation. This requires that each participatingnation cede some degree of sovereignty over its spaceexploration activities. While countries do cooperate inoverarching sectoral organizations such as the Committeeon Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), they do not cedecontrol to a higher party within these. Indeed, today’spolitical climate and foreseeable future climates do notallow for an overarching organization that could controlboth US and Italian space exploration resources andpolicies. We therefore rule out this type of cooperation ascurrently infeasible on political grounds.
3.4. Case study step 4: assess effects of feasible schemes
With the three feasible cooperative schemes identifiedabove, namely short-term niche, long-term niche, andcritical path, the next step is to explore their effects on thetechnical parameters (cost, schedule and performance) andthe policy parameters (domestic political utility and foreignpolitical utility) as defined in the framework. To evaluatethese effects, a particular example context is needed foreach scheme, and we choose to use the examples that arecited above in Sections 3.3.2–3.3.4. The schemes consideredin this case study are listed in Table 3 along with a briefdescription of an example context for each scheme.
3.4.1. Cost
Conventional wisdom holds that international coopera-tion increases overall mission cost, while decreasing per-partner cost. This is largely due to the fact that currentcooperation usually occurs on a ‘‘no exchange of funds’’basis. However, the process of cooperating itself involvescertain expenses that would not otherwise be incurred, suchas those for increased communication and travel, forhardware shipping, and for regulatory issues. Thus whetheror not cooperation truly decreases per-partner costs is
Table 3
Feasible cooperative schemes between the USA and Italy, with associated
examples of each that are used for analysis
Feasible
cooperative scheme
Example context used for analysis
Short-term niche Italian drilling instrument on an American Mars
science mission
Long-term niche Using the multi-purpose logistics module for
transporting human mission consumables to low
Earth orbit
Critical path Italian construction of a pressure vessel for the
American crew exploration vehicle
ARTICLE IN PRESSD.A. Broniatowski et al. / Space Policy 24 (2008) 181–189 187
a function of how much original mission cost is saved andhow much cooperation cost is incurred.
Short-term niche cooperation and long-term nichecooperation can probably be accomplished with little orno negative cost impact, because the associated technologyhas already been developed by Italy. However, critical pathcooperation would probably incur substantial coordinationcosts because of the integrated nature of the technicalcontribution from Italy. A pressure vessel, for example, isan interconnected part of a spacecraft, with manyinterfaces to other components that will need to be heavilymonitored during the design, development, and manufac-turing stages.
3.4.2. Schedule
In general the more partners involved in coordinationefforts, the more the overall schedule can be negativelyaffected. However, these negative effects may be partiallyoffset by employing coordination schemes using technol-ogy that has already been developed by the partner nation,thus reducing schedule risk. Better system integration anddesign coordination can also mitigate additional scheduleimpacts.
It should be possible to accomplish short-term nichecooperation and long-term niche cooperation with little orno negative schedule impact, as the associated technologyhas already been developed by Italy. However, critical pathcooperation has reasonable potential to result in negativeschedule impacts because of the intensive coordinationrequired for an integral component of the design.
3.4.3. Performance
Italian technical expertise largely overlaps with UStechnical expertise in the three areas of cooperation underexamination. Thus, performance is likely to be affectedneither positively nor negatively by the US cooperatingwith Italy, regardless of cooperation scheme chosen.
3.4.4. American policy goals
Cooperation with Italy will benefit several Americanpolicy objectives mentioned earlier, including the ability todemonstrate solidarity with US allies. Having allies inEurope also has positive derivative effects for nationalsecurity, pride and prestige, and for shaping policy on theglobal scale. On the other hand, cooperation with Italymay be perceived to somewhat inhibit US employment andlimit the further development of American technicalcapabilities. The magnitude of this negative impact onjobs and technical development is smallest for short-termniche cooperation, and grows slightly larger for long-termniche cooperation. For critical path cooperation, thisnegative impact on domestic jobs and technical develop-ment increases further.
Short-term niche cooperation, with Italy providing aninstrument on a Mars science mission for example, iseffective in generating the positive policy effects ofcooperation without incurring significant impacts on jobs
and technical capabilities. This is a result of the limitedemployment opportunities and technical capabilities re-quired to engage in this collaboration. Long-term nichecooperation on a pressurized Cargo Module will demon-strate solidarity with Italy and allow for continued shapingof Italian policy. However, as the number of peopleemployed by the program in Italy grows, domesticemployment concerns in the USA may emerge. Finally,critical path cooperation through the use of an Italianpressure vessel on the Orion CEV, for example, is likely tohave an overall negative political impact (indeed, suchcollaboration runs counter to the currently stated USpolicy of independently developing a lunar transportationarchitecture). In addition to outsourcing a significantamount of jobs and technical capabilities to Italy, theUSA would become dependent on Italy to complete theOrion CEV by putting it in the critical path of the program.
3.4.5. Italian policy goals
Based on the Italian foreign policy objectives statedpreviously, cooperation between Italy and the USAstrengthens the alliance between the two nations andimproves Italy’s ability to shape policy by strengthening itsposition with respect to other actors in the region.In addition, Italy’s ability to claim technological prowessat home and on the world stage is increased, resulting ineconomic gain and increased national pride and prestigein this area. It should be noted that such cooperationmight limit Italy’s ability to shape policy in Europe if closerelations with the USA are criticized by other actors in theregion. Therefore, cooperation with the USA must reflect astrategic judgment.Short-term niche cooperation on the avionics of the
Phoenix Lander potentially enhances Italian policy goals.This type of cooperation allows for the maintenance athigh-level of existing Italian technical capabilities. Inaddition, such collaboration sends a signal to the world,indicating alliance with one of the world’s leading spacepowers. Long-term niche cooperation on an MPLM-stylepressurized Cargo Module will not only generate thebenefits described above but will also create moresignificant economic benefits thanks to the increasedproject size. In addition, participation in a higher-visibilityproject provides the Italians with greater prestige andopportunity to shape regional policy. Finally, critical pathcooperation on an Italian pressure vessel for the OrionCEV provides the greatest benefit to Italian policy goals,with each being met to a very high degree. This cooperationscheme also provides Italy with the ability to claim strongtechnological capability.
3.4.6. Potential policy impediments
Aside from the policy benefits to both nations mentionedabove, there are some potential policy impediments thatmust be considered. One practical issue regarding imple-mentation of a joint program is the alignment of fundingcycles from each nation’s space agency. Even though two
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 4
Net effects, ranging from positive to negative, of possible cooperation schemes with Italy
Short-term niche Long-term niche Critical path
Cost Neutral Somewhat negative Negative
Schedule Neutral Somewhat negative Negative
Performance Somewhat positive Somewhat positive Somewhat positive
United States political utility Positive Positive Negative
Italian political utility Somewhat positive Somewhat positive Positive
D.A. Broniatowski et al. / Space Policy 24 (2008) 181–189188
agencies may both be funded on the same time frame(e.g. yearly) mismatches between government authoriza-tion of funds can result in policy uncertainty, therebymaking it difficult for cooperating nations to commitresources simultaneously.
More fundamental policy impediments may also stemfrom an individual nation’s regulatory regime. Forexample, export controls within the USA, falling underthe purview of the International Traffic in Arms Regula-tions (ITAR), place limitations on which technologies maybe transferred to specific countries. Assessing compliancewith these regulations can impose additional monetary andschedule costs on a collaborative effort. More importantly,such regulations can be ambiguous.4 This ambiguity alsoincreases political uncertainty, often requiring higher-levelgovernment approval than would otherwise be necessary.This, in turn, can introduce unexpected sources of cost anddelay into a joint program.
3.4.7. Summary of effects of feasible schemes
Results from the analysis above are summarized inTable 4. The assessment of the impacts of the cooperationschemes on the evaluated parameters (technical andpolitical) are shown in matrix form with the rows denotingthe parameters and the columns denoting the cooperationschemes.
3.5. Case study step 5: identify each nation’s
preferred schemes
Preferred schemes are those that improve both thetechnical and policy parameters. Looking at Table 4, theUSA sees neutral to positive impacts on the technicalparameters as well as the policy parameters for short-termniche cooperation, while it sees largely negative impacts
4A classic example of such ambiguity can be found within the United
States Munitions List (USML), the primary document listing those items
that are ITAR-controlled. Technical data, including detailed design,
development, production, or manufacturing data are ‘‘deemed exports’’
and therefore subject to the same restrictions as any technical equipment.
This classification can create an environment that discourages collabora-
tion by making the costs of including international participants in a
project prohibitively high for both parties. Although marketing data is
explicitly allowed by the USML, there is no clear distinction for what
constitutes a difference between technical and marketing data, thereby
encouraging a risk-averse attitude among participants, whereby data
transfer must be approved by State Department officials.
from critical path cooperation. Long-term niche coopera-tion falls between the other two schemes, with neutral tonegative impacts on the technical parameters but positiveimpacts on the policy parameters.Looking at preferred schemes from the Italian point of
view (i.e. the Italian political utility row of Table 4), each ofthe three cooperative schemes provides policy benefits, withcritical path cooperation, as described in the precedingsection, providing the greatest policy benefits.
3.6. Case study step 6: identify win–win
cooperation schemes
In this case study a win–win cooperative scheme ofshort-term niche cooperation exists between the USA andItaly. The short-term niche option provides net positivebenefits to both countries. While long-term niche andcritical path cooperation would provide larger net positivebenefits to Italy, these schemes may have a net negativeimpact for the USA across the range of technical andpolicy parameters.
4. Discussion and conclusions
This article has introduced a model of internationalcooperation that aims to integrate two domains of spaceprograms: technology and policy. The oft-competing needsof these two realms are reconciled when a cooperativescheme is found that benefits both. As such, the frameworkpresented in this paper is intended to identify preciselythose cooperative scenarios that provide technical as wellas policy benefits.The strength in understanding cooperation impacts from
both the technical and policy viewpoints is evidenced inexamining the case study of US and Italian cooperationin space exploration. Had the USA only considered policyaspects in selecting its preferred cooperative scheme, itmight have considered both short-term and long-termniche options equally (reference Table 4). Once technicalconsiderations are also brought into the selection criteria, itbecomes clearer that long-term niche cooperation mayhave negative schedule and cost impacts, while short-termnice cooperation is likely to have neutral schedule and costimpacts. Taking the technical and policy aspects underconsideration together, the short-term niche cooperation
ARTICLE IN PRESSD.A. Broniatowski et al. / Space Policy 24 (2008) 181–189 189
scheme is readily identified as the more attractive one forthe USA.
Planned future work will focus on detailed case studiesbetween the USA and a wide array of traditional and non-traditional partner nations. The framework presented inthis article will be used to evaluate US cooperationopportunities with these nations, and to identify acombination of cooperative projects that will provide bothtechnical and political benefits to the parties involved.While the planned future work focuses on the USA, theframework presented in this article can be applied by anycountry seeking to engage in cooperation with anothernation. The authors would encourage interested partiesfrom other nations to employ such a framework to evaluatepotential projects from their own viewpoint.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Dr John M. Logsdon,Director of the Space Policy Institute, and Ms Audrey M.Shaffer at the George Washington University, ElliottSchool of International Affairs for their great advice andcollaboration on this project. Thanks are also extended tothe peer reviewers of this article for their thoughtfulsuggestions.
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