A CRAFTSMAN AND HIS HANDMAIDEN.

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTINUS

JAN OPSOMER

Demiurgy is not the most debated topic in Plotinus scholarship. Scholars who care to talk about it mostly confine themselves to the claim that Plo-

tinus equates the demiurge with intellect.' Yet not even this identification seems to be certain. It has also been suggested that Plotinus' demiurge is to be identified with the intellect of the world souP Recently, D. Montet has

published an article in which she offers what is the most detailed and bal-anced account of the status of the demiurge to date.'

There may be a good reason for this general lack of interest. It is widely

acknowledged that the figure of the divine craftsman is far from central to Plotinus' thought 4 Plotinus rejects a vulgar understanding of the demiurge

as a craftsman involved in practical deliberation.' But even if one does away

with the demiurge's blatantly mythological features there remains some-

thing problematic about him, as F.M. Schroeder (1992, p. 36) observes:

1he story implies some kind of mediation between intelligible and sen-

sible reality, even if literally there is no figure such as the Demiurge who

would perform this function. Such mediation, as it employs the Form as

an instrument of production, tends to obscure its intrinsic value.

This is a fundamental problem indeed: are not the Forms in themselves

sufficient for their own causal agency and does not the Demiurge become

entirely superfluous76

1 E.g., Matter 1964, p. 86; Charrue 1993, p. 133. 2 Gerson 1994, p. s6. 3 Montet 2000. 4 Cf. Theiler 1957, col. 703 ("!m Grunde interessiert ihn das Demiurgproblem

gegeniiber dem Drama des innerseelischen Aufstieges nicht"}; Gcrson 1994, p. 56 (the demiurge is "a vestigial organ in the body of Platonic thought") and p. 57 ("Plo-tinus is unlikely to have considered the radical surgery to Platonism involved in removing the demiurge").

5 Cf. Schroeder 1992, p. 36; Charrue 1993, p. 132; Bnsson 1999, p. 93; 95; Montet 2000, p. 220-223.

6 Cf. Schroeder 1992, p. 109: "[ ... ] it contains its relationship to us and our rela-tionship to it internally. It contains our iconic attributes in the manner appropriate to an original or pattern [ ... ].1here could be no more radical elimination of the De-miurge considered as an external agent of creation from the thought of Plotinus."

68 )AN OPSOMER

As D. O'Meara has pointed out, Plotinus' philosophy is situated at the

meeting point of two traditions and two models by which the origin of the

world is explained, the model whereby o1der is imparted onto a pre-ex-isting chaos, and the derivation model. 1he first is the demiurgic model of the Timaeus, the second stems from Neopythagorean sources and ul-timately from the Academy and the unwritten doctrines (for our present purposes it does not matter whether their attribution to Plato is justified or not). Plotinus dearly favoured the derivation model, so that the demiurge became a rather sorry

Nach dem Model! des ln-Ordnung-Bringens, also dem Modell des De-miurgen, des Handwerkers, gibt es im Grunde genommen am Anfang zwei entgegengesetzte Komponente: Vernunft unci Unordnung. Nach dem Modell der Ableitung gibt es aber am Anfang nur das Eine, wovon das Bose schlieBlich wird. Das demiurgische Mo-del! gehort zum traditionellen Schulplatonismus, der die Deutung des Timaios als Grundlage hat; das Ableitungsmodell stammt eh er vom ma-thernatisierenden Neupythagorismus, der zum pythagoreisierenden Pla-tonisrnus der Akadernie und zu Platons sogenannter "ungeschriebener Lehre" zurllckhihrt. Beide Modelle tauchen bei Plotin auf, obwohl er eigentlich das AbleitungsmodeU radikal einsetzen will und dadurch das

demiurgische Model! unterdruckt.7

The demiurge, then, is a remnant from a different time, whose systemic redundancy can only lead to trouble. For Plotinus did not see himself as the

builder of a new system, but as a faithful interpreter of Plato; and it cannot

be denied that Plato talks a lot about demiurges, not only in the Timaeus."

Precisely with regard to demiurgy Plotinus emphasises the ancient roots of his views, He does so most explicitly in Enn. 5,1, after the summary of his doctrine of the Good (the One), intellect, and soul, according to which the lower principles derive from the higher. Plotinus calls intellect "cause" and "demiurge", and accordingly uses the expression "father of the cause" and" father of intellect" for the One. 1hen follows a strong assertion of the ancient provenance of these terms:

7 O'Meara 1997, p 43 (italics DD'M.). See also O'Meara, 1993, p. 76: "1lms, in IlL 8, Plotinus definitively replaces the artisanal mode of world-making with a process of contemplative derivation: the world derives from soul in the same way that soul derives from intellect and intellect from the One."

8 Neschke-Hentschke 2ooo, p. xvm-xxY 9 Cf injm.

DEM!URGY ACCORDING TO PLOT! NUS

And these statements of ours are not new; they do not belong to the present time, but were made long ago, not explicitly, and what we have said in this discussion has been anmterpretation of them (wi1c;; 8e vllv A.6yous /:;lJYTp:a

70 JAN OPSOMER

any real distinctions within the primary hypostases. So he equated the de-

miurge with intellect, but transferred as many of his activities as he could

to the soul. This solution was not new either. As the most direct influence on Plotinus the Gnostics have been suggested," but also the Stoic active

principle comes to mind, which was called, besides many other things,

both demiurge and world soul. 15 The idea, however, is still older. Already

in the Epinomis the highest kind of soul, which possesses intelligence (982B5), is said to be the only thing suitable to mole! and craft (rr::\cct-rnv

Kai OT]f!lOUpyEtV, 981B8). A close parallel is Plutarch, who clearly attributes

demiurgic functions to the world soul, without making soul the demiurge.' 6

This can be seen in the fourth Quaestio Platomca,' 7 where soul, once it partakes of intellect and becomes a true world soul, starts shaping body

and being its demiurge (EDT]~LlOUpyn, 1003A). It can do so only because the

god has imparted something of himself- intellection - to the soul (cf. Quaest. Flat. 2,2, wolC). Intellect remains the undisputed demiurge, but it acts through the soul. TI1e demiurge structures the body of the world, but does so through the world soul; hence to say that "the maker and father"

created the cosmic body is almost equivalent to saying that the world soul

structured the cosmic body (Quaest. Flat. 4, J003A, De an. procr. I016F-

1017A). Tellingly, the very last word of the treatise on the composition of the

world soul1s 8taKEKOG!J.T]KEV, said of the soul (De an. procr. 103oc).'"

Plotinus did not express himself as clearly as one would have wished about

the nature of the demiurge. 111is is shown by an ancient debate, reported to

'4 Ratzinger 1959, coi. 1226, Hadot 19\19, p. 222-223 [= Annuaire de l'Ecole Pra-

tique des Hautes Etudes (V' Section), 1975-76, p. 76-77]. For Plotinus' criticism of the Gnostics, cf. inf"ra.

15 Cf. Diog. Laerl. 7,88; 7,134-136; Cleanthes (svF 1 537: Hymn to Zeus); Philod. De pi et. col. 11 (= svF II 1076 = DG 545b12-2o). See also Kramer 1964, p. 296, n. 407; Van den Berg 2001, p. 259; Reydams-Schils 1999, p. 42-51; 55-56.

'' O'Meara 1993, p. 71-72, refers to Alcinous, Didaskalikos, chapter 14. In that text however, the soul is only spoken of as the product of the demiurge: although the soul is uncreated, Alcinous says, in a way the demiurge can also be said to make the soul, insofar as he wakes it up and turns it and its intellect toward him. There is no mention, however, of the soul carrying out the job of the demiurge (in chapters 15 and 16 the "generated gods" come into play, and they do part of the work, pre-cisely as it is said in the Timaeus.). The verbs "to make, to produce" (bllfllOUpyi:w, rrotw) are said only of the god.

17 Cf. Cherniss 1976, p. 48-49, note d. '' Other important texts on the transmission of demiurgic activity are De

facie 30, 945A {soul is molded by intellect and in turn molds the body: ~ 1 ~IUXTJ 1U1!0UflEVT] flEV D!!O 10U vou 1U1!0Ucra bE 10 crmrta) and De Pyth. or. 21, 404BC (soul an instrument of god, whose function it is to conform as exactly as possible to the purpose of the agent that employs it; it is unable, however, to preserve god's purpose in the form it had in its creator, uncontaminated, unaffected and fault-less).

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTINUS 71

us by Proclus, about Plotinus' legacy. Before examining Plotinus' own pro-

nouncements on the demiurge and speculating about possible reasons for the doctrinal ambiguities or for what could be veiled expressions ot a view

that is in itself clear, let us first take a look at this ancient debate.

Proclus on Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus (in Tim. 1,3os,16-309,13) If we are to believe Proclus, Plotinus held the v1ew that the demiurge is two-fold: one demiurge belongs to the intelligible realm, the other IS the ruler

of Lhe universe. Somewhat surprisingly maybe, 19 Prod us praises this view,

because, as he explains, "the cosmic intellect, too, is somehow a demiurge of the whole universe".20

The part of Plotinus' theory that is apparently uncontroversial is that about the demiurge in the intelligible. "Intelligible" of course refers to the

entire realm between the One and the soul. The entire intelligible is in-

deed one-many, that is, one intellect that encompasses all the intelligibles (1,305,22-29). Therefore one may just as well call it an intellect. This expla-nation is supposed to vindicate Plotinus' views about the intelligible demi-

urge: so far Proclus agrees with Plotinus, since for Proclus, too, the universal

demiurge is situated in the intelligible realm. Contrary to Plotinus, Proclus

assigns the demiurge to a well-defined spot within the multi-layered realm

of the intelligible world. Plotinus, who does not accept a multiplicity of hy-

postases within the intelligible, al least locates the demiurge in the right realm and considers him an intellect. Plotinus' intelligible realm is, as Pro-

clus elucidates, where the true heaven is, and the reign of Kronos 2 ' and the

Zeus-lntellect (6 L'.ito

72 TAN OPSOMER

Prod us' indulgence towards Plotinus is remarkable. Even what he is sup-

posed, or alleged, to have said about the lower demiurge - the more con-

troversial23 bit- meets with Proclus' cautious approval. He links Plotinus'

view of the cosmic intellect to Aristotle, who considered this to be the first

intel!ece4 and called it heinzarmene and Zeus. lhe reference is actually to the end of the De rnundo,25 where the author indeed extols the merits of Zeus, the son of Kronos, who is the cause of all the goods in the universe,

and calls him destiny and fate, among other things. In the De mundo pas-sage there is moreover a reference to the famous Orphic fragment about

Zeus as the beginning, middle and end of everything. and a quotation from Plato's Laws (715e8-716az), where the same Orphic fragment is cited.

But what does Proclus mean when he talks about Plotinus' two demi-

urgic intellects? What are the "encosmic intellect" and the intellect that is the "transcendent father and maker"? To understand the last expression

is not the problem: the broader context of the passage is Timaeus 28c3-5. where Plato points out the difficulty of finding the father and maker of this universe and the sheer impossibility to communicate his nature to others. What this passage is about, then, is the figure that Proclus calls the uni-

versal demiurge. This is whom he means by the expression "transcendent maker and father". In other words, Proclus' claim is that Plotinus identi-

ties the demiurge of the Timaeus with the hypostasis intellect. It is less dear, to what Prod us' second claim amounts, namely that Plotinus' second demiurge is the cosmic ("encosmic") intellect. Again, what this means in

Proclus' system is not important tor our present purposes.26 lhe question is rather whether such an cosmic demiurgic inte!Iect can be found in the system of Plotinus.

Proclus' account of Plotinus' views on the demiurge is part of a larger

section, in wh1ch he discusses not only the views of Plotinus, but also the

interpretations they received by Porphyry and Iamblichus. It is highly prob-

in P!Jil. 133. Opsomer 2000, p. 118. Plotinus sees in this passage a reference to intel lect and soul, that are both entitled to the name Zeus, the one as the demiurge, the other as the governing principle of the world: 4.4 j28], 9-10 (discussed below).

23 As is suggested by nwc;, 1. 29. H See also in Tim. 1,404,79. 2

' Ps.-Anst. De mundo 401a12-b29. Proclus may be the only ancient author who has ever expressed his doubts about the authorship of the De mundo. Cf in Tim. 3,272,20-21: iilc; nou tpTJOl n:6./l.tv 'Aptcr'tO'tEATJ

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT! NUS

able that the latter's commentary on the Timaeus was Proclus' source for the entire section!7 'The details of the dispute among his students may help us to get a better grasp of what exactly is at issue

Porphyry, who thought that his account was in perfect conformity with

Plotinus', is said to have regarded the hypercosmic soul as the derniurge,

and to have equated the intellect belonging to th1s soul with the paradigm used by the demiurge (the cdrw~

74 JAN OPSOMER

parently Porphyry's demiurge is an unparticipated or hypercosmic soul,

whereas the higher demiurge, i.e. intellect, is actually the paradigm.

W. Deuse (1977) lms examined Porphyry's conception of the demiurge more closely and concludes that Proclus has hardly done justice to Por-

phyry's theory. Only a drastic simplification could have led to the reproach that Porphyry posited a straightforward equation of the demiurge with the

world soul, and thus banished the demiurge from the realm of intellect.30

Actually, in other contexts (at 1,394,2-9 and 395,11-12) Proclus implies that Porphyry equates the demiurge with intellect.31 1his is moreover confirmed

by other sources." Deuse explains that for Porphyry there was no great

divide between the realms of soul and intellect. 'Ihe identification of the demiurge with soul does not automatically imply that he is denied an intel-

lective existence.'" For Porphyry, the paradigm, i.e. the intelligible living being (a'iYrosc?JOv), is the intellect of the hypercosmic soul. This soul, i.e. the demiurge, is always turned towards its intellect (1tcr"tpan1:cn). The demi-

urgic function of the hypercosm1c soul depends on its intimate connection to intellect, Porphyry understands demiurgy as a steady gliding down and self-development of intellect, that in his lowest manifestation becomes the

transcendent soul, creator of the world of becoming and division." Iambli-clms and Proclus could only understand this "dynamic continuum", says

30 Dillon 1969, p. 67, argues the opposite: it is Porphyry who tends to simplify, not Proclus reporting on the latter's doctrines.

31 Deuse 1977, p. 239-241. 32 See his Philosophos Historia (fr. 221F Smith contra Jul. 8, 271a, 916B3-

15), where he ascribes the theory of three hypostases to Plato: the highest god or the good; the demiurge or Nous; and the world soul. This text clearly echoes Enn. 5,1 [10], 8. Cf. Segonds 1982, p. 191, n. 1. 1l1is account is in accordance with his ex-planation in the commentary on the Oracles, where the demiurge is equated with the Chaldean olr:; n:KEtva (fr. 365F Smith Lydus De mens. no,18-zs), who is only second, after the highest good. In TIEpt ayaJ\.~&~rov Porphyry calls Zeus, Le. the demmrge. the mtellect of the world (fr. 354F,s Smith), and says that the demmrgic intellect is the king of the world (354F,57 Smith Euseb. Praep. ev. 3,82-9,9). In De philosophia ex oraculis, however, he apparently took the position that the demi-urge is the god. Probably this text stems from an earlier stage of his career, possibly from before he met Plotinus. Cf. Hadot 1965, p. 133-134: Waszink 1965, p. 57 (and see the discussion p. 82-83). 1l1is last view was also current among some middle Platonists. Seen. 12..

Deuse 1977, p. :q.8: "Wiihrend Porphyrios das Verhaltnis der iiberweltlichen Seele zu ihrem Geist als eine sehr enge Verbindung beider Hypostasen sieht, betont Proklos stark die Verschiedenheit der Hypostasenbereiche." Id., p. 249: "Durch-schlagend lief5 sich nun die Identifizierung der Seele mit dem Demiurgen kriti-sieren, war sie doch m it dem geistigen Sein des Demiurgen unvereinbar"; see also Smith 1987, p. 729~730; Zambon 2002, p. 160-161.

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTINUS

Deuse (1977, p. in terms of their own rigid hypostases. However, for Porphyry there is no contradiction between talking of the demiurge as a soul and as an intellect; it is just that at the end of the demiurgic process we find the soul taking over matter and imposing order on it. Deuse gives the following reconstruction of the self-development of intellect. First there

is a triadic development starting with Being, characterized by subject/ob~ ject identity, via Life (thought going outside to look at itself), to the act of

thinking, also called the "first intellect". These three moments correspond to the triadic structure remaining~ procession-return. 'l11e first intellect

forms the starting point of a further triadic development, again in accord~ ance with the moments of remaining, procession and return: thought is at rest within itself, Forms proceed, and intellect turns back toward itself.

This last is that of the transcendent soul, that is also called the second intellect. 'l11is double development of intellect could be represented as follows:

(1) f.l.OVTJ (2) rrp6ooo

IAN OPSOMER

d1Us, says Pmclus, just like Plotinus declares the whole intelligible realm to

be the demiurge:

But after him (Porphyry) the divine Iamblichus, attacking the theory of

Porphyry at length, and condemning it as being un-Plotinian, in giving his own theology, denominates the whole intelligible kosmos as the de-

miurge, being in agreement himself, to judge at least by what he writes,

with Plotinus. At any rate, he says in his Comrnentaries: "Real Being and the beginning of things that come to be and the intelligible paradigms of the kosmos, which we term the intelligible kosrnos, and such causes

as we declare to pre-exist all things in Nature, all these things the Demi urge-God whom we are now seeking gathers into one and holds within himself." (in Tim. 1,307,14-25 Iambi. In Tin1. fr. 34, trans. J. Dillon, slightly modified)

Proclus will argue that lamblichus' words lend themselves to two different interpretations. But let us first analyse the literal citation for ourselves. The first part of the sentence contains a series of expressions, that can be under-stood as referring to the same reality:

(al) "real being" (1:1lY OY1:(1)S oucriav), Le. intelligible being;

(a2) "the beginning of things that come to be" (Kai nov yryvo~u'vffiv apxi1v), presumably identical with (a1) or at least part of it;

(a3) "the intelligible paradigms of the world" (Kat

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO Pl.OTINUS 77

(b) All of these (talYC(Y. navta)

(b1) are "gathered into one" (E:v hi cruA.A.apwv) by the demimge,

(b2) who holds them within or more literally, subsumes them "under" tam:ov EXEt)37 - himself.

Now one could understand (b) as meaning that the demiurge completely

coincides with the realities named in so that he is the entire intelligible

realm and there would be no intelligible realm outside of him. If this is what Iamblichus means,38 he is wrong, says Proclus: the demiurge shmdd not be said to coincide with the entire realm between the soul and the One

(1,308,6-8).

Another reading is however possible. For Iamblichus says that the demi-urge gathers the realities mentioned in (a) into one and holds them within himself (b1-2). This could mean that originally they have an existence out side the demiurge, and then are internalised by the demiurge so that they come to exist also in him. This is mdeed the other reading that Proclus has in mind:

If what damblichus> means by these words is that in lhe demiurge, too, everything "real being" as well as "the intelligible world" - exists in a

demiurgic manner, he agrees with himself and with Orpheus who says that "ali these lie in the body of the great Zeus." (1,307,26-31).

Proclus assesses this view as unprob!ematic: "of course each of tlw gods is all, but each in a different manner, the one in a demiurgic way, the other

in a contaming manner." (1,308,3-6). On this reading, lamblichus would be applying the Neoplatonic principle according to which everything is in eve-rything, but in each according to its proper nature-"9 In other words. the

a reading: (a!) in itself refers no more to the intelligible living bemg than it does to the Forms. 1he expression in (as) is left out of the picture by Dillon. It may be a reference to the intelligible Forms, or to an entity such as the ralional formative principles {::\oyot), that, from the intelligible word. come down to us.

Cf. Festugiere 1954, IV, p. 122, n. "Cf. Dillon1969, p. 6g: "It might seem that for the Demiurge 'to contain within

himself' the whole noetic world need not imply identity with it, but Proc!us is quite clear, in the preceding passage (nana TOV vmrrov K6cqwv anoKaA!:t: li1j-flt01.lpy6v), that that is what lamblichus meant." [ think that Proclus is willing to entertain the two readings, but takes the "identity" reading as the most obvious while allowing for the possibility of a more benevolent interpretation.

39 El. 1heol. 103, p. 92, 13; Porph. Sent. 10.

/AN OPSOMER

demiurge would not have to fill the entire intelligible realm. A possibility

would be that he occupies a specific spot within the intelligible, in which

case Iamblichus' view would indeed be compatible with Proclus', although his words remain very general and vague40 Pro cl us continues by saying that

elsewhere Iamblichus has expressed himself in less general terms and with greater precision. He then cites another text by his predecessor, in which

can be found an improved version of his views on the demiurge, that is

much closer, and maybe even identical, to Proclus' own theory. But this does not concern us here.41

For the purpose of the comparison with Plotinus, let us accept the first, less favourable, reading of the passage from Iamblichus' Commentaries, ac-

cording to which the demiurge coincides with the entire intelligible world.

Proclus appears to believe that this is what lamblichus really meant when he wrote his Commentary,42 for this is how Proclus first presents Iambli-chus' view, adding that the latter was in agreement with Plotinus.43 The

alternative reading is as it were offered out of courtesy towards his pred-ecessor.

From Proclus' report of the controversy between Porphyry and lambli-

clms it thus appears that Proclus agrees with Iamblichus that Plotinus has

the true demiurge coincide with intellect (i.e. with the entire intelligible realm). Apart from the true demiurge, there is mention of a lower clemiurge,

who is immanent in the world. Proclus identifies this immanent demiurge as the intellect of the world soul. Porphyry allegedly conceives of this lower

demiurge not as the intellect of this soul, but as a soul - an unforgivable heresy according to Proclus. Porphyry's higher demiurge would then be the

intellect of this soul, which he calls the "intelligible living being". In other

words, Porphyry demotes the demiurge to the level of soul and the para-

digm to that of intellect."

Proclus' reason for sympathising with Plotinus and attacking Porphyry

may be that he considers the first's mistakes to be less impious than those

40 Dillon 1987, p. 890, argues for a reading that roughly corresponds with the second interpretation outlined above: lamblichus is taken to state that the creator of the world should have under his control all the forces of the intelligible world. As he is an intellect himself, he can only create the intelligence of intelligent beings. It must be left to Life to create life and to Being to be responsible for the mere being of things.

41 See Opsomer 2001a. 42 See also Deuse 1977, p. 261-262. 43

1,307,17-19. 44 See also 1,308,18: v iiAAO\~ aKpl~E

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTINUS 79

of the second. He understands Plotinus' "second demiurge" as identical with his own second demiurgic monad (the encosmic demiurge, the intel-lect of the world), and the first as his own true demiurge. Because Plotinus

refuses to acknowledge any real distinctions within the realm of intellect,

this demiurge is at the same time the paradigm. This is not so bad, because

the paradigm is not deprived of the dignity that is owed to the intelligible.

Porphyry's paradigm, on the contrary, is, according to Proclus, intellective,

not intelligible, and his demiurge is psychic, not intellective. And that is a double impiety.

On Deuse's reconstruction of Porphyry's doctrine of the clemiurge, this

criticism is not fully justified. Porphyry is much closer to Plotinus" 6 than is suggested by Iamblichus' criticism as we know it through Proclus. His de-

miurge in a sense coincides with the realm of intellect, and when Porphyry

calls the transcendent soul a demiurge, his justification is that this soul, as he sees things, is inextricably linked to intellect to the point of being intel-lective. This is of course unacceptable for Prod us, who wants to have soul and intellect to be clearly separated entities.""~ Porphyry's demiurge is, how-ever, first and foremost an intellect. Moreover, as we will see shortly, Por-

phyry has good reasons for claiming Plotinian authority for the attribution

of demiurgic functions to a higher soul, or to the intellect of such a soul.

A twofold demiurgy: Enn. 4,4 [28] Proclus' own notion of an immanent, "encosmic" demiurgic intellect,

bringing to completion the work of the transcendent demiurge, is partially

based on his mterpretation of Phil. 3001-3, where a kingly intellect and a kingly soul are mentioned. When he refers to what he things is Plotinus'

second demiurge as the "Zeus-lntellect" (d. infra) he may be thinking of

this passage and Plotinus' interpretation of it.

46 Plotinus, too, has demarcation problems, although he kept soul and intellect separate: Schwyzer 1944, p. 98; Blumenthal1974; D'Ancona Costa 1999, p. 69.

" In his De anima lamblichus accuses Porphyry of blurring the lines between soul and intellect: "according to his doctnne, the soul differs in no way from intel-lect and the gods and the superior classes, at least in respect to its substance in gen-eral" (ap. Stob. 1,365.15-17). D'Ancona Costa (1999, p. 70-2.) points to a passage that could have led Porphyry to the assumption that the line between soul and intellect is blurred: Enn. 4,7,13 could be read as saying that soul is intellect plus desire (soul as an "orectic" intellect), as ifPlotinus did not distinguish sharply between soul and intellect. The same passage can also - indeed: slumld- be read, however, as saying that after intellect comes soul, which has desire. Thus, as D'Ancona Costa shows, on close reading the passage is consistent with the separation of soul and intellect proclaimed elsewhere.

So IAN OPSOMER

Plotinus quotes the Philebus passage in the second part of the treatise Difficulties about the soul (4A !28], 9), Just before he introduces the notion

of a double kosmopoietic principle. l shall shmv that this text provides evi-dence both for Prod us' claim that the intellect of the world soul is Plotinus' "second demiurge", and for the allegedly incompatible view, ascribed to

Porphyry, that it is the world soul itself This is a strong indication Enn. 4,4 was as least as important for the whole debate as Enn. 3,9 [13]. 1, Plotinus' exegesis of Tim. 39E7, which is usually held to have led to the diverging in-terpretations of Plotinus' own views.""

The distinction between two types of productiOn corresponding to two principles of production is introduced to clarify certain issues con-cerning the soul's mode of cognition and activity. In the earlier sections of

the text, mention was made of certain activities of the soul that had to do with production and, in a sense, demiurgy. These were as it were taken for granted. At 4,3 [27], 6, the question was simply why our souls do not make the universe, whereas the world soul does (7te1tOt11Kt: KOO"IJ.OV, 6,2; 6,7: "it has [always] made the world"), The answer is partly that the world soul has remained closer to soul as a whole (the hypostasis soul) and contemplates intellect as a whole, whereas individual souls contemplate their own intel-

lects. Later on, Plotinus says that the world was being ordered (hoto)

by a formative rational principle (a 'AoyocJ of the soul, since the soul has the power to set in order according to rational principles ('A6yot, 4,3 [27],

10,10-ll), an activity that is again called 'making'. 'Ihis, however, it does not

do according to a principle brought from without (4,3 [:;n]. 10,14-15). Soul has production, and in particular the capacity to make body be alive, as a function proper to itself. It exercises this function by imparting a rational

principle (/coyoc;), which is a copy of the logos that soul contains in itself (10,37-40).49 This, it is stressed, is not done from outside, but by nature as an internal fashioning power. 5

48 Cf. Festugiere I!, 1967, p. 159 n. 2; Dillon 1969; Opsomer 2001a. 49 Cf. Fattal 1998, p. "Il [i.e. logos] sert la plupart du temps d'intermediaire

entre le sensible et !'intelligible a travers le rapport dynamique qu'il instaure entre les hypostases elles-memes d'une part et entre les hypostases et le monde sensible d'autre part En fait, un tellogos ne peut etre une hypostase

so On this passage, see Brisson, 1999, p. 97103, summarising (p. 101): 'Tunivers est une ceuvre d'art qui n'est pas prodUJte de l'exterieur par un artisan, comme s'il l'avait ete par le demiurge du Timee, mais qui est produit de l'interieur par cette puissance organisatrice qu'est la Nature." This, however, is not the whole story, as Brisson himself makes very clear: soul receives its creative power from intellect.

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTJNUS

The notion of a twofold agency tor the production of the world comes up in a long section in which Plotinus discusses the question whether the more elevated kinds of souls, such as the world soul, and even Zeusl1imself,

have memory, and also whether they deliberate and calculate (4.4 [28j, 6-q). 1l1e answer is negative, but cannot of course be ascertained before all pos-sible objections are met. Plotinus argues that even for practical activities it is not necessary to store in memory particulars perceived by the senses, "unless one is engaged in the practical management of something, since the particulars are included in the knowledge of the whole" (4.4 [28], 8,4-7).

Even Zeus, "who sets all things in order and administers and directs them forever" (4,4 [28], and who has "a kingly soul and a kingly intellect"

the reference to the Philebus does not need memory, and this despite the fact that he has foreknowledge of all the heavenly cycles. Indeed, does he not calculate them? After all. he is the wisest craftsman (iitUtLoupyoc; crocpriYcaTo

82 fAN OPSOMER

tivity IS superior to that of our individual souls). Obviously, the demiurge must be intellect, but this is not said explicitly. The characteristic that Plo-

tinus highlights is that he possesses an unchanging and timeless life, in which there is no before and after (9,4-5). A being for which there is no time, cannot have memory. TI1at much is clear. But what about Zeus in the

other sense, the ruling principle of; and in, the universe, the world soul or the "life of the world"? 52

First I would like to point out that it is not entirely clear what exactly IS meant to be the second principle. At first things seem simple: we speak of the first ordering principle as the demiurge, of the second as the "soul of the all" (10,2), and likewise (Kat) with Zeus: in the first sense we mean the demiurge, in the second, "that which rules the universe" (10,4). The ob-vious conclusion is that the soul of the all is the ruling principle of the uni-verse. Then Plotinus says that "the life of the universe contains within itself its ruling principle" (10,7). TI1is could be more or less equivalent to saying that the universe contains within it a soul, which is its ruling principle, but could just as well mean that the soul, which is the life of the universe, has

itself a ruling principle.53 TI1e "life of the umverse" is said to be in no need of deliberation, as things have already been discovered and ordered, not in the sense that the things that are becoming have actually been set in order

(ou "Cax8v'La), but rather that order ('La~u;) has already been established or determined. This order 1s the producing cause of the order in the world of becoming ('Lo 8 nowuv au"Ca 1] "Ca~u;, 10,11). This is the activity of soul

which depends on "an abiding/intermediate thinking (lppOVll

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTINUS

the soul is attached could again either be the transcendent intellect (the

demiurge), or the intellect of the soul itself, which could then considered to

be the true second demiurge (rather than the soul itself).'" The soulunvary-

ingly looks at this thinking, for its activity is one, and the soul is one (only

if it stopped looking, would it be perplexed). "For the ruling principle is

one, always dominant, and not somelimes dominated." 55 The most natural

reading of this last sentence would be to take the expression "the ruling

principle" as referring to the "one soul" mentioned in the previous sentence

(cf. yap), but again it cannot be excluded that Plotinus wants to say that the

soul is one, because its ruling principle - whether this be a transcendent or an immanent intellect - is always dominating.56 If this is the case, the soul would again be distinguished from a "ruling principle". The same am-

biguity obtains when he further on mentions a thinking (

84 )AN OPSOMER

may have played on the ambiguity of to hegemonoun (the ruler of the world, or the ruler of the soul) and phronesis (the thinking soul, or the thinking

to which the soul is attached). An unbiased reading of the text - one that does not start from the need to hypostasise aspects or functions of the soul - would probably lead to Porphyry's conclusion, that from 4,4,10 onwards

Plotinus speaks of the thinking soul as the second ordering principle. I take it that its thinking (.:pp6vll

DEM!URGY ACCORDING TO PLOTJNUS 8s

constitutes a multiplicity, but insofar it is one living being. lt is not a gov-ernment over parts, but over a whole (11,1-2).61 cfl1.e care of the soul for the world should not be compared to that of a doctor, wlw approaches the pa-tient from the outside, but to the workings of nature, happenmg from the inside and without deliberation (11,2-7). What deliberation, calculation or

memory could there be when intelligent thinking (

86 )AN OPSOMEH

come from outside). lhe soul, then, needs nothing but its own thinking, which is nothing different from itself.64

That may be a nice thought but not one that is unproblematic. Plotinus' world soul comes to resemble intellect very closely when deliberation is de-

nwd to it.65 lhe only difference seems to be that its activity, although

one and unvarymg, takes place in time. Its thinking already has timeless, i.e. intellective features. Deliberating will be left to the souls that have a still more partial nature. For them, things do approach them from outside, but

for the soul of the all there is nothing outside. In Plato's Timaeus, however, the description of the world soul's epistemic activities does seem to involve a succession, more specifically when they concern the sensible: whenever

the circle of the Different encounters something perceptible, firm and true

opinions and beliefs come about (37B6-8).66 'These opinions are firm, which

I take to mean that they cannot be shaken, not that they are always the same and unvarying.67

If it is not the thinking (qJp6Vll

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOTlNUS

principle itself. Intellect, then, possesses, and the soul of the all receives from it for ever and has always received, and this is its life, and what ap-pears at each successive time is its consciousness as it thinks: and that which is reflected from it into matter is nature, in which, or indeed, be-

fore it, the real beings come to a stop. (13,13-21)

The hierarchy of kosmopoiests is rather more complex than it would appear at first sight. For every link of the chain Plotinus emphasises the transmis-

sion of activity and power, and the unchanging, and in that sense neces-

sary, character of the entire process. The world soul completely escapes the turmoil: whereas nature still acts (rro10ucro.) on matter and is afl'ected by it

(nacrxou

BB TAN OPSOMER

however, remains: the only thing that seems to distinguish the soul from

mtellect"1 is that the soul generates time, not eternity, and that is the case

only because the thwgs it generates are not eternal, but encompassed by time. In its productive capacity the soul is very much like intellect: all the rational formative principles (logoi)72 are inside it together and simultane-ously; it is only in the products that they are no together (16,5-9). In other words. it is the multiplicity and succession in the products that makes the difference. But then one should be entitled to ask, whence this multiplicity originates. In a sense, Plotinus is wrestling with a problem that is very similar to Lhe oue with which Proclus saw himself confronted.73

L Bnsson and other commentators were right to stress the fact that Plo-tinus wanted to get rid of the artisanal metaphors. Plotinus wished to keep his demiurge free of the toils of deliberation and memory, and saw himself forced to transmit some of the demiurgic powers and the actual work to the world souL Unfortunately, it does not end there and then. Plotinus finds himself on a slippery slope: in order to preserve the blessed status of the world soul he now sees himself forced to deny deliberation to the soul as welL He tries to make the soul's activity as timeless as possible, and can only posit, not satisfactorily explain, the transition to the temporal succession,

to which the things created are subjected. Ultimately, the transition has to do with the difference between the universal character of the soul and the divisiOn among particular beings. In this sense. the situation our individual souls74 find themselves in has more affinity with that of particular bodies than with that of the world souL Surely Plotinus is not short of arguments explaining why that is not the case. The more fundamental problem is the perspectivism: the thinking soul is unchanging from the perspective of na-ture, but not from the perspective of intellect.

"In 3,8 [3o], 6 Plotinus tries a different approach: "soul, too, was rational prin-ciple and a sort of mtellect, but an intellect seeing something else. For it is not full, but has something wanting in relation to what comes before it"

72 On the function of logos ancllogoi in Plotinns' philosophy, Fattal1998. " Cf. Opsomer 2000, p. 129130 and n. ns, p. 141. Plotinus tries to explain the

transition from simultaneity to succession in an interesting way: priority in this case does not consist in giving orders through speaking (A.yco). The ordering prin ciple does not give orders, in the sense that it would say "this after that". Instead it JUSt makes this after that. Speaking would involve looking at the arrangement and then enunciatmg it. This presupposes a distinction between the arranging and the arrangement. But in this case the arranging principle is the primary ar rangement (see also 4,4 [28], 10,10-11). It is not form and matter, but pure form. 1he distinction between form and matter appears only in its products (16,11-20).

"Cf. 4.4 17

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT!NUS 89

Whereas in the Timaeus the demiurge is said to calculate and delib-erate, Neoplatonists cry out in nnison that this is not to be understood literally. In this Plotinus is no different from later Platonists: the world soul, handmaiden of intellect, wl 11 relieve the latter of actual work. The problem, for all Neoplatonists, is to determine where things start to lit-erally. As we have already seen, the world soul is the next to be declared unchanging in its essence: it transcends the toils of this world and rules .,HmHcc:lv thanks to its handmaiden. nature. For this blessed life of the world soul there is clear textual evidence in the Tinzaeus.75 Yet to say its knowledge is timeless may be stretching the evidence.

Production at the lower levels: Enu. 3,8 [30], 2,3 [52], and 4,8 [6] With nature, at last, we seem to have found a principle that actually does some real work. But even that is denied. As Plotinus says in Ennead 3.8 [3o], On nature and its contemplatwn, nature is a maker, but does not use hands or feet or instruments (also 5,8 [31j, 7,10-12.). \Xlhereas this may seem obvious,76 the following remark may be less so: Plotmus also claims that nature's production is effortless, and moreover, unmoving, as nature is a form (3,8,2)?7 Nature is itself a logos and creates the in plants and animals. These rational principles, that are situated in the visible shapes, are no longer alive nor able to produce something else. But the formative principle that is nature is alive, yet motionless, and it "makes in that which comes into being". \Xlhat it makes are the logoi that are immanent in vis-ible things.78 Nature does not it does not search, but possesses and makes. Nature even has a ldnd of contemplation, albeit a very weak one, and its making can therefore be considered the outcome of its contempla-

tive At the end of Enn. 3,8, the One is described as that which makes and

generates intellect. Plotinus actually uses the words notqTi]'; and yEvv1wo:c;

" Tin1. 34B8; 36E4. 76 Actually this constitutes a reply to an Epicurean criticism of the Timneus: see

Cic. De nat. dem: 1,19. Annstrong 1967, p. 363 n. 2. 77 The argument in favour of an unmoved principle, combined with the idea that

such a principle must be unmoved throughout may be loosely based upon Arist. Plzys. 8,5 (which does not mean that Plotinus' nature is equivalent to Aristotle's first mover).

78 3,8 [30], 2.,27-34

79 3,8 [30], 3,12-23; 4,16-21; 27; 30. At 4.4 [28], 13,7 Plotinus denies that nature has any knowledge.

90 /AN OPSOMER

(11,37-38), but not demiurge.80 We have "makers" from the One all the way down to nature, and all agents in the production line produce motionlessly and without effort. From the perspective of the Tirnaeus this is surprising: what happened to the recalcitrance, disorder, and chance'?

'TI1is aspect is addressed at the end of the late treatise Wlhether the stars

are causes (2,3 [sz]). From section 16 onwards, Plotinus asks himself what it means to say that the soul administers the world according to reason. He admits that the soul can never rest as after a job accomplished: its product is in need of continuous correction (16,31-36). The larger context explains this change in emphasis: since Plotinus is combating the view that stars are evil agents, he has to deal with those things that do not run so smoothly. There is no contradiction with earlier texts, as he does not say that the soul toils or suffers from its JOb. The soul produces, using logoi. But are these its thoughts and does it then produce by mere thought? Ultimately the work gets done in the mode proper to nature (qYUCl'tK&

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT! NUS 91

takes come m at the level of nature.82 Nature, the lowest image of soul, is the lowest maker (notT]ci]

92 !AN OPSOMER

]lnEp ouv vo\h; vo\Jcrw; tlleac; t(l} 6 llcrnv otat n i.'vacrt Kai

ooat. KaOop{i, ' wtaumc; Kat tOCfO:Utac; Ol!':VOllOT] OELV Kai 't60c CJXf.tV

P!otinus starts off the discussion with a ioose quotation of these words:

Intellect (vouc;), Plato says, sees the Ideas existing in the Living-Being-that-Is. 1hen, he says, the demiurge planned (cha lltvm1011, (PTlcriv,

o llT]fHOupy6c;) that what intellect sees in the Living-Being-that-Is, this muverse too should have. (1,1-3)

By mserting an explicit reference to the demiurge in the second half of his paraphrase, Plotinus makes it look as if the planning demmrge is different

from the seeing intellect. This is exactly what will lead to the main contro-versy. Plotinus' analysis starts with the apparent independent existence of the forms, prior to their being seen. 'TI1at what contemplates them, is intel-lect; the forms and the "real living being" are to be called intelligible. Though intellect and the intelligible may be different from each other, they cannot

really be separate, so Plotinus argues. Intellect and intelligible are actually

one dvm U!l(flW), and can be distinguished in thought alone (8uxtpou-!1EVa 8 'TI V01lOEl, 1,12-13). "For Plato does not say that what it sees is in something absolutely different, but in it, m that it has the intelligible object in itself" (1,14-15). If intellect were different from the intelligible, it would be looking, not at reality, as the real Forms would exist elsewhere, but at mere images of reality (ref1ections of reality in the intellect, 1,8-9)," Fortunately, they are not different entities: the intelligible is nothing but intellect at rest, in unity and quietness, remaining in itself, whereas the seeing intellect is an activity proceeding from the former.88 By thinking intellect at rest, the seeing intellect is the intellect of that intellect. Yet one can also say that the seeing intellect is intellect and intelligible in another way, by imitation (1,15-

:.n). 'D1is seeing intellect is the same that "planned" to make in this universe what it "sees" in the intelligible (Touw ouv crn 'tO litaV0119Ev, & EKEi f.V tq)/i 't(\l KOO)H:J,) 1tOtfjcrm,

"4,8 [6], 2,19-38; 8,13-16. Cf. O'Meara 1993, p, 73. Near the end of the text Plo-linus admits that even for the higher soul contact with the world is unavoidabh: (7,31-32),

86 For a full discussion of Plotinus' argument, see O'Brien 1993, p. 5-27. 87 Cf Montet 2000, p. 220. Cf. D'Ancona 2003, p. 156-157, 160. 88 Here we dearly have the first two terms of the triad remaining procession-

reversion.

DEM!UHGY ACCOHD!NG TO PLOT!NUS 93

Then however, Plotinus retracts this identiflcation, grammatically ob-vious"9 as .it may be:

Plato seems, nevertheless, to be making, obscurely, the planning prin-

ciple ('to owvoou~tevov) something other than those two. (1,23-24)

Instead of having just two aspects of intellect, the intellect at rest and the

seeing activity proceeding from it, we now have a third pnnciple, that which

plans. Plotinus informs us that some think that these three90 the livmg being-that-is, intellect, and the planner are one.

As Plotinus has already discussed the first two, he now focuses on that which plans to construct and make and to divide in parts the things seen by the intellect in the Living Being. Its activities are explicated as plan-

ning (i'n

94 JAN OPSOMER

is true of planning. 1his "planning"," deliberating" or" discursive thinking"

is not the work of intellect, but of soul, for soul has a divided activity in a

divided nature (a free interpretation of Tim. 35A).94 Il is remarkable and not untypical of either Plotinus or other Platonists, to name discursive thought as the activity proper to soul when it comes to distinguishing it from intel-lect, but to deny this of the (world) soul, when its divine nature needs to be

stressed. This text gives some support to Porphyry's claim that Plotinus consid-

ered the world soul as a second demiurge, especially since Plotlnus in his initial paraphrase of the Ilmaeus passage supplies the word" demiurge" as the grammatical subject of the "planning", and concludes his interpreta-

tion with the suggestion that it is soul who does the planning. It is often assumed that Porphyry based his whole interpretation on this text, or per-haps on unpublished discussions with his master on the very same pas-sage."" I think, however, that he combined the views expressed in 3,9,1 with other texts of Plotinus, more particularly with the discussions reported in the Enn. 4,4, Difficulties about the soul II. For it is there that Plotinus says literally that the kosmopoiesis is twofold and discusses the soul as a maker - but reserves the term" demiurge" for intellect. There too Plotinus stresses the transcendence of the world soul - which may be why Porphyry char-acterises the soul-demiurge as an unparticipated souL" 7 lamblichus' and Proclus' condemnation of Porphyry's views as un-Piotinian appears to be unjustified for Lhe most part. In answer to Proclus exclaiming "show me a

passage in which Piotinus makes the soul the demiurge!" 98 Porphyl'y could simply have referred to Enn. 3,9,1.99 Only if Porphyry had maintained, which I take to be unlikely, that soul according to Plotinus is the true demiurge, he would have made a claim that disregards Plotinus' insistence on the view that intellect is the real demiurge.100

"'' Plotlnus adds that Plato says that division belongs to the third and is the third. 1his is an oblique reference to the three Kings of the second Letter, in which the soul takes the third place. Cf. Saffrey - \1\festerink 1974, p. xxx V XLIX.

'" Discursive thought is attributed to the soul, including the world soul, in a number of texts. See, e.g., 5,1, [w], 3,13; 4,16 (intellect does not think by seeking but by having); 4,19-21 (contrary to intellect, the soul thinks one after the other); 7.42 (the offspnng of intellect, i.e. soul, is 1:0 1\t.avooil[lEvov).

'"Cf. Dillon 1969, p. 63, n. 1. 97 Pace Dillon 1969, p. 68. "' Prod in Tim. 1,307AS '

9 See also n. 115. '0 Cf. n. 116.

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT!NUS 95

Ennead 3,9 [13], 1 was not Plotinus' last word on Tim. 39E.ln the antiGnostic treatise 2,9 [33], which is given the sub-title"" Against those who say that the demiurge of the ttfltl'erse is eFil and that the world is evil, he comes btlck

to this passage. Plotinus argues against the view that a fallen soul creates the world, and against the general idea that the origin of the world and the

world self are eviL He begins by clearly setting out the number and the na-ture of the principles from which this world flows: intellect IS unchanging; it is what it is, resting in stable, unmoved activity(02 without any sort of

decline, imitating its father (the One) as much as it the universal

soul is continuously contemplating intellect, "receives from there and gives to what comes after it, and is always illuminated as it illuminates." \vhile

managing body it remains itself untroubled (a:rrpant6v(l)c;),104 for its gov-ernment is not the result of discursive thinking (otK K 1havoim;J nor does

it have to set anything right (because things did not have a chance to go wrong).105 Demiurgy is not due to a being that turns from one thing to the

other and changes106 Crucial for Plotinus' argument is that the world soul does not produce as a result of a downward inclination, but on the contrary through its steady contemplation of intellect.

If it declined, it was obviously because it had forgotten the mtelligible realities; but if it forgot them, how is it the craftsman of the world'! For what is the source of its making, if not what it saw in the mtelligible world? (2,9 [33],

What is produced by the higher realities is produced tor ever, because these

principles give necessarily, because of what they are; and the fact that they

produce is good!"" Ihe higher principles are three in number, and should

101 Porph., Vita Plot. 24,5657 See also 3,2 [.p), 1,9. 102 2,9 [33), 1,29.; 8,21-25.

)AN OPSOMER

not be multiplied (3,1,1,12-2,2); 1his is one of the reasons why Plotinus ob-jects to the Gnostics' interpretation of Tim. J9:

And the making a plurality in the intelligible world, being, and intellect, and the maker different from intellect, and soul, is taken from the words

in the Timaeus: for Plato says, "1he maker of this universe thought that it should contain all the forms that intelligence discerns contained in the living being that truly is." But they did not understand, and took it to mean that there is one mind which contains in it in repose all reali-ties, and another mind different from it which contemplates them, and another which plans but often they have soul as the maker instead of the planning mind- and they think that this is the maker according to Plato, being a long way from knowing who the maker is. (2,9 [33], 6,14-24)

1he Gnostics whose views Plotinus is here discussing obviously read Plato. They, too, discerned three entities in Tim. 397-9: either three intellects

a possibility not mentioned in 3,9,1 or two intellects and a souL Just like he did in 3,9,1, but this time in stronger terms, Plotinus rejects the no-tion of a real distinction between an intellect at rest and an intellect that

would somehow be in motion.109 \Vhat he finds offensive is not so much

the fact itself that the Gnostics attribute a demiurgic function to a soul (the alternative version, that of three intellects, is equally objectionable), but

rather that they make soul the demiurge; but even worse is the fact that they think this soul is subjected to passions, and creates after some fall (6,55-62; 7,11-14). Moreover the Gnostics are mistaken in their view that there was a

temporal beginning to the making, and that the maker of the world made things in succession and is himself subject to change.no Against his oppo-nents Plotinus emphasises that "the image has to exist, necessarily, not as the result of thought and contrivance."111 The Gnostic account of demiurgy is rather careless about details and lacks consistency. T11ey tend to multiply

the number of principles involved and remain vague about precise relations among them. 1his, however, should not concern us here.112

'""See also 2,9 (33), 1,26-27; and 5,9 [s), 9,6-8 (intellect is identical with the para-digm, to which refers the expression ev t{il o tcrn ~(i)ov, taken trom Tim. 398).

l!O 2,9 [33], 8,25-111 2,9 1331. 8,20-21. 112 Cf. Brehier 1924, p. 105-107; Rolotf 1970, p. 18

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT! NUS 97

Plotinus' "Makers" Plotinus does not seem to reject the notion of the world soul that is demiur-gically active- although he usually reserves the tetm "demiurge" for intei-

lect and calls soul a "maker" instead. As we have seen, Plotinus in 4.4 [28] first distinguishes between two principles of kosmopoiesis, the first being

the demiurge, the second the world soul. Both are called Zeus. Then Plo-tinus differentiates various stages of kosmopoiesis within the realm of soul, most importantly betweer1 the world soul and r1ature. 'TI1e activity of both world soul and nature is called Jtmi:v, yet both are motionless, as can be concluded from 3,8 [30]. What Plotinus wants to deny is the idea of the soul as the real demiurge, acting on its own initiative, having turned away from the steady contemplation of intellect and relying instead on deliberation.

T11is concern becomes very clear in the classic text on the three hypos-tases, Enn. 5,1 [w]. In order to make the soul aware of its divine origins, it should remind itself of its own works. Soul makes all things alive, breathing life into them. T11e soul of the all orders the world (2,5-6), is present every-where and assimilates itself to its father, who begat it in its unity and uni-versality (2,37-38). T11e father of soul, of whom soul is the image, is intellect (3,7; 20-21). In "the myths about the gods", intellect is called Kronos (4,9; 7,33), which is why soul, its offspring, is Zeus (7,36-37). Before Zeus is born,

Kronos contains everything within himself, and in this way is full and in-tellect in satiety (7,34-35). Intellect is the "cause" or "craftsman". Above in-tellect thrones the One, that in a sense generates intellect (7,5). 'TI1e One is therefore called "the father of the cause" (8,4-8). In other words, of the

three principles, who all generate an offspring, the One and intellect are both called fathers;m intellect is the true demiurge, but the soul too pro-duces.114

T11is is confirmed by other passages: the soul is assigned a demiurgic function,115 but ultimately it is intellect that is the true demiurge.l!6 lhe world is created by intellect through the intermediary of the soul. Whether that gives us the right to call the soul a demiurge is of no great concern.

113 Cf. Montet 2000, p. 214: "la relation de paternite [.--) illustre en effet aussi bien le rapport du Premier a ce qui le suit que la relation de !'Intellect a ce qui de-pend de lui."

"" 'lhe term maker is sometimes also used of the One. Cf. n. 8o_ 115 In addition to the passages examined in the text. one could refer to 2,4 [12],

10,35 (the soul imposing forms); 2,9 (33], 18,16; 5,1 [w], 10,28; s.8 [31), 2,31-32. 116 2,1 [40], s,s-6 (the world soul follows upon the demiurge); 2,3 [52], 18,15; 5,1

[10], 8,s; 5.9 [s], 3,2526 (vouv 1t0t1111\V ovuoc; Ked 01Htl0Upy6v): 5.19-21. In 2,4 [n]. 7,2-9 Anaxagoras' vouc; is described as being the demmrge.

fAN OPSOMER

What IS much more important for Plotinus is that we realise that the soul

can have this function only because of its uninterrupted contemplation of

intellect. The act of creation is single and constitutes a whole. It involves no deliberating, calculating or planning. Without temporal beginning, crea-tion happens instantaneouslyn7

What Plotinus criticizes is not so much the Timaeus, as too literal an interpretation of this dialogue. Of course one should not believe that gods use hands and feet, but neither that they plan and calculate. The entire ac-count of the demiurge should be taken metaphorically: no deliberation was involved at any stage.118 Timaeus' account has the status of a 'hypothesis', in that for the sake of exposition god is said to generate and make things in succession and as a result of deliberation, whereas in reality they are

contained eternally in the spiritual realm; their coming to be is likewise perpetual and not a matter of this after that119 'l11e creation of the world

does not take place in time, nor does it happen in steps.

Plotinus was well aware of the fact that the Timaeus is a dialogue that can easily be misunderstood.120 As D. O'Meara (1993, p. 73) has pointed

out, this problem had been exacerbated by the Gnostic belief that an im-

perfect (i.e. evil) world was produced by an imperfect cosmic demiurge. The Gnostic reading of the Timaeus, claims Plotinus, is a perverse one. 1he problem, however, lies deeper. L. Brisson and F. Schroeder have already drawn the attentiOn to the fact that the demiurgic model does not make a good combination with a derivation system. Plotinus was aware of this

difficulty, and tried to soften the problem by stressing the transcendence of the spiritual principles. They produce in an immobile way, thanks to the powers they receive from the proximately higher leveL The transcendence

of each principle is saved at the cost of the lower entities, and th1s procedure

117 s.s [18], 7,1-17. na Evidently this is true for intellect as welL See, in addition to 4A !28], 10,4.'6

(cf supra), 3,2 [47], 1,34

DEMIURGY ACCORDING TO PLOT I NUS 99

is repeated down to the level of nature. 'TI1is does not make the problem go away, however. At best, it is pushed out of sight.

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ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

DE WULF-MANSION CENTRE

Series 1

XXXIV

The De Wulf-Mansion Centre deals with research in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy at the Philosophy Institute of the Catholic University of Leuven (K. U. Leuven),

Kardmaa! Mercierplein 2, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium).

PLATONS TIMAIOS

ALS GRUNDTEXT DER KOSMOI.OGIE

IN SPATANTIKE, J\11TTELALTER

UND RENAISSANCE

PLATO'S TIMAEUS

AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF COSl\tlOLOGY

IN LATE ANTIQUITY, THE MIDDLE AGES

AND RENAISSANCE

Edited by Thomas LEINKAUF and Carlos STEEL

LEUVEN UNIVERSITY PRESS 2005