A Deployed Analyst in The Vietnam War -...
Transcript of A Deployed Analyst in The Vietnam War -...
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A Deployed Analyst
in
The Vietnam War
A Deployed Analyst
in
The Vietnam War
E. B. Vandiver III24 August 2007
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Purpose
Relate the experiences of a deployed analyst during the Vietnam War in the late 1960s.
Compare the experience of a deployed analyst in an earlier conflict with deployed analyst support to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) today.
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Vietnam War Background (1 of 2)
1945 The French reclaim their colonies in Indochina after the defeat of the Japanese. A Communist Viet Minh insurgency begins.
1954 The French leave Indochina after their defeat at Dienbienphu. Indochina is partitioned into four states: The Kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, the Peoples Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). US supports RVN.
1960s Growing Viet Cong Communist Insurgency in RVN. President Diem assassinated in coup (1963) followed by successive coups and growing insurgent strength. North Vietnam infiltrates two divisions into RVN in late 1964.
1965 American Marines secure an enclave at Danang (Feb 1964). 173rd Airborne Bdedeploys to Bien Hoa airbase followed by 1st ID. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) deploys to RVN highlands (July). Battle of Ia Drang Valley (Nov). Buildup to 200k authorized.
1965 HQDA directs Combat Developments Command to conduct an evaluation of combat operations in Vietnam in September.
1966 Army Combat Operations in Vietnam (ARCOV) study conducted in RVN, Jan-Apr. Buildup continues.
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Vietnam War Background (2 of 2)
1967 Authorized strength achieved. Multi-division operations begin; e.g. JUNCTION CITY, CEDAR FALLS, Gen Westmoreland reports substantial progress to Congress in theFall.
1968 The Tet Offensive (Feb). Walter Cronkite of CBS announces the war is lost (in realitythe Viet Cong are destroyed). Peace talks begin. LBJ withdraws from the presidential election campaign. Bobby Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King assassinated. Urban riots. Riots at Democratic National Convention. Richard M. Nixon elected.
1969 Vietnamization begins. US Troop withdrawals begin.
1970 Incursion into Cambodia. Student rioting. Kent State shootings.
1972 Air Campaign resumes with laser guided bombs. Massive bombing strikes by B-52s and aerial mining of Haiphong harbor at Christmas. North Vietnam signs Geneva Accord.
1973 Last US combat troops depart. POWs returned.
1975 North Vietnamese multi-corps conventional invasion destroys RVN after Congress signals no support for RVN by denying aid funding.
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My Background
1960 BS Physics, University of Missouri. Commissioned 2LT US Army Chemical Corps
1962 MS Physics, University of Missouri
1962-64 Active duty with Combat Development Command CBR Agency, Fort McClellan, Alabama - Studies, Field Experiments, Analysis, Computer Simulations.
1964 Junior Analyst, Wargaming Division, Combat Operations Research Group (CORG), Fort Belvoir, Virginia
1965 Chosen to deploy to Vietnam in support of ARCOV Evaluation (Nov).
1966 Deployed to Saigon, Vietnam (Jan-Apr) for ARCOV
1967 Deployed to Saigon, Vietnam (three weeks Jan – Feb) on Artillery Ammunition Requirements Study for HQDA.
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The ARCOV Evaluation
•Number and intensity of combat operations increased as buildup proceeded throughout 1965.
•Four kinds of infantry battalions had been or were deploying to Vietnam with very different characteristics. Infantry, Airborne Infantry, Airmobile Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry. Only Airmobile Infantry had been specifically configured for the counterinsurgency environment.
•HQDA directed Combat Development Command (CDC) to conduct an evaluation of combat operations to determine adjustments needed to doctrine, organization, and equipment as a result of experience in the environment.
•CDC engaged the services of CORG to provide analysis support in-country.
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The ARCOV Evaluation Organization
HQDA
HQ CDCCORG
ARCOV DirectorBG Mabry
Analysis Group
Evaluation Staff
Field DataCollectors
6 CORG Analysts6 Field Grade Officers
12 Officers (06 and below) 60 Majors and LTC’s on TDY
Military Assistance Command Vietnam
US ArmyVietnam
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CORG Background
1949 Operations Research Office (ORO) created under contract to Johns Hopkins University.
1952 U.S. Army Combat Operations Research Group established at US Continental Army Command (CONARC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, with assigned officers and ORO analysts on site.
1954 ORO Transferred the CONARC work to Technical Operations Inc., a Massachusetts’ company specializing in physical optics. About 23-28 contracted civilian analysts. A separate CORG groupsupported the Air Mobility testing at Fort Benning, Georgia.
1962 Combat Developments Command formed at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. CORG moved to Fort Belvoir and expanded to 100 contracted civilian analysts.
1964 CORG expanded again to 150 contracted civilian analysts.
1966 CORG supports ARCOV evaluation in Vietnam.
1967 CORG supports MACOV evaluation in Vietnam.
1970 CDC Systems Analysis Group formed in-house. CORG contract begins ramping down.
1971 CORG contract terminated.
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The Deployment to ARCOV
When CORG Team assembled in late fall of 1965 and were all in-countryby the end of the first week in January. Departed the end of April.
Who Six CORG analystsWesley Curtis, ChiefGeorge LewettRichard PohlmanBill BrownBill CarswellE. B. Vandiver III
Where Work - Army Concepts Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) Compound (about 6
blocks from downtown Saigon).Living - Two Bills and me at De Tham Street second floor apartment
about two blocks from the Central Market. The other threeCORG analysts shared a house down the street from ACTIV.
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Evaluation Methodology
Five Functions of CombatMobility (Bill Brown)*
Firepower (Bill Carswell)
C3 (E. B. Vandiver III)
Intelligence ( Richard Pohlman)
Logistics (George Lewett)
e.g. Is the infantry BNorganized
appropriately?
e.g. How many platoonsor companies are used
to secure Bn base?
Field Data Collectors(Bn/Bde/Div)
20 Objectives&
62 EEA
AnalysisIssues
Findings andRecommendations
Questionnaires
*Each CORG Analyst was paired with a field grade officer. I had Major Virgil Hensen, an Army Aviatorassigned to ACTIV.
Mr. Wesley Curtis
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Work on the Study
Work Hours •Nominally 8-12, 12-2 Siesta, 2-7 Weekdays, 8- 12 Saturday.
•Never less, frequently more.
Weekends •Sight seeing around town
•Group dining out.
•Several days off for the Tet holiday
Trips to the Field
•One trip via UH-1 to the Delta, Plain of Reeds, Bien Hoa.
•One trip (Beaver) to Dalat.
Technology Support
•Paper questionnaires, mechanical calculators, slide rules, pencils and accounting pads, typewriters.
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ARCOV Study Major Events
Jan 1966- Getting organized- Session with Ia Drang Valley battle participants.- Data collectors arrive.- Data collectors sent to the field with first set of instruments.- BG Mabry arrives
Feb 1966- Questionnaires begin returning- Session with selected data collectors near end of month.- Questionnaire revisions begin.
Mar 1966- Mid-term review and course corrections.- Visits by HQDA and HQ CDC poohbahs.
April 1966- Report and final briefing preparation.- Final briefs to General Westmoreland and Staff. Major findings and
recommendations accepted.
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Life in VietnamGetting Around
Vietnam•Navy school buses ran regular bus
routes….hot , slow and not punctual.•Tiny Renault taxicabs with kamikaze drivers.•Pedi cabs & Cyclos. Noisy, dirty and scary.
Favorite Eating Places
•International Club…..good burgers.•Mayflower Café…..excellent French onion soup.•Tour D’ Ivoire…..Chinese.•Arc en Ciel…..Top of Line Chinese Bird’s Nest Soup.
Shopping •PX for beer, scotch, and cigarettes.•Various arcades/shops downtown.•Corner tailor shop for special orders.
•Second floor walk-up.•Three bedrooms/living room, kitchen and bath.•No water last month (Tooth brushing with Heinekens).•Rolling electrical blackouts
Housing
Terrorism
Special Weekend
•Major incidents
•TET•Saigon Port Visit
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ARCOV Results – Major Recommendations
1. RECOMMENDATION: Current Doctrine should be expanded to incorporate lessons learned in Vietnam. (C3)
2. RECOMMENDATION: The assault elements of the rifle company should be foot mobile, the equipment of the assault elements of the maneuver battalion should be mobile by utility helicopter, and the equipment of the brigade force, including combat support and combat service support elements, should be mobile by medium helicopter. (Mobility)
3. RECOMMENDATION: The maneuver battalions in Vietnam should consist of a headquarters and headquarters company and four rifle companies. The organizations are shown in Figures II-16 through II-19, and the implementing MTOE are contained in Annex H, Volume 9. (C3)
4. RECOMMENDATION: Additional study should be made of the base camp problem to ascertain the best means of providing post, camp, and station type services and equipment, while relieving the combat units of these responsibilities to the extent feasible. (SS)
5. RECOMMENDATION: In order to bring the 1st Cavalry Division up to its designed lift capability, alternative courses of action should be analyzed using cost effectiveness techniques and production data together with the information contained in this report, to provide the most desirable means of increasing the division’s lift. (Mobility)
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Other Notable ARCOV Recommendations
MobilityReplace M101A1 105mm Howitzers with M102 Lightweight 105mm howitzers.
FirepowerCounter-mortar Radar development requirements.Equip all riflemen of all maneuver battalions with the M-16 rifle.Develop a dual purpose weapon for grenadiers.Eliminate the anti-tank weapons.
C3Adopt as doctrine the AOR and TAOR as control measures for area operations.Make aerial command posts available to battalion commander during all types of operations.Add an S5/G5 Staff Section to all Bn, Bde, and Division Headquarters.
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C3 Organization – Why Four Rifle Companies
1 Company Secure Base and LZ
1 Company to sweep.
1 Company to act as an anvil.
Or
2 Companies to Sweep
1 Company for a Reaction Force
4 Companies Total
BaseLZ
BaseLZReaction
Force
Reaction Force
Sweep
Sweep
Sweep
Anvil
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C3 Doctrine – Control measures
X
XX
X
X
Continuing
Temporary
TAOR – TacticalArea of Responsibility
II
AOR – Area of Responsibility
PZZONE
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Afterwards
BG Mabry’s briefing team took final briefing to HQ CDC and HQ DA
HQ CDC conducted a review of the findings and recommendations. Provided HQ DA their modifications and recommendations.
Final report published as a CDC document including their changes and recommendations.
Brown, Carswell, and Vandiver gave plenary session presentation1 on the study at the 18th MORSS2 at JFK Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina in Oct 1966.
1Using glass lantern slides2 My First MORSS
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ARCOV – Why it was Successful
A strong desire by the Army to know what to adjust to make military operations more effective (eager customers).
Highly respected leader (BG Mabry held the Medal of Honor) and first class team of data collectors gave immense credibility.
Military Study with civilian analyst support. Each seen as contributing appropriately. Civilian analysts not yet tarred bythe McNamara Whiz Kid brush.
Incremental, non parochial, practical, affordable, credible changes and adjustments proposed (believable results with doable implementation).
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Then and Now
OR Support in Vietnam
• OR support to operations not widely known.
• No military OR specialty.
• Few in-house OR analysts –mostly contractors/FCRC’s.
• No OR positions in field.
• Limited IT capabilities (the mainframe era).
OR Support in OIF/OEF
• Extensive Knowledge of OR support to operations.
• FA 49 Specialty well established.
• Civil Service 1515 OR specialty well established. In-house agencies.
• FA49 position in Div, Corps, ASCC, and higher HQ.
• Major in-house analyst activities and reachback support.
• Highly advanced portable and networked IT capabilities.
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Summary
ARCOV was first major fact-based evaluation of combat operations in Vietnam.
Major external positive factors contributed to the success of the study.
ARCOV focused on infantry and airmobile operations because infantry was what had been deployed and airmobility was the newly preferred method of operating.
Civilian OR analysts made a major contribution by developing a logical structure for organizing the study and analyzing the data.